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The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.


Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, I yield the remainder of the time on the pending amendment of the managers.

I ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate? If not, the question is on agreeing to the amendment.

The amendment (No. 2553), as amended, was agreed to.

Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to.

Mr. WARNER. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.



Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Virginia [Mr. Warner], for himself, Mr. Graham, Mr. DeConcini, Mr. Metzenbaum, Mr. Chafee, Mr. Cohen, Mr. Kerrey, Mr. Boren, Mr. Lugar, Mr. Bryan, Mr. Baucus, Mr, Durenberger, Mr. Pell, Mr. Lautenberg, Mr. Hatch, Mr. Johnston, Mr. Bumpers, and Mr. Kerry, proposes an amendment numbered 2556.

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows:
At the end of the bill, add the following new title:


There is established a commission to be known as the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community (hereafter in this title referred to as the `Commission').

(a) Membership: (1) The Commission shall be composed of 17 members, as follows:

(A) Nine members shall be appointed by the President from private life, no more than four of whom shall have previously held senior leadership positions in the intelligence community.

(B) Two members shall be appointed by the Majority Leader of the Senate, of whom one shall be a Member of the Senate and one shall be from private life.

(C) Two members shall be appointed by the Minority Leader of the Senate, of whom one shall be a Member of the Senate and one shall be from private life.

(D) Two members shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of whom one shall be a Member of the House and one shall be from private life.

(E) Two members shall be appointed by the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives, of whom one shall be a Member of the House and one shall be from private life.
(2) The members of Commission appointed from private life under paragraph (1) shall be persons of demonstrated ability and accomplishment in government, business, law, academe, journalism, or other profession, who have a substantial background in national security matters.
(b) Chairman: The President shall designate one of the members appointed from private life to serve as Chairman of the Commission.
(c) Period of Appointment; Vacancies: Members shall be appointed for the life of the Commission. Any vacancy in the Commission shall not affect its powers but shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment.
(d) Deadline for Appointments: The appointments required by section subsection (a) shall be made within 45 days after the date of enactment of this Act.
(e) Meetings: (1) The Commission shall meet at the call of the Chairman.
(2) The Commission shall hold its first meeting not later than four months after the date of enactment of this Act.
(f) Quorum: Nine members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum, but a lesser number of members may hold hearings, take testimony, or receive evidence.
(g) Security Clearances: Appropriate security clearances shall be required for members of the Commission who are private United States citizens. Such clearances shall be processed and completed on an expedited basis by appropriate elements of the executive branch of Government and shall, in any case, be completed within 90 days of the date such members are appointed.

(a) In General: It shall be the duty of the Commission--

(1) to review the efficacy and appropriateness of the activities of the United States intelligence community in the post-Cold War global environment; and

(2) to prepare and transmit the reports described in section X04.
(b) Implementation: In carrying out subsection (a), the Commission shall specifically consider the following:

(1) What should be the roles and missions of the intelligence community in terms of providing support to the defense and foreign policy establishments.

(2) Whether the roles and missions of the intelligence community should extend beyond the traditional areas of providing support to the defense and foreign policy establishments, and, if so, what areas should be considered legitimate for intelligence collection and analysis, and whether such areas should include for example, economic issues, environmental issues, and health issues.

(3) What functions, if any, should continue to be assigned the Central Intelligence Agency and what capabilities should it retain for the future.

(4) Whether the existing organization and management framework of the Central Intelligence Agency provide the optimal structure for the accomplishment of its mission.

(5) Whether existing principles and strategies governing the acquisition and maintenance of intelligence collection capabilities should be retained and what collection capabilities should the Government retain to meet future contingencies.

(6) Whether intelligence analysis, as it is currently structured and executed, adds sufficient value to information otherwise available to the Government to justify its continuation, and, if so, at what level of resources.

(7) Whether the existing decentralized system of intelligence analysis results in significant waste or duplication, and, if so, what can be done to correct these deficiencies.

(8) Whether the existing arrangements for allocating available resources to accomplish the roles and missions assigned to intelligence agencies are adequate.

