VERIFICATION AND CONTROL TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM FOCUS Mr. Bevill. How has the focus of this program changed since the breakup of the former Soviet Union? Dr. Alessi. Since the breakup of the former Soviet Union, the focus of the Verification and Control Technology (V&CT) program has been reoriented to reflect the increasing importance of the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them to U.S. national security interest. Specifically the development of arms control-related verification technologies and systems under our Detection Technology activity has been reoriented to include the development of technologies and systems for enhancing U.S. and international capabilities for detecting the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Our Analytical Support activity has been reoriented to include establishing a baseline technical analysis program at the national laboratories in support of U.S. and international nonproliferation efforts. In addition, under our Analytical Support activity, we have been playing an increasing role in coordinating Department of Energy efforts in support of U.S. activities aimed at assisting Russian and other states of the former Soviet Union, in a number of critical areas such as nuclear warhead dismantlement and emergency response capabilities. Lastly, beginning in FY 1994, funding for the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation's Offices of Nonproliferation Policy and Export Control and International Safeguards is included in the V&CT program rather than under the Departmental Administration and Nuclear Safeguards and Security programs as in previous years. As reflected in our FY 1994 budget request, funding for these offices will be significantly increased to: expand our activities in support of U.S. regional nonproliferation efforts; accelerate development and implementation of a U.S. national and international Proliferation Information Network System; expand other activities needed to support U.S. and international export control regimes; expand International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and other safeguards and physical protection support activities; and expand technology development programs needed to enhance safeguards and IAEA special inspection activities. VERIFICATION & CONTROL TECHNOLOGY Mr. Bevill. Please describe any role you have had in discussions with Russia regarding control, storage and dismantlement of their nuclear weapons. Dr. Alessi. In November 1991, a Soviet Union delegation was invited to Washington to discuss measures for cooperation and assistance in control, storage, and dismantlement of Soviet nuclear weapons. DOE participated in the delegation meetings, as well as in a technical working group meeting. At this first U.S./Soviet meeting on such technical issues, the U.S. presented an overview of how the U.S. manages nuclear weapons, with particular emphasis on control, storage, and dismantlement of nuclear weapons. In this meeting, as well as in all following meetings, Soviet (and subsequently, Russian) delegations insisted that direct assistance in control, storage, and dismantlement of their nuclear weapons was neither necessary nor desired. The sensitivity of weapon design information, as well as the reluctance to reveal any possible weakness with respect to nuclear weapons issues, were believed to be the basis for this Russian position. The Soviet delegation informed the U.S that the most important way in which the U.S. could help the Soviet Union achieve its goal of dismantling tactical, INF, and START nuclear warheads by the year 2000, was to support construction of a specially designed storage facility and procurement of containers for nuclear materials removed from dismantled weapons. The U.S. has agreed to provide assistance in both these areas. This assistance also includes, among other things, a design of the system for control, accounting, and physical protection of fissile material in the facility. Many Department of Energy and national laboratory staff members are working to apply the very best technical expertise to these problems. Since November 1991, DOE has participated in frequent U.S. delegations to Russia and technical information exchanges both in Russia and in the U.S. to discuss issues associated with facilitating dismantlement of Russian nuclear weapons (on average at least monthly). In summary, we have placed emphasis on providing assistance which is believed important to Russia in maintaining control, safeguarding stored weapons, and performing safe and ecologically sound dismantlement of nuclear warheads. The attached table lists agreements in which DOE is involved in implementing or on-going negotiations. As our technical partnership as nuclear weapon states improves and we are able to become increasingly open with each other in addressing these problems of mutual concern, it is realistic to expect further initiatives in these areas. Agreements with the states of the Former Soviet Union: Agreements with Russia: - Technical assistance in design of a fissile material storage facility (now being implemented) - Fissile material storage containers (now being implemented) - Flexible armor blankets (now being implemented) - Security upgrade kits for railcars (now being implemented) - Accident response equipment (now being implemented) - International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow (awaiting Russian signature) - Highly-enriched uranium (HEU) purchase (agreement signed, contract being negotiated) - Equipment for the storage facility (awaiting Russian signature) - Technical assistance for establishing a state system for nuclear material control, accounting, and physical protection (awaiting Russian signature) - Assistance in the elimination of strategic offensive arms (awaiting Russian signature) Agreements with Belarus: - Emergency response equipment (now being implemented) - Government-to-government communication link equipment (now being implemented) - Assistance in export control (now being implemented) Agreements with Ukraine: - Emergency response equipment (awaiting Ukrainian approval) - Government-to-government communication link equipment (awaiting Ukrainian approval) - Assistance in nuclear material control, accounting, and physical protection (awaiting Ukrainian approval) - Assistance in export control (awaiting Ukrainian approval) - Science and Technology Center of Ukraine (STCU) in Kiev (awaitin Ukrainian approval) Agreements with Kazakhstan: - Emergency response equipment (now being negotiated) - Government-to-government communication link equipment (now being negotiated) - Assistance in nuclear material control, accounting, and physical protection (now being negotiated) - Assistance in export control (now being negotiated) DOE ACTIVITIES IN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS Mr. Bevill. Please describe the activities of DOE in arms control negotiations. What activities will be conducted in FY 1994. Dr. Alessi. DOE serves on U.S. delegations involved in bilateral and multilateral consultations and negotiations related to arms control. For example: DOE representatives served on the Nuclear Testing Talks, the START, Defense and Space, and Chemical Weapons Convention and US/Russian bilateral Chemical Weapons delegations and on U.S. delegations for Review Conferences on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Biological Weapons Convention. DOE also provides representatives and/or expert advisors to consultative committees associated with the completed treaties, e.g. START, INF, and TTBT. DOE expertise is often requested by the interagency in preparing for negotiations and other arms control related meetings. For instance, in preparation for international meetings on potential verification measures which might be applied to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), DOE was asked to prepare a series of papers evaluating specific types of technologies. The papers were prepared by the Laboratories, coordinated with the interagency through DOE's Office of Arms Control and will be presented as U.S. papers at the BWC meeting in Geneva next month. Assistance to the Former Soviet Union DOE is heavily involved in the U.S. effort to assist the Former Soviet Union in activities related to Safe Secure Dismantlement (SSD) of its nuclear weapons. DOE-laboratories are providing technical support to production of containers for shipment and storage of fissile materials, emergency response equipment, security upgrades for railcars, and technical assistance in design of a secure storage facility for special nuclear materials. Moreover, DOE weapons laboratories have held several meetings with their Russian counterparts and identified a series of peaceful activities on which they can collaborate. 1994 ACTIVITIES Treaty Negotiations DOE will provide policy and technical support, including experts for delegations and analytical studies of policy and technical issues as noted above for on going negotiations, including: review of verification proposals for the Biological Weapons Convention, the Preparatory Commission for the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Conference on Disarmament and the Preparatory Committee meetings for the Nonproliferation Treaty Extension Conference to be held in 1995. In addition, the Department will continue to prepare for expected negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban and for the possibility of negotiations on a global ban on production of fissile materials for weapons purposes. In that regard, the Office of Arms Control will continue to call on Laboratory scientific and expertise both for analytical support of technical issues and identification and application of technologies to meet specific treaty needs. Treaty Implementation DOE facilities are subject to overflights under Open Skies and to suspect site inspections under the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Department must prepare to meet its obligations both under the treaties and under U.S. laws protecting Secret Restricted Data (SRD). The Office of Arms Control must play a significant role in that effort. Among the activities which will be pursued are: (1) analytical tools for assessing treaty requirements and SRD vulnerabilities and, (2) strategies for demonstrating treaty compliance without revealing SRD As in Fiscal Year 1993, DOE again will provide policy and technical support for consultative commissions associated with existing treaties such as START, INF and TTBT. LABORATORY ROLES Mr. Bevill. Please describe the roles performed by each DOE laboratory or facility for arms control activities. Who has the lead in each programmatic area? Dr. Alessi. The Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation conducts research and development (R&D) to support national-level arms control and proliferation policies. Detection Technology is being developed for current and future nuclear and chemical weapons arms reduction treaties and for proliferation detection via on-site verification, regional effluent monitoring, and remote (satellite) detection. Listed below are the laboratories and the major projects currently underway. At the end of this section there is a table addressing lead laboratories. Argonne National Laboratory (ANL): The major projects support warhead dismantlement and detection of nuclear material. Technology is being developed to track containers and treaty limited items using commercial technology and to develop a detector which will remotely measure emission signatures of key molecules released from exhaust and vent stacks of a plant. Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL): Current R&D projects will develop a Raman Spectrometry/Chemical Analysis system to detect chemical effluent in concentrations of less than 10 parts per million at a one kilometer range. Also under development is a Controlled Intrusiveness Verification Technology (CIVET) to identify, with a high-confidence level, nuclear warheads while minimizing intrusiveness and protecting classified information. Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL): Major projects focus on supporting the Chemical Weapons (CW) Bilateral Agreement and the START II requirements for on-site inspection of re-entry vehicles. Development is underway on-the Portable Isotopic Neutron Spectroscopy (PINS) system as a nondestructive assay system to identify the contents of suspected or declared CW containers or munitions. INEL is developing an experimental system, Fission Assay Tomography, as a passive verification tool for counting nuclear warheads on missiles without moving the missile or shroud. In support of proliferation detection, INEL is developing a Surface Analysis Molecular Beam ion trap mass spectrometer for rapid detection (<5 minutes) and chemical identification of nonvolatile and low volatility compounds. