S. 2258. A bill to create a Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community, and for other purposes; to the Select Committee on Intelligence.
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I am rising today to introduce legislation that would establish a Presidential Commission to examine the roles and missions of the U.S. intelligence community.
It was not too many years ago, Mr. President, that there was a solid consensus in Congress in support of the intelligence budget and our intelligence agencies. During the decade of the 1980's, for example, the intelligence authorization bill was so noncontroversial that it was often passed during a late night session on a voice vote without debate or amendment. That era is now gone, and the intelligence authorization bill seems to attract more debate and discussion every year.
I anticipate that this year the Senate will establish a new record for the length of time that it debates the intelligence authorization bill. We will consider counterintelligence legislation in connection with the intelligence bill this year; we will probably face amendments aimed at cutting the intelligence budget, as we have each of the last few years; and the Senate may revisit the issue of declassifying the intelligence budget totals. Some Senators have indicated they may seek to convene the Senate in executive session to debate classified programs. That is a procedure I always support.
As my colleagues are aware, the Department of Defense has been the subject of extensive reviews in recent years. The Bottom-Up Review being the most recent. In 1986, both Houses of Congress overwhelmingly approved the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which strengthened the Unified Combatant Commands and the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A Presidential commission has been established to review the roles and mission of our Armed Forces. These have been very productive and necessary steps, and I believe that a comparable review of the intelligence community is now, timely. Such a review, I predict, will result in the strengthening of the Nation's intelligence.
The bill that I am introducing today, together with Senator Graham of Florida, chairman of the Intelligence Committee, is intended to provide a thorough and fully independent
review of the organization and mission of the intelligence community. While the Jacobs' panel looked at part of our intelligence structure, and made a valuable contribution, this proposed commission would be the first fully independent review of the roles and missions of the entire intelligence community since the establishment of the CIA in 1947.
Our bill has a number of important features.
First, the Commission would be composed of four Members of Congress appointed by our leadership in consultation with the chairman and vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee as well as seven individuals from the private sector appointed by the President. In order to ensure an independent perspective, we have stipulated in the bill that the members of the Commission shall not have previously held leadership positions in the intelligence community.
Second, we have provided funds so that the Commission can have a clearance staff to handle classified material, and will therefore not need to depend on intelligence community officials for information and analysis.
Third, we have provided the Commission the time necessary to do a thorough and detailed study. Its report would not be due until December 1996.
Finally, I think it is important for my colleagues to understand that our bill tasks the Commission with reviewing the full range of issues that have arisen with regard to the intelligence community in recent years. For example, under our bill, the Commission would be charged with reviewing the budgets of the intelligence community as well as their roles and missions; the role of economic intelligence would be addressed, as would the issue of declassifying the intelligence budget.
I want the record to reflect the fact that this bill was a collaborative effort involving myself, Senator DeConcini, and Senator Graham of Florida. Over the last couple of months, I have been publicly outspoken regarding the need for a Presidential Commission, and on May 19 I wrote the President urging his support for such a Commission. But my initial idea had been to have a Presidential Commission that would have focused primarily on the CIA and its relations with other organizations. Senator Graham at that point approached me expressing support for a Presidential Commission, suggesting however that its purview be expanded to include the entire intelligence community. Senator Graham and our distinguished chairman, Senator DeConcini, both had ideas for topics the Commission should consider that have been incorporated in this bill. So my colleagues from Florida and Arizona are not only cosponsors, but coauthors of this legislation.
I strongly believe that the world is a more complex and difficult place in many respects than it was during the cold war. There is no doubt in my mind that an independent Commission will validate the continued need for clandestine human and technical intelligence collection to support U.S. national security interests. Nevertheless, the Commission may very well recommend changes that eliminate waste or duplication and increase the performance and effectiveness of the intelligence community. We need an independent review at this time, to scrub the existing structure and provide both the Congress and the public with assurances that the intelligence organization and activities we support are consistent with our great Nation's values, budgets, and interests. I have no doubt that the intelligence community will pass this test and emerge with renewed public and congressional support.
I hope that my colleagues, the administration and the public will review the bill and comment on it so that we can make any needed changes or improvement prior to the time the intelligence authorization bill comes to the floor of the Senate. It would be my intention, and I know that of our distinguished chairman and the distinguished Senator from Florida, to offer this bill as an amendment to the intelligence authorization bill at that time.
