Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 229 and ask for its immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:
Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 1(b) of rule XXIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of the bill (H.R. 2330) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1994 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes. The first reading of the bill shall be dispensed with. Points of order against consideration of the bill for failure to comply with section 302(f) or 303(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 are waived. General debate shall be confined to the bill and shall not exceed one hour equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. After general debate the bill shall be considered for amendment under the five-minute rule. It shall be in order to consider as an original bill for the purpose of amendment under the five-minute rule the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence now printed in the bill. The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be considered by title rather than by section. Each title shall be considered as read. Points of order against the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute for failure to comply with clause 7 of rule XVI or section 302(f) or 303(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 are waived. No amendment to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be in order unless printed in the portion of the Congressional Record designated for that purpose in clause 6 of rule XXIII prior to its consideration. At the conclusion of consideration of the bill for amendment the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted. Any Member may demand a separate vote in the House on any amendment adopted in the Committee of the Whole to the bill or to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit with or without instructions.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson] is recognized for 1 hour.
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Speaker, for purposes of debate only, I yield the customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss], pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume. During consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the purposes of debate only.
Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 299 is the rule providing for the consideration of H.R. 2330, the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1994.
The rule provides 1 hour of general debate time to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Mr. Speaker, included in the rule are waivers of sections 302(f) and 303(a) of the Congressional Budget Act against consideration of the bill. These sections of the Budget Act prohibit consideration respectively of measures that would cause the appropriate subcommittee level or program level ceilings to be exceeded, and of budgetary legislation prior to the adoption of the budget resolution.
These waivers are necessary to consider one provision of H.R. 2330 that extends pension benefits to certain former spouses of retired Central Intelligence Agency employees. These same waivers are provided for the Intelligence Committee amendment in the nature of a substitute which will be considered for the purposes of amendment.
In addition, the substitute will be considered by title with each title considered as having been read.
Mr. Speaker, the rule also waives clause 7 of the rule XVI which prohibits nongermane amendments against the Intelligence Committee substitute. The rule also requires that amendments to H.R. 2330 be printed in the Congressional Record prior to their consideration. There were no objections to the request which was made by the chairman and also by the ranking minority member of the Intelligence Committee.
And finally, Mr. Speaker, the rule provides for one motion to recommit with or without instructions.
Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 229 provides for the consideration of H.R. 2330, legislation authorizing fiscal year 1994 appropriations for the intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government including those of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence arms of a number of executive branch departments.
Classified portions of the bill containing amounts and personnel ceilings for each intelligence program are available for Members of Congress to review.
Mr. Speaker, I would like to compliment and commend the chairman of the Intelligence Committee, our good friend, the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman]. He has done an outstanding job along with our friend, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest], the ranking minority member of the committee, in bringing to the House a bill that addresses the changing nature of intelligence operations in this post-cold war period.
Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 229 is a well-written rule for the consideration of legislation that contains, as H.R. 2330 does, classified information. I urge my colleagues to support the bill, the rule, so that we may proceed with consideration of this important bill.
Mr. Speaker, I yield for purposes of debate only to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss], himself a former CIA gentleman who has brought considerable knowledge from his experience to our committee, which we appreciate greatly.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. GOSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks, and include extraneous material.)
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend, the distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. Beilenson] for the kind remarks and certainly congratulate him as well for his years of service on the House Permanent Select Intelligence Committee.
Mr. Speaker, the future of our Nation's intelligence programs is now. It is today. It is what this debate is going to be about.
We can, and do, debate whether the world is a safer place absent the U.S.S.R. monolith and that hated symbol of national enslavement--the Berlin wall. But very few people buy the proposition that the world is a more certain place. If anything, we have left behind the Warsaw pact and cold war we knew so well and have entered into a promising but decidedly uncertain future. When you do not know what is out there, that is the time to expand your vision and that is the time to turn up your hearing. And that is precisely why it is unwise and illogical, if not absurd, to cut back our information gathering and active intelligence activities at this time. What captain runs to the bridge to turn off the radar in an effort to economize as his ship enters foggy and uncharted waters? The funding levels in this bill are approximately $1 billion below the
administration's request. And I congratulate the administration for going into this and seeing our true need and asking for it.
In the Rules Committee, we had reasonable debate and lots of discussion about the changing dynamics of the world around us and about the corresponding need to adapt, update and streamline our national intelligence programs. Of course, the decline of the Soviet Union has changed the nature of the security threat we face.
There is still a difference in the threat, to be sure. But has it lessened the overall threat? In fact, recent evidence seems to show that we are entering an era of increased volatility and instability, an era when we have fewer easily defined enemies but more, many more, potential sources of life-threatening mischief.
Who is seriously postulating that terrorist groups are folding up, that ruthless dictators are all safely confined in some Jurassic Park? How could a gigantic munitions, arms, and false documents supermarket suddenly turn up right under our noses in a neighboring friendly country with a democratically elected President, a place called Managua, Nicaragua? Who could testify that other nations have cut back their own intelligence organizations and no longer target the United States either politically or militarily or commercially?
Our intelligence program has served us extremely well in the past, and it must serve us just as well in the future. Good intelligence is literally priceless. What better investment can we make than to improve our capability for knowledge so we do not have to employ our capability of muscle?
Are there really any short-term savings when you consider the long-term costs of global terrorism, involving bombings within our own borders or aimed at American citizens and interests overseas?
We all fervently wish to avoid sending U.S. troops into battle. How can the President and the Congress weigh that decision without the best possible information to make a judgment? Those of us here for the Desert Shield-Desert Storm debate remember the depth of the soul-searching that went on before we cast our votes that night. We owe our troops nothing less.
Today we have a rule to allow the fiscal year 1994 Intelligence Authorization Act to come to the floor for debate. I wish to commend Chairman Glickman and our ranking member from Texas, Larry Combest, for really great diligence in crafting this bill and especially for their willingness to allow it to come forward under an essentially open rule. I applaud the Committee for providing all Members with the opportunity to review the legislation in full and be party to detailed briefings regarding our intelligence programs, including briefings of classified matters. That is an inspired initiative which I hope yields a good harvest of understanding. True, amendments were required to be preprinted in the Congressional Record this year. But that minor constraint seems to me to be entirely appropriate, given the complexity and sensitivity of the materials before us and especially in view of the guarantee we received from the Committee that there would be no effort to limit or cut off amendments and, to my knowledge, there was none.
I do not believe any Members seeking to improve this bill or further the debate were inconvenienced by this requirement for pre-printing.
At first glance, this rule did give me some pause, especially because it includes budget act waivers that I am generally very reluctant to support. The purpose of the budget act is to provide consistency and constraint in congressional budgeting, as we know. But judging by our
ever-growing national debt, those good intentions have not realized really positive results.
The Rules Committee was asked to provide the necessary waivers to allow for relatively minor changes in current law. Upon examination, it turns out the Intelligence Committee seeks to alter the eligibility requirements for retirement and disability benefits provided to former spouses of participants in the CIA's retirement and disability system. This is more a matter of fairness than cost.
And I have to point out that I am in no way involved, after the gentleman's opening remarks. There is no benefit or connection between me personally with this provision.
In addition, the bill slightly exceeds the committee's allocation of new entitlement authority.
Finally, the bill increases direct spending under paygo by a minor percentage figure, which technically must be offset by comparable spending cuts or tax increases. The ranking member of the Budget Committee, Mr. Kasich, has made a strong case against waiving the Budget Act to allow for these admittedly minor and generally noncontroversial provisions. In principle, I agree. That is the job of the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Kasich], and he does it well. In practice, though, because of the bona fide effort of the committee to allow this important bill to proceed through an open-amendment process, I will not object to the rule.
In fact, I endorse it.
Mr. Speaker, I am including at this point in the Record the statistics on open versus restrictive rules, as follows:
OPEN VERSUS RESTRICTIVE RULES: 95TH-103D CONG.
Congress (years) Total rules granted 1 Open rules 2 Restrictive rules 3
Number Percent Number Percent
95th (1977-78) 211 179 85 32 15
96th (1979-80) 214 161 75 53 25
97th (1981-82) 120 90 75 30 25
98th (1983-84) 155 105 68 50 32
99th (1985-86) 115 65 57 50 43
100th (1987-88) 123 66 54 57 46
101st (1989-90) 104 47 45 57 55
102d (1991-92) 109 37 34 72 66
103d (1993-94) 31 9 29 22 71
OPEN VERSUS RESTRICTIVE RULES: 103D CONG.
Rule number date reported Rule type Bill number and subject Amendments submitted Amendments allowed Disposition of rule and date
H. Res. 58, Feb, 2, 1993 MC H.R. 1: Family and medical leave 30 (D-5; R-25) 3 (D-0; R-3) PQ: 246-176. A: 259-164. Feb. (Feb. 3, 1993).
H. Res. 59, Feb. 3, 1993 MC H.R. 2: National Voter Registration Act 19 (D-1; R-18) 1 (D-0; R-1) PQ: 248-271. A: 249-170. (Feb. 4, 1993).
H. Res. 103, Feb. 23, 1993 C H.R. 920: Unemployment compensation 7 (D-2; R-5) 0 (D-0; R-0) PQ: 243-172. A: 237-178. (Feb. 24, 1993).
H. Res. 106, Mar. 2, 1993 MC H.R. 20: Hatch Act amendments 9 (D-1; R-8) 3 (D-0; R-3) PQ: 248-166. A: 249-163. (Mar. 3, 1993).
H. Res. 119, Mar. 9, 1993 MC H.R. 4: NIH Revitalization Act of 1993 13 (D-4; R-9) 8 (D-3; R-5) PQ: 247-170. A:248-170. (Mar. 10, 1993).
H. Res. 132, Mar. 17, 1993 MC H.R. 1335: Emergency supplemental appropriations 37 (D-8; R-29) 1 (not submitted) (D-1; R-0) A: 240-185. (Mar. 18, 1993).
H. Res. 133, Mar. 17, 1993 MC H. Con. Res. 64: Budget resolution 14 (D-2; R-12) 4 (1-D not submitted) (D-2; R-2) PQ: 250-172. A: 251-172. (Mar. 18, 1993).
H. Res. 138, Mar. 23, 1993 MC H.R. 670: Family planning amendments 20 (D-8; R-12) 9 (D-4; R-5) PQ: 252-164. A: 247-169. (Mar. 4, 1993).
H. Res. 147, Mar. 31, 1993 C H.R. 1430: Increase Public debt limit 6 (D-1; R-5) 0 (D-0; R-0) PQ: 244-168. A: 242-170. (Apr. 1, 1993).
H. Res. 149, Apr. 1, 1993 MC H.R. 1578: Expedited Rescission Act of 1993 8 (D-1; R-7) 3 (D-1; R-2) A: 212-208. (Apr. 28, 1993).
H. Res. 164, May 4, 1993 O H.R. 820: National Competitiveness Act NA NA A: Voice vote. (May 5, 1993).
H. Res. 171, May 18, 1993 O H.R. 873: Gallatin Range Act of 1993 NA NA A: Voice Vote. (May 20, 1993).
H. Res. 172, May 18, 1993 O H.R. 1159: Passenger Vessel Safety Act NA NA A: 308-0. (May 24, 1993).
H. Res. 173, May 18, 1993 MC S.J. Res. 45: U.S. Forces in Somalia 6 (D-1; R-5) 6 (D-1; R-5) A: Voice vote. (May 20, 1993).
H. Res. 183, May 5, 1993 O H.R. 2244: 2d supplemental appropriations NA NA A: 251-174. (May 26, 1993).
H. Res. 186, May 27, 1993 MC H.R. 2264: Omnibus budget reconciliation 51 (D-19; R-32) 8 (D-7; R-1) PQ: 252-178. A: 236-194. (May 27, 1993).
H. Res. 192, June 9, 1993 MC H.R. 2348: Legislative branch appropriations 50 (D-6; R-44) 6 (D-3; R-3) PQ: 240-177. A: 226-185. (June 10, 1993).
H. Res. 193, June 10, 1993 O H.R. 2200: NASA authorization NA NA A: Voice vote. (June 14, 1993).
H. Res. 195, June 14, 1993 MC H.R. 5: Striker replacement 7 (D-4; R-3) 2 (D-1; R-1) A: 244-176. (June 15, 1993).
H. Res. 197, June 15, 1993 MO H.R. 2333: State Department. H.R. 2404: Foreign aid 53 (D-20; R-33) 27 (D-12; R-15) A: 294-129. (June 16, 1993).
H. Res. 199, June 16, 1993 C H.R. 1876: Ext. of `Fast Track' NA NA A: Voice vote. (June 22, 1993).
H. Res. 200, June 16, 1993 MC H.R. 2295: Foreign operations appropriations 33 (D-11; R-22) 5 (D-1; R-4) A: 263-160. (June 17, 1993).
H. Res. 201, June 17, 1993 O H.R. 2403: Treasury postal appropriations NA NA A: Voice vote. (June 17, 1993).
H. Res. 203, June 22, 1993 MO H.R. 2445: Energy and water appropriations NA NA A: Voice vote. (June 23, 1993).
H. Res. 206, July 23, 1993 O H.R. 2150: Coast Guard authorization NA NA A: 401-0. (July 30, 1993).
H. Res. 217, July 14, 1993 MO H.R. 2010: National Service Trust Act NA NA A: 261-164. (July 21, 1993).
H. Res. 218, July 20, 1993 O H.R. 2530: BLM authorization, fiscal year 1994-95 NA NA
H. Res. 220, July 21, 1993 MC H.R. 2667: Disaster assistance supplemental 14 (D-8; R-6) 2 (D-2; R-0) PQ: 245-178. F: 205-216. (July 22, 1993).
H. Res. 226, July 23, 1993 MC H.R. 2667: Disaster assistance supplemental 15 (D-8; R-7) 2 (D-2; R-0) A: 224-205. (July 27, 1993).
H. Res. 229, July 28, 1993 MO H.R. 2330: Intelligence authorization Act, fiscal year 1994 NA NA
H. Res. 230, July 28, 1993 O H.R. 1964: Maritime Administration Authorization NA NA A: Voice vote. (July 29, 1993).
Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to our ranking member, the distinguished gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest].
Mr. COMBEST. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.
Mr. Speaker, there is nothing that I could add that has not been said by the gentleman from California or the gentleman from Florida. I appreciate the kind remarks of both of them.
I want to reiterate particularly for the Members on this side that we have a tendency, as a general opposition to closed rules. Of course, this one did not have a closed rule. It did allow amendments which were printed previously to be allowed.
There was no effort whatsoever by the committee to cut off any of those amendments, none was done, so in many instances, and in fact, basically tried to do that so that the Members of the committee or the staff of the committee could help in the assistance of crafting those amendments to make certain that we did not by any stretch of the imagination jeopardize any information which might be otherwise classified.
I would also indicate that, as the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Goss] mentioned, the budget waivers that this rule does contain are minor in terms of numbers, and I support strongly the rule and would urge my colleagues to support the rule and that any portions of the bill which did include budget waivers that might normally be of concern to Members did have the option to be stricken by amendment if a Member so desired.
Mr. Speaker, I would stand in strong support of the rule, and I appreciate the cooperation and the work of the Committee on Rules in granting the rule which was requested by the chairman of the committee and myself.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, we have no further requests for time, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. BEILENSON. Mr. Speaker, we have no requests for time, and I move the previous question on the resolution.
The previous question was ordered.
The resolution was agreed to.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 229 and rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 2330.
The Chair designates the gentlewoman from New York [Ms. Slaughter] as Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, and requests the gentlewoman from Colorado [Mrs. Schroeder] to assume the chair temporarily.
Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 2330) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1994 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government and the Central Intelligence Agency retirement and disability system, and for other purposes.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having been read the first time.
Under the rule, the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman] will be recognized for 30 minutes, and the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest] will be recognized for 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman].
(Mr. GLICKMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Madam Chairman, this bill authorizes all of the funds for the coming fiscal year for the national and tactical intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government. National intelligence activities, known collectively as the National Foreign Intelligence Program [NFIP], provide intelligence to policymakers such as the President, members of the Cabinet, the National Security Council, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Among the programs and activities authorized within the NFIP are those undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency, as well as by the intelligence components of the Department of State and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Other executive branch agencies and departments having intelligence elements, such as the Treasury and Energy Departments and the Drug Enforcement Administration, are also presented within the NFIP.
By contrast, tactical intelligence programs are wholly the responsibility of the Department of Defense. While tactical programs primarily focus on the provision of intelligence to military commanders, like Desert Storm, there are instances in which they are used for national intelligence purposes.
It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between the functions of national and tactical programs, and the Intelligence Committee, therefore, is responsible for reviewing the budgets of both. We work closely with the Committee on Armed Services on those programs which are of particular concern to the military, and I want to thank Chairman Dellums and members of his committee for the assistance provided by the members and staff of his committee.
The requirement that classified information be protected against disclosure makes it hard to discuss intelligence activities publicly, even in the most general terms. All of the programs and activities authorized by H.R. 2330 are, however, set forth in a classified schedule of authorizations which is incorporated into the bill by reference, and discussed in detail in a classified annex to the committee's report.
Since June 30, these materials have been available in the committee's offices, and I urge Members who have not done so to go upstairs to H. 405 and review these documents.
The committee has promoted efforts to increase understanding on the part of the public and the Members of this House about the importance of an effective intelligence capability in the post-cold war world. This year, for the first time, the Director of Central Intelligence appeared before the committee in open session to offer his vision of the future roles of our intelligence community. Other open sessions of the committee have occurred, and recently Director Woolsey briefed the Democratic caucus and the Republican conference on intelligence capabilities and challenges.
And I would say that dozens and dozens of Members for the first time were exposed to many of the intricacies of what our intelligence community does.
I hope these sessions have provided Members with some understanding of the fact that timely and reliable intelligence is essential in providing the warning of political, military, and economic threats which policymakers need to enable them to decide among possible responses.
As the size of the U.S. military declines and our Pentagon budget is going to do down to reflect this, the importance of an early-warning system, the importance of what I call an insurance policy, that is intelligence, grows. As we witnessed during the Persian Gulf war, effective intelligence can save American lives. In fact, it saved thousands of lives in the gulf war. It may also make the use of force unnecessary, a fact of special significance as the U.S. military presence overseas diminishes.
The cold war has ended, but the need for a capability to collect, produce, and disseminate intelligence has not. It is true intelligence activities no longer need to be focused on the military threat once posed by the Soviet Union and that the resources devoted to intelligence should decrease as a result. The committee has been a leader in encouraging the intelligence community to redirect its efforts and to reduce its budgets.
For example, this year's bill is 3.7 percent below President Clinton's request. I might add that the defense bill was about even or very slightly under, the President's request. This bill is nearly 4 percent under what President Clinton requested and 3.8 percent below the amount authorized by last year's bill.
Enactment of this measure would provide an authorization for intelligence at about the same level appropriated for the current fiscal year, an amount significantly below that which has been available in the preceding fiscal year.
Current law mandates a 5-year, 17.5-percent reduction in civilian personnel in the intelligence community. The bill keeps the community on course toward meeting that requirement, which is intended to be accomplished without the use of involuntary separation.
It may be, however, that additional personnel reductions are necessary, and the committee has not ruled out the possibility that they would have to be accomplished in that manner.
As resource levels decline, it becomes imperative that intelligence be focused on requirements of the highest priority. Significant threats to the security of the United States remain. Many nations have the means and the desire to acquire nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons. Recently, the Director of the CIA said that more than 25 countries have that capability right now. The proliferation of these weapons poses a problem of catastrophic proportions for the world. Imagine in the old days, all we had to worry about was the Russians, maybe the Chinese; but now we have to worry about up to 25 different countries having either the real power or the capability to develop nuclear weapons, which could pose dangers to people in this country.
Efforts to address this threat--that is, the nuclear, biological, and chemical threat--as well as the threats posed by terrorism, trafficking in illegal narcotics, and the economic espionage activities of other nations, cannot be successful without dependable intelligence. You have to have your eyes and ears open to what is happening in the world. That is what we are talking about today, having good hearing and good vision to try to become aware of the insidious elements in the world and giving that information to policymakers so they will know what kind of action is needed.
