1994 Congressional HearingsIntelligence and Security
1994 Congressional HearingsFY 1995 BUDGET - DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL, 03/15/1994, Question and Answer
- Basis Date:
- 19950213
- Chairperson:
- T. Bevill
- Committee:
- House Appropriations
- Docfile Number:
- Q94AN301
- Hearing Date:
- 19940315
- DOE Lead Office:
- DP/NN SUB
- Committee:
- Energy and Water Development
- Hearing Subject:
- FY 1995 BUDGET - DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL
- Witness Name:
- V. Reis/J. Keliher
- Hearing Text:
........... STATE OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS LABORATORIES Mr. Bevill. Can you describe the state of the Russian nuclear weapons laboratories? Dr. Keliher. Deleted Deleted Deleted DIVERSION OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SCIENTISTS Mr. Bevill. How concerned should we be about the possible diversion of Russian nuclear weapons scientists to other countries? What can be done to mitigate the danger? Dr. Keliher. Observations to date by the DOE's National Laboratory scientists, as they interact on a project working level with their counterparts in the Former Soviet Union (FSU), indicate that this is not presently a major concern. However, economic conditions are rapidly deteriorating and the desire of FSU weapons scientists to feed themselves and their families will increase the probability that some will leave. Since early 1992, the Department of Energy has strongly encouraged technical collaborations between its laboratories and FSU weapons institutes. As of this date, initial technical exchange visits in March 1992 have led to over $5,000,000 in direct contracts between DOE and FSU weapons institutes. This contracting is employing thousands of scientists, engineers and technicians in non-weapons related work that maintains their professional integrity. Professional relationships are being established that provide a continuing basis for education in market economics. The success of direct laboratory-to-institute contracting is now leading to other programs that include U.S. industrial and academic participation, which will foster long- term commercial enterprises. This direct contracting for goods and services benefits Newly Independent States (NIS) institutes with employment and education in western business practices and provides the U.S. access to a large highly talented scientific pool of knowledge. These activities should be strengthened and given long-term support so as to minimize the developing proliferation risk and establish lasting economic benefits. In addition to these laboratory-to-institute exchanges, the DOE is supporting the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow. The Director of the Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation is the U.S. representative to the board of governors and two National Laboratory scientists are providing technical support to the center. The DOE strongly supports the nonproliferation goals of the ISTC and we encourage enhanced support to the center. ..................... NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS Mr. Bevill. Dr. Smith, what is the current DOD thinking on the most likely national security threat this Nation faces? Dr. Smith. We believe that there are four new post-cold war dangers faced by the Nation. These are: regional threats to U.S. interests, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and possible failure of democratic reforms (both in Russia and elsewhere in the world,). The fourth, although not a traditional military threat, but one that could have significant impact, is negative national economic trends. .......... Nuclear Safeguards and Security COORDINATION WITH DOD ON DECLASSIFICATION Mr. Bevill. How is DOE coordinating with DOD in its current efforts to declassify information? Are there any instances of disagreement between the two organizations on how the declassification effort should proceed? Dr. Keliher. DOE coordinates its declassification efforts with two primary offices in the DOD: The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, and the Assistant Deputy to the Under Secretary of Defense for Security Policy. DOE has notified DOD of current declassification efforts thorough DOE's Defense Program Office. DOD was also invited and participated in DOE's internal review of declassification proposals on March 3, 1994. A formal memorandum of recommended declassifications will be sent to DOD by April 1, 1994. We anticipate a response from DOD by the end of April 1994. There have been no disagreements between the two organizations on how the declassification effort should proceed; however, there have been disagreements on certain declassification proposals in the past. .............. COUNTRIES WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS Mr. Bevill. Please identify all countries known or suspected to have nuclear weapons and include the number of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons held by each. Dr. Keliher. The countries known to have nuclear weapons are the Former Soviet Union, China, France and the United Kingdom, as well as the United States. Countries suspected of