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL): Major projects here are in the following program areas: - Development of technologies which will improve our ability to detect nuclear proliferation activities from space-borne observation platforms. Included are multi-spectral thermal imagery, multi-spectral transient radiometry, low light-level imagery, and others. - Development and fabrication of satellite instrumentation which supports nuclear detonation detection for nuclear treaty verification, proliferation detection, and collateral military goals. - Development of advanced Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) systems for noncooperative proliferation detection scenarios. - Development of Continuous Reflectometry for Radius versus Time Experiment (CORRTEX) and advanced hydrodynamic yield technologies for nuclear threshold testing treaties. - The study of the generation and propagation of shock waves in a geologic media surrounding underground nuclear tests. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL): The major R&D projects support current and future treaty verification requirements and the development of new proliferation detection technologies. The major projects are: - Development of a Temperature Imaging System Infrared Camera which corrects atmospheric effects so that temperature determinations to 0.1 degree C (absolute) and 0.01 degree C (relative) are feasible. This system will have broad application in analyzing thermal emission from CW and nuclear suspect sites and possibly in detecting nuclear warheads. - Development of an advanced seismic verification and analysis capability to distinguish nuclear from chemical explosions. - Development of an Advanced Forensic Science Laboratory to advance the knowledge base for optical characterization and mass spectrometry technologies for effluent signatures and chemical collection/analysis. - Development of on-site monitoring technologies for measurements of nuclear testing sites as prescribed by a very low-yield threshold treaty, comprehensive test ban treaty, or an enhanced nonproliferation treaty. - Development and commercialization of high security electronic tags and seals for treaty applications. Nevada Operations Field Office (NV)/Remote Sensing Laboratory (RSL): The R&D projects here support the development and engineering of airborne applications of technologies for the experimental collection of data for testing data/knowledge fusion concepts. RSL also develops advanced radiometric detection technologies. Concurrently, NV is leading the operational/logistical support for a one kilo-ton underground chemical test experiment to evaluate ground motion data. This test will enhance discrimination between chemical explosions and decoupled low-yield nuclear explosions. Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL): Major R&D supports the development of field portable instrumentation for.future bilateral/multilateral international inspections. Technologies include Microchip Liquid Chromatograph and Surface Enhanced Raman Scattering Monitors which can theoretically provide chemical resolving power equivalent to conventional laboratory devices, but with much less sample preparation. ORNL is also developing a Centrifugal Concentrator for organic molecules to enhance sample collection and analysis. Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL): Major projects here include: - Development of advanced radiation detection technologies and effluent collection and analysis for nuclear proliferation detection. - Leading in a tag and seal demonstration project to support the U.S. purchase of highly enriched uranium from Russia. - Development of a rigorous statistical assessment for both current and future analytical methodologies to enhance monitoring of proliferation and testing weapons of mass destruction. - Improving commercial technologies for arms control and noncooperative proliferation detection scenarios. Ultrasonic measurement and acoustic technology is investigated to verify selected liquid properties (e.g., speed of sound, density, and viscosity). Sandia National Laboratories (SNL): Major projects include: Development of technologies which will improve our ability to detect nuclear proliferation activities from space-borne observation platforms. Included are multi-spectral thermal imagery, multi-spectral transient radiometry, low light-level imagery, and others. - Development of detection/sensor technologies for satellite flight systems. This program provides a number of operational payloads supporting DOE requirements for continuously monitoring and categorizing atmospheric nuclear events. - Development of seismic instrumentation and analysis methods to ensure effective monitoring of underground nuclear testing. - The SNL Tags/Seals program is the lead developer of new concepts for treaty and nonproliferation application. - SNL is developing signal and image processing algorithms to improve and augment national technical means (NTM) and advanced remote sensing technology. - SNL is responsible for fielding a pod mounted synthetic aperture radar and integrating optical and hyperspectral instruments in an accompanying airborne pod. Savannah River Technical Center (SRTC): The major R&D projects at SRTC are to develop systems to support nonproliferation initiatives by improving analytical methods. SRTC is developing a method for chemical analysis by fiber optic spectrometry. This technology will be designed into an automated in-line/in-tank analytical system capable of identifying chemical agents and measuring their concentration in disposal incinerators and in phosphate based pesticide manufacturing plants. Also SRTC is developing an improved Radio Frequency Glow Discharge/Fourier Transform Mass Spectrometer with resolving power necessary to unambiguously identify the isotopes present in bulk and/or particulate samples. Lead Laboratories. The lead laboratory in each programmatic area is not in all cases discernable, but is generally reflected as follows: = On-site Monitoring: Lead - LANL, Second - LLNL. = Satellite Instrumentation: Joint lead - LANL/SNL. = Seismic Verification: Lead - LLNL, Second - LANL/SNL. = Samples/Debris Detection and Analysis: Multilaboratory program area with no clear programmatic leader, but the larger laboratories dominate (LANL/LLNL/PNL/SNL). = Nonseismic Verification: Lead - LANL. = Directed Energy Verification: Lead - LANL. = Technology and Advanced Concepts: Multilaboratory program with no clear leader, but the larger laboratories dominate. = Radiation Detection Technology: Multilaboratory program with no clear leader, but the larger laboratories dominate. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ARMS CONTROL BUDGET Mr. Bevill. Please provide a lead table as shown in the budget that includes only arms control funding, excluding intelligence activities. Dr. Alessi. [Deleted) TREATY IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITY Mr. Bevill. In the treaty implementation activity, how many U.S. and Soviet tests were monitored in FY 1992 and how many planned for FY 1993 and FY 1994? Dr. Alessi. During FY 1992, Russia monitored one U.S. underground nuclear test. That test was named JUNCTION. No Russian (Soviet) tests were conducted. No decisions have yet been made about the U.S. FY 1993 and FY 1994 test programs. Because of the TTBT Protocol requirements, it is now too late for any Russian monitoring of U.S. tests in FY 1993 and too early to project activities for FY 1994. Current guidance provides for the United States to exercise all of its verification rights under the TTBT Protocol. This would mean conducting on-site verification activities for all eligible Russian nuclear tests. A Russian test is in the planning stage and the United States plans to exercise its full monitoring rights when it is executed. TREATY VERIFICATION BUDGET ASSUMPTIONS Mr. Bevill. What are the treaty verification assumptions on which the budget is based? Dr. Alessi. The Treaty Implementation activity budget request for FY 1994 assumes: (1) that the U.S. will exercise its full spectrum of monitoring and inspection rights on every Russian test or explosion under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty verification protocols; (2) that the Department of Energy will continue to be required to maintain a capability to support three verification deployments; and (3) that the Department of Energy will maintain a capability to support three verification efforts by the Russians at the Nevada Test Site. LIST OF TREATIES IN EFFECT, UNDER NEGOTIATION, AND ANTICIPATED THROUGH THE 1990'S IN WHICH DOE WILL BE INVOLVED Mr. Bevill. Please provide a list of treaties in effect; treaties under negotiation; and anticipated treaties through the 1990's in which DOE will be involved. Dr. Alessi. The treaties and agreements which are in effect include: - Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) (awaiting Ukrainian ratification) - Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II) (awaiting both U.S. and Russian ratification) - Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) - Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty - Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) - Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) - Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) - "Hot Line" Agreement - "Hot Line" Modernization Agreement - "Hot Line" Expansion Agreement - "Accidents Measures" Agreement - Incidents at Sea Agreement - Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms - Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers Agreement - Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement - Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement - U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement - Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material - Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty - Outer Space Treaty - Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) - Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) - Bilateral U.S.-Russian Chemical Weapons Destruction Agreement (awaiting both U.S. and Russian signature) - Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare - Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) - Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty - Open Skies - Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) - Confidence- and Security-Building Measures Document - Environmental Modification Convention (ENMOD) - Seabed Arms Control Treaty - Treaty of Tlatelolco (Latin-American Nuclear Weapon Free Zone) - Treaty of Raratonga (South Pacific Nuclear Weapon Free Zone) - Antarctic Treaty The treaties which are under negotiation include: - Chemical Weapons Convention Preparatory Commission - Radiological Weapons Convention (RWC) The treaties we anticipate DOE will be involved with through the 1990's include: - Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty - Global Ban on the Production of Fissionable Material for Nuclear Weapons Purposes FUNDING AND FULL TIME EQUIVALENTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY (TTBT) AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSION TREATY (PNET) Mr. Bevill. Provide the total funding by program activity included in the budget for implementation of the TTBT and PNET in FY 1992, FY 1993 and FY 1994. Dr. Alessi. The attached chart shows by major areas of activity (maintenance of core capability, support for Russian verification activities at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), and support for U.S. verification deployments in Russia) and organization (Nevada Operations Office contractor support, Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos National Laboratories) the budget for implementation of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty (PNET) in FY 1992, FY 1993 and FY 1994. Mr. Bevill. How many FTEs support each activity? Dr. Alessi. Also, the Full Time Equivalents supporting each activity are indicated on the chart. FUNDING AND FULL TIME EQUIVALENTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY (TTBT) AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSION TREATY (PNET) FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994 DOLLARS FTE DOLLARS FTE DOLLARS FTE IN THOUSANDS IN THOUSANDS IN THOUSANDS Nevada Oper Office -Core Capability $4,300 30.8 $3,716 27.04 $3,400 24.74 -NTS Activities 665 4.6 - - 300 2.08 -Deployments - - 35 0.30 35 