The technologies associated with the more diverse threats in biological, chemical, and nuclear terrorism, particularly as they relate to all these other countries that we never worried about before, are sophisticated and require a similarly sophisticated and expensive intelligence attack. The committee has attempted to achieve what President Clinton, in a recent letter vigorously opposing further cuts in his budget request termed a `delicate balance' between intelligence capabilities and budget constraints. The bill supports the investment in new technologies which will be needed to address the challenges policymakers will confront in the years to come and promotes the consolidation of collection platforms to maximize effectiveness while reducing costs. These actions, since they involve the development and acquisition of new, complex systems, require significant initial costs. Once these systems become operational, however, very significant savings will result. H.R. 2330 puts the intelligence community on the path toward realizing those savings.
The post-cold-war intelligence community will be leaner, both in terms of numbers of personnel and budgets, than its predecessor. We do not differ with the administration on that result, but we do differ on the question of how much smaller the community should be, and on the pace by which reductions should be made. Although the bill does not provide the level of funding sought by the administration, a majority of the committee believed that the cuts will not degrade essential intelligence capabilities, and that they are appropriate in light of changes in the world and the intense competition for increasingly scarce Federal resources.
Some may argue that the pace of change favored by the committee is too slow, that we should cut more, that more money should be taken from the intelligence budget because our traditional adversary is gone. Those amendments will be offered today. I urge that these amendments be rejected. Further reductions will, in my judgment, increase the risk that unacceptable gaps in intelligence coverage will result. We live in a world in which more countries, some of whom are not friendly to the United States, are aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them, in which the expertise and equipment needed to develop those weapons and their delivery systems are readily available on the open market, a world in which regional conflicts requiring some commitment of U.S. forces are becoming increasingly frequent, and in which terrorists are less reluctant to bring their deadly activities to our shores.
The World Trade Center, the Lincoln Tunnel, the Washington Monument, the Golden Gate Bridge, it can and it is happening here in our country.
The capability to provide adequate intelligence about these activities serves as insurance to those who must fashion policies to respond to them, and to military commanders who must minimize the risk to American lives if military force must be employed to counter them. That capability will be available at the funding levels set forth in H.R. 2330, but it becomes more doubtful, more questionable, more gaps remain open, the more we reduce the bill.
In addition to authorizing intelligence programs and activities, the bill contains a number of legislative provisions which will be explained in detail by the chairman of our Subcommittee on Legislation, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Coleman]. Some of these provisions are within the jurisdiction of other committees. As an example, section 303, which repeals the National Security Education Act of 1991, is within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Education and Labor. At the appropriate time, I will seek permission to include, at this point in the Record, an exchange of correspondence between myself and Chairman Ford on section 303, an exchange which typifies the degree of cooperation extended by us by other committees as we sought to bring legislation to the floor.
I want to draw particular attention to section 304 because it illustrates the efforts the committee is making to bring a greater degree of openness to the work of the intelligence agencies. Section 304 requires the Director of Central Intelligence, for the first time, to submit an annual unclassified report to Congress on the activities of the intelligence community during the preceding year, and those issues which will require particular attention in the year ahead. This report will help make intelligence a little less mysterious and a little more understandable to the average American, a process which in my judgment is essential if support for adequate funding is to be assured.
Madam Chairman, in conclusion I want to compliment the staff of my committee, both the majority and the minority staff, for their particular help. My special thanks go to my ranking member, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest], for his cooperation. It has been a pleasure to deal with him on this bill. We have not always agreed, but we have been pretty cooperative, even when we have not agreed, and I appreciate this support.
Let me say one more thing in conclusion. There are a lot of dangers in this world. Americans are actually more threatened today from a diverse number of sources than they have ever been before, by a number of very exotic international powers who want to do great damage to the United States. Many of these people, foreign powers, terrorists and the like, have the capability to obtain sophisticated weaponry with mass destructive power. We need effective eyes and ears to make sure that American citizens are protected. That is the main function of the intelligence budget, and I urge my colleagues to adopt it.
Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, I yield myself such time as I might use.
(Mr. COMBEST asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, as the ranking Republican member of the Intelligence Committee, let me start by expressing my great appreciation to my colleague from Kansas, Chairman Glickman, for his leadership of the Intelligence Committee through some very tough deliberations. The business of this committee is of critical importance to the security of the United States and its interests worldwide and--as recent terrorist activities in New York have shown--at home. Mr. Glickman has carefully worked with all members of the committee to make sure that important arguments have been heard and important issues considered. To this end, the outstanding support of the Intelligence Committee's staff must be recognized. It has been said many times before by members of this committee, but I would be remiss not to add my own observation that the staff of the Intelligence Committee is second to none in dedication, hard work, and expertise. We are fortunate to have them.
Madam Chairman, the Republican members of the Intelligence Committee, strongly support the passage of H.R. 2330 without further reductions in the funding levels authorized. While we believe the bill makes several unwise--indeed the future may show them to be extremely unwise--cuts to the President's proposed intelligence budget, we have had to accept these pragmatically. For a fuller discussion of our concerns, I would urge Members to read our minority views.
I will only comment here that in a strange sort of bipartisan partisanship we Republicans supported President Clinton's budget. That budget was in keeping with President Clinton's plan to reduce the fiscal year 1993-97 intelligence budgets as projected by the Bush administration by $7 billion. The President's budget made some very difficult major reductions to reach a level below last year's authorized budget, and yet put needed money into program initiatives which will trigger major savings in coming years. The bill before us took that very lean administration budget and made numerous significant additional cuts. That said, you can understand why we stand firmly behind every cent remaining in this authorization bill.
We are walking a fine line. We are trying to maintain the flexible intelligence capabilities we need while simultaneously reducing funding. This can be appreciated when we look at this budget in the context of last year's major cuts. As the House debated an intelligence budget which the Intelligence Committee had cut by 5 percent, then Chairman McCurdy said:
This is a significant cut * * * It represents, for a bipartisan majority on the committee, the outer limit on which the intelligence community can reasonably be expected to reduce spending next year. To require further cuts would be to risk severe damage to the ability of the community to provide intelligence necessary to policymakers.
Despite our warning, those cuts were effectively doubled in the appropriations process. The net result was that last year's intelligence budget was cut in a manner which, I think, a majority of our committee members--Republican and Democrat--believe was draconian and haphazard. We must not repeat or compound those errors.
We are asking the intelligence community to maintain vigorous, responsive capabilities while suffering cuts to muscle and sinew. The intelligence budget before you funds everything from the antennas on satellite systems to the rent on safehouses for meeting penetrations of radical terrorist organizations; from the technical means of tracking chemical weapons transfers to putting an `X' on a map for an Army sergeant trying to locate enemy artillery; from the FBI's tracking of foreign terrorists to paying an agent to tell us of a foreign government's theft of our industrial secrets; from learning the frequencies of enemy radars so our air crews can counter them or knock them out to tracking the massive illegal transfer and laundering of money by the international narcotics cartels.
Obviously, considered as a whole, these things lumped under the term `intelligence' are not cheap. But neither are the benefits of intelligence:
From my 4 1/2 years on the Intelligence Committee, I can say plainly and without hesitation that intelligence funding buys the lives of American soldiers who would otherwise be parachuting blindly onto strange foreign battlegrounds and the lives of innocent, ordinary tourists, shoppers, and workers who would die victims of undetected terrorists.
The intelligence budget buys the jobs of American workers whose companies and industries would fall prey to unhampered foreign industrial espionage and unchallenged unfair trade practices.
Intelligence buys the capability of working with our allies to slow and, possibly, halt the acquisition of critical technology and equipment with which the world's despots and radical regimes would build nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons--at, God knows, what final cost in human lives. It is no accident that the most despotic and despicable--in North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Libya, to name but a few--are those who are most intent on building up such capabilities.
Protecting American economic competitiveness, countering terrorism, supporting our military, and retarding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: Thought it is largely hidden from the public, these are but four of the ways in which our intelligence agencies work relentlessly and with extreme dedication everyday protecting American interests. We must not foolishly think that this is a safe world and that we can now shut our eyes, close our ears, and ignore the dangers around us. We cannot thoughtlessly continue to cut and pare and chop and slice and yet expect that the intelligence community will be able to do what is needed. There are lives, there are jobs, there are principles for which we must still be vigilant and capable of fighting. It is our duty here today to ensure that we provide U.S. intelligence with the wherewithal to do just that.
I urge my colleagues to pass this authorization without additional reductions which will further imperil crucially important intelligence capabilities.
Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to my colleague, the gentleman from New Mexico [Mr. Richardson].
(Mr. RICHARDSON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. RICHARDSON. Madam Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.R. 2330, the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1994. Mr. Chairman, I would first like to recognize the leadership of our distinguished chairman, the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman] for his efforts in bringing this important legislation to the floor. His tireless efforts in working to establish a consensus on this bill have been a lesson in diligence, patience, and attention to detail and I am proud to have had the opportunity to serve with him on the Intelligence Committee.
Madam Chairman, when I was first appointed to the Intelligence Committee in 1988, cold war considerations were the driving force behind intelligence budgets. In the face of the military threat posed by the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, ever increasing amounts of resources were dedicated to the intelligence community during the 1980's. The end of the cold war, the budget deficit and domestic priorities demand a reduction in the level of intelligence community funding today.
The funding levels recommended in H.R. 2330 represent a 3.7-percent reduction from the administration's initial request and a 3.8-percent reduction from last year's intelligence authorization bill. Madam Chairman, this recommended reduction in no way compromises the national security interests of our country. The funding levels we are recommending today are lean but prudent. The Director of Central Intelligence, James Woolsey, has been in contact with many Members of this House concerning the continuing importance of intelligence. The administration has indicated that it can accept this funding level, although it would oppose additional reductions.
Madam Chairman, as we venture into the next century, our intelligence community must possess the ability to confront new and unorthodox intelligence challenges. The trade center bombing and the failed New York conspiracy offer two examples of the demand terrorism will have on tomorrow's intelligence community. Likewise, the intelligence community will be called upon to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, whether they be chemical, biological or nuclear. Finally, it will be up to the intelligence community to conduct economic intelligence in support of U.S. industrial policy abroad to ensure that the playing field is level between our trading partners and competitors.
Madam Chairman, the funding levels recommended in this bill offer adequate resources to our intelligence agencies and entities to undertake these new and future challenges.
Madam Chairman, H.R. 2330 also authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence to establish a program in which small cash prizes may be awarded to students who demonstrate excellence in high school science fairs within the United States. We are all aware of the important role science plays in the continuing technological advancement of our country. Scientific excellence is in fact critical to many of the important successes of the U.S. intelligence community and this high school science fair program will help make our Nation's youth aware of that fact.
Madam Chairman, providing for our national security is a fundamental obligation of this body. The American public rightly expects to live in a free society without fear of attack from foreign forces. A strong and dedicated intelligence community is one reason this expectation can be justified. H.R. 2330 ensures the necessary resources to the intelligence community to continue its excellent work and I encourage my colleagues to support this important bill.
Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, I yield 8 minutes to the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter].
(Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. BEREUTER. Madam Chairman, this Member rises in strong support for H.R. 2330, the Intelligence Authorization Act of fiscal year 1994. In a moment, this Member will address a principal concern regarding the size of the overall cuts in this Nation's intelligence programs.
Before doing so, however, this Member would first take a moment to compliment the chairman of the Intelligence Committee, the distinguished gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman], for the very capable and equitable manner in which he led the committee during this session. It is a difficult fiscal year, as everyone in this body knows, and budget submissions from every Federal agency came very late indeed. Despite this handicap, the chairman held a full series of hearings in which all intelligence issues of interest both to the majority and minority were fully aired and discussed. Every Member was afforded an opportunity to explore, in sufficient detail, questions and issues of importance. The chairman demonstrated bipartisan leadership and worked closely with the distinguished ranking member of the Select Committee, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest], who has himself performed with special distinction in that position. Together, they have built a consensus on most matters coming before the committee and found that consensus whenever possible.
Turning to the legislation, this bill, of course, is the annual authorization legislation for the national and tactical intelligence programs. The Director of Central Intelligence, the Honorable R. James Woolsey, made a cogent and persuasive case for the President's budget. Nonetheless, despite his repeated efforts to provide whatever supporting information the committee required, there seemed to be a dominant mind set to reach a much lower funding level than President Clinton proposed. The Committee has cut dramatically the President's request. But that goal has been met at a very steep price. And every Member of this body must be mindful of the price of this cut as we cast our votes today.
Madam Chairman, acting to defend this country's national security through its defense and civilian components of Government begins with its intelligence agencies--the CIA, NSA, the National Reconnaissance Office, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the FBI's Counterterrorism Division, and others. They are our eyes and ears in a world that is more dangerous than ever before.
Yes, the cold war is over and we have emerged victorious. Yet, like a slain hydra, the end of the cold war has spawned a series of policy issues that have vexed first the Bush, and now the Clinton administrations. None of them can be resolved easily. What are we going to do in Bosnia? How will the Muslims react to the latest Serb offensive in Sarajevo? What do we do about the allegations that China is engaged in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction? How do we deal with the
assertions that Saddam Hussein may have retained a significant amount of his missile forces despite the U.N. sanctions? What do we do about the mass starvation in Africa, not only in Somalia but in the Sudan and elsewhere? And what is the African drought's long-term effect on stability and the growth of democracy in that troubled region?
How do we continue the major, positive trends in the reduction of casual drug use in this country and reduce the supply of cocaine being produced by the South America drug lords? Will our trade negotiators who are engaged in critical talks with our trading partners have the information they need to handle delicate negotiations as they try to close the Uruguay round of the GATT? The questions go on and on, with new questions appearing daily as answers and actions are provided to others.
These are all issues that our intelligence agencies address. They must continue to report on these matters, but also be mindful that Russia continues to maintain a significant strategic weapons capability that can threaten the United States. That capability exists, not only in Russia, but also to a much lesser extent in three other states which are part of the former Soviet Union.
Indeed, Director Woolsey has testified that the types of issues that the United States faces today are, in many ways, considerably more complex and more difficult to deal with than the old mission of tracking the works of Moscow. According to Mr. Woolsey, the old Soviet Union usually operated in relatively predictable ways. It tested new weapons systems in the same manner. It even sought to infiltrate groups in the Third World in the same way. But there is far less certainty or predictability with respect to such countries as North Korea, Libya, Iran, Iraq, and others. The behavior or these rogue regimes is difficult to predict, and even harder to deter.
Director Woolsey provided sensible arguments for maintaining funding at the requested levels. Acceptance of those arguments would allow him to gradually lower the amount of spending in the U.S. intelligence community, but also to consolidate and rationalize technical collection capabilities in order to make them more efficient and less costly. Unfortunately, the authorized level in this bill does not provide the Director with the resources that we will require to make a smooth transition to new technologies.
Madam Chairman, this Member was disappointed that the White House did not come to the aid of the intelligence community and actively support the President's own request for funds for fiscal year 1994. I emphasize that their bill authorizes 3.7 percent less than the President requested. However, this Member does appreciate the President's energetic opposition to any further reductions in the fiscal year 1994 intelligence authorization. Indeed, in a July 27, 1993, letter to the distinguished chairman of the Intelligence Committee, the President stated, and I quote:
The reductions already proposed by the House Intelligence Committee will, in themselves, test our
ability to manage prudently the reduction of the intelligence budget while we simultaneously seek to meet the new security challenges which confront the country. Therefore, I will oppose an amendment on the House floor which seeks to reduce intelligence spending beyond the reduction already proposed by the Committee.
Thus, the President has made it absolutely clear that he cannot support a further diminution of our intelligence capability.
Madam Chairman, we are all looking for savings in ongoing programs to pay for worthy programs and essential expenditures and to reduce the deficit. But the cuts the committee has made in this legislation will not go to finance such other worthy expenditures or toward deficit reduction. Rather, the reductions will simply be swallowed up by the Defense authorization bill. Colleagues, I ask you to think about that fact. It is an interesting and general unrecognized fact that what we cut here will only increase Defense authorizations, for that it is widely recognized, is where the intelligence authorizations are widely hidden.
As with any capital investment, one must maintain an acceptable level of such capital assets so they can operate at peak efficiency during times of crisis. Indeed, this Member is not convinced that the authorized funding we are considering will do so; I did not support the level of cuts approved by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Finally, this Member would say that when we are finished with the authorization and appropriations bills, the Congress inevitably will have cut even more funding than the cut made in the House Select Committee on Intelligence. Any further cut clearly would be devastating. Additional cuts could lead to unintended consequences such as involuntary separations of intelligence community employees, a less reliable capability to respond to crises around the world, a tendency to hold back on intelligence operations for fear that there would not be long-term funding to support them, and the dampening of the vital `esprit de corps' within the intelligence community that is so essential to the type of brilliant intelligence operations which have so successfully helped our country throughout the cold war.
Let this Member assure his colleagues that those successes are many, but a great many of those successes necessarily had to go unmentioned or have been concealed either to protect the national interest or to conceal intelligence assets or methods.
For these reasons, Madam Chairman, this Member urges his colleagues to tread very carefully and reject further cuts in our intelligence agencies, America's first line of defense.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Coleman], chairman of the Subcommittee on Legislation.
(Mr. COLEMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. COLEMAN. Madam Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 2330, the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1994. As the chairman of the Subcommittee on Legislation, I feel we have produced a good bill that has made substantial but careful reductions in the administration's budget request to levels that will maintain our Nation's essential intelligence capabilities.
As a new member of the committee, I have been very concerned that the American people get their money's worth from our spending on intelligence activities. I have pushed to see that overlap and redundancy are eliminated and interagency coordination is improved. More can be done in these areas, but we should not take a meat-ax approach. I am glad the President, in his recent letter to Chairman Glickman, has committed his administration to these goals, as well as to making further reductions in intelligence spending in the future, according to sensible and appropriate consolidation and reorientation plans. I will thus be supporting the committee's bill against amendments on the floor to reduce spending below the levels recommended by the committee.
The Subcommittee on Legislation, which I am honored to chair, held a number of hearings and briefings on legislative proposals either suggested by the administration or arising out of other committee inquiries. Among these were the proposals to authorize separation pay incentives and early out retirement for certain CIA employees, which became Public Law 103-36. The bill before us today contains several other substantive measures, which I would like to outline just briefly:
Section 203 authorizes retirement annuities, survivor annuities, and access to health insurance for certain ex-spouses of participants in the Central Intelligence Agency retirement and disability system [CIARDS]. The provision is essentially the same as H.R. 981 introduced by Representative Barbara Kennelly, which passed the House last year with bipartisan support. It allows certain ex-spouses of participants in CIARDS who, on or before December 4, 1991, did not qualify as a former spouse because they failed to spend 5 years outside of the United States with the participant, to qualify for retirement, survivor, and other benefits available to a qualified former spouse starting on October 1, 1994.
Section 303 repeals the National Security Education Act of 1991 and requires that all amounts in the national security education trust fund that are not obligated on enactment of the section are to be transferred to the Treasury of the United States as miscellaneous receipts. This program would provide undergraduate scholarships for study abroad, graduate fellowships in international, area and foreign language studies, and grants to colleges and universities to improve programs in these disciplines. The NSEA has very worthwhile goals, but despite the claims of some supporters, repeal does represent savings to the Treasury in reduced anticipated outlays of approximately $83 million over the next 5 years. At a time when the clamor for deficit reduction is strong, this program is a luxury we cannot afford.
Section 304 requires the Director of Central Intelligence to submit to Congress annually an unclassified report on the activities of the intelligence community. The report is to be unclassified and is to describe the successes and failures of the past fiscal year as well as the areas of the world and the issues that will be of particular concern in the year to come. This section, the work of Chairman Glickman, will help inform the American people of the role of the intelligence community, including the variety of its missions in the post-cold war era.
Section 305 expresses the support of the committee for two efforts underway in the executive branch to assess and reduce secrecy and security practices and procedures. The committee is concerned that the two efforts could be duplicative or even contradictory. Thus, section 305 expresses the sense of Congress
that the reviews be conducted with maximum consultation between them and consolidated recommendations be made to the President. The costs of classification and excessive security procedures is an issue about which the committee will continue to be active and concerned.