(9) Whether the existing framework for coordinating among intelligence agencies with respect to intelligence collection and analysis and other activities, including training and operational activities, provides an optimal structure for such coordination.

(10) Whether current personnel policies and practices of intelligence agencies provide an optimal work force to satisfy the needs of intelligence consumers.

(11) Whether resources for intelligence activities should continue to be allocated as part of the defense budget or be treated by the President and Congress as a separate budgetary program.

(12) Whether the existing levels of resources allocated for intelligence collection or intelligence analysis, or to provide a capability to conduct covert actions, are seriously at variance with United States needs.

(13) Whether there are areas of redundant or overlapping activity or areas where there is evidence of serious waste, duplication, or mismanagement.

(14) To what extent, if any, should the budget for United States intelligence activities be publicly disclosed.

(15) To what extent, if any, should the United States intelligence community collect information bearing upon private commercial activity and the manner in which such information should be controlled and disseminated.

(16) Whether counterintelligence policies and practices are adequate to ensure that employees of intelligence agencies are sensitive to security problems, and whether intelligence agencies themselves have adequate authority and capability to address perceived security problems.

(17) The manner in which the size, missions, capabilities, and resources of the United States intelligence community compare to those of the Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, France, Israel, Russia, and Germany.

(18) Whether existing collaborative arrangements between the United States and other countries in the area of intelligence cooperation should be maintained and whether such arrangements should be expanded to provide for increased burdensharing.

(19) Whether existing arrangements for sharing intelligence with multinational organizations in support of mutually-shared objectives are adequate.

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(a) Initial Report: Not later than two months after the first meeting of the Commission, the Commission shall transmit to the congressional intelligence committees a report setting forth its plan for the work of the Commission.
(b) Interim Reports: Prior to the submission of the report required by subsection (c), the Commission may issue such interim reports as it finds necessary and desirable.
(c) Final Report: No later than March 1, 1996, the Commission shall submit to the President and to the congressional intelligence committees a report setting forth the activities, findings, and recommendations of the Commission, including any recommendations for the enactment of legislation that the Commission considers advisable. To the extent feasible, such report shall be unclassified and made available to the public. Such report shall be supplemented as necessary by a classified report or annex, which shall be provided separately to the President and the congressional intelligence committees.

(a) Hearings: The Commission or, at its direction, any panel or member of the Commission, may, for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this section, hold hearings, sit and act at times and places, take testimony, receive evidence, and administer oaths to the extent that the Commission or any panel or member considers advisable.
(b) Information From Federal Agencies: The Commission may secure directly from any intelligence agency or from any other Federal department or agency any information that the Commission considers necessary to enable the Commission to carry out its responsibilities under this section. Upon request of the Chairman of the Commission, the head of any such department or agency shall furnish such information expeditiously to the Commission.
(c) Postal Services: The Commission may use the United States mails and obtain printing and binding services in the same manner and under the same conditions as other departments and agencies of the Federal Government.
(d) Subcommittees: The Commission may establish panels composed of less than the full membership of the Commission for the purpose of carrying out the Commission's duties. The actions of each such panel shall be subject to the review and control of the Commission. Any findings and determinations made by such a panel shall not be considered the findings and determinations of the Commission unless approved by the Commission.
(e) Authority of Individuals To Act for Commission: Any member or agent of the Commission may, if authorized by the Commission, take any action which the Commission is authorized to take under this title.

(a) Compensation of Members: Each member of the Commission who is a private United States citizen shall be paid at a rate equal to the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay payable for level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of title 5, United States Code, for each day (including travel time) during which the member is engaged in the performance of the duties of the Commission. All members of the Commission who are Members of Congress shall serve without compensation in addition to that received for their services as Members of Congress.
(b) Travel Expenses: Each member of the Commission shall be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, at rates authorized for employees of agencies under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code, while away from their homes or regular places of business in the performance of services for the Commission.
(c) Staff:

(1) In general: The Chairman of the Commission may, without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, appoint a staff director and such additional personnel as may be necessary to enable the Commission to perform its duties. The appointment of a staff director shall be subject to the approval of the Commission. No member of the staff shall be a current officer or employee of the intelligence community.