having nuclear weapons are Israel, Pakistan, India, and North Korea. Estimates 'on the numbers of weapons are classified. .......... RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING Mr. Bevill. Describe the nonproliferation activities funded in this program and explain why they are not included in the Department's arms control and nonproliferation budget. Dr. Reis: As part of our effort to make the Research and Development budget justification more accurately descriptive of the work performed by the laboratories in support of the weapons program, certain high priority, high visibility programs were broken out as separate activities within Research and Development. Among these Programs and Initiatives is N-PACTA, Nonproliferation, Arms Control, and Threat Assessment. N-PACTA is a relatively small activity, $11.7 million in FY 1994 and $6.4 million in FY 1995, but because of the high priority the Congress and the President are placing on nonproliferation activities we have chosen to highlight it. The activities collected within this category are not duplicative of the activities funded within the Materials Support and Other Defense Programs account. Rather, they are concentrated around nuclear weapons design-specific engineering and technology concepts and issues, and therefore a part of the R&D budget. In general, these activities are activities which are captured by the Department's Nonproliferation crosscut but which do not fall under the purview of the Office of NonProliferation and National Security because the requirement for these activities is driven by the.needs of the U.S. stockpile, as opposed to the need to monitor non-U.S. weapons activities. Specifically, the activities within the N-PACTA category either are activities that are necessary for the Weapons Research and Development program to meet its responsibilities and fit under a broad definition of nonproliferation, such as international device design assessments, military implication assessments, and limited R&D efforts to guard against technology surprise; or they are efforts in support of the Department's treaty negotiation efforts which utilize the weapons program's unique talents and capabilities, such as technical support for the nuclear test talks. In no case does this category support activities which should be, or are, funded through the Materials Support and Other Defense Programs account which is primarily involved in the monitoring of non-U.S. weapons stockpile activities. .................. CHANGE IN FOCUS OF VERIFICATION AND CONTROL TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM SINCE THE BREAKUP OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION Mr. Bevill. How has the focus of this program changed since the breakup of the former Soviet Union? Dr. Keliher. As a result of the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, the Verification and Control Technology Program has shifted its focus from the verification of arms control agreements primarily with the USSR to activities to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction on a global scale. The threat of proliferation had always existed, but events of the past few years have brought the subject to the top of the arms control agenda. With the collapse of Communism and the break-up of the former Soviet bloc, we can confront the ambitions which fuel proliferation not through the prism of Cold War alliances, but through the examination of regional tensions which cause such ambitions. The program has adapted significantly to confront the proliferation threat from successor states of the former Soviet Union themselves, which has resulted from decades of militarized economies and is worsened now by economic hard times. As a result, the program has extended its training programs to encourage consolidation of residual nuclear weapons and materials in Russia and to help selected states of the former Soviet Union develop improved nuclear material control and accountability and export control systems. These new types of assistance were initiated through intensive diplomatic bilateral dialogue in 1992, approximately one year after the dissolution of the U.S.S.R.. As such, the focus of this assistance program to enhance or establish national export control and nuclear material and accountability systems in all of the former republics has remained constant, with workplan adjustments found primarily in funding levels and project priorities as articulated by each recipient country, (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan). In addition, since the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., the program has been active in the effort to establish the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Russia and the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU) and to facilitate direct U.S.