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The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The bill clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Oregon [Mr. Hatfield], for himself, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Exon, Mr. Levin, and Mr. Wellstone, proposes an amendment numbered 2833.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 82, strike out line 19 and all that follows through page 83, line 5, and insert in lieu thereof the following:
Sec. 507. (a) Hereafter, funds made available by this Act or any other Act for fiscal year 1993 or for any other fiscal year may be available for conducting a test of a nuclear explosive device only if the conduct of that test is permitted in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(b) No test of a nuclear weapon may be conducted before July 1, 1993.
(c) On and after July 1, 1993, a test of a nuclear weapon may be conducted--
(1) on if--
(A) the President has submitted the annual report required under subsection (d);
(B) 90 days have elapsed after the submittal of that report in accordance with that subsection; and
(C) Congress has not agreed to a joint resolution described in subsection (d)(3) within that 90-day period; and
(2) only if the test is conducted during the period covered by the report.
(d)(1) Not later than March 1 of each year beginning after 1992, the President shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives, in classified and unclassified forms, a report containing the following matters:
(A) A schedule for resumption of the Nuclear Testing Talks with Russia.
(B) A plan for achieving a multilateral comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear weapons on or before September 30, 1996.
(C) An assessment of the number and type of nuclear warheads that will remain in the United States stockpile of active nuclear weapons on September 30, 1996.
(D) For each fiscal year after fiscal year 1992, an assessment of the number and type of nuclear warheads that will remain in the United States stockpile of nuclear weapons and that--
(i) will not be in the United States stockpile of active nuclear weapons;
(ii) will remain under the control of the Department of Defense; and
(iii) will not be transferred to the Department of Energy for dismantlement.
(E) A description of the safety features of each warhead that is covered by an assessment referred to in subparagraph (C) or (D).
(F) A plan for installing one or more modern safety features in each warhead identified in the assessment referred to in subparagraph (C) that does not have any such feature and, as determined after an analysis of the costs and benefits of installing such feature or features in the warhead, should have one or more of such features.
(G) An assessment of the number and type of nuclear weapon tests, not to exceed 5 tests in any period covered by an annual report under this paragraph and a total of 15 tests in the 4-fiscal year period beginning with fiscal year 1993, that are necessary in order to ensure the safety of each nuclear warhead in which one or more modern safety features are installed pursuant to the plan referred to in subparagraph (F).
(H) A schedule, in accordance with subparagraph (G), for conducting at the Nevada test site, each of the tests enumerated in the assessment pursuant to subparagraph (G).
(2) The first annual report shall cover the period beginning on the date on which a resumption of testing of nuclear weapons is permitted under subsection (c) and ending on September 30, 1994. Each annual report thereafter shall cover the fiscal year following the fiscal year in which the report is submitted.
(3) For the purposes of paragraph (1), `joint resolution' means only a joint resolution introduced after the date on which the Committees referred to in that paragraph receive the report required by that paragraph the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: `The Congress disapproves the report of the President on nuclear weapons testing, dated .' (the blank space being appropriately filled in).
(4) No report is required under this subsection after 1996.
(e)(1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), during a period covered by an annual report submitted pursuant to subsection (d), nuclear weapons may be tested only as follows:
(A) Only those nuclear warheads in which a modern safety feature has been installed pursuant to the plan referred to in subsection (d)(1)(F) may be tested.
(B) Only the number and types of tests specified in the report pursuant to subsection (d)(1)(G) may be conducted.
(2)(A) One test of the reliability of a nuclear weapon other than one referred to in paragraph (1)(A) may be conducted during any period covered by an annual report, but only if--
(i) within the first 60 days after the beginning of that period, the President certifies to Congress that it is vital to the national security interests of the United States to test the reliability of such a nuclear weapon; and
(ii) within the 60-day period beginning on the date that Congress receives the certification, Congress does not agree to a joint resolution described in subparagraph (B).
(B) For the purposes of subparagraph (A), `joint resolution' means only a joint resolution introduced after the date on which the Congress receives the certification referred to in that subparagraph the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: `The Congress disapproves the testing of a nuclear weapon covered by the certification of the President dated ------.' (the blank space being appropriately filled in.')
(3) The President may authorize the United Kingdom to conduct in the United States, within a period covered by an annual report, one test of a nuclear weapon if the President determines that it is in the national interests of the United States to do so. Such a test shall be considered as one of the tests within the maximum number of tests that the United States is permitted to conduct during that period under paragraph (1)(B).
(f) No underground test of nuclear weapons may be conducted by the United States after September 30, 1996.
(g) In the computation of the 90-day period referred to in subsection (c)(1) and the 60-day period referred to in subsection (e)(2)(A)(ii), the days on which either House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than 3 days to a day certain shall be excluded.
(h) In this section, the term `modern safety feature' means any of the following features:
(1) An insensitive high explosive (IHE).
(2) Fire resistant pits (FRP).
(3) An enhanced detonation safety (ENDS) system.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, one of the chief cosponsors, Senator Exon, chairman of the Subcommittee of Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence, has arrived and would like to be able to speak, and I would at this time to yield the floor. I see my comanager of the bill, Senator Johnston, also wishing to take the floor. I ask if we could give Senator Exon an idea of how much time----
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Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I would like to speak for a short period of time. I hope Senator Exon will remain here because I want to express some thoughts and concerns to which I wish he as well as the Senator from Oregon would respond. That is the reason I would like to speak before he speaks, because I would like to have him speak to that.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Louisiana [Mr. Johnston] is recognized.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I yield myself 10 minutes.
I would like to sharpen the issue here, if I may. The House bill contained a moratorium on any nuclear testing for this year for any purpose unless the former Soviet Union tested their weapons. That is the way the energy and water appropriations bill, which contains the nuclear testing money each year, came to us from the House. So our committee had to respond to that moratorium.
What we did in the Appropriations Committee is to provide a moratorium for any purpose save safety. The language which we used was as follows:
None of the funds made available in this act may be used for any nuclear testing unless the President certifies to Congress that it is in the national interest to conduct an explosive weapons test or tests for the purposes of safety of nuclear weapons. Such certification shall be provided in advance of each test and contain an explanation of the purposes and reasons for the test. For classified measures the certification may be transmitted in a classified annex.
Mr. President, it is my understanding that something like four or maybe five tests are planned this year and that I think I am correct in saying all are for safety save one test. So I think it is important, therefore, to zero in on this question of safety.
Why is testing of nuclear weapons so important? It is so important because nuclear weapons, even today's nuclear weapons, represent a great danger to the American public and to the world because of the lack of safety of their devices. As the sheet from the national lab, the Lawrence Livermore Lab which conducts these tests, states:
Nuclear weapons that are accident proof, that remain safe under all credible accident conditions, will be needed for the reduced stockpile envisioned for the 21st century. Most of the currently projected reduced stockpile of nuclear weapons will not have even the modern safety features available with existing technology, insensitive high explosives that is nearly impossible to detonate accidentally, and fire resistant pits to contain plutonium in a fuel fire. We need to improve the safety of the stockpile to these current standards promptly. But this requires nuclear testing of specific designs.
Further, we need to design warheads that are truly accident proof by utilizing a `binary nuclear weapons' concept, in which the high explosive and plutonium are physically separated until after launch. Only such weapons can be made impervious to all credible accidents.
So our situation now is that most of our nuclear weapons in the inventory are not safe. They do not contain the insensitive high explosives, the fire resistant pits, and they certainly do not contain the binary nuclear weapons concept that would protect them.
Why is this important? We have been very, very lucky in this country. I have here a description of 32 different nuclear weapons accidents--32. It so happens that none of these were very close.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have this report printed in the Record. It makes absolutely fascinating and hair-raising reading to realize how close to absolute disaster we came.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
Attahced are unclassified summaries describing the circumstances surrounding 32 accidents involving nuclear weapons. Also attached is the Department of Defense (DOD)/Department of Energy (DOE) definition of `accident' used in researching this project.
Twenty-six of these summaries were first released by the Air Force in 1977; another was prepared following the Titan II explosion in Arkansas in September 1980. These previously released summaries are marked with a figure `1'; in some cases they include new material made available as a result of more search.*
There never has been even a partial, inadvertent U.S. nuclear detonation despite the very severe stresses imposed upon the weapons involved in these accidents. All `detonations' reported in the summaries involved conventional high explosives (HE) only. Only two accidents, those at Palomares and Thule, resulted in a widespread dispersal of nuclear materials.
Nuclear weapons are never carried on training flights. Most of the aircraft accidents represented here occurred during logistic/ferry missions or airborne alert flights by Strategic Air Command (SAC) aircraft. Airborne alert was terminated in 1968 because of:
Accidents, particularly those at Palomares and Thule
The rising cost of maintaining a portion of the SAC bomber force constantly on airborne alert, and,
The advent of a responsive and survivable intercontinental ballistic missile force which relieved the manned bomber force of a part of its more time-sensitive responsibilities. (A portion of the SAC force remains on nuclear ground alert).
Although normal DOD policy is to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons or components, recently revised DOD Directive 5230.16 governing public affairs guidance allows for confirmation when required to protect public safety or as a means of reducing widespread public alarm. Therefore, in some of the events summarized here, confirmation of presence is not published. Except for Palomares and Thule, it is not possible to specify the location of the accidents that occurred overseas.
Most of the weapons systems involved in these accidents are no longer in the active inventory. Those include the B-29, B-36, B-47, B-50, B-58, C-124, F-100, and P-5M aircraft, and the Minuteman I missile.
With some early models of nuclear weapons, it was standard procedure during most operations to keep a capsule of nuclear material separate from the weapon for safety proposes. While a weapon with the capsule removed did contain a quantity of natural (not enriched) uranium with an extremely low level of radioactivity, accidental detonation of the HE element would cause neither a nuclear detonation nor contamination. Modern design incorporates improved redundant safety features to insure that a nuclear explosion does not occur as the result of an accident.
This list of accidents was compiled by DOD/DOE researchers during December 1980-January 1981. The researchers reviewed all available records of the military services and DOE, applying current definition to determine if an event warranted categorization as an accident.
For example, one event not covered by these narratives was included in a `Chronology of Nuclear Accident Statements', released by DOD in 1968:
The researchers found, however, that only a small retrorocket on the missile had accidentally fired. The missile and its warhead were not damaged. That event does not warrant inclusion in a list of accidents involving nuclear weapons.
Another event from the 1968 list, involving a U.S. Navy Terrier missile (January 1966; NAS Mayport, Florida) was not considered to be an accident, but has been categorized as a significant incident. In that incident, a nuclear warhead separated from the missile, and fell about eight feet. The warhead was dented; no other damage occurred.
The other events in this list, that were also cited in the 1968 `Chronology * * *', are identified with a figure `2'.
The events outlined in the attached narratives involved operational weapons, nuclear materials, aircraft and/or missiles under control of the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, or the Atomic Energy Commission (a DOE predecessor agency). The U.S. Army has never experienced an event serious enough to warrant inclusion in a list of accidents involving nuclear weapons. The U.S. Marine Corps does not have custody of nuclear weapons in peacetime and has experienced no accidents of significant incidents involving them.
To the best of our knowledge, this list is complete. Reporting requirements varied among the Services, (particularly in the earlier period covered by these narratives) so it is possible, but not likely, that an earlier accident has gone unreported here. All later events, however, have been evaluated and are included if they fall within the established definition of an accident.
An `accident involving nuclear weapons' is defined as--
An unexpected event involving nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons components that results in any of the following:
Accidental or unauthorized launching, firing, or use, by U.S. forces or supported allied forces, of a nuclear-capable weapon system which could create the risk of an outbreak of war.
Nuclear detonation.
Non-nuclear detonation or burning of a nuclear weapon or radioactive weapon component, including a fully assembled nuclear weapon, an unassembled nuclear weapon, or a radioactive nuclear weapon component.
Radioactive contamination.
Seizure, theft, or loss of a nuclear weapon or radioactive nuclear weapon component, including jettisoning.
Public hazard, actual or implied.