Mr. President, in closing, I ask unanimous consent that a letter I wrote to the President on this topic last month be included in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
May 19, 1994.
The White House,
Dear Mr. President: I am writing today to urge you to consider establishing a Presidential Commission to review the roles, mission, funding level and organizational structure of the Central Intelligence Agency as well as its integral role as the lead agency in the Intelligence Community.
As you know, the CIA has come under intense public scrutiny as a result of the Ames case. My own view is that much of this criticism is unjustified. Nevertheless, this tragic case has triggered many of my colleagues (and their constituents) to pose constructively, a broad range of important questions, not only about the CIA's counterintelligence practices, but more fundamentally, the appropriate role of clandestine activities in a world devoid of the Soviet threat. As I, Chairman DeConcini, and others, support the Intelligence Authorization bill (and subsequent appropriations) on the floor, it would be helpful to refer to a decision by you to initiate an in-depth study by a Presidential Commission.
For nearly a quarter of a century, I have worked with the CIA. Unequivocally, I believe that the CIA continues to play a unique and vital role in supporting U.S. national security interests. The threat of nuclear conflicts has diminished, in the wake of the demise of the Soviet Union, but the dramatic collapse of that vast empire has produced a heightened instability throughout not only the former Soviet Union, but the world.
Further, as you well know, in the minds of many the world is more complex and unpredictable than it was before the collapse of the Soviet Union. The time for a hard look at the CIA is now. I am confident that the Agency will pass `the test,' no matter how vigorously examined, and that constructive new ideas, which neither you nor I now have, will emerge to change and strengthen intelligence.
In recent years, other parts of the national security apparatus have undergone fundamental reforms. The Goldwater-Nichols bill reformed important structures within the Department of Defense and was approved overwhelmingly by both Houses of Congress. It was enacted in 1986, following vigorous efforts by the Senate Armed Services Committee. Last Year, the Defense Department conducted a `bottom-up review' in order to assure that we have an appropriate balance between U.S. military objectives and force structure. More recently, Congress directed, and you appointed, a panel to review the roles and missions of the armed forces. A Presidential Commission, however, is essential in this case.
In my view, an independent appraisal of the Agency, in the context of it's partners, would restore a sense of confidence in the Agency and in Congress.
Congress, in its oversight capacity, is undertaking, to a limited extent, its own review; but, in my judgment would welcome an independent analysis. In keeping with past practice, I recommend that such a commission be composed of individuals appointed by yourself and the leaders of the House and Senate and be directed to report back to you in less than a year.
Senator Boren and Senator Cohen worked very successfully with a group--with similar objectives--known as the `Jacobs Panel.' Both Senators, unsolicited, support the concept of your appointing a group and suggest that one or more of the `Jacobs Panel' be included to achieve a measure of continuity.
In closing, I would urge that this panel examine the question of economic intelligence, for I foresee growing problems as other nations are becoming more active in this area and economic competition intensifies.
If you support the idea of a Presidential Commission, I would be happy to offer an amendment authorizing such a commission during Senate consideration of the Fiscal Year 1995 Intelligence Authorization bill. I appreciate your consideration of this important issue.
Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, I am pleased to join Senators Warner and DeConcini in introducing legislation to establish a blue ribbon commission on the roles and capabilities of the United States intelligence community.
The purpose of this Commission is to commence an analysis of the missions, roles, functions, and relationships of the intelligence community and its responsiveness to consumers' needs, based on the post-cold war environment.
With the collapse of the Soviet Eastern bloc we face a dramatically changed world. Rather than one principle enemy, we now confront a world where regional instability presents a variety of threats.
As the world is changing, so must our approach to intelligence gathering. We must chart a new course. The Commission which we are today proposing will play a critical role in charting that new course.
I believe, as my colleague and friend from Virginia has stated, this is the time to step back to take a long view and a fresh look at our intelligence priorities. Where changes are needed we need to make them. New thinking is required and nothing is sacrosanct. Most importantly in an environment of reduced resources we must match means to ends.
Intelligence is critical to the security of our Nation and will remain so. As we reduce our defense spending the role of intelligence becomes even more critical. Good intelligence is invaluable, it can tell us where the next threat will arise and how we should best deploy resources to address it.
