Union Calendar No. 235
104th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - House Report 104-486
NATIONAL DRUG POLICY: A REVIEW OF THE STATUS OF THE DRUG WAR
__________
SEVENTH REPORT
by the
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT
together with
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>
March 19, 1996.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT
WILLIAM F. CLINGER, Jr.,
Pennsylvania, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
DAN BURTON, Indiana
J. DENNIS HASTERT, Illinois
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
WILLIAM H. ZELIFF, Jr., New
Hampshire
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
STEPHEN HORN, California
JOHN L. MICA, Florida
PETER BLUTE, Massachusetts
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia
DAVID M. McINTOSH, Indiana
JON D. FOX, Pennsylvania
RANDY TATE, Washington
DICK CHRYSLER, Michigan
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
WILLIAM J. MARTINI, New Jersey
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona
MICHAEL PATRICK FLANAGAN, Illinois
CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South
Carolina
CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois ROBERT L. EHRLICH, Jr., Maryland
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
TOM LANTOS, California
ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN M. SPRATT, Jr., South Carolina
LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER, New York
PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
GARY A. CONDIT, California
COLLIN C. PETERSON, Minnesota
KAREN L. THURMAN, Florida
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin
BARBARA-ROSE COLLINS, Michigan
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of Columbia
JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia
GENE GREEN, Texas
CARRIE P. MEEK, Florida
CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
BILL BREWSTER, Oklahoma
TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania
------ ------
------
BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont (Independent)
James L. Clarke, Staff Director
Kevin Sabo, General Counsel
Jane Cobb, Professional Staff
Member
Judith McCoy, Chief Clerk
Bud Myers, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal
Justice
WILLIAM H. ZELIFF, Jr., New
Hampshire, Chairman
ROBERT L. EHRLICH, Jr., Maryland
STEVEN SCHIFF, New Mexico
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
JOHN L. MICA, Florida
PETER BLUTE, Massachusetts
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
KAREN L. THURMAN, Florida JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona
ROBERT E. WISE, Jr., West Virginia
TOM LANTOS, California
LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER, New York
GARY A. CONDIT, California
BILL K. BREWSTER, Oklahoma
------ ------
Ex Officio
WILLIAM F. CLINGER, Jr.,
CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois Pennsylvania
Robert Charles, Staff Director
Sean Littlefield, Professional
Staff Member
Robert Shea, Professional Staff
Member
Sally Dionne, Clerk
Cherri Branson, Minority
Professional Staff
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC, March 19, 1996.
Hon. Newt Gingrich,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Speaker: By direction of the Committee on
Government Reform and Oversight, I submit herewith the
committee's seventh report to the 104th Congress.
William F. Clinger, Jr., Chairman.
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
I. Summary, Oversight Findings and Recommendations..................1
A. Introduction.......................................... 1
B. Overview of Investigation............................. 3
C. Committee Findings.................................... 5
D. Committee Recommendations............................. 7
II. Report on the Committee's Oversight Review......................11
A. Background............................................ 11
B. Proceedings of the Subcommittee on National Security,
International Affairs, and Criminal Justice.......... 15
1. March 9, 1995, Hearing.......................... 15
a. Purpose and Panels.......................... 15
b. Summary of Findings......................... 15
c. Subcommittee Chairman's Introduction........ 16
d. Testimony of First Lady Nancy Reagan........ 16
e. Testimony of John P. Walters................ 18
f. Testimony of William J. Bennett............. 22
g. Testimony of Robert C. Bonner............... 23
h. Testimony of Dr. Lee P. Brown............... 26
i. Testimony of Admiral Paul Yost.............. 31
j. Testimony of Thomas Hedrick, Jr............. 32
k. Testimony of G. Bridget Ryan................ 34
l. Testimony of James Copple................... 35
m. Testimony of Charles Robert Heard, III...... 35
2. April 6, 1995, Hearing.......................... 36
a. Subcommittee Chairman's Introduction........ 36
b. Interdiction: The Kramek Letter Revisited... 37
c. Interdiction In General..................... 38
d. Source Country Programs..................... 40
e. Prevention In General....................... 41
f. Prevention and Accountability............... 41
g. Shift to Treatment.......................... 43
h. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network........ 44
i. White House Drug Use........................ 44
j. Surgeon General and Legalization............ 44
k. Subcommittee Chairman's Closing Remarks..... 45
3. June 27, 1995, Hearing.......................... 45
a. Testimony of DEA Administrator Thomas A.
Constantine................................ 46
b. Testimony of GAO's Director-in-Charge of
International Affairs, Joseph Kelley, and
GAO Investigators, Allan Fleener and Ron
Noyes...................................... 47
c. Testimony of Acting Assistant Secretary of
State for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs, Jane E. Becker........ 49
d. Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Drug Enforcement and Support
Brian Sheridan............................. 49
4. June 28, 1995, Hearing.......................... 50
a. Testimony of U.S. Interdiction Coordinator
and U.S. Coast Guard Commandant Admiral
Robert E. Kramek........................... 50
b. Testimony of the Commissioner of U.S.
Customs George Weise....................... 51
5. September 25, 1995, Hearing..................... 52
a. Background on the Problem, How Community
United, and the Interagency Task Force..... 52
b. State Attorney General Jeff Howard Credits
Effective Coordination, Drug Task Force,
and Byrne Grants........................... 53
c. Director of State Office of Alcohol and Drug
Abuse Prevention Geraldine Sylvester Urged
Prevention, Treatment, Student Assistance,
Parental Training and Peer Counseling...... 53
d. Commissioner of the State Department of
Corrections Paul Brodeur Urged Support for
Byrne Grants, Correctional Pathways Program 53
e. State Narcotics Investigation Unit's
Assistant Commander Neal Scott Explained
Usage Breakdown, Urged Local Flexibility... 54
f. DEA Special-Agent-In-Charge Billy Yout
Explained Recent Trends, Concurred in
Support for Prevention, Law Enforcement.... 54
g. Manchester Mayor Ray Wieczorek Testified on
the Importance of Public Sector-Private
Sector Cooperation......................... 54
h. Manchester Police Chief Peter Favreau
Explained Multi-Agency Effort and How
Operation Streetsweeper Succeeded.......... 54
i. United States Attorney Paul Gagnon Discussed
Cooperation and Funding.................... 55
j. Citizen Groups Represented by Alice Sutphen
Urged Community Action..................... 55
k. Dover Police Captain Dana Mitchell Urged
support for D.A.R.E. and Law Enforcement's
Role in Prevention......................... 55
l. Executive Director of Nashua Youth Council
Michael Plourde Urged Community Need
Assessment Prior to Receipt of Federal
Funds...................................... 56
m. Marathon House Regional Director John Ahman
Urged Support for Effective Treatment...... 56
n. Manchester Police Sergeant Dick Tracy Urged
Strong Support for D.A.R.E. Program........ 56
C. Fact-Finding Trip to Transit Zone..................... 56
1. OPBAT Operations Need Resources................. 57
2. Aerostat Radars Were Deterrent.................. 57
3. Cuba Creates Overflight and Maritime Constraints 57
4. Puerto Rico: Drug Gateway, Assets Needed........ 58
5. Joint Interagency Task Force--East.............. 58
D. Interdiction Policy Oversight......................... 59
1. Interdiction From 1984-1990..................... 59
2. Clinton's Cuts In Drug Interdiction............. 60
a. ONDCP Interdiction Budget Cuts.............. 60
b. Assets Lost According to Admiral Yost....... 60
c. ONDCP Strategy Confirms Specific Reductions. 61
d. Field Representatives Confirm Assets Lost
and Explain Impact......................... 61
e. USIC Memorandum Confirms Assets Lost........ 62
f. Additional Expert Testimony Confirms Assets
Lost....................................... 62
g. Admiral Kramek's December 1994 Letter to
Drug Czar Lee Brown Confirms Assets Lost,
And Interdiction Coordinator's Unsuccessful
Efforts to Restore......................... 64
h. Admiral Kramek's June 1995 Testimony
Underscore's Interdiction's Importance and
the Missing Priority....................... 64
i. Testimony Of Drug Czar Lee Brown Confirms
Low Priority on Interdiction............... 65
j. No Heroin Strategy Until November 1995...... 65
k. GAO Reports Serious Deficiencies in Clinton
Administration Source Country Programs..... 66
l. Bottom National Security Priority........... 66
m. Only Six Staff for Nation's Interdiction
Coordinator, and No Supply Side Deputy
Director of ONDCP.......................... 66
n. ONDCP Has No Deputy for Supply Reduction.... 66
o. ONDCP Staff And Budget Gutted--Not Restored. 67
p. Conclusions on Interdiction Policy.......... 67
3. The Implications of Reduced Interdiction........ 67
a. Lower Prices, Higher Availability and Purity 67
b. Exploding Casual Use by Youth............... 68
c. Increasing Drug Related Juvenile Crime...... 69
d. Nature of Juvenile Drug Use Changing Toward
Addiction.................................. 70
e. Drug Emergencies At Record Level............ 70
f. Foreign Perceptions of U.S. Commitment
Altered By Clinton Reductions.............. 70
E. Source Country Programs Oversight..................... 71
1. The ``Controlled Shift''........................ 71
2. GAO Study of Clinton's Source Country Programs.. 72
3. Admiral Kramek's View in December 1994 of the
Source Country Programs........................ 72
4. Invitations Rejected By the President's National
Security Advisor and By the President.......... 72
5. Conclusions on Source Country Programs.......... 73
F. Prevention Programs Oversight......................... 74
1. Prevention is Central to Drug War............... 75
a. Interdiction Experts Agree.................. 75
b. The Partnership For a Drug-Free America
Explains Broad Effectiveness of Drug
Prevention................................. 75
c. The BEST Foundation Describes Differences
Between Validated and Unvalidated
Prevention Programs........................ 76
d. Community Antidrug Coalitions of America
(CADCA) Favors Renewed National Leadership
And Accountable, Well-Funded Drug
Prevention................................. 77
e. Texans' War on Drugs Program Favors Renewed
Presidential Leadership, Possible
Separation of Prevention and Treatment, And
Block Grant of Unified Agency for
Prevention Programs........................ 77
f. New Hampshire Experts Urge Support for Byrne
Grants, Attention to Prevention, Treatment,
Correctional Programs...................... 78
2. Media Have a Key Role........................... 78
3. Accountability Concerns Are Serious,
Specifically In Safe and Drug Free Schools Act
Monies......................................... 78
4. Presidential Leadership Missing................. 81
5. Fact-Finding Trip With Director of ONDCP........ 81
6. Conclusions on Prevention Policy................ 81
G. Treatment Programs Oversight.......................... 82
1. Background: Treatment Needed in Drug War........ 82
2. Administration Shift to Treatment............... 82
3. Contrary to ONDCP Assertions, Treatment Funding
Grew in Past Strategies........................ 83
4. Treatment Limitations: Bureaucracy.............. 83
5. Treatment Limitations: Effectiveness............ 83
6. The June 1994 RAND Treatment Study: A Poor Basis
For National Drug Policy....................... 84
7. Treatment Conclusions........................... 86
III. Conclusions and Recommendations.................................87
A. Conclusions........................................... 87
B. Recommendations....................................... 89
VIEWS
Additional views of Hon. Karen L. Thurman, Hon. Henry A. Waxman,
Hon. Tom Lantos, Hon. Robert E. Wise, Jr., Hon. Major R. Owens,
Hon. Edolphus Towns, Hon. Louise McIntosh Slaughter, Hon. Paul
E. Kanjorski, Hon. Carolyn B. Maloney, Hon. Thomas M. Barrett,
Hon. Barbara-Rose Collins, Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton, Hon.
James P. Moran, Hon. Carrie P. Meek, Hon. Chaka Fattah, and
Hon. Tim Holden................................................ 94
Additional views of Hon. William H. Zeliff, Jr................... 107
Additional views of Hon. Mark Souder............................. 111
Union Calendar No. 235
104th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session 104-486
_______________________________________________________________________
NATIONAL DRUG POLICY: A REVIEW OF THE STATUS OF THE DRUG WAR
_______
March 19, 1996.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______________________________________________________________________
Mr. Clinger, from the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight,
submitted the following
SEVENTH REPORT
together with
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
based on a study by the national security, international affairs, and
criminal justice subcommittee
On March 7, 1996, the Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight approved and adopted a report entitled ``National
Drug Policy: A Review of the Status of the Drug War.'' The
chairman was directed to transmit a copy to the Speaker of the
House.
