Congressional Documents
105th Congress Rept. 105-135
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session Part 1
_______________________________________________________________________
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998
_______
June 18, 1997.--Ordered to be printed
_______________________________________________________________________
Mr. Goss, from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
MINORITY VIEWS
[To accompany H.R. 1775]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was
referred the bill (H.R. 1775) to authorize appropriations for
fiscal year 1998 for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the United States Government, the Community
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes,
having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an
amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.
CONTENTS
The bill as reported............................................. 2
Purpose.......................................................... 11
Overall perspective on the intelligence budget and committee
intent......................................................... 12
Scope of committee review........................................ 12
Committee findings and recommendations........................... 13
Areas of Special Interest........................................ 15
Shortfalls in All-Source Analysis............................ 15
``Downstream'' Intelligence Activities....................... 17
Clandestine Humint Funding................................... 18
Present funding of Clandestine Humint.................... 18
Budgeting for the Future................................. 19
Technical Investments........................................ 19
A Corporate and Flexible Community........................... 20
Quadrennial Defense Review of Intelligence................... 21
Intelligence System Interoperability......................... 22
FBIS Reorganization.......................................... 23
DCI Nonproliferation Center.................................. 24
Declassification............................................. 26
Review of National Drug Intelligence Architecture............ 27
Joint Military Intelligence Program.............................. 28
Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities..................... 45
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Bill as Reported.............. 53
Title I--Intelligence Activities............................. 53
Section 101--Authorization of Appropriations............. 53
Section 102--Classified Schedule of Authorizations....... 53
Section 103--Personnel Ceiling Adjustments............... 53
Section 104--Community Management Account................ 54
Title II--Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and
Disability System.......................................... 54
Section 201--Authorization of Appropriations............. 54
Title III--General Provisions................................ 54
Section 301--Increase in Employee Compensation and
Benefits Authorized by Law............................. 54
Section 302--Restriction on Conduct of Intelligence
Activities............................................. 54
Section 303--Administration of the Office of the Director
of Central Intelligence................................ 55
Section 304--Detail of Intelligence Community Personnel--
Intelligence Community Assignment Program.............. 55
Section 305--Application of Sanctions Laws to
Intelligence Activities................................ 56
Title IV--Central Intelligence Agency........................ 58
Section 401--Multiyear Leasing Authority................. 58
Section 402--CIA Central Services Program................ 59
Section 403--Protection of CIA Facilities................ 59
Title V--Department of Defense............................... 61
Section 501--Authority to Award Academic Degree of
Bachelor of Science in Intelligence.................... 61
Section 502--Unauthorized Use of Name, Initials, or Seal
of National Reconnaissance Office...................... 62
Section 503--Extension of Authority for Enhancement of
Capabilities of Certain Army Facilities................ 62
Title VI--Miscellaneous Community Program Adjustments........ 63
Section 601--Coordination of Armed Forces Information
Security Programs...................................... 63
Section 602--Authority of Executive Agent of Integrated
Broadcast Service...................................... 63
Section 603--Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle............ 63
Section 604--U-2 Sensor Program.......................... 63
Section 605--Requirements Relating to Congressional
Budget Justification Books............................. 64
Section 606--Joint SIGINT Program Office................. 64
Section 607--Discontinuation of the Defense Space
Reconnaissance Program................................. 65
Section 608--Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office...... 65
Committee position............................................... 65
Findings and recommendations of the Committee on Government
Reform and Oversight........................................... 65
Oversight findings............................................... 65
Fiscal year cost projections..................................... 66
Congressional Budget Office estimates............................ 66
Committee cost estimates......................................... 67
Specific Constitutional authority for Congressional enactment of
this legislation............................................... 67
Changes to existing law.......................................... 68
Minority views................................................... 79
The amendment is as follows:
Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu
thereof the following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1998''.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1998
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of the following elements of the United States Government:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Department of Defense.
(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(4) The National Security Agency.
(5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(6) The Department of State.
(7) The Department of the Treasury.
(8) The Department of Energy.
(9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(10) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
(11) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(12) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts
authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized
personnel ceilings as of September 30, 1998, for the conduct of the
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed
in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 1775 of the 105th
Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The
Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on
Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the
President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the
Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the
executive branch.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of Central
Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess
of the number authorized for fiscal year 1998 under section 102 when
the Director of Central Intelligence determines that such action is
necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions,
except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number
authorized under such section may not, for any element of the
intelligence community, exceed two percent of the number of civilian
personnel authorized under such section for such element.
(b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of Central
Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate whenever he exercises the authority
granted by this section.
SEC. 104. COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated for the Community Management Account of the Director of
Central Intelligence for fiscal year 1998 the sum of $147,588,000.
Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for the Advanced Research
and Development Committee and the Environmental Intelligence and
Applications Program shall remain available until September 30, 1999.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the Community
Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence are
authorized a total of 313 full-time personnel as of September 30, 1998.
Such personnel may be permanent employees of the Community Management
Account elements or personnel detailed from other elements of the
United States Government.