0.30 ------- ----- ------ ----- ------ ----- Subtotal $4,965 35.4 $3,751 27.34 $3,735 27.12 Lawrence Livermore -Core Capability $1,150 5.03 $1,100 4.40 $ 800 3.20 -NTS Activities 800 5.0 - - 400 2.50 -Deployments - - 250 1.07 250 1.07 ------- ----- ------ ----- ----- ----- Subtotal $1,950 10.03 $1,350 5.47 $1,450 6.77 Los Alamos -Core Capability $2,845 10.32 $2,788 10.85 $2,600 10.12 -NTS Activities 1,040 3.80 - - 515 1.88 -Deployments - - 911 3.33 500 1.83 ------ ----- ------ ----- ------ ----- Subtotal $3,885 14.12 $3,699 14.18 $3,615 13.83 Total $10,800 59.55 $8,800 46.99 $8,800 47.72 FOLLOW-ON EARLY WARNING SYSTEM Mr. Bevill. What is the Status of the Follow-on Early Warning System? Dr. Alessi. In light of the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the shift in emphasis to detecting emerging proliferants, the intelligence community has been reevaluating monitoring requirements for nuclear tests in space. Awaiting final decisions, the Department of Energy (DOE) has ceased almost all effort related to the Follow-on Early Warning System, except for minimal coordination with the Air Force and its related contractors. In the absence of a strong statement supporting exoatmospheric monitoring requirements from the intelligence community or the Department of Defense, DOE has no plans to continue funding this program in FY 1994. ONSITE MONITORING ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA Mr. Bevill. In the absence of nuclear testing in this country and Russia, what onsite monitoring activities are being conducted and at what funding levels in FY 1993 and FY 1994. Dr. Alessi. [Deleted] As called for in the Coordinated Schedule for carrying out activities related to verification of the Russian test that has been agreed upon by Russia and the United States, [Deleted] Total DOE funding in FY 1993 and FY 1994 for these monitoring activities is estimated to be $1.2 million. Should the Russians conduct additional tests (Deleted] similar funding would be required for DOE monitoring activities for each test conducted. These costs are incremental costs for actual onsite monitoring activities and do not include the costs for maintaining a core capability for conducting such monitoring activities. In addition, should the Russians decide to monitor any U.S. tests conducted in FY 1993 or FY 1994, additional funding would be required to support their monitoring activities at the Nevada Test Site. SATELLITE INSTRUMENTATION PROGRAM Mr. Bevill. Please describe fully each of the activities being conducted under the Satellite Instrumentation program including milestones through completion, annual funding requirements, and total estimated cost of each. Dr. Alessi. The activities being conducted under the Satellite Instrumentation program are described in our draft plan for that program, which is included in the written material we are providing. That draft plan describes a program which is undergoing a major shift in emphasis. The draft plan will be reviewed by the Community Nonproliferation Committee Research and Development Subcommittee before it is implemented. The review will assure that the plan addresses the most urgent needs of the U.S. nonproliferation community. While we will continue to provide space-borne instrumentation to detect and characterize atmospheric nuclear explosions, most new investment will be directed at technologies for detecting proliferation activities prior to the occurrence of any nuclear test. ******DRAFT (SATELLITE INSTRUMENTATION PROGRAM PLAN) IS ATTACHED TO ORIGINAL DOCUMENT***** FRAMEWORK FOR DETECTION TECHNOLOGY Mr. Bevill. The budget request for detection technology consists of many separate tasks to be performed by the Department. Can you discuss the overall framework for this request; explain how the components fit together; and discuss what the overall priorities of the program are? Dr. Alessi. As shown in the attached chart, the Detection Technology activities are grouped in three program areas: on-site verification, regional measurements, and remote sensing. This programmatic structure is organized around the primary physical arenas in which the technologies are likely to be deployed. The program areas cover the spectrum of our technology development programs that are aimed at providing technologies and systems to enhance U.S. and international capabilities that range from cooperative on-site inspections and monitoring to remote satellite verification and monitoring. The overall priorities of the program have shifted from arms control verification to the development of technologies for detecting proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction as a result of the increasing importance of weapons proliferation to U.S. national security interest. ******DETECTION TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS ATTACHED TO ORIGINAL DOCUMENT***** DIFFERENCES BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS AND DOE NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY Mr. Bevill. How does the international safeguards program differ from the activities performed by the nuclear safeguards and security program? Mr. Alessi. The International Safeguards Program, administered by the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, and the Nuclear Safeguards and Security Program, under the Office of Safeguards and Security, have unique missions and serve fundamentally different national security goals. The two programs differ substantially in the threats they address and the technologies they use to accomplish their objectives. The International Safeguards Program is managed expressly to support the international nonproliferation regime, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, and U.S. government initiatives in bilateral and multilateral fora to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Program provides the DOE technical basis for development of nonproliferation policy. It also provides the long-term technology base for U.S. support of IAEA and other international safeguards activities. In addition, DOE's International Safeguards Program implements U.S. technical exchanges and cooperation with other countries in international safeguards, including training programs conducted in support of IAEA objectives and as part of the U.S. Government's ongoing nonproliferation policy objectives. International safeguards are implemented by the IAEA to assure, through detection and deterrence, that all declared nuclear material under safeguards is used for peaceful purposes. International safeguards provide for independent verification by the IAEA of a country's commitment to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and continuity of knowledge of peaceful nuclear activities. On the other hand, DOE's Office of Safeguards and Security (OSS) implements safeguards and security measures for DOE's nuclear assets (including the nuclear weapons complex). The OSS safeguards and security program aims to protect DOE nuclear material and facilities against theft or sabotage by external or internal adversaries (e.g., terrorists, criminals, etc.). This contrasts with the objective of international safeguards to verify that declared nuclear material in countries accepting safeguards on their peaceful nuclear activities has not been diverted to some non-peaceful use. Because international safeguards objectives and philosophy differ from the safeguards and security measures employed at DOE for its own facilities, the technologies employed to implement the two programs also differ. Domestic safeguards in the United States are based on rigorous, technically intrusive control and accountability for nuclear material, and physical protection of nuclear material and facilities which address a specific "design basis threat." Conversely, international safeguards rely primarily on material accounting, complemented by methods of material containment and surveillance. Information on the status of nuclear material is collected and analyzed through periodic inspections by IAEA staff. ................ Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center To meet responsibilities for radiological monitoring and assessment as set forth in the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan, the Department of Energy is responsible for establishing and managing the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC). The FRMAC is an operational center at or near the scene of a radiological incident, which provides a focal point for coordination and compilation of all offsite Federal radiological monitoring and assessment activities. All Federal, state and local agencies concerned with the radiologic incident are represented in the Center. Information related to offsite radiological risks resulting from accidents/incidents is consolidated and analyzed in the FRMAC. This information is made available to the lead Federal agency, state and/or local official(s) to aid in formulating policy decisions and for taking appropriate protective actions. Field Program Management for FRMAC is performed by the Nevada Operations Office. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FEDERAL RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT CENTER FUNDING SUMMARY (Dollars in Thousands) FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994 Operating Funding $770 $660 $1,000 Nuclear Emergency Search Team The Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) is a group of diverse and specially trained engineers, scientists, and technicians from the weapons complex, along with specialized equipment providing technical assistance in response to a malevolent nuclear threat. NEST provides the Department with the unique capability to assess the validity of communicated nuclear threats and to counter any attempts by terrorists or extortionists to achieve their objectives by utilization of stolen nuclear weapons, improvised nuclear devices, or radioactive dispersal devices. Within the United States and its territories, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has primary responsibility for such incidents. In incidents involving foreign locations, the Department of State would be the lead Federal agency for the United States. NEST assets are located primarily at the Department's facility at Nellis AFB, Nevada, with a smaller initial response/advanced party capability located at Andrews AFB, Maryland. Field Program Management for NEST is performed by the Nevada Operations Office. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT NUCLEAR EMERGENCY SEARCH TEAM FUNDING SUMMARY (Dollars in Thousands) FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994 Operating Funding $23,014 $23,920 $27,477 Radiological Assistance Program The DOE Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) provides a Federal emergency radiological response capability at the local level. Eight RAP regions provide initial "first responder" assistance, as they are located at DOE field or area offices, providing regional coordination and serving as the point of contact for providing the initial DOE response. RAP teams are usually staffed with certified Health Physicists and Registered Radiation Protection Technicians, providing an excellent resource to assist state, local and tribal governments with expert advice and support for accidents involving radioactive materials. A RAP Team's assistance is scenario-dependent and consists typically of the ability to conduct localized searches with hand-held instruments to identify nature and extent of local contamination and to provide non-clinical advice on health affect of radiation. Field Program Management for the RAP is performed by geographical regions: Brookhaven Area Office (Region 1); Oak Ridge Operations Office (Region II); Savannah River Operations Office (Region III); Albuquerque Operations Office (Region IV); Chicago Operations Office (Region V); Idaho Operations Office (Region VI); San Francisco Operations Office (Region VII); and Richland Operations Office (Region VIII). STOCKPILE SUPPORT RADIOLOGICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FUNDING SUMMARY (Dollars in Thousands) FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994 Operating Funding $1,460 $1,387 $2,000 Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site The Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS) provides direct or consultative assistance with medical and health physics support following radiation accidents. REAC/TS provides DOE with a core capability for handling the medical aspects of radiation accident/incident response, training of professional and technical personnel in related specialty areas, and in resolving medical-legal issues