I. Summary, Oversight Findings and Recommendations
a. introduction
The Committee on Government Reform and Oversight (``the
Committee'') has primary legislative and oversight jurisdiction
for the ``overall economy, efficiency and management of
[G]overnment operations and activities . . . and for
``[r]eorganizations in the Executive Branch of the
government.'' [Rules of the House of Representatives, 104th
Congress, X,1(g)(6) and (12).]
In addition, the Committee has primary oversight
responsibility to ``review and study, on a continuing basis,
the operation of government activities at all levels with a
view to determining their economy and efficiency.'' [Rules of
the House of Representatives, 104th Congress, X,2(b)(2).]
Finally, the Committee ``may at any time conduct investigations
of any matter without regard to the provisions . . . conferring
jurisdiction over such matter upon another standing
committee.'' [Rules of the House of Representatives, 104th
Congress, X,4(c)(2).]
Pursuant to the foregoing grants of jurisdiction, the
Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and
Criminal Justice convened five oversight hearings during 1995
to assess the status of the Nation's Federal drug control
strategy and its implementation. Specifically, the Subcommittee
examined the status of Federal interdiction, source country,
prevention and treatment programs.
Advice and recommendations were sought from top
Administration officials and preeminent outside experts. The
Subcommittee's twin aims were (a) identifying strategic and
implementation issues requiring improvement, and (b)
identifying sound recommendations for achieving measurable
improvement in combating illegal drug importation and illegal
drug use.
The Subcommittee's inquiry was driven by seven background
facts, discussed in more detail in the ``Background'' section
below. In brief, these facts are as follows.
First, drug use has been rising markedly across American
society over the past three to four years, especially among the
Nation's juvenile population. The statistics are deeply
troubling.
Second, drug use fell markedly between 1981 and at least
early 1992, following what most agree was concerted federal,
state, community and parental counter narcotics activity, as
well as strong national leadership on the issue by Presidents
Reagan and Bush, and First Lady Nancy Reagan.
Third, rising juvenile drug use and rising violent juvenile
crime are integrally related, and have tended to feed upon each
other.
Fourth, objective indicators of the overall attention being
devoted to the antidrug message by the media, national leaders,
and the President have been lower during the past several years
than at any time in recent history.
Fifth, objective indicators of Federal support for the
counter narcotics effort or the Drug War, particularly for drug
interdiction, show a substantial reduction in resources
committed to key areas. In early 1995, key budget numbers were
already clearly below the prior high water marks deemed
necessary for an effective strategy.
Sixth, the Administration's 1994 and 1995 Office of
National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) Strategies represent two
conscious shifts in policy, one toward greater drug treatment
emphasis within the demand reduction component of the strategy
and one toward greater source country program emphasis within
the supply-reduction component.
Seventh, the 1994 and 1995 White House Strategies depart
from prior White House Strategies and from the statutory
requirement of ``quantifiable goals,'' offering instead broad,
prescriptive goals, such as ``[r]educe the number of drug users
in America.'' \1\
\1\ Office of National Drug Control Strategy, National Drug Control
Strategy, February 1995, p. 53.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These seven facts compelled oversight and review of the
status of the Nation's Federal counter narcotics effort, the
Office of National Drug Control Policy, the National Drug
Control Strategy and its implementation.
b. overview of investigation
The Nation's anti-drug effort has been a long and evolving
one, spanning at least six Presidents and involving continuous
reassessments. In fact, the impact of illegal drugs on our
society has been a growing concern since the early 1970s. In
June 1971, President Nixon told Congress that a national
response to drug addiction was needed since ``the problem has
assumed the dimensions of a national emergency.'' \2\
\2\ Musto, David F., The American Disease: Origins of Narcotic
Control, p. 256 (1987).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By 1980, illegal drug use was so widespread that antidrug
parent groups such as Pride and National Family Partnership
began to form. That year, more than half of all minors surveyed
acknowledged illegal drug use.\3\
\3\ In 1979, 54 percent of youth respondents to the Monitoring the
Future Survey indicated drug use. See the 1995 Pride Report, Executive
Summary, p. 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During the early 1980's, then-First Lady Nancy Reagan
became a leader in the anti-drug, or drug abuse prevention,
movement. Nancy Reagan effectively led the campaign to educate
our Nation's youth and stem rising youth drug abuse. Her most
famous statement, ``Just Say No,'' the answer to a child's
question about how to respond if pressed to take drugs, became
the guiding phrase of the prevention movement. Unrivaled in her
energy and commitment, Nancy Reagan became the movement's chief
spokesperson. During the mid-1980's, President Reagan showed
unprecedented leadership in what soon became known as a war
against illegal drug use and those who trafficked in illegal
drugs.\4\
\4\ See ``Testimony of Admiral Paul Yost,'' supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 1986, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act,
effectively establishing the first Federal framework of
mandatory minimum sentences for drug trafficking.\5\ The 1986
Act created ``two tiers of mandatory prison terms for first-
time drug traffickers: a five-year and ten-year minimum
sentence. Under the statute, these prison terms are triggered
exclusively by the quantity and type of drug involved in the
offense. For example, the ten-year penalty is triggered if the
offense involved at least one kilogram of heroin or five
kilograms of powder cocaine or 50 grams of cocaine base.'' \6\
\5\ See P.L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).
\6\ Special Report to Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing
Policy, United States Sentencing Commission, February 1995, p. 116.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 1988, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988
(P.L. 100-690, Title I, Subtitle A), which established the
Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and created the
new position of ``White House Drug Czar'' or ONDCP Director.
The Act also required the White House ONDCP Director to present
an annual strategy with measurable goals and a Federal drug
control budget to the President and Congress.\7\
\7\ P.L. 100-690, Title I, Subtitle A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 1994, pursuant to the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-322, Title X), the ``drug
czar'' was authorized to make recommendations to agencies
during budget formulation. The aim of this Act was to improve
resource targeting and policy consistency at Federal agencies
involved in implementing the National Drug Control Strategy, as
well as to heighten overall counter narcotics coordination
throughout the Federal Government. In addition, the ``drug
czar'' was authorized under the 1994 Act to exercise discretion
over two percent of the overall drug budget; the ``drug czar''
could theoretically transfer up to two percent of the budget
among National Drug Control Program accounts, upon approval by
the appropriations committees.\8\
\8\ In fact, this two percent measure has proved more theoretical
than actual, as particular agency heads have resisted the transfers and
prevailed in those efforts. For example, FBI Director Louis Freeh
reportedly blocked resource allocations by ONDCP in 1994.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During recent prior sessions of Congress, legislative and
oversight hearings have been held on various aspects of
national drug policy. The Subcommittee's 1995 oversight
hearings, proposed and supported by both minority and majority
Subcommittee members, were the result of recent developments,
including the steep rise in juvenile and overall drug use
(including both rising casual drug use, and increasing
regularity of use); the growing awareness that increased
juvenile drug use is linked to rising juvenile crime; \9\ the
absence of a long-promised White House Heroin Strategy; \10\ an
objective reduction in interdiction efforts; \11\ an apparent
lack of progress in source countries toward goals set forth for
so-called source country programs; \12\ reports of lagging
accountability in certain drug prevention programs; \13\ the
deemphasis by the media on drug abuse; \14\ the overall rise in
drug related juvenile violence; \15\ and general concerns about
interagency coordination of the Federal counter narcotics
effort.\16\
\9\ 1995 OJJDP Report, pp. 58-65.
\10\ The President promised a Heroin Strategy within 120 days of
taking office. Without any White House announcement, he signed a Heroin
Strategy in late November 1995. The signed Strategy offers little
detail, and was promulgated without implementing guidelines, which has
so far made it a nullity.
\11\ See ``Interdiction Policy Oversight'' section, below.
\12\ See ``Source Country Program Oversight'' section, below.
\13\ In particular, reports of waste and misapplication of funds
have been associated with certain states' administration of Safe and
Drug Free Schools monies, and these allegations are under investigation
by the Department of Education Inspector General's Office and the
United States General Accounting Office.
\14\ See ``Prevention Policy Oversight'' section, below.
\15\ See ``Background'' section, below.
\16\ See, e.g., Yost Testimony, below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The intent to examine National Drug Control Strategy was
set forth in the February 6, 1995 Subcommittee Strategic Plan,
in accord with the minority and majority view that the area
required oversight.\17\
\17\ The topic was discussed at a meeting of the full Subcommittee
in early February, views were solicited by the Chairman, and both
minority and majority members indicated a desire to conduct oversight
in this area.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the course of investigating the status of the National
Drug Control Strategy, the Strategy's implementation and the
need for improvement, the Subcommittee engaged in extensive
correspondence with the Administration, including direct
correspondence with the President; the Vice President; the
President's National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake; the
Director of ONDCP, Dr. Lee P. Brown; the United States
Interdiction Coordinator and Coast Guard Commandant, Admiral
Robert E. Kramek; the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement
Administration, Thomas A. Constantine; the Commissioner of the
U.S. Customs Service, George Weise; the Department of Defense
Deputy Assistant for Drug Enforcement Policy, Brian Sheridan;
the Department of State Deputy Assistant Secretary for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, Ambassador Jane E.
Becker; and others at the Departments of Justice, Defense,
State, ONDCP and elsewhere in the Administration.
The Subcommittee investigation included one fact finding
trip. Subcommittee members, the United States Coast Guard and
staff, traveled to the Seventh Coast Guard District in the
Caribbean transit zone. There, they attended briefings at
Seventh District Headquarters in Miami, Coast Guard
interdiction initiatives at sea, Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) activities in the Greater Antilles, high
level interagency briefings in Puerto Rico by the FBI, DEA,
Customs, Border Patrol, and local authorities, and received in
depth briefings by Admiral Granuzo and others at Joint Task
Force Six in Key West, dedicated to Eastern Caribbean Drug
Interdiction. This interdiction trip was arranged in
coordination with the United States Coast Guard, and
invitations were extended to minority and majority members. The
trip occurred on June 16 through 19, 1995. Additionally, in
coordination with ONDCP, the Subcommittee Chairman traveled
with the White House Director of ONDCP to see prevention and
treatment programs first-hand in Massachusetts.
Throughout 1995, the Chairman, Members and Subcommittee
staff met extensively with the agencies involved in the counter
narcotics effort, and endeavored to collect directly and
indirectly both statistical and anecdotal evidence on the
effectiveness and accountability of the current National Drug
Control Strategy and programs. These efforts spanned the key
areas of interdiction, law enforcement, prevention, treatment,
and source country initiatives. The Subcommittees sought
further insight from GAO investigators, agents in the field,
and departmental inspectors general.
c. committee findings
The Committee's 1995 examination of the National Drug
Control Strategy, its implementation and overall effectiveness
resulted in the following findings:
(1) Casual teenage drug use trends have suffered a marked
reversal over the past three years, and are dramatically up in
virtually every age group and for every illicit drug, including
heroin, crack, cocaine, hydrochloride, LSD, non-LSD
hallucinogens, methamphetamine, inhalants, stimulants, and
marijuana.
(2) Rising casual teenage drug use is closely correlated
with rising juvenile violent crime.
(3) If rising teenage drug use and the close correlation
with violent juvenile crime continue to rise on their current
path, the Nation will experience a doubling of violent crime by
2010.\18\
\18\ See Juvenile Offenders and Victims: A National Report, OJJDP,
Department of Justice, September 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(4) The nature of casual teenage drug use is changing.
Annual or infrequent teenage experimentation with illegal drugs
is being replaced by regular, monthly or addictive teenage drug
use.\19\
\19\ See 1995 surveys conducted by PRIDE, The National Household
Survey, and The University of Michigan's Monitoring the Future Survey.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(5) The nationwide street price for most illicit drugs is
lower than at any time in recent years, and the potency of
those same drugs, particularly heroin and crack, is higher.\20\
\20\ See ``Interdiction Policy Oversight'' section, below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(6) Nationwide, drug related emergencies are at an all time
high.\21\
\21\ See ``Background'' section, below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(7) The 1994 and 1995 White House ONDCP strategies
consciously endeavored to shift resources away from priorities
set in the late 1980's, namely from the prior emphasis on
prevention and interdiction to a post-1993 increase emphasis on
treatment of ``hardcore addicts'' and a ``controlled shift'' to
source country programs.