(2) Compensation: The Chairman of the Commission may fix the pay of the staff director and other personnel without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of title 5, United States Code, relating to classification of positions and General Schedule pay rates, except that the rate of pay fixed under this paragraph for the staff director may not exceed the rate payable for level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of such title and the rate of pay for other personnel may not exceed the maximum rate payable for grade GS-15 of the General Schedule.
(d) Detail of Government Employees: Upon request of the Chairman of the Commission, the head of any Federal department or agency may detail, on a non-reimbursable basis, any personnel of that department or agency to the Commission to assist it in carrying out its administrative and clerical functions, except that no person shall be detailed to the staff of the Commission who is an officer or employee of an intelligence agency.
(e) Procurement of Temporary and Intermittent Services: The Chairman of the Commission may procure temporary and intermittent services under section 3109(b) of title 5, United States Code, at rates for individuals which do not exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay payable for level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of such title.
(f) Administrative and Support Services: The Director of Central Intelligence shall furnish the Commission, on a non-reimbursable basis, any administrative and support services requested by the Commission consistent with this title.

The compensation, travel expenses, per diem allowances of members and employees of the Commission, and other expenses of the Commission shall be paid out of funds available to the Director of Central Intelligence for the payment of compensation, travel allowances, and per diem allowances, respectively, of employees of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The Commission shall terminate one month after the date of the submission of the report required by section X04(c).

For purposes of this title--

(1) the term `intelligence agency' means any agency, office, or element of the intelligence community;

(2) the term `intelligence community' shall have the same meaning as set forth in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)); and

(3) the term `congressional intelligence committees' refers to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I would like to read the distinguished list of cosponsors that have joined in this legislation. First, the Senator from Florida [Mr. Graham], a very valued Member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, who will momentarily address this bill; the distinguished chairman, the Senator from Arizona [Mr. DeConcini]; Senator Metzebaum; Senator Chafee, Senator Cohen; Sen ator Kerrey; Senator Boren; Senator Lugar; Senator Bryan; Senator Baucus; Senator Durenberger; Senator Pell; Senator Lautenberg; Senator Hatch; Senator Johnston; Senator Bumpers; and Senator Kerry.

I ask unanimous consent that the record may remain open until 2 o'clock today, within which time other Senators desiring to be noted as original cosponsors may do so.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. WARNER. Madam President, in the wake of the Ames case, and the demise of the Soviet Union, and the Warsaw Pact, many tough questions regarding the effectiveness of our intelligence agencies and their proper role in a post-cold-war world are being asked by Members of Congress and the public. These questions deserve careful, sustained, and detailed consideration by a group which is independent of the intelligence community independent of the Congress and the executive branch.

In my view, an independent review is long overdue. The Defense Department has been subject to a variety of reviews that have helped it to keep pace with a changing strategic environment. These reviews have included the Goldwater-Nichols Act largely conducted by the Senate Armed Services Committee under the leadership of Senator Nunn; the Bottom-Up Review, largely conducted under the aegis of the Secretary of Defense, Secretary Aspin; and an ongoing Presidential Commission on the Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces. By contrast, the Intelligence Community has not had an independent top-to-bottom review since it was established in 1947.

I would like to reiterate that point.

The CIA came into being in 1947, and not since the initial legislation establishing it has there been a Presidential commission to examine that agency and other related agencies. So that is why it is timely, I think, to undertake a thorough review. That is the precise reason that I came forward with this concept, and I am pleased to be joined by some distinguished Members of the Senate.

I happen to believe that an independent commission will validate the continued need for a robust intelligence structure to support U.S. national security interests.

Again, Madam President, the concept of the Commission is not in any way to be perceived as a criticism of the employees who are now performing these valued duties. I think if you were to submit to them the question of whether or not their functions, individually and collectively, should be reviewed in the context of the functions of others in like agencies and departments, they would agree it is timely to look at these matters collectively.