-Russian Laboratory-to-Laboratory interactions. The purpose of these three activities is to provide non-weapons collaborative research projects to former Soviet weapons scientists to prevent "brain drain" to proliferant states. It should be mentioned that technical support for negotiations to verify arms control agreements with the primary successor state of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal, Russia, remains a high priority in the Verification and Control Technology Program. Partly a nonproliferation and partly an arms control measure, the U.S. purchase of 500 metric tons of Russia highly-enriched uranium and its corresponding revenue-sharing agreement with Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan continue to be subject for negotiation and supported by the program. Transparency measures between the U.S. and the Russians have been agreed upon to ensure that HEU being purchased is actually derived from dismantled nuclear weapons. The program also supports negotiation of transparency measures relating to the entire nuclear weapon dismantlement process. The program is now exploring new technology Which will allow our dismantlement process at Pantex to be more transparent without revealing sensitive nuclear weapon design information. The program has supported efforts to provide more direct assistance to the Russians on dismantlement., including assistance for the design of a storage facility for fissile material derived from dismantled weapons. ................... TREATIES Mr. Bevill. Please provide a list of treaties under negotiation and anticipated treaties through the 1990's in which DOE will be involved. Dr. Keliher. DOE is involved in support of treaties, agreements, and reciprocal unilateral initiatives either under negotiation or anticipated. Treaties that are in effect include: - Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) (awaiting Ukrainian ratification) - Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II) (awaiting both U.S. and Russian ratification) - Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) - Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty - Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) - Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) - Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) - Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty - Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) - Bilateral U.S./Russian Chemical Weapons Destruction Agreement (awaiting both U.S. and Russian signature) - Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) - Wyoming MOU and BOA - Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty - Open Skies Treaty Treaties and agreements that are under negotiation include: - Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty - Chemical Weapons Convention Preparatory Commission - African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaties, agreements, and initiatives we expect to come to fruition through the 1990's include: - Global Ban on the Production of Fissionable Material for Nuclear Weapons Purposes - U.S. voluntary offer to place fissile materials no longer needed for nuclear deterrence under international safeguards ............... IMPACT OF PROPOSED DECLASSIFICATION Mr. Bevill. How has the proposed declassification of some of the U.S. nuclear weapons and nuclear materials information impacted this program? Dr. Keliher. There have been no impacts to date. IMPACT OF THE ARREST OF A SUSPECTED SPY Mr. Bevill. Has the arrest of a suspected spy at the CIA impacted this program? Dr. Keliher. The arrest of the CIA employee and the subsequent media coverage has made the foreign intelligence service threat message more credible to DOE employees and contractors. While the end of the Cold War caused many employees to become skeptical concerning the existence of an espionage threat, employees are now more receptive to the message of the Department's counterintelligence awareness program. No other impacts have been observed. INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT ON CLASSIFIED INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL ACCESS WORK-FOR-OTHERS PROJECTS Mr. Bevill. The Inspector General issued a report criticizing the Department's classified intelligence and special access work-for-others projects. What steps has the Department taken to address these concerns? Dr. Keliher. The Office of Nonproliferation and National Security has coordinated a Departmental position and Action Plan to implement the Inspector General's recommendations. The Departmental position concurs with the 46 Inspector General recommendations. All recommendations have been accepted and assigned Target Completion Dates. Eleven recommendations have already been implemented. PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS Mr. Bevill. What performance measures can be used to measure the effectiveness of intelligence programs? Dr. Keliher. There are four primary measures of the effectiveness of intelligence programs: "timeliness, accuracy, impact," and the "cost/benefit ratio." For strategic warning and finished intelligence, the measures should be applied to the products each program produces. For current intelligence, the measures should be applied to the aggregated function. "Timeliness" addresses the receipt by the customer in time to influence a targeted decision. "Accuracy" examines whether the correct issue was addressed in the analysis; if the appropriate analytic approach was applied; if the research appears