I am also well aware that recent events, such as the Ames spy case, have focused a critical light on the intelligence community and generated renewed concerns for an evaluation.
Mr. President the time is right for a comprehensive review. I would like to highlight three issues which the commission will evaluate closely:
First, the roles and missions of the intelligence community in terms of providing support to its traditional customers--the defense and foreign policy establishments.
Second, whether intelligence efforts are prepared to address emergency needs--such as increasingly sophisticated economic intelligence for new customers.
Third, available requirements and resources--both human and material--are they properly watched and allocated within the intelligence community.
A particular concern is whether the recruitment, training, and promotion policies of the intelligence community will achieve the human resources needed in a world in which human intelligence capabilities will be increasingly required.
I am particularly concerned that at a time when I suspect that human intelligence, as distinct from technological means of gathering intelligence, will assume greater importance, particularly in places in the 60 emerging hot spots around the world, that we have the capability to recruit, train and lead our humans who will be providing that human intelligence.
The proposed Commission would consist of 11 members: 7 appointed by the President; one member each appointed by the Senate majority leader and minority leader; and one member each appointed by the Speaker of the House and the House minority leader.
This proposed Commission would ensure an independent evaluation with executive and legislative branch collaboration, to provide a review that could serve to strengthen the support and refine the management of these vital capabilities essential for our national security. The structure of this Commission will ensure its independence.
I look forward to its creation and receiving its recommendations by December 31, 1996.
Mr. President, I appreciate this time and join my colleague from Virginia in looking forward to the creation and the receipt of the report of the Commission by December 31, 1996.
By Mrs. MURRAY (for herself, Mr. Hatfield, Mr. Gorton, Mr. Inouye, and Mr. Bradley):
S. 2259. A bill to provide for the settlement of the claims of the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation concerning their contribution to the production of hydropower by the Grand Coulee Dam, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Indian Affairs.
This legislation would codify an historic agreement recently reached between the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation and the United States. Since the Federal construction of the Grand Coulee Dam, the people of Washington State and the Nation have benefited greatly from the power produced from the waters of the Columbia. But few have sacrificed as much for these gains as the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, on whose land the Grand Coulee Dam was built. This bill would resolve this inequity, settling the tribe's long-standing claims against the United States for compensation of the reservation lands taken for Grand Coulee Dam construction and operation.
In 1933, the Federal Power Commission granted a permit to develop the water resources at the site that is now the Grand Coulee Dam on the Columbia River in Washington State. The dam was to be constructed under a Federal Power Act license, and the tribe was to receive annual payments for tribal lands taken and used for the production of power. The tribe testified before Congress, that their best lands would be lost and their ability to fish would be destroyed. The Secretary of the Interior, Harold Ickes, supported the tribes, affirming that they should be compensated according to the power produced by the dam.
Even so, when the United States completed the dam and began producing electricity in 1942, the tribe received nothing for its contribution to the production of electricity.
The tribe then commenced to pursue its claim in the Federal courts. For almost 50 years--nearly a generation--the tribe filed claims litigation seeking compensation. The tribe first brought suit against the United States under the 1946 Indian Claims Commission Act for the taking of its property and the use of its lands. Finally, in 1992, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a previously dismissed claim, thereby opening the door for settlement negotiations between the tribe, the Justice Department, and the Bonneville Power Administration [BPA] to begin.
The settlement agreement negotiated between the United States and
the tribe is a fair, equitable and final settlement for tribal compensation claims. Over 6 months of negotiations, representatives of the Department of Justice, the Department of Interior, and the BPA agreed with the Colville Tribe on the Settlement Agreement represented by this act.
The purposes of this act are as follows. First, to approve and ratify the Settlement Agreement entered to by the United States and the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation in Washington State. And second, to direct the BPA to carry out payment obligations under the Settlement Agreement.
Under the Settlement Agreement, the United States has agreed to pay $53 million to the tribe as settlement for past unpaid annual charges. The BPA will pay the tribe an annual payment for the continued use of reservation lands. The first payment will be for $15.25 million and will be made by March 1, 1996. Additional payments will be subject to a formula set forth in the agreement. These payments will fluctuate according to the amount of power produced annually at the Grand Coulee Dam and BPA's average sale price for power.