February 13, 1950/B-36/Pacific Ocean, off Coast of British Columbia:
The B-36 was enroute from Eilson AFB to Carswell AFB on a simulated combat profile mission. The weapon aboard the aircraft had a dummy capsule installed. After six hours of flight, the aircraft developed serious mechanical difficulties, making it necessary to shut down three engines. The aircraft was at 12,000 feet altitude. Icing conditions complicated the emergency and level flight could not be maintained. The aircraft headed out over the Pacific Ocean and dropped the weapon from 8,000 feet. A bright flash occurred on impact, followed by a sound and shock wave. Only the weapon's high explosive material detonated. The aircraft was then flown over Princess Royal Island where the crew bailed out. The aircraft wreckage was later found don Vancouver Island. (*1)
April 11, 1950 /B-29/ Manzano Base, New Mexico:
Aircraft departed Kirtland AFB at 9:30 p.m. and crashed into a mountain on Manzano Base approximately three minutes later, killing the crew. Detonators were installed in the bomb on board the aircraft. The bomb case was demolished and some high explosive (HE) material burned in the gasoline fire. Other pieces of unburned HE were scattered throughout the wreckage. Four spare detonators in their carrying cases were recovered undamaged. There were no contamination or recovery problems. The recovered components of the weapons were returned to the Atomic Energy Commission. Both the weapon and the capsule of the nuclear material were on board the aircraft but the capsule was not inserted for safety reasons. A nuclear detonation was not possible. (*1)
July 13, 1950 /B-50/ Lebanon Ohio:
The B-50 was on a training mission from Biggs AFB, Texas. The aircraft was flying at 7,000 feet on a clear day. Aircraft nosed down and flew into the ground killing four officers and twelve airmen. The high explosive portion of the weapon aboard detonated on impact. There was no nuclear capsule aboard the aircraft. (*1)
August 5, 1950 /B-29/ Fairfield/Suison AFB, California:
A B-29 carrying a weapon, but no capsule, experienced two runaway propellers and landing gear retraction difficulties on takeoff from Fairfield/Suison AFB (now Travis AFB). The aircraft attempted an emergency landing and crashed and burned. The fire was fought for 12-15 minutes before the weapon's high explosive material detonated. Nineteen crew members and rescue personnel were killed in the crash and/or the resulting detonation, including General Travis. (*1)
November 10, 1950 /B-50/ Over Water, outside United States:
Because of an in-flight aircraft emergency, a weapon containing no capsule of nuclear material was jettisoned over water from an altitude of 10,500 feet. A high-explosive detonation was observed.
March 10, 1956 /B-47/ Mediterranean Sea:
The aircraft was one of a flight of four scheduled for non-stop deployment from MacDill AFB to an overseas air base. Takeoff from MacDill and first refueling was normal. The second refueling point was over the Mediterranean Sea. In preparation for this, the flight penetrated solid cloud formation to descend to the refueling level of 14,000 feet. Base of the clouds was 14,000 feet and visibility was poor. The aircraft, carrying two nuclear capsules in carrying cases, never made contact with the tanker.
An extensive search failed to locate any traces of the missing aircraft or crew. No weapons were aboard the aircraft; only two capsules of nuclear weapons material in carrying cases. A nuclear detonation was not possible. (*1)
July 27, 1956 /B-47/ Overseas Base:
A B-47 aircraft with no weapons aboard was on a routine training mission making a touch and go landing when the aircraft suddenly went out of control and slid off the runway, crashing into a storage igloo containing several nuclear weapons. The bombs did not burn or detonate. There were no contamination or cleanup problems. The damaged weapons and components were returned to the Atomic Energy Commission. The weapons that were involved were in storage configuration. No capsules of nuclear materials were in the weapons or present in the building. (*1)
May 27, 1957 /B-36/ Kirtland AFB, New Mexico:
The aircraft was ferrying a weapon from Biggs AFB, Texas, to Kirtland AFB. At 11:50 a.m. MST, while approaching Kirtland at an altitude of 1,700 feet, the weapon dropped from the bomb bay taking the bomb doors with it. Weapon parachutes were deployed but apparently did not fully retard the fall because of the low altitude. The impact point was approximately 4.5 miles south of the Kirtland control tower and .3 miles west of the Sandia Base Reservation. The high explosive material detonated, completely destroying the weapon and making a crater approximately 25 feet in diameter and 12 feet deep. Fragments and debris were scattered as far as one mile from the impact point. The release mechanism locking pin was being removed at the time of release. (It was standard procedure at that time that the locking pin be removed during takeoff and landing to allow for emergency jettison of the weapon, if necessary). Recovery and cleanup operations were conducted by Field Command, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project. Radiological survey of the area disclosed no radioactivity beyond the lip of the crater at which point the level was 0.5 milliroentgens. There were no health or safety problems. Both the weapon and capsule were on board the aircraft but the capsule was not inserted for safety reasons. A nuclear detonation was not possible. (*1)
July 28, 1957/C-124/Atlantic Ocean:
Two weapons were jettisoned from a C-124 aircraft on July 28 off the east coast of the United States. There were three weapons and one nuclear capsule aboard the aircraft at the time. Nuclear components were not installed in the weapons. The C-124 aircraft was enroute from Dover AFB, Delaware when a loss of power from number one and two engines was experienced. Maximum power was applied to the remaining engines; however, level flight could not be maintained. At this point, the decision was made to jettison at 4,500 feet altitude. The second weapon was jettisoned at approximately 2,500 feet altitude. No detonation occurred from either weapons. Both weapons are presumed to have been damaged from impact with the ocean surface. Both weapons are presumed to have submerged almost instantly. The ocean varies in depth in the area of the jettisonings. The C-124 landed at an airfield in the vicinity of Atlantic City, New Jersey, with the remaining weapon and the nuclear capsule aboard. A search for the weapons or debris had negative results.(*1)
October 11, 1957/B-47/Homestead AFB, Florida:
The B-47 departed Homestead AFB shortly after midnight on a deployment mission. Shortly after liftoff one of the aircrafts outrigger tires exploded. The aircraft crashed in an uninhabited area approximately 3,800 feet from the end of the runway. The aircraft was carrying one weapon in ferry configuration in the bomb bay and one nuclear capsule in a carrying case in the crew compartment. The weapon was enveloped in flames and burned and smoldered for approximately four hours after which it was cooled with water. Two low order high explosive detonations occurred during the burning. The nuclear capsule and its carrying case were recovered intact and only slightly damaged by heat. Approximately one-half of the weapon remained. All major components were damaged but were identifiable and accounted for.(*1)
January 31, 1958/B-47/Overseas Base:
A B-47 with one weapon in strike configuration was making a simulated takeoff during an exercise alert. When the aircraft reached approximately 30 knots on the runway, the left rear wheel casting failed. The tail struck the runway and a fuel tank ruptured. The aircraft caught fire and burned for seven hours. Firemen fought the fire for the allotted ten minutes fire fighting time for high explosive contents of that weapon, then evacuated the area. The high explosive did not detonate, but there was some contamination in the immediate area of the crash. After the wreckage and the asphalt beneath it were removed and the runway washed down, no contamination was detected. One fire truck and one fireman's clothing showed slight alpha contamination until washed. Following the accident, exercise alerts were temporarily suspended and MDS B-47 wheels were checked for defects.(*1)
February 5, 1958/B-47/Savannah River, Georgia:
The B-47 was on a simulated combat mission that originated at Homestead AFB, Florida. While near Savannah, Georgia, the B-47 had a mid-air collision with a F-86 aircraft at 3:30 a.m. Following the collision, the B-47 made three attempts to land at Hunter AFB, Georgia, with a weapon aboard. Because of the condition of the aircraft, its airspeed could not be reduced enough to insure a safe landing. Therefore, the decision was made to jettison the weapon rather than expose Hunter AFB to the possibility of a high explosive detonation. A nuclear detonation was not possible since the nuclear capsule was not aboard the aircraft. The weapon was jettisoned into the water several miles from the mouth of the Savannah River (Georgia) in Wassaw Sound off Tybee Beach. The precise weapon impact point is unknown. The weapon was dropped from an altitude of approximately 7,200 feet at an aircraft speed of 180-190 knots. No detonation occurred. After jettison the B-47 landed safely. A three square mile area was searched using a ship with divers and underwater demolition team technicians using Galvanic drag and handheld sonar devices. The weapon was not found. The search was terminated April 16, 1958. The weapon was considered to be irretrievably lost. (*1; **2)
March 11, 1958/B-47/Florence, South Carolina:
On March 11, 1958 at 3:58 p.m. EST, a B-47E departed Hunter AFB, Georgia, as number three aircraft in a flight of four enroute to an overseas base. After leveling off at 15,000 feet, the aircraft accidentally jettisoned an unarmed nuclear weapon which impacted in a sparsely populated area 6 1/2 miles east of Florence, South Carolina. The bomb's high explosive material exploded on impact. The detonation caused property damage and several injuries on the ground. The aircraft returned to base without further incident. No capsule of nuclear materials was aboard the B-47 or installed in the weapon. (*1; **2)
November 4, 1958/B-47/Dyess AFB, Texas:
A B-47 caught fire on takeoff. Three crew members successfully ejected; one was killed when the aircraft crashed from an altitude of 1,500 feet. One nuclear weapon was aboard when the aircraft crashed. The resultant detonation of the high explosive made a crater 35 feet in diameter and six feet deep. Nuclear materials were recovered near the crash site. (*1; **2)
November 26, 1958/B-47/ Chennault AFB, Louisiana:
A B-47 caught fire on the ground. The single nuclear weapon on board was destroyed by the fire. Contamination was limited to the immediate vicinity of the weapon residue within the aircraft wreckage. (*1; **2)
January 18, 1959/F-100/ Pacific Base:
The aircraft was parked on a reveted hardstand in ground alert configuration. The external load consisted of a weapon on the left intermediate station and three fuel tanks (both inboard stations and the right intermediate station). When the starter button was depressed during a practice alert, an explosion and fire occurred when the external fuel tanks inadvertently jettisoned. Fire trucks at the scene put out the fire in about seven minutes. The capsule was not in the vicinity of the aircraft and was not involved in the accident. There were no contamination or cleanup problems.(*1)
July 6, 1959/C-124/ Barksdale AFB, Louisiana:
A C-124 on a nuclear logistics movement mission crashed on take-off. The aircraft was destroyed by fire which also destroyed one weapon. No nuclear or high explosive detonation occurred--safety devices functioned as designed. Limited contamination was present over a very small area immediately below the destroyed weapon. This contamination did not hamper rescue or fire fighting operations.(*1; **2)
September 25, 1959 /P-5M/ Off Whidbey Island, Washington:
A U.S. Navy P-5M aircraft ditched in Puget Sound off Whidbey Island, Washington. It was carrying an unarmed nuclear antisubmarine weapon containing no nuclear material. The weapon was not recovered.