Section 401 authorizes the Central Intelligence Agency to carry out a program to award cash prizes to students who participate in high school science fairs within the United States. The section will give the CIA authority already available to other Federal agencies such as NASA and DOD. The committee does not anticipate the program to involve expenditures greater than $5,000 in total annually.
Section 501 increases the statutory ceiling on the amount of foreign language proficiency pay [FLPP] that may be awarded to active duty and reserve component linguists. Foreign language proficiency continues to be a serious problem for our military particularly in intelligence activities. It is a problem of continuing concern to the Intelligence Committee, one that will require action by the Department of Defense on management, training, and pay issues. Our committee and the House Armed Services Committee have worked cooperatively on the FLPP issue and I will support Chairman Glickman's amendment to delete section 501 so that the provision on foreign language proficiency in the defense authorization bill may go forward.
Section 502 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to make clear that any deployment of military intelligence collection units is an intelligence activity about which the congressional intelligence committees must be kept fully and currently informed. This clarification should not be necessary, but the record of the Department of Defense in this area has been uneven at best. It should be noted that the committee is united on the importance of this measure.
In the Subcommittee on Legislation, we have repeatedly asked what is the proper role of the intelligence community--where is the bright line between areas in which the community should be involved and those in which it should not. I believe we have struck an appropriate balance, both legislatively and fiscally, and urge my colleagues to support H.R. 2330.
Mr. DICKS. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. COLEMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
Mr. DICKS. Madam Chairman, I want to commend the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Coleman]. Literally thousands and thousands of hours have been spent by the members of the Select Committee on Intelligence and our very competent staff in reviewing this budget, and we have made very significant reductions over the last 2 years on this budget. So for our colleagues, I would urge caution in considering across-the-board approaches to further reducing this budget.
I think we have got it in good shape. It is coming down, personnel is coming down. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. Coleman] has been a leader in trying to get rid of duplication, but we also have to remember how important this intelligence budget is.
So I think the gentleman is on target here, and I would urge the House to stay with the committee recommendations on this budget.
Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas].
(Mr. GEKAS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. GEKAS. Madam Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.
I concur in the sentiments that have been expressed by the gentleman from Texas, the chairman of our Subcommittee on Legislation, and am very highly satisfied that we have contributed to the deliberations that have led us to this moment where we hope that the approval of this bill will be the next order of business of the House.
Members, even as we begin the deliberations on this legislation, our young fellow Americans are poised for a possible airstrike or series of airstrikes in the boiling pot of Bosnia. This action, if taken, is going to require not only the admitted and recognized and acknowledged skill of our pilots and those who maintain our aircraft and those who supply the logistical backup for such a military action, but, equally as important, the intelligence capacity of our Armed Forces will be the guiding beam, as it were, for these young Americans to do the job that they will be asked to do.
It brings to mind forcibly what has already been stated in various ways on the floor thus far by the members of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, that no matter how we restructure, no matter how we downsize, no matter how we try to make the Armed Forces and the national security apparatus of our country leaner and meaner, no matter how we reduce it, we will always need
logistics and we will always need, and more so than ever before, intelligence capability.
That is the core of what we argue here today. The proposed reductions, further reductions in the outlays for intelligence will be depriving in a symbolic way, will be depriving our young pilots, if they engage in this Bosnian action, that extra element of intelligence and know-how and scientific background to be able to accomplish their mission with a minimum loss of life on the ground to innocent citizens and with safety and purpose to themselves.
Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Utah [Mr. Hansen].
(Mr. HANSEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. HANSEN. Madam Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 2330, the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1994. I am a new member on this committee. The amount of information that we must digest and consider, in a short period of time, is a challenge to any Member. Chairman Glickman and the ranking Republican member, Mr. Combest, shepherded the budget through a difficult period when pressures were increasing constantly for deeper and deeper cuts. It is my feeling, shared I think by my Republican colleagues, that the committee went deeper than is prudent, and that we may pay a steep price for this in the future. Our action comes after last year's cuts, when the Congress, both the authorizers and the appropriators, cut far deeper than anyone anticipated, sending shock waves through the intelligence community. That has a negative impact on important intelligence operations that are vital to our national security.
I would like to discuss briefly the issue of international economic intelligence. Innumerable Americans are secure in their jobs in a variety of industries throughout the United States because of good economic intelligence. No doubt, the average American is unaware of the fact that there is significantly more energy expended by our intelligence agencies collecting economic intelligence than for following strategic weapons developments.
While there is unanimity of opinion that our intelligence agencies will not engage in industrial espionage, many of our international competitors do not have these qualms much less share our basic belief in free trade. Accordingly, our intelligence agencies are the American people's first line of defense to ensure the playing field of international commerce is level and the officiating honest.
We are in the midst of some very difficult times now in dealing with a global economic turndown and in trying to counter the tendency of many of our economic competitors to protect themselves through a variety of unfair means. Intelligence is absolutely crucial in such an environment. Just as much as in supporting our troops and fighting terrorism, intelligence is our first line of defense in maintaining our economic competitiveness. In this case, though, instead of saving lives, it saves jobs.
Finally, I want to comment on section 501 of this bill, which Chairman Glickman will offer an amendment to delete at the appropriate point. In adopting this section, the committee took action to address a longstanding inequity between active and Reserve component forces. This addressed the vital issue of providing well-trained linguists for our military commanders in the field. Section 501, initially, provided that members of the National Guard and Reserve components who maintain a language proficiency at the same level as their active duty counterparts, would receive the same pay, $100 per month, to maintain this proficiency. At the present rate for the Reserve components, $13 a month, there is simply no incentive for the Reserves to spend the long hours necessary to keep their language proficiency. The provision was amended at the full committee markup to increase monthly pay to a maximum $450 per month for active duty and reservists who maintain fluency in two foreign languages. As we downside our military forces, we need to maintain these capabilities within the Reserve components as more and more missions are being shifted to them. The only way that one can do this is by insuring that there is an incentive for the Reserves and National Guard personnel who have language skills to maintain them and improve them. Section 501, as amended, would have addressed longstanding pay inequities and provided a strong financial reward for proficiency. My colleague, Mr. Skelton, on the Armed Services Committee felt we needed to study the proposal further and test it through a pilot program. I agreed with him, but I will continue to focus on language programs and work to ensure there is parity in language proficiency pay between active and Reserve components.
It is noteworthy that Judge Louis Freeh the candidate for Director of the FBI, said at his confirmation hearing that, `We need more agents who speak foreign languages and understand other countries and cultures.' Our committee has been a strong proponent of strong language programs, not only in the military but the entire intelligence community. I agree with Judge Freeh that we need better language programs. I will continue to work on comprehensive programs to address this problem. There will be progress soon because it is essential to better counterterrorism programs at the FBI. If we want to stop terrorists, we must understand them and their organizations. This is where language is necessary. We will work with Judge Freeh to help him rectify this problem.
In conclusion, I urge my colleagues to support the bill and oppose further reductions in the authorization levels.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Baltimore, and surrounding areas, Mr. Ben Cardin.
(Mr. CARDIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend is remarks.)
Mr. CARDIN. Madam Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me, and congratulate the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman] and the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest] for bringing to the House a bipartisan bill, a bill that is extremely important for the security of this country.
Madam Chairman, I do not serve on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, but as a Member of Congress I took the opportunity to visit NSA and to see firsthand the work that is being done by that agency. I would encourage my colleagues to take advantage of that opportunity as a Member of Congress. I saw firsthand the dedicated work that is being done by very, very talented people for the defense of this country. They are working under extremely difficult circumstances with the problems that we are having with our budget. The reality is they are going to get less resources. We know that. That is the fiscal reality. However, we expect our intelligence community to be able to obtain the brightest minds to work for our intelligence needs, the best mathematicians and linguists in the Nation. It is very difficult with less funds.
I would urge my colleagues to support this authorization and not to make any further cuts. The needs of the intelligence community are changing. Yes, our defense needs might be less as far as our military is concerned, but the need for intelligence actually increases. As we have less military tools, how we use those tools becomes even more important, and intelligence can help us use our tools more efficiently, in the best interests of our times.
These are changing times. The economic competition among nations requires intelligence information for our Nation to remain strong. We need to protect our research and development capacities in this country, and the role of the intelligence community in stopping international terrorism is absolutely essential.
The nature of intelligence work has become critically important to our country. I urge my colleagues to support the committee's recommendation.
Mr. COMBEST, Madam Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. Dornan].
(Mr. DORNAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. DORNAN. Madam Chairman, I rise today on behalf of my committee's bill, H.R. 2330, the Intelligence Authorization Act. Ulysses S. Grant, one our our great Civil War generals, who at age 46 become our 18th President, once said that, `The art of war is simple enough: Find out where your enemy is, get at him as soon as you can, strike at him as hard and as often as you can, and then keep on moving.'
The key there is finding your enemy. At the 130th anniversary of the Battle of Gettysburg, one of the more tragic parts of the history there was Gen. Robert E. Lee losing his cavalry for almost all 3 days of the conflict. Whoever came up to him on the battlefield, he would say, `Have you seen my cavalry? Where is my cavalry? Where are my eyes?' That probably contributed greatly to his loss.
Without intelligence we are blinded. Madam Chairman, we may have seen the end of the evil police state empire, but the world remains a very, very dangerous place. Finding out where our enemy is will be just as difficult and maybe even more complicated than in other parts and times of the cold war. Spotting an individual foot soldier in the hills of Bosnia with an SA-14 shoulder-held weapon, one of the best of its type in the world, that is not easy. Locating a ballistic missile site in Iraq, pinpointing a nuclear weapons facility in North Korea, or uncovering a terrorist plot in the Middle East to strike the United States or our assets anywhere in this world, all of this is dependent upon the capability of our Government's intelligence forces.
If we further cut this already depleted budget, we will directly risk the lives of not only our brave military forces, who may be asked to tackle one of those problems, or destroy a potential enemy threat, but also every citizen of our Nation, every citizen assigned overseas, and every American who travels. At any given moment, 500,000 to 600,000 or more Americans are traveling around this world. All of them are potential targets of terrorist attack.
Enough is enough. I would ask my colleagues, do not tear down our intelligence services any more. What we are defending on this side of the aisle is Mr. Clinton's intelligence request. One of the amazing things is, no matter who ends up as the Commander in Chief, the one thing they treasure is that 9 o'clock briefing every morning of their service, or when there is a crisis, those hourly briefings where we bring all of the forces of our intelligence to bear on helping the executive branch make their decisions.
Madam Chairman, I include for the Record specific answers to some of the damaging amendments we will have before us today.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, may I ask how much time I have remaining?
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman] has 5 minutes remaining, and the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest] has 6 minutes remaining.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I yield 1 minute and 30 seconds to the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Harman].
(Ms. HARMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)
Ms. HARMAN. Madam Chairman, I rise to support the fiscal year 1994 intelligence authorization bill. As a member of the Armed Services Committee, I appreciate the work of Chairman Glickman and the Intelligence Committee to shape a budget that adapts our intelligence community to changing threats. This bill funds programs that are critical to our national security, and I urge my colleagues to support it.
Intelligence spending is intelligent spending. I believe that intelligence is a crucial investment for much the same reason that I support aid to the former Soviet Republics: It is proactive. The money we spend for these programs helps us avoid spending much greater sums later, because we can identify threats early on and organize our response. Our intelligence capabilities were a major factor in the Persian Gulf war: They improve our battle management, increased our knowledge about Iraq's capabilities, and helped pave the way for the ground war and liberation of Kuwait. My district has made a major contribution to the tactical intelligence systems that are funded jointly by the Intelligence and Armed Services Committees, and I think these systems are more vital than ever in these times of rapid international change.
It is also intelligent for the Intelligence Committee to bring fresh air into its proceedings--by holding open hearings where possible, and requiring an unclassified annual report to Congress on the intelligence community's priorities and performance. These are important departures from past practice. I think this information will go a long way toward increasing public understanding of the intelligence community, and of the important programs we are voting on here today.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks].
Mr. DICKS. Madam Chairman, I want to commend our new colleague, the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Harman] on her interest not only in defense intelligence but in defense and national security issues. I would also point out that the technology, those sensors, that stealth capability, all those things came to bear, and it did one other thing in the Persian Gulf war. It saved thousands, and thousands, and thousands of American lives.
Bill Perry probably did as good an article as there has been in Foreign Affairs about how these sensors worked and how all that investment in technology came to bear in the gulf war. I can just tell the Members that it was because of technological superiority, because of those investments, that we did save those lives.
I must tell the Members and I must warn them, we have cut this budget down to the point where if we do not stay with the committee mark, I am concerned, very concerned, that we will not have that technological superiority in the future. We will not be able to make the investments in new capability that are so crucial for the future.
Ms. HARMAN. If the gentleman will yield, I thank him for his comments and I agree.
Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Pelosi].
Ms. PELOSI. Madam Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding the time.
Madam Chairman, I rise in support of the Intelligence Committee bill today and commend our chairman, the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman], and the ranking member, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combset], for their leadership in bringing this legislation to the floor. I especially want to commend Chairman Glickman for the spirit of openness that his leadership is bringing to the committee. As he mentioned in his remarks. the open hearing was historic with the new and very capable Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Woolsey, and in addition, our meeting and briefing for Members was also. I also want to commend him for the efforts he is making toward making our intelligence gathering more open, less expensive, and therefore safer.
Many of my colleagues with whom I serve on the committee have pointed out reasons why it is necessary for us to have a significant amount of money spent on intelligence. I support them in that. I believe that our committee has made the sharpest responsible cuts to the budget. Are we allowed to say we came in over $1 billion under the President's request? I hope so.
In any event, I believe that to cut any deeper at this point in the process would not be responsible.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam. Chairman, I yield the balance of our time to the distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. Schumer] who is, of course, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Crime and very involved in terrorism issues affecting this country.
Mr. SCHUMER. Antiterrorism issues.
Mr. GLICKMAN. The Chair was just testing the gentleman from New York, and he is as sharp as I thought he was.
Mr. SCHUMER. Madam Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding the time and I rise in support of the committee bill, and commend Chairman Glickman in his first year as head of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for bringing to the floor legislation that will take the CIA and the intelligence communities into the 1990's. I want to also commend Chairman Glickman and ranking minority member Combest for making sensible reductions in the overall funding level for intelligence.
It seems to me that at $1 billion under the President's request, the bill roughly funds Intelligence at last year's level, but more than adequately protects our interests overseas.
It is certainly true, Madam Chairman, that with the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war, the threat to America from a foreign power has significantly diminished. But we have to be realistic. We are in a brave new world.
The bill is especially important, in my opinion, because it begins to make the transition from an intelligence community that was focused, and I would say obsessed with the cold war, to a modern, lean intelligence-gathering organization that is geared toward counter-terrorism, nuclear nonproliferation, and industrial espionage.
I have been particularly concerned about the steady rise of State-sponsored terrorism around the world, terrorism that has become more extreme, more deadly, more autonomous, and more heavily armed, and unfortunately, for the first time, more active on American soil.
Our success or failure to fight State-sponsored terrorism will depend more than ever on intelligence activities than just about any other leg of national security. If we cut the budget beyond the levels contained in this bill, the happiest people may well be terrorists in Hamas and Hezbollah and their patrons in Libya, Syria, Iran, and Iraq.
I would say one other sensitive area is nuclear nonproliferation. I know that that is an important issue, but from the perspective of letting the CIA transition from anti-cold war to fighting the new battles of terrorism and nuclear nonproliferation, it is a responsible bill, well put together, and I support it.
Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Just to complete the debate, let me once again reiterate what was said on this floor last year during the consideration of the intelligence bill by the chairman at that time. This is a significant cut. It represents, for a bipartisan majority on the committee, the outer limits on which the intelligence community can reasonably be expected to reduce spending next year. To require further cuts would be to risk severe damage to the ability of the community to provide the intelligence necessary to policymakers.
Mr. COMBEST. Madam. Chairman, I yield back the remainder of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired.
Pursuant to the rule, the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute now printed in the bill shall be considered by titles as an original bill for the purpose of amendment, and each title is considered as read.
No amendment to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute is in order unless printed in the portion of the Congressional Record designated for that purpose in clause 6 of rule XXIII prior to its consideration.
The Clerk will designate section 1.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute be printed in the Record and open to amendment at any point.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Kansas?
There was no objection.
The text of the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute is as follows:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the `Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994'.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1994 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Department of Defense.
(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(4) The National Security Agency.
(5) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force.
(7) The Department of State.
(8) The Department of the Treasury.
(9) The Department of Energy.
(10) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(11) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings: The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 1994, for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 2330 of the One Hundred Third Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations: The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Adjustments: The Director of Central Intelligence may authorize employment for civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 1994 under section 102 of this Act when the Director determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that such number may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed 2 percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such section for such element.
(b) Notice to Intelligence Committees: The Director of Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate whenever the Director exercises the authority granted by this section.
SEC. 104. COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations: There is authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 1994 the sum of $110,788,000. Within such amounts authorized, funds identified for the Advanced Research and Development Committee shall remain available for two years.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels: The Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence is authorized 222 full-time personnel as of September 30, 1994. Such personnel of the Community Management Account may be permanent employees of the Community Management Account or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government.
(c) Reimbursement: During fiscal year 1994, any officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the Community Management Staff from another element of the United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary functions as required by the Director of Central Intelligence.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 1994 the sum of $182,300,000.
SEC. 202. TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS.
(a) In General: The Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act is amended--
(1) in section 101(7) (50 U.S.C. 2001(7))--
(A) by striking the comma after `basic pay' and inserting in lieu thereof `and'; and
(B) by striking `, and interest determined under section 281';
(2) in section 201(c) (50 U.S.C. 2011(c)), by striking `the proviso of section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(d)(3))' and inserting in lieu thereof `section 103(c)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(5))';
(3) in section 211(c)(2)(B) (50 U.S.C. 2021(c)(2)(B)), by striking `the requirement under section 241(b)(4)' and inserting in lieu thereof `prior notification of a current spouse';
(4) in section 221 (50 U.S.C. 2031)--
(A) by striking `(or, in the case of an annuity computed under section 232 and based on less than 3 years, over the total service)' in subsection (a)(4);
(B) in subsection (f)(1)(A)--
(i) by inserting `after the participant's death' before the period in the first sentence;
(ii) by striking `after the participant's death' in the second sentence;
(iii) by striking `(or is remarried if' in subsection (g)(1) and inserting in lieu thereof `(or, if remarried,'; and
(iv) by striking `(except as provided in paragraph (2))' in subsection (j);
(5) in section 222 (50 U.S.C. 2032)--
(A) by striking `other' the first place it appears in subsection (a)(7) and inserting in lieu thereof `survivor';
(B) by inserting `the participant' before `or does not qualify' in subsection (c)(3)(C); and
(C) by inserting `spouse's death or the' after `month before the' in subsection (c)(4);
(6) in section 224(c)(1)(B)(i) (50 U.S.C. 2034(c)(1)(B)(i)), by striking `former participant' and inserting in lieu thereof `retired participant';
(7) in section 225(c) (50 U.S.C. 2035(c))--
(A) by striking `other' the first place it appears in paragraph (3) and inserting in lieu thereof `survivor'; and
(B) by striking `1991' in paragraph (4)(A) and inserting in lieu thereof `1990';
(8) in section 231(d)(2) (50 U.S.C. 2051(d)(2)), by striking `241(b)' and inserting in lieu thereof `241(a)';
(9) in section 232(b)(4) (50 U.S.C. 2052(b)(4)), by striking `section 222' and inserting in lieu thereof `section 224';
(10) in section 234(b) (50 U.S.C. 2054(b)), by striking `sections 241 and 281' and inserting in lieu thereof `section 241';
(11) in section 241 (50 U.S.C. 2071)--
(A) by striking `A lump-sum benefit that would have been payable to a participant, former participant, or annuitant, or to a survivor annuitant, authorized by subsection (d) or (e) of this section or by section 234(b) or 281(d)' in subsection (c) and inserting in lieu thereof `Lump-sum payments authorized by subsections (d) through (f) of this section or by section 281(d)'; and
(B) by redesignating subsection (f) as subsection (g) and inserting after subsection (e) the following new subsection:
`(f) Termination on Death of Participant: If a retired participant dies, any annuity accrued and unpaid shall be paid in accordance with subsection (c).';
(12) in section 264(b) (50 U.S.C. 2094)--
(A) by inserting `and' after the semicolon at the end of paragraph (2);
(B) by striking `and to any payment of a return of contributions under section 234(a); and' in paragraph (3) and inserting in lieu thereof `, and the amount of any such payment;'; and
(C) by striking paragraph (4);
(13) in section 265 (50 U.S.C. 2095), by striking `Act' in both places it appears and inserting in lieu thereof `title';
(14) in section 291(b)(2) (50 U.S.C. 2131(b)(2)), by striking `or section 232(c)'; and
(15) in section 304(i)(1) (50 U.S.C. 2154(i)(1)), by striking `section 102(a)(3)' and inserting in lieu thereof `section 102(a)(4)'.