relating to alleged radiation exposure and subsequent health issues. REAC/TS is designated by World Health Organization as the World Collaboration Center for Radiation Accident Management. A comprehensive medical assistance/treatment course for accidents involving radiation, which is sponsored by DOE, is offered at the training site in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and is open to all government agencies as well as the private sector. Field Program Management for REAC/TS is performed by the Oak Ridge Operations Office. STOCKPILE SUPPORT RADIATION EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE CENTER/TRAINING SITE FUNDING SUMMARY (Dollars in Thousands) FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994 Operating Funding $663 $669 $705 NUCLEAR EMERGENCY SEARCH TEAM Mr. Bevill. What level of funding was provided for NEST in the FY 1992, FY 1993, FY 1994? What emergencies were responded to in each year? Dr. Beckner. Over the past 3 fiscal years, there have been no NEST deployments in response to malevolent nuclear threats. NEST did, however, conduct seven threat assessments of alleged nuclear or radiation dispersal devices and participated regularly in exercises, in addition to its training and readiness requirements. (The information follows:) NUCLEAR EMERGENCY SEARCH TEAM FUNDING SUMMARY (Dollars in Thousands) FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994 Operating $23,014 $23,920 $27,477 Capital Equipment 4,000 0 4,724 Total $27,014 $23,920 $32,201 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS Mr. Bevill. How are these programs coordinated with the Office of Emergency Management? Dr. Beckner. The "Emergency Management" activities funded under Atomic Energy Defense Activities maintain the Department's seven radiological emergency response assets or capabilities, which include: the Accident Response Group; Aerial Measurement System; Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability; Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center; Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site; and eight Radiological Assistance Program Teams. Other "emergency management" functions within the Department are the responsibility of the newly created Office of Intelligence and National Security and are involved with certain aspects of all emergencies of concern to the Department. This organization operates the Headquarters Emergency Operations Center and ensures integration and compatibility of all departmental Emergency Operations Centers. The management of the Defense Programs' radiological response program is the responsibility of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military Application. Coordination between Defense Programs and the Office of Intelligence and National Security takes place as required -- primarily to assure the effective functioning of the operations centers to support radiological accidents or incidents. ............. MISSION, ROLE, AND PRIORITIES Mr. Bevill. Please describe how your mission, role and priorities have hanged since the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the significant downsizing of the U.S. weapons production mission. Mr. Ford. The mission of the Office of Intelligence is to provide the Department, other U.S. Government policy makers, and the Intelligence 30 Community with timely, accurate, high impact foreign intelligence analyses; to deter and neutralize foreign intelligence service actions in the U.S. to acquire classified and sensitive unclassified information involving Departmental programs, facilities, technology, and personnel; and provide threat assessment support to both Headquarters and field operations. Our mission, from a counterintelligence perspective, has been refocused from the traditional communist and hostile intelligence service threats to nontraditional adversaries and economic intelligence threats. Foreign intelligence priorities have also changed. The Weapons Intelligence Program is focusing on the safety, security, and use control of Russian nuclear weapons, while no longer emphasizing the strategic weapons threat. Increased attention is being focused on foreign nuclear reactors, in view of the growing concerns about foreign nuclear reactor accidents. The Science and Technology Intelligence Program is focusing on economic and environmental science and technology, which is a change from the defense science and technology emphasis of the past. DISCUSSIONS WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY Mr. Bevill. Have there been any discussions within the Intelligence Community on the appropriate size and focus of DOE's intelligence program now that the national security needs have changed? Mr. Ford. Yes. The Community Management Staff has informed the Department that its priorities and resource request for FY 1994 and the out 30 years are consistent with its role with the Intelligence Community. In various meetings of the Intelligence Community working groups and committees, the role of the Department's intelligence component and its contributions to national security has been singled out. The Department's role in the Intelligence Community competitive analysis of key intelligence questions and issues has been singled out for its unique contributions. The Department's technical and analytical expertise continues to sustain it as a major player in National Intelligence Estimates. The Department will continue to be a major contributor in the Intelligence Community assessments of potential nuclear proliferant nations and contribute to their Economic Security program activities. The Department will continue to be a lead player in the Former Soviet Union's nuclear weapons dismantlement, including the subsequent disposition of its component parts. In addition, the Department will continue to be a lead player in the analysis, assessment, and reporting of the Former Soviet Union nuclear weapons safety, security, and control. OTHER CABINET-LEVEL AGENCIES Mr. Bevill. Now does the size and funding for this Department of Energy compare to that of other Cabinet-level agencies in FY 1993 and FY 1994? Mr. Ford. The following table provided by the Director of Central Intelligence Community Management Staff reflects the size and funding for the Department of Energy activities in comparison with other Cabinet-level agencies. FY 1994 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET REQUEST (Dollars in Thousands) AGENCY DELETED Dept. of Defense Dept. of Justice (FBI) Dept. of State DELETED Dept. of Energy Dept. of Treasury SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY Mr. Bevill. What science and technology areas are being explored in FY 1993 and FY 1994? Mr. Ford. [Deleted] STUDIES AND REPORTS Mr. Bevill. Please provide a list of all studies or reports prepared in each program area in FY 1992, FY 1993 and planned for FY 1994. Identify whether these were anticipatory or responsive products. Mr. Ford. The materials that have been requested are being prepared and will be provided to the Committee for their files. COUNTERNARCOTICS Mr. Bevill. Please Identify all funding in FY 1992, FY 1993, and FY 1994, for counternarcotics activities, and describe the activities. Mr. Ford. In FY 1992, FY 1993, and FY 1994 funds for counternarcotics activities are $570 000; $360,000; and $200,000 respectively. The three activities being funded are the Vapor Generator, Multiple Threat Analyzer, and Associated Particle Imaging. The Vapor Generator provides a very precise measurement of cocaine vapor used to calibrate detectors. The Multiple Threat Analyzer detects trace amounts of drugs or chemicals used in the drug manufacturing process by trapping single molecules for analysis. The current development effort reduced the size of the instrument from room size to a two cabinet size. The Associated Particle Imaging uses neutrons through a special process to image and provide the element content of a closed container. The process requires access to only one side of the target and may be used to identify contraband inside suspect containers. No new funding is required beyond FY 1993 for the Vapor Generator and the Multiple Threat Analyzer. DECLASSIFICATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INFORMATION Mr. Bevill. How has the declassification of U.S. nuclear weapons and nuclear materials information impacted this program? Mr. Ford. The declassification of U.S. nuclear weapons and nuclear materials information has not impacted this program. .......... SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY THREAT POLICY Mr. Bevill. Has the 1983 Threat Policy Statement been updated? Is there a need to modify this guidance? Please describe the revised threat statement. Mr. McFadden. The Director of Security Affairs issued a "Design Basis Threat Policy for Department of Energy Programs and Facilities," dated April 1992. This policy replaced the 1983 Generic Threat Statement and was founded on a January 31, 1992, Department of Energy (DOE)/Department of Defense (DOD) "Memorandum of Agreement on the Security Threats to DOE and DOD Nuclear Weapons Programs and Facilities." The Memorandum of Agreement was based on a Defense Intelligence Agency review of worldwide threats to United States Government interests. The 1992 Design Basis Threat Policy is undergoing review in the Office of Security Affairs for currency. The Design Basis Threat Policy describes a spectrum of threats to DOE Programs and activities ranging from terrorist threats to Departmental nuclear weapons and production programs to the threats posed by criminals, psychotics, radical environmentalists, foreign agents, and dissident or disgruntled insiders. The Design Basis Threat Policy, classified Confidential, National Security Information, provides guidance on the characteristics of the various threats types and describes the capabilities of the adversary. The Design Basis Threat Policy also describes Safeguards and Security Program strategies for addressing the threat spectrum. It also requires the development of site specific considerations in mitigating threats. THREATS TO DOE FACILITIES Mr. Bevill. What is the most likely threat to DOE facilities and what is the least likely? Mr. McFadden. Terrorist threats to DOE programs and facilities, while potentially resulting in catastrophic consequences, are the least likely to occur. The threat posed by cleared and authorized insiders is perhaps the most likely and includes theft of material and equipment, espionage and sabotage. Departmental locations have also been targeted by anti-nuclear and/or radical environmental extremist groups, which has resulted in demonstrations, acts of civil disobedience and trespass. THREAT TO DOE FACILITIES Mr. Bevill. Have any DOE facilities experienced any threat in the past five years that approaches the threat guidance now in effect? Mr. McFadden. Threats to Department of Energy (DOE) facilities are identified in the Design Basis Threat Policy for the Department of Energy Programs and Facilities, April 1992. Based on the eight threat categories and associated characteristics detailed in this document, no DOE facilities have experienced terrorist threats in the past five years. The strategy to guard against threats to facilities emphasizes providing a high degree of assurance of a capability to detect, assess, delay, and inhibit unauthorized access to nuclear weapons, test devices, and completed nuclear assemblies, Category II or greater quantities of special nuclear materials and associated facilities while providing command and control to protective forces. Safeguards and security measures are also designed to prevent acts of sabotage. Safeguards and security systems are performance tested to ascertain their effectiveness in countering threats to assets and facilities. SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY PROGRAM PLANNING AND INTEGRATION Mr. Bevill. The Office of Security Evaluations stated in response to a question in last year's hearing that, "Noticeably absent in the overall improvement in safeguards and security posture is an improvement in safeguards and security management and oversight. The system lacks an integrated approach to planning and implementation of the total program. The lack of integration is reflected in the inconsistent quality of the programs and the persistence of costly, manpower-intensive solutions. The underlying cause of these weaknesses is inadequate program management and oversight at all levels." How do you respond to this concern? Mr. McFadden. The Department's safeguards and security planning process is integrated through a number of mechanisms. First and foremost is the development of two reports: the Master Safeguards and Security Agreements (MSSAs) and the Site Safeguards and Security Plan (SSSP). These reports are the product of a standardized and consistent process designed to review and evaluate the protection posture of major facilities. Based on this review, cost-effective protection measures are selected to safeguard vital assets against vulnerabilities identified during the review and planning process. Such measures may include the development of line-item construction projects to implement cost-effective improvements over a number of years. The planning process, as well as the periodic survey program, also provides for a regular management review of the protection posture of the Department's facilities and any corrective actions in progress to improve security. As noted in the 1992 Annual Report to the Secretary, most major DOE facilities have an overall satisfactory rating. Only six facilities were rated marginal, and, of these, three have been uploaded to satisfactory during 1993. In addition, the newly developed Safeguards and Security Information Management System (SSIMS) serves as an important management tracking system. SSIMS, which is linked electronically between Headquarters and Operations Offices, permits management to conduct near "real-time" analysis on the status of their respective protection programs. In a continuing effort to ensure that safeguards and security is a cost-effective program, the Department recently initiated a series of resource reviews to identify additional cost-saving possibilities which can be implemented while, at the same time, affording appropriate protection for DOE assets. A review of Security Evaluations inspections for 1992 indicates that no facilities were rated unsatisfactory in the area of Protection Program Management nor were any facilities evaluated by the Department as unsatisfactory overall. The Office of Security Affairs was established to ensure clearer lines of authority, management, and accountability; correct organizational fragmentation and provide focused management in policy, field oversight, Headquarters operations; and provide integration of materials control and accountability and security disciplines; and we are committed to making this happen. CENTRAL TRAINING ACADEMY OPERATING COSTS Mr. Bevill. What is the total cost of operating the Central Training Academy and the FTEs in FY 1992, FY 1993, and FY 1994? Are funds provided from any sources other than this budget? Mr. McFadden. The costs for the Central Training Academy (CTA) are as follows: FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994 (In Thousands of Dollars) Program $ 8,823 $ 7,323 $ 8,523 FTEs (5) 361* 393* 425 Total Central Training Academy $ 9,184 $ 7,716 $ 8,948 *In FY 1992 and FY 1993, these FTEs were funded from the Weapons Production and Surveillance budget. In addition to the above funding, CTA receives approximately $200,000 annually to cover CTA staff travel and adjunct costs such as freight expenses related to specially requested Mobile Training Team activities. These Mobile Training Teams are in addition to normally scheduled and budgeted CTA classes. These funds come from other Departmental programs. Since the establishment of the CTA, the Albuquerque Operations Office has provided funding for CTA's rent, electricity, etc. (it is estimated that approximately $500,000 is expended annually). Also, in Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, the CTA received $2,000,000 annually in General Plant Project funding. ACCELERATED ACCESS AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM (AAAP) Mr. Bevill. How many individuals were approved using the Accelerated Access Authorization Program in FY 1993 and FY 1994? What activities - (including funding) are included in the Safeguards and Security budget and the Security Investigations budget for this program? Mr. McFadden. For the period October 12, 1992, through April 26, 1993, 140 individuals were approved for security clearance on an interim basis using this program. The average processing time under this program (from tests completion to approval) is 30 days. We estimate that about 500 individuals will be approved under this program in FY 1994. AAAP has been a significant factor in cost avoidance without jeopardizing the safeguards and security of our National Assets. Funding for this program (which will be funded solely from the Security Investigations budget in FY 1995) is shown on a table which I would like to insert for the record. (The information follows:) ACCELERATED ACCESS AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM (In Thousands of Dollars) FY 1993 FY 1994 Nuclear Safeguards and Security AAAP - Operational Activities $ 500 $ 500 AAAP - Technical Aspects - 0 210 guidance documents; research and analysis, planning, 500 710 quality assurance, etc. Security Investigations AAAP - Full Implementation - 0 1,100 Initiate 5-year competitive bid contract, and expand number of individuals for inclusion in program. $ 500 $1,810 PERSONNEL SECURITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM Mr. Bevill. What is the Center for Human Reliability? When was it established? What is the total budget in FY 1993 and FY 1994? Mr. McFadden. The Center for Human Reliability Studies (CHRS) was established in July 1989 to assist the Department of Energy (DOE) in developing and implementing the Personnel Security Assurance Program (PSAP) and other human reliability program initiatives. It is part of the Medical Sciences Division of the Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education, a Management and Operating contractor of the DOE. It utilizes a staff of 3 full-time employees and 18 consultants. Through a comprehensive process of policy analysis, program development, operational guidance, and followup program evaluation, the CHRS supports the DOE in the PSAP and the Accelerated Access Authorization Program. The CHRS provides expertise in the following disciplines: personnel security; clinical psychology; human resource management research and analysis; law, including labor and personnel law; financial analysis; organizational and industrial psychology; social psychology and sociology; counterintelligence; criminology, criminal justice, and investigations; operations research and statistics; and computer systems analysis to assist the DOE in achieving program goals. The total CHRS budget for FY 1993 was $485,000. The same amount has been requested for FY 1994. CROSSCUT OF SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY ESTIMATES Mr. Bevill. Provide a crosscut by location of all Safeguards and Security funding throughout the Department for FY 1992, FY 1993, and FY 1994. Mr. McFadden. The following information is provided: DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY FY 1994 Congressional Budget Safeguards and Security Budget Estimates BY FACILITY (in thousands) FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994 Safeguards Safeguards Safeguards Organization/Facility & Security & Security & Security Albuquerque Albuquerque Direct 102,319 93,538 96,199 Allied (Kansas City) 6,960 7,941 9,069 Los Alamos Natl. Lab. 84,108 85,721 86,888 Mound 10,887 8,837 9,804 Pantex 53,473 24,600 45,600 Pinelies 7,020 5,590 5,100 Rocky Flats 76,153 74,937 73,222 Sandia Natl. Lab. 54,370 56,103 54,709 ---------- --------- -------- Total, Albuquerque 395,290 357,267 380,591 Chicago Chicago Direct 1,593 1,493 1,445 Ames Natl. Lab, 679 405 381 Argonne Natl Lab. 7,515 11,880 12,275 Brookhaven Natl. Lab. 7,344 635 673 Fermi National Lab. 1,732 1,837 2,531 New Brunswick Lab, 4,404 4,253 4,252 Natl. Renewable Energy Lab. 530 675 731 Princeton Plasma Physics Lab, 1,109 1,089 1,243 Superconducting Super Collider 1,025 1,300 1,400 ---------- ---------- ---------- Total, Chicago 25,931 23,567 24,931 Idaho 43,359 45,804 45,081 Naval Petroleum Reserves 1,097 1,097 1.077 Nevada 80,764 81,368 73,407 Oak Ridge Oak Ridge 82,877 73,885 79,112 WMCC - FMPC 2,717 2,510 1,844 Oak Ridge Assoc. Univ. 802 851 715 Oak Ridge Natl. Lab. 7,572 7,409 7,306 Y-12 59,755 52,775 35,771 ---------- ---------- ---------- Total Oak Ridge 153,723 137,430 124,748 Pittsburgh Naval Reactors 12,497 14,266 12.042 Richland 66,030 64,992 68,391 San Francisco San Francisco 6,892 9,535 9,559 Lawrence Livermore Natl. Lab. 42,309 38,752 33,179 -------- ---------- ---------- Total, San Francisco 49,201 48,287 42,738 0 Savannah River 159,880 157,876 127,754 0 Schenectady Naval Reactors 13,522 15,689 16,141 Office of Scientific & Tech. Infor. 804 851 800 Strategic Petroleum Reserve Off. 18,572 19,390 24,650 Western Area Power Admin. 848 870 870 Morgantown Energy Tech. Ctr. 558 499 725 Pittsburgh Energy Tech. Ctr. 1,400 1,600 1,916 Headquarters 102,805 99,920 99,760 ---------- ---------- ---------- Total DOE Safeguards & Security 1,126,281 1,070,773 1,045,623 PROTECTIVE FORCE STRENGTH AND EXPENDITURES Mr. Bevill. Please provide a table showing the size of guard forces and expenditures for guard forces by location for FY 1992, FY 1993, and FY 1994. Mr. McFadden. During the past six months, protective force strength levels have been reduced by approximately 480 personnel complex-wide. At some Operations Offices, there has been a commensurate reduction in Protective Force budgeting. At others, budget changes have been less noticeable partly because savings realized in personnel reductions are being rolled back into automated protective systems. Protective requirements based on categories of materials on hand and other unique facility concerns are major factors influencing Protective Force strength levels and budget considerations. The following table represents FY92-FY94 Protective Force strength levels and associated budgets. *****PROTECTIVE FORCE LEVELS AND OPERATING BUDGETS***** ADDITIONAL SUPPORT DETAIL Mr. Bevill. Please provide a breakdown of the specific tasks and funding associated with the "Additional Support" activity in FY 1992, FY 1993, and FY 1994. Mr. McFadden. The "Additional Support" breakdown is as follows: ADDITIONAL SUPPORT TASKS AND FUNDING (In Thousands of Dollars) FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994 Chicago Field Office S&S Staff $ 1,176 $ 1,445 $ 1,445 Headquarters Physical Security Upgrade Technical Assistance 409 313 313 Technical Support to Headquarters and Field Assistance 3,857 1,763 1,792 Support Services Contracts 7,435 7,174 10,183 AOSS Modernization 1,200 Information Security Research Center 250 400 415 Technical Security Research Center 655 662 682 Total Additional Support $13,782 $11,757 $16,030 SECURITY EVALUATIONS RESULTS Mr. Bevill. Please characterize the results of security evaluations conducted at DOE sites during the last year. Mr. Podonsky. The results of Security Evaluations inspections and assessments activities are very briefly summarized with the following information. The Security Evaluations Annual Report for FY 1992 provides a more detailed assessment of the inspections conducted and the overall status of DOE protection programs. Protection of special nuclear material was adequate at all facilities reviewed. Many sites are in the process of reducing or consolidating their nuclear material inventories to facilitate remediation efforts and reduce operating costs. Some sites have made substantial progress by consolidating security interests and have reduced both the direct (e.g., cost of guard force operations) and indirect costs (e.g., time spent complying with security requirements) of safeguards and security. Although protection of the nuclear material is adequate, many facilities rely heavily on manpower-intensive measures to provide adequate protection. Protection of classified matter is inconsistent. Although physical protection of classified documents at most facilities is consistent with DOE order requirements, several facilities have deficiencies in document control procedures and accountability systems. Further, computer security at DOE facilities is not uniformly effective. Personnel security programs have improved considerably; the elimination of the longstanding reinvestigation backlog is particularly notable. However, continued attention is require to assure sustained effectiveness and reduce the timeframes required to process clearances. Protection program management within DOE requires continued attention. Progress has been noted in some areas and at some facilities. For example, significant progress was made toward updating the DOE orders (most of which had not been updated since 1988). However, protection program management at all levels of DOE can be improved. At the Headquarters level, additional effort is necessary to resolve longstanding safeguards and security