October 15, 1959 /B-S2/KC-135/ Hardinsberg, Kentucky:
The B-52 departed Columbus Air Force Base, Mississippi at 2:30 p.m. CST, October 15, 1959. This aircraft assumed the #2 position in a flight of two. The KC-135 departed Columbus Air Force Base at 5:33 p.m. CST as the #2 tanker aircraft in a flight of two scheduled to refuel the B-52s. Rendezvous for refueling was accomplished in the vicinity of Hardinsberg, Kentucky, at 32,000 feet. It was night, weather was clear, and there was no turbulence. Shortly after the B-52 began refueling from the KC-135, the two aircraft collided. The instructor pilot and pilot of the B-52 ejected, followed by the electronic warfare officer and the radar navigator. The co-pilot, navigator, instructor navigator, and tail gunner failed to leave the B-52. All four crewmembers in the KC-135 were fatally injured. The B-52's two unarmed nuclear weapons were recovered intact. One had been partially burned but this did not result in the dispersion of any nuclear material or other contamination. (*1; **2)
June 7, 1960 /BOMARC/ McGuire AFB, New Jersey:
A BOMARC air defense missile in ready storage condition (permitting launch in two minutes) was destroyed by explosion and fire after a high-pressure helium tank exploded and ruptured the missile's fuel tanks. The warhead was also destroyed by the fire although the high explosive did not detonate. Nuclear safety devices acted as designed. Contamination was restricted to an area immediately beneath the weapon and an adjacent elongated area approximately 100 feet long, caused by drainoff of firefighting water. (*1; **2)
January 24, 1961 /B-52/ Goldsboro, North Carolina:
During a B-52 airborne alert mission structural failure of the right wing resulted in two weapons separating from the aircraft during aircraft breakup at 2,000-10,000 feet altitude. One bomb parachute deployed and the weapon received little impact damage. The other bomb fell free and broke apart upon impact. No explosion occurred. Five of the eight crew members survived. A portion of one weapon, containing uranium, could not be recovered despite excavation in the water-logged farmland to a depth of 50 feet. The Air Force subsequently purchased an easement requiring permission for anyone to dig there. There is no detectable radiation and no hazard in the area. (*1; **2)
March 14, 1961/B-52/Yuba City, California:
A B-52 experienced failure of the crew compartment pressurization system forcing descent to 10,000 feet altitude. Increased fuel consumption caused fuel exhaustion before rendezvous with a tanker aircraft. The crew bailed out at 10,000 feet except for the aircraft commander who stayed with aircraft to 4,000 feet steering the plane away from a populated area. The two nuclear weapons on board were torn from the aircraft on ground impact. The high explosive did not detonate. Safety devices worked as designed, and there was no nuclear contamination.(*1; **2)
November 13, 1963/Atomic Energy Commission Storage Igloo/Medina Base, Texas:
An explosion involving 123,000 pounds of high explosive components of nuclear weapons caused minor injuries to three Atomic Energy Commission employees. There was little contamination from the nuclear components stored elsewhere in the building. The components were from obsolete weapons being disassembled.
January 13, 1964/B-52/Cumberland, Maryland:
A B-52D was enroute from Westover Air Force Base, Massachusetts, to its home base at Turner Air Force Base, Georgia. The crash occurred approximately 17 miles SW of Cumberland, Maryland. The aircraft was carrying two weapons. Both weapons were in a tactical ferry configuration (no mechanical or electrical connections had been made to the aircraft and the safing switches were in the `Safe' position). Prior to the crash, the pilot had requested a change in altitude because of severe air turbulence at 29,500 feet. The aircraft was cleared to climb to 33,000 feet. During the climb, the aircraft encountered violent air turbulence and aircraft structural failure subsequently occurred. Of the five aircrew members, only the pilot and co-pilot survived. The gunner and navigator ejected but died of exposure to sub-zero temperatures after successfully reaching the ground. The radar navigator did not eject and died upon aircraft impact. The crash site was an isolated mountainous and wooded area. The site had 14 inches of new snow covering the aircraft wreckage which was scattered over an area of approximately 100 yards square. The weather during the recover and cleanup operation involved extreme cold and gusty winds. Both weapons remained in the aircraft until it crashed and were relatively intact in the approximate center of the wreckage area.(*1; **2)
December 5, 1964/LGM 30B (Minuteman ICBM)/Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota:
The LGM 30B Minuteman I missile was on strategic alert at Launch Facility (LF) L-02, Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota. Two airmen were dispatched to the LF to repair the inner zone (IZ) security system. In the midst of their checkout of the IZ system, one retrorocket in the spacer below the Reentry Vehicle (RV) fired, causing the RV to fall about 75 feet to the floor of the silo. When the RV struck the bottom of the silo, the arming and fusing/altitude control subsystem containing the batteries was torn loose, thus removing all sources of power from the RV. The RV structure received considerable damage. All safety devices operated properly in that they did not sense the proper sequence of events to allow arming the warhead. There was no detonation or radioactive contamination.(*1)
December 8, 1964/B-58/Bunker Hill (Now Grissom) AFB, Indiana:
SAC aircraft were taxiing during an exercise alert. As one B-58 reached a position directly behind the aircraft on the runway ahead of it, the aircraft ahead brought advanced power. As a result of the combination of the jet blast from the aircraft ahead, the icy runway surface conditions, and the power applied to the aircraft while attempting to turn onto the runway, control was lost and the aircraft slid off the left hand side of the taxiway. The left main landing gear passed over a flush mounted taxiway light fixture and 10 feet farther along in its travel, grazed the left edge of a concrete light base. Ten feet farther, the left main landing gear struck a concrete electrical manhole box, and the aircraft caught on fire. When the aircraft came to rest, all three crew members aboard began abandoning the aircraft. The aircraft commander and defensive systems operator egressed with minor injuries. The navigator ejected in his escape capsule, which impacted 548 feet from the aircraft. He did not survive. Portions of the five nuclear weapons on board burned; contamination was limited to the immediate area of the crash and was subsequently removed.(*1)
October 11, 1965/C-124/Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio:
The aircraft was being refueled in preparation for a routine logistics mission when a fire occurred at the aft end of the refueling trailer. The fuselage of the aircraft, containing only components of nuclear weapons and a dummy training unit, was destroyed by fire. There were no casualties. The resultant radiation hazard was minimal. Minor contamination was found on the aircraft, cargo, and clothing of explosive ordnance disposal and fire fighting personnel, and was removed by normal cleaning.(*1)
December 5, 1965/A-4/At Sea, Pacific:
An A-4 aircraft loaded with one nuclear weapon rolled off the elevator of a U.S. aircraft carrier and fell into the sea. The pilot, aircraft, and weapon were lost. The incident occurred more than 500 miles from land.
January 17, 1966/B-52/KC-135/Palomares, Spain:
The B-52 and the KC-135 collided during a routine high altitude air refueling operation. Both aircraft crashed near Palomares, Spain. Four of the eleven crewmembers survived. The B-52 carried four nuclear weapons. One was recovered on the ground and on April 7, one was recovered from the sea. Explosive materials exploded on impact with the ground, releasing some radioactive materials. Approximately 1400 tons of slightly contaminated soil and vegetation were removed to the United States for storage at an approved site. Representatives of the Spanish government monitored the cleanup operation.(*1;**2)
January 21, 1968/B-52/Thule, Greenland:
A B-52 from Plattsburgh AFB, New York, crashed and burned some seven miles southwest of the runway at Thule AB, Greenland while approaching the base to land. Six of the seven crewmembers survived. The bomber carried four nuclear weapons, all of which were destroyed by fire. Some radioactive contamination occurred in the area of the crash, which was on the sea ice. Some 237,000 cubic feet of contaminated ice, snow and water, with crash debris, were removed to an approved storage site in the United States over the course of a four-month operation. Although an unknown amount of contamination was dispersed by the crash, environmental sampling showed normal readings in the area after the cleanup was completed. Representatives of the Danish government monitored the cleanup operations.(*1;**2)
Spring 1968/At Sea, Atlantic:
Details remain classified.
September 19, 1980/Titan II ICBM/Damascus, Arkansas:
During routine maintenance in a Titan II silo, an Air Force repairman dropped a heavy wrench socket, which rolled off a work platform and fell toward the bottom of the silo. The socket bounced and struck the missile, causing a leak from the pressurized fuel tank. The missile complex and the surrounding area were evacuated and a team of specialists was called in from Little Rock Air Force Base, the missile's main support base. About 8 1/2 hours after the initial puncture, fuel vapors within the silo ignited and exploded. The explosion fatally injured one member of the team. Twenty-one other USAF personnel were injured. The missile's reentry vehicle, which contained a nuclear warhead, was recovered intact. There was no radioactive contamination.(*.1)
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Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. President, one of these accidents was an accident at Grand Forks, ND, in 1980. This picture shows a B-52 on the runway, on a strip alert, which burned for 6 hours with nuclear weapons aboard.
These weapons on this B-52 did not contain insensitive high explosives. Or, to put it another way, they contained sensitive high explosives. Had this fire reached the high explosive part--keep in mind that the high explosive detonates the nuclear device. And the danger in this kind of accident is not from a nuclear explosion because in order to have the nuclear explosion, all of these small pieces of high explosive must detonate exactly simultaneously in order to crush the nuclear mass into a critical mass and that can happen only if it is intentionally detonated--I mean only if it receives the electrical impulse that intentionally detonates it.
The danger in this situation is that if any of these high explosives detonate, they will spew plutonium over a wide area.
As a matter of fact, this chart shows the situation. It shows what the pattern would have been in the Grand Forks case. This is the size of Grand Forks, population 44,000.
This is the possible plutonium dispersal pattern. This is what would have happened had the fire actually--had the wind been blowing in another direction, which would have spread the fire to the nuclear weapon itself--an area that big.
There are other nuclear accidents. This is a Titan II ICBM silo fire in 1980, in Arkansas. The ICBM or the warhead was actually blown out of the silo. It did not detonate.
There are other accidents. There was an accident in Palomares, Spain, where you had the weapon that hit the ground, there was a detonation of the high explosive, it spread plutonium over a very large area. There was not loss of life in that case. Luckily, it was in a rural area.
But it spread plutonium over a large area. In Thule, Greenland, the same thing happened. In Alaska, the same thing happened. Perhaps the most hair-raising of all was the accident in North Carolina where a B-52 broke up in flight. Two nuclear weapons were released. One, the parachute deployed and was recovered, and the other, the nuclear weapon went down and hit the ground. I understand that several of the safety devices on the nuclear weapon failed. Luckily at least one was successful.
In this case, the 24-megaton warhead was equipped with six interlocking safety mechanisms, all of which had to be triggered in sequence to explode the bomb. When the Air Force experts rushed to the North Carolina farm to examine the weapon after the accident, they found that five of the six interlocks had been set off by the fall. Only a single switch prevented the 24 megaton bomb from detonating and spreading fire and destruction over a large area.
Mr. President, my colleagues know that usually we deal with kilotons. For example, the new D5 nuclear warhead is 450 kilotons. This accident in North Carolina was 24 megatons, or 50 times as powerful as the D5 missile, and it was almost detonated.
Mr. President, the point is, I think as these pictures graphically show, we cannot abide not having these weapons tested for safety.
If I may show one more picture. This happens not to have been a nuclear weapon. This picture of this device is a bomb that was put into the hotel in Lake Tahoe back in 1980. It is a booby-trapped 1,000-pound bomb. They put it in the hotel and they brought in the greatest experts on bomb detonation in the world. This was also accompanied by a note that said `Do not fool with this bomb, it will blow up on you.' They were asking for $24 million, whatever the extortion threat was. But that is a picture of the bomb. We sent in our experts to try to disarm the bomb. They were up there in a helicopter with all kinds of devices. Mr. President, it did not work, as this photograph shows. This is the Lake Tahoe, the Frontier Hotel, whatever the resort
hotel. There it is going up, exploding. The purpose of this picture is to also illustrate that there is a terrorist dimension to the purpose of safety.
I am spending a lot of time on safety because the case is irrefutable that this country, indeed the former Soviet Union, all countries need to test for safety. We need fire resistant pits, we need better electrical systems, we need insensitive high explosives, we will need eventually the binary safety devices.
So what does this have to do with where we are now and what are the differences between the two bills? As we came out of the Appropriations Committee, we saved test only for safety, not for reliability, only for safety. And the President must certify in advance about what the purposes is, what he hopes to achieve, and send that to the Congress.
The Senator from Oregon proposes that we have a moratorium for 9 months, no testing for safety in the meantime. This means that we would, I am sure, have to cancel how many of those tests that are presently planned for safety.
What does that achieve, Mr. President? Why do we want to stop testing? Keep in mind, these are underground tests. They have nothing to do with pollution of the atmosphere and those other problems we used to have. It has nothing to do with the pollution of the ground. Even the Senators from Nevada have recognized that these tests are conducted with perfect safety.
I guess it has something to do with some international treaty and why that proposal gets you closer to an international treaty and what you would hope to achieve on an international treaty by delay of 9 months and the cancellation of some of these safety tests, I do not know.
In other words, Mr. President, the sooner we get to alleviating the danger of this kind of accident, the better off we are. The sooner we can get all of our nuclear facilities with safety devices, I think the better off we are.