to be exhaustive and if appropriate data was located and incorporated; and, if the answer was correct (if validated by events). "Impact" measures the level of influence the product had on a customer's decision, asking if actions were taken that otherwise would not have been and assessing the outcomes of those actions. "Cost to benefit ratio" addresses whether or not the impact (benefit) justifies the cost. ........... SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY THREAT POLICY Mr. Bevill. Please describe the current threat assessment. Have any DOE facilities experienced any threat in the past five years that approaches the threat guidance now in effect? Dr. Keliher. The current Department of Energy (DOE) threat policy is founded on a January 31, 1992, DOE/Department of Defense, (DOD) "Memorandum of Agreement on the Security Threats to DOE and DOD Nuclear Weapons Programs and Facilities." The Memorandum of Agreement was based on a Defense Intelligence Agency review of worldwide threats to United States Government interests. The 'Design Basis Threat Policy for Department of Energy Programs and Facilities" dated July 28, 1993 describes a spectrum of threats to DOE Programs and activities ranging from terrorist threats to Departmental nuclear weapons and production programs to the threats posed by criminals, psychotics, radical environmentalists, foreign agents, and other insiders. The Design Basis Threat Policy, classified Confidential, National Security Information, provides guidance on the characteristics of the various threats types and describes the capabilities of the adversary. The Design Basis Threat Policy also describes Safeguards and Security Program strategies for addressing the threat spectrum. It requires the development of site specific considerations in mitigating threats. The Office of Security Affairs performs an annual review of the threat policy for validity and currency. The current policy replaces an April 1, 1992 version. These revisions replaced the 1983 Generic Threat Statement. Both the April 1992 and July 1993 versions are consistent with the January 1992 interagency Memorandum of Agreement. Currently, the Office of Security Affairs is working with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to draft a document similar to the 1992 agreement with the Department of Defense. A review of incidents at DOE facilities since 1990 indicates that several events categorized as insider threat activity have occurred. These incidents vary from tampering with systems, vandalism and threats directed against other personnel. A series of incidents at one facility were believed to have been caused by disgruntled employees resulting from labor/management disputes. Because of the significant insider controls, these incidents were quickly identified, investigated and resolved with no significant negative or adverse impact to the safeguard and security systems of the facility or the public's health and safety. These incidents were referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for further action. Threats of violence to individuals have occurred at several DOE facilities. To the best of our knowledge, however, none have been carried out. There are also clear indications that the Department continues to be actively targeted by foreign interests in the areas of nuclear proliferation and advance technology.- The Department maintains active security and counter intelligence programs that protect against such threats. There have been no incidents of terrorism directed at DOE facilities. There is a growing concern for terrorism in the United States, particularly in light of the World Trade Center terrorist bombing. The ability and readiness of safeguards and security programs at field and Headquarters facilities to detect and respond to terrorist events continues to be frequently tested and certainly provides a deterrence to any group considering such an act. One of the objective's of the program is to provide a high degree of assurance of the programs' ability to successfully respond to the spectrum of threats to include terrorism. The strategy to guard against threats to facilities emphasizes providing a high degree of assurance of a capability to detect, assess, delay, and inhibit unauthorized access to nuclear materials, nuclear weapons, and nuclear weapons design information. Safeguards and security measures are also designed to prevent acts of sabotage. THREATS TO DOE FACILITIES Mr. Bevill. What is the most likely threat to DOE facilities and what is the least likely? Dr. Keliher. Notwithstanding the 1993 World Trade Center bombing attack, terrorist acts directed against DOE programs and facilities, while potentially resulting in catastrophic consequences, are the least likely to occur partly due to the,deterrence in place. The threat posed by cleared and authorized insiders is perhaps the most likely and includes theft of material and equipment, espionage and sabotage. The threat posed by insiders is also potentially exacerbated by the current downsizing of some Departmental programs, as well as other major changes in our programs. Some Departmental locations have also been targeted by