policy issues and provide consistent and timely direction and guidance to the field. At the field level, efforts to implement effective and efficient systems should be more aggressively pursued, management control and feedback systems (e.g., the survey and self-assessment programs) should be improved, and the required planning documents should be completed. TRENDS TRACKING Mr. Bevill. How does the Office of Security Evaluations track trends or patterns in deficiencies identified at various sites? Mr. Podonsky. Security Evaluations has several functions that involve tracking safeguards and security trends and patterns: the inspection program, the assessments program, the Facility Officer program, and information management systems. These systems combine to provide DOE managers with a comprehensive picture of the status of safeguards and security programs, including trends and patterns identified at various sites. The inspection program is specifically designed to identify strengths and weaknesses at individual DOE sites. The findings at each facility are tracked through resolution and, where appropriate, reinspection or safeguards and security readiness reviews are conducted. Security Evaluations also routinely reviews Security Affairs Safeguards and Security Information Management System (SSIMS), which provides information on the status of findings throughout DOE. In the assessments program, Security Evaluations periodically reviews the status of selected program elements, focusing on trends and patterns across DOE facilities. Innovative technologies, safeguards and security policy issues, and potential program enhancements are also identified. Reports summarizing the assessment results are distributed to all DOE Operations Offices. Security Evaluations assigns a Facility Officer to each major DOE facility to monitor the status of each facility. One of the Facility Officer's responsibilities is to track findings. Security Evaluations uses a variety of hardcopy and computerized information management systems to facilitate tracking trends and patterns across DOE. As an example, Security Evaluations Policy Information Resource Management System encompasses policy issues, Security Evaluations findings, exceptions, working groups, and orders. Security Evaluations is also currently working on developing additional automated data bases. Security Evaluations disseminates the results of its analysis of trends and patterns through its annual reports (which summarize the overall status of safeguards and security across DOE) and assessment reports (which provide detailed information on selected topics). Further, Security Evaluations routinely uses its analysis of trends and patterns across DOE as a basis for inspection planning. DEPARTMENT'S SECURITY POSTURE Mr. Bevill. What improvements have you seen in the Department's security posture since your office was established? Mr. Podonsky. In the late 1970s, safeguards and security entered a downswing in the cycle that is at least partly attributable to a lack of attention to operational issues during the turmoil associated with the creation of DOE. As an example of the lack of attention, most of DOE's safeguards and security orders were not issued until after 1984 (several years after the Department was created). Predictably, the effectiveness of safeguards and security programs had degraded to unacceptable levels in the early 1980s. Category I quantities of special nuclear material were not consistently provided adequate physical protection, accountability systems were inadequate, protective force personnel were not adequately equipped or trained, and protection of classified documents and material was inadequate. In the early days of Security Evaluations performance testing, facilities often performed miserably. Since Security Evaluations was created as an independent office in 1985, the overall status of protection of special nuclear material has improved dramatically. Most DOE facilities completed safeguards and security upgrade programs during the mid to late 1980s, investing approximately $500 million in new security hardware and adding thousands of security staff. Most vulnerabilities affecting high priority special nuclear material targets have been addressed. While problems occasionally recur, they are generally degradations in one layer of a multi-layer security system rather than direct threats to special nuclear material of the type frequently noted in the early 1980s. In recent years, DOE safeguards and security programs have become much more effective. Many improvements have resulted from heightened attention to protection requirements, increased allocations of both personnel and funding, and more intensive oversight. However, the security systems are not optimally efficient. Many DOE facilities still rely heavily on costly, manpower intensive measures to provide adequate protection. SIGNIFICANT ACCOMPLISHMENTS Mr. Bevill. Describe the most significant accomplishments of the Office in FY 1992 and FY 1993. How has the security of the Department been improved? Mr. Podonsky. During FY 1992 and the first half of FY 1993, Security Evaluations was able to maintain and enhance its inspection program, refocus its assessments efforts on DOE's current needs, and produce and disseminate information and tools to other DOE offices for their use in inspection programs. Security Evaluations inspection program continues to be regarded as one of DOE's most effective oversight programs. Although we continue to find and report problem areas, Security Evaluations is respected by the field and viewed as a resource by DOE managers. DOE operations office managers have repeatedly cited Security Evaluations process and protocols as the model for other DOE oversight activities. One of the most significant enhancements in the inspection program in the past 2 years has been the maturation of the Safeguards and Security Readiness Review program. Safeguards and Security Readiness Reviews are similar to comprehensive inspections but are conducted on short notice and are usually focused on selected aspects of a protection program. The Safeguards and Security Readiness Review program's goal is to provide an accurate picture of day-to-day readiness and to assure that facilities do not relax between inspections. One of the primary reasons Security Evaluations decided to emphasize Safeguards and Security Readiness Reviews and conduct fewer comprehensive inspections is cost savings. Safeguards and Security Readiness Reviews are smaller and cheaper to conduct. More importantly, however, Security Evaluations found that the Safeguards and Security Readiness Review program has significantly reduced the costs associated with facilities preparing for inspections. Another enhancement to the inspection program has been the increased focus on protection program management. Security Evaluations has been focusing on the protection program management topic in an effort to assure that management is providing the resources necessary to support security programs and is using those resources effectively. Security Evaluations believes this is an important initiative and that this will become increasingly more important as DOE manages the transition to environmental restoration and remediation. Security Evaluations has evaluated DOE's current needs and has shifted the focus of its assessments program. Previously, assessment reports focused primarily on program weaknesses. Recently, Security Evaluations has been focusing not only on what is wrong but also on what can be done. The reports on the personnel clearance process and the use of helicopters throughout DOE are recent examples of Security Evaluations assessments that provided DOE managers with the information needed to enhance their programs. For example, in the personnel clearance special study, Security Evaluations identified potential enhancements that should reduce the time required in the processing of clearance requests. Recognizing that DOE managers must identify innovative safeguards and security technologies that hold promise for cost-effective application without loss of protection, Security Evaluations is currently conducting a safeguards and security technology assessment. DOE managers indicated that they are hindered by a lack of readily available information about safeguards and security technology that has the potential to reduce operating costs. To meet DOE needs, Security Evaluations objectives are to identify user needs for safeguards and security technology applications and to identify and describe technologies that can be appropriately applied in the near term to help the field apply resources more cost effectively. The expected publication date for the assessment report is July 15, 1993. The results of that assessment will be distributed to all operations and program offices. The intent of the assessment is to systematically identify existing or emerging technologies that could provide effective security while reducing costs at DOE facilities. The study is an example of Security Evaluations effort to provide DOE managers with the information needed to manage effectively. One of Security Evaluations secondary missions is to promote communications and develop inspection techniques. In FY 1992, Security Evaluations issued a set of comprehensive inspectors guides that cover all major safeguards and security topics. These guides are used by the field survey staff and personnel involved in self assessments, as well as Security Evaluations inspectors. Security Evaluations also hosted several interagency symposiums and an internal DOE forum. In these meetings, Security Evaluations and other agencies and offices shared techniques and tools. By sharing techniques and tools, Security Evaluations is promoting a gradual but steady improvement in DOE safeguards and security programs. In addition to the concrete accomplishments, Security Evaluations has an important role as a leader and trend setter. As Security Evaluations focuses on selected aspects of DOE programs, those programs tend to get the attention of DOE management and are improved. This trend has been evident since the mid-1980s when Security Evaluations focused primarily on vulnerabilities in the protection of DOE's most sensitive security interests (nuclear weapons components and strategic quantities of special nuclear material). As those vulnerabilities were addressed, Security Evaluations gradually expanded its emphasis on classified information, personnel, and computer security programs, which have been gradually improving. Security Evaluations views today's safeguards and security challenges as efficiently maintaining adequate protection of vital security interests in a idly changing environment. If DOE does not anticipate and prepare for the rap future, security could once again degrade to unacceptable levels. Conversely, if DOE is proactive and starts managing resources more effectively now, adequate security can be maintained at reduced costs. Therefore, in its role as a trend setter, Security Evaluations will be increasingly focusing on protection program management and cost-effective issues. RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS PACKAGING CERTIFICATION Mr. Bevill. Describe the radioactive materials packaging certification program. Why was it established? What activities are required of your office to perform this function? Mr. Brush. Based on the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 and the unique nature of DOE, the Department of Transportation authorized DOE to conduct its own radioactive materials certification program. The program is required to be equivalent to that of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The purpose of the radioactive materials packaging certification program is to ensure the health and safety of the public and workers and the protection of the environment when radioactive materials are transported by DOE and its contractors. Principal functions of the program include: evaluating packaging designs; maintaining a database of certified packagings; and providing external liaison for packaging certification matters between DOE and concerned agencies. The evaluation of DOE packaging designs involves reviewing Safety Analysis Reports for Packagings for compliance with DOE orders and with the regulations of the Department of Transportation and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Evaluations are accomplished by performing independent reviews and confirmatory analyses of structural, thermal, containment, shielding, and criticality integrity; operating procedures; acceptance tests; maintenance procedures; quality assurance; and