The only thing I know of, the amendment of the Senator from Oregon goes into a plan which the President would need to file in advance, and I think that would be useful. I think it would be useful to know what he plans to do. But if the President should miscertify--and these experts will know exactly what these tests are under our amendment when he files in advance--they will know if he says we are going to test the W-88 warhead or whatever it is, and we hope to find this out, they will know if that is true or not and we will be here next year in case the President willy-nilly wants to have a large number of nuclear tests. But, Mr. President, it seems to me that we would be better off to go ahead with those planned tests that we have right now, tests for safety, and not cancel those or delay those for the 9 months involved.
Mr. President, there are almost 10,000 employees out in Nevada for these tests. It seems incredible, but this is a large staff of scientists who conduct these tests, almost 10,000 in number. It seems to me inordinately wasteful if we all recognize that tests must be done to keep a cadre of 10,000 people, or 9,000, whatever the figure is, on the payroll waiting for 9 months before you commence the tests. If these tests are necessary, then let these people, expensively employed, go ahead and do their jobs testing for safety, for no other purpose.
We cannot fire these people for 9 months and then say come back on September 30 or September 1, whenever the date is, and we will rehire you at that time. You have to keep them on the payroll twiddling their thumbs while they wait for the President to give them the directions to test for safety.
Mr. President, let me say just one final word. The Union of Concerned Scientists, which supports some form of test ban, certainly a test ban treaty and some form of moratorium, one of their leading experts was in my office recently. He affirmatively and strongly stated that, yes, we need to test for safety, for all of the reasons that I have just stated.
I am sure that there would be a difference in what he would say as to the number of tests necessary over the next number of years between him and the people at Lawrence Livermore lab. But everyone who is knowledgeable in this debate recognizes the need to test for safety. I think the question now at hand between us is whether there ought to be a moratorium for 9 months canceling those tests now planned for safety, in effect wasting that money for 9 months, while we decide what to do. It is a fairly narrow question, but I think an important one. I hope my colleagues will address that question.
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Mr. HATFIELD. I will be happy to respond to the Senator's question.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon is recognized.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, first of all, let me reiterate again, from the testimony of the administration--bear in mind, the Senator from Louisiana has implied that somehow there is a program all ready to go, and that those scientists out there would be sitting around twiddling their fingers if he put this moratorium through. Mr. President, again, the Air Force and the Navy, in cooperation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of Energy, have evaluated the safety--and I am quoting. This is from Dr. Robert Barker, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy. This is March 19, 1992.
All of these agencies have evaluated the safety of all ballistic missiles that carry nuclear warheads. It was determined that there is not now sufficient evidence to warrant our changing either warheads or propellants.
Now, there is no such plan the administration has waiting for testing.
Let me add one other document----
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at that point?
Mr. HATFIELD. Sure.
Mr. JOHNSTON. The Senator spoke of warheads and ballistic missiles. That does not include cruise missiles?
Mr. HATFIELD. Propellants.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Cruise missiles. It does not include cruise missiles and iron bombs from airplanes, does it?
Mr. HATFIELD. If the Senator will withhold just 1 minute, here is another document, Mr. President, in which it talks about warheads of all kinds--bombs, missiles, and so forth--and the grade that they give. There are three tests, as you know, three safety tests, and the military has taken each one of these, indicating the entry and the stockpile and the safety rate: A, B, or C. And not one of them is rated under C, as far as safety is concerned.
It is on this document that was based this statement by the Assistant Secretary of Defense that we have no plans at this moment to upgrade the safety of this arsenal.
Does the Senator have any other information that would indicate the administration has a plan ready to go, or that would be somehow unduly restricted for a 9-month delay? I have searched. I have asked the questions. I have not found any answer to that.
If the administration started today to develop a plan for safety testing, I would say to the Senator from Louisiana, it will take a major part of that 9 months, probably, with all the other activities that are ongoing. And also the 9 months overlaps the expiration of the moratorium of the Russians. I would think this is all the more reason, from a nonproliferation point, and stability of the world, that we ought to push on this. But the safety factor, we provide for that after the 9-month moratorium.
The Senator showed a demonstration of a B-52 and explosion. Let us bear in mind, B-52's are no longer flying around with those bombs for 24 hours a day.
And let me also say----
Mr. JOHNSTON. The Senator is correct; they are no longer on alert.
Mr. HATFIELD. That is right.
Mr. JOHNSTON. But the bombs are available to put on the planes.
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, let me go back again to the fact that the Assistant Secretary of Defense says the Air Force, which is in charge of those B-52's, has no plans to upgrade its current arsenal for safety purposes--the Air Force. So I think that type of exhibit is without validity as to this issue.
I would say to the Senator from Louisiana, 53 Senators out of the Senate would like a 1-year moratorium--1-year moratorium. We are suggesting on this modification 9 months, with these outyears. And beyond the moratorium, nonproliferation conferences and safety device definitions, and having the Congress come back and take the President's recommendation seriously and reevaluate the whole testing question.
So I think here we have a pretty clear case, Mr. President, that we have attempted to not only cooperate with the administration and those who have felt we should not limit tests, or we would go on and test and test and test and test. We want to modify, of course, to satisfy the Senator from Maine on the matter of the end of 1996; we have no problems with that.
So we are trying to develop the consensus where we can have the moratorium. That is first out--the moratorium. That is as much domestic as it is international.
I would say to the Senator, down in Nevada there are many of those fine scientists, and so forth, who could be engaged in nonnuclear safety programs. We are not going to lose them. Where are they going, with Russia being on a moratorium, France on a moratorium. The world market, with that kind of science expertise, is not that readily available. I am for keeping them in place. I do not want to lose that scientific community.
But by the same token, I must say, there are many other things besides the testing. Or they can be planning for the tests. They can be doing a lot of things. In a 9-month period, a simple gestation period for human life, we cannot utilize that time with these scientists for all the related activities to safety and the reduction of the arsenals that are all part of the grand design, hopefully, to lead us to a save world?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I yield however many minutes the Senator from Nebraska wishes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska [Mr. Exon].
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield 1 minute, I would like to add the Senator from Michigan [Mr. Levin] as an original cosponsor of this modification.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Nebraska.
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I thank my friend from Oregon for yielding.
I have listened with great interest to my colleague from Louisiana, who has put in a lot of effort on the concern that is before the Senate right now. As a member of the Armed Services Committee and chairman of the committee of jurisdiction, we have looked very long and hard at that. We have made two trips to the Nevada test site to get some firsthand knowledge as best we could. We have had thorough briefings from the scientists there with regard to the potential safety problems.
Let me say that I have some of the same concerns so well expressed by the Senator from Louisiana during the remarks he just made on the floor, and I congratulate him for those remarks. I think testing for safety purposes is something with which we should proceed.
The concern that I an other Senators have had--the concern we had with the original proposal, to be offered by the Senator from Oregon, joined by the majority leader, the Senator from Maine, which essentially was the same position taken by several committees and the House of Representatives by a very large vote, was that there would be a moratorium, period, for 1 year. That, in essence, was the thrust of all of the proposals that had been advanced.
That proposal had not only passed the House of Representatives by a substantial majority, but 52 or 53 Members of the Senate evidently had signed on to such a proposal in the form of a letter to the Secretary of Defense.
I oppose those measures. I oppose those measures now. I congratulate the Senator from Oregon and the Senator from Maine, the majority leader, and others who I think have been convinced by the lengthy discussions in which we have been involved that, indeed, there should be a window--a reasonable window, if you will--for proper testing, with a strong emphasis on safety testing, as has just been brought out and talked about by the Senator from Louisiana.
Indeed, I agree, not with the degree but that there is a potential problem with safety with regard to our intercontinental ballistic missiles.
I would simply like to say, Mr. President, the Senator from Louisiana said that our inventory of such weapons today is `not safe,' as I heard the Senator from Louisiana. I think that is not a totally accurate statement. I think it would be far better to say--and put this in a proper perspective by so saying--those weapons are not as safe as we would like them to be; or they can be made safer, and should be, through testing, if that is possible. And I think it is.
That is why, if the Senator will take a very close look at the amendment offered by the Senator from Oregon and other cosponsors, including this Senator, I believe that most, if not all, of the legitimate concerns he has brought up are addressed.
With regard to cruise missiles, my interpretation of the Drell report--I stand corrected if there is evidence that I am not accurate--was that the Drell Commission, which made a very in-depth study of this, indicated that there was no reason for concern about the safety of cruise missiles. Therefore, I think we can downgrade that somewhat as a matter of concern.
Simply stated, the Senator from Oregon and those associated with him have come a long way, a very long way, Mr. President, from their proposal to eliminate all testing for a 1-year period, period.
What is wrong with that? What is wrong with that is, I am sure, is that the signal would be clearly sent to all of the very talented people that we have at the Nevada test site that this is simply a forerunner to closing that facility within a matter of months. If that would happen, I am concerned--from signals, and contacts, and conversations that I have had with people very close to that situation--that an outright 1-month moratorium period without any consideration for what we are going to do in the future would cause us to lose a great deal of the expertise that we have now to get on with the business of safety and the safety from the spread of plutonium, as has been addressed by the Senator from Louisiana.
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Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?
Mr. EXON. Certainly.
Mr. JOHNSTON. I think there is a fairly narrow but important difference between the Hatfield amendment and the Appropriations Committee amendment. The Hatfield amendment as of now has a moratorium for any purpose for 9 months. That is that you cannot test for safety or any other purpose during that 9 months.
Am I not correct that, of the tests planned for the coming year, three or four of those tests were for safety purposes?
Mr. EXON. I think the Senator from Louisiana is correct.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Is there any good reason to have those 10,000-odd people out there sort of twiddling their thumbs when we need to move forward with this test for safety? Is it really the reason that the Senator is for that, to sort of avoid the total moratorium? Should we not proceed for that 9 months?
Mr. EXON. I suspect, in answer to my friend from
Louisiana very directly, if you could have that option, it might be the best of all worlds. It has been my concern, I say to my friend from Louisiana, which I take it has been one of his concerns and why he got into this matter, that he was not in support of the action taken by the House of Representatives nor was he in support of what 52 or 53, over half of our colleagues in the Senate, have expressed in letter form to the Secretary of Defense.
Mr. JOHNSTON. The Senator is correct.
Mr. EXON. Therefore, it comes back to the situation of how do we best solve this problem? It seems to me that the people out there would not be twiddling their thumbs if the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell-Nunn, et al., amendment is passed. They would indeed be planning for the safety tests that would be made in the future. It takes a long time to adequately and correctly plan these tests.
Mr. President, the Senator is so right. Let me emphasize once again, we had an accident with a nuclear warhead in Missouri. We had an accident with a nuclear warhead in North Dakota. We have had other accidents.
So far, Mr. President, we have been successful with the safety means in place, or crossing your fingers, you might say. Maybe there was some degree of luck in the fact that we did not have an explosion of plutonium. However, it did not happen, which partially proves that the system that we have now cannot be adequately, or properly, or honestly described as `not safe.' Nevertheless, there are binary--which is another way of saying separating-type--features that can very likely be put into our ICBM inventory that have to be properly tested, which is one of the reasons that this Senator, at least, feels that we should not be talking about or enacting any piece of legislation here, as the House of Representatives already has, that would send a signal to those people out there that we are not going to do any more testing at all for whatever reason.
So, I believe that the Senator from Louisiana and this Senator are on exactly the same track. I just would like to have the opportunity, as I have now done, to try to take back some of those statements that were made that our nuclear ICBM inventory is `not safe.' It simply is not as safe as it could be, and, if we are going to make it safer, we are going to have to have some tests, which are clearly allowed under reasonable conditions by the amendment offered by the Senator from Oregon.
I think the Senator from Oregon, once again, would
agree that indeed he and his colleagues have come a long, long way to try to accommodate many of the concerns that have been raised by the Senator from Oregon and others in this particular area.
Mr. President, if I might go into a little bit of the details on why I support and join with the Senator from Oregon. After a great deal of conversations, talk back and forth, we made some proposals that I thought were very reasonable. I felt, though, that maybe they would be rejected out of hand. They were not rejected out of hand.