(b) Effective Date: The amendments made by subsection (a) shall take effect as of February 1, 1993.
SEC. 203. SURVIVOR ANNUITY, RETIREMENT ANNUITY, AND HEALTH BENEFITS FOR CERTAIN EX-SPOUSES OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EMPLOYEES.
(a) Survivor Annuity:
(1) In general:
(A) Entitlement of former wife or husband: Any person who was divorced on or before December 4, 1991, from a participant or retired participant in the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System and who was married to such participant for not less than 10 years during such participant's creditable service, at least five years of which were spent by the participant during the participant's service as an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency outside the United States, or otherwise in a position the duties of which qualified the participant for designation by the Director of Central Intelligence as a participant under section 203 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2013), shall be entitled, except to the extent such person is disqualified under paragraph (2), to a survivor annuity equal to 55 percent of the greater of--
(i) the unreduced amount of the participant's annuity, as computed under section 221(a) of such Act; or
(ii) the unreduced amount of what such annuity as so computed would be if the participant had not elected payment of the lump-sum credit under section 294 of such Act.
(B) Reduction in survivor annuity: A survivor annuity payable under this subsection shall be reduced by an amount equal to any survivor annuity payments made to the former wife or husband under section 226 of such Act.
(2) Limitations: A former wife or husband is not entitled to a survivor annuity under this subsection if--
(A) the former wife or husband remarries before age 55, except that the entitlement of the former wife or husband to such a survivor annuity shall be restored on the date such remarriage is dissolved by death, annulment, or divorce;
(B) the former wife or husband is less than 50 years of age; or
(C) the former wife or husband meets the definition of `former spouse' that was in effect under section 204(b)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees before December 4, 1991.
(3) Commencement and termination of annuity:
(A) Commencement of annuity.--The entitlement of a former wife or husband to a survivor annuity under this subsection shall commence--
(i) in the case of a former wife or husband of a participant or retired participant who is deceased as of October 1, 1994, beginning on the later of--
(I) the 60th day after such date; or
(II) the date on which the former wife or husband reaches age 50; and
(ii) in the case of any other former wife or husband, beginning on the latest of--
(I) the date on which the participant or retired participant to whom the former wife or husband was married dies;
(II) the 60th day after October 1, 1994; or
(III) the date on which the former wife or husband attains age 50.
(B) Termination of annuity.--The entitlement of a former wife or husband to a survivor annuity under this subsection terminates on the last day of the month before the former wife's or husband's death or remarriage before attaining age 55. The entitlement of a former wife or husband to such a survivor annuity shall be restored on the date such remarriage is dissolved by death, annulment, or divorce.
(4) Election of benefits: A former wife or husband of a participant or retired participant shall not become entitled under this subsection to a survivor annuity or to the restoration of the survivor annuity unless the former wife or husband elects to receive it instead of any other survivor annuity to which the former wife or husband may be entitled under the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System or any other retirement system for Government employees on the basis of a marriage to someone other than the participant.
(A) Time limit; waiver: A survivor annuity under this subsection shall not be payable unless appropriate written application is provided to the Director, complete with any supporting documentation which the Director may by regulation require. Any such application shall be submitted not later than October 1, 1995. The Director may waive the application deadline under the preceding sentence in any case in which the Director determines that the circumstances warrant such a waiver.
(B) Retroactive benefits: Upon approval of an application provided under subparagraph (A), the appropriate survivor annuity shall be payable to the former wife or husband with respect to all periods before such approval during which the former wife or husband was entitled to such annuity under this subsection, but in no event shall a survivor annuity be payable under this subsection with respect to any period before October 1, 1994.
(6) Restoration of annuity: Notwithstanding paragraph (5)(A), the deadline by which an application for a survivor annuity must be submitted shall not apply in cases in which a former spouse's entitlement to such a survivor annuity is restored after October 1, 1994, under paragraph (2)(A) or (3)(B).
(7) Applicability in cases of participants transferred to fers:
(A) Entitlement: Except as provided in paragraph (2), this subsection shall apply to a former wife or husband of a participant under the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System who has elected to become subject to chapter 84 of title 5, United States Code.
(B) Amount of annuity: The survivor annuity of a person covered by subparagraph (A) shall be equal to 50 percent of the unreduced amount of the participant's annuity computed in accordance with section 302(a) of the Federal Employees' Retirement System Act of 1986 and shall be reduced by an amount equal to any survivor annuity payments made to the former wife or husband under section 8445 of title 5, United States Code.
(b) Retirement Annuity:
(1) In general:
(A) Entitlement of former wife or husband: A person described in subsection (a)(1)(A) shall be entitled, except to the extent such former spouse is disqualified under paragraph (2), to an annuity--
(i) if married to the participant throughout the creditable service of the participant, equal to 50 percent of the annuity of the participant; or
(ii) if not married to the participant throughout such creditable service, equal to that former wife's or husband's pro rata share of 50 percent of such annuity (determined in accordance with section 222(a)(1)(B) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2032 (a)(1)(B)).
(B) Reduction in retirement annuities:
(i) Amount of reduction: An annuity payable under this subsection shall be reduced by an amount equal to any apportionment payments payable to the former wife or husband pursuant to the terms of a court order incident to the dissolution of the marriage of such former spouse and the participant, former participant, or retired participant.
(ii) Definition of terms: For purposes of clause (i):
(I) Apportionment: The term `apportionment' means a portion of a retired participant's annuity payable to a former wife or husband either by the retired participant or the Government in accordance with the terms of a court order.
(II) Court order: The term `court order' means any decree of divorce or annulment or any court order or court-approved property settlement agreement incident to such decree.
(2) Limitations: A former wife or husband is not entitled to an annuity under this subsection if--
(A) the former wife or husband remarries before age 55, except that the entitlement of the former wife or husband to an annuity under this subsection shall be restored on the date such remarriage is dissolved by death, annulment, or divorce;
(B) the former wife or husband is less than 50 years of age; or
(C) the former wife or husband meets the definition of `former spouse' that was in effect under section 204(b)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees before December 4, 1991.
(3) Commencement and termination:
(A) Retirement annuities: The entitlement of a former wife or husband to an annuity under this subsection--
(i) shall commence on the later of--
(I) October 1, 1994;
(II) the day the participant upon whose service the right to the annuity is based becomes entitled to an annuity under such Act; or
(III) such former wife's or husband's 50th birthday; and
(ii) shall terminate on the earlier of--
(I) the last day of the month before the former wife or husband dies or remarries before 55 years of age, except that the entitlement of the former wife or husband to an annuity under this subsection shall be restored on the date such remarriage is dissolved by death, annulment, or divorce; or
(II) the date on which the annuity of the participant terminates.
(B) Disability annuities: Notwithstanding subparagraph (A)(i)(II), in the case of a former wife or husband of a disability annuitant--
(i) the annuity of the former wife or husband shall commence on the date on which the participant would qualify on the basis of the participant's creditable service for an annuity under the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (other than a disability annuity) or the date the disability annuity begins, whichever is later; and
(ii) the amount of the annuity of the former wife or husband shall be calculated on the basis of the annuity for which the participant would otherwise so qualify.
(C) Election of benefits: A former wife or husband of a participant or retired participant shall not become entitled under this subsection to an annuity or to the restoration of an annuity unless the former wife or husband elects to receive it instead of any survivor annuity to which the former wife or husband may be entitled under the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System or any other retirement system for Government employees on the basis of a marriage to someone other than the participant.
(i) Time limit; waiver: An annuity under this subsection shall not be payable unless appropriate written application is provided to the Director of Central Intelligence, complete with any supporting documentation which the Director may by regulation require, not later than October 1, 1995. The Director may waive the application deadline under the preceding sentence in any case in which the Director determines that the circumstances warrant such a waiver.
(ii) Retroactive benefits: Upon approval of an application under clause (i), the appropriate annuity shall be payable to the former wife or husband with respect to all periods before such approval during which the former wife or husband was entitled to an annuity under this subsection, but in no event shall an annuity be payable under this subsection with respect to any period before October 1, 1994.
(4) Restoration of annuities: Notwithstanding paragraph (3)(D)(i), the deadline by which an application for a retirement annuity must be submitted shall not apply in cases in which a former spouse's entitlement to such annuity is restored after October 1, 1994, under paragraph (2)(A) or (3)(A)(ii).
(5) Applicability in cases of participants transferred to fers: The provisions of this subsection shall apply to a former wife or husband of a participant under the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System who has elected to become subject to chapter 84 of title 5, United States Code. For purposes of this paragraph, any reference in this section to a participant's annuity under the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System shall be deemed to refer to the transferred participant's annuity computed in accordance with section 302(a) of the Federal Employees' Retirement System Act of 1986.
(6) Savings provision: Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to impair, reduce, or otherwise affect the annuity or the entitlement to an annuity of a participant or former participant under title II or III of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act.
(c) Health Benefits:
(1) In general: Section 16 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403p) is amended--
(A) by redesignating subsections (c) through (e) as subsections (e) through (g), respectively; and
(B) by inserting after subsection (b) the following:
`(c) Eligibility of Former Wives or Husbands: (1) Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) and except as provided in subsections (d), (e), and (f), an individual--
`(A) who was divorced on or before December 4, 1991, from a participant or retired participant in the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System or the Federal Employees Retirement System Special Category;
`(B) who was married to such participant for not less than ten years during the participant's creditable service, at least five years of which were spent by the participant during the participant's service as an employee of the Agency outside the United States, or otherwise in a position the duties of which qualified the participant for designation by the Director of Central Intelligence as a participant under section 203 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2013); and
`(C) who was enrolled in a health benefits plan as a family member at any time during the 18-month period before the date of dissolution of the marriage to such participant;
is eligible for coverage under a health benefits plan.
`(2) A former spouse eligible for coverage under paragraph (1) may enroll in a health benefits plan in accordance with subsection (b)(1), except that the election for such enrollment must be submitted within 60 days after the date on which the Director notifies the former spouse of such individual's eligibility for health insurance coverage under this subsection.
`(d) Continuation of Eligibility: Notwithstanding subsections (a), (b), and (c) and except as provided in subsections (e) and (f), an individual divorced on or before December 4, 1991, from a participant or retired participant in the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System or Federal Employees' Retirement System Special Category who enrolled in a health benefits plan following the dissolution of the marriage to such participant may continue enrollment following the death of such participant notwithstanding the termination of the retirement annuity of such individual.'.
(2) Conforming Amendments: (A) Subsection (a) of such section is amended by striking `subsection (c)(1)' and inserting in lieu thereof `subsection (e)'.
(B) Subsection (e)(2) of such section (as redesignated by paragraph (1) of this section) is amended by inserting `or to subsection (d)' after `subsection (b)(1)'.
(d) Source of Payment for Annuities: Annuities provided under subsections (a) and (b) shall be payable from the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund maintained under section 202 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2012).
(e) Effective Date:
(1) In general: Except as provided in paragraph (2), subsections (a) and (b) shall take effect as of October 1, 1994, the amendments made by subsection (c) shall apply to individuals on and after October 1, 1994, and no benefits provided pursuant to those subsections shall be payable with respect to any period before October 1, 1994.
(2) Section 16(d) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (as added by subsection (c) of this section) shall apply to individuals beginning on the date of enactment of this Act.
SEC. 204. CROSS-REFERENCE CORRECTIONS TO REVISED CIARDS STATUTE.
(a) Annual Intelligence Authorization Acts: Section 306 of the Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1990 (50 U.S.C. 403r-1) is amended by striking `section 303 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees' and inserting in lieu thereof `section 303 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2153)'.
(b) Foreign Service Act of 1980: The Foreign Service Act of 1980 is amended--
(1) in section 853 (22 U.S.C. 4071b), by striking `title II of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees' in subsection (c) and inserting in lieu thereof `title II of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.)';
(2) in section 854 (22 U.S.C. 4071c)--
(A) by striking `title II of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees' in subsection (a)(3) and inserting in lieu thereof `title II of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.)'; and
(B) by striking `title III of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees' in subsection (d) and inserting in lieu thereof `title III of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.)'; and
(3) in section 855 (22 U.S.C. 4071d), by striking `under title II of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees or under section 302(a) or 303(b) of that Act' in subsection (b)(2)(A)(ii) and inserting in lieu thereof `under title II of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.) or under section 302(a) or 303(b) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 2152(a), 2153(b))'.
(c) Internal Revenue Code of 1986: Section 3121(b)(5)(H)(i) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by striking `section 307 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees' and inserting in lieu thereof `section 307 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2157)'.
(d) Social Security Act: Section 210(a)(5)(H)(i) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 410(a)(5)(H)(i)) is amended by striking `section 307 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees' and inserting in lieu thereof `section 307 of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2157)'.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
SEC. 303. NATIONAL SECURITY SCHOLARSHIPS, FELLOWSHIPS, AND GRANTS.
(a) Repeal: Title VIII of Public Law 102-183 (50 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) is repealed.
(b) Return of Funds to Treasury: All amounts in the National Security Education Trust Fund established pursuant to section 804 of such public law that are not obligated on the date of enactment of this Act are transferred to the Treasury of the United States as miscellaneous receipts.
SEC. 304. ANNUAL REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
(a) Annual DCI Report: Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by adding at the end the following new section:
`(1) the activities of the intelligence community during the preceding fiscal year, including significant successes and failures that can be described in an unclassified manner; and
`(2) the areas of the world and the issues that the Director expects will require increased or unusual attention from the intelligence community during the next fiscal year.
`(c) Time for Submission: The report under this section for any year shall be submitted at the same time that the President submits the budget for the next fiscal year pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United States Code.'.
(b) Clerical Amendment: The table of contents in the first section of such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 108 the following new item:
`Sec. 109. Annual report on intelligence community activities.'.
SEC. 305. SECURITY REVIEWS.
(a) Findings: The Congress finds that--
(1) the President directed the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office to review Executive Order 12356 and other directives relating to the protection of national security information and to report no later than November 30, 1993; and
(2) the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence have established a joint security commission to conduct a review of security practices and procedures at the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency and to report within 1 year of the establishment of the commission.
(b) Sense of Congress: It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office should conduct the reviews referred to in subsection (a) with maximum consultation with each other; and
(2) the results of these reviews should be incorporated into a consolidated recommendation for the President.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SEC. 401. SUPPORT FOR SCIENCE, MATHEMATICS, AND ENGINEERING EDUCATION.
Section 5 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f) is amended--
(1) by striking out `and' at the end of paragraph (e);
(2) by striking out the period at the end of paragraph (f) and inserting in lieu thereof `; and'; and
(3) by adding the following new paragraph at the end thereof:
`(g) In recognition of the importance of science, mathematics, and engineering to the national security and in order to encourage students to pursue studies in science, mathematics, and engineering, the Director may carry out a program to award cash prizes and visits to the Agency (including the payment of costs associated with such visits) for students who participate in high school science fairs within the United States.'.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
SEC. 501. FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY PAY.
(a) Rates of Proficiency Pay: Subsection (b) of section 316 of title 37, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
`(b)(1) The monthly rate for special pay under subsection (a) shall be determined by the Secretary concerned.
`(2) Special pay under subsection (a) may--
`(A) only be paid for the achievement of level 2 or greater on the defense language proficiency test in each of the categories of listening and reading; and
`(B) may not exceed the maximum monthly rates for the achievement of the levels designated in this subparagraph, or greater, of foreign language proficiency in the number of foreign languages specified, as follows:
Maximum amount of monthly pay Level of proficiency achievement in listening/reading/speaking Number of foreign languages required
$450 3/3/3 2
$300 3/3/3 1
$200 3/3/0 1.'.
SEC. 502. REPORTING ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN COVERT ACTIONS.
Section 502 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413a) is amended--
(1) by inserting `(a)' after `Sec. 502.'; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
`(b) For the purposes of this section, the term `intelligence activity' includes any deployment of military intelligence personnel serving in clandestine intelligence collection units.'.
TITLE VI--ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS.
SEC. 601. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949.
The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 is amended--
(1) in section 5(a) (50 U.S.C. 403f(a)), by striking `sections 102 and 303 of the National Security Act of 1947 (Public Law 253, Eightieth Congress)' in the first sentence and inserting in lieu thereof `sections 103 and 104 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3, 403-4)';
(2) in the first sentence of section 6 (50 U.S.C. 403g), by striking `the proviso of section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (Public Law 253, Eightieth Congress, first session)' and inserting in lieu thereof `section 103(c)(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(5))'; and
(3) in section 19(b) (50 U.S.C. 403s(b))--
(A) by striking `Section 231' in the heading after `(b)' and inserting in lieu thereof `Section 232'; and
(B) by striking `section 231' in the matter following paragraph (4) and inserting in lieu thereof `section 232'.
SEC. 602. NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.
Section 103(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(3)) is amended by striking `providing' and inserting in lieu thereof `provide'.
SEC. 603. CODIFICATION IN TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE, OF CERTAIN PERMANENT PROVISIONS.
(a) Intelligence-Related Provision: (1) Chapter 21 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 424 the following new section:
`425. Disclosure of personnel information: exemption for National Reconnaissance Office
`(a) Exemption From Disclosure: Except as required by the President or as provided in subsection (b), no provision of law shall be construed to require the disclosure of the name, title, or salary of any person employed by, or assigned or detailed to, the National Reconnaissance Office or the disclosure of the number of such persons.
`(b) Provision of Information to Congress: Subsection (a) does not apply with respect to the provision of information to Congress.'.
(2) The table of sections at the beginning of subchapter I of such chapter is amended by adding at the end the following new item:
`425. Disclosure of personnel information: exemption for National Reconnaissance Office.'.
(b) Conforming Repeal: Section 406 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 (Public Law 102-496; 10 U.S.C. 424 note) is repealed.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I offer an amendment which was printed in the Record.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Glickman: Page 31, strike line 3 and all that follows through line 7 on page 32 (all of section 501).
Page 32, line 8, strike `502' and insert `501'.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, my amendment deletes section 501 of the bill which would raise the statutory ceiling on the amount of monthly foreign language proficiency pay a qualified military linguist could receive.
The committee has long been concerned about the difficulties associated with attracting, training, and retaining qualified linguists throughout the intelligence community but particularly in the military. Current law limits the monetary incentive available to active duty linguists who preserve or increase their language skills to $100 per month. For reservists, the incentive is only $13 per month before taxes--an amount insufficient to encourage many people to devote the time and effort necessary to maintain their skills in difficult languages. Given the importance to the military of being able to quickly and accurately translate intercepted communications, particularly on the battlefield, this situation clearly needs to be addressed.
This issue is, however, also within the jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committee. The defense authorization bill for fiscal year 1994 contains a provision, developed with the assistance of a member of the Intelligence Committee, Mr. Laughlin, requiring the Secretary of Defense to devise and implement a test program to improve foreign language proficiency. An increase in proficiency pay will be evaluated as part of this process. We have agreed to delete section 501 in light of this plan and our practice of working cooperatively with the Armed Services Committee on military intelligence matters. I urge the adoption of the amendment.
Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GLICKMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman yielding. We concur with the gentleman from Kansas and would certainly accept the amendment on this side.
Mr. LAUGHLIN. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GLICKMAN. I yield whatever time I have remaining to the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. LAUGHLIN. Madam Chairman, I rise in support of the chairman's amendment, and certainly thank him and the distinguished ranking member of our committee, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest], for their efforts in trying to alleviate a very serious problem that our intelligence community, indeed our military forces face, and that is that in the ever-changing world we have more demands for the diverse languages of the world than we had just 2 or 3 years ago. And since the committee worked so well with me in getting this amendment in the intelligence bill, the House Armed Services Committee came along and has worked with us. And it is certainly in the interests of the military forces of America to have the Armed Services Committee of the House and the Senate be involved in this matter.
It was said to me one time that it is more dangerous to jump out of an airplane in a parachute than it is to speak a foreign language. I would readily agree with that and say it is true. But I would also say it takes far more years and commitment to learn one of these languages, and we need it, and all of our tactical commanders that testified before the committee said one of the greatest needs they have is for the language capacity and capability. That is why we need to reward those who are committed to studying languages and keep their proficiency at the highest level so that our military forces can be safe and secure when they get accurate information.
Mr. GLICKMAN. I thank the gentleman and I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman].
The amendment was agreed to.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Madam Chairman, I offer an amendment that has been printed in the Record under my name on July 30 of this year.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. McCOLLUM: Page 30, after line 3, add the following.
SEC. 306. NATIONAL TASK FORCE ON COUNTERTERRORISM
(a) Establishment: It is the sense of the Congress that the President should establish a National Task Force on Counterterrorism comprised of the following nine members: the Deputy Attorney General of the United States, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, the Coordinator for Terrorism of the Department of State, an Assistant Secretary of Commerce as designated by the Secretary of Commerce, the National Security Advisor for Special Operations. Low Intensity Conflict, the Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Enforcement, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and an Assistant Secretary of Transportation appointed by the Secretary of Transportation. The Deputy Attorney General and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence should serve as the Co-Chairs of the Task Force which will review all counterterrorism activities of the intelligence community of the United States Government.
(b) Duties.--The National Task Force on Counterterrorism should prepare a report to the Congress which should:
(1) define terrorism, both domestic and international;
(2) identify federal government activities programs, and assets, which may be utilized to counter terrorism;
(3) assess the processing, analysis, and distribution of intelligence on terrorism and make recommendations for improvement;
(4) make recommendations on appropriate national policies, both preventive and reactive, to counter terrorism;
(5) assess the coordination among law enforcement, intelligence and defense agencies involved in counter terrorism activities and make recommendations concerning how coordination can be improved;
(6) assess whether there should be more centralized operational control over federal government activities, programs, and assets utilized to counter terrorism, and if so, make recommendations concerning how that should be achieved.
(c) Support.--Sufficient full time staff to support and fulfill duties outlined in paragraph (b) should be provided.
(d) Report.--The Task Force will report to Congress no later than six months after the date of enactment of this Act as to the review and recommendations outlined in paragraph (b) and how those recommendations might be implemented. Each 120 days there-after for the remainder of the two year period beginning on the date of the initial Report, the Task Force will report to Congress on the progress of the implementation of any recommendations.
Mr. McCOLLUM (during the reading). Madam Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the Record.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?
There was no objection.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Madam Chairman, this amendment is a very straightforward amendment establishing a sense of the Congress in this bill that the President should set up an intergroup, if you want to call it that, National Task Force on Counterterrorism to assess the terrorism threat to this country, to make recommendations to the President and to the Congress on how we best address the problem of terrorism.
It seems to me that there has been a missing link in our entire terrorist concern in this Government of ours for quite some time now with respect to the failure to have such a working group among those agencies of the Government that deal with this problem.
While this does not direct the President to do it, it does express the sense of our Congress and our body that we ought to have such an interagency group, suggest perhaps who should comprise that group and suggest the type of thing that would be involved in our view with respect to the assessments that are involved in it, defining terrorism, identifying Government activities, programs, and assets which may be utilized to counter terrorism, to assess the processing, analysis, and distribution of intelligence on terrorism, to make recommendations on the appropriate national policies, to prevent and be reactive to terrorism, to assess the coordination among law enforcement, intelligence, and defense agencies involved in counterterrorist activities, and to assess whether there should be more centralized operation and control and so forth.
It is a very simple, straightforward amendment. It is my understanding that the committee has no objection to it.
I would urge my colleagues to adopt it and to let us have this particular procedure in the bill to express the sense of Congress that we have such an interagency group.
I do not have anything else to comment on it.
Mr. EDWARDS of California. Madam Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
This is an idea that Vice President Bush had a number of years ago, and one of these task forces was established and did some work, and made some recommendations, and I do not see any need to repeat the effort.
I think that we ought to realize, and let me point out that the FBI is very skillful in counterterrorism under the direction of the Attorney General. Anytime the Attorney General feels that this kind of a task force or interagency group should be forged, I am sure that the new Attorney General would act and I am sure that the President would support it. However, let me review for a minute what has been going on and the work that the FBI has been doing in counterterrorism in this country.
The subcommittee I chair has had jurisdiction over the FBI on this issue for many, many years. Ten years ago or twelve years ago we had in this country, and we count very carefully the incidence of terrorism in this country, over 100 incidents a year in this country. The FBI is skillful in counterterrorism and has steadily reduced the number of incidents to where, since 1985, we did not have one major international terrorism incident. Since 1985, the only major incident of international terrorism has been the World Trade Center. And let me point out to my colleagues that this was resolved and solved in a very few days.
I do not have any strong objection to this idea of my friend and our colleague, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum]. However, it is one more bureaucracy, one more group of people sitting around spending money where it is absolutely unnecessary.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield on that point?
Mr. EDWARDS of California. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Florida.
Mr. McCOLLUM. I do not contemplate any money necessarily really being spent here. I know that the gentleman is very thoughtful on this point.
If you would look at what I am doing, I am not establishing a task force. I am merely expressing the sense of Congress that we think something like this would be a good idea, and it would simply suggest that the Deputy Attorney General who already is doing this for our good Attorney General coordinate with the Deputy Director of the CIA, the Coordinator for Terrorism of the Department of State and Assistant Secretary of Commerce, the National Security Adviser, et cetera, the people who are already in place really just to assure that this coordination really takes place, not to try to supersede or whatever it is.
It is my understanding that is part of the problem, that we are not having the discussions that perhaps would be best in this situation.
I do not want to create something for the sake of creating it. We just do not have these discussions taking place, from my conversations with those involved. And I think that they really are critical.
I appreciate the gentleman's concern. But I am not creating somebody to create a lot more paperwork. That is not my intent.
Mr. EDWARDS of California. I thank the gentleman for his response, but the communication and coordination are already taking place. I think we should remember that if Congress does pass this resolution, such a resolution, it sends a strong signal to the Attorney General and the White House that we want them to spend this extra money, set up this bureaucracy that, in my judgment and I believe in the judgment of the subcommittee with jurisdiction over the FBI, is entirely unnecessary.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
Madam Chairman, I think this amendment is actually offered in good spirit and is a sensible amendment.
While I understand the concerns of my colleague from California, I honestly do believe that there is no overall focus of counterterrorism within the law enforcement and intelligence community. You can see that very dramatically in all the issues raised with respect to the issuance of visas overseas, the message that went to consular offices, the relationship between consular offices and the intelligence community and the relationship between what happens overseas and what happens with domestic law enforcement. It is not very good.
Now, that does not mean that the FBI does not do a splendid job. They have. Perhaps the gentleman's amendment does not include the FBI, and maybe as we work our way through this, we ought to make specific reference to the FBI, because they have taken the lead domestically in terms of law enforcement.
There has been an effort to try to separate what happens in the rest of the world from what happens here in the United States, and you cannot do that anymore. In fact, I believe the State Department has been notorious for wanting to segregate international terrorism from domestic terrorism. That is just not the way the world works anymore. That is not the way Americans are threatened anymore.
I think the amendment in its goal to try to get some coordination, some, so to speak, interpersonal relationships between departments of Government about terrorism is actually a good idea.
So on this side we have no objection to the amendment, and we support it.
Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.
Madam Chairman, I rise to commend my colleague, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum], for this amendment and the thoughtful and long work he has performed on the problem of terrorism. I commend him on his willingness to work through this amendment and everything that he has done to put into it.
There is no one in the House, I think, who has focused more on the issue of terrorism than the gentleman from Florida. He heads a task force on terrorism, and it is a subject, Madam Chairman, that fortunately, because there has been some good work done, that is not the first issue on the minds of the American people. If it were not for the fact that there was some good work being done and much more that can be done, it might become one of the first things on the minds of the American people, and that would be a tragedy.
I want to commend my friend, the gentleman from Florida, for the diligent work he has put in on this issue.
We have only to examine our daily newspapers to see the toll that terrorism is taking around the world. We have experienced it this year in the bombings of the World Trade Center and planned operations which we would still be speaking of against four major targets that fortunately were uncovered by the FBI.
The U.S. intelligence community has long worked with other agencies and departments of the Government to coordinate intelligence support for law enforcement and policymakers. The intelligence community's counter-terrorism center is the focus of this multidisciplinary fight against terrorism.
This amendment expresses the sense of the Congress that a national level task force on counterterrism should take a broad look at how best to marshal our national efforts against terrorist targets.
I support this amendment, Madam Chairman, and we on this side would be glad to accept the amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum].
The amendment was agreed to.
Mr. SKAGGS. Madam Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
Madam Chairman, this is my first year serving on the Intelligence Committee, and I want to commend the chairman, Mr. Glickman, our ranking Republican member, Mr. Combest, and my committee colleagues on both sides of the aisle for their hard work on this challenging bill. We tried to strike a responsible balance between legitimate intelligence needs, tough fiscal realities, and a rapidly changing international security environment.
This was by no means an easy task--some are already saying either that we cut too much or that we have not cut enough. I believe that this year's bill, which is over $1 billion less than requested, reflects a serious attempt to redirect the intelligence community's activities toward meeting the threats of the future.
One key area where I have focused a lot of time and attention is the current problem of overclassification. Appropriately deemed the `cement overcoat,' our cold-war-era rules and procedures on information security are outmoded and too cumbersome. President Clinton has stated that the existing classification system is `onerous and costly,' and he has established a task force to conduct a bottom-up review of how and why information is labeled `secret.'
The classification bureaucracy, in many respects still reflecting the cold war, stamps `top secret' on nearly 7 million new documents each year. Ninety-five percent of these will be marked for indefinite restriction.
Over the years, all this has led to the build-up of tens of millions of secret documents, some dating from before World War I. Remaining under lock and key, for instance, are memos on the movement of United States troops in Europe in 1917; and documents on some 6,000 U.S. inventions, some dating from the 1940's, whose authors are forbidden to publish, patent, or even discuss their work.
The tremendous Government cost for personnel, processing and storage needed for all these classified documents is daunting enough. But we also need to consider that private U.S. companies spend at least $14 billion a year to meet increasingly complex, overlapping, and sometimes contradictory controls on classified information.
Above and beyond the dollars themselves, is the cost to a democratic, free society. To the very real extent it is excessive, the current classification system undermines the ideals of open Government, individual liberty, and the maximum access to Government information requisite to an informed
electorate. The Government's preoccupation with secrecy also hampers competitiveness by impeding scientific and technological developments, and obstructs Congressional oversight of foreign and defense policy.
The irony is that overclassification has not necessarily bought us better security. In fact, excessive--often arbitrary--classification has led to an ossified secrecy system that is often unable to cope with the rapidly changing challenges of the post-cold war world. Overdoing classification ultimately does a poor job of protecting legitimate national security information. When classified information becomes commonplace, it devalues the currency of the more important secrets; carelessness sets in and accountability declines.
This tendency toward excessive and unchecked secrecy is fostered by the lack of a credible cost accounting mechanism. I was amazed to find that agencies affected by classification regulations could not even tell me roughly how much it costs them to comply with secrecy rules. I anticipate that the efforts of the President's Task Force on Secrecy Reform and another joint security commission established by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence will produce a comprehensive post-cold war plan to reform the current system, and I expect the new rules will be reflected as savings in future budget requests.
However, to ensure that overclassification is no longer simply built-in to agency budgets, I have initiated a Government-wide cost accounting and expenditure-reduction effort involving all the agencies that comprise the intelligence community or are affected by classification rules and procedures. I have sought and obtained report language to the relevant appropriations bills--Commerce-Justice-State; Energy and Water; Treasury-Postal; and Defense, pending--and in the Intelligence Authorization bill now before the House, which will require reports detailing the cost and number of personnel involved in classifying information and keeping information classified. The agencies are also required to set specific expenditure-reduction goals for handling classified information in fiscal year 1995.
The purpose of the reports, due on March 31, 1994, is to obtain real numbers and real plans for cutting costs. I am hoping that when this bill is up before the House next year. I will be here telling you about historic changes in the way information is handled by the intelligence community and about the savings the agencies plan to achieve.
I believe this reassessment will add to, rather than detract from, the value of our information security system. It is true that the post-cold war era presents both new threats and new opportunities. The information secrecy system is a key place to prove it. The Government does not often have the chance to cut costs and improve operations, but, by reigning in unnecessary classification, we can do both, all the while enhancing, not shorting, our real security objectives.
To summarize, Madam Chairman, this is a good bill. It finances the necessary intelligence functions of Government, and it takes into account the importance of greater flexibility in responding to domestic budgetary pressures and the challenges of a changed international environment. I urge its passage.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. SKAGGS. I yield to the gentleman from Kansas, the chairman of the committee.
Mr. GLICKMAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
First of all, it is a pleasure to have the gentleman on the committee. He is a very talented member. He has raised a very important issue, the issue of classification. How many Members listening and watching have addressed a situation, whether they have been in the Congress or on the outside, where something is classified and we may not be sure why it is classified but it remain classified forever? There are no procedures to remove that classification.
Some things need to be classified; most do not need to be classified forever. Some do not need to be classified in the first place.
So, what the gentleman has done is to elevate the subject so that the intelligence community is under warning they had better get moving on working on a responsible declassification policy so that more records of Government can be open and so that we do not, without sense, classify matters in the first place.
I just wanted to commend the gentleman.
Mr. SKAGGS. I thank the chairman for his comments on this. I think we are going to bring some better rigor and discipline to the process, doing a better job of keeping secret what needs to be secret and opening up to the country things they need to have access to.
Mr. TRAFICANT. Madam Chairman, I offer an amendment printed in the Record on July 28.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Traficant: At the end of the bill, add the following new sections:
SEC. . COMPLIANCE WITH BUY AMERICAN ACT.
No funds authorized pursuant to this Act may be expended by an entity unless the entity agrees that in expending the assistance the entity will comply with sections 2 through 4 of the Act of March 3, 1933 (41 U.S.C. 10a-10c, popularly known as the `Buy American Act').
SEC. . SENSE OF CONGRESS: REQUIREMENT REGARDING NOTICE.
(a) Purchase of American-Made Equipment and Products: In the case of any equipment or products that may be authorized under this Act, it is the sense of the Congress that entities receiving such assistance should, in expending the assistance, purchase only American-made equipment and products.
(b) Notice to Recipients of Assistance: In providing financial assistance under this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall provide to each recipient of the assistance a notice describing the statement made in subsection (a) by the Congress.
SEC. . PROHIBITION OF CONTRACTS.
If it has been finally determined by a court or Federal agency that any person intentionally affixed a fraudulent label bearing a `Made in America' inscription, or any inscription with the same meaning, to any product sold in or shipped to the United States, that was not made in the United States, such person shall be ineligible to receive any contract or subcontract made with funds provided pursuant to this Act, pursuant to the debarment, suspension, and ineligibility procedures described in section 9.400 through 9.409 of title 48, Code of Federal Regulations.
Mr. TRAFICANT (during the reading). Madam Chairman, I ask unanimous consent the amendment be considered as read and printed in the Record.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?
There was no objection.
Mr. TRAFICANT. Madam Chairman, I would like to start out by saying, during my years here in the Congress, this is one of the better descriptions and analyses of this bill that I think we have ever had, as a Member, to understand this issue. I want to commend the gentleman from Kansas, Chairman Glickman, and the ranking member, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Combest, for that analysis.
I would also like to say that this open rule and the open process, in my opinion, is probably going to lead to much more support for their efforts and I think this is a very refreshing change which I have seen.
Madam Chairman, my amendment is a standard amendment, straightforward. But there is one provision in it that I think is very important in the intelligence committee. That is the matter of these fraudulent labels.
There was a company, Mazak, Inc., in Florence, KY, there was a sensitive issue dealing with parts for our defense industry and the parts would have been made in America, stamped `Made in America,' but were imported parts coming from Japan. There was a young marine who finally could not tolerate changing the tags anymore. He made that adjustment. I think this provision in here gives us that possibility to have some of our keenest minds in intelligence looking at what may be some of the economic factors that have hurt America as well.
I know the bill deals with much of that. It is not just the military apparatus that this bill concerns itself with. But some of these economic and industrial problems have existed, and I commend the chairman.
With that, I would like to yield to the chairman. I know the chairman has some concerns in this area, and I would like for him to address those.
Mr. GLICKMAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Madam Chairman, first of all, we do not have any objection to the amendment. We will accept it.
I would like to make a couple of points and ask the gentleman a question.
First of all, the intelligence community is already covered by Federal acquisition regulations embodying the Buy American Act. Second, in agencies like the CIA, the existing policy is to procure American products except in unusual circumstances, primarily related to security. Even in those circumstances, a waiver is required if the contract is required to procure products owned, controlled, or influenced by foreign interests.
Third, an example of the result of this policy is, I am told, that 96.4 percent of the procurement contracts executed by the CIA in 1991--the last figures we have--were with firms with no foreign control, no foreign ownership, no foreign influence. That is a record which I doubt few agencies could match.
The 3.6 percent of contracts executed with foreign firms were done so of necessity, either because the goods or services had to be procured overseas for security reasons or because the product itself was not produced domestically.
My point to the gentleman is, while we accept the amendment, I want to let the gentleman know that as we go through the process, we want to reserve the right to make sure that we can protect the intelligible community's ability, in those very limited circumstances where contracts need to be executed with foreign firms because of necessity or for security reasons; to continue to do that. I hope the gentleman understands that.
Mr. TRAFICANT. Yes, without doubt. There is no intention to do anything other than that.
Let me say on the matter, Mr. Chairman, on the matter of these false labels, it might be a very good provision in the bill to give us an opportunity to help the entire country on that problem; it might be an added bonus of this legislation, more than anything else.
So, the intention parallels that of the chairman's, the legislative intent, and concern here parallels his.
Madam Chairman, I yield to the ranking minority member, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest].
Mr. COMBEST. I thank the gentleman for yielding and for his kind comments.
Madam Chairman, the concerns which the committee had were adequately expressed and resolved by the chairman of the committee. Madam Chairman, this side would be happy to accept the amendment.
Mr. TRAFICANT. With that, Madam Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant].
The amendment was agreed to.
Mr. SANDERS. Madam Chairman, I offer an amendment, which was printed in the Record on July 27.
The Clerk read as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Sanders:--Page 5, after line 11, insert the following:
SEC. 105. LIMITATION ON AMOUNTS AUTHORIZED TO BE APPROPRIATED.
(a) Limitation.--Except as provided in subsection (b), notwithstanding the total amount of the individual authorizations of appropriations contained in this Act, including the amounts specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 2330 of the One Hundred and Third Congress, there is authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1994 to carry out this Act not more than 90 percent of the total amount authorized to be appropriated by the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993.
(b) Exception: Subsection (a) does not apply to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund.
Mr. SANDERS (during the reading). Madam Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the Record.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Vermont?
There was no objection.
Mr. SANDERS. I thank the chairman.
Madam Chairman, we are here to speak out about an important amendment offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. Owens], and myself. Let me begin by congratulating the chairman, the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman], and the ranking member, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest], for their excellent work on the intelligence bill. It is, in fact, a good bill.
