1991 Congressional HearingsIntelligence and Security
1991 Congressional Hearings
STATEMENT OF JOHN C. TUCK
UNDER SECRETARY OF ENERGY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
before the
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
DOE's NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ROLE
April 24, 1991
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before your
Subcommittee today to discuss the role of the Department of Energy
(DOE) in performing its nuclear nonproliferation responsibilities,
including the interaction between DOE and other U.S. Government
agencies and international organizations.
As you requested in your letter of April 10, 1991, I will direct my
remarks primarily to the Department's role in performing its
nuclear nonproliferation responsibilities.
As President Bush stated in his first State of the Union message,
"The spread of nuclear weapons must be stopped .... Our diplomacy
must work every day against the proliferation of nuclear weapons."
This has been the policy of every President since the advent of
nuclear weapons on August 6, 1945. The implementation of this
policy has never been so evident as with the actions taken with
regard to Iraq in the past few months. The conditions which the
U.S. Government insisted that Iraq accept for a permanent
ceasefire include several specifically designed to halt and
reverse Iraq's efforts to develop and produce nuclear, chemical,
or biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them. Iraq's
Scud missile attacks on Saudi Arabia and Israel were a reminder
that these could have been launched with warheads other than high
explosives. If Iraq's nuclear and chemical/biological and missile
programs were allowed to proceed unchallenged, other countries
could be the target of such an aggressive regime within the next
decade.
The Department, under the direction of Secretary Watkins, is firmly
committed to President Bush's goal of stopping nuclear proliferation
and we take our responsibilities in this area very seriously. Because
we recognize that this goal is one of our most difficult challenges,
DOE has, in cooperation with other interested agencies, undertaken
major efforts to achieve it. First let me cover recent organizational
changes initiated by Admiral Watkins before I discuss DOE's
nonproliferation role.
RECENT REORGANIZATION ACTIVITIES: At the time of his appointment
as Secretary of Energy in March 1989, it was immediately apparent
to Admiral Watkins that the general organizational and management
responsibilities of the Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Defense Programs were too far-reaching and complex for one
individual to oversee. The Admiral recognized that in order to
establish better downsize the overall role and responsibilities of
the ASDP to include management and accountability of this office,
it would be necessary to only the national security related
functions of Nuclear Weapons Research, Development and Production,
Nuclear Materials Production, and Arms Control and Verification.
Admiral Watkins also became concerned with a number of issues
related to DOE's intelligence program as well as the status of
safeguards and security throughout the complex. This caused him
to take two separate actions to address these matters.
First, he asked retired Rear Admiral Sumner Shapiro, formerly Chief
of Naval Intelligence, who had completed a comprehensive study of
DOE's intelligence programs in April 1988, to once again evaluate
the program and provide his recommendations for setting a new
direction.
Second, he commissioned a study conducted by retired Army Major
General James E. Freeze to review the broad area of safeguards and
security.
Based on the findings and recommendations resulting from those
studies the Secretary directed organizational realignments to
clarify and strengthen accountability and responsibility for
intelligence and safeguards and security related activities while
concurrently reducing the span of control for the overburdened
Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs.
On April 6, 1990, Secretary. Watkins transferred DOE's intelligence
programs from the Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs into a
newly created Office of Intelligence headed by the Honorable
Robert W. Daniel, Jr. And, on April 1, 1991, the Secretary
established an Office of Security Affairs whose primary
responsibilities include the safeguards and security throughout
DOE and the classification and protection of Restricted Data and
national security related information entrusted to the Department.
These functions will now report directly to my office.
On a broader front, Admiral Watkins was concerned by the
Department's lack of a single, high-level individual who could
serve him as a scientific and technical advisor. Crosscutting
issues that he felt were not being adequately addressed included:
o the overall health of the DOE National Laboratory system,
and, in particular, the effectiveness of Laboratory
efforts for both DOE sponsors and sponsors in other
agencies of the Federal government;
o priority setting and integration among DOE research
programs; and
o the overall vigor and direction of the Department's
technology transfer program.
To obtain impartial advice on all three areas, Admiral Watkins will
soon formally establish a Department-wide Science and Technology
Advisor, with Deputy Science and Technology Advisors for major
portions of the Department's R&D program--both for defense and
civilian applications. One key feature of this reorganization will
be the implementation to a Director of Technology Utilization
under the assignment of coordination of DOE technology transfer
policy and Science and Technology Advisor. This position will
promote the coherence of the overall Department program in support
of technology transfer.