Friday afternoon we came to a basic agreement that I think has encompassed the real need with regard to the future. And the fact that, as the Senator from Oregon just indicated, my close friend and colleague, Senator Levin, from Michigan, has now come on our bill as a cosponsor indicates to me what I thought about the attitude of Senator Levin when the Senator and I discussed this in my office on Friday last.
Senator Levin was one of those, by the way, who signed a letter to the President, but I think that the arrangements, and the compromise, and--above all else--the consensus position, is best represented in the amendment that is now before the body. A lot of hard work and compromise has gone into that.
Mr. President, as an original cosponsor of the Hatfield-Mitchell-Exxon, et al., amendment, I rise to urge my colleagues to support this position, which represents a balanced, sound approach to bringing our nuclear testing program in line with recent arms control progress between the United States and the former Soviet Union. The cold war adversarial relationship between the United States and Russia has transformed into a positive alliance where newfound trust and cooperation has yielded revolutionary agreements sharply slashing our respective nuclear stockpiles.
To be sure, the world of 1992 bears little, if any, resemblance to the world of 1972. The Russians have stopped nuclear testing. The French have stopped nuclear testing. Even the Chinese, who have a limited testing program, are making encouraging comments about joining a testing moratorium. The prospect of reaching an international court whereby nuclear nations agree to halt all testing and in the process slam shut, maybe just slam it down, the atomic Pandora's box is no longer simply a pipe dream. It is real, Mr. President, and it is within our grasp, but only achievable if the United States, the most powerful nation in the world, nuclearwise and otherwise, begins to show leadership and fulfills its pledge--I say again, Mr. President--fulfills its pledge for a comprehensive test ban, a pledge made in the United States-signed treaty, a pledge made by both the Reagan and the Bush administration.
Without a comprehensive test ban, the chance of halting the spread of nuclear weapons to nonnuclear nations is greatly diminished. Without a rudimentary testing program, a new member to the nuclear arms club will not have the confidence in its arsenal necessary for full operational effectiveness and deterrent capability.
A comprehensive test ban is the key to nuclear nonproliferation. It is in this context that the United States must view the justification for future nuclear tests, for it is in this context, in light of the Russian and French pledges, that the world is judging us. The issue comes down to a simple question: Is or is not the United States serious about nuclear nonproliferation?
As chairman of the Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence, I made two trips to our nuclear testing range at the Nevada test site. A have been briefed at length by Department of Energy officials and national laboratory scientists in highly classified sessions. The amendment before the Senate is the product of my conclusions reached as a result of these visits and other considerations.
My first conclusion is that there are needed upgrades to our nuclear weapons stockpile that should be pursued in order to improve weapons safety. Though no new weapons are planned for the U.S. arsenal, three specific upgrades identified by the congressionally created Drell panel--fire-resistant pits, insensitive high explosives and enhanced nuclear detonation safety systems--should be retrofitted into our weapons so as to significantly reduce the possibility of a catastrophic peacetime accident occurring. Our amendment allows for no more than five safety tests a year for a period of 3 years--15 total--a sufficient number to properly test out these much needed improvements.
My second conclusion is that after over 820 nuclear detonations, the United States has no compelling need to test for warhead reliability extensively. Even so, the amendment allows for reliability testing--no more than one per year--so long as it is counted against the five tests per year limit and only if Congress does not disapprove the substitution after notification by the President. This latitude to use 3 of the 15 allowable tests for purposes of reliability testing is designed to accommodate unforeseen testing needs, though I believe it will not be needed.
My third conclusion is that a comprehensive test ban is in the national security interests of the United States. Once the testing for the previously mentioned safety improvements is complete, our Nation can match the Russian and French initiative and end its program of testing with the knowledge that its nuclear arsenal is a safe, thoroughly tested deterrent which will continue
to be the mainstay of our Nation's superpower status. Without American participation there can be no true comprehensive test ban treaty. And without a comprehensive test ban treaty, the spread of nuclear weapons technology into the Third World--a legitimate threat to the future security of our country--cannot be stemmed. For this reason, the amendment sets September 30, 1996, as the end date of the U.S. nuclear testing program, provided Russia does not test beyond this date as well. If Russia does test after this date, the ban would be lifted.
My fourth conclusion is that the United States cannot let the push for a temporary superpower moratorium on nuclear testing go unanswered. For this reason, our provision enacts a 9 month moratorium on testing while the President is directed to submit a report to Congress detailing the nuclear weapons inventory, modifications needed to incorporate all necessary safety upgrades, the tests, not to exceed five, to be performed in the next fiscal year, and a proposed plan to achieve a comprehensive test ban by 1996. Most importantly, after so many years of stalling and unfulfilled promises, the United States would be on the path toward a multilateral test ban, joined by Russia and, hopefully, the nations of the world.
In certain ways, this amendment is similar to the administration's present testing policy.
The administration's plan calls for six tests a year; this amendment authorizes no more than five, which is not a significant difference, most would agree.
The administration wants to test for safety and reliability; this amendment authorizes needed safety tests and a handful of reliability tests provided Congress affirms the need for such a nonsafety test.
The administration wants to permit the United Kingdom to conduct one test a year at the Nevada test site; this amendment allows for such a test.
The reluctance of the executive branch, however, to take advantage of a defining moment in the history of the nuclear age necessitates that the Congress act in order to fill the void in leadership and, in the process, move the world closer to effectively halting the spread of nuclear weapons. While the need for superpower testing has lessened, the need to stem the tide of nuclear proliferation in the Third World becomes more urgent.
In reining in the testing of these weapons, significant progress will be made toward closing the atomic Pandora's box destabilizing our future security. By enacting an interim moratorium that has been outlined and then completing what remains of justified safety testing, our country can move toward a test ban with Russia and lead the rest of the world through example, not just hollow, ineffective words.
Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.
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Mr. JOHNSTON. Will the Senator yield for a question on my time.
Mr. EXON. I yield.
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, as the Senator knows, this is not just a moratorium for this year but is permanent legislation on an appropriations bill.
I was just talking to the White House people out in the cloakroom about what it all means. Is the Senator supporting this as permanent legislation without having the Armed Services Committee take a look at the permanent legislation?
We have to deal with this as a moratorium for this year; it is in the House bill. No funds may be used for testing for this year. But this, of course, is permanent legislation. Is that the position of the Armed Services Committee that they want the Appropriations Committee to or that we want to legislate on this matter on the floor?
Mr. EXON. The Armed Services Committee, as the Senator knows, has just completed our authorization bill, and we had a very lengthy debate and study on that matter and could not reach an agreement in committee. Therefore, it was the recommendation of the chairman, and it was the recommendation of I guess most of the people on the Committee on both sides of the aisle, that we had best let this matter ride until we get to the floor.
We knew very well and talked about the various proposals that the Senator had put into this bill in the appropriations measure. We knew full well of the proposed amendment to be offered on this bill by the Senator from Oregon. We knew full well of the 53 Members of the Senate who had written to the Secretary of Defense indicating that we should just have a moratorium for a year, period. We knew all of those things. I simply am saying that we have worked very hard to try and come up with a compromise.
The Senator is absolutely correct. This is a 1-year appropriations bill and cannot carry beyond that?
Mr. JOHNSTON. No. This amendment does carry on beyond that.
Mr. EXON. It carries for how long?
Mr. JOHNSTON. 1996; it is permanent law.
Mr. EXON. That might well be, but the Senator knows that whatever we do here on an appropriations bill, or authorization bill, or anything else cannot bind future Congresses.
I simply say then that what we were attempting to do, what this Senator is attempting to do with this particular amendment, is maybe to set this down on this particular measure and have this or something very close to it be the hallmark of other types of legislation where it would be proper and very much in order to bring it up for debate or amendment. That is the best answer that I can give to my friend from Louisiana.
I want to make sure that he understands where we are coming from. I do not really believe that the Senator from Louisiana and the Senator from Nebraska are coming from far distances on this particular matter. Does that answer the question from the Senator?
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Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I had not seen this amendment before today, in fact before this afternoon. The amendment which I proposed and which is the position of the Appropriations Committee is to have a moratorium for this year's testing except for safety.
It was our position that we needed safety. Everyone recognizes the need for those tests. There are safety tests planned for this year. I am in the process of getting information from the White House as to the nature of those they can give to us.
I think there is an important difference again between what this legislation does and our position. This legislation does not permit any tests--even those planned tests which are planned within the next 3 months for safety must be
canceled under this legislation and no safety test or for any reason after 1996 may be taken.
I just wonder if we want to make the decision now to have no test for safety after September 30, 1996. Maybe we want to.
But I do not think the problem is we are worried about the Soviet Union building new weapons. I think the greater worry is both our weapons and the Soviet weapons are not sufficiently safe and endanger mankind by some kind of premature explosion.
The Senator says that the cruise missiles are OK. It is my understanding that the SRAM missile which is still in the inventory and not on alert----
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, whose time is this?
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Robb). The Chair advises the Senator the current time is being charged against the Senator from Louisiana.
Mr. JOHNSTON. The SRAM does not have a sensitive high explosive and there is a new version of the air launch cruise missile which will have a sensitive high explosive. I do not know that will go in the inventory. If so, it will have to be tested. The D-5 if put into the inventory needs to be tested.
It is the position of Lawrence Livermore that I earlier read that almost none of our present weapons in the inventory contained the kind of safety devices that we need, and we need those tests.
As I mentioned earlier, the Union of Concerned Scientists say we need safety tests.
I would say that it would be better to have the kind of moratorium which we have in the appropriations bill, which limits for this year any test except for safety which the President must certify and gives the Armed Services Committee and other committees of jurisdiction the chance to look at long-term permanent law, because this is permanent law as opposed to Appropriations Committee language. I think those are differences but important differences.
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield me 2 minutes to try to respond to the Senator?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. HATFIELD. I am happy to yield time.
The majority leader has asked for time and has been waiting.
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, will the majority leader allow me 2 minutes to try to respond directly to the points raised by the Senator from Oregon?
Mr. HATFIELD. I am happy to yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Nebraska.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nebraska is recognized for up to 3 minutes.
Mr. EXON. Mr. President, I am fearful that the Senator from Louisiana, while I am sure it is not his intention, is trying to throw cold water on a concept that we have advanced in that it would destroy safety testing. That is not the correct description of what we had done.
I think it would be legitimate to say that about the original proposal offered by the Senator from Oregon. The lab experts tell us, and we have in contact with them, that 10 to 15 safety testings as authorized and could be approved in the legislation offered by the amendment from the Senator from Oregon would be more than is necessary to prove up on these safety matters. So that is not an issue.
If you want to argue, as you might, that under this amendment we would not test as quickly as we would under the Johnston proposal, I might say, yes. Although I think that is a matter of degree. I would simply say that let us not try and use the same arguments against this proposal that the Senator from Oregon has offered as what he intended to offer.
This proposal, I think the Senator from Louisiana would agree, is far, far better with regard to the ability to test for safety purposes than was the original proposal offered by the Senator from Oregon and certainly that authored and passed in the House of Representatives.
I thank my friend from Oregon, and I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I yield to the majority leader such time as he may consume.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader, Senator Mitchell, is recognized accordingly.
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I am pleased that for the first time since 1988 the Senate today has an opportunity to consider a measure to limit nuclear testing.
Much has changed since 1988. This provision, and I trust the vote today, reflects that change in a positive and appropriate way.
Like the distinguished former chairman of the Appropriations Committee, Senator Hatfield, I have been a longtime supporter of limits on nuclear tests.
I commend the Senator for his efforts on this issue and I know that he shares my gratification that a total of 53 Senators agree on the need for an immediate testing moratorium and have cosponsored S. 2064 to express their support for a testing pause.
I am particularly pleased that the distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence, Senator Exon, has joined me and Senator Hatfield to craft a comprehensive nuclear testing policy.
Our amendment combines the concept of the moratorium bill with the basic elements of a testing phaseout provision that Senator Exon included in his subcommittee mark--a provision which I understand had the support of all the Democrats on the Armed Services Committee.