(8) During 1993, 1994 and the early part of 1995, the
President put little emphasis on, and manifested little
interest in, either the demand side war against illegal drug
use or the supply side war against international narcotics
traffickers; an objective look at the President's public
addresses and his actions regarding gutting the ONDCP when he
became President, interactions with Congress, and discussions
with foreign leaders reveals that attention to the rising tide
of illegal drug use was a low presidential priority.\22\
\22\ See ``Background,'' ``Interdiction Policy Oversight'' and
``Prevention Policy Oversight'' sections, below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(9) The President's actual attention to this problem,
measured by other than the paucity of speeches and proposed
budget cuts, has been uniformly low. In addition to the absence
of direct presidential involvement in the drug war, the
President produced no 1993 Annual Strategy, despite a statutory
duty to do so under the 1988 Antidrug Abuse Act; delayed
appointment of a White House Drug Czar, or ONDCP Director,
until half way through 1993; and produced only a terse
``interim'' strategy in 1993.
(10) The Drug War appears also to have been expressly
reduced to a low national security priority early in the
Administration, and not to have been formally elevated at any
time since.\23\
\23\ See ``Interdiction Policy Oversight'' section, below.
Reportedly, the drug war's national security priority during the first
3 years of the Clinton Administration was number 29 out of 29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(11) While the position is contested by the
Administration's ONDCP Director, a wide cross section of drug
policy experts inside and outside of the Administration concur
that the absence of direct presidential involvement in foreign
and domestic counter narcotics efforts has contributed to
recent reversals in youth drug use trends, reduced street
prices for most narcotics, and increased potency of most
illicit drugs.
(12) Prevention programs that teach a right-wrong
distinction in drug use, or ``no use,'' such as D.A.R.E.,
G.R.E.A.T., the Nancy Reagan After School Program, community-
based efforts run by groups such as C.A.D.C.A., PRIDE, the
National Parents Foundation, and Texans War on Drugs, as well
as other local school and workplace programs, have proven both
successful and popular where they have been well-managed and
accountable--despite the 1995 White House ONDCP Strategy
statement that ``[a]ntidrug messages are losing their potency
among the Nation's youth''; \24\ while some of these programs,
for accountability reasons, have come under increased scrutiny,
such as Federal monies disbursed under the Safe and Drug Free
Schools Act, others have received increased funding, such as
the Byrne Grants, which help to finance the D.A.R.E. program.
\24\ See ``Prevention Oversight'' section, below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(13) Federal drug prevention programs, such as Safe and
Drug Free Schools, while supporting successful prevention
programs in many parts of the country, are of two types; some
have been widely lauded, such as D.A.R.E., while others have
been subject to continuing concerns about misapplication, waste
and abuse of funds.\25\
\25\ See ``Prevention Oversight'' section, below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(14) The Nation's law enforcement community needs greater
flexibility and support from the Federal Government in
addressing the rise in juvenile and drug related crime. While
certain developments are promising, such as the $25 million
increase in Byrne Grant funding in fiscal 1996, a law
enforcement block grant to supersede the COPS program, and
increased reliance on joint interagency task forces, valuable
time has been lost in addressing this need; renewed attention
to strengthening local, county, state and Federal law
enforcement's counter narcotics efforts are required.
(15) The Nation's interdiction effort has been dramatically
curtailed over the past three years, due to lack of White House
support for interdiction needs, reduced funding, a tiny staff
at the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator's Office, the absence of
an ONDCP Deputy for Supply Reduction, reduced support for
National Guard container search days, the elimination of
certain cost effective assets in the Eastern Caribbean,
reassignment or absence of key intelligence gathering assets,
reluctance by the Department of State to elevate counter
narcotics to a top priority in certain source and transit
countries, unnecessary interagency quarreling over asset
management and personnel issues, and the apparent inability or
unwillingness of the White House Drug Czar to bring essential
interdiction community concerns to the attention of the
President or to aid the President's Interdiction Coordinator in
doing so; and
(16) Poor management and interagency coordination in source
countries has been discovered and was described in detail by
the General Accounting Office (GAO).
d. committee recommendations
Upon review of the 1995 National Drug Control Strategy and
an assessment of the status of the Drug War through expert
testimony at oversight hearings, receipt of reliable
documentary evidence, reference to General Accounting Office
studies commissioned by the Subcommittee, and contacts with
experts inside and outside the Federal government, the
Subcommittee advances the following recommendations for
improvement of the Nation's national drug control strategy:
(1) To assure that the Drug War becomes a top national
priority, the President should, in close consultation with
Congress, establish an overall budget that places counter
narcotics high among national priorities.
(2) To reverse the rise in casual drug use by juveniles,
the President should, in close consultation with Congress,
establish a National Drug Control Strategy which returns
accountable prevention programs to highest priority among
Federal demand reduction programs, and does not
disproportionately favor increased drug treatment funding at
the expense of accountable prevention.
(3) To reverse the rise in illegal drug importation, high
drug availability, high drug purities, and low street prices,
the President should, in close consultation with Congress,
establish a National Drug Control Strategy which returns well-
coordinated interdiction programs to highest priority among
Federal supply reduction programs, and does not embrace further
cuts in interdiction assets or funding, or otherwise shift
interdiction assets or funding to source country programs.
(4) To restore accountability to ONDCP and the national
drug policy, the President should return to promulgating, in
compliance with the Antidrug Abuse Act of 1988, a clear set of
measurable and quantifiable annual goals as part of the annual
National Drug Control Strategy.
(5) To restore accountability, the overall National Drug
Control Strategy should be more than descriptive, and more than
a collection of laudable goals to which agencies aspire; the
Strategy should become the standard against which success or
failure of all agencies' antidrug programs are measured; the
Strategy should also be the basic document against which future
justification for antidrug funding at each agency is measured.
(6) To restore accountability to Federal demand reduction
programs, the President, in close consultation with Congress,
should establish workable accountability mechanisms and clear
measures of effectiveness, either by statute or regulation.
Prevention programs that have no means for assuring
accountability, that cannot demonstrate achievement of any
measurable goals, or that do not fund ``no use'' messages
should be unfunded in subsequent budget cycles; similarly,
treatment programs unable to assure accountability and
effectiveness should be unfunded.
(7) To restore accountability to supply reduction programs
(e.g. source country programs), the President, in close
consultation with Congress, should establish workable
accountability mechanisms; while effectiveness may be more
difficult to measure on the supply side, programs that have no
means for assuring accountable expenditures or fail to meet
previously established goals should be unfunded in subsequent
budget cycles.
(8) To restore accountability, coordination and meaningful
ONDCP guidance of the overall Federal antidrug efforts,
antidrug programs that receive their justification in the
annual ONDCP Drug Strategy Budget should be identified with
greater specificity, and the 50-plus agencies that receive
funding through these programs should be required to place the
details of each program before the ONDCP Director prior to the
production of succeeding annual budgets.
(9) To restore accountability and coordination of the
Nation's overall drug strategy, the White House Drug Czar
should become the chief voice within the Administration on
whether programs continue to be funded or not and at what
levels, in consultation with OMB and the authorizing and the
appropriations committees. However, in all antidrug efforts,
the Drug Czar--and not individual agency heads--should then be
viewed by the President, OMB and Congress as the primary
decision-maker on national drug policy;
(10) The President should be encouraged to be unequivocal,
vocal and constant in his support of the Drug Czar, and to
delegate to him or her the fullest authority possible on all
issues relating to the Nation's counter narcotics efforts.
(11) In support of the Drug Czar and heightened interagency
coordination, the President should insist that all relevant
agency heads coordinate antidrug activities directly through
that person, and insist that all major counter narcotics
decisions be approved by that person. Moreover, the one
document that should govern all coordination efforts should be
the National Drug Control Strategy.
(12) The President should maximize the Drug Czar's
authority by:
<bullet> Funding ONDCP itself back to late 1980's levels,
including a complement of 150 ONDCP staff and a substantial
increase in the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator's staff
(currently six);
<bullet> Expressly delegating all authority for program
prioritization and, in consultation with OMB, selected budget
matters to ONDCP;
<bullet> Expressly giving ONDCP the authority to evaluate
antidrug program effectiveness across all agencies of the
Federal Government, and the authority to offer the primary
recommendation to the President and Congress on program
continuation, enhancement, reduction or elimination;
<bullet> Insisting that all agency heads meet personally
with the ONDCP Director at least quarterly, following a format
similar to the never-repeated October 1994 drug interdiction
agency head conference.
<bullet> Confirming that the White House Drug Czar's
priorities are the President's priorities in all contacts with
agency heads.
<bullet> Publicly supporting efforts of the White House
Drug Czar and ONDCP through regular discussion in the media,
with Cabinet Officials, and in periodic addresses to the Nation
or other public speeches.
(13) To demonstrate the President's constant concern,
awareness and consistent support for the Nation's Drug Control
Strategy, and the many public and private sector advocates and
implementors of policies within or consistent with that
Strategy, the President should speak out regularly on the
topic, utilizing the presidential ``bully pulpit'' to elevate
the issue and build public support for demand and supply
reduction efforts.
(14) To bring the issue immediately back to the forefront
of the Nation's agenda, the President should consider one or
all of the following: An address to the Nation from the Oval
Office or to a Joint Session of Congress on the topic of
exploding teenage drug use; a series of White House Drug Policy
Conferences, including one each on prevention, narcotics-
related law enforcement, interdiction, source country programs,
treatment programs, and the role of the media; meeting
personally with congressional leaders on this issue at least
once or twice annually, notably the Bi-Partisan Drug Policy
Group (currently co-chaired by Congressman Bill Zeliff, R-NH,
and Congressman Charles Rangel, D-NY) or a similar counter
narcotics leadership group; and appoint a bipartisan White
House Commission on ``Winning the Drug War,'' to study the
evolving options in depth and report new policy ideas and
findings to the President and Congress for swift action.
(15) In specific support of supply reduction, the National
Drug Control Strategy should:
<bullet> Elevate the Drug War threat on the National
Security Council's list of national security priorities to a
top position;
<bullet> Restore funding for interdiction efforts, as
recommended by the current U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, to
``1992-1993 levels;''
<bullet> Restore funding to ONDCP for staff and policy
support lost in 1993 Administration cuts;
<bullet> Restore funding for intelligence gathering lost
between 1993 and 1995;
<bullet> Restore lost Ship Days, National Guard Container
Search Works Days, and Flight Hours lost in 1993, 1994 and 1995
Administration cuts;
<bullet> Restore to the Transit Zone the lost airborne and
stationary radars, Jayhawk helicopters, Coast Guard Cutters and
SES Patrol Boats, HU-25 Falcon Interceptor aircraft (five
lost), E2-C Hawkeye AEW aircraft (4 lost), EC130-V AEW aircraft
with rotodome (transferred to DoD), modernized sea-based
aerostats (all lost), and personnel, including Transit Zone
personnel and personnel formerly assigned to C3I East,
subsequently consolidated into the Customs Domestic Air
Interdiction Coordination Center (DAICC) and suffering
``serious manning shortages;''
<bullet> Establish a process for direct, regular
communications between the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator (USIC)
and the National Security Advisor, if not also between the USIC
and the President;
<bullet> Issue the missing agency implementation guidelines
that should have accompanied the November 1995 Heroin Strategy;
<bullet> Provide sufficient staff to the USIC (who now
coordinates the Nation's interdiction policy with a staff of
6);
<bullet> Rescind or modify PDD-14 to reflect either a
slower shift of resources or no shift at all toward source
country programs.
<bullet> Insist on accountability mechanisms in source
country programs that assure improved management, interagency
coordination, clarity and targeting.
<bullet> Restore support for law enforcement's counter
narcotics mission through a combination of greater flexibility
by block grants, increasing the Byrne Grant and similar
programs, heightened drug prosecutions in the Federal courts,
and encouraging increased cross over of high technologies
available to the military but not yet economically to law
enforcement;
<bullet> Encourage wider use of joint interagency task
forces, by reducing jurisdictional conflicts, bureaucratic
impediments, and restrictive regulations, as well as
rechannelling funds to these joint efforts.