(c) Classified Authorizations.--In addition to amounts authorized to
be appropriated by subsection (a) and the personnel authorized by
subsection (b)--
(1) there is authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year
1998 such amounts, and
(2) there is authorized such personnel as of September 30,
1998,
for the Community Management Account, as are specified in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).
(d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (as added by section 304 of this Act), during
fiscal year 1998 any officer or employee of the United States or member
of the Armed Forces who is detailed to an element of the Community
Management Account from another element of the United States Government
shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis; except that any such
officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis
for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary
functions as required by the Director of Central Intelligence.
(e) National Drug Intelligence Center.--
(1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated
in subsection (a), the amount of $27,000,000 shall be available
for the National Drug Intelligence Center. Within such amount,
funds provided for research, development, test, and engineering
purposes shall remain available until September 30, 1999, and
funds provided for procurement purposes shall remain available
until September 30, 2000.
(2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central Intelligence
shall transfer to the Attorney General of the United States
funds available for the National Drug Intelligence Center under
paragraph (1). The Attorney General shall utilize funds so
transferred for the activities of the Center.
(3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the Center may not be
used in contravention of the provisions of section 103(d)(1) of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)).
(4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the
operations of the Center.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 1998 the sum of
$196,900,000.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY
LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement,
and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in
such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed
to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity
which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of
the United States.
SEC. 303. ADMINISTRATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
Subsection (e) of section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 403) is amended by adding at the end the following new
paragraph:
``(4) The Office of the Director of Central Intelligence shall, for
administrative purposes, be within the Central Intelligence Agency.''.
SEC. 304. DETAIL OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONNEL--INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY ASSIGNMENT PROGRAM.
(a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
``detail of intelligence community personnel--intelligence community
assignment program
``Sec. 113. (a) Detail.--(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, the head of a department with an element in the intelligence
community or the head of an intelligence community agency or element
may detail any employee within that department, agency, or element to
serve in any position in the Intelligence Community Assignment Program
on a reimbursable or a nonreimbursable basis.
``(2) Nonreimbursable details may be for such periods as are agreed
to between the heads of the parent and host agencies, up to a maximum
of three years, except that such details may be extended for a period
not to exceed 1 year when the heads of the parent and host agencies
determine that such extension is in the public interest.
``(b) Benefits, Allowances, Travel, Incentives.--An employee detailed
under subsection (a) may be authorized any benefit, allowance, travel,
or incentive otherwise provided to enhance staffing by the organization
from which they are being detailed.
``(c) Annual Report.--(1) Not later than March 1 of each year, the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to the
Permanent Select Committee onIntelligence of the House of
Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate
a report describing the detail of intelligence community personnel
pursuant to subsection (a) for the previous 12-month period, including
the number of employees detailed, the identity of parent and host
agencies or elements, and an analysis of the benefits of the program.
``(2) The Director shall submit the first of such reports not later
than March 1, 1999.
``(d) Termination.--The authority to make details under this section
terminates on September 30, 2002.''.
(b) Technical Amendment.--Sections 120, 121, and 110 of the National
Security Act of 1947 are hereby redesignated as sections 110, 111, and
112, respectively.
(c) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents contained in the first
section of such Act is amended by striking the items relating to
sections 120, 121, and 110 and inserting the following:
``Sec. 110. National mission of National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
``Sec. 111. Collection tasking authority.
``Sec. 112. Restrictions on intelligence sharing with the United
Nations.
``Sec. 113. Detail of intelligence community personnel--intelligence
community assignment program.''.
(d) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) of this
section shall apply to an employee on detail on or after January 1,
1997.
SEC. 305. APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS LAWS TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
Section 905 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 441d) is
amended by striking ``1998'' and inserting ``1999''.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SEC. 401. MULTIYEAR LEASING AUTHORITY.
(a) In General.--Section 5 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 is amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraphs (a) through (f) as paragraphs
(1) through (6), respectively;
(2) by inserting ``(a)'' after ``Sec. 5.'';
(3) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (5), as so
redesignated;
(4) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (6), as so
redesignated, and inserting ``; and'';
(5) by inserting after paragraph (6) the following new
paragraph:
``(7) Notwithstanding section 1341(a)(1) of title 31, United States
Code, enter into multiyear leases for up to 15 years that are not
otherwise authorized pursuant to section 8 of this Act.''; and
(6) by inserting at the end the following new subsection:
``(b)(1) The authority to enter into a multiyear lease under
subsection (a)(7) shall be subject to appropriations provided in
advance for (A) the entire lease, or (B) the first 12 months of the
lease and the Government's estimated termination liability.
``(2) In the case of any such lease entered into under clause (B) of
paragraph (1)--
``(A) such lease shall include a clause that provides that
the contract shall be terminated if budget authority (as
defined by section 3(2) of the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 622(2))) is not
provided specifically for that project in an appropriations Act
in advance of an obligation of funds in respect thereto;
``(B) notwithstanding section 1552 of title 31, United States
Code, amounts obligated for paying termination costs in respect
of such lease shall remain available until the costs associated
with termination of such lease are paid;
``(C) funds available for termination liability shall remain
available to satisfy rental obligations in respect of such
lease in subsequent fiscal years in the event such lease is not
terminated early, but only to the extent those funds are in
excess of the amount of termination liability in that
subsequent year; and
``(D) annual funds made available in any fiscal year may be
used to make payments on such lease for a maximum of 12 months
beginning any time during the fiscal year.''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) applies
with respect to multiyear leases entered into pursuant to section 5 of
the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended by subsection
(a), on or after October 1, 1997.