Mr. President, The Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation have contributed greatly to the success of my region of the country, and will continue to do so for many generations to come. It is time for the United States to recognize the contributions that have been made. Therefore, it is with conviction that I urge my colleagues to vote with me for passage of this act. Thank you.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of my statement be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the `Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation Grand Coulee Dam Settlement Act'.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
As used in this Act:
(1) Administrator: The term `Administrator' means the Administrator of the Bonneville Power Administration;
(2) Bonneville power administration: The term `Bonneville Power Administration' means the Bonneville Power Administration of the Department of Energy or any successor agency, corporation, or entity that markets power produced at the Dam.
(3) Dam: The term `Dam' means the Grand Coulee Dam--
(A) operated by the Bureau of Reclamation of the Department of the Interior, and
(B) with respect to which power is marketed by the Bonneville Power Administration of the Department of Energy.
(4) Confederated tribes v. united states: The term `Confederated Tribes v. United States' means the case pending before the United States Court of Claims arising from the claim filed with the Indian Claims Commission with the docket number 181-D that--
(A) was transferred to the United States Court of Claims pursuant to the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 (96 Stat. 25) as Confederated Tribes v. United States (20 Cl. Ct. 31);
(B) with respect to which an appeal was filed in the United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit (964 F.2d 1102) (Fed. Cir. 1992); and
(C) on the basis of the appeal, was remanded in part by the United States Court of Appeals to the United States Court of Claims.
(5) Minor: The term `minor' means a child who has not attained the age of 18.
(6) Secretary: The term `Secretary' means the Secretary of the Interior.
(7) Settlement agreement: The term `Settlement Agreement' means the Settlement Agreement entered into between the United States and the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, signed by the United States on April 21, 1994, and by the Tribe on April 16, 1994, to settle the claims of the Tribe under Confederated Tribes v. United States.
(8) Tribe: `Tribe' means the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, a federally recognized Indian tribe.
SEC. 3. FINDINGS AND PURPOSE.
(a) Findings: Congress finds the following:
(1) An action by the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation against the United States is pending before the United States Court of Federal Claims.
(2) In such action, the Tribe seeks to recover damages under section 2(5)) of the of the Indian Claims Commission Act (60 Stat. 1050 (formerly 25 U.S.C. 70a(5)) relating to fair and honorable dealings.
(3) Although the matter that is the subject of such action is in dispute, the potential liability of the United States is substantial.
(4) The claim filed by Tribe with respect to such action alleges that--
(A) after the construction of the Grand Coulee Dam, the United States has used land located in the Colville Reservation in connection with the generation of electric power;
(B) the United States will continue to use such land during such time as the Grand Coulee Dam produces power; and
(C) the United States has promised to pay the Tribe for the use referred to in subparagraph (A), but has failed to make such payment.
(4) After years of litigation, the United States has negotiated a Settlement Agreement with the Tribe that was signed by the appropriate officials of the Department of Justice, the Bonneville Power Administration, and the Department of the Interior.
(5) The Settlement Agreement is contingent on the enactment of enabling legislation to approve and ratify the Settlement Agreement.
(6) Upon the enactment of this Act, the Settlement Agreement will--
(A) provide mutually agreeable compensation for the past use (as determined under such Agreement) of land of the Colville Reservation in connection with the generation of electric power at Grand Coulee Dam;
(B) establish a method to ensure that the Tribe will be compensated for future use (as determined under such Agreement) of land of the Colville Reservation in the generation of electric power at Grand Coulee Dam; and approved; and
(C) settle the claims of the Tribe against the United States brought under the Indian Claims Commission Act.
(b) Purposes: The purposes of this Act are as follows:
(1) To approve and ratify the Settlement Agreement entered into by the United States and the Tribe.
(2) To direct the Bonneville Power Administration to carry out the obligations of the Bonneville Power Administration under the Settlement Agreement.
SEC. 4. APPROVAL, RATIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT.
(a) In General: The Settlement Agreement is hereby approved and ratified.
(b) Duties of the Bonneville Power Administration: The Bonneville Power Administration shall--
(1) on an annual basis, make payments to the Tribe in a manner consistent with the Settlement Agreement; and
(2) carry out any other obligation of the Bonneville Power Administration under the Settlement Agreement.