(16) In specific support of demand reduction efforts, the
National Drug Control Strategy should:
<bullet> Reaffirm the central place of drug use prevention
in the overall national drug strategy;
<bullet> Respond to recommendations that develop out of the
GAO and Department of Education investigations of prevention
program accountability, including the accountability of the
Safe and Drug Free Schools Program;
<bullet> Encourage greater private sector and media support
for drug prevention efforts nationwide;
<bullet> Offer greater flexibility to States and
localities, through mechanisms such as a separate prevention
block grant (independent of treatment), while clearly
supporting only ``no use'' messages and ``no use'' curricula;
<bullet> Encourage greater cooperation among the prevention
and law enforcement communities, while increasing support for
such overlapping programs as the Byrne Grants, D.A.R.E. and
G.R.E.A.T. programs;
<bullet> Fund only ``validated'' prevention programs, as
suggested by national prevention efforts in the March 1995
Subcommittee hearings;
<bullet> Encourage the establishment of accepted criteria
for effective drug treatment and the creation of programs that
are likely to meet these criteria;
<bullet> Encourage greater application of effective
treatment programs in correctional institutions;
<bullet> Provide opportunities for the President to
regularly and forcefully speak out on the issue;
<bullet> Explore means for establishing a larger number of
overall treatment ``slots,'' so long as the treatment programs
under consideration are effective;
<bullet> Reducing the Federal ``treatment bureaucracy'' to
allow a greater flow of treatment funds to the states and
localities outside Washington, D.C.
<bullet> Consider increased funding for research into
potentially more effective drug treatment.
II. Report on the Committee's Oversight Review
a. background
The Nation's Drug Control Policy must be evaluated against
the backdrop of seven incontrovertible facts. First, drug use
has been rising markedly across American society over the past
three years, especially among the Nation's juvenile population.
The statistics are alarming.
In 1994, for the third consecutive year, reputable
nationwide surveys, including the National Household Survey
\26\ and Michigan University's Monitoring the Future Study,\27\
measured disturbing increases in drug use and acceptability,
especially among the Nation's youth.
\26\ Substance Abuse Mental Health Services Administration,
National Household Survey on Drug Abuse: Population Estimates 1994,
U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service,
September 1995.
\27\ Johnston, L., O'Malley, P. and Bachman, J., Monitoring the
Future Study, University of Michigan (1994).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to the 1994 Michigan University study, 13 percent
of 8th-graders experimented with marijuana in 1993, about twice
the 1991 level. Experimentation among 10th-graders increased
about two-thirds the previous three years, and daily use among
high school seniors was up by half over 1993 levels.
Increasing use was also reported in 1994 by the Drug Abuse
Warning Network Data, which collected data from emergency rooms
around the country on drug related emergencies in 1993. That
data showed an 8 percent increase in drug related emergency
room cases between 1992 and 1993, with 45 percent being heroin
overdoses. Cocaine was also at an all-time high, having more
than doubled since 1988, and marijuana emergencies increased 22
percent between 1992 and 1993.
1995 data is worse: The National Household Survey released
in September 1995 shows that overall drug use among kids ages
12 to 17 jumped 50 percent in 1994, from 6.6 percent to 9.5
percent. The National Pride Survey of 200,000 students shows
that one in three American high school seniors now smokes
marijuana; there has been a 36 percent increase in cocaine use
among students in grades 9 through 12 since 1991-92; and
hallucinogen use by high schoolers has risen 75 percent since
1988-89.
Finally, October 1995 DAWN data shows that, in 1994,
``Cocaine-related episodes reached their highest level in
history'' and registered a ``15 percent increase from 1993 and
40 percent increase from 1988.'' On top of this, marijuana or
hashish-related emergencies rose 39 percent from 1993 to 1994,
and total drug related emergency cases rose 10 percent between
1993 and 1994.
Not surprisingly, a significant quantity of the narcotics
producing the foregoing statistics come from a foreign source;
for example, from mid-1993 to early 1995, Mexican traffickers
reportedly produced at least 150 tons of methamphetamine, or
speed; not surprisingly, Mexico also imported an estimated 170
tons of ephedrine, a precurser chemical in production of
methamphetamine. Similarly, the Drug Enforcement Administration
confirms that approximately 70 percent of the estimated 400
tons of cocaine was smuggled into the United States annually
comes across Mexico's border with the United States. Other
leading source countries include, not surprisingly, Colombia,
Bolivia, Peru and Burma.\28\
\28\ See, e.g., February 22, 1996 letter from the President to the
Chairmen and Ranking Members of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Affairs, The Senate Committee on Appropriations, The House Committee on
Appropriations and the House Committee on International Relations. This
letter lists as ``major illicit drug producing or drug transit
countries,'' the following: Afgahanistan, The Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia,
Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, China, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Guatamala, Haiti, Hong Kong, India, Iran, Jamaica, Laos, Lebanon,
Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Syria,
Taiwan, Thailand, Venezuela and Vietnam.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The second incontrovertible fact is that overall drug use
fell markedly between 1981 and 1992, during a period of
concerted Federal, State, community and parental counter
narcotics activity, and vocal national leadership by Presidents
Reagan and Bush, as well as First Lady Nancy Reagan.
In combination with nationwide grassroots parent groups,
such as Pride and the National Family Partnership, Mrs.
Reagan's ``Just Say No'' prevention program began the push to
reduce drug use through education in the early 1980s. Mrs.
Reagan's effort was supplemented by Federal drug prevention
monies in 1987, and coordinated with the first concerted drug
interdiction program in the late 1980s.
Aided by new programs at the Departments of Defense and
Justice, the Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Customs
Service, Border Patrol, and State and local law enforcement
agencies, then-Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Paul Yost
coordinated and implemented a drug interdiction effort based on
the increased flow or ``pulsing'' of resources into the transit
zone at high-drug trafficking times.
Together, these prevention, law enforcement and
interdiction efforts demonstrated results. Monthly cocaine use
dropped from 2.9 million users in 1988 to 1.3 million in 1990.
Overall drug abuse dropped from 14.5 million users in 1991 to
11.4 million in 1992. The perceived risk of drug use rose, as
did prices, while availability and purity fell.
The third incontrovertible fact is that juvenile drug use
and violent juvenile crime are closely related, and predictably
feed upon each other. In September 1995, the Justice
Department's Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention (OJJDP) reported that, ``[a]fter years of relative
stability, juvenile involvement in violent crime known to law
enforcement has been increasing,'' and ``juveniles were
responsible for about 1 in 5 violent crimes.'' \29\
\29\ DOJ, OJJDP, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: A National Report
(1995), Overview.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OJJDP also confirmed 1994 National Institutes of Justice
Drug Use Forecasting (DUF) data showing that ``1 in 3 juvenile
detainees were under the influence of drugs at the time of
their offense.'' \30\ For example, the level of marijuana use
in 1993 varied from 14 percent to 51 percent of juveniles
tested at 12 sites, making an average value of 26 percent,
which was substantially above the 1992 average value of 16
percent.\31\
\30\ 1995 OJJDP Report, p. 64; NIJ Study (1994), Drug Use
Forecasting: 1993 annual report on juvenile arrestees/detainees.
Research in Brief.
\31\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A fourth central fact is that objective indicators of
overall attention being devoted to the antidrug effort by the
media, national leaders and the President in particular is
lower than at any time in recent history. Media coverage of the
Drug War, which peaked in 1989, has been anemic since. The
Partnership for a Drug Free America was able to afford in 1990
and 1991, with media financing, roughly one antidrug message
per household per day; Tom Hedrick of the Partnership testified
that ``support for these messages has declined 20 percent in
the past three years . . . because the media is not as
convinced that the drug issue is as important as it was.''
Moreover, media coverage is also down--from 600 antidrug
stories on the three major networks in 1989 to 65 last year, a
free-fall.
Presidential leadership has been equally weak. In 1993 and
1994, President Clinton made seven addresses to the Nation;
none mentioned illegal drugs. The President's 1993 presidential
papers reveal 13 references to illegal drugs in a total 1,628
presidential statements, addresses, and interviews. Of 1,742
presidential statements and other utterances in 1994, illegal
drugs were mentioned only 11 times.\32\
\32\ Presidential Papers of President William Jefferson Clinton,
1993 and 1994.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The fifth fact: Objective indicators of Federal support for
the counter narcotics effort, or Drug War, particularly for
drug interdiction, show a substantial reduction in resources
committed to key areas. In early 1995, key budget numbers were
already clearly below prior high water marks, lines formerly
defined as the minimum necessary for effective conduct of the
Drug War.\33\
\33\ The term ``Drug War'' is employed throughout this report to
denote not just interdiction and international source country programs,
but the entire gamut of Federal counter narcotics efforts, including
prevention and treatment programs, law enforcement, and various Federal
support efforts. For specific budget request and appropriation numbers,
see below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the total antidrug budget rose from $1.5 billion in
fiscal 1981 to $13.2 billion in fiscal 1995,\34\ ONDCP reports
a drop in both drug interdiction and international program
funding,\35\ and concedes a significant shift among demand
reduction programs to treatment efforts.
\34\ Teasley, David, Congressional Research Service Report 95-943,
September 6, 1995, p. 1.
\35\ National Drug Control Strategy, The White House, February
1995, p. 113.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notably, drug interdiction's budget authority fell from
$1.511 billion in fiscal 1993 to $1.312 billion in fiscal 1994;
President Clinton's fiscal 1994 budget slashed the interdiction
budget by $200 million, again by $18 million to $1.293 billion
in fiscal 1995, and finally by another $15 million to $1.278
billion in fiscal 1996.\36\
\36\ Id. p. 113.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the same time, international or source country counter
narcotics funding fell from a high of $523 million in fiscal
1993 to $329 million in fiscal 1994 to $309 million in fiscal
1995, recovering only slightly to $399 million in fiscal
1996.\37\
\37\ Id. p. 113.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A sixth key fact is that the Administration's 1994 and 1995
Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) Strategies
represent several conscious shifts. First, they represent a
conscious shift of available resources toward treatment
programs for hardcore drug users, and away from prevention
programs for casual and non users.
The 1995 White House National Drug Control Strategy
identifies first on its list of ``National Funding Priorities
for FY's 1997-99'' the ``[s]upport programs that expand drug
treatment capacity and services so that those who need
treatment can receive it.'' \38\ In support of this shift to
drug treatment, the President has markedly increased treatment
resources. In fiscal 1993, treatment resources stood at $2.339
billion. But the figure increased to $2.398 billion in fiscal
1994, increased to $2.646 billion for fiscal 1995, and the
President's request for fiscal 1996 was at the all-time high of
$2.826 billion.\39\ With respect to rising casual use, the
President's 1995 Drug Control Strategy acknowledges that
``casual drug use is increasing among our youth,'' \40\ but
instead of focusing on casual use, states: ``Antidrug messages
are losing their potency among the Nation's youth.'' \41\
\38\ Id. p. 119.
\39\ Id. p. 113.
\40\ Id. p. 9.
\41\ Id. p. 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, the 1994 and 1995 White House Strategies
represent a conscious shift of resources away from interdiction
or transit zone counter narcotics programs.
Finally, seventh, the Clinton White House Drug Strategies
depart from prior White House Strategies and from the statutory
requirement of ``quantifiable goals,'' \42\ and offer instead
broad, prescriptive goals, such as: ``Reduce the number of drug
users in America.'' \43\
\42\ 1988 Antidrug Abuse Act.
\43\ Id. p. 53.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These seven facts, already becoming apparent in early 1995,
strongly implied the need for continuing oversight and
investigation into the status of the Nation's Federal counter
narcotics effort, as well as review of the Office of National
Drug Control Policy, the National Drug Control Strategy and its
implementation.
b. proceedings of the subcommittee on national security, international
affairs, and criminal justice
1. March 9, 1995, Hearing
a. Purpose and Panels
The purpose of this hearing was to examine President
Clinton's 1995 National Drug Control Strategy, and to begin an
assessment of how effectively the Nation is fighting illegal
drug abuse, domestically and internationally. Acknowledged
components of the Drug War under review include prevention,
treatment, interdiction, law enforcement, and source country
programs.
At this hearing, testimony was received from four panels.
The Subcommittee heard first from former First Lady of the
United States, Nancy Reagan.
Second, testimony was received from former Director of the
Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) William J.
Bennett, former Administrator of the Drug Enforcement
Administration Robert C. Bonner, and former Acting Director of
ONDCP John Walters.