SEC. 402. CIA CENTRAL SERVICES PROGRAM.
The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.)
is amended by adding at the end the following new section:
``central services program
``Sec. 21. (a) Establishment.--The Director may--
``(1) establish a program to provide the central services
described in subsection (b)(2); and
``(2) make transfers to and expenditures from the working
capital fund established under subsection (b)(1).
``(b) Establishment and Purposes of Central Services Working Capital
Fund.--(1) There is established a central services working capital
fund. The Fund shall be available until expended for the purposes
described in paragraph (2), subject to subsection (j).
``(2) The purposes of the Fund are to pay for equipment, salaries,
maintenance, operation and other expenses for such services as the
Director, subject to paragraph (3), determines to be central services
that are appropriate and advantageous to provide to the Agency or to
other Federal agencies on a reimbursable basis.
``(3) The determination and provision of central services by the
Director of Central Intelligence under paragraph (2) shall be subject
to the prior approval of the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget.
``(c) Assets in Fund.--The Fund shall consist of money and assets, as
follows:
``(1) Amounts appropriated to the Fund for its initial
monetary capitalization.
``(2) Appropriations available to the Agency under law for
the purpose of supplementing the Fund.
``(3) Such inventories, equipment, and other assets,
including inventories and equipment on order, pertaining to the
services to be carried on by the central services program.
``(4) Such other funds as the Director is authorized to
transfer to the Fund.
``(d) Limitations.--(1) The total value of orders for services
described in subsection (b)(2) from the central services program at any
time shall not exceed an annual amount approved in advance by the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget.
``(2) No goods or services may be provided to any non-Federal entity
by the central services program.
``(e) Reimbursements to Fund.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, the Fund shall be--
``(1) reimbursed, or credited with advance payments, from
applicable appropriations and funds of the Agency, other
Intelligence Community agencies, or other Federal agencies, for
the central services performed by the central services program,
at rates that will recover the full cost of operations paid for
from the Fund, including accrual of annual leave, workers'
compensation, depreciation of capitalized plant and equipment,
and amortization of automated data processing software; and
``(2) if applicable credited with the receipts from sale or
exchange of property, including any real property, or in
payment for loss or damage to property, held by the central
services program as assets of the Fund.
``(f) Retention of Portion of Fund Income.--(1) The Director may
impose a fee for central services provided from the Fund. The fee for
any item or service provided under the central services program may not
exceed four percent of the cost of such item or service.
``(2) As needed for the continued self-sustaining operation of the
Fund, an amount not to exceed four percent of the net receipts of the
Fund in fiscal year 1998 and each fiscal year thereafter may be
retained, subject to subsection (j), for the acquisition of capital
equipment and for the improvement and implementation of the Agency's
information management systems (including financial management,
payroll, and personnel information systems). Any proposed use of the
retained income in fiscal years 1998, 1999, and 2000, shall only be
made with the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget and after notification to the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate.
``(3) Not later than 30 days after the close of each fiscal year,
amounts in excess of the amount retained under paragraph (2) shall be
transferred to the United States Treasury.
``(g) Audit.--(1) The Inspector General of the Central Intelligence
Agency shall conduct and complete an audit of the Fund within three
months after the close ofeach fiscal year. The Director of the Office
of Management and Budget shall determine the form and content of the
audit, which shall include at least an itemized accounting of the
central services provided, the cost of each service, the total receipts
received, the agencies or departments serviced, and the amount returned
to the United States Treasury.
``(2) Not later than 30 days after the completion of the audit, the
Inspector General shall submit a copy of the audit to the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of Central
Intelligence, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate.
``(h) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
``(1) the term `central services program' means the program
established under subsection (a); and
``(2) the term `Fund' means the central services working
capital fund established under subsection (b)(1).
``(i) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated to the Fund $5,000,000 for the purposes specified in
subsection (b)(2).
``(j) Termination.--(1) The Fund shall terminate on March 31, 2000,
unless otherwise reauthorized by an Act of Congress prior to that date.
``(2) Subject to paragraph (1) and after providing notice to the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate,
the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget--
``(A) may terminate the central services program and the Fund
at any time; and
``(B) upon any such termination, shall provide for
dispositions of personnel, assets, liabilities, grants,
contracts, property, records, and unexpended balances of
appropriations, authorizations, allocations, and other funds
held, used, arising from, available to, or to be made available
in connection with such Fund, as may be necessary.''.
SEC. 403. PROTECTION OF CIA FACILITIES.