Nevertheless, the Commission may well recommend changes that eliminate some duplication and waste that is in the system today. Indeed, I am confident it is there. I think many of the employees who devote their lives and careers to intelligence would be the first to acknowledge that some corrections are now timely.

An independent review--or, as we call it in Government, a scrub--of the existing structure, would provide both the Congress and the American people with assurances that our intelligence organizations and activities are consistent with our great Nation's values, budgets, and goals.

It is not the intent of the sponsors to prevent the implementation of changes already being contemplated. Counterintelligence reforms, for example, should be implemented immediately. So should the reforms underway in the Directorate of Intelligence, which were enumerated by Director Woolsey recently. These are limited efforts which do not include a review of the fundamental missions and organization of the intelligence community.

My colleagues should be aware that the administration has indicated its opposition to this amendment, preferring instead to have a study of the intelligence community conducted by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, commonly referred to as PFIAB.

I and the other sponsors of this amendment, however, believe that a study staffed by current employees of the intelligence community would not be as credible as one under the independent aegis of a Presidential commission. A PFIAB study would not provide the fully independent review which is required at this critical time.

I should also point out that the executive branch, as a rule, does not share PFIAB documents with Congress, it being an executive branch agency, and that is quite proper within the framework of our laws and precedence. So congressional committees could not have, perhaps, the full opportunity to review a PFIAB report.

Recently I asked to see a PFIAB report, which I have reason to believe is an excellent report, on Somalia. Senator Levin and I, at the direction of the leadership of the Armed Services Committee, are performing a report on that subject. But I was denied, understandably, because of executive branch privilege. That is a clear example.

Our amendment has a number of important features:

First, the commission established by this amendment would review the full range of issues that have arisen concerning the intelligence community in recent years. For example, the commission would be charged with examining the roles and missions of the intelligence community, as well as its budget.

Second, the commission would be comprised of 4 Members of Congress, appointed by the leadership, as well as 13 individuals from the private sector, 9 appointed by the President, and 4 by the congressional leadership. To ensure an independent perspective, the private sector individuals must have a strong background in the national security arena, but a majority of them cannot have previously held senior leadership positions in the intelligence community.

Third, this amendment stipulates that no member of the commission staff shall be a current employee of the intelligence community.

Finally, the commission has been given sufficient time to conduct a thorough review and develop recommendations for Congress and the President. I am hopeful that my colleagues will support this amendment.

Madam President, before the distinguished Senator from Florida, who is my principal cosponsor, addresses this amendment, I ask for the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?

There is a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

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Mr. GRAHAM addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

Mr. WARNER. I yield such time as the distinguished Senator from Florida may require.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida is recognized.

Mr. GRAHAM. Madam President, I thank my colleague and copartner in the development of this amendment, the distinguished Senator from Virginia.

As he has so well said, the intelligence community in the United States is largely a product of World War II and the events immediately after World War II leading to the cold war. The CIA was formed during the administration of President Truman and has proceeded for the intervening almost half century, largely operating on the same principles that were in existence at the time of its creation.

Some of those principles were that our enemy was the large empire of the Soviet Union; that it was an empire which was difficult to penetrate; it was an empire which encouraged the development of technology as a means of gathering information; it was a period of time in which we had relationships with special allies, largely the result of experiences during World War II; our intelligence community was an activity which was largely provider rather than user oriented.

Those were some of the characteristics which, for a half century, served this Nation well, as we were dealing with the Soviet Union. Now we are in a new era, and we need to ask a new set of questions, such as: What will be the needs of the users of our intelligence? Who will be the users of our intelligence? How do we best provide for their needs?

I came to this need for a study of the future of our intelligence community, Madam President, during the course of our budget considerations in the Intelligence Committee. Without breaching any of the confidentiality of those discussions, I was struck with the fact that we were largely focused on highly specific, relatively technical questions, when the questions we ought to have been asking were: What is it we are trying to accomplish? How will this particular allocation of resources move us toward the achievement of those objectives? How do we evaluate whether we have accomplished the objectives or are moving in a direction toward their attainment?