anti-nuclear and/or radical environmental extremist groups. Those actions have resulted in demonstrations, acts of civil disobedience and trespass. DECLASSIFICATION EFFORT Mr. Bevill. Please describe the current effort to declassify information including the funding for each year and milestones. Dr. Keliher. As a followup to the Secretary's December 7, 1993 press conference, the Office of Declassification issued a second call for information declassification proposals at the end of December 1993. The first joint DOE/DOD meeting to discuss these new proposed declassifications was completed on March 3. A new call will be issued for additional information declassification proposals by July 1994. Additionally, we are involved in a comprehensive, fundamental review of DOE classification policy to determine what information is still truly sensitive and requires protection. This review is scheduled to be completed within 12 months after initiation. To assist in accomplishing this review, four additional full-time employees and four additional contractor support personnel have been selected and should be on the job within the next 45 days. This policy review will be followed by a review and revision of DOE classification guidance, scheduled to be completed at the end of one additional year. This classification guidance consists of detailed instructions describing what is classified and is used as the basis for the declassification review of documents. To accelerate the review and declassification of documents, additional derivative declassifies must be trained. Therefore, a substantial increase in the number of authorized derivative declassifies required to support this initiative in the field are in the process of being trained (as many as 300 more). Each authorized derivative declassifier must attend a training course conducted by DOE Headquarters. Funding for the declassifies is not included in this budget request; they are funded by the program offices. In addition, there will be a substantial increase in the number of Headquarters Office of Declassification Federal positions as well as support contractors who will require training as derivative declassifies. Current program expectations for declassifying documents in the following areas are as follows: Responses to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Requests - At the end of FY 1993, the backlog in FOIA classified documents was approximately 2 years. By the end of FY 1994, provided the public demand for access does not increase, the backlog should be reduced to 18 months, and by the end of FY 1995 and future years the backlog should be less than 1 year. Support to Declassify Historical Documents at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) - In FY 1994, we will hire and train six qualified document reviewers. By mid-March 1994, we plan to have an average of three document reviewers to directly support NARA in the review of DOE and predecessor agency documents. During FY 1995, the target is to support NARA with six fully qualified and trained document reviewers. Other Document Reviews (includes documents involved in litigation, congressional testimony, draft documents intended for public release, etc.) Maintain the close support of operational needs of our clients. Funding to support the information declassification initiative is as follows: FY 1994 - $5,900,000 and FY 1995 $6,536,000. CENTRAL TRAINING ACADEMY OPERATING COSTS Mr. Bevill. What is the total cost of operating the Central. Training Academy and the FTEs in FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY 1995? Are funds provided from any sources other than this budget? Dr. Keliher. The costs for the Central Training Academy (CTA) are as follows: FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995 (In Thousands of Dollars) Program $ 7,323 $ 7,933 $ 8,867 Program Direction/Other Services 393* 700 709 Total Central Training Academy $ 7,716 $ 8,633 $ 9,576 FTEs 5 5 5 *In FY 1993, the funding for Program Direction was provided by the Weapons Production and Surveillance budget. In FY 1994, Program Direction funding increases due to the funding of janitorial services and costs associated with replacement of mechanical systems. In addition to the above funding, CTA receives approximately $200,000 annually from other Departmental programs to cover CTA staff travel and adjunct costs related to specially requested Mobile Training Team activities. These Mobile Training Teams are in addition to normally scheduled and budgeted CTA classes. Since the establishment of the CTA, the Albuquerque Operations Office has provided funding for CTA's rent, electricity, etc. (it is estimated that approximately $500,000 is expended annually). In FY 1993, the CTA received $2,000,000 in General Plant Project funding. The CTA in FY 1994 and FY 1995 has zero General Plant Project funding. GUARD OVERTIME COSTS Mr. Bevill. There have been reports of excessive overtime costs for guards at several facilities. Can you discuss this issue? Dr. Keliher. Based upon data from the Rocky Flats Operations Office, there are indications that protective force personnel at this location are working excessive overtime hours