Third, the Subcommittee received testimony from the current
Director of ONDCP, Dr. Lee P. Brown. Finally, the Subcommittee
heard from former Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Paul A. Yost,
Jr. and several nationally-recognized drug abuse prevention
experts, including Senior Representative of the Partnership for
a Drug-Free America, Thomas Hedrick, Jr.; Executive Director of
California's BEST Foundation, G. Bridget Ryan; National
Director of the Community Antidrug Coalitions of America
(CADCA), James Copple; and Director of Program Services for
Texans' War on Drugs, Charles Robert Heard, III.
b. Summary of Findings
With varying degrees of emphasis, all panels acknowledged
that current Federal efforts are under strain from reduced
emphasis on certain components of the Drug War, budgetary
pressure, and in some cases accountability.
The panels also acknowledged that, over the past several
years, there has been a marked reversal in several important
national trend lines, including most notably a rise in casual
drug use by juveniles, but also reaching to perceived drug
availability (up), perceived risk of use (down), average street
price (down), drug related medical emergencies (up), drug
related violent juvenile crime (up), total Federal drug
prosecutions (down), and parental attention to the drug issue
(down).\44\
\44\ Press Release, The University of Michigan, ``Drug Use Rises
Again in 1995 Among American Teens:'' December 15, 1995; Press Release,
PRIDE, ``Teen Drug Use Rises for Fourth Straight Year,'' November 2,
1995; Preliminary Estimates from the Drug Abuse Warning Network, U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, September 1995; James E.
Burke, ``Presentation: An Overview of Illegal Drugs in America,''
Partnership for a Drug-Free America, Fall 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Subcommittee found that these reversals have continued
through the period 1993 to 1995, although certain trend lines,
including a shift from falling to rising casual use, typically
among juveniles, began in 1992. In addition, a shift of certain
interdiction resources, which were earlier a part of the
counter narcotics force structure, began in late 1991 with the
advent of the Persian Gulf War.
All panels agreed, albeit with differing emphases, that
renewed national leadership, including both Presidential and
Congressional leadership, will be necessary to combat these
recent trend reversals, especially the rise in juvenile drug
abuse and drug related violent juvenile crime.
c. Subcommittee Chairman's Introduction
The Subcommittee Chairman initiated the hearing by noting
that Mrs. Reagan ``woke the Nation up to this [juvenile drug
abuse] problem and its pervasiveness in the early 1980's.''
Zeliff observed that the former First Lady's ``Just Say No''
campaign effectively launched a ``national crusade'' for drug
abuse prevention.
The Chairman also noted that, in April 1985, Mrs. Reagan
held the first International Drug Conference for the world's
First Ladies; in 1988 she held the second such conference and
became the first American First Lady to speak before the United
Nations; and after leaving the White House, she founded the
Nancy Reagan Foundation, which has since ``awarded grants in
excess of $5 million to drug prevention and education programs
. . .''
d. Testimony of First Lady Nancy Reagan
Essentially, First Lady Nancy Reagan testified that America
has forgotten the dangers of drug use, that America's children
are at increased risk in 1995, that there is an absence of
national leadership on the drug issue, and that a national
strategy focused on treatment of so-called hardcore addicts
misses the largest at-risk population, namely children
participating in casual use.
Mrs. Reagan pleaded with national opinion leaders, for the
sake of the nation's children, to raise this issue to the top
of the national agenda.
Specifically, Mrs. Reagan explained that she had ``decided
to speak [before Congress on the drug issue] only after a lot
of soul searching . . . because my husband and everything he
stands for calls for me to be here.''
She then explained that the Nation ``is forgetting how
endangered our children are by drugs,'' that societal
``tolerance for drugs'' is up, and that ``the psychological
momentum we had against drug use [in the late 1980's and early
1990's] has been lost.'' In short, she asked, ``How could we
have forgotten so quickly?''
Mrs. Reagan detailed that, in eight years as First Lady,
she had traveled ``hundreds of thousands of miles'' to stem
drug abuse among young people and highlight its ``tragic human
consequences.'' To illustrate the misery left in its wake, she
read aloud a letter received from a 16-year-old girl.
The letter poignantly described how this girl of low self-
esteem got caught in the ``vicious cycle'' of drug use,
prostitution to buy more drugs, the death of her deformed and
premature baby, and her heart-rending reaction to these events.
The letter ended with a plea, which Mrs. Reagan repeated:
``Please reach kids my age and younger. Don't let what has
happened to me and what destroyed my life happen to them.''
Mrs. Reagan also testified that, ``[b]efore the drug use
increases of 1993 and 1994, we really had seen marked
progress,'' and that ``[juvenile] attitudes were being
changed.''
In support of these statements, Mrs. Reagan offered that
``monthly cocaine use dropped from nearly 3 million users in
1988 to 1.3 million users in 1990,'' and ``[b]etween 1991 and
1992, overall drug use dropped from 14.5 million users to 11.4
million.'' She credited many elements of society, including
``athletes and entertainers,'' ``many CEO's of large
companies,'' and political leaders.
She also explained the origins of her ``Just Say No''
message; it came in answer to a child's question about what to
do if pressured to buy or use drugs. As she explained, it was
an intentionally simple answer, and was never intended to be a
``total answer.'' In short, Mrs. Reagan said, it is ``important
for children to appreciate that `no' is in the vocabulary . .
.''
Directing herself to national policy, Mrs. Reagan quoted
from President Clinton's 1995 National Drug Control Strategy,
which states that ``[a]nti-drug messages have lost their
potency.'' Mrs. Reagan disagreed, testifying: ``That's not my
experience. If there's a clear and forceful no use message
coming from strong, outspoken leadership, it is potent . . .
Half-hearted commitment doesn't work. This drift, this
complacency, is what led me to accept your invitation to be in
Washington today . . . [W]e have lost a sense of priority on
this problem, we have lost all sense of national urgency and
leadership.''
Elaborating, Mrs. Reagan noted that the current national
strategy seems to shift resources toward treatment and away
from prevention and education. While she stated that treatment
is important in the overall mix of antidrug measures, it cannot
supplant prevention as the nation's demand side priority. Mrs.
Reagan pointed toward a more effective antidrug strategy when
she observed simply that ``treatment can't begin to replace the
overwhelming importance of education and prevention,'' since
``tomorrow's hardcore users are today's children.''
As she explained to the Subcommittee, ``[r]oughly 80
percent of drug users are casual users. Only 20 percent are
hardcore, and most of the casual users are children and
adolescents. They are the ones whose lives are changed by
prevention and education.''
Overall, Mrs. Reagan argued for greater attention to demand
reduction, although she testified that ``many outstanding
prevention programs across the country'' were ``started and
funded privately,'' including her own foundation, which
recently ``merged with the BEST Foundation for a Drug-Free
Tomorrow'' and ``has trained over 13,000 teachers and others.''
Beyond the private sector, she said, the antidrug effort
``requires leadership here in Washington.'' Rhetorically, she
asked, ``[w]here has it gone?,'' and in closing, she called for
renewed leadership on this issue. ``Today, the antidrug message
just seems to be fading away. Children need to hear it and hear
it often, just like they need to hear that they're loved.''
Missing is ``our common national purpose'' in combating drugs
and teaching young Americans to ``live in the world that God
made, not the nightmare world of drugs.''
e. Testimony of John P. Walters
John P. Walters, president of the New Citizenship Project
and former Acting Director of ONDCP, testified essentially that
President Clinton has promoted policies that reversed or
accelerated the reversal of nearly a decade of falling drug
use.
Walters also tagged President Clinton as the source of
major reversals in: the cultural aversion to drug use, falling
drug availability, falling drug purities and rising drug
prices. Walters sees these trends as significant and dangerous.
Specifically, Walters testified that, between 1977 and
1992, America's culture underwent a significant transformation.
``The moral injunction not to use drugs swept over the Nation''
and ``[b]etween 1985 and 1992 alone, monthly cocaine use
declined by 78 percent.''
However, this ``sea change'' in attitudes was undone by the
Clinton Administration, said Walters, noting that the Clinton
Administration is ``undermining existing antidrug efforts on
almost all fronts.''
Walters pointed to the President's 80 percent reduction in
ONDCP staff,\45\ the Attorney General's stated goal of reducing
mandatory minimum sentences for drug trafficking,\46\ a
presidential directive reducing Department of Defense support
to drug interdiction efforts, the reduction in resources to
transit and source countries by 33 percent (from $523.4 million
in FY 1993 to $351.4 million in FY 1994),\47\ a reduction in
Federal domestic marijuana eradication efforts, a call by the
President's Surgeon General for study of drug legalization,\48\
and ``no moral leadership or encouragement'' from President
Clinton himself.
\45\ On February 9, 1993, the White House announced that ONDCP
would have its personnel cut from 146 to 25.
\46\ See also Isikoff, The Washington Post (November 26, 1993), pp.
A1, A10-A11.
\47\ See also, ONDCP, National Drug Control Strategy: Budget
Summary (February 1994, p. 184.)
\48\ See also, Reuters, ``Elders Reiterates Her Support For Study
of Drug Legalization,'' The Washington Post (January 15, 1994), p. A8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Walters testified that the impact of President Clinton's
deemphasis on the Drug War was palpable, as illustrated by
recent nationwide studies of youth use and attitudes towards
illegal drug use. Again turning to hard numbers, Walters noted
that the December 1994 University of Michigan study of 8th,
10th and 12th graders showed that marijuana use ``rose sharply
in 1994, as it did in 1993, after virtually a decade of steady
decline'' and that ``student attitudes were becoming
significantly less hostile toward illegal drug use.'' \49\
\49\ See also University of Michigan, Monitoring the Future Study,
December 1994.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Walters saw this reversal as alarming, and testified that
recent projections by the non-partisan Center on Addiction and
Substance Abuse at Colombia University, show: ``If historical
trends continue, the jump in marijuana use among America's
children (age 12-18) from 1992 to 1994 signals that 820,000
more of these children will try cocaine in their lifetime . . .
Of that number, about 58,000 will become regular cocaine users
and addicts.''
Arguing that the Clinton Administration has oversold drug
treatment, Walters also contended that the Administration has
failed to create the number of treatment ``slots'' necessary to
accommodate its own stated treatment priority.
First, turning to hard numbers, Walters noted that the
current strategy's success cannot be found in chronic, hardcore
drug user numbers--since these are also rising.
Despite the stated aim of the Clinton strategy, namely
reduction of hardcore use by heightened emphasis on treatment,
data gathered by the non-partisan Drug Abuse Warning Network
from emergency rooms around the country shows that ``drug
related emergency room cases . . . have reached the highest
levels ever, in reporting going back to 1978'' and ``[c]ocaine,
heroin, and marijuana cases all increased sharply to record
levels [in 1994].''
Second, while Walters explained the value of effective
treatment, he testified that today's Federal ``government
[drug] treatment bureaucracy is manifestly ineffective.'' He
said the Clinton Administration has, on the one hand, sought
increased treatment funding, yet on the other, failed to
provide sufficient treatment slots to effectuate the policy:
``Although Federal drug treatment spending almost tripled
between FY 1988 and FY 1994, the number of treatment slots
remained virtually unchanged and the estimated number of
persons treated declined--from 1,557,000 in 1989 to 1,412,000
in 1994,'' Walters testified.
Walters also offered statistics to support his view that
the current Administration has eroded the effectiveness of
international programs, ``destroyed'' intelligence support for
the Drug War, and abandoned ``presidential leadership'' on the
issue.
On international counter narcotics efforts, Walters rings
an alarm bell. He testified that, while the President's FY 1995
request for international antidrug programs was $428 million,
or $76 million above FY 1994, it is still $96 million below the
Administration's FY 1993 funding and $233 million below FY
1992. In addition, the President failed last year to secure the
request from a Democratically-controlled Congress.
In short, Walters testified, ``the drug problem is simply
not a part of the foreign policy agenda of the United States
under President Clinton--there is no carrot and no stick facing
countries from which the poison destroying American lives every
day comes.'' Walters noted, finally, that this deemphasis on
international efforts ``fuels calls in other countries for
abandoning antidrug cooperation.'' \50\
\50\ See also The New York Times (February 20, 1994), p. A6; The
New York Times (February 27, 1994), Section 4, p. 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Walters further testified that President Clinton's policies
are ``destroying the intelligence support to the drug war'' by,
for example, last year cutting $600,000 in intelligence funding
for FY 1995, and taking other measures to redirect resources
away from this key priority.