material information provided in the Safety Analysis Reports for Packagings. On the basis of these reviews and analyses, the Department determines that the packagings meet all applicable DOE orders and other requirements. MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT Mr. Bevill. Last year you were very critical of the safeguards and security management and oversight. Has there been noticeable improvement in the past year? Mr. Podonsky. Clearly, there has been improvement in safeguards and security management in the past year at both Headquarters and in the field. However, safeguards and security management must improve further and adopt a more proactive stance if DOE is to resolve long standing deficiencies and take advantage of the unparalleled opportunities for reducing safeguards and security costs by consolidating and, where possible, eliminating security interests. At Headquarters, the efforts to update the DOE Orders, to eliminate expensive but questionably effective policies (e.g., accountability systems for classified documents), and to eliminate the reinvestigation backlog are examples of management's willingness to tackle longstanding problems. However, many longstanding deficiencies remain to be corrected. For example, as noted in the Security Evaluations annual report and a recent General Accounting Office study, many DOE facilities still do not have the basic planning documents that are required to assure that the protection strategy and objectives are current, approved, and understood by both the facility and DOE Headquarters. Further, resolution of some issues has been slow even when a clear course of action was identified, as exemplified by the continued failure to document a clear and consistent safeguards and, security policy to cover Work for Others. At the field level, safeguards and security management has improved but is not uniformly effective. For example, Operations Offices and facilities have had varying levels of success in ongoing cost-reduction efforts. Through a concerted transition effort, DOE's Hanford Site was able to eliminate and consolidate security interests while maintaining adequate security. This effort resulted in a dramatic reduction in the number of security clearances (reduced by 66%) and potential longterm cost savings, both in direct security costs and in indirect operational costs associated with maintaining security. Other DOE offices have also made some progress in trimming costs. However, some sites that have experienced drastic reductions in weapons program activities have not made corresponding progress in reducing safeguards and security costs. PERSONNEL SECURITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM Mr. Bevill. How many positions are included in the Personnel Security Assurance Program (PSAP) in FY 1992, FY 1993 and FY 1994? How do you measure the effectiveness of this program? What are the benefits? Mr. McFadden. In FY 1992, 10,493 positions in the Department of Energy and its contractor workforce were identified as PSAP positions. The number of identified positions has since been revised downward, due largely to changes in the DOE mission and the consequent consolidation of special nuclear materials at certain sites. With material consolidated in limited locations, less individuals require placement in the PSAP. The number of identified positions and the number of actual positions are disparate, as the program is in its initial implementation. By FY 1994 the number of identified positions and the number of actual positions should be equal at about 9,000 positions. In FY 1992 there were 210 occupied PSAP positions, all under the Idaho Operations Office. In FY 1993 there were 7,996 PSAP positions either occupied or in the initial processing stages. The effectiveness of the program can be measured by an evaluation of the attitudes of the individuals taking part in the PSAP. This evaluation is conducted in both pre- and post-orientation for the program, with followup evaluation done 1 year after initial orientation. Effectiveness can also be measured through increased referrals for security concerns and the greater sharing of information between the evaluation elements of the program. The benefits of the program include the ongoing evaluation of individuals in highly sensitive positions to deter and detect behaviors or conditions which might indicate security concerns. The evaluation includes a medical examination, psychological assessment, drug screening, and security review. The Office of Safeguards and Security has determined that participation in the PSAP reduces the insider threat from the violent insider to the passive insider. PERSONNEL SECURITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM Mr. Bevill. How many individuals were relieved of their positions in this program (PSAP) in FY 1992 and FY 1993? Mr. McFadden. A total of 10 individuals have been removed from PSAP duties in FY 1992 and FY 1993. Two have subsequently been returned to those duties. SECURITY CLEARANCE REDUCTIONS Mr. Bevill. What attempts are being made to reduce the number and level of clearances throughout the Department? Mr. McFadden. As a result of the general downsizing of classified activities within the Department, particularly in the nuclear weapons program, the number of active security clearances were reduced during the interval of April 1992 to April 1993 from about 176,000 to about 166,000. Additional reductions will be realized this year as the national laboratories have been directed to eliminate corporate policies that require all employees to be cleared as a condition of employment at a Department of Energy owned site. Instead, Department contractor employees will be processed for a Department of Energy clearance only when such action can be justified based upon the duties of the employee's position. Efforts are also underway at Department contractor sites to consolidate classified and special nuclear material inventories, which will result in the need for fewer clearances by their employees. SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS - STATISTICS Mr. Bevill. Provide by field office and facility the number and types of clearances held by DOE employees, contractors, and other Federal employees in FY 1992 and FY 1993. Mr. McFadden. There are just under 167,000 clearances currently held by DOE Employees, contractors, and other Federal employees. Current information will be provided for the record. CLEARANCE STATISTICS FOR FY 1992 DOE DOE EMPLOYEES CONTRACTORS 0GA CONGRESS TOTAL ALBUQUERQUE Q 1,465 34,502 138 0 36,105 TS 0 0 0 0 0 L 20 546 0 0 566 SE 0 1 0 0 1 Total 1,485 35,049 138 0 36,672 CHICAGO Q 240 1,339 6 0 1,585 TS 0 0 0 0 0 L 22 690 0 0 712 SE 0 0 0 0 0 Total 262 2,029 6 0 2,297 HEADQUARTERS Q 3,298 2,227 4,563 324 10,412 TS 153 47 2 0 202 L 120 275 192 1 588 SE 517 629 8 0 1,154 Total 4,088 3,178 4,765 325 12,356 IDAHO Q 304 3,889 17 0 4,210 TS 0 0 0 0 0 L 182 8,578 0 0 8,760 SE 0 0 0 0 0 Total 486 12,467 17 0 12,970 NEVADA Q 386 7,278 58 0 7,722 TS 0 0 0 0 0 L 1 428 1 0 430 SE 0 0 0 0 0 Total 387 7,706 59 0 8,152 OAKRIDGE Q 827 20,199 143 0 21,169 TS 0 11 0 0 11 L 66 4,162 14 0 4,242 SE 4 19 0 0 23 Total 897 24,391 157 0 25,445 PITTSBURGH Q 278 3,938 33 0 4,249 TS 0 0 0 0 0 L 0 7,031 6 0 7,037 SE 0 0 0 0 0 Total 278 10,969 39 0 11,286 RICHLAND Q 165 4,263 16 0 4,444 TS 0 0 0 0 0 L 165 5,924 11 0 6,100 SE 1 0 0 0 1 Total 331 10,187 27 0 10,545 ROCKY FLATS Q 204 9,830 9 0 10,043 TS 0 0 0 0 0 L 0 405 0 0 405 SE 0 0 0 0 0 Total 204 10,235 9 0 10,448 SAN FRANCISCO Q 212 12,886 5 0 13,103 TS 0 0 0 0 0 L 0 211 0 0 211 SE 7 0 0 0 7 Total 219 13,097 5 0 13,321 SAVANNAH RIVER Q 377 15,468 141 0 15,986 TS 0 0 0 0 0 L 104 6,167 3 0 6,274 SE 0 0 0 0 0 Total 481 21,635 144 0 22,260 SCHENECTADY Q 104 2,218 16 0 2,338 TS 0 0 0 0 0 L 0 5,989 0 0 5,989 SE 0 0 0 0 0 Total 104 8,207 16 0 8,327 TOTALS Q 7,860 118,037 5,145 324 131,366 TS 153 58 2 0 213 L 680 40,406 227 1 41,314 SE 529 649 8 0 1,186 GRAND TOTAL 9,222 159,150 5,382 325 174,079 CLEARANCE STATISTICS FOR FY 1993 DOE DOE EMPLOYEES CONTRACTORS 0GA CONGRESS TOTAL ALBUQUERQUE Q 1,709 35,290 72 0 37,071 TS 0 0 0 0 0 L 10 504 0 0 514 SE 1 0 0 0 1 Total 1,720 35,794 72 0 37,586 CHICAGO Q 238 1,246 8 0 1,492 TS 0 0 0 0 0 L 26 653 0 0 679 SE 0 0 0 0 0 Total 264 1,899 8 0 2,171 HEADQUARTERS Q 3,734 2,858 4,561 318 11,471 TS 143 17 3 0 163 L 81 274 161 1 517 SE 496 601 9 0 1,106 Total 4,454 3,750 4,734 319 13,257 IDAHO Q 312 3,704 17 0 4,033 TS 0 0 0 0 0 L 199 8,157 0 0 8,356 SE 0 0 0 0 0 Total 511 11,861 17 0 12,389 NEVADA Q 409 6,419 33 0 6,861 TS 0 0 0 0 0 L 0 238 1 0 239 SE 0 0 0 0 0 Total 409 6,657 34 0 7,100 OAK RIDGE Q 556 16,370 114 0 17,040 TS 0 3 0 0 3 L 313 7,184 16 0 7,513 SE 0 17 0 0 17 Total 869 23,574 130 0 24,573 PITTSBURGH Q 272 3,462 26 0 3,760 TS 0 0 0 0 0 L 1 6,680 5 0 6,686 SE 0 0 0 0 0 Total 273 10,142 31 0 10,446 RICHLAND Q 119 2,625 18 0 2,762 TS 0 0 0 0 0 L 283 4,521 16 0 4,820 SE 0 0 0 0 0 Total 402 7,146 34 0 7,582 ROCKY FLATS Q 153 7,371 4 0 7,528 TS 0 0 0 0 0 L 1 222 1 0 224 SE 0 0 0 0 0 Total 154 7,593 5 0 7,752 SAN FRANCISCO Q 239 13,162 4 0 13,405 TS 0 0 0 0 0 L 2 198 0 0 200 SE 3 0 0 0 3 Total 244 13,360 4 0 13,608 SAVANNAH RIVER Q 407 15,283 84 0 15,774 TS 0 0 0 0 0 L 118 6,943 2 0 7,063 SE 0 0 0 0 0 Total 525 22,226 86 0 22,837 SCHENECTADY Q 91 1,928 13 0 2,032 TS 0 0 0 0 0 L 0 5,443 0 0 5,443 SE 0 0 0 0 0 Total 91 7,371 13 0 7,475 TOTALS Q 8,239 109,718 4,954 318 123,229 TS 143 20 3 0 166 L 1,034 41,017 202 1 42,254 SE 500 618 9 0 1,127 GRAND TOTAL 9,916 151,373 5,168 319 166,776 SECURITY CLEARANCE REDUCTIONS Mr. Bevill. Now that several former nuclear materials production sites have been deactivated and transferred to the waste cleanup program, how has this impacted the number of security clearances? Mr. McFadden. When a site is deactivated, the number of security clearances associated with that site decreases. Usually, the level of security clearances associated with a deactivated site also decreases. At the Richland Operations Office, for example, the number of Q clearances was reduced during the period from July 1990 through January 1993 from 10,235 to 2,753, or by 73 percent. At that same office, a total of 2,591 security clearances were eliminated during the interval of February 1992 through January 1993. SECURITY CLEARANCE REDUCTIONS Mr. Bevill. What steps are being taken to reduce the number of clearances? Are there any impediments to a quick reduction? Mr. McFadden. As sites are deactivated, classified and special nuclear 20 material inventories are consolidated or the sites reconfigured as quickly as practicable. As consolidation and reconfiguration activities proceed, security clearance levels and numbers are also reduced in a prudent manner without endangering National Security. The only impediment to a quick reduction will be our limited ability to consolidate special nuclear material because of limited storage and staging facilities. PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAM Mr. Bevill. What is the Department's current security clearance policy? When was this policy developed and when was it last updated? Mr. McFadden. The Department's Personnel Security Program policies and procedures are stipulated in Order 5631.2, last reissued on September 15, 1992. The Department's security clearance policy conforms to pertinent provisions of the Atomic Energy Act and Executive Orders that require an individual's eligibility for access to classified matter or special nuclear material to be based upon review and adjudication of investigative reports provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation or Office of Personnel Management, or other agencies or departments provided that the scope and extent of the investigation meets standards set by the Department of Energy. Individuals are granted a security clearance only when access is required to classified information or special nuclear materials and when it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so. When a serious question is raised concerning an individual's eligibility for a security clearance, the case is processed under Departmental administrative review procedures to determine whether the security clearance should be denied or revoked. Individuals granted a Department of Energy security clearance are reinvestigated at 5-year intervals. SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS - STATISTICS Mr. Bevill. What is the current backlog of reinvestigations? Is it increasing? What efforts are being taken to reduce the backlog? Mr. McFadden. As of March 1, 1993, the number of reinvestigations that are due to be conducted (that is, the most recent investigation was conducted more