Subsection (a) of section 15 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act
of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403o(a)) is amended--
(1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(a)'';
(2) by striking ``powers only within Agency installations,''
and all that follows through the end, and inserting the
following: ``powers--
``(A) within the Agency Headquarters Compound and the
property controlled and occupied by the Federal Highway
Administration located immediately adjacent to such Compound
and in the streets, sidewalks, and the open areas within the
zone beginning at the outside boundary of such Compound and
property and extending outward 500 feet; and
``(B) within any other Agency installation and in the
streets, sidewalks, and open areas within the zone beginning at
the outside boundary of any such installation and extending
outward 500 feet.''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
``(2) The performance of functions and exercise of powers under
paragraph (1) shall be limited to those circumstances where such
personnel can identify specific and articulable facts giving such
personnel reason to believe that their performance of such functions
and exercise of such powers is reasonable to protect against physical
attack or threats of attack upon the Agency installations, property, or
employees.
``(3) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to preclude, or
limit in any way, the authority of any Federal, State, or local law
enforcement agency or of any other Federal police or Federal protective
service.
``(4) The rules and regulations enforced by such personnel shall be
the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director and shall only be
applicable to the areas referred to in paragraph (1).
``(5) On December 1, 1998, and annually thereafter, the Director
shall submit a report to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate that describes in detail the exercise of the
authority granted by this subsection, and the underlying facts
supporting the exercise of such authority, during the preceding fiscal
year. The Director shall make such report available to the Inspector
General of the Agency.''.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 501. AUTHORITY TO AWARD ACADEMIC DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF SCIENCE IN
INTELLIGENCE.
(a) Authority for New Bachelor's Degree.--Section 2161 of title 10,
United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
``Sec. 2161. Joint Military Intelligence College: academic degrees
``Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, the
president of the Joint Military Intelligence College may, upon
recommendation by the faculty of the college, confer upon a graduate of
the college who has fulfilled the requirements for the degree the
following:
``(1) The degree of Master of Science of Strategic
Intelligence (MSSI).
``(2) The degree of Bachelor of Science in Intelligence
(BSI).''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The item relating to that section in the
table of sections at the beginning of chapter 108 of such title is
amended to read as follows:
``2161. Joint Military Intelligence College: academic degrees.''.
SEC. 502. UNAUTHORIZED USE OF NAME, INITIALS, OR SEAL OF NATIONAL
RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE.
(a) Extension, Reorganization, and Consolidation of Authorities.--
Subchapter I of chapter 21 of title 10, United States Code, is amended
by adding at the end the following new section:
``Sec. 425. Prohibition of unauthorized use of name, initials, or seal:
specified intelligence agencies
``(a) Prohibition.--Except with the written permission of the
Secretary of Defense, no person may knowingly use, in connection with
any merchandise, retail product, impersonation, solicitation, or
commercial activity in a manner reasonably calculated to convey the
impression that such use is approved, endorsed, or authorized by the
Secretary of Defense, any of the following (or any colorable imitation
thereof):
``(1) The words `Defense Intelligence Agency', the initials
`DIA', or the seal of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
``(2) The words `National Reconnaissance Office', the
initials `NRO', or the seal of the National Reconnaissance
Office.
``(3) The words `National Imagery and Mapping Agency', the
initials `NIMA', or the seal of the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency.
``(4) The words `Defense Mapping Agency', the initials `DMA',
or the seal of the Defense Mapping Agency.''.
(b) Transfer of Enforcement Authority.--Subsection (b) of section 202
of title 10, United States Code, is transferred to the end of section
425 of such title, as added by subsection (a), and is amended by
inserting ``Authority To Enjoin Violations.--'' after ``(b)''.
(c) Repeal of Reorganized Provisions.--Sections 202 and 445 of title
10, United States Code, are repealed.
(d) Clerical Amendments.--
(1) The table of sections at the beginning of subchapter II
of chapter 8 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by
striking out the item relating to section 202.
(2) The table of sections at the beginning of subchapter I of
chapter 21 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by
striking out the items relating to sections 424 and 425 and
inserting in lieu thereof the following:
``424. Disclosure of organizational and personnel information:
exemption for Defense Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance
Office, and National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
``425. Prohibition of unauthorized use of name, initials, or seal:
specified intelligence agencies.''.
(3) The table of sections at the beginning of subchapter I of
chapter 22 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by
striking out the item relating to section 445.
SEC. 503. EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY FOR ENHANCEMENT OF CAPABILITIES OF
CERTAIN ARMY FACILITIES.
Effective October 1, 1997, section 506(b) of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-93; 109 Stat.
974) is amended by striking out``fiscal years 1996 and 1997'' and
inserting in lieu thereof ``fiscal years 1998 and 1999''.
TITLE VI--MISCELLANEOUS COMMUNITY PROGRAM ADJUSTMENTS
SEC. 601. COORDINATION OF ARMED FORCES INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAMS.
(a) Program Execution Coordination.--The Secretary of a military
department or the head of a defense agency may not obligate or expend
funds for any information security program of that military department
without the concurrence of the Director of the National Security
Agency.
(b) Effective Date.--This section takes effect on October 1, 1997.
SEC. 602. AUTHORITY OF EXECUTIVE AGENT OF INTEGRATED BROADCAST SERVICE.