As a result, citing the Clinton Administration's own
documentation, Walters noted that ONDCP itself admits more
teenagers nationwide are using heroin and marijuana, that
cocaine use is stable but high,\51\ and that heroin, cocaine
and marijuana are now available at lower prices and higher
purities than at any time in recent years.\52\
\51\ See ONDCP, ``Pulse Check: National Trends in Drug Abuse,''
December, 1994, pp. 5, 8 and 10.
\52\ See ONDCP, National Drug Control Strategy: Strengthening
Communities' Response to Drugs and Crime, February, 1995, pp. 45-48,
146 (Table B-16).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Walter's view, ``if these trends continue, by 1996, the
Clinton Administration will have presided over the greatest
increase in drug use in modern American history.''
Looking forward, Walters advocated several policies for
getting the drug war ``back on track,'' including direct
presidential leadership or use of ``the bully pulpit,''
limited-duration antidrug block grants for states, putting the
military ``in charge'' of all international counter narcotics
efforts, using trade and diplomatic sanctions against source
countries, establishing clear no-use prevention programs,
closing open-air drug markets nationwide, drug testing where
constitutionally permissible, and calling on local media to
tackle the drug issue in a new wave of public service
announcements.
Walters concluded by noting that ``most Americans have
never used illegal drugs and have always been strongly opposed
to their use.'' Nevertheless, the Nation is on a collision
course with devastating extrapolations, and a swift change of
policy and return to effective implementation is required.
On questioning, Walters affirmed that pursuing the so-
called kingpin strategy for apprehension of cocaine cartel
leaders was a ``Federal responsibility.'' For that reason, the
FBI and DEA should return to ``the long, hard, crafted effort
to go after kingpins [that] has been dismantled by the
Administration in favor of . . . helping street-level local law
enforcement . . . for political reasons.'' Walters described
that, at present, ``there is no plan by Federal law enforcement
to dismantle . . . organizations that are moving hundreds of
millions of dollars a month out of the United States.''
Again upon questioning, Walters testified that ``the
military and other interdiction agencies have received a 50
percent force reduction in 1994, that has caused over a 50
percent reduction in their ability to interdict drugs . . .
[in] the transit zone.''
Walters took issue with the Clinton Administration's
granting of a national security waiver to Colombia, which was
this year technically de-certified. He indicated that the
national security waiver obviated the decertification.
Asked about the efficacy of drug testing, Walters suggested
that ``pre-employment testing ought to be able to be done
everywhere, Congress, the Judiciary, the Executive Branch,''
and that the Federal employees should also be subject to
``random testing,'' although he also noted that he was not a
lawyer and that testing is subject to legal limits.
Both Bennett and Bonner concurred with Walter's
recommendation for wider drug testing, although Judge Bonner
noted that there are legal limits on employee drug testing
which generally require that a job be ``potentially dangerous''
to the public or involve ``security.'' Bonner noted
countervailing concerns of citizen privacy, yet added that
``drug testing has proved effective in deterring drug use,''
especially ``in the military.'' Walters concluded the
discussion of drug testing by noting that the Federal work
force is only part of the problem, and that drug testing in the
larger private sector is key.
Congressman Robert E. Wise, Jr. questioned whether the
Andean initiative had not already been failing, leading to
increased cocaine availability, during the Bush Administration.
In response, Walters testified that a shift of military
assets to the Persian Gulf War toward the end of the Bush
Administration affected the Andean initiative. However, Walters
drew a distinction between the Bush and Clinton
Administrations, noting that ``the [Clinton] administration
intentionally and vocally changed policy, shifting out of
interdiction into hardcore treatment . . . ,'' and that the
Clinton administration never returned military assets to the
pre-Gulf War interdiction force structure.
Judge Bonner contested Congressman Wise's cocaine
availability numbers, stating that ``throughout most of 1990
[there was] a substantial and sharp increase in the price of
cocaine that was being marketed on a wholesale basis in the
United States, and we again saw through about half of 1992 that
kind of increase.'' Judge Bonner attributed this progress to
the DEA, United States agencies and the Colombian Government,
which were effectively ``destroying the Medellin cartel.''
Bonner also noted that the Mexican Government was, at that
time, closely cooperating with the United States.
Finally, on questioning, Walters closely linked drug use to
crime. Walters testified that, in his experience, the ``biggest
single contributor'' to drug related crime was not trafficker
violence, but violence by people using drugs--who ``abuse
children, abuse their spouses, be[come] violent with other
people, be[come] disinhibited and paranoid and more proned to
violence.''
Surprisingly, Walters cited a study by ONDCP, conducted in
New York City, Chicago and San Diego, which found that ``public
assistance is the major and perhaps the single largest source
of income for heroin users,'' noting that it is the poorest
Americans who are most often devastated by heroin. Walters
called it a ``national disgrace that in inner city
neighborhoods, it is accepted as a fact of life that we are
going to allow open air drug markets to exist without
harassment.''
Walters concluded that ``the Clinton administration has
turned its back on the drug problem and taken actions that
undermine achievements in prevention, interdiction and
enforcement.''
f. Testimony of William J. Bennett
William J. Bennett, current Co-Director of Empower America
and former Director of ONDCP, testified that there has been a
``sharp rise in drug use,'' citing many of the same studies
cited by Zeliff, Reagan, Walters and others.
According to Bennett, this rise should have ``mobilized the
Federal Government to forcefully state the case against drug
use, enforce the law and provide safety and security to its
citizens.'' Instead, ``the Clinton administration has abdicated
its responsibility'' and ``has been AWOL in the War on Drugs,''
said the former White House Drug Czar.
Widely regarded as the most effective White House Drug Czar
to date, Bennett denounced the 80 percent cut by President
Clinton in the ONDCP staff, and the willingness of Clinton's
Attorney General to endorse reductions in mandatory minimum
sentences for drug traffickers.
Strikingly, Bennett noted that the Administration's 1995
strategy would ``cut . . . more than 600 positions from drug
enforcement divisions of the Drug Enforcement Administration,''
cut ``more than 100 drug prosecution positions in United States
Attorney's offices,'' cut ``drug interdiction and drug
intelligence programs from fiscal 1994 levels,'' and was ``an
unfocused, wasteful drug treatment strategy that will do little
to target hardcore users.''
Bennett introduced new facts into the national dialogue
when he observed that, ``last year, the Clinton administration
directed the U.S. Military to stop providing radar tracking of
cocaine-trafficker aircraft to Colombia and Peru,'' a policy
``Congress again had to reverse,'' and noted that ``last month,
for the first time in history, the nation's drug control
strategy was introduced without the participation of the
president.''
Bennett also believes that, if present trends continue, by
1996 the Clinton administration will have presided over the
greatest increase in drug use ``in modern American history.''
Expanding his analysis beyond the failure of public policy,
Bennett testified that ``the Clinton Administration suffers
from moral torpor on the issue'' and that, as a general matter,
``policy follows attitude.''
In support of this statement, Bennett quoted several
statements by the President on his own prior use of drugs, in
particular, Clinton's 1991 statement that he had never ``broken
any drug law,'' followed by the 1992 statement that he had used
marijuana in England but ``didn't inhale it,'' followed in
turn, when asked if he would inhale if he had it to do over,
by: ``Sure, if I could, I tried before.''
Bennett also articulated the oddity of continued
presidential support for a Surgeon General who ``had favorable
words to say about legalization,'' noting that her eventual
dismissal had nothing to do with her remarks on drug
legalization.
Citing ``massive policy failures'' by the Clinton
Administration, Bennett proposed basic remedial measures.
First, communities need to be able to ``choose their own
antidrug priorities by combining Federal antidrug support with
that from states and localities.''
Second, the U.S. Military must be clearly given a
leadership role in the international war on drugs. Third,
international trade and diplomatic sanctions must be used, and
all aid to cocaine-source countries should be eliminated if
they fail to reduce production. Fourth, the Justice Department
should make apprehension and prosecution of drug traffickers a
top priority.
Upon questioning, Bennett testified that he favored ``drug
testing'' for Federal employees, and pursued the matter as Drug
Czar until confronted by legal obstacles; ONDCP did use random
and pre-employment drug testing, premised on ``security and
safety.''
Bennett noted, on closing, that ``success in the drug war
depends above all on the efforts of parents and schools and
churches and police chiefs and judges and community leaders.''
Giving examples from more than 100 cities he visited while
President Bush's Drug Czar, Bennett urged renewed leadership.
g. Testimony of Robert C. Bonner
Robert C. Bonner, former Administrator of the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) under both Presidents Bush and
Clinton, a former Federal judge, and currently a partner at
Gibson, Dunn and Crutcher, testified forcefully for renewed
leadership in the Drug War: ``The bottom line is unmistakable--
during the past two years, drug use among the youth of America
has soared in nearly every category of illegal drug . . . When
juxtaposed against the immediately preceding period and nearly
a decade of declining drug use, there can be only one
conclusion--the Clinton Administration's National Drug Strategy
has failed miserably, and indeed it is a tragedy.''
Supporting this statement, Judge Bonner offered
observations from his experience as DEA Administrator, and
referred to a number of recent studies.
Bonner testified that he was ``deeply troubled'' by the
``absence of an effective, coherent national drug strategy and
the apparent abandonment of any presidential leadership in this
area.''
Moreover, Bonner believes drugs now pose ``a serious threat
to the well-being of our nation'' and a genuine ``national
security threat.'' Bonner called for a bipartisan effort to
address this ``resurgent threat to our nation's security,''
noting that the threat ``does not distinguish among
Republicans, Democrats or Independents.''
Bonner vividly described the costs of drug use to the
Nation in the 1970's. ``Families were torn apart by drugs, more
than many realize. Child and spousal abuse, bankruptcy, and
criminal prosecutions followed . . . [h]undreds of thousands of
drug-addicted babies were born to young mothers who, more often
than not, could not support themselves, let alone children
requiring serious medical attention. Drug related health care
costs soared, draining still unacknowledged capital from our
economy. Rampant in the work place, the wide-spread use of
illegal drugs literally threatened America's ability to compete
in the global marketplace.''
Crediting Mrs. Reagan's ``Just Say No'' campaign and the
antidrug Abuse Act of 1988, Bonner noted that the onslaught of
direct and indirect damage from illegal drugs was turned back
in the mid-1980's and early 1990's. In Bonner's view, national
will, and a combination of ``strong law enforcement,'' a strong
``educational and moral message,'' and effective treatment
programs for hardcore users has made the difference. However,
he warns that drug treatment programs should not be
``oversold.''
Statistically, he reminded the Subcommittee that ``our
national drug strategy [in the 1980's and early 1990's] was
working . . .'' Citing household surveys by the National
Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), Bonner added new statistics to
the record. ``[R]egular users of cocaine dropped from 5.8
million Americans in 1985 to 1.3 million in 1992 . . . a
decline of over 80 percent'' and that ``crack cocaine use
sharply declined from nearly a million in 1990 to just over
300,000 two years later in 1992,'' said Bonner.
Judge Bonner observed that ``marijuana use . . . plummeted
from about 22 million regular users in 1985 to approximately
8.5 million in 1992 . . . a decrease of an astonishing 61
percent in seven years.''
However, he confirmed that there has been a ``rollback over
the past two years of hard-fought victories achieved between
the mid-1980's and the early 1990's.'' Citing the University of
Michigan study of high school students, he noted that use of
``heroin, LSD, cocaine, and crack,'' and ``the ill-named
recreational drugs, marijuana, stimulants and inhalants'' was
up and ``ominous.''
According to Bonner, ``[w]e have seen a 100 percent
increase in the number of 8th graders who used marijuana in
just three years from 1991 to 1994; and just since last year,
we have witnessed a 50 percent increase in the daily use of
marijuana by 8th graders.'' Meanwhile, ``the perceived risks
and disapproval of drug use has declined.''
Bonner also shared the view of Joseph Califano, President
Carter's Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare and current
co-director of CASA, that ``if this relaxed attitude [toward
drug use] continues, further marked increases in drug use by
children can be expected.''
This, he said, is why casual use by juveniles must not be
become peripheral or secondary to treatment of hardcore
addicts. In a nutshell, ``if you emphasize, as [the Clinton
Administration] is, . . . treatment of hardcore drug users,
you're assuming that the drug problem is a static one--that we
have a certain number of hardcore drug users here, and then we
have certain number of casual drug users, and if we just take
care of these hardcore drug users, the problem goes away.'' He
strongly contested this view.