based upon existing protective force contract allowances. Based on Fiscal Year 1992 data, in some instances, the annual wage of an armed guard is supplemented in excess of 90 percent by overtime compensation. Based upon data compilation, information analysis, and research by Department of Energy Headquarters staff personnel and an independent research group, the following working hour guidelines are being examined to help standardize duty hour application: - No more than 12 total hours worked per continuous 24 hour period, inclusive of shift change briefings and uniform and equipment outfitting. - No more than 60 total hours worked per seven day week. These guidelines are intended as a tool that can assist managers and contract officers in future negotiations dealing with protective forces. It is believed that cost savings can be realized from the enactment of these guidelines. RESOURCE REVIEW INITIATIVES Mr. Bevill. Describe the actions taken to date to reduce Department-wide Safeguards and Security (S&S) costs. Dr. Keliher. In fiscal year 1993, DOE mandated a complex-wide S&S resource review designed to identify opportunities for program savings while ensuring appropriate and effective security for DOE assets and personnel. This effort was coordinated by the Office of Security Affairs. This effort identified over 400 cost saving initiatives. These initiatives offer a potential estimated cost-savings of approximately $200M in FY 1995 when compared to the original FY 1992 cost estimate for complex-wide expenditures of $1.2B. Estimated complex-wide S&S expenditures for FY 1995 are approximately $62M below actual FY 1993 expenditures. In addition to the 400 specific initiatives submitted by the Operations Offices, the Office of Security Affairs resource review identified consolidation of special nuclear materials as a significant opportunity for resource savings. Examples are: - fewer hardened storage facilities. - reduced equipment and accountability requirements. - smaller number of protective force personnel. The Office of Security Affairs has instituted measures to assure the continuation of an ongoing system to identify and pursue cost saving activities. SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY CROSSCUT Mr. Bevill. Provide a crosscut by location of all Safeguards and Security funding throughout the Department for FY 1993, FY 1994 and FY 1995. Dr. Keliher. The following information is provided: DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY FY 1995 Congressional Budget Safeguards and Security Crosscut Estimates BY FACILITY (in thousands) FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995 Organization/Facility Actuals Estimate Request ---------------------------------------- --------- --------- -------- Albuquerque Albuquerque Direct 83,911 86,676 85,954 Allied (Kansas City) 6,994 7,516 6,203 Central Training Academy 9,186 8,857 9,639 Grand Junction Project Off. 932 1,055 1,091 Los Alamos Natl. Lab. 66,934 74,385 74,677 Mound 8,603 6,885 5,673 Pantex 34,356 56,284 54,858 Pinellas 4,974 4,450 1,523 Rocky Flats 76,661 75,129 65,820 Sandia Natl. Lab. 52,768 64,443 63,452 --------- -------- --------- Total, Albuquerque 344,629 385,680 368,890 Chicago Chicago Direct 1,493 1,445 1,532 Ames Natl. Lab. 448 215 223 Argonne Natl. Lab. 13,390 14,098 14,839 Brookhaven Natl. Lab. 7,016 7,518 7,766 Fermi National Lab. 2,065 2,365 3,351 New Brunswick Lab. 4,253 4,215 4,295 Princeton Plasma Physics Lab. 1,213 1,212 1,291 --------- -------- --------- Total, Chicago 29,878 31,068 33,297 National Renewable Energy Laboratory 675 1,000 1,049 Superconducting Super Collider 1,300 1,400 1,446 Idaho 40,093 39,141 43,148 Nevada 68,434 73,083 67,081 Naval Petroleum Reserves 1,180 1,245 1,269 Oak Ridge Oak Ridge 24,271 25,975 25,952 Cont. Electron Beam Accelerator Fac. 330 345 355 FERMCO 3,025 2,788 2,644 Oak Ridge Institute for Sci. & Ed. 851 714 925 Oak Ridge Natl. Lab. 6,950 7,726 7,304 Paducah Gaseous Diffusion 11,560 3,888 1,323 Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion 22,532 22,059 10,463 Y- 12 40,905 27,921 29,344 --------- -------- -------- Total Oak Ridge 110,424 91,416 78,310 Pittsburgh Naval Reactors 12,342 12,223 10,774 File Name: BYSITE95.WK3 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY FY 1995 Congressional Budget Safeguards and Security Crosscut Estimates BY FACILITY (in thousands) FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995 Organization/Facility Actuals Estimate Request -------------------------------------- --------- ---------- --------- Richland 60,865 56,311 39,693 San Francisco San Francisco (Oakland Ops Office) 8,014 7,617 8,158 Lawrence Livermore Natl, Lab. 37,370 34,842 35,177 Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory 1,137 1,033 1,062 Stanford Linear Accelerator 834 812 852 --------- --------- --------- Total, San Francisco 47,355 44,304 45,249 Savannah River 140,331 110,781 125,567 Schenectady Naval Reactors 13,208 13,534 14,182 Bartlesville Project Office 61 232 239 Office of Scientific & Tech. Infor. 635 725 760 Strategic Petroleum Reserve Off. 19,468 16,801 16,250 Western Area Power Admin. 