All amounts appropriated for any fiscal year for intelligence
information data broadcast systems may be obligated or expended by an
intelligence element of the Department of Defense only with the
concurrence of the official in the Department of Defense designated as
the executive agent of the Integrated Broadcast Service.
SEC. 603. PREDATOR UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE.
(a) Transfer of Functions.--Effective October 1, 1997, the functions
described in subsection (b) with respect to the Predator Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle are transferred to the Secretary of the Air Force.
(b) Functions To Be Transferred.--Subsection (a) applies to those
functions performed as of June 1, 1997, by the organization within the
Department of Defense known as the Unmanned Aerial Joint Program Office
with respect to the Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.
(c) Transfer of Funds.--Effective October 1, 1997, all unexpended
funds appropriated for the Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle that are
within the Defense-Wide Program Element number 0305205D are transferred
to Air Force Program Element number 0305154F.
SEC. 604. U-2 SENSOR PROGRAM.
(a) Requirement for Minimum Number of Aircraft.--The Secretary of
Defense shall ensure--
(1) that not less than 11 U-2 reconnaissance aircraft are
equipped with RAS-1 sensor suites; and
(2) that each such aircraft that is so equipped is maintained
in a manner necessary to counter available threat technologies
until the aircraft is retired or until a successor sensor suite
is developed and fielded.
(b) Effective Date.--Subsection (a) takes effect on October 1, 1997.
SEC. 605. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION
BOOKS.
(a) In General.--The congressional budget justification books for any
element of the intelligence community submitted to Congress in support
of the budget of the President for any fiscal year shall include, at a
minimum, the following:
(1) For each program for which appropriations are requested
for that element of the intelligence community in that budget--
(A) specification of the program, including the
program element number for the program;
(B) the specific dollar amount requested for the
program;
(C) the appropriation account within which funding
for the program is placed;
(D) the budget line item that applies to the program;
(E) specification of whether the program is a
research and development program or otherwise involves
research and development;
(F) identification of the total cost for the program;
and
(G) information relating to all direct and associated
costs in each appropriations account for the program.
(2) A detailed accounting of all reprogramming or
reallocation actions and the status of those actions at the
time of submission of those materials.
(3) Information relating to any unallocated cuts or taxes.
(b) Definitions.--For purposes of this section:
(1) The term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given
that term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 401a).
(2) The term ``congressional budget justification books''
means the budget justification materials submitted to Congress
for any fiscal year in support ofthe budget for that fiscal
year for any element of the intelligence community (as contained in the
budget of the President submitted to Congress for that fiscal year
pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United States Code).
(c) Effective Date.--Subsection (a) shall take effect with respect to
fiscal year 1999.
SEC. 606. COORDINATION OF AIR FORCE JOINT SIGINT PROGRAM OFFICE
ACTIVITIES WITH OTHER MILITARY DEPARTMENTS.
(a) Contracts.--The Secretary of the Air Force, acting through the
Air Force Joint Airborne Signals Intelligence Program Office, may not
modify, amend, or alter a JSAF program contract without coordinating
with the Secretary of any other military department that would be
affected by the modification, amendment, alteration.
(b) New Developments Affecting Operational Military Requirements.--
(1) The Secretary of the Air Force, acting through the Air Force Joint
Airborne Signals Intelligence Program Office, may not enter into a
contract described in paragraph (2) without coordinating with the
Secretary of the military department concerned.
(2) Paragraph (1) applies to a contract for development relating to a
JSAF program that may directly affect the operational requirements of
one of the Armed Forces (other than the Air Force) for the satisfaction
of intelligence requirements.
(c) JSAF Program Defined.--For purposes of this section, the term
``JSAF program'' means a program within the Joint Signals Intelligence
Avionics Family of programs administered by the Air Force Joint
Airborne Signals Intelligence Program Office.
(d) Effective Date.--This section takes effect on October 1, 1997.
SEC. 607. DISCONTINUATION OF THE DEFENSE SPACE RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAM.
Not later than October 1, 1999, the Secretary of Defense shall--
(1) discontinue the Defense Space Reconnaissance Program (a
program within the Joint Military Intelligence Program); and
(2) close the organization within the Department of Defense
known as the Defense Space Program Office (the management
office for that program).
SEC. 608. TERMINATION OF DEFENSE AIRBORNE RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE.
(a) Termination of Office.--The organization within the Department of
Defense known as the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office is
terminated. No funds available for the Department of Defense may be
used for the operation of that Office after the date specified in
subsection (d).
(b) Transfer of Functions.--(1) Subject to paragraphs (3) and (4),
the Secretary of Defense shall transfer to the Defense Intelligence
Agency those functions performed on the day before the date of the
enactment this Act by the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office that
are specified in paragraph (2).
(2) The functions transferred by the Secretary to the Defense
Intelligence Agency under paragraph (1) shall include functions of the
Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office relating to its responsibilities
for management oversight and coordination of defense airborne
reconnaissance capabilities (other than any responsibilities for
acquisition of systems).