This approach merges the immediate political demand to alter our testing practice with a longer term strategy to eliminate the need for nuclear testing altogether.
The amendment imposes a 9-month moratorium on nuclear testing.
The moratorium can be followed by a testing program to implement all necessary safety features on stockpiled weapons. Five tests can be conducted each year for 3 years. One exception per year may be made for a reliability test if Congress does not disapprove the test within 60 days. One exception may also be made to conduct a test for the United Kingdom. But in no case can the total number of tests exceed 5 tests per year or a total of 15 tests through September 30, 1996.
And then, as of September 30, 1996, the U.S. nuclear testing program will end.
This amendment truly reflects post-cold war thinking.
Five years ago, who would have predicted that the Presidents of the United States and a newly independent State of Russia would each offer proposals for massive arms reductions, many to be carried out unilaterally?
Who would have thought the START negotiations would have been completely and immediately overshadowed by a new strategic arms agreement that cut far deeper into the heart of both sides' arsenals?
Who would have believed that the race for strategic superiority would end so suddenly, and that the most immediate military threat to our security would be the efforts of countries other than the Soviet Union to acquire nuclear technology and the means to deliver it?
It is in this context--the end of the superpower arms race and the urgent need to strengthen nuclear nonproliferation--that this amendment is so important and timely.
There are many important reasons to enact a temporary moratorium now.
First, a United States moratorium is an appropriate response to the Russian and French testing moratoriums.
We all know the long history of Soviet, and then Russian, unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing: They were ignored by the Reagan and Bush administrations.
The most recent action was the renewal of a 1-year moratorium announced by President Yeltsin in October.
If there were ever an opportunity to help buttress Yeltsin against the military men who would resurrect the Russian nuclear arsenal, the moratorium provides one.
Yeltsin reportedly already has agreed that--in the absence of a United States response to the Russian moratorium--the Russian military can renew nuclear testing at the end of the year.
That would be an unfortunate development, representing an increased role for the military establishment and a diminution of the civilian authority's ability to press for continuing arms control measures.
Yeltsin's initiative subsequently was joined by the French.
In April, France initiated its own testing moratorium through the end of the year, and it finally agreed to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
France and Russia have called for the United States to join and to negotiate a comprehensive testing ban. The Presidents of Canada, Kazakhstan and many other nations also have urged the United States to halt tests.
The only other nuclear powers, the United Kingdom and China, could well follow suit. Since the United States conducts nuclear tests on behalf of the United Kingdom, those tests would automatically stop. The Chinese would either join or be isolated in the world community. So a U.S. moratorium would make it possible that, for the first time ever, all nuclear powers stop nuclear testing.
This would be an historic acknowledgement of the transformation of international politics.
It also would provide a much-needed opportunity for the nuclear establishment of each nation to reevaluate the purposes of their nuclear testing program.
This is the second reason to implement a moratorium.
A hard look at our testing program would reveal that there is only one reason to resume nuclear testing--to ensure the operability of the two or three warheads that could be fitted with new safety devices. And then testing could stop altogether.
A testing pause would provide the political momentum for all nuclear nations to negotiate a multilateral, comprehensive test ban.
This is a third reason for joining the Russian and French moratorium.
It is regrettable that the Bush administration has such a poor record on this issue.
For decades, the United States had sought to negotiate an end to nuclear testing. Every American President from Eisenhower through Carter, Republican and Democrat, sought a comprehensive test ban. In treaties signed by the United States in 1963, 1969, and 1974 the United States solemnly and formally committed itself to continue negotiations to end such testing.
President Reagan pledged that he would continue this policy.
In 1986, President Reagan wrote to Congress that he would:
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This promise was used to induce the House of Representatives to end its insistence on a nuclear testing moratorium in conference on the fiscal year 1987 DOD authorization bill.
But, as we all know, this has not been upheld by the Bush administration.
In fact, the Bush administration has taken just the opposite position.
In response to a letter from the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Nunn, and Senators Gore and Simon, the President's National Security Adviser, Brent Scowcroft, rule out the possibility of seeking an end to testing, even though that had been the objective of every American President since Eisenhower, and an objective to which the United States committed itself in three treaties signed previously.
It is time to face the facts: This administration will not willingly pursue further limits on testing. It must be required to take a pause, reassess its testing program, and understand how serious Congress--and the rest of the world--is about ending nuclear testing. The moratorium will do this.
Finally, a U.S. commitment to ending testing is a critical tool in the effort against nuclear proliferation. The Bush administration says it cares about halting the spread of nuclear technology. I believe it does. But it ignores the fact that nuclear testing gravely undermines U.S. nonproliferation objectives.
The 1969 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons [NPT] offered an implicit quid pro quo to induce nonnuclear states to sign on: The nuclear powers would work to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament.
For nonnuclear states, the sign of seriousness that the nuclear powers are upholding their end of the bargain is whether they are moving to end nuclear testing. No one can dispute the inconsistency of the administration telling other countries that they have no right to nuclear weapons, while insisting that we have the continuing right to build and test nuclear weapons.
Ending nuclear testing is the obvious first step toward nonproliferation. This is why other nations have been trying to get the superpowers to end testing for years. Consistent U.S. objections to testing limits has prevented progress in strengthening the Treaty on Nonproliferation.
At the last review conference in 1990, there was no progress on strengthening International Atomic Energy Agency procedures in two different areas because Mexico and other nations wanted to ban further nuclear tests.
The stronger agency procedures on which there was no action would have allowed special inspections of undeclared sites and required full scope safeguards for nuclear exports to nonnuclear states. These are important measures. They would have been useful regarding Iraq's nuclear program prior to the war. It is foolhardy to forestall strengthening international nuclear safeguards simply because we will not end an unnecessary nuclear test program.
In 1995, the treaty will again come up for review. This time, the treaty itself could be jeopardized. Joining the Russian and French moratorium would demonstrate America's good faith in improving efforts to achieve nonproliferation; to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries.
The administration argues that America's choices about nuclear weapons have no relationship to the policies of other nations. Showing restraint on testing, they say, cannot help in the effort against nonproliferation.
Yet North Korea and other would-be nuclear nations frequently point to United States testing to defend their policies. At the very least, we give them an excuse behind which to hide.
Moreover, the administration itself--in another clear inconsistency--has claimed that U.S. nuclear restraint can aid nonproliferation efforts. President Bush explained that the United States formally ended nuclear material production `to show leadership on critical issues [and] to encourage countries in regions of tension such as the Middle East and South Asia to take similar actions.' Those very words apply to this very issue. Ending testing does matter.
The United States should demonstrate that it takes its commitment to nonproliferation seriously and uphold its end of the Nonproliferation Treaty's bargain. Of course, a testing moratorium also will save hundreds of millions of dollars each year and save the environment from the effects of nuclear explosions.
But other critical reasons to pause in our nuclear test program are to readjust the U.S. testing program and to jumpstart progress toward a comprehensive test ban. That is why these are the other elements of the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell provision.
The administration will be required to submit a report during the moratorium. In addition to outlining the nuclear arsenal, the need for any additional safety tests, and other technical details, the report must include a plan to negotiate a comprehensive test ban. The moratorium itself will encourage the other nuclear powers to join in such a ban. Russia, which has long sought a treaty banning nuclear tests, will obviously be eager to help achieve this goal.
Because the amendment mandates an end to U.S. tests by 1996, I am confident that the United States will do all it can to make this a multilateral achievement. Achieving a comprehensive test ban would be perhaps the clearest proof that what was once derided pie-in-the-sky thinking is now eminently practical.
The administration's arguments against this amendment are without merit. The administration would have us believe that a temporary moratorium will prevent tests ever again. The administration also would have us believe that continued testing remains necessary. Neither contention is true.
Because this amendment concerns only a temporary moratorium, the first objections are irrelevant. The legislation itself provides that tests can resume. In terms of the need for continued testing, ad infinitum--their arguments don't hold up to scrutiny.
First, the United States now has no plans to develop or design new warheads, and we have no nuclear warheads in production. So we obviously do not need tests to produce new warheads.
Second, testing for reliability is not necessary. Warhead design flaws that can be cited to scare people are flaws that were not revealed by nuclear testing, but by designers who realized that they had neglected some factors in their work.
The reliability of our nuclear stockpile can be monitored without tests almost indefinitely. We are talking about percentages of reliability or declining confidence that are very small. Furthermore, it is the missile, not the warhead, that is the least reliable part of the weapons system.
Finally, from 1964 to 1981, not a single nuclear test was conducted for reliability reasons. The sudden interest in the warhead reliability arises out of desperation for a rationale for continued testing.
Safety is a different matter. According to the March testimony of Robert Barker, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, the Air Force, the Navy, DOD, and DOE concluded `that there is not now sufficient evidence to warrant our changing either warheads or propellants.' Thus, no retrofits for safety have even been ordered by the administration. So a moratorium sure is not going to affect our safety program.
But there is a rational for limited tests to ensure that every weapon that we keep in the stockpile will incorporate up-to-date safety features. Because two, or possibly three warheads that will be kept need additional safety features, we will need to conduct a limited number of tests on an example of each reconfigured weapon. Ray Kidder from Lawrence-Livermore National Laboratory has testified that only four tests would put insensitive high explosives on both the W-88 and W-76 warhead.
The regime set out by this amendment--15 tests over 3 years--ensures sufficient testing to successfully upgrade those weapons.
The administration has tried to defuse the growing congressional support for limits on nuclear testing by proposing its own so-called new policy. But the new policy is really the old policy. It is just more of the same. It barely affected the previously planned testing schedule. It did nothing to respond to the Russian and French moratoriums. And it remained sullen silent on the question of negotiating further testing limits--each of which is critical to any new policy.
Other have suggested other equally unsatisfying alternatives to the comprehensive policy presented by this measure that Senator Hatfield, Senator Exon, and I have agreed upon. This bill, for example, contains a pseudomoratorium--a moratorium with waiver authority so broad that the President already has indicated he would use it. The provision in this bill would let the President conduct any nuclear tests for safety that he deems to be in the national interest.
Well, President Bush already has said that continued testing is in the national interest. So, the provision in the bill is not a moratorium at all. It is a green light to more testing. Another proposal is to put in law the President's so-called new policy--the one that's really the same as the old policy and does not really change anything. The proposal would include language urging the President to negotiate a comprehensive test ban.
The Senate already has passed such language and we already know that the administration will ignore it. So this alternative offers nothing new, either. The time has come for the United States to stop dragging its heels on progress toward a nonnuclear world. Dozens of Nobel laureates who helped develop nuclear weapons say the time is right to end testing.
Admiral Crowe endorsed a moratorium, saying that a United States moratorium should last as long as Russia and France suspend their tests. `The [U.S.] needs to take some steps toward a pause in nuclear testing,' he said, `We need to do something on this issue.'
The House of Representatives agrees. It included a moratorium provision in its energy and water bill, passed overwhelmingly. It voted 237-167 for the Kopetski-Green nuclear moratorium amendment to the DOD authorization bill. The American people also know that the time has come to pass this amendment. An overwhelming majority of Americans want to halt testing now.
In a recent poll conducted by ICR Survey Research Group, 72 percent of Americans wanted the United States to stop nuclear testing, either without conditions or temporarily wile seeking a multilateral test ban. Only 7 percent of those Americans polled supported continued testing regardless of the actions of other nations. That is the policy of the Bush administration.
Americans are ahead of their Government on this issue. They know that the world has changed and that we have an unprecedented opportunity to put the arms race behind us. They want us to start by ending nuclear testing.
The Russian moratorium expires in October. The French moratorium expires in January. Both nations will resume testing if the United States fails to join their moratorium. As the Russian Minister of Atomic Energy said: `The United States has the last word [on nuclear testing], and the whole world awaits this step.' Let us speak clearly and forcefully, and take this step today.
I urge my colleagues to support the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell amendment and vote against all weakening amendments offered today.
I thank my colleague for his courtesy in extending this time to me.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? The Senator from Louisiana [Mr. Johnston].