Some of the subissues that come out of that analysis will include questions such as: What will be the role of our intelligence community in providing economic intelligence, in addition to its traditional foreign policy and national security orientation? What will be the changes required in our selection of personnel for our intelligence community at a time when the intelligence community is at least stagnating and may be constricting as a result of budget constraints?

And as we begin to move more toward intelligence that human beings gather, rather than intelligence acquired through machines, I have been dismayed, Madam President, in a number of visits to our Embassies and intelligence stations around the world, that there was not more diversity in who our intelligence agents are.

If you are in a country which is largely Hispanic, or largely of African origin, you would think that we would be in a better position to gather human intelligence if we had people who were personally more conversant with and expressed the language, the culture, the background of that particular country. One of the unique things about America is that we are so diverse and therefore have the ability to draw upon a wide range of backgrounds of Americans who can serve American interests in societies with which they have some special affinity. Those are the kinds of questions which I hope this intelligence commission will pursue.

Madam President, as the Senator from Virginia indicated----

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Virginia has expired.

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Mr. WARNER. The distinguished chairman and I yield such additional time from our managers' allocation as our colleague from Florida may desire, recognizing that we will need some additional time, both of us. So I hope that will not exceed 6, 7, or 8 minutes.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator yield time from the bill?

Mr. WARNER. Yes, that is correct.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida may continue.

Mr. GRAHAM. I appreciate the generosity of my colleague from Virginia. I will not intrude on that generosity to even the extent that he suggested.

I would like to reiterate some of the concerns that the Senator from Virginia expressed relative to the alternative to that which we have presented. I am pleased that in the administration, in the intelligence community, and in the Congress there is a recognition that there needs to be this indepth study of the mission and role of the intelligence community in the post-cold-war era.

The alternative to doing it in the manner that is suggested in this amendment is to have it done through the Presidential Commission on Foreign Intelligence, which is an agency within the White House which has been in existence to assist the President in his evaluation of intelligence activities.

I believe that the format that is being presented to the Senate today is a superior method of achieving and securing support for a comprehensive examination of our Intelligence Commission of our intelligence community for at least three reasons.

First, the structure that we are suggesting includes both representatives of the executive branch and of the legislative branch. If the report of the Commission is to have the maximum degree of sustained support by the public and by the Government, I believe that it would be enhanced by having all of those persons who will eventually have to be involved in implementation of the policy involved in the establishment of those new policies.

Second, I think that it is important that the membership be people who are primarily selected because of the vision of the questions of what we need to have for the future of our intelligence community, that they can bring to this task.

The President's advisory agency has in the past largely been assigned specific technical responsibilities, important responsibilities but generally focused on question of the appropriate technology for a particular type of information gathering.

I believe that while those questions are critical to the tactical implementation of whatever recommendations are made the questions that we hope will be asked and answered are of a higher level of concept, of basic function, direction and necessary steps in order to achieve goals for our intelligence community.

Third, it is important that there be an independent staff. In the past, the President's advisory agency has been staffed by professionals from the Central Intelligence Agency. That staff was arguably appropriate given the focused nature of the questions that they were asked to answer, but I believe that if we are going to be looking comprehensively at all components of the intelligence community for a long period into the future that the Commission's report would have a great degree of credibility if it had a staff that was not seen as being predisposed to any particular component of the intelligence community or predisposed to the way in which the intelligence community had conducted itself in the past.

Madam President, I believe this is important business that we are discussing today. It represents a significant part of our Nation's effort at maintaining an effective not only foreign policy and national security policy but increasingly an economic policy.

I believe that the Senator from Virginia and those who have joined with him have given us an effective road map as to how to get the right questions asked and answered and I hope that our colleagues will concur and this amendment will be adopted.

Madam President, with the introduction of this amendment, we have the opportunity to lay the groundwork for a pivotal change in the intelligence community. This amendment will establish a blue-ribbon commission to take a fresh look at the roles, missions, and resources of the intelligence community, to refine the objectives and renew the vitality of this essential capability.