(3) The Secretary shall determine which specific functions are
appropriate for transfer under paragraph (1). In making that
determination, the Secretary shall ensure that responsibility for
individual airborne reconnaissance programs with respect to program
management, for research, development, test, and evaluation, for
acquisition, and for operations and related line management remain with
the respective Secretaries of the military departments.
(4) Any function transferred to the Defense Intelligence Agency under
this subsection is subject to the authority, direction, and control of
the Secretary of Defense.
(c) Report.--(1) Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the
committees named in paragraph (2) a report containing the Secretary's
plan for terminating the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office and
transferring the functions of that office.
(2) The committees referred to in paragraph (1) are--
(A) the Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Committee on National Security of the House of Representatives.
(d) Effective Date.--Subsection (a) shall take effect at the end of
the 120-day period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.
Purpose
The bill would:
(1) Authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1997 for (a)
the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the
U.S. Government, (b) the Community Management Account, and (c)
the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability
System;
(2) Authorize the personnel ceilings on September 30, 1998
for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the
U.S. Government and permit the Director of Central Intelligence
to authorize personnel ceilings in Fiscal Year 1998 for any
Intelligence element up to two percent above the authorized
levels, with the approval of the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget;
(3) Authorize $27 million for the National Drug
Intelligence Center in Johnstown, Pennsylvania;
(4) Authorize the Intelligence Community Assignment
Program, which is intended to develop a ``corporate''
perspective among senior Intelligence Community employees
participating in the program;
(5) Extend the authority of the President to defer the
imposition of sanctions through January 6, 1999, when to
proceed without delay would seriously risk the compromise of an
intelligence source or method, or an ongoing criminal
investigation;
(6) Provide the Central Intelligence Agency with multiyear
leasing authority;
(7) Authorize the establishment of a ``Central Services
Program'' within the Central Intelligence Agency that will help
reduce costs and streamline operations within the Intelligence
Community, and authorize the obligation of $5 million from
among the funds authorized to be appropriated to the CIA, which
will be utilized to cover management and overhead costs of the
Central Services Program, with reporting requirements to both
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and the
oversight committees of Congress;
(8) Provide the CIA with additional authority to protect
its facilities and employees from criminal and terrorist
threats;
(9) Authorize the Joint Military Intelligence College to
award Bachelor of Science in Intelligence and Masters of
Science of Strategic Intelligence degrees, pursuant to
regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense;
(10) Prohibit the unauthorized use of the name, initials,
or seal of the National Reconnaissance Office;
(11) Extend the Army's flexible transfer and reprogramming
authority to rectify infrastructure and quality of life
problems at Bad Aibling and Menwith Hill Stations;
(12) Require the coordination of all defense and military
information security systems programs by the National Security
Agency;
(13) Allow the obligation of funds for intelligence and
intelligence-related data broadcast systems only with the
concurrence of the Integrated Broadcast Service Executive
Agent:
(14) Transfer those functions relating to the Predator
unmanned aerial vehicle to the Air Force;
(15) Require the maintenance of a specific number of U-2
Reconnaissance Aircraft with sensor suites;
(16) Require that the Congressional Budget Justification
Books for the National Foreign Intelligence Program and the
Congressional Justification Books for the Joint Military
Intelligence Program and the Tactical Intelligence and Related
Activities of the Department of Defense supply more detail to
Congress than is currently provided;
(17) Discontinue the Defense Space Reconnaissance Program;
and
(18) Abolish the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office and
transfer its current functions to the Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency.
Overall Perspective on the Intelligence Budget and Committee Intent
The classified annex to this public report includes the
classified Schedule of Authorizations and its associated
language. The Committee views the classified annex as an
integral part of this legislation. The classified annex
contains a thorough discussion of all budget issues considered
by the Committee, which underlies the funding authorization
found in the Schedule of Authorizations. It is the intent of
the Committee that all intelligence programs discussed in the
classified annex to this report be conducted in accord with the
guidance and limitations set forth as associate language
therein. The classified Schedule is incorporated directly into
this legislation. The classified annex is available for review
by all Members of the House of Representatives, subject to the
requirements of clause 13 of Rule XLIII of the House.
Scope of Committee Review
U.S. intelligence and intelligence-related activities under
the jurisdiction of the Committee include the National Foreign
Intelligence Program (``NFIP''), the Tactical Intelligence and
Related Activities of the Department of Defense (``TIARA''),
and the Joint Military Intelligence Program (``JMIP'').
The NFIP consists of all programs of the Central
Intelligence Agency, as well as those national foreign
intelligence and/or counterintelligence programs conducted by:
(1) the Department of Defense; (2) the Defense Intelligence
Agency; (3) the National Security Agency; (4) the Departments
of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; (5) the Department of State;
(6) the Department of the Treasury; (7) the Department of
Energy; (8) the Federal Bureau of Investigation; (9) the Drug
Enforcement Administration; (10) the National Reconnaissance
Office; and (11) the National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
The Department of Defense TIARA are a diverse array of
reconnaissance ant target acquisition programs that are a
functional part of the basic military force structure and
provide direct information support to military operations.