Today, however, we have an opportunity to make a good bill a better bill. That is what we are here to discuss.
First of all, nothing in our discussion suggests that we are not living in a dangerous world; nobody here thinks that the United States has no enemies; nobody here is suggesting that we dismantle the intelligence agencies; and nobody is suggesting that we do not need a vigorous intelligence capability.
What we are in fact talking about pure and simple is a 10-percent cut. As everybody here knows, according to the New York Times and the mass media, the budget is approximately $28 billion, so what we are talking about is a $2.8 billion cut in spending.
Madam Chairman, the world has changed profoundly in the last 5 years. The fact of the matter is that the cold war is over. The Soviet Union does not exist. Russia and the satellite nations of the Soviet Union are now begging to get into NATO. In fact, on the floor of this Congress we debate how many billions of dollars we should now give to Russia and other former Communist satellite nations.
On March 14 the New York Times wrote:
For decades spy agencies spent two-thirds of their budget dollars to track the Soviet threat.
The New York Times tells us that two-thirds of our money went to track the Soviet threat. The Soviet threat is no longer there.
Are there other threats? Are there other problems? Yes, there are, but the people we fought for 40 years, the Soviet Union, no longer exists.
Senator Metzenbaum on the floor of the Senate on April 21, stated:
The intelligence budget is more than double what it was in 1979.
The New York Times, March 14, says:
The spy agencies tripled in size in the 1980's.
The point here is that faced with a superpower, the taxpayers of the United States spent substantial sums of money on intelligence to defend us from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union no longer exists. Communism is dead in that part of the world. The world has changed profoundly. We should consider that reality as we debate the intelligence budget today.
Madam Chairman, it seems to me that one problem we are having in this discussion today is that we are not looking at the intelligence budget in a broader context. What our friends are saying is that this money is needed very much for the intelligence communities. Maybe they are right, but what I am saying is that given the priorities of the United States of America, some of us think that massive unemployment, that low wages, that homelessness, that hungry children, that the collapse of our educational system is perhaps an equally strong danger to this Nation, or maybe a stronger danger for our national security than Iraq and Iran and North Korea, who are also enemies.
So the question comes out, what are we talking about when we are talking about our national security? Is it only defending us from foreign enemies who wish us no good? We know they wish us no good, but must we not consider in that debate the problems that are destroying our country at the fiber, young people today who understand they are never going to have a job, millions of working class kids who cannot afford to go to college because we have not adequately funded education, environmental problems that are causing ill-health to our people, children sleeping out in the streets.
So Madam Chairman, I urge my friends on the Intelligence Committee, you have made your point. We understand it. My job is not to go through the intelligence budget. I have not even looked at it.
What I am here to tell you is that you have to tell us that your spy satellites are more important than feeding the hungry children, taking care of people sleeping out in the streets, not rebuilding our educational system, not rebuilding our infrastructure. That is what this debate is about.
Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
Madam Chairman, I cannot overstate my opposition to across-the-board cuts to this intelligence authorization bill. To make such cuts by a percentage or a number grabbed out of the air totally undercuts the duty of Congress to make responsible, informed decisions based on a close scrutiny of the costs and benefits of specific programs.
To my colleagues who favor this amendment I ask, what would you like to see cut? Which programs should be scaled back or terminated? Which intelligence targets should be dropped?
Should the FBI and CIA cut back on their work against international terrorists? Should we cut back on monitoring the unfair trade and economic policies of our competitors, not to mention their efforts to steal us blind of our technology and commercial secrets? Should we maybe slow down our efforts to stay one step ahead of the radical regimes who are feverishly working to develop nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the missile systems to deliver them to us? Perhaps it would be better to tell our men and women in uniform that the intelligence community will not support them in certain parts of the world? Or should we just tell them that they will have to accept higher casualties wherever they are put in harm's way because we must stretch out our intelligence resources and settle for less accurate and less timely intelligence on the dispositions, capabilities, and intentions of our foes?
Let me digress a second on that last point. Yes, there are new global strategic realities. Yes, the cold war is over and communism as an ideology is dead. But have you happened to notice that our military has been pretty active the last few years, indeed, more active than they have been for quite some time? Think of the huge military operation against Iraq. Think of the humanitarian mission in Somalia. It may interest some to know that 2 years ago, in keeping with congressional direction, the intelligence community was asked to prioritize its missions and direct its resources accordingly. After consulting with policymakers throughout the Government, Somalia was placed at the very bottom of the list. One intelligence agency--stretched very tighly--decided to drop totally its efforts to collect against the region. At the time I think we all would have applauded this decision to cut the `nice to have.' Within 6 months we had troops on the ground there. Fortunately, that intelligence agency was able to revise its capabilities and our troops had tremendous support. Our intelligence community preceded our troops into contested areas, identified landing zones, neutralized some armed factions, and, as a result, we suffered minimal casualties.
This point illustrates the fact that in the current world we must have an intelligence community more flexible, resilient, and agile than ever before. We in the House Intelligence Committee have
gone over this budget with the proverbial fine-toothed comb and have demanded that the intelligence community justify every penny spent. We are satisfied that the authorization bill before us is as lean as can possibly be, without acutely endangering American interests. To propose an across-the-board cut with the thought that some fat must remain is to play with the life of the patient.
I would remind my colleagues that President Clinton, the man who is most dependent on our intelligence agencies to tell him what is really going on in the world, firmly opposes further cuts.
Anyone who is familiar with last year's cuts knows that the intelligence community suffered a tremendous shock last year. As I mentioned in my opening statement, the cumulative cuts were haphazard and at a level which appalled Intelligence Committee members from both sides of the aisle.
What were the results of those cuts? Without discussing specific programs I can tell you that operations and maintenance of some of our most critical programs were stretched tighter than the breaking point. Supercomputers were idled for want of maintenance, office spaces were left vacant for lack of funds to bring them to up to standards, and we no longer have redundancies built into systems which are critical to our national security. These cuts have sent those working on the technical side of the intelligence community scrambling for ingenious ways to satisfy the demands placed on it by fielding less expensive systems. One of the great innovations of the President's budget was a proposed overhaul of our intelligence satellite architecture by which a modest current expenditure will yield huge savings in the future. That innovation has barely survived this bill. In this case a further cut will most definitely be penny-wise and pound-foolish.
Any additional cuts to the community will force some very hard choices on the intelligence community--choices which we in the Intelligence Committee do not want to see made. As the Director of Central Intelligence, Jim Woolsey, has said, additional cuts will perhaps result in his having to turn down bona fide important requirements from the policymakers and military for intelligence support.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Texas has expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Combest was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)
Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, it could also require his having to involuntarily release employees so as to go beyond the 17.5-percent decrease in personnel we have already legislated. In addition to this impacting on the employment of individuals with critical skills, this could obviously result in significant counterintelligence problems. I am convinced from my 4 1/2 years on the Intelligence Committee that Mr. Woolsey is not overstating the case--indeed, I am surprised he and the community have so far avoided these desperate circumstances.
In closing, although some may be well intentioned in supporting this amendment, its passage would be disastrous. Its first casualty would be the flexibility which is now the most important quality of our intelligence community in these uncertain and changing times.
Mr. SANDERS. Madam Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, all that I wanted to say is the following: The gentleman asked me where we would cut. When I was mayor of my city for 8 years, what I did is what I think the Congress should do. We should not be running every agency. We do not know enough. The gentleman knows a lot more than I do. What the gentleman and I should say is, `Agency, here is the money that the American people are afford. With that money, you give us the best that you can.'
I do not think it is incumbent upon every Member of Congress to tell every agency how they should spend every nickel.
Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, reclaiming my time, I do not disagree with the gentleman. That is what I think we have done. The American people cannot afford to have less spent on intelligence.
Mr. DICKS. Madam Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.
(Mr. DICKS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. DICKS. Madam Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment. I would say though that the gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Sanders] has raised a significant question, and that is the question of our priorities here in this country.
Madam Chairman, I must say as one who has served on Defense appropriations now in my 15th year, I have witnessed the biggest buildup in defense spending in U.S. history, and I am now witnessing the sharpest decline in defense spending in U.S. history. And I want to say this to the House: Sometimes we forget, if you remember, in 1985 it was the end of the Reagan buildup. When you look to 1997, we will have cut defense spending in this House, using 1993 dollars, from a high of about $360 billion in 1985 down to $233 billion in fiscal year 1997.
That is a significant reduction. There is no other area of government in the discretionary area where we have cut anything like what we have cut in defense.
We have also made significant cuts in the intelligence budget, cuts that I know the Director, Mr. Woolsey, feels takes us to the very edge of thwarting some things that he wants to do to simplify our intelligence gathering architecture, both in terms of imagery and signal intelligence.
One of the things that we have to try to explain in terms that will not give away any of our secrets, is that in order to do that, in order to simplify and reduce the number of ground collection stations and the number of satellites that we have, we have got to invest in some new equipment.
It is in this year, and that is why I wish the gentleman had the opportunity to come to the Intelligence Committee and be briefed by our very capable staff and the chairman and other members, because then he would have realized there are some very significant investments that are going to be made in this particular year, started in this particular year, that in the outyears will allow us to reduce spending on intelligence over a 5-year period by somewhere between $7 and $15 billion.
Without those investments, one, we will degrade greatly the intelligence gathering capabilities of this country, and we will miss the opportunity to make further significant savings as we bring this defense budget down further.
On the question of personnel, when I first came on the Committee on Intelligence I was a little bit stunned by just how many people we had out there gathering intelligence when you look at all of these agencies. We are on a downward slope of about 17.5 percent over the next 5 years.
Now, we have looked at this very carefully. We think that is a reasonable way to bring down this intelligence community staffing.
So, I would say to my colleague, I understand his priorities. I am just as concerned about trying to take care of the homeless people of this country and to deal with the problems of unemployment. But I must remind Members that when we cut this defense budget by 43.5 percent since 1985, we are throwing out of work thousands and thousands of people all over this country who have made their careers helping to defend this country, helping to make sure that we had the weapons systems to prevail
over Iraq after the invasion into Kuwait. It is that modernization. Those people feel badly treated as well. They are part of the unemployed out there.
Madam Chairman, we are running a risk if we go much further and do this cut more rapidly of really weakening the industrial base of this country and our capability at any time in the future to be able to take a force like we did just a couple of years ago and go and do something that was important to the national security interests of this country. We are coming close, perilously close, to not being able to respond to those kinds of contingencies because of the downward escalation in overall defense spending.
I must say to the gentleman, too, any savings that would be achieved here in the intelligence part of the Defense budget would be quickly utilized in other areas of Defense spending. This notion of being able to transfer the money to some other account simply does not exist in this context. We are going to be short in Defense appropriations in outlays anyway. Any savings here would be immediately utilized in other areas of the Defense budget.
When we enact the budget resolution we set our priorities between defense and social spending.
Mr. OWENS. Madam Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
Madam Chairman, I rise in strong support of the amendment. Let us apply common sense and old-fashioned logic to this argument. We do not have the details because of the secrecy factor. Even those who are allowed to go into the room and look at the budget will not really know as much as the members of the Committee on Intelligence know.
But just old-fashioned logic would tell us that if the estimate of the New York Times is that about 75 percent of the activity of our intelligence is directed toward the Soviet Union, and the most conservative estimate is that about 50 percent of our intelligence activity was directed toward the Soviet Union, then now that the Soviet Union is no longer the threat that it was before, why do we hesitate to cut the overall budget by 10 percent?
This is a very reasonable amendment. Senator Moynihan of my State of New York said, after tragically witnessing the fact that the CIA had not predicted the collapse of the Soviet Union's economy, he said perhaps we should eradicate and abolish the whole agency. That is a radical proposal.
We are not here to offer a radical proposal to abolish the agency. We would like to have less secrecy so that the American people can see fully what is going on and we can discuss it in a more open manner.
But we are not here to abolish. Just 10 percent. The slogan was `No pain, no gain' earlier in the year. Everybody had to take some pain in order for us to move forward and make some gains in terms of reduction of the deficit, in terms of having the money necessary to create programs which do provide jobs for people.
I heard people mourn about the possibility of unemployed CIA agents. Well, there are areas in the FBI, the Border Patrol, Drug Enforcement Agency, and local police departments that can reabsorb some of these people that want to stay in law enforcement. It is too expensive to keep people at CIA salaries merely to keep them employed.
Congress is asleep. Congress is delinquent in rapidly moving forward to approve this intelligence budget. The American people are angry. They do not really know why they are angry, but this is one of the reasons they ought to be angry. Obsolete, very expensive, big-ticket items like this are not touched. This is a sacred cow. This is smoked pork, salted pork. Nobody
wants to deal with it.
The cut required by the Sanders-Owens amendment is half of what was recommended by the Congressional Budget Office. The Congressional Budget Office suggested in its February booklet entitled `Reducing the Deficit: A Report to Congress' that there should be a 20 percent cut.
The Congressional Budget Office said nothing would suffer. We would not be at any disadvantage at all if we cut the CIA by 20 percent.
Quoting the Congressional Budget Office, `Cuts of this magnitude would not prevent the United States from maintaining traditional activities that remain critically important in the post-cold war world, such as tracking arms shipments between countries, monitoring proliferation activities, and supporting United States and Allied forces engaged in regional conflicts.
`Even after these reductions, U.S. intelligence spending would remain, in real terms, comparable to its cold war average,' from the Congressional Budget Office.
Why, if the KGB is not only cutting its budget, the KGB has opened its files, they have declared themselves basically out of business for the next 20 to 30 years. Maybe they will come back. We are not talking about abolishing the intelligence office totally.
They say China is the great danger now. Terrorism is a great danger.
Five years ago, 10 years ago, we considered China a hostile country, a danger to the United States. Terrorism, we considered 5 years ago.
We have been prepared for that all the time. That is in the budget already. It has always been in the budget.
We are not talking about cutting out the antiterrorism measures. We are not talking about cutting out any intelligence activity directed toward China, or Iran, or Iraq. We are talking about cutting the portion that is directed toward the Soviet Union.
We have plenty of leeway, if we cut 10 percent and that is 10 percent of the apparatus that was designed to spy on the Soviet Union, what have we lost? What have we lost? No pain, no gain; to continue with this CIA budget is insane, to foist upon the American people.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. OWENS. I yield to the gentleman from Kansas.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, the gentleman says he did not intend to cut anything about Iran or Iraq. He is obviously saying there is terrorism that is important and we should pursue this. The amendment does not say that we are not to cut Iran or Iraq.
Mr. OWENS. Madam Chairman, cut 10 percent. We are not going to tell the gentleman where to cut. We do not know. We do not have the budget. But we say, logic and common sense dictates that we cut 10 percent. Because, after all, 50 to 75 percent of the budget was devoted toward intelligence from the Soviet Union, directed toward the Soviet Union. It does not exist any more.
We have the leeway.
Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Madam Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.
Madam Chairman, the previous speaker mentioned that members of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence have a greater knowledge of some of these international affairs than the Members who are not members of that committee. I would like to advise the gentleman and also the Members of the House that there is a procedure whereby any Member of this House may have access to that type of information, which they might find of tremendous interest.
As a member of that committee, I would encourage Members to do just that, because a little bit of knowledge on this subject will go a long way in determining what the needs of the intelligence community really are.
I would like to say further that last year this committee brought to the floor authorizing legislation that was reduced severely beyond what many of us thought should be the figure set for operating our intelligence community. That bill passed basically the way that we reported it out. The Committee on Appropriations then came back, as a follow-on, and made drastic, and I repeat, made drastic cuts below the authorized level that this committee had recommended.
So this year, for fiscal year 1994, we started with a baseline that was far below where we should have been in the first place. And now, a 10 percent cut on top of that, would take us to the point of being very dangerous to our national security.
Mentioning the breakdown of the Soviet Union, that certainly was one target of our intelligence operations. As other Members have said, that was a pretty predictable target. While we had a very active intelligence operation relative to the Soviet Union, they were predictable.
Today that one target is gone, basically, as the Soviet Union, but I would remind my colleagues that the Russians are still there. And what used to be the Soviet KGB, now being operated by the Russians, is just as aggressive as the KGB was in the past.
But besides that, there are many, many other targets today that we have to be concerned about because, Madam Chairman, the world is arming itself at an alarming rate. I am not talking about superpowers or major nations. I am talking about nations that we never heard of before the breakup of the Soviet Union. But they are arming themselves. The technology is being made available to them. The arms are being made available to them by countries like North Korea.
Iran is a big purchaser. Iran is a big financer. Iran is no friend of the United States.
The world is a dangerous place today, and we had better realize that.
I remember, for years there were slogans all over this country that said, `Remember Pearl Harbor.' There were songs written about Pearl Harbor, `Remember Pearl Harbor.' Adequate intelligence could have prevented Pearl Harbor.
Mr. OWENS. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. YOUNG of Florida. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
Mr. OWENS. Madam Chairman, I yield to the gentleman's greater knowledge of the facts with respect to intelligence operations. Is the gentleman saying that the Russians now have an intelligence apparatus just as dangerous as the KGB under the old Soviet Union? That is news to me. Is that a fact the gentleman is stating?
Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Madam Chairman, let me repeat what I said, the Soviet KGB is nonexistent as the KGB. But the Russians have the same intelligence capability, and they are extremely active.
Mr. OWENS. Madam Chairman, if the gentleman will continue to yield, do we feel as threatened by this Russian capability as we were threatened by the old KGB?
Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Madam Chairman, from an intelligence standpoint, I would say no, because the Soviet nuclear threat to the United States, we believe, has pretty much gone away. Except we do know this: There are still nuclear weapons aimed at the United States. And the control of those weapons is a little questionable now.
We know that the Russians and former members of the Soviet Union still have control of those weapons.
It is essential for us to know who has the control, for example, who has the ability to launch those weapons. That is an intelligence factor.
It is a big question mark right now, exactly where we stand on that.
Mr. OWENS. If it is a big question mark, I wish the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence would level with the American people. We are appropriating money to help the Soviet Union. We are about to enter into joint space exploration agreements, all kinds of things happening with respect to the Soviet Union, which ought to be reconsidered and reexamined, if the Committee on Intelligence has information that they are as aggressive as ever.
Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Madam Chairman, I think the gentleman is mixing up what I am trying to say and what he is trying to say.
I think it is essential that we have cooperative arrangements with the former Soviets, the Russians and anyone else who would like to cooperate with us on peaceful missions.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. YOUNG of Florida. I yield to the gentleman from Kansas.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I think it is worthwhile noting, notwithstanding all the pleasantries we exchange with the Soviet Union, there are 10,000 warheads, imagine that, 10,000 nuclear weapons, nuclear-tipped missiles in the old Soviet Union.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Young] has expired.
(On request of Mr. Glickman, and by unanimous consent, Mr. Young of Florida was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, if the gentleman will continue to yield, they have not been dismantled. Most are probably still pointed at us. There is enormous instability in that region of the world.
I am not telling Members that the Soviet Union is the same as it was before. It is not. I understand that. But I am telling my colleagues that the political power base in those countries is not very stable at all.
For us to believe that the threat of nuclear annihilation is gone is just believing in a fairy tale that does not exist.
Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Madam Chairman, let me make one further statement on this.
Russia, the former Soviet Union, in addition to what the gentleman from Kansas, Chairman Glickman, has just said, has just now signed a new agreement with Cuba. The former Soviet intelligence station in Cuba is now going to be operated by Cuba for the Russians.
Now, is that a good sign? I do not think that is a good sign.
Mr. DICKS. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. YOUNG of Florida. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
Mr. DICKS. Madam Chairman, the only thing I would say to the gentleman, with the breakup of the Soviet Union, we now have 16 separate Republics. So where we used to be able to deal with one superpower, now we have 16 Republics that we have to deal with.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Young] has again expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Young of Florida was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)
Mr. DICKS. Madam Chairman, if the gentleman will continue to yield, for the intelligence community, whether we are talking about human intelligence in setting up operations inside each of these Republics, we are talking about a whole expansion of activities. Instability in the world, where within the Soviet Warsaw bloc, there was great stability. Now we have seen what has happened in Bosnia. We have seen what has happened in Azerbaijan, other areas, in Georgia.