To improve the nuclear nonproliferation posture of the Department,
on April 1, 1991, Secretary Watkins, transferred the Technology
Policy Division's export control and nonproliferation
responsibilities to the Office of Arms Control in Defense
Programs. This, I believe, is the first step in an evolving
process to combine the various nonproliferation activities and
responsibilities within one office reaction to any one event but
that the Secretary has had this issue within the Department.
It should also be noted that this is not a under consideration
since the Fall of 1989. The export control and associated nuclear
nonproliferation functions now complement those responsibilities
of the Arms Control Office relating to the control of missile,
chemical, and biological weapons and verification technology.
DOE's ROLE IN NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION ACTIVITIES
INTERAGENCY NONPROLIFERATION ACTIVITIES: U.S. nonproliferation
policy and initiatives are developed by an interagency group
composed primarily of representatives from the Department of
Energy, the Department of State, the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency the Department of Defense and the Department of Commerce.
These agencies are represented on the Nonproliferation Policy
Coordinating Committee which is chaired by the Department of
State.
EXPORT CONTROLS: Most of the Department's export control activities
are based on two statutory provisions: Section 57b of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 and Section 309(c) of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act of 1978.
Section 57b of the Atomic Energy Act requires that U.S. firms or
individuals intending to engage, directly or indirectly, in the
production of special nuclear material outside the United States
obtain the authorization of the Secretary of Energy. The Federal
regulations that implement this statutory requirement appear as 10
CFR Part 810. Because of the significance of this responsibility,
the Atomic Energy Act does not permit the Secretary of Energy to
delegate the authorizing function.
At the present time, U.S. persons intending to engage in
activities falling within the scope of 10 CFR Part 810 must
submit an application to the Department of Energy's Office of
Defense Programs. A DOE staff analysis and a proposed
recommendation to the Secretary are circulated to the Department
of State for concurrence and to the Departments of Defense and
Commerce, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission for their views. Only after the other
agencies have been consulted does the Secretary determine whether
or not to authorize the activity.
I might mention that we have had only one Part 810 case for Iraq in
recent years. This was in 1990 and involved a U.S. company that had
been asked to present a training course at the Tuwaitha Nuclear
Research Center. On July 13, 1990, DOE staff informed the applicant
that because the proposed activity was contrary to existing policy,
they were unable to recommend approval to the Secretary.
Section 309 (c) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act requires the
Department of Commerce to control dual-use exports of potential
nuclear concern. On June 9, 1978, the Departments of State,
Energy, and Commerce jointly published "Procedures Established
Pursuant to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978," to jointly
establish and maintain a list of such export items, known as the
Nuclear Referral List. Whenever Commerce receives an application
to export an item on refers the application to DOE for a review
and recommendation. In the Nuclear Referral List to a country of
proliferation concern, it keeping the list up to date and in
making reviews, the Department of Commerce relies extensively on
the technical experts within the Department as well as its
contractor facilities to assess the significance of the technology
involved, its value to a would-be nuclear proliferant, and the
ease and likelihood of its diversion to a clandestine nuclear
program.
Whenever DOE's review of dual -use cases raises a potential
proliferation concern, DOE refers the case to the Subgroup on
Nuclear Export Coordination (SNEC), an interagency forum mandated
by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. The Department of State
chairs the Subgroup and DOE serves as the Secretariat. Other
members of the Subgroup on Nuclear Export Coordination are
the Departments of Defense and Commerce, the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The
Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency and the
Defense Intelligence Agency have observer status.
INTERNATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION ACTIVITIES: In order to control
proliferation of nuclear weapons, a viable and effective
international nonproliferation regime must be in place. The two
major components of such a regime are the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). To
monitor compliance with NPT provisions, the Treaty provides for
the application of international safeguards by the International
Atomic Energy Agency. safeguards system and technical assistance
activities, to keep IAEA a The Department provides and coordinates
support for the IAEA, its strong viable organization and to
maintain and monitor effectiveness of IAEA safeguards.
The Department also participates in varied bilateral and
multilateral activities with other countries to promote and
strengthen international nonproliferation activities including
control of exports by supplier countries. In this regard, DOE has
been an active participant in various international export control
mechanisms -- including the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral
Export Controls (COCOM), the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear
Suppliers Group.
COCOM is comprised of our NATO allies, minus Iceland, plus Japan
and Australia. COCOM members agree to control exports of strategic
significance to the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China,
and their allies. DOE, along with the other agencies, provides the
technical and policy support to the Department of State in
formulating COCOM's Industrial List (IL) of dual-use commodities;
DOE provides the principal support in formulating COCOM's
International Atomic Energy List (AEL) which describes nuclear
materials, equipment, and technologies considered to be of
strategic significance.