(c) Implementation of Settlement Agreement:
(1) In general: In a manner consistent with the negotiated terms of the Settlement Agreement, the United States shall join in the motion that the Tribe has agreed to file in Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation v. United States, for the entry of a compromise final judgment in the amount of $53,000,000.00.
(2) Requirements for payment: The United States shall pay the amount specified in paragraph (1) from funds appropriated pursuant to section 1304 of title 31, United States Code. The amount paid as a judgment may not be not reimbursed by the Bonneville Power Administration.
SEC. 5. DISTRIBUTION OF THE SETTLEMENT FUNDS.
(a) Lump Sum Payment: The payment made under section 4(c)(1) (including any interest that accrues on the payment) shall be deposited by the Secretary of the Treasury in a trust fund established for the Tribe pursuant to of Public Law 93-134 (25 U.S.C. 1401 et seq.) for use by the tribal governing body of the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, pursuant to a distribution plan developed by the Tribe and approved by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to section 3 of Public Law 93-134 (25 U.S.C. 1403), except that--
(1) under the distribution plan developed pursuant to this subsection any payment to be made to a minor shall be held by the United States in trust for the minor until the later of--
(A) the date the minor attains the age of 18; or
(B) the date of graduation of the secondary school class with respect to which the minor is scheduled to be a member; and
(2) the Secretary may, pursuant to regulations prescribed by the Secretary relating to the administration of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, authorize the emergency use of trust funds for the benefit of a minor.
(b) Annual Payments: In addition to the lump sum payment described in subsection (a), the appropriate official of the Federal Government shall make annual payments directly to the Tribe in accordance with the Settlement Agreement. The Tribe may use any amount received as an annual payment under this subsection in the same manner as the Tribe may use any other income received by the Tribe from the lease or sale of natural resources.
SEC. 6. REPAYMENT CREDIT.
(a) In General: Beginning with fiscal year 2000, and ending at the end of the last fiscal year during which the Tribe receives an annual payment pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, the Administrator shall deduct from the interest payable to the Secretary of the Treasury from net proceeds (as defined in section 13(b) of the Federal Columbia River Transmission System Act (16 U.S.C. 838(b)) an amount equal to 26 percent of the payment made to the Tribe for the immediately preceding fiscal year.
(b) Credit of Interest:
(1) In general: Each deduction made under this section shall--
(A) be credited to the amount of interest payments that would otherwise be payable by the Administrator to the Secretary of the Treasury during the fiscal year in which the deduction is made; and
(B) be allocated on a pro rata basis to all interest payments on debt associated with the generation function of the Federal Columbia River Power System that are payable during the fiscal year specified in subparagraph (A).
(2) Special allocation rule: If, for any fiscal year a deduction calculated pursuant to paragraph (1) would be greater than the amount of interest due on debt associated with the generation function described in paragraph (1)(B) for such fiscal year, the amount by which the deduction exceeds the interest due on debt associated with the generation function shall be allocated on a pro rata basis as a credit for the payment of any other interest that is payable by the Administrator by the Secretary for such fiscal year.
SEC. 7. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS.
(a) Liens and Forfeitures: Funds paid or deposited to the credit of the Tribe pursuant to the Settlement Agreement or this Act, any interest or investment income earned or received on such funds, any payment authorized by the Tribe or the Secretary of the Interior to be made from such funds to members of the Tribe, and any interest or investment income earned on any such payment earned or received and deposited in a trust pursuant to this section for a member of the Tribe, may not be subject to any levy, execution, forfeiture, garnishment, lien, encumbrance, seizure, or taxation by the Federal Government or a State or political subdivision of a State.
(b) Eligibility for Federal and Federally Funded Programs: None of the funds described in subsection (a) may be treated as income or resources or otherwise used as the basis for denying or reducing the financial assistance or other benefits to which the Tribe, a member of the Tribe, or a household of the Tribe would otherwise be entitled under the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 301 et seq.) or any program of the Federal Government or program that receives assistance from the Federal Government.
(c) Trust Responsibility: This Act and the Settlement Agreement may not be construed to affect the trust responsibility of the United States to the Tribe or to any of the members of the Tribe.