We have tremendous problems of instability. So the challenge out there for the people who have to gather intelligence and keep our country informed, we now have probably more trouble spots in the world than when we had during the iron grip of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. We also are faced with four separate Republics possessing nuclear weapons.
So I am just saying, there are new challenges, and we have to adapt to that. We are trying to bring this budget down, I guarantee the gentleman, as quickly as we can.
But to go in with an across-the-board approach, with draconian cuts up front on the thesis that because the Soviet Union does not exist we still do not have problems, is just misguided.
Mr. SANDERS. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. YOUNG of Florida. I yield to the gentleman from Vermont.
I am a little bit confused. My memory is that on the floor of this House we debated, and, in fact, passed a significant appropriation, billions of dollars to Russia. I happened not to have vote for it, but a majority of the Members did, I am a little bit confused. What we are told is that we have to spend billions more of taxpayers' money to defend us from a country for which we have now appropriated billions of dollars more. Some of us may not fully understand the logic.
Let me say another word about the claim of the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks]. I am also a little bit confused about that. I read the newspapers. I understood we won the cold war. We won the cold war. Now that we are being told is that because we won the cold war, we have to spend money for intelligence than if we had lost the cold war.
Mr. BEREUTER. Madam Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.
Madam Chairman, I rise in opposition to the gentleman's amendment. I do, in fact, rise in strong opposition to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Sanders]. Last year, I believe, the gentleman addressed the House during the consideration of the fiscal year 1993 intelligence authorization bill, and he raised many of the same concerns that he raised today to justify his 10-percent cut.
I also want to reiterate what President Clinton has to say about this subject. According to a July 27, 1993, letter from President Clinton to the chairman of the committee, he said, `The reductions already proposed by the House Committee on Intelligence will in themselves test our ability to manage prudently reductions of the intelligence budget while we simultaneously seek to meet the new security challenges which confront the country. Therefore, I will oppose an amendment on the House floor which seeks to reduce intelligence spending beyond the reductions already proposed by the committee.'
In fact, there is in the legislation before the House a substantial reduction to what the President proposed. It is 3.7 percent. The gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] pointed out that in the next 5 years we will be reducing the civilian component of the intelligence community by 17 1/2 percent. That is a personnel cut. If we take a look at the people in the defense component of the intelligence community, the reductions there in the next 5 years will be about 25 percent.
We did win the cold war, and we are reducing deferral and intelligence expenditures dramatically because of that fact, but it does not mean that all of the problems will have disappeared in the process.
Mr. DICKS. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BEREUTER. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Washington.
Mr. DICKS. Madam Chairman, we won the cold war because we had the courage on a bipartisan basis to remain militarily strong in the face of those people who wanted to see America withdraw from its international responsibility. I think it is a point we are considering as we debate this amendment.
Mr. BEREUTER. Madam Chairman, I do not yield at this point.
Madam Chairman, I know and admire the gentleman's concern about how he would spend the money elsewhere if he could. I understand, and that is my motivation, too. Actually, however, in a strange situation, if we reduce the authorization for the intelligence community below what the President wants and below the 3.7-percent cut we, the committee, have already made, those authorizations continue to exist in the Defense Department's authorization bill, because most of what we spend for the intelligence community is buried there. So we are really not cutting the authorization of dollars by any cuts that are offered out here. The authorization levels would in effect be automatically shifted to Defense Department authorization levels. That is one of the few places in the budget where such an automatic shift is made.
I want to suggest that indeed, there are a lot more complicated things that we now need to consider in the post-cold war situation we face. Much of the infrastructure that we need for intelligence gathering must be there nevertheless to meet our intelligence requirements throughout the globe. We could have the Soviet Union and its new component parts disappear and we still must have most of the required expenditures for an adequate personnel and capital asset requirement for the intelligence community.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BEREUTER. I yield to the distinguished gentleman from Kansas.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, this is a very important point. I would like to ask the gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Sanders] and my colleagues to listen to what the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter] just said.
Mr. BEREUTER. I am just saying to my colleagues that even if the Soviet Union not only disappeared but the surviving component Republics of the Soviet Union disappeared, we still need the kind of personnel and capital assets for all of the intelligence requirements elsewhere in the globe.
Mr. GLICKMAN. If the gentleman will continue to yield, he did not let me extoll his virtues long enough, if I may be permitted just another minute of yielding.
Mr. BEREUTER. I am pleased to yield to the gentleman from Kansas.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, to watch the world, to listen to the world, we need a certain amount of collectors up there, whether it is the Soviet Union or whether it is Iran, whether it is Pakistan, Korea, China, Central America, Somalia, Angola, you name it, we have to have a certain number of satellites to cover the sky so we can see, so we can listen. It is just a fact of life.
It is true that we do not devote as many of our resources, mostly human resources, to the Soviet Union. However, if we want to listen to terrorists and watch military actions in Iran and in other countries that are causing us trouble, we need basically the same amount of infrastructure we needed before. If we cut a third of the satellite capability, for example, it means we are going to see a third less. It means we will not be able to focus on certain parts of the world.
Geographically I wish all of our trouble spots were in one part of the world alone. Then we would not need to do that. The fact of the matter remains that even with the reduced threat in the Soviet Union, we still have to watch the entire globe. That is where so many of the dollars fall into, enough satellites to watch and listen and collection capabilities to watch and listen.
While I would like to think that the gentleman's gut feeling is right, that the cold war is over and we can cut 10, 20, 30 percent across the board, the fact of the matter is that to watch the world, we need a certain basic amount of infrastructure.
Mr. OWENS. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BEREUTER. I am pleased to yield to the gentleman from New York.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Nebraska has expired.
(On request of Mr. Owens and by unanimous consent, Mr. Bereuter was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)
Mr. OWENS. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BEREUTER. I yield to the gentleman from New York.
Mr. OWENS. Madam Chairman, let us assume we need to keep satellites in place. They are very expensive, I know, because we have an article from the Los Angeles Times which said one exploded recently, and it was a $2 billion loss. The space agency spokesman for some space group here in Washington said it was a $2 billion loss, but our capability has not really been affected that much by it.
Nevertheless, let us concede that point. Are there not places to cut in terms of the money we pay to informers throughout the world, in terms of the number of agents provocateur we have on the payroll, in terms of the number of femme fatales we have on the payroll? And there are a number of aspects of the operation, frogmen who are diving in the waters to look at Russian submarines; there are a number of aspects of the operation which have nothing to with satellites in the sky which look at the whole world.
Let us assume that we are not devoting the entire budget but only about one-fourth of it to the satellite operation, and leave that in place. There are numerous other places that we could make reductions, because despite the fact that there is a lot of unrest in the world, there are no threats. That unrest does not threaten the United States of America the way the Soviet Union threatened the United States of America.
Mr. BEREUTER. Madam Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his points. There are a couple of things that I would respond.
First of all, we are cutting dramatically the expenditures elsewhere. If the gentleman had gone to the Democratic caucus, perhaps he did, or the Republican Conference, he would have understood about the restructuring that Director Woolsey will be bringing to the satellite capacity of the United States, in an effort to reduce costs but still to maintain an adequate level of surveillance and protection for this country.
We do not have femmes fatales. We do not have agents provocateur, but we are cutting dramatically expenditures on a whole range of programs. I would say also to the gentleman, since he asked to be recognized, that if he took a careful look at the CBO report that he referenced a few minutes ago, if he would take a look at the end of it, they give a disclaimer that basically says, Forget about everything else that we have said previously because we really do not have full information on which to base our conclusions.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Nebraska has expired.
(On request of Mr. Dicks and by unanimous consent, Mr. Bereuter was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)
Mr. BEREUTER. Madam Chairman, I would say to my colleagues, look at the tremendous proliferation of weapons of mass destruction today. Look at all the countries that are seeking to gain those capacities, and look at the extraordinary proliferation of missile technology, and the Members will understand we have to know what is happening around the world.
We do hope to move to a multilateral approach to many things, but where in the world do we think the intelligence for the U.N. forces and the other multilateral forces comes from? It comes predominantly--95 percent--from our capacity, the United States of America.
Mr. DICKS. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BEREUTER. I am pleased to yield to the gentleman from Washington.
Mr. DICKS. Madam Chairman, I would just point out to my friend, the gentleman from New York [Mr. Owens], he mentioned some of the areas where there have been real cuts made. I go out and spend some Saturday mornings with the people who are involved in human intelligence and do these operations. They are complaining bitterly about how much we have already cut them.
I would also point out the gentleman mentioned the 25-percent reduction in military personnel. Part of this budget goes to the military for all of its intelligence operations as well. So it helps to explain why you cannot bring it down much more dramatically than we already are doing.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Bereuter] has again expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Bereuter was allowed to proceed for 30 additional seconds.)
Mr. BEREUTER. To conclude my remarks, Madam Chairman, I thank my colleagues for their indulgence and for this dialog. I want to suggest to my colleagues to remember these facts. We already have reduced the President's intelligence budget recommendations by 3.7 percent. The President has asked us not to cut further below this level. He says it creates difficulties.
So I urge my colleagues to oppose the amendment of the gentleman from Vermont.
Ms. PELOSI. Madam Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.
Madam Chairman, the gentleman from Vermont and the gentleman from New York know the esteem in which I hold both of them for their relentless advocacy on behalf of working people and those who need help in our country. I appreciate the spirit in which the Sanders-Owens amendment is offered, and I agree with them. We should cut the intelligence budget as quickly as we can responsibility do so. In fact, I think that we are well on our way to reducing our national security budget by the 10 percent they suggest. However, this must be done by making the kinds of specific cuts that we started to do with in this year's authorization bill.
I would say to the gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Sanders] and the gentleman from New York [Mr. Owens] that I share their values. The gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Sanders] went on before very eloquently about the values debate that we always have in this Congress, and about what we are neglecting in our country. And I agree with him. I believe that we should measure the strength of our country in its health, education, and the well-being of its people. For that reason I have voted every year for the values budget put forth by the Congressional Black Caucus, and I will continue to do so to make those budget priorities the priorities of this Congress. I know they are the priorities of this country.
However, the gentleman from Vermont in his remarks set forth some choices which are indeed not the choices that are before us today. The choice we have today is between the intelligence community spending this money on
the intelligence budget or on defense. By the way, the funding which this legislation authorized goes into the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. Last year the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee made deep cuts in the intelligence budget, thereby spending more money on defense. Therefore, every dollar we cut from intelligence will be spent on defense under the circumstances as they are before us now. Next year we could address this issue at an earlier stage in the process and come in with a new set of budget numbers from the Budget Committee. We would be starting at a different place. But as the facts are and the process is before us, money saved in the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee on the intelligence budget is spent on defense. Of the two, while I would rather cut both, of the two I prefer spending the money on intelligence and cutting it on defense. I would rather spend on intelligence so that we could have better intelligence about the Saddam Husseins of the world.
Think of the money we could have saved in defense dollars if we knew more about Iraq's intentions rather than having to spend money and risking the lives of our young people.
I wanted to go on the Intelligence Committee to focus on the proliferation issues and terrorism issues. yes, the cold war is over, but there are many hot spots left in the world. And there is mobilization going on without the deterrence that the cold war offered as some form of defense. And there is mobilization going on without even the kind of detente we had with the Soviet Union that we do not have with the leading terrorists like the Saddam Husseins and the Qadhafis of the world.
As a member of the Intelligence Committee, I worked with my colleagues for the highest possible cuts. That was one of my missions as a progressive going to that committee. My vote today on the committee bill is my expression of gratitude to my chairman, the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman] for making these cuts possible.
We have cut over $1 billion from the Clinton budget recommendation. I defy any other committee chair in this Congress to make that claim.
Therefore, I reluctantly oppose the Sanders-Owens amendment. My reluctance springs, however, from the respect that I have to these two gentlemen, and not for the amendment which they offer. And I urge my colleagues to vote `no.'
Mr. BROWN of California. Madam Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.
(Mr. BROWN of California asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. BROWN of California. Madam Chairman, first of all I rise in support of the amendment offered by the gentleman from Vermont and the gentleman from New York. Let me say, however, that I have a great deal of confidence in the work of the Intelligence Committee as currently constituted under the chairmanship of Mr. Glickman with Mr. Combest as the ranking member. I think they are moving the committee in the right direction. I recognize that they have cut below the President's request by 3 percent.
I would point out that this House, in its wisdom, has cut the civilian space program by about twice that much, and there was no question as to whether the civilian space program would survive. We know it will survive. The Administrator says, as with any large bureaucracy, you can probably cut it 5 percent a year for several years and still get more production. The same is true of the
intelligence agencies, and I urge that we consider sending them a message by asking them to become more efficient.
I spent several years on the Intelligence Committee. I was very frustrated. One of the reasons I was frustrated is the information that all of the Members are hinting at, that is available up in the committee rooms, I knew full well, but I could not tell, because that would have been a breach of secrecy. All Members can go up there and get this information, but they cannot bring it down here and use it in the debates. What good does it do then in terms of building a case for or against any particular way of spending that money?
As a matter of fact, I was threatened with legal action because I revealed the fact that there was an organization known as the NRO. We have finally a year ago admitted that we have an organization called the NRO. You can find the date and the type of satellite that was just launched, disastrously, in the Pacific. The preceding satellite that it was to replace, you can find the name and the date of launch in official Government publications, but you cannot reveal it here on this floor.
The Los Angeles Times, a reputable newspaper, said it was a Lacrosse imaging satellite. There is one reason for a Lacrosse imaging satellite. That is to peer below the cloud cover in the Soviet Union. Most of the rest of the world you do not need a Lacrosse imaging satellite. You can use the other imaging satellite which do a very good job of pinpointing the exact location of every tank, or even individual soldiers if you want to get down to that level.
So my suggestion is if you want to save money, do not replace that Lacrosse imaging satellite. It is no longer needed to penetrate the cloud cover of the Soviet Union. I would take that $2 billion, and that is again reported in the L.A. Times, and use it for some other purpose.
Several of the very knowledgeable members of the committee have suggested that those who offer this amendment ought to make specific suggestions as to how that money should be spent. Well let me tell you this: When I went on the Intelligence Committee I was tremendously reassured of the safety of the United States from the technological capabilities that we have. The CIA, the NSA, the National Reconnaissance Office and these others, they have the best hardware in the world. You can see any tank movement or anything else, any airplane movement, any ship movement that takes place in the Soviet Union. I felt comforted knowing that they could not move a single item of hardware without or knowing about it almost instantaneously. That was not the problem.
There is a tremendous gap in our intelligence. We know nothing about what is going on in the Moslem world, for example. There is a hiatus in terms of human intelligence about the great revolutionary movement shaking the world.
I would suggest that instead of building another satellite, we try to train more human sources who can get into these other cultures and understand them, analyze the results, and tell us what are the areas of the world which face imminent revolution, and what is going to happen in those areas.
That would help our intelligence, and it would not take all the billions that we are spending on these satellites.
Now, I have another suggestion. Lockheed is currently seeking to do an unclassified satellite that has essentially the same resolution as the NRO's classified satellites. Why do we not ask Lockheed to go ahead and do that, and then we buy the imagery from them?
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. Brown] has expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Brown of California was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)
Mr. BROWN of California. I have asked for the additional 5 minutes because I am enjoying this so much.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, would the gentleman yield?
Mr. BROWN of California. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Kansas.
Mr. GLICKMAN. The gentleman is such an extraordinarily brilliant person.
Mr. BROWN of California. Thank you.
Mr. GLICKMAN. I was amused to think that the gentleman does not think there are clouds anywhere else in the world except over the Soviet Union, and I was a little worried. You are chairman of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology.
Mr. BROWN of California. There are clouds even in Washington; even in Washington there are clouds.
Mr. GLICKMAN. But the gentleman does acknowledge that there are clouds in other parts of the world?
Mr. BROWN of California. Yes. As a matter of fact, one of my suggestions is, and I am just getting into this matter, I think that we should spend some of this money for technical resources to do dual-purpose investments, that we, as I started to say, ought to use a civilian satellite which Lockheed, which builds the classified satellite, is perfectly willing to put up for us, and make a huge amount of money and get all the data that we need. If we need a radar satellite, and there is a lot of value in them, for civilian purposes, I might say, we used this kind of imaging, for example, to find out what lay below the surface of the desert of North Africa. It is marvelous. You cannot get that kind of information any other way. We found new archeological information using those radar satellites.
I would suggest that we put up a dual-purpose radar satellite and let the intelligence agencies use it, sell the products on the commercial market, and use the rest of the product for scientific research which I am very much interested in. I think we can do that.
But my main suggestion at this point is that we recognize that the great gap in our intelligence-gathering is human intelligence and in analysis of the data that we collect. I would suggest less focus on hardware and more on sophisticated human intelligence-gathering which is far less expensive, incidentally, and a better job of understanding these other cultures where the terrorism originates that we are so afraid of.
Mr. DICKS. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BROWN of California. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Washington.
Mr. DICKS. Madam Chairman, I have a great respect for the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology who is an expert on these matters.
I would raise one question, since you have a great grasp of the space program, et cetera, and being from California: Are you not concerned, as many other experts are, about the declining industrial base in the United States and our capability to reconstitute the defense industrial base. No one wants to think that there could ever be an overthrow in the Soviet Union, that the hard-liners would take over again. But there are still 10,000 weapons there. If we had to reconstitute our defense base and build these space systems or other defense systems, I mean, the industrial-base argument--we could be in trouble. We only have a handful of companies involved and you waxed eloquently here on a number of subjects, give me your views on the industrial base issue.
Mr. BROWN of California. I agree with the gentleman that this country should be doing a more diligent effort to understand the technological and scientific developments in other countries and that we could use intelligence gathering for that purpose. The CIA has approached me and discussed that with me, and I encouraged them, just as I am encouraging other defense installations to look for civilian missions. I think that is legitimate. I would be happy to fund them if I knew what they would do.
Unfortunately, many other countries such as the Soviet Union devoted a great deal of their time to industrial intelligence collection, and they found that they could not transfer the technology to their own industrial base because there was a lack of understanding of how you transfer technology.
Now, we may have some of those same problems, even if we have a robust collection program. I hope that we will not.
But let me make one or two other points. I do not want to take up all the time. But one of the former speakers said that the world was arming itself at an alarming rate, and they are correct, the world is still very insecure. The insecurity, however, is not solved by the technology. It is solved by the other kinds of collection that I am talking about, understanding other cultures, revolutionary movements, the kind of thing that is happening, and a better analysis of the data.
I might point out that the reason the rest of the world is armed so well is that the United States provided those arms over many, many years. We are currently, the CIA is, currently buying back Stingers that we gave to the Afghan rebels in past years, because now those Stingers are getting into the hands of other kinds of terrorists, and they are being used to shoot down airplanes. We are spending many millions of dollars buying back those Stingers that we originally gave away.
Now, we cannot engage in those kinds of tactics and then lament the fact that other nations are also supplying arms to other parts of the world. We have a number of important intelligence problems. We need to discuss them. We need to make intelligent policy.
We are not able to do it because we still overclassify the data. I still resent this overclassification, and I feel very bitter about it sometimes.
Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BROWN of California. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, recognizing that I would not change the gentleman's mind on the amendment, but I would want to go in saying, and I will be very careful how I proceed with this, I think every member of the committee is concerned, and I want to agree with the gentleman on the need and the importance and the significance for human intelligence.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. Brown] has again expired.
(At the request of Mr. Combest and by unanimous consent, Mr. Brown of California was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.
Mr. COMBEST. If the gentleman will yield further, it is an area that I would say that every member of the committee, I think, probably has as much of an interest in, and it is not something, I assure the gentleman, that we have overlooked or forgotten about.
Mr. BROWN of California. I am sure that is the case.
As I said earlier, I think this committee is in the best hands that I have seen it in many years. I think you underestimate the amount of reductions that you could make.
The 3 percent below the President's request that you are lauding is a very trivial amount. I would like to suggest, that even with the 10 percent that is stated here, we would still have a very comfortable budget.