The Zangger Committee, based in Vienna, Austria, implements Article
III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which prohibits the
export of specially designed equipment or material used in the
production of special nuclear material unless under International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The Committee has
developed a so-called "trigger list" of items that trigger the
mandatory implementation of IAEA safeguards to ensure peaceful
use.
DOE, in conjunction with the Department of State and other
agencies, has initiated the upgrade of the "trigger list" for the
control of gas centrifuge and gaseous diffusion enrichment and
reprocessing components. DOE has also developed and published a
guide on gaseous diffusion and gas centrifuge equipment to assist
officials in this and other countries in enforcing export control
laws based on the Zangger "trigger list."
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) -- of which France is a member --
was formed at the initiative of the United States and in response
to the Indian nuclear explosion in 1974. The aim was to address
the need for more comprehensive guidelines for control of exports
of nuclear technology. The Zangger list controls only equipment
and material especially designed for the production of special
nuclear material. It does not address technology, nor does it
address dual-use components that can contribute to a nuclear
explosive.
Last year, the U.S. Government began a series of bilateral
discussions with other countries to lay the groundwork for
establishing an International Dual-Use List of items that all
supplier countries should control from a nuclear proliferation
standpoint. These bilateral discussions led to a meeting of 26
nuclear supplier countries in March in The Hague at which there
was a clear consensus that such an International Dual-Use List
should be adopted.
Allow me to note that the International Dual-Use List effort traces
back to an initiative launched in March 1990 by the Department of
Energy. And, drawing on the expertise of the DOE nuclear weapons
laboratories, DOE developed a draft list that the U.S. Government
is circulating to the other supplier countries. DOE also is
participating DOE-drafted U.S. Government list to form the basis
of these in the bilateral and multilateral meetings and we expect
the discussions.
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT: Intelligence support is key to the success
of our nonproliferation actions. The Department of Energy's
national laboratory complex provides much of the technical
undergirding for the U.S. Intelligence Community's extensive
research and analysis on nuclear proliferation. For over fifteen
years DOE Intelligence and its national laboratory resources have
been leaders in the establishment and development of the
proliferation intelligence program, in constant agencies.
Resources have been arrayed in direct support of numerous and
close coordination with all U.S. Intelligence Community member
U.S. nonproliferation policy determinations and enforcement
activities.
DOE's intelligence capabilities and performance in the nuclear
proliferation field are second to none and have been highly
supportive of this Department's senior management as it carries
out its critical nuclear nonproliferation responsibilities. As I
mentioned in my introduction, DOE's intelligence program was
removed from Defense Programs a year ago to restore the balance
between intelligence support for defense and for non-defense
programs. Additionally, we brought in a new management team, under
the direction of Mr. Daniel, to augment the program's
responsiveness to Secretary Watkins' priorities, guidance and
requirements. Additional resources have also been committed to
this important function.
This transition was effected without disruption to our
proliferation intelligence program which, I wish to emphasize, has
consistently kept our senior management informed about foreign
nuclear programs of proliferation concern. For example, the Iraqi
nuclear program has been under close scrutiny for a very long
time, and in my two-year tenure as Under Secretary the DOE
intelligence program has been a U.S. Government leader in properly
characterizing Iraqi nuclear capabilities and associated with the
Iraqi nuclear program and furnished this data to intentions. As
another example, we identified and prioritized targets the
Department of Defense in support of Operation Desert Storm.
DOE's Role in UN Military Denuclearization Plan for Iraq: One of
the most recent significant international non-proliferation
actions taken by the Department was directed at Iraq. In the wake
of the Gulf War, DOE's nonproliferation community played a
critical role in formulating the U.S. Government's plan for
eliminating Iraq's future capability to intra-departmental
cooperation, the Department organized a Task Force develop nuclear
weapons. In an outstanding example of that, in two-and-a-half
days of intensive effort, prepared a detailed assessment of what
it would take in terms of personnel, time, and money to ensure
Iraq's military denuclearization well into the future. Admiral
Watkins recently wrote to Secretary of State Baker, on April 12,
1991, that he had "...taken steps to ensure that the Department of
Energy's considerable intelligence and technical resources stand
ready to support the United Nations-mandated demilitarization of
Iraq's nuclear program." A DOE task force is assisting Secretary
Baker under the direction of Dr. Victor Alessi, Director of Arms
Control.
SUMMARY
DOE, led by Admiral Watkins, continues to play a very important
role in both U.S. Government and international efforts to prevent
the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. We take our
responsibilities very seriously and are continuously reviewing our
performance to look for ways in which to improve.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I would be pleased to
answer any questions that you or other members of the Subcommittee
may have.