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Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, when we put together the unanimous-consent request on this matter last Friday, the Senator from Texas was out of town. He has since called and asked me for 10 minutes to speak on the SSC. I told him I would give it to him out of my nuclear testing time.
At this time, I yield 10 minutes to the junior Senator from Texas to speak about SSC, or whatever else he wants to speak about.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Texas is recognized.
Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman of the Energy Committee.
Testing is about safety and reliability, and as long as we want safety and reliability, we have to test. I am opposed to the test ban amendment that is pending.
But we are debating today two issues. We will first vote on funding for the superconducting super collider, and then we will vote on nuclear testing. I want to direct my remarks this afternoon to the SSC.
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Mr. GRAMM. I want to begin by reminding my colleagues of the process we used to get to this point on the SSC.
On February 10, 1987, the Secretary of Energy announced that we were going to move ahead with building the superconducting super collider, the world's largest and most important scientific project to be built anywhere in the world in the last quarter of the 20th century.
States were asked to submit proposals for the site location. Forty-three proposals were received from 25 States and, as a matter of fact, a guy named Paul Jablonka proposed it be built on the Moon. That proposal, as far as I know, was immediately rejected.
But the Secretary of Energy set out a process whereby the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering, as a joint project, would look at each of the proposals, evaluate them, and choose the best site on technical merit. They immediately reduced down the 43 proposals to 36 sites in 25 States. After a comprehensive study, the final list came out. There were seven States on the list. When that study was completed on November 9, 1989, Texas was chosen.
I want to remind my colleagues--those from 25 States--States that submitted proposals for the SSC site--that their proposal was considered not by the administration; not by a political appointee; but by the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering. And a selection was made to build the SSC in Texas, as the best site from a technical viewpoint.
I also want to remind my colleagues that in competing for this $8 billion project, the State of Texas, offered and the Federal Government accepted, $1 billion of funds from the State. No other State made a similar gesture.
We now have come down to the moment of truth, Mr. President, as to what we are going to do about building the SSC. We have heard many arguments about funding. I would like to address two of them.
First of all, I would like to address the deficit argument. I remind my colleagues that we are operating under a spending ceiling. Nobody doubts that we are going to spend right up to the spending ceiling. So if we reduce funding for the SSC, the money is going to be spent somewhere else.
There are those who say: Well, this is a good place to start deficit reduction. I could respond by saying that when we voted to increase by 50-percent funding for the Public Broadcasting Service, that that was a good opportunity to begin deficit reduction. But the bottom line is we decided deficit reduction in the budget. We set out a spending limit. So the debate is not about deficit reduction; the debate is about priorities. That is the major argument, I think, for the superconducting super collider.
Twenty-five years ago, in 1967, the Federal Government spent over 5 percent of the nondefense budget on research in science and technology. Today, 25 years later, if we fund and build the SSC, we are going to be spending 1.8 percent of the Federal budget on science and technology in the future. In short, as a proportion of the budget, we have reduced by more than half the amount of money spent on science and technology.
I think we are basically down to a decision, and we all know what the decision boils down to: Do we want to spend money on science and technology in a long-term investment in the future of the country, or do we want to take the money from science and technology and spend it on something else?
The disadvantage that science has always had in debate on the floor of the Senate and on the floor of the House is that there is a limited constituency for the future. As a result, we consistently underfunded the future. We consistently invest more in the next election than we do in the next generation.
I doubt if there is a Member of the Senate who really understands to any degree what the SSC is about. We have all learned our little pat statements as to what it does, but it is an investment in high-energy physics. That is an area that the United States has been the world leader ever since the Manhattan project.
Between 20 and 30 percent of the gross national product of the United States today comes from high-energy physics that the United States of America was the pioneer in research on. Everything from the computer to the television has come as a result of high-energy physics research undertaken in this country. It is an area that we have been a leader in; it is an area that we are a leader in today; and the decision on this project is a decision as to whether we are going to stay the leader in this important area.
I believe that we are talking about an investment that will yield hundreds of thousands of jobs after the turn of the century, jobs in new technology and new techniques. I think it is important that we make the decision to invest not in the next election, but in the next generation.
So I want to ask my colleagues to look at the SSC, to look at what research and development has done for America in the past, to look at the high return we have gotten on
the research we have undertaken. I hope that after taking that look that we decide to build the most important scientific project to be built anywhere in the last quarter of the 20th century.
I hope we build the SSC so America can stay No. 1 in science and technology because, in the longrun, the only way we can maintain the highest standard of living in the world, the only way we can pay the highest wages in the world, is to have the best technology and the best tools in the world. And the SSC is a sound, long-term investment in the future of America. I hope today we make that investment.
I yield back the reminder of my time.
Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the Senator from Oregon indicated to me that he would yield me 10 minutes from his time, but he is not on the floor to do it.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senator from Michigan [Mr. Levin], is recognized for up to 10 minutes, with the time charged to the Senator from Oregon.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, first, I want to congratulate the Senator from Oregon, the Senator from Nebraska, and the majority leader for working out this amendment on testing. It is a very important step forward towards a comprehensive test ban, I does it in a way which will allow for the completion of safety testing on the two to three warheads which can still arguably use some safety testing.
This initiative will finally, after years and years and years of commitment to a comprehensive test ban, put us on the road to a global ban on nuclear explosion. Most important, it will take a major step on the road to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
What is important is that those two goals are inextricably linked. Moving toward a comprehensive test ban and limiting proliferation of nuclear weapons are inextricably linked. They cannot be separated. We cannot have nonproliferation without finally agreeing to a comprehensive test ban, because other nations will not agree not to proliferate, not to produce nuclear weapons, not to have tests, unless we also finally agree to end the testing of nuclear weapons.
This administration has made some notable progress in the area of nuclear weapons policy. But, on the question of continued explosive testing of nuclear warheads, it is frozen into cold war priorities. Instead of halting testing and leading a global effort to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons, the United States is insisting on exploding nuclear warheads in the desert for as long as we have a nuclear arsenal.
That is the administration's position. And so we continue to test despite the Russian suspension of nuclear testing that began last October and the French suspension of testing that began in April. Both nations have called on the United States to join their moratorium in negotiating a comprehensive test ban treaty. But the administration has failed to show the slightest interest in negotiations on nuclear testing despite the cessation of testing in other countries, despite existing U.S. treaty obligations, and despite commitments from the Bush administration to negotiate further limits on testing.
Every President from President Eisenhower through President Carter pursued the goal of a comprehensive test ban treaty. In the Limited Test Ban Treaty signed by President Kennedy in 1963, the United States and other signatories pledged to achieve `the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to that end.' That is the Limited Test Ban Treaty which has been approved by this country. We are a party to that treaty.
In 1969, President Johnson negotiated the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty that was subsequently supported by President Nixon. It repeated that pledge verbatim in its preamble. Article VI of that treaty is viewed by nonnuclear states as an agreement by the United States and other nuclear states to negotiate a comprehensive test ban. Every 5 years the parties to the nonproliferation treaty meet to review the treaty.
If anyone doubts that article VI and the achievement of a comprehensive test ban is crucial to the extension of the nonproliferation treaty in 1995, the next time it comes up for its 5-year review, they should read the record of the 1990 review conference of the Nonproliferation Treaty. At that conference the participants agreed to the following statement. We were one of the participants. We agreed to this statement in 1990. And every one of us should be aware of what we have pledged as recently as 1990:
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The conference noted that no multilateral negotiations had taken place between 1985 and 1990 toward the achievement of an agreement banning all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. Mindful that the extension of the treaty will be considered in 5 years--
That is 1995--
the conference expressed its belief that a comprehensive test ban treaty would significantly enhance the universality and durability of the nonproliferation treaty beyond 1995. The conference reaffirmed
that a comprehensive test ban treaty adhered to by all states would make the single most important contribution toward strengthening and extending international barriers against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and would contribute greatly to the limitation of the grave threat to the environment and human health represented by continued nuclear testing. The conference once again emphasizes the critical importance of a comprehensive nuclear test ban and calls for early action towards that objective.
We approved that. We subscribed to those statements as late as 1990.
Now, the Nonproliferation Treaty is not the only treaty commitment we have made to negotiate a comprehensive test ban. In 1974, President Nixon signed the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. Article I said: `The parties shall continue their negotiations with a view toward achieving a solution to the problem of the cessation of all underground nuclear weapons test.' That commitment was shared by the Senate. In 1990 we voted to ratify the Threshold Test Ban Treaty containing that commitment, 98-0.
Although President Carter continued comprehensive test ban negotiations and made extensive progress, President Reagan halted those talks. Congress then took the initiative with both the House and the Senate voting several times to urge resumption of negotiations. In 1986, the House voted for the United States to join a Soviet moratorium. President Reagan then threatened a veto. The distinguished chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Nunn, then became personally involved in obtaining a commitment from President Reagan to resume talks on limiting test explosions.
In a 1986 October 10 letter to the Congress, President Reagan pledged to `immediately engage in negotiations on ways to implement a step-by-step parallel program--in association with a program to reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons--of limiting and ultimately ending nuclear testing.'
That is his commitment. That is President Reagan's commitment. In exchange for that commitment, the House of Representatives dropped its insistence on a nuclear testing moratorium for the fiscal year 1987 Department of Defense authorization bill.
The progress since then has just not occurred on comprehensive test ban negotiations. We have seen none from the Reagan administration or the Bush administration.
And now the Congress again must act, not just because we made a solemn commitment to act but because we have seen through the statement of a number of other countries, including France, that unless we live up to our solemn obligations, they will begin testing, and we clearly see before us that unless we live up to our commitment to stop the testing of nuclear weapons, we will lost the battle against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We cannot have nonproliferation and endless testing of nuclear weapons. We must finally do what we have committed ourselves over and over again to do, which is to negotiate an end to the testing of nuclear weapons, if we are, in fact, going to achieve the greatest single goal for our own security, which is the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.
On September 17, 1990, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Ronald Lehman promised in a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing that the delay in resuming nuclear testing talks would not be lengthy. He said, `We are not talking about years.' That was almost 2 years ago.
The chairman of the Armed Services Committee, along with Senators Simon and Gore, wrote to the President's National Security Adviser, Brent Scowcroft, on March 31 of this year, citing many of these facts and seeking to know from the administration when further steps toward a CTB Treaty would be forthcoming. That letter noted:
When Congress reached its compromise agreement on nuclear testing with President Reagan on the eve of the Reykjavik Summit in 1986, it believed that it had received a solemn commitment from the President to pursue in good faith a step-by-step series of negotiations resulting in progressively more stringent limitations on underground nuclear tests.
But the response from General Scowcroft contained no commitment to work toward a CTB, no plans or schedule for resumption of negotiations. General Scowcroft ruled out any limits on nuclear testing beyond current United States plans and practices, and reaffirmed the U.S. intention to continue testing as long as we retain nuclear weapons, regardless of other nations' efforts to seek a mutual halt to explosive nuclear weapons tests. The administration's new policy on nuclear testing merely formalizes a previous decision to test up to six times a year. That policy flies in the face of logic. It violates treaty commitments which are the law of the land, and it violates Presidential commitments made to Congress.
Now there are several reasons we have conducted nuclear weapons tests. The main reason is to perfect new weapons designs. But the United States has no nuclear warheads in production, and no new warheads being developed or designed.
Another reason is to confirm that safety devices on warheads work as intended. Although safety questions have been raised about some warheads and missiles in the stockpile, no retrofits of warheads for safety reasons have actually been ordered at this time. The Air Force, Navy, DOD and DOE have concluded `that there is not now sufficient evidence to warrant our changing either warheads or propellants,' according to March testimony from then-Assistant Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy Robert Barker before the House Armed Services Committee Defense Nuclear Facilities Panel.
But this amendment allows for safety tests that would permit three kinds of safety devices to be installed in all warheads that will remain in the arsenal. Insensitive high explosives, fire resistant pits and enhanced detonation safety systems can be installed in warheads that will remain in the arsenal but lack these features, if the President reports to Congress that those safety features are required, and if the tests to support those retrofits are completed by September 1996.