I urge support for the gentleman's amendment.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.
Madam Chairman, the gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Sanders], as usual, has presented this amendment correctly. It is a question of choices, a question of level of effort, and I think I want to get some facts out again so that we understand where we are going.
This bill is 3.8 percent below last year's authorization bill. This bill is about 3.7 percent below what President Clinton has requested. He has written me a letter which I have shared with all of you which indicates that he will oppose any amendment on the House floor which seeks to reduce intelligence spending beyond the reductions already proposed by the committee.
I did not always support Presidents Bush and Reagan in their defense proposals, but we have a new President, and I say this particularly for my party, we have a new President who is working his way through a variety of foreign-policy and international crises. I would think that from the standpoint of giving him some sure footing to deal with the situation in Bosnia and the Balkans, to deal with Iran, to deal with Egypt, to deal with other problems in the world that it would be an unnecessary affront to dramatically reduce the budget that he says is his bottom line.
I say that because I think it is important to give him that support right now.
Now, let me, for a moment, also describe what is in this intelligence budget so people know. The gentleman from New York [Mr. Owens] talked about the satellites.
Yes, there are satellites. But let me describe the other parts of the budget so you have some idea of what the intelligence community does. Part of it is imagery. Satellites take pictures. A big part of it is something called signals intelligence. Satellites and other collectors listen to what people are saying. Some of these are in the sky. Some of these are not in the sky. Some of this is done by human beings. Some of this is done by machines all over the world.
Another big part is human intelligence, people on the ground listening, analyzing, making decisions. That is what the budget is all about, it is not just technology.
It takes all of these people to look, to listen, to analyze in order to do the appropriate job.
I think it is important again to understand the threats to the United States, because, this whole thing has to be based on a legitimate threat. If there is no threat, we do not need this. Let us just junk it all.
The fact of the matter is that we still have very serious threats facing this country.
What are they? First and foremost is nuclear proliferation. The old Soviet Union still has 10,000 warheads. Many of those may be on the marketplace right now, both the actual warheads and the technology to countries like Iran and North Korea who do not want to use it to provide aid to the homeless and unemployed in their countries. They want a nuclear capability to destabilize America and other parts of the world. That nuclear threat is very serious.
When you combine that nuclear threat with the terrorist threat, the ability to transport nuclear devices around the world, we have a problem in this country, in your hometowns.
It takes an international intelligence effort to analyze that. Does that mean every dollar in this budget is absolutely well spent? Probably not. There are probably more places where you can cut. But the fact of the matter is, that when you are dealing with these very serious threats, you do not know which cut will result in which conversation not being heard, or which picture not being taken, or which terrorist not being watched.
The FBI's investigation in the terrorist incidents in New York could not have been done without a very effective international intelligence effort to find out about that terrorist organization and what it was going to do? They were going to blow up the second tallest building in the United States which could have killed 50,000 people. The FBI did a great job with the help of the international intelligence community both here and overseas. But do we want to risk the possibility of major loss of life to people in America because of the international terrorist threat, and the threat of nuclear proliferation? I do not think so. I do not think this country, the American people, want to do that. I agree with the gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Sanders]. The fact is we have other problems in this country. We have problems of economic necessity in America.
But if you ask the priorities of the American people, they will say public safety is probably the first priority. I view the intelligence budget as a public safety budget. It is an eyes-and-ears budget to see what is happening in the world. As the gentlewoman from California [Ms. Pelosi] said, as your actual defense dollars go down radically, which they are, it would be foolish for us to get rid of our eyes and ears in terms of this intelligence budget.
So, while I understand this amendment, I think it is inconsistent with what the priorities of the American people are, and I urge you not to support it.
There will be more terrorist acts in this country. I do not want it on my shoulders, that I could have done something and did not.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman] has expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Glickman was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, I do not want it on my shoulders that I could have done something and I got rid of the potential for that additional information collection when we reduced this budget rather radically.
So, I would urge Members not to support the amendment.
One final point: The gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Sanders] said that the level of effort should be reduced. He is pretty honest about it. He said to cut 10 percent. How does he know? I think it is a gut feeling because he did not go upstairs and examine the budget. Neither did Mr. Owens.
You have a committee that did examine the budget. We are no geniuses, but let me tell you something: This committee is not composed of people who are on here permanently, like most committees of Congress. We are on for 6 years, and then we are off. We are not doing this to promote our district or to promote particular defense contracts. We are really trying to do this in the best interest of the country, and, hopefully, we provide that kind of review that can only come from an independent group of people.
We are not brilliant, but we have looked at this, and we decided we can make some cuts, but it would not be prudent to make additional large cuts. Maybe you can make it without any damage, Mr. Owens or Mr. Sanders, although as Ms. Pelosi says, the money will not go to the homeless, it will go back into the defense budget. But I just think at this stage it is not a responsible thing to do.
I understand where the amendment is coming from. I urge my colleagues to take the responsible approach today by not supporting the amendment.
Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GLICKMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest].
Mr. COMBEST. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Madam Chairman, the gentleman mentioned the New York tower bombing. I want to reiterate once again: The great intelligence work, literally within hours of the time that they were going to be set off, there were four additional bombs that were found set by terrorist groups in New York; one in the Federal Building, one in the United Nations Building, and two in major commuter tunnels during the height of rush hour. Those were stopped because of good intelligence.
So, rather than talking today about how good it was that the FBI followed up on the leads after the fact, those were stopped beforehand. So we could be speaking of much more in the way of destruction in New York City had it not been for good intelligence.
Mr. LEWIS of California. Madam Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.
(Mr. LEWIS of California asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. LEWIS of California. Madam Chairman, to my colleagues, I wanted to share just a moment how I happened to become a member of the Committee on Intelligence. When I was appointed to this committee at the start of the 103d Congress, I was literally a greenhorn in terms of the intelligence business.
I want to express my deep appreciation to my chairman, the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman] and my ranking member, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest] for their patience with me as I worked my way through the complex issues at this committee These two gentlemen have provided quality leadership in the difficult process of educating members new to the committee.
Madam Chairman, I went on the committee for a couple of fundamental reasons. First, I have the responsibility in the Subcommittee on Appropriations which funds the VA, HUD and independent agencies. This subcommittee has the oversight of the more advanced technological involvement of our country under NASA, specifically our space programs, of which my colleague, the gentleman from California, [Mr. Brown], spoke earlier.
Second, I am member of the Subcommittee on Defense and I have served there during which we have gone about a rather significant reduction in our defense appropriations. While we have drastically reduced our defense spending, people have suggested that the world has changed, and indeed there is a prospect of living in a very peaceful world.
In that type of environment, there is great pressure to begin to commercialize the technology we have learned in our defense community as well as technical advancements of NASA. There is great pressure to push that commercial opportunity toward the private sector.
If we begin to move toward that commercialization, an intelligence background would be most helpful in my capacity as a member of the VA, HUD, and independent agencies as well as a member of the Defense Appropriations subcommittees.
As I have said, in those committees I have been one of those members who has been very concerned with the relatively radical reduction that we have made in our defense budget. The gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] earlier spoke about that reduction rather articulately. I have been concerned, but as a member of the subcommittee have gone along with that progressive shrinkage of our defense expenditure. Having said that, it is absolutely critical in that sort of circumstances that not just the Congress but the President of the United States must have available to him the best possible information regarding threats that may be developing around the world. And that sort of critical information, as you are reducing defense spending, only comes from our intelligence processes.
I am absolutely astonished, as a new member of this committee, at the quality of the work being done by our intelligence community. The President has asked that we not cut this budget any further. He has done so because he knows the world is changing radically, and you cannot begin to place assets in a position where you might need them, whether they be in the sky or otherwise, at any snap of the finger. We must continue our investment in the intelligence community. This President recognizes that America, if it is going to lead, must be strong. And with shrinking defense budgets, our strengths often come through information. I understand, and I understand clearly, that the intention of this amendment is to cut the intelligence community in the hope that these funds will somehow move in the direction of social programs. In the real world, that is not going to happen. Our defense authorization process has put our Appropriations Committee in a position where we are short by several billions of dollars in outlay. Any money given up here in terms of intelligence authorization will quickly be swallowed by a defense network which feels they are under too great pressure.
Indeed, my colleagues, carefully evaluate and listen to those people who are leading this committee. Mr. Glickman and Mr. Combest have done an outstanding job. Measuring very carefully, they have attempted to be responsive to our defense needs, and to the needs of the President for excellent information.
Madam Chairman, this is the wrong cut at the wrong time, and I urge my colleagues to oppose this amendment.
Mr. COMBEST. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. LEWIS of California. I yield to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Combest].
Mr. COMBEST. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
Madam Chairman, just as a point of reference, and the gentleman in the well and the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Dicks] both know this, many people say that intelligence and defense should contain parallel reductions. I argue, in fact, that if defense is going down, intelligence should go up. But that is obviously some other argument for some other day. I would only wish we had had only the same reductions in intelligence as we have had in defense, because in the last 2 years intelligence has taken a significantly larger proportional cut than defense has.
Mr. DICKS. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. LEWIS of California. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
Mr. DICKS. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Madam Chairman, I want to commend the gentleman for his statement. Let me say one other thing: Our good friend from California [Mr. Brown] the chairman of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, got up and kind of painted a picture that I am troubled about, in this sense, a picture where we have this enormous scientific capability, incredible satellites, and they do everything.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. Lewis] has expired.
(On request of Mr. Dicks and by unanimous consent, Mr. Lewis of California was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)
Mr. DICKS. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman continue to yield?
Mr. LEWIS of California. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
Mr. DICKS. I want to make sure that our colleagues here understand something: These satellites go around in various orbits, they are only over various parts of the Earth for a few minutes each day. If during that time there is cloud cover or other problems, we may not get the pictures of the same quality that the gentleman discussed.
I worry that if we do not continue to invest in the newer technologies and try to overcome some of the deficiencies in the current system as we downsize, we are not going to have that good quality out there in the future.
There are significant deficiencies that have to be overcome with new investment. That is why I think Mr. Woolsey is correct. As we look at signals, as we look at imagery, we have got to continue to invest. That costs us some money in the near term, but it will simplify the architecture in the long term and help us save additional money.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California has expired.
(By unanimous consent, Mr. Lewis of California was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)
Mr. LEWIS of California. Madam Chairman, I appreciate very much my colleague's comments.
If I may by way of closing indicate to my colleagues that as a new member of the committee, I have become somewhat startled by the tendency of the House to suggest that the world has become so peaceful that we can afford to significantly continue to shrink our national defense budget. If that is logical, is it not just as logical that the information that is made available, not just to our defense network, but to the President, the Commander in Chief and the Appropriation Committees, should be better?
The only way you can do that is if you have the assets in place, or develop the assets that allow us to improve that information.
The world, in many ways, is better today than it was a decade ago in terms of our relation with the former Soviet Union, but in other regions such as Somalia, Bosnia, Sendero Luminoso in Peru, the challenges we face throughout this developing world are very real. It is incredibly important that America be able to continue to lead. To do that, we must be able to provide quality information to those decisionmakers who can make a difference for a peaceful world.
Mr. DeFAZIO. Madam Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.
Madam Chairman, anyone listening to the debate knows America is not safe. The world is a perilous place. I think all the Members on both sides of this amendment would agree. We need a good cost-effective intelligence system.
The question is really whether or not what we are doing today is cost-effective.
There is another question, which is put into perspective, not only is the world not safe, but America is not safe. It is not safe to walk the streets in many places in America. They could be made safer with more police, something the President has promised and something that we have had difficulty reducing in our budget.
With this classified amount of money that we are cutting out of this budget, my rough estimates are from my days as a county commissioner, we could put 56,000 deputy sheriffs in patrol cars on the road, fully armed and equipped, for the same amount of money, or urban police, would probably be close to that number.
Now, of course, the Russians can take that number and they can quickly go back and check on my county budget and they can interpolate how much money we might be cutting out of the budget here and soon hey will know that we are cutting somewhere near $3 billion and America will be less safe because the Russians know that we cut $3 billion out of this budget.
How much are we spending? Well, I cannot tell you that. It is classified.
What are we doing with the money? Are we fighting terrorism? Are we fighting the cold war? Are we fighting some other adversary? Well, I cannot tell you that.
But we know that every single dollar in this classified budget is well-spent, better spent than any other part of the Government. This is not like any other Government undertaking or agency. Not a penny is wasted. That is what our colleagues would have us believe. I do not believe that.
I am from the Government and I am here to protect you. That is what we are talking about here today. Believe us and spend this amount of money. Do not make them make the tough choices.
I read one article that said we cannot possibly lay off the people in the Intelligence Agency. That article was such an insult to the people in those agencies, that they simply could not lay them off because they are also laden with secrets that one might become disgruntled upon losing his or her job and reveal some of those secrets. I do not believe anybody in our Intelligence Agency would do that if they knew that for the good of those agencies and for the good of America and to cut the deficit they had lost their jobs, just like my loggers are losing their jobs, just like people who work in military bases are losing their jobs, everybody across America has to give and give equally.
What possible solace could the Russians or Mu'ammar Qadhafi or Saddam Hussein take from knowing how much money we are spending? Why not reveal the baseline number? What advantage could they gain?
What they would know is that we are spending more than their gross domestic product on our Intelligence Agencies. I think they would be pretty depressed if they saw how much money we are spending in this budget, because they would know they could never possibly match it if they spent every penny available to them to have their own counter-intelligence services.
There is a lot of talk about the ex-Soviet Union, or Russia. The gentleman from Vermont made the most telling point of the day. I did not vote for a single penny for our ex-adversary, Russia, or the Soviet Union, and now many of our colleagues
have voted to send them billions of dollars in aid are going to tell us we cannot cut a few billions of dollars out of this secret intelligence budget because of the threat presented to us by Russia or the ex-Soviet Union.
Why are we sending them money if we still feel so threatened and if they are not so much of a threat, why do we still need to spend so much money?
Terrorist acts? I think terrorism is the new threat to America and to world stability in many cases, particularly with nuclear terrorism. What percentage of the budget is spent on that? How effectively is it spent? There is not being effective oversight of that. This is all being done in secret and secrecy does not lie well with a full Democratic Republic.
America could do better. Let us come level with the American people. Let us tell them how much money we have spent, how much money we spent to win the cold war in overtaking the threat of the Soviet Union. Let us compare that to how much money we are spending today. Let us tell them how much money we are spending today.
Let us at least lay out some of the categories of the budget and let people see some gross numbers and let our colleagues here make some decisions on whether or not it is well spent, just like we do with every other budget in this body, every other budget in the U.S. Government.
We can do better and we can cut from this, just like we can cut from any other part of this Government. There are places to cut in every agency of the Federal Government.
Madam Chairman, I urge my colleagues to send a message and vote for this budget.
Mrs. SCHROEDER. Madam Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.
I wanted to follow the gentleman from Oregon, because I thought he made a lot of excellent points.
First, let me thank the new chairman from the Intelligence Committee, because I have been very impressed with his leadership; but I must say, it is a different world. None of us would say it is a different world. None of us would say it is a peaceful world, but we would say it is a different kind of environment we have to target. By not being able to talk about this openly, we do not know if we are targeting it right or not.
I was very pleased this year that the Committee on Armed Services did practically its entire markup in the open. I think that is a real change. We have never seen that happen before.
I would hope that that would be a reason we could at least say how much we are spending on this whole area of Intelligence.
Second, let me put a few things up. The gentleman from Oregon pointed out very well that why we have been so focused on the international arms race, one of the things we forgot to look at was our domestic arms race, and our domestic arms race is very out of control. Cities such as mine are reeling from that.
I think an awful lot of our constituents are much more fearful about getting shot as they drive to the grocery store than they are about having some missile coming at them.
I also thought the gentleman made an excellent point about the ridiculous statements that have been made in one of the prior newspaper stories, and that was that we cannot fire anybody here, that is why we have to keep the budget so high, because if we fire them they will tell. Well, I certainly hope that is not true.
I certainly hope as we look at different threats in the world, radical fundamentalism and so on, that there is an ability to shift the kind of personnel needs to people who understand that, rather than hang on to people from the prior cold war at any cost for fear that they will say something.
Finally, let me say, if we cut this money, there are so many uses for it domestically and every other way.
Remember, we are still leaving 90 percent intact, which is more money than most countries spend on absolutely everything in their national budget.
One of the things that has worried me the most is that in Intelligence one of the things people talk about is maybe we ought to have Intelligence out there to watch our national technology base, to make sure that there are not foreigners coming in and stealing secrets from America's corporations.
Now, at the very time we are seeing that, we just finished this incredible competition where we went out and we asked people to take the research we were doing in these high-technology classified areas and figure out a way to put it out in the civilian sector.
We had this terrific competition. CEO said, `We think this is silly. It's you liberals talking about defense diversification. It won't work.'
We have $471 million, and guess what? If we funded all the things that came in in this competition, we would need $8.3 billion, and the people applying have to put in half that money, so it would be almost $17 billion all together that we would have out there to start new jobs right away.
Now let me tell my colleagues that, if we do not pick up this resource, if we do not find some way to fund all those applications that came in, guess what? Foreign investors are going to fund them. They are drooling to fund them on a 50-50 match, and we will not need the intelligence community to tell us why they went offshore. They went offshore because we had a competition, got people excited. They came forward and thought of all sorts of new market approaches for the things we have invested in as taxpayers, in defense that had been classified, and then we could not fund it. At this point we are going to be able to fund about one-seventeenth of the proposals, and every one of the proposals is appearing to be jurored very, very high. This is eating our seed corn.
So, Madam Chairman, this is not saying that all of the world is peaceful, we do not need it. It is saying the world is different, it is not peaceful, let us reconfigure. It is not saying that the future is not looking at intelligence, but make sure the people there are looking at the proper things, and it is also saying we have new threats domestically in our cities and new threats to build a tech base in the civilian side where we do not rely totally on Government contracts coming from the Defense Department or the intelligence department, and everything else is offshore. That is a miserable future for this country.
Defense diversification is our future, and we are sitting here looking at the most successful thing anyone could dream of, and it is going to go down the chute because we do not have any money to fund it.
So, I think these are places where we could find the money, we could begin funding these things, and we can begin instant job creation in a very critical area that will help us retain some of that defense and technology base forwarding, and that is one of the ideas I would have, and I would hope people would vote for this very small 10-percent cut.
Mr. LAZIO. Madam Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.
Madam Chairwoman, I rise in opposition to the amendment proposed by Representatives Sanders and Owens and urge my colleagues to defeat it.
The demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war has not lessened America's need for timely and accurate intelligence. Indeed the opposite is the case.
The restructuring of Europe has put increased demands on the intelligence community to provide information on the policies and economies of numerous newly Independent States--15 alone in the former Soviet Union. Global threats still exist, and our contemporary intelligence problems--ranging from terrorism to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to economic espionage--are complex.
Moreover, we continue to face many regional disturbances worldwide. While the United States will not--and should not--respond militarily in all cases, the Intelligence Community must still be capable of providing timely information to policy makers and military leaders. This capability is all the more important in a time of steep military draw downs. Intelligence is a cheap defense.
We must preserve a strong, capable, and flexible intelligence capability to help maintain America's strength and security. Further cuts in intelligence community funding and personnel at this time would be shortsighted. They would only damage the effectiveness of our intelligence programs and our ability to respond quickly to emerging threats.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Madam Chairman, it is my understanding that the leadership would like to have a quorum call now, and so, Madam Chairman, I would suggest the absence of a quorum. I would say that we intend to go back on this bill and will try to finish this amendment tonight. I do not think we are going to be able to finish the bill tonight.
Madam Chairman, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.
The CHAIRMAN. Evidently a quorum is not present.
Members will record their presence by electronic device.
The call was taken by electronic device, and the following Members responded to their names:
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Serrano). Four hundred twenty Members have answered to their names, a quorum is present, and the Committee will resume its business.
Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
The motion was agreed to.
Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr. Wise) having assumed the chair, Mr. Serrano, Chairman pro tempore of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that the Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 2330) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1994 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. Government and the Central Intelligence Agency retirement and disability system, and for other purposes, has come to no resolution thereon.