than 5 years ago) has been reduced to 7,672. This number includes both backlogged cases, and cases that normally will "come of age" as part of a continuing cycle of 5-year reinvestigations. There are less than 2,000 reinvestigations remaining from the original "backlog" of 132,000 reinvestigations that resulted from the Department of Energy policy change of December 1985 which mandated reinvestigations for all levels of security clearances every 5 years. The Department anticipates elimination of the remaining 2,000 backlogged investigations by the end of FY 1993. (NOTE: The 7,672 also includes 2,910 clearances that are held by employees of other Federal Government agencies,) SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS BUDGET Mr. Bevill. What were the number, by type and performing agency, of investigations and reinvestigations performed for FY 1992, FY 1993, and FY 1994? Describe the reasons for the increases or decreases? Mr. McFadden. The following data on investigations and reinvestigations is inserted for the record: (The information follows:) INVESTIGATIONS AND REINVESTIGATIONS FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994 ACTUAL ESTIMATED REQUEST FBI Initial 44 12 10 FBI Reinvestigation 10 9 8 OPM Initial Single Scope Background 0 10,700 10,000 Background 13,488 50 60 Limited Background 0 1,220 1,217 OPM Reinvestigations Periodic - Single Scope 0 20,025 19,976 Special Background 371 0 0 Limited Background 21,716 7,809 0 OPM National Agency Checks Initial 8,525 3,650 4,990 Reinvestigations 12,784 5,460 8,125 TOTAL INVESTIGATIONS 56,938 48,935 44,386 FBI investigations decreased in FY 1993 as that agency is now being used strictly for initial investigations for individuals who occupy positions of a high degree of importance or sensitivity (150 positions have such designations within the Department). OPM Special Background Investigations (SBI) decreased in FY 1992 and were "zeroed" out in FY 1993. The Department adopted the Single Scope Background Investigations (SSBI) which replaced and negated the need for the SBI. SBI's were used primarily for individuals who require access to Sensitive Compartment Information (SCI) access approval. OPM Background Investigations (BI) decreased beginning in FY 1993 when the SSBI became available. BI's will only be conducted on DOE employees who occupy critical sensitive positions, but do not require access to classified material in order to perform their official duties. OPM Limited Background Investigations (LBI) conducted for reinvestigations decreased in FY 1993 and will be "zeroed" for FY 1994 as a result of the adoption of the Periodic Reinvestigation - Single Scope Background Investigation (PRIS) in December 1992. LBI's are currently used only for initial L and Secret clearances for DOE employees. OPM National Agency Checks with Credit (NACC) will increase as the need for the number of initial Q clearances is reduced. PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAM Mr. Bevill. Describe the effort to develop an electronic transfer program for security clearances, including the timetable for completion and cost by year. Mr. McFadden. The current time between the DOE request for a background investigation and when the completed product is received from the investigative agency (Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is approximately 90 days. However, depending on the geographic location, it takes another 15 to 30 days in mail time to send and receive the case papers and completed investigation. This project is to implement an electronic transfer system (including appropriate safeguards of data) between each of the DOE Operations Offices and the OPM's Office of Federal Investigations in Boyers, Pennsylvania, which will allow the DOE to electronically transfer the paperwork requesting a background investigation (including fingerprints) to OPM, and when the background investigation is completed, to have it electronically transferred to the appropriate DOE Operations Office for adjudication. This will also allow transfer of security files between DOE Operations Offices. The electronic transfer system will reduce the mail time between DOE and OPM from several weeks to several hours. The FY 1994 Security Investigations budget includes $2,950,000 for this project, which will take 2 years to complete, and approximately $2,200,000 will be required in FY 1995. SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS BUDGET Mr. Bevill. Provide an analysis of security investigation programs showing the funds for defense and other than defense programs. Mr. McFadden. Approximately 65 percent of the FY 1994 Security Investigations budget will be allocated for Defense activities, as shown below in the table which I would like to insert into the record. (The information follows:) SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS FY 1994 Defense $34,667,750 Other than Defense 18,667,250 Total SI Budget 53,335,000 Use of Prior-Year-Funds (8,335,000) FY 1994 REQUEST $45,000,000 SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS BUDGET Mr. Bevill. What was the average cost by type and performing agency of investigations and reinvestigations performed by FY 1992, FY 1993, and FY 1994? What is the average completion time? Mr. McFadden. Security investigations actual and estimated costs for FY 1992, FY 1993, and FY 1994 are shown in a table below which I would like to insert in the record. (The information follows:) ACTUAL AND ESTIMATED CASE COSTS FY 1992, FY 1993, and FY 1994 Columns of the FY 1994 Congressional Request FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994 AGENCY/INVESTIGATION TYPE ACTUAL ESTIMATE ESTIMATE FBI Background Investigation $4,089 $4,627 $4,997 OPM Single Scope Background N/A $2,850 $3,125 Investigation (SSBI) 1/ OPM Background Invest. (BI) 1/ $2,475 $2,575 $2,850 OPM Limited Background $1,250 $1,400 $1,550 Investigation (LBI) 2/ OPM Periodic Reinvest. SBI N/A $675 $750 (PRIS) 2/ OPM Special Background Investigation (SBI) $2,575 N/A N/A OPM National Agency Check $42 $45 $50 with Credit (NACC) * FY 1993 and FY 1994 columns do not reflect OPM price increases 1/ For 75 day service 2/ For 120 day service The Federal Bureau of Investigation is completing applicant cases in 60 days and reinvestigations in 90 days. The Office of Personnel Management is currently completing Single Scope Background Investigations (used for the initial investigation for Q and Top Secret clearances) in 74 days; Periodic Reinvestigations for Single Scope Background Investigations (for reinvestigation of Q and Top Secret clearances) in 120 days, and National Agency Checks with Credit (used for initial and reinvestigation of L and Secret clearances) in 24 days. SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS BUDGET Mr. Bevill. Provide a breakout, by activity, of.the $4.3 million requested for Security Investigations Activities. Mr. McFadden. The breakout of our request for Related Security Investigations ActiVities is shown on a table which I would like to insert in the record. (The information follows:) RELATED SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITIES Electronic Transfer Program $2,950,000 Implementation of Accelerated Access Authorization Program (AAAP) 1,100,000 National Industrial Security Program (NISP) support 250,000 Total Related SI Activities $4,300,000 ........... THE OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PLANNING AND OPERATIONS Mr. Bevill. This office was established to consolidate emergency response activities throughout the Department. Instead of creating more efficient operations, the total cost of emergency operations has increased substantially. Please justify this increase in funding. General Bickford. Efficiency of operations has increased with a slight increase in funding. This increased funding results from breaking out common funding support from the Atomic Energy Defense Activities Appropriation. In fiscal years 1991 and 1992, common funding support from the Atomic Energy Defense Activities Appropriation amounted to $6.5 million and $3.05 million, respectively. Also, for FY 1992, $214,000 supported 3 FTEs directly funded by Departmental Administration. The increase from FY 1991 to FY 1992 is for additional contractor assistance for training, emergency plans review, data analyses, and to strengthen the DOE exercise and appraisal program. Also, the funding increase provides for state-of-the-art communications, display, and data processing equipment necessary for full operation of the improved Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The FY 1993 budget increase is for continued Emergency Management System (EMS) enhancement and the EOC. Contractor support is required to continue, expand, and improve the EMS appraisal program; contractor and Federal support to meet guidance and oversight requirements of the EMS Program; and contractor support to strengthen DOE's EMS exercise and evaluation program to ensure effective EMS planning, preparedness, and response to emergency situations; and continued improvement of the Department-wide emergency training and technical assistance to the readiness assurance program and to support other exercises. Funding for the EOC supports continued oversight and operation of the Headquarters EOC and the departmental emergency communication system between the Field Offices EOCs. The funding increase for capital equipment ensures compatibility throughout the Headquarters and Field Offices EOCs. OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PLANNING AND OPERATIONS Mr. Bevill. How are efforts of this office coordinated with the emergency response and operations funded in the defense programmatic areas? General Bickford. The Office of Emergency Planning and Operations is responsible for the development and operation of the Department's Emergency Management System (EMS), which is the framework for all of DOE's emergency planning, preparedness , and readiness assurance activities. The EMS has been established to ensure a fully coordinated and integrated emergency preparedness program is maintained by the Department. The Office of Emergency Planning and Operations is also responsible for ensuring that Departmental policies and standards are appropriately applied in emergency management programs. This is accomplished through the review of emergency plans and procedures and periodic appraisals of emergency management programs and evaluation of other emergency preparedness activities. Emergency response and operations activities funded in the defense programmatic area include the unique radiological emergency response assets (i.e., the Nuclear Emergency Search Team, the Accident Response Group, the Aerial Measuring System, the Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability, the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center, the Radiological Assistance Program, and the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site) managed by the Department and the emergency management programs for DOE's defense-related facilities, operations, and activities. Program management responsibilities for the response assets are solely within the defense programmatic purview, subject to periodic review, appraisal, and evaluation by the Office of Emergency Planning and Operations, as are the emergency management programs for DOE's defense-related facilities, operations, and activities. Coordination is accomplished by the Office of Emergency Planning and Operations through a number of mechanisms and activities, including: chairing the Department's Emergency Management Advisory Committee, which is comprised of representatives of all Departmental elements with emergency preparedness responsibilities and interests; participation in the directives development process which sets Departmental responsibilities, authorities, and requirements; review and concurrence on emergency readiness assurance plans; and, concurrence in selection of Departmental representatives to interagency and international committees, work groups, and task forces. IMPORTATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND PARTS Mr. Rogers. The U.S. Customs Service has a large presence at all US ports as well as the technology and capacity to inspect all goods entering the U.S. Are there any joint initiatives between the Departments of Energy and Defense and the Customs Service to detect the importation of nuclear weapons and parts? Please describe these initiatives including the requested funding for fiscal year 1994. Mr. Ford. There are no joint initiatives between the Departments of Energy and Defense and the Customs Service to detect the importation of nuclear weapons and parts.