870 870 890 Morgantown Energy Tech. Ctr. 499 725 529 Pittsburgh Energy Tech. Ctr. 1,600 1,600 1,515 Headquarters 101,640 93,629 83,012 --------- -------- ------- Total DOE Safeguards & Security 995,487 975,768 933,150 File Name:BYSITE95.WK3 GUARD FORCE SIZE AND EXPENDITURE Mr. Bevill. Please provide a table showing the size of guard forces and expenditures for guard forces by location for FY 1993, FY 1994 and FY 1995. Dr. Keliher. The following information is provided: ****PROTECTIVE FORCES LEVELS AND OPERATING BUDGETS chart is attached to original document**** ADDITIONAL SUPPORT DETAIL Mr. Bevill. Please provide a breakdown of the specific tasks and funding associated with the "Additional Support" activity in FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY 1995. Dr. Keliher. The "Additional Support" breakdown is as follows: ADDITIONAL SUPPORT TASKS AND FUNDING (In Thousands of Dollars) FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995 Chicago Field Office S&S Staff $ 1,445 $ 1,503 $ 1,532 Headquarters Physical Security Upgrade Technical Assistance 313 313 313 Technical Support to Headquarters and Field Assistance 2,825 3,054 2,946 Support Services Contracts 7,174 9,165 7,695 AOSS Modernization 0 900 1,200 Maintenance of HQ Security Alarm 0 290 350 Total Additional Support $11,757 $15,225 $14,036 Security Investigations SECURITY CLEARANCE REDUCTIONS Mr. Bevill. What attempts are being made to reduce the number and level of clearances throughout the Department? Dr. Keliher. As a result of the general downsizing of classified activities within the Department, particularly in the nuclear weapons program, the number of active security clearances were reduced during the interval of April 1993 to March 1994 from about 166,000 to about 154,000. Additional reductions will be realized again this year consistent with the national laboratories' direction to eliminate corporate policies that require all employees to be cleared as a condition of employment at a Department of Energy owned site. As in the past year, the Department's contractor employees will be processed for a DOE clearance only when such an action can be justified based upon the duties of the employee's position. Efforts continue at DOE contractor sites to consolidate classified and special nuclear material inventories, which will result in the need for fewer clearances by their employees. SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS - STATISTICS Mr. Bevill. Provide by field office and facility the number and types of clearances held by DOE employees, contractors, and other Federal employees in FY 1993 and FY 1994. Dr. Keliher. There are just under 154,000 clearances currently held by DOE Employees, contractors, and other Federal employees. Current information will be provided for the record. ****CLEARANCE STATISTICS FOR FY 1994 chart is attached to original document**** PERSONNEL CLEARANCE PROGRAM Mr. Bevill. How will the change in mission at Rocky Flats, Mound and Pinellas impact the number of security clearances in FY 1995? Dr. Keliher. I would like to submit the following information for the record. - Rocky Flats. Mission change will have very little impact in FY 1995 due to the continued need to consolidate material and classified matter. - Mound. Mission change will result in the downgrading of a significant portion of the work force from "Q" to "L" but current estimates do not indicate that the total number of security clearances will be affected. - Pinellas. Mission changes will result in a 25 percent reduction in the number of security clearances in FY 1995 (400 clearances). SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS BUDGET Mr. Bevill. What were the number, by type and performing agency, of investigations and reinvestigations performed for FY 1993, FY 1994, and FY 1995? Describe the reasons for the increases or decreases. Dr. Keliher. The following data on investigations and reinvestigations is inserted for the record: (The information follows:) INVESTIGATIONS AND REINVESTIGATIONS FY 1993 FY 1994 FY 1995 ACTUAL ESTIMATED REQUEST FBI Initial Investigations 21 18 15 OPM Initial Investigations Single Scope Background 9,456 7,144 4,600 Background 45 50 50 Limited Background 936 550 300 OPM Reinvestigations Periodic - Single Scope 13,517 16,978 13,345 Limited Background 7,809 0 0 OPM National Agency Checks Initial 3,551 5,210 5,500 Reinvestigations 5,460 7,635 7,900 TOTAL INVESTIGATIONS 40,895 37,585 31,710 FBI investigations have decreased as that agency is now being used strictly for initial investigations for individuals who occupy positions of a high degree of importance or sensitivity (150 positions have such designations within the Department). The number of Single Scope Background Investigations (SSBI's) continues to decline as the Department emphasizes the need to reduce the number and levels of DOE access authorizations to a minimum consistent with operating requirements. OPM Background Investigations (BI's) decreased beginning in FY 1993 when the SSBI became available. Currently a BI is only conducted on DOE employees who occupy critical sensitive positions, but do not require access to classified material in order to perform their official duties. OPM