The intelligence community as we know it has developed largely during and since World War II. For most of this period, we had a clear, identifiable enemy. The collapse of the Soviet Eastern bloc, however, presents a dramatically changed world. We now face several simultaneous crisis areas around the globe. Regional instability presents a variety of new threats each day.

Our intelligence needs are different today than just a few years ago. As we reduce our defense spending, the focus on intelligence as a force multiplier becomes even greater.

Yet, my sense is that the intelligence community has not confronted and adjusted to this reality. The timing is right with the changes brought about by the post-cold-war era, to readdress the functions and structure of the intelligence community.

Agencies within the intelligence community have been studied, but a comprehensive study of the entire community has not been undertaken since its establishment. In addition, implementation of the recommendations has been limited.

This amendment offers the advantages of an independent and collaborative approach to achieve the most effectiveness. The proposed commission has the independence to freely and comprehensively assess intelligence activities and develop a paradigm for an intelligence community that can better address today's and tomorrow's requirements. A collaborative, bipartisan approach with both executive and legislative branch involvement with nine members appointed by the President, and eight members appointed by congressional leadership--four Members of Congress and four members from the private sector--ensures that recommendations will have support from both areas and can easily be acted upon.

These members are the most critical element of the Commission's credibility and effectiveness. These members--charged with the responsibility for an essential redirection of the intelligence community--must be knowledgeable, respected individuals with appropriate stature; with a background in national security affairs; and with

a desire to develop a blueprint to refine our intelligence collection, analysis and management. In keeping with the spirit of the Commission, partisan alliances should be surpassed. Issues should be addressed in the best interest of the Nation to effect a new course for the intelligence community. The Commission will have the necessary independence to take a new look at the intelligence community and consider these key elements:

First, what should the role of the intelligence community be, not only for defense and foreign policy support, but should roles extend into other areas such as economic intelligence; second, do resources--human, material, and funding--appropriately correspond with the Nation's requirements, including contingencies; third, are intelligence efforts properly focused for today's environment as well as poised to address future needs.

A particular concern is whether recruitment, training, and promotion policies of the intelligence community are properly focused to provide the human resources needed to fulfill current and future requirements.

Human intelligence, as a potential source, is increasing, especially in the numerous emerging hot spots around the world where other means of intelligence gathering may be limited. But this source is useful only if we adapt our resources, drawing on the diversity available within our Nation. To accomplish this, the intelligence community must relinquish outmoded cultures and break through to a new mind set which more adequately addresses national requirements.

In a separate effort, the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces is beginning their review with recommendations expected by May 24, 1995. This Commission will review intelligence product use and value as a threat assessment for the military services, and, if needed, develop recommendations. Our proposed Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the Intelligence Community should assess these findings and to the extent that it is pertinent, develop recommendations.

The Commission proposed in this amendment will conduct an independent, comprehensive evaluation with executive and legislative branch collaboration, providing an opportunity for a pivotal change which could serve to strengthen the support and renew the vitality of this vital capability essential for our Nation's security.

Madam President, I look forward to creation of this Commission and the recommendations it will provide.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?

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Mr. WARNER. Madam President, I thank our distinguished colleague from Florida. He has worked with me every step of the way on this amendment and provided some very valuable concepts which have been incorporated into the amendment.

Madam President, I anticipate at this time that the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. Specter] desires to address the Senate under the time allocation accorded him on this amendment.

Mr. SPECTER. I will in a few minutes.

Mr. WARNER. Recognizing that the Senator from Pennsylvania is not ready to proceed, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. GRAHAM. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senator from Delaware.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, what is the business before the Senate?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate is considering S. 2082 under a time agreement.

Mr. BIDEN. Madam President, I ask the distinguished chairman of the committee whether he would be willing to yield me 2 minutes on an unrelated matter.

Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, I certainly yield to the Senator from Delaware 2 minutes of the manager's time.

if the Senator wants some more time, since we are waiting for another Senator who is coming over to speak, I will yield him additional time or we go outside the bill.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Delaware be permitted to speak as if this morning business for 5 minutes and the time not be allotted against the time on the bill.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senator from Delaware is recognized 5 minutes.