TIARA, as defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Secretary of Defense, include those military intelligence
activities outside the General Defense Intelligence Program
that respond to the needs of military commanders for
operational support information, as well as to national
command, control, and intelligence requirements. The programs
comprising TIARA also fall within the jurisdiction of the
Committee on National Security in the House of Representatives.
The JMIP was established in 1995 to provide integrated
program management of defense intelligence elements that
support defense-wide or theater-level consumers. Included
within JMIP are aggregations created for management efficiency
and characterized by similarity, either in intelligence
discipline (e.g. Signals Intelligence, Imagery Intelligence),
or function (e.g. satellite support, aerial reconnaissance).
The following aggregations are included in the JMIP: (1) the
Defense Cryptologic Program (``DCP''); (2) the Defense Imagery
and Mapping Program (``DIMAP''); (3) the Defense General
Intelligence Applications Program (``DGIAP''), which itself
includes (a) the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Program
(``DARP''), (b) the Defense Intelligence Tactical Program
(``DITP''), (c) the Defense Intelligence Special Technologies
Program (``DISTP''), (d) the Defense Intelligence Counterdrug
Program (``DICP''), and (e) the Defense Space Reconnaissance
Program (``DSRP'').
Committee Findings and Recommendations
The Committee completed its review of the President's
fiscal year 1998 budget, carrying out its annual responsibility
to prepare an authorization based on close examination of
intelligence programs and proposed expenditures. The review
continued to reflect the Committee's belief that intelligence
activities must be examined by function as well as by program,
thus, was structured across program lines and intelligence
disciplines and themes. The Committee held seven full Committee
budget-related hearings and two Subcommittee budget hearings on
the following issues: Intelligence Requirements; Airborne
Reconnaissance; Technical Intelligence; Overhead Collection;
Human Intelligence; Covert Action; Analysis and Production;
Counterintelligence; and Personnel and Legislative Issues. The
Committee also held full Committee briefings on subjects such
as the Future Imagery Architecture, Unconventional SIGNINT
Capabilities, and some selected sensitive DoD collection
platforms. There were, in addition, over 100 staff briefings on
programs, specific activities and budget requests.
The Committee continued to place heavy emphasis on
understanding and addressing the future needs of the
Intelligence Community, and the several distinct roles that it
plays in national security. At the national level, the goal of
intelligence is to make the national-level policy maker and
decision maker aware of impending events so that appropriate
actions are taken, especially those than might avoid or contain
conflict. At the other end of the spectrum, intelligence is now
incorporated into the very fiber of tactical military
operational activities, whether forces are being utilized to
conduct humanitarian missions or are engaged in full-scale
conflict. To serve national security objectives, the
Intelligence Community must act throughout the spectrum. Too
often, however, the Intelligence Community has not maintained a
balance between the diverse strategic and tactical demands it
now faces and will face in the future. Specifically, in recent
years, the Community has emphasized fleeting current
intelligence issues, often at the expense of keeping a watchful
eye on those areas that are likely to be tomorrow crises. The
Committee believes that a balance must be reached and
maintained.
The value and necessity of intelligent are such now that
intelligence plays much more than a support role. Whether a
decision maker is planning policy or responding to a fast-
breaking situation, intelligence is now regularly a part of the
debate, often a prerequisite. Whether that response involves
law enforcement, diplomacy or military forces, or even if the
issue involves our nation's commercial or trade interests,
intelligence data are the bedrock on which such a response is
built. Moreover, in an era that is leading to the
``digitization'' of the armed forces, intelligence will be as
much a part of operations as firing a weapon.
Techology enhances intelligence capabilities as well as
provides new intelligence challenges. As suggested previously,
information technology has created new areas of opportunity in
intelligence operations. It also greatly facilitates
intelligence exploitation, analysis and dissemination. But, the
fact that access to and understanding of various technologies
are expanding on a world-wide basis, is creating an era in
which the United States may not enjoy the exclusive
technological edge that it once had. It also is clear that in-
depth knowledge and usage of technology no longer applies
exclusively to governments, but is present in organizations and
individuals as well, some who would do harm to the U.S. or its
interests. Consequently, although intelligence opportunities
are enhanced, so too are the threats to our own technology-
based infrastructures. Our ability to protect U.S. systems,
detect attempts to affect those systems and respond to such
threats, also rely on an active, strong intelligence
capability.
Likewise, our national security is affected by a broader
set of issues, that, heretofore, have not been so readily
identified with our global interests. These issues range from
economics to environmental concerns, and to the mass migration
of people. Developments in these areas greatly expand the
universe of problems with which the Community must grapple--
problems than demand a world-wide view and a highly flexible
set of resource.
The types of threats that face our nation demand that the
Intelligence Community be ever vigilant on both the strategic
and tactical levels. Countering the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, narcotics trafficking, terrorism, and the
activities ofinternational organized crime, by definition, call
for the types of intelligence collection, analysis and reporting that
emphasize the need to produce the hardest information--intentions, for
example--and that substantiates the need for a dynamic intelligence
capability. In short, in the world we face today and tomorrow, the
United States must have its ``eyes and ears'' more than ever before to
protect its freedom--politically, economically and militarily.