Limited Background Investigations (LBI's) conducted for reinvestigations have been discontinued as a result of the adoption of the Periodic Reinvestigation - Single Scope Background Investigation (PRIS) in December 1992. LBI's are currently used only for initial L and Secret clearances for DOE employees or if the PRIS must be expanded due to special circumstances. OPM National Agency Checks with Credit (NACC) will increase as the need for the number of initial Q clearances is reduced. PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAM Mr. Bevill. Describe the effort to develop an electronic transfer program for security clearances, including the timetable for completion and cost by year. Dr. Keliher. The current time between the DOE request for a background investigation and receipt of the completed product from the investigative agency (Office of Personnel Management (OPM)) is approximately 75 days. However, depending on the geographic location, it takes another 15 to 30 days in mail time to send and receive the case papers and completed investigation. This project will implement an electronic transfer system (including appropriate safeguards of data) between each of the DOE Operations Offices and the OPM's Office of Federal Investigations in Boyers, Pennsylvania, which will allow DOE to electronically transfer the paperwork requesting a background investigation (including fingerprints) to OPM, and when the background investigation is completed, to have it electronically transferred to the appropriate DOE Operations Office for adjudication. This will also allow transfer of security files between DOE Operations Offices. The electronic transfer system will eliminate the mail time between DOE and OPM. The FY 1995 Security Investigations budget includes $2,200,000 for this project. SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS BUDGET, Mr. Bevill. Provide an analysis of security investigation programs showing the funds for defense and other than defense programs. Dr. Keliher. There is approximately a 50/50 split of the FY 1995 Security Investigations budget allocation between defense and other than defense activities, as shown below in the table which I would like to insert into the record. (The information follows:) SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS FY 1995 Defense/Environmental Activities $19,801,770 Other than Defense/Environmental 19,025,230 Total SI Budget 38,827,000 Use of Prior-Year-Funds -4,000,000 FY 1995 REQUEST $34,827,000 SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS BUDGET Mr. Bevill. Provide a breakout, by activity, of the $3.6 million requested for Related Security Investigations Activities. Dr. Keliher. The breakout of our request for Related Security Investigations Activities is shown on a table which I would like to insert in the record. (The information follows:) RELATED SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITIES FY 1995 Electronic Transfer Program $2,200,000 Implementation of Accelerated Access Authorization Program (AAAP) 1,300,000 National Industrial Security Program (NISP) support 50,000 TOTAL - Related SI Activities $3,550,000 ............... ABILITY TO CARRY OUT MISSION Mr. Myers. Dr. Keliher, your request for intelligence activities is decreased by $2.3 million from the 1994 level of $45.4 million. What impact will this decrease have on your ability to carry out your mission? Dr. Keliher. The FY 1995 Request will enable the Office of Nonproliferation and National Security to meet its intelligence responsibilities to the Department in its objectives of ensuring the continued credibility of the Nation's nuclear deterrent, assessing conditions that pose a nuclear threat, and executing its responsibilities for nonproliferation., Although the FY 1995 Request is about five percent below our current year funding level, I am confident that we can fulfill our intelligence responsibilities within expected fiscal constraints by satisfying high priority Departmental intelligence needs through effective interaction with the intelligence Community. SECURITY CLEARANCE REDUCTIONS/CLASSIFIED INFORMATION Mr. Myers. Is your decrease in requested funding for security clearances due to less information needing to be.classified? Are you still doing updates on existing clearances? Dr. Keliher. No, the FY 1995 request is not lower due to less information being classified. Information declassification involves declassifying the facts, data, or knowledge itself. We are involved in a comprehensive, fundamental review of the Department of Energy's classification policy. The decrease is a result of reduced numbers of clearance requirements, facility consolidation efforts, low turnover rates, and elimination of the reinvestigations backlog. The Department is continuing to do updates (reinvestigations) on existing clearances. DECLASSIFICATION FUNDING Mr. Myers: Is any of the funding for nuclear safeguards and security activities being used to declassify material? If so, how much? Dr. Keliher: Funds within the nuclear safeguards and security budget which directly support the declassification of material are as follows: FY 1994 $5,900,000 and FY 1995 $6,536,000.