Could there be any value to conducting some limited number of nuclear tests to support the addition of those safety features to warheads that lack them? The answer may be `yes.'
But the costs of continuing to test nuclear weapons with no end in sight, developing a whole new set of safety features with totally redesigned warheads, or for so-called weapons effects tests, or to keep thousands of weapons designers employed--those costs are very high. Continuing testing for those purposes would actually promote nuclear proliferation, a far greater potential danger to our national security than the threat of accidental detonation of nuclear warheads, which is extraordinarily low and can be further reduced through greater care in transportation and other operational procedures.
Make no mistake--when we insist on testing without end, we are promoting proliferation of nuclear weapons. Other nations that
have currently suspended their nuclear tests will begin testing again. `France will resume testing in the South Pacific if other nuclear powers fail to join its moratorium,' said President Mitterand on July 15. And Victor Mikailov, Russian Minister of Atomic Energy and Power, said last month `If the United States doesn't stop testing, we will be forced to resume testing next year.' So Russia and France have stopped testing--but the actions the Bush administration proposes could actually lead them to start again.
Even the Chinese, who recently conducted a large test, are--`serious about preparing for a comprehensive test ban. The other nuclear weapons states should be prepared for that'--says Shen Dingli, a Chinese physicist and arms control expert. `The test related to China's preparation for a test ban. It may be the last on a big scale,' said Shen.
The whole world is concerned about nuclear proliferation, but the United States is promoting that dreaded result when we are a major obstacle to a worldwide comprehensive test ban. Our nuclear testing policy puts at risk the existing nonproliferation regime and jeopardizes chances to build a stronger regime. Weigh the value of effective nonproliferation against the value of continued testing, and the conclusion is clear.
The administration's policy cannot and should not stand. First, we need a moratorium, one that least matches the Russians and the French. Second, we need negotiations to complete a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. This amendment sets a target date of 1996 for achieving a CTB, and toward that end allows up to 15 tests to incorporate warhead safety features, even though we probably would not need all 15. Those tests--if the President orders them--must be completed and a final end to all testing secured as soon as possible.
And finally, we need a strategy to strengthen and extend the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1995. The United States should be leading efforts to stop proliferation, not posing the greatest threat to the NPT regime we have.
I urge my colleagues to reject the current administration policy and approve this amendment to put the United States on course to end nuclear explosive testing in all nuclear weapons states as quickly as possible. That is one way we can begin addressing the foremost security threat--not warhead safety but nuclear proliferation.
Mr. President, again, I congratulate the sponsors of this amendment, and I ask unanimous consent that I be added as a cosponsor, if I am not already listed as one.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Who yields time?
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Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, will the Senator yield me 15 minutes? I think I have it under the UC.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct. The Senator from New Mexico is recognized for 15 minutes.
Mr. DOMENICI. I thank the Chair.
Mr. President, I thought the issues before the Senate this afternoon would be a 1-year full moratorium or a moratorium with the exception of permitting safety testing upon certification by the President. When I thought that was the issue, I felt very comfortable that we would understand what we are doing on the floor and we would choose one or the other.
But what has happened is, over the last 72 hours, a 1-year moratorium has turned into a permanent multiyear program for all nuclear testing. The Chair has heard it explained. Senators have heard it explained.
Mr. President, on plain, simple grounds, are we sure we know what we are doing? It seems to me that if ever there was a situation when we should not, on an appropriation bill, over the last 72 hours, devise a permanent, total program for the nuclear testing of American nuclear weapons, it is this one.
Now, frankly, it is very difficult to try to get the point across that nuclear testing for safety is serious business. Let me just show this chart.
This is a Minuteman III MK-12 reentry vehicle. This is it exposed to safety and reliability testing. It was down in the ground as one of America's nuclear weapons that could be there waiting to be used, and it would not have worked.
You see what happened? You could not simulate this. That is what nuclear testing is about. You take the weapons, and you test them to make sure that you do not have unsafe weapons.
Before I show you a couple more, let me tell you what we are supposed to do with our nuclear weapons system during the next 8 or 10 years, whether or not everything works out with the Soviet Union, whether or not we have the much-spoken-of nonproliferation treaty, we are going to make seven safety modifications to our current system. Not that anybody understands what they are, but just so we know they
are real--the B-61, the W-62, the W-69, W-76, W-78, W-80, and W-88. These are all nuclear weapons. And we are going to do safety modifications on them because we already know that science and technology cries out for safety modifications.
In each of these we are going to implement things like enhanced nuclear detonation safety, insensitive high explosives, and fire resistant pits. All of these are things we are going to do to these weapons to make them safer, so we will not have that happening when they are sitting down there in the silo waiting around ready to be used, God willing never, but nonetheless ready.
I am told--and this is one group of experts--that if we are going to make these changes, these safety modifications--and I say to my friend Senator Bennett Johnston, we are told if we are going to make those needed safety modifications that approximately five tests are needed for each of those particular safety enhancements so that we will end up knowing that the needed safety modifications as planned are safe.
I do not know if five is right. I am told it is right. What if it is four? What if it is three? There are eight different warheads we are going to modernize, and from what I understand that modernization and needed safety enhancement is going to occur even within the small numbers of nuclear weapons that are contemplated under the new agreements with the Soviet Union.
In other words, we are going to have these weapons, they are going to be part of our arsenal, and I wonder why we would not want to be sure that they are safe and that the needed safety modifications had taken place. Why would we not do that? Does that have anything to do with the Soviet Union? Does it have anything whatsoever to do with nuclear proliferation? It seems to me that it has everything to do with whether you want safe nuclear weapons in the arsenal.
Having said that, it seems to me that Senator Hatfield's proposed multiyear program for nuclear testing that originally was to be a moratorium--all of a sudden it sprang wings and from a moratorium it is a 5-year program. It seems to me that every one of us on the floor today agrees that modifications to enhance safety should be pursued, and being told that about five tests are needed to implement each new technology on each type of warhead, how could we be agreeing to 15? It seems to me we might not even know what we are talking
about. Maybe we pick three a year, or four a year and say that sounds right. Maybe we could get something good out of the world on some other program, some other treaty. But what does it have to do with a valid, appropriate, American safety program?
Mr. JOHNSTON. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. DOMENICI. Yes.
Mr. JOHNSTON. The information I have is that after all the strategic weapon reductions that are planned there will be nine weapons in the inventory. Of those, seven need safety modifications; the B-61 needs two, the B-62 needs three; that is insensitive high explosive, fire resistant pit and enhanced nuclear detonation safety; that normally there is no way to certify a warhead without six or more tests; and that to install all safety modifications will take at least 40 tests unless they cut corners.
I do not know whether that is correct or not. That is the information given to me by the testers, by the Department of Energy.
The information they also gave me is that originally they had five safety tests planned for 1933. I can give you the information on it. The GABBS test, or ultra safe pit plutonium involved test, the counter bore test, optimized safety design with pit reused. There are two others, without going into detail of them.
It just seems to me that if we do not know enough about this to go beyond saying no test except for safety, that is an understandable, clear rule. Yet, this amendment would give us a long-time, permanent law which cancels safety tests, and has no safety test after 1996. It seems to me that is not connected to nuclear proliferation. That is connected to nuclear safety on the wrong side of nuclear safety.
Does the Senator agree with that?
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Mr. DOMENICI. I agree. Since I have the exact same information regarding the same warheads that are going to be enhanced, they will be in the inventory and enhanced as described, I ask unanimous consent that the entire list be made a part of the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
After all the strategic weapon reductions, there will still be eight or nine weapon types in the stockpile: B-61, W-62, W-69, W-76, W-78, W-83, W-87, W-88, W-80.
Of these, seven need safety modifications: B-61 IHE, FRP; W-62 ENDS, IHE, FRP; W-69 ENDS, IHE, FRP; W-76 IHE, FRP; W-78 IHE, FRP; W-80 FRP; W-88 IHE, FRP.
ENDS=Enhanced Nuclear Detonation Safety.
IHE=Insensitive High Explosive.
FRP=Fire Resistant Pit.
Normally there is no way to certify a warhead without five or more tests.
To install all safety modifications will take at least forty tests, unless we cut corners.
Mr. DOMENICI. I said that we have been advised that there are about an average of 5 tests for each. If there are 8, that is 40. That sounds much different than 15, and it really is.
Mr. COHEN. Will the Senator yield? I do not think it is quite 15. The amendment as written allows for 5 per year for 3 years; minus 1 for reliability, if the administration chooses one for reliability, and minus 1 for the British test. It is basically 3 per year for 3 years, or a total of 9 tests for safety.
Mr. DOMENICI. I thank the Senator. He is more right than I am.
The point is, when you are talking about this kind of event in our history, we have gone through building this arsenal. It is here. If anybody thinks that we do not get very much out of these underground tests and these tests for safety, let us look at this one real quick.
I do not need to cite the missiles down the side here, but every system except one had unpredicted failures discovered on nuclear tests. There they are, with the little red checks, `major system test, unexpected results.' That is why we do tests. We do not do these tests because we like to do underground nuclear tests. I think America would be delighted to never do them again. I am certain that our friends from Nevada in whose State much of this occurs--I mean if they knew that America never needed to do these, they will not be here on the floor. They are concerned because they have manpower, they have facilities. We are going to put them all up in some kind of state of confusion because on the floor of the United States Senate we are going to come up with an ill advised multiyear plan for about three tests a year.
If I were on the Armed Services Committee, far be it from me to advise anyone, but I would be here asking that you do nothing for more than 1 year on this bill, and give it back to those who delve into this in great detail to see if we are right about the 8 systems, to see if we are right about how many tests you have to do, and to see if that jibes up with the 3 that are in here for each of the next 3 years.
So I urge--although it seems to me that the die is sort of cast, and unless we hear from additional members of the Armed Services Committee on our side and some additional Democrats on the other side, other than Senator Exon and Levin--if we do not hear from any, the die is cast on the floor of the Senate, in spite of what we are being told about the 8 systems, we are going to cavalierly decide that enough is enough, these are not very good things, and it is going to help some other program of negotiating on proliferation, which is going to get a big positive boost out of this. Frankly, it seems to me that we should be sure if we have 2,000, or 18,000 or 12,000 nuclear weapons, and whether we have an agreement to lower it more than it is today, we ought to do the safety experiments to make sure that what we have are safe.
I yield back any time that I have to the chairman, Senator Johnston.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, under the order entered, it is my understanding that I control 1 hour; is that true?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senators from Nevada are going to control 1 hour.
Mr. REID. Senator Bryan has asked me to request that 10 minutes of his time be extended to Senator Cohen.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized for 10 minutes.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, it has been stated by several members that we have come a long way on this issue, and indeed I think we have come a very long way. Last week, the committee was talking about an amendment that would have established a 1-year moratorium period--nothing about safety and reliability, simply a 1-year moratorium. I think that the committee members--certainly the Senator from Oregon and others--tried to negotiate in good faith to come up with some acceptable compromise. They have come down from a year to 9 months. They have, in fact, recognized that safety is a critically important issue in this entire debate. That safety is not something to be dismissed lightly, or to be denigrated, saying, `oh, there they go again with their safety considerations, another ruse foisted on the American people by the Bush administration.' They have also recognized that there are issues dealing with reliability and nonproliferation and the nuclear testing talks.
I might say, for the information of my colleagues, I raised these issues about this linkage, and there is a linkage between our testing practices and our ability to encourage other nations to join in the nonproliferation regime. There is linkage between our testing policies and reestablishing nuclear test talks with Moscow. There is linkage between all of this.
So I think we were right to raise these issues in the Armed Services Committee. As the Senator from Nebraska pointed out, we did not reach any conclusion. I raised this linkage in the Armed Services Committee markup in response to questions raised by Senator Nunn--he is not here just yet, but he will be soon--about the failure of the administration to really aggressively pursue the nuclear testing talks during the past several years. I think that was a legitimate complaint, and we tried to address that during the Armed Services Committee's mark-up and we were unable to reach a consensus.
The Senator from Oregon said this is a simple issue. I would like to take issue with that statement. This is not a simple issue. This is a very