``That's wrong,'' says Bonner, ``the drug problem is a
dynamic one, [because] as you increase the number of casual
users, you are down the pipeline going to be increasing the
number of hardcore users that [you] have to deal with.'' Bonner
drew the analogy to bailing a leaky ship while failing to patch
the leaks; eventually ``that's going to sink the boat.''
He called the medical impact of the recent rise in drug use
alarming. For example, the Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN)
data for emergency room admissions in recent years indicates
``significant increases in hospital emergency room admissions
related to drug abuse, with the largest increases in heroin
admissions, up by 44 percent between 1992 and 1993,'' noted
Bonner.
The chief causes for recent reversals in juvenile drug use,
according to Bonner, include: ``lack of national, and
specifically, presidential leadership; lack of a clear, loud,
and persistent moral message that illegal drug use is wrong;
and a misallocation of resources that undermines drug law
enforcement and prevention efforts and overemphasizes hardcore
user treatment . . .''
Bluntly, Bonner concluded, ``there has been a near total
absence of presidential leadership by President Clinton in the
fight to turn back illegal drug use . . .'' and his Surgeon
General's remarks on legalization ``arguably encourages it'' by
further reducing perceived risk; Bonner called Surgeon General
Jocelyn Elders' statement on legalization ``dead wrong and
flagrantly irresponsible for a national public health
official.''
On treatment, Bonner testified that ``the Clinton Strategy
badly oversells the efficacy of the treatment of hardcore drug
abusers'' and fails to acknowledge that ``studies repeatedly
indicate the low success rates associated with many programs .
. .''
Specifically, Bonner cited the work of Harvard University's
Mark Kleiman, a former member of the Clinton Justice Department
Transition Team, which shows that ``even the most expensive
treatment program--long-term residential treatment programs
costing as much as $20,000/patient--have success rates as low
as 15 to 25 percent.''
Upon questioning, Bonner reminded the Subcommittee that
``with respect to crack addicts . . . after treatment programs,
less than 10 percent are free of drugs, free of crack after 24
weeks, so you don't want to put too many eggs in that
[treatment] basket.''
Addressing reversals in availability and price, Bonner
testified that ``from 1990 to 1992, the wholesale price of
cocaine in the U.S. increased substantially'' as law
enforcement involvement went up; meanwhile, demand fell. By
contrast, based on the laws of supply and demand, ``as the
resources for enforcement and interdiction have been cut, the
price of cocaine has gone down and the estimated number of
heavy users has gone up.''
Upon questioning, Judge Bonner stated that the Cali Cartel
is ``supplying between 80 and 90 percent of all of the cocaine
that reaches the United States . . .''
Contradicting later testimony by Dr. Brown, the current
ONDCP Director, Bonner stated that the Clinton administration
was ``moving away from'' the Bush Administration's ``Linear
kingpin strategy,'' which Bonner explained ``was designed to go
after the leadership, the key lieutenants, the means of
transport, the means of production . . . of the drug
trafficking organizations . . .'' Bonner called this
regrettable.
In conclusion, Bonner said, ``we are regressing in the
fight against drugs, after making significant, hard-fought and
dramatic gains.'' Quoting University of Michigan researchers,
he said, ``[d]espite substantial progress against illicit drug
use in earlier years . . . it is a problem which is getting
worse at a fairly rapid pace.''
Sadly, Bonner, President Clinton's former DEA
Administrator, observed: ``The Clinton administration has
utterly failed to appreciate the value of strong international
drug law enforcement as a major component in an effective drug
control strategy.'' He called on the President to ``reverse
this trend and start leading our Nation's antidrug efforts.''
h. Testimony of Dr. Lee P. Brown
Dr. Lee P. Brown, President Clinton's Director of the White
House Office of Drug Control Strategy, or White House Drug
Czar, testified in defense of the 1995 National Drug Control
Strategy.
(i). Overall Drug Policy Spending.--Brown testified that
President Clinton's fiscal 1996 budget sought $14.6 billion in
funding across the Federal Government for drug related Federal
programs.
For context, the President's 1995 National Drug Control
Strategy lists the total ``Drug Budget'' as $14,550.4
(million). This figure is somewhat misleading, however, since
it contains funding for a variety of programs mixed purposes,
such as the Federal Court System, Food and Drug Administration,
Social Security Administration, Department of Agriculture's
Agricultural Research Service, U.S. Forest Service, Department
of Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Land
Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, National Park Service,
Department of Justice's Community Policy, Immigration and
Naturalization Service, U.S. Marshal's Service and Tax
Division, an unidentified grant to the Department of Labor,
ONDCP's ``gift fund'' (zeroed out in fiscal 1996), the Small
Business Administration, the Agency for International
Development (AID), the Department of Treasury's Internal
Revenue Service, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Information Agency
(USIA), and a range of other disparate Federal initiatives.\53\
\53\ See National Drug Control Strategy, February 1995, The White
House, pp. 120-121.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A dual concern raised by some members of the Subcommittee
was how these funds are actually spent and who coordinates the
spending. The latter concern boiled down to accountability,
avoiding duplication, and assuring interagency coordination.
Dr. Brown testified that the President recognized the drug
``link to other domestic policy issues, such as individual
economic security, health care, housing, jobs, educational
opportunities, crime and violence, and family and community
stability.''
(ii). Shift To Treatment.--Seeking to justify the
Administration's acknowledged shift to treatment of hardcore
drug users and the President's request for ``$2.8 billion for
treatment'' in fiscal 1996, Dr. Brown noted that ``chronic
hardcore drug users comprise 20 percent of the drug user
population but consume two-thirds of the drugs . . .'' From
this, he argued that ``past strategy [sic] ignores this
inextricable part of the drug problem.''
In fact, while the 1995 National Drug Control Strategy does
increase the proportion of overall spending devoted to
treatment, past strategies have included--and have steadily
increased--funding for treatment. In fact, Federal treatment
funding has increased every year from 1982 to 1995.\54\
\54\ Fiscal Year 1992, Federal treatment spending stood at $505.6
million. Fiscal year 1995, Federal treatment spending stood at $ 2.65
billion. National Drug Control Strategy: Budget Summary, Office of
National Drug Control Policy, February 1995, p. 238.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
John Walters further testified that ``between 1988 and
1993, we roughly tripled the treatment budget of the Federal
Government,'' while the ``number of people treated per year
declined.'' The decline, according to Walters, was the result
of ``bureaucracy'' and money being channeled to effective
treatment programs.
Dr. Brown testified that ``the best way to reduce the
overall demand for drugs and the related crime and violence is
to reduce the number of hardcore drug users,'' adding that
``treatment works.''
In defense of this statement, Brown cited a June 1994 RAND
study that reportedly found that ``drug treatment is the most
cost effective drug control intervention.'' Brown asserted that
the study found that ``for every dollar invested in drug
treatment in 1992, taxpayers saved $7 in crime and health care
costs.''
Brown did not comment on the arguments raised by Walters,
Bennett, and Bonner against increasing treatment spending vis-
a-vis other programs, namely that many of the funded treatment
programs are ineffective and that the Administration has not
created enough ``slots'' to absorb increased spending.
Moreover, he did not acknowledge fundamental limitations of
the June 1994 RAND study as a guide to national policy. The
study was conducted by C. Peter Rydell and Susan S. Everingham
and entitled, ``Controlling Cocaine: Supply versus Demand
Programs.'' While the study is of value, it is also easily
misread, is subject to clear limitations, and is arguably
flawed.
Before examining methodology, two observations on substance
are worth making. First, the study properly condemns
legalization.\55\ Second, the study implies that the
Administration's ``controlled shift'' from interdiction to
source country programs is a serious misstep.\56\
\55\ On legalization, the RAND study explains the devastating
effect that drug legalization would have on overall drug use, by
applying the economic mechanism of reduced prices, or price elasticity.
In 1994, the average street or retail price for a pure gram of cocaine
was $143; if cocaine were legalized, the estimated retail price would
be $15-$20 per gram; See RAND Study, supra, pp. 11, 13.
\56\ On the ``controlled shift,'' the RAND study concludes that
dollar-for-dollar, interdiction is more effective than pumping money
into source country programs. Ironically, while the Administration
embraces the study's pro-treatment conclusion, it obviously rejects
this conclusion. As one drug policy expert noted, ``[t]his analysis
implies that the National Drug Control Strategy's `controlled shift' of
resources from interdiction to source-country control might be a
misstep.'' See Schnaubelt, Christopher, ``Drug treatment Versus Supply
Reduction: Which Is Cheaper?,'' National Interagency Counterdrug
Institute, May 1995, p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed below, in the ``Treatment Policy Oversight''
section, the RAND study has serious limitations, including
omission of prevention as an effective demand reduction
tool,\57\ failure to follow up assessments of active
residential and outpatient treatment programs for long-term
effectiveness,\58\ a disfavoring of supply side programs
because they yield only ``indirect'' benefits and are further
removed from the user population, and the employment of a
flawed measure of effectiveness, namely reduced overall cocaine
consumption rather than a reduced number of users.
\57\ See, e.g., Gleason, Thomas J., Hall, Douglas J., Oliver,
William D., The Executive Summary of PRIDE Communities: A Grassroots
Drug Prevention Effort for Healthy Teens, PRIDE, August, 1995; Burke,
James, E., An Overview of Illegal Drugs in America, Partnership For A
Drug-Free America, Fall, 1995; Johnson, Dr. Lloyd G., Monitoring the
Future, December 1995, University of Michigan Institute for Social
Research.
\58\ The RAND study itself acknowledges that, once treatment ends,
only about 12 percent of out-patient and 17 percent of residential
treatment recipients stop heavy use of cocaine. See C. Peter Rydell and
Susan S. Everingham, ``Controlling Cocaine: Supply Versus Demand
Programs,'' RAND Drug Policy Research Center, Santa Monica, California,
June 1994, pp. 24-25, 88-89.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(iii). Prevention Programs.--Brown acknowledged that ``drug
use among adolescents is rising,'' but attributed the trend to
the final year of the Bush Administration. Brown offered the
view that Safe and Drug Free Schools monies are ``the
cornerstone of this Nation's efforts to educate our children
about drug use'' and are currently disbursed to ``94 percent of
the school districts in this country.''
After first calling for a ``non-partisan'' discussion of
antidrug measures and stating that he was ``determined not to
play politics,'' Brown proceeded to call the 1995 rescission
package, containing unspent 1994 prevention funding for the
complaint-ridden Safe and Drug Free Schools program, a
Republican ``anti-children rescission package.''
No mention was made of accountability problems in Federal
prevention programs, proposed remedies for these reported
problems, or on-going investigations into dispersement of Safe
and Drug Free Schools funds by the Federal Department of
Education or in any of the states.
Congressman Mark Souder raised documentary evidence,
including a study by the Michigan State Governor's Office,
supporting the view that the Safe and Drug Free Schools program
monies had, at least in that state, been ``misapplied,
untargeted and unaudited.''
Congressman Souder also took Brown to task for Brown's
political partisanship, noting that he ``took a direct shot and
very political shot'' at Republicans by suggesting that they
were funding ``a tax break for the wealthiest Americans by
gutting drug education in our schools.'' Souder then quoted
from Democratic Congressman Charles Rangel, who he said had
observed, ``I have been in Congress for over two decades, and I
have never, never, never found any Administration that has been
so silent on this great challenge to the American people.''
Brown responded that the rising youth use trend justified
support for ``school-based prevention programs,'' regardless of
reported accountability problems.\59\ Brown did not address the
1995 Strategy's deemphasis on prevention vis-a-vis treatment.
\59\ See, e.g., publications of Office of Drug Control Policy,
Michigan State, Robert E. Peterson Director, concerning waste, fraud
and abuse in Federal prevention funds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Upon questioning, and against the backdrop of his own
favorable comments regarding Mrs. Reagan's ``Just Say No''
campaign, Brown sought to defend statements in the President's
1995 Strategy, particularly the Strategy's contentions that
``simplistic prevention messages of the past appear not to work
for today's young people'' and ``[a]nti-drug messages are
losing their potency among the Nation's youth.'' \60\
\60\ National Drug Control Strategy, The White House, February
1995, p. 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
His defense of these messages hinged on the view that ``we
have seen a substantial reduction in your non-addicted, if you
would, the casual drug user population,'' and emphasis had to
be placed, after 1993, on the ``chronic hardcore drug user
population.''
Brown did not address recent numbers indicating increases
in both the casual and hardcore user populations, numbers that
contradict both his contentions--that casual use is
sufficiently low to warrant a shift of strategy, and that the
Administration's post-1993 shift toward hardcore users has
shown results.
(iv). Interdiction Mentioned.--Brown confirmed a shift in
trafficking patterns toward greater use of container cargo and
noted that ``over 70 percent of the cocaine entering our
country crosses the border with Mexico,'' but was unable to
explain reduced emphasis in the current strategy on National
Guard Container Search Workdays along the U.S.-Mexican border.
Specifically, Brown had no answer for the question why National
Guard Container Search Workdays fell from 227,827 in 1994 to a
1996 projection of 209,000, as described in ONDCP's own 1995
Strategy at page 41.
Notably, the 1995 ONDCP Strategy also describes an
inexplicable drop in other National Guard workdays from 597,385
in 1994 to 589,000 in 1995 and 530,000 projected for 1996; a
drop in Ship Days devoted to drug interdiction from 2,268 in
1994 to 1,545 in 1995 and projected for 1996; and a reduction
in Department of Defense flight hours from 50,624 in 1994 to
50,000 in 1995 and projected for 1996.\61\
\61\ National Drug Control Strategy, The White House, February
1995, p. 41.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Congressman Gene Taylor (D-Miss), citing ``serious flaws in
the policy'' and noting his own recent trip to Colombia, asked
Dr. Brown why more Customs agents were not available for border
inspections of containers coming out of Colombia.
Brown responded that he had been on the U.S.-Mexican border
himself, that he was ``committed to make sure that we do all
that's humanly possible,'' and that ``it becomes the
responsibility of the Mexican Government to do what they can .
. .''
Pressed again by Taylor to provide an answer on U.S.
Customs resources, Dr. Brown offered that the Administration
had a source country policy. Finally, in frustration, Taylor
stated: ``We're in the same political party. I'm not here to
beat up on you. But I'm asking you to rethink the strategy . .
.'' Dr. Brown never answered Congressman Taylor's Customs
question.
Dr. Brown testified that, at the Department of Justice, the
original Bush administration ``kingpin strategy'' was still
being pursued, and on a different topic, Brown testified that
he had no evidence that Haitian President Aristide was
``involved in any drug trafficking.''
Generally, Brown condemned ``Congress'' for having ``failed
to fulfill [the President's] budget request.'' However, Brown
made no attempt to provide specific answers to members'
questions concerning (1) the President's own proposed deep cuts
in interdiction and international program funding, (2)
accountability, (3) shifting interdiction resources to source
countries, (4) a reduction of Customs agents at the Southwest
border, or (5) the shift in resources from prevention of casual
use (80 percent of total users) by juveniles to treatment for
older, chronic, hardcore users (20 percent of total).
(v). Interdiction and the Kramek Letter.--Subcommittee
Chairman Bill Zeliff (R-NH) introduced an unclassified piece of
correspondence dated December 1994 between the Interdiction
Coordinator, Admiral Kramek, and the Director of ONDCP, Dr.
Brown, which stated that a consensus of agency heads believed
``we need to restore assets to the interdiction force structure
. . .'' and ``we must return to the 1992-1993 levels of
effort.''
The Kramek letter also indicated that the source country
programs were not yet ``producing necessary results.''
Addressing drugs as a national security threat, the Kramek
letter specifically asked for a meeting with the President. The
letter read, ``I believe it appropriate that we meet with the
President and National Security Advisor as soon as possible to
brief them on the results of our conference and discuss the
current state of implementation and national strategy . . . Of
key importance to this meeting is the determination of priority
of counting narcotics trafficking as a threat to national
security of the United States as evaluated against other
threats to our security that compete for resources.''
The Subcommittee Chairman asked Brown if he had followed
the Interdiction Coordinator's and agency heads' consensus that
drug interdiction resources be returned to the ``1992-1993
levels.'' Brown indicated that he held a view different from
that of the Interdiction Coordinator and had, apparently, not
followed that recommendation. Similarly, the Subcommittee
Chairman asked Brown if he had taken the Interdiction
Coordinator's request to the President or National Security
Advisor. Brown indicated that he had not, and apparently also
had not set up the requested meetings between Kramek and the
President, or between Kramek and the National Security Advisor
to ``determin[e] [the] priority of counting narcotics
trafficking as a threat to national security . . .''
(vi). Shift to Source Countries.--Brown conceded a shift of
resources from interdiction to ``international efforts in
source countries,'' but was unable to offer results of the
shift or details about how the source country programs were
being implemented or managed.
As an addenda, hearings held by the Subcommittee in June
1995 (see below) revealed serious mismanagement and
misdirection of the source country programs, according to
General Accounting Office investigators.
(vii). No Measurable Goals.--Brown extolled the President's
Strategy as ``new'' and ``action-oriented'', and testified that
it offered ``specific targets and steps to achieve these
targets.''
As a matter of record, however, the Clinton Strategies have
arguably failed even to meet the clear statutory obligation
that specific goals and measurable objectives be set forth--
goals against which progress or a lack thereof can meaningfully
be gauged.
Section 1005 of the Antidrug Abuse Act of 1988 sets forth
the requirement that every National Drug Control Strategy
present both ``long-range goals for reducing drug abuse in the
United States'' and ``short-term measurable objectives'' for
completion in two years from the date of the strategy's
submission. These are statutory requirements.
Thus, between 1989 and 1992, the Bush Administration set
forth clear and quantifiable goals and objectives, each one
susceptible to evaluation on an ``achieved'' or ``did not
achieve'' basis. In the language of the 1992 Strategy, the
President laid out ``10 detailed goals and objectives with
specific numerical and proportional targets,'' and expressly
stated that ``if levels and rates of national drug use do not
fall, the Strategy is a failure--a test this document continues
to invite.''
By example, the Bush strategy set the goal to ``reduce
current overall drug use by 15 percent,'' but then stated in
1992: ``Goal not met. Current overall drug use declined 13
percent from 1988 to 1991.'' The same 1992 strategy, projecting
long-range goals, sought a 1994 goal of ``25 percent reduction
below the 1988 level in the number of people reporting any
illegal use of drugs in the past month'' and a 2002 objective
of ``65 percent reduction below the 1988 level in the number of
people reporting any illegal use of drugs in the past month.''
Each of the prior Bush Drug Control Strategies, and the
remaining 1992 goals, were similarly specific. Each met the
requirements of the statute, and permitted accountability.
The Clinton Strategies have been a stark contrast. Contrary
to Dr. Brown's assertions of specificity, the statutory
requirement has likely not been met.
For example, the first stated goal of the 1995 Drug Control
Strategy is simply ``reduce the number of drug users in
America.'' The second goal is to ``expand treatment capacity
and services and increase treatment effectiveness so that those
who need treatment can receive it.'' The third goal is ``reduce
the burden on the health care system by reducing the spread of
infectious diseases related to drug use.''
All the remaining goals are similarly open-ended,
essentially unmeasurable, and lacking the statutorily required
``objectives with specific numerical and proportional
targets.'' In short, contrary to Dr. Brown's assertions before
the Subcommittee, the goals were neither specific nor
measurable in terms prescribed by the 1988 Antidrug Abuse Act.
(viii). No Heroin Strategy.--Brown testified that the
Nation faced ``growing availability of cheap and high purity
heroin,'' and acknowledged ``concern about the possibility of
another heroin epidemic.''
He assured the Subcommittee that ``the Clinton
administration was responding . . . with a new heroin strategy
which reaffirms that heroin control is one of our major foreign
policy objectives.''
In fact, as later conceded, President Clinton had promised
the Nation a heroin strategy within 120 days of taking office.
As of March 1995, he had not yet signed a heroin strategy.
The President finally signed a heroin strategy on November
29, 1995, according to internal reports. The Strategy, however,
apparently has no implementing guidelines.
Brown concluded his testimony by agreeing to return to
testify before the Subcommittee within one month.
i. Testimony of Admiral Paul Yost
Admiral Paul Yost, former 18th Commandant of the United
States Coast Guard and presently President of the non-partisan
James Madison Fellowship Foundation, testified on the topics of
interdiction and interagency coordination.
He testified that the Nation witnessed a ``major build-up
in drug interdiction in the at-sea war on drugs from 1984
through 1990,'' with the result that this interdiction effort
``successfully interrupted the flow of bulk marijuana by sea
and cocaine by air over the water routes [of the Caribbean].''
In Admiral Yost's view, ``strong interdiction and law
enforcement were providing a climate [from 1984 through 1990]
that made it clear to the [drug] trafficker that `this is
wrong, and your chances of being intercepted are very high.' ''
Since that time, he testified, there has been a ``tragic
dismantling'' of the at-sea interdiction effort, so that today
``there are several orders of magnitude less effort spent on
drug interdiction.''
Specifically, Yost testified that ``ship days and aircraft
hours are drastically reduced [from 1990],'' and ``[a]ll of the
Coast Guard jet aircraft, the Falcons with the f-16 intercept
radars, were taken away from interdiction . . .'' ``The three
Coast Guard E-2C airborne early warning aircraft have been
turned back to the Navy and used for other purposes,'' and
``the Coast Guard Air Station at St. Augustine, Florida, which
was established to support these three multimillion dollar
aircraft, is now closed.'' On questioning, Yost indicated that
he believed some of the E-2Cs were even being
``decommissioned.''
Moreover, Yost testified, ``the Coast Guard C-130 airborne
early warning aircraft has been turned over to the Air Force,
stripped of its equipment, including a dome-mounted radar, and
is now used for transportation of cargo.'' ``In addition, the
new Command Control Communications and Intelligence Center has
been closed, and its duties performed elsewhere.''
Calling the resultant increase in drug availability and
drug use predictable, Yost testified that the Nation ``will
never stop drug use without a solid interdiction foundation for
. . . education and treatment programs.''
Accordingly, Yost favored a return to ``emphasiz[ing] the
interdiction prong of the drug strategy'' and increased budget
authority for the Coast Guard.
Finally, Yost discussed the need for better interagency
coordination. He supports greater ``authority'' for the White
House Drug Czar and President's Interdiction Coordinator.
Without the ability, specifically, to ``direct cabinet-level
officers regarding budget allocation, personnel allocation, or
forced deployments'' on this issue, both positions are
``largely ceremonial,'' he said.
Yost believes that ``a priority on drug interdiction . . .
would have to be imposed on Cabinet departments by the
President himself.'' An effective interdiction policy would
require that one person be ``in charge,'' and able to ``lay
force requirements on other agency heads for specific filed
operations,'' as well as receiving ``authority to direct both
strategy and tactics . . .'' A ``theater commander'' is needed,
according to Yost, and ``a totally committed Congress and
Administration.'' Yost concluded by observing that, ``up to
now, we have been unable to select a theater commander and to
delegate to him the authority he needs to win.''
Responding to a question from the Subcommittee Chairman,
Admiral Yost noted that his successful at-sea weapons
interdiction program in Vietnam had ``three or four times the
drug interdiction assets per mile of coast,'' ``a dedicated
commander,'' a ``chain of command,'' and mechanisms for
assuring ``responsibility and accountability,'' all of which
are missing from the current drug war.
Yost emphasized that interdiction, alone, will not win the
drug war; interdiction must be the foundation for prevention,
education, and treatment--and ``that's what'll win the war.''
j. Testimony of Thomas Hedrick, Jr.
Thomas Hedrick, Jr., Vice Chairman of the Partnership for a
Drug-Free America, testified that prevention and interdiction
advocates must begin to work together, and that ``preventing
drug use by young people'' is essential ``if we are to have a
prayer of building safe and healthy families and communities.''
(i). Removing Barriers to Winning the Drug War.--As a
prevention expert with ten years of experience, Hedrick
testified that, ``quite frankly, I am frightened because after
nearly a decade of progress, drug use is rapidly increasing.''
Hedrick testified that drug abuse is a ``process'' that
begins with the first use decision, and that ``any use'' of
illegal drugs should be defined as ``abuse.''
Hedrick testified that the Partnership sees three major
barriers, each a public misperception, to winning the drug war.
The first mispercep