With these points in mind, the Committee review was guided
by two key questions. First, what programs are properly
structured and sufficiently prepared for future needs and
requirements, such that we can feel confident about our
preparedness? And, second, what are our unmet needs?
Unfortunately, the Committee review suggested a paucity of
areas where the Intelligence Community is well situated for the
future and an overabundance of unmet needs. Clearly, there are
specific areas within specific programs where the Intelligence
Community is functioning well and is ready for the future. But,
by and large, the Committee finds several large areas of
concern. Principal among these are:
The Community's very limited analytical capabilities
to meet the myriad challenges ahead, especially to be
more strategic and predictive in viewpoint;
the uncertain commitment and capability to collect
``human intelligence'' on a world-wide basis, through
espionage;
the growing capabilities of other nations and groups
to deny information, especially from our overhead
sensors, by employing ``denial and deception''
techniques, and the Community's slow realization and
limited ability to recognize and overcome these
efforts; and
the ever-growing demand for detailed, actionable
intelligence to law enforcement to support
prosecutions, while still protecting intelligence
sources and methods.
Therefore, the Committee encourages the Director of Central
Intelligence to work rapidly toward alleviating these concerns
during this period when the nation is less at risk, in the
physical sense, than during the Cold War. This Committee is
prepared to assist in this effort. To that end, the Committee
examined the Community's most immediate unmet needs, and has
begun a process to address them. The basis for many of the
Committee's decisions was formulated not only from examining
these needs, but also from a set of themes that are important
to establishing the type of Community that is vital to our
future national security. These themes are basically included
within the first five Areas of Special Interest of this report,
and will be used to help focus the Committee's activities in
the future.
Areas of Special Interest
shortfalls in all-source analysis
The Committee is concerned that the Intelligence Community
(IC) lacks the analytic depth, breadth and expertise to monitor
political, military, and economic developments worldwide while
maintaining in-depth expertise on critical countries and
issues. Problems associated with analytic shortfalls include: a
largely inexperienced workforce; lack of foreign language
skills and limited in-country familiarity among all-source
analysts; and a predominant focus on current intelligence that
is eroding the IC's ability to conduct comprehensive strategic
analysis.
The Committee believes that the IC must make a concerted
effort to enhance both substantive and linguistic expertise
among its analytic corps. Moreover, the IC must maintain a
basic level of knowledge about trends and developments
worldwide, while maintaining the capability to warn of
impending crises and ``surge'' resources during such crises. In
addition, the IC must find ways to augment its analytic
capability during crises without diminishing the ability to
monitor other areas of the world.
The Committee is very concerned with the fact that over the
past several years, the IC has shifted analytic production to
focus on short-term, event-driven analysis. While such a shift
provides strong analytic coverage of day-to-day events, it
comes at the expense of basic research and analysis. Not only
does basic research and analysis provide the foundation for
short-term, event-driven analysis, it also is critical to
producing in-depth, long-term/strategic analysis of issues that
will pose challenges to U.S. national security in the future.
The Committee believes that the ability to process and
analyze all-source information is crucial to the quality and
utility of all-source analytic products. Unfortunately, the
IC's ability to do thorough, truly all-source analysis may be
hampered by the difficulties associated with prioritizing,
processing, and analyzing the vast amounts of open source data
available to analysts. Another area of concern in this regard
is the ability of the IC's all-source analysts truly to have
access to all sources of information. Bureaucratic barriers
have been erected that have prevented access by all-source
analysts to information from other departments, from other
agencies within the IC and, in some cases, from other offices
within the same agency. The Committee will continue to monitor
initiatives to improve the IC's ability to collect, process,
and analyze open source information, and of the ability of IC
all-source analysts to gain sufficient access to all sources of
information.
Given the fact that resources for the IC are unlikely to
increase significantly in the future, the Committee believes
that the IC must find other ways to address shortfalls in
analytic depth and breadth. The IC must examine the importance
of all-source analysis relative to the importance of collection
and support activities. The Committee is particularly concerned
about the imbalance between collection and ``downstream''
processing of intelligence. Expending resources to collect
intelligence that is not being analyzed is simply a waste of
money.
In order to enhance analytic expertise, the IC must improve
training and better target its recruitment efforts. In
addition, the IC must identify ways to fill analytic gaps and
surge analytic resources without creating gaps elsewhere in the
process. For the past several years, the Committee has strongly
urged the IC to develop a ``civilian'' reserve capability that
would tap into the expertise of former IC employees, non-IC
experts, and linguists. Certain elements within the IC already
have taken steps to augment analytic capabilities; the IC as a
whole must do the same. In the fiscal year 1998 intelligence
authorization bill, the Committee again has provided funds for
the establishment of a pilot civilian reserve program. The
Committee will closely scrutinize progress made in this area.
Several new initiatives already are underway that will help
the IC to maintain a worldwide information ``base'' and to
augment existing analytic efforts. The Committee supports
efforts to create ``knowledge databases,'' including the
nascent World Basic Information Library (WBIL). Such efforts
will help to ensure that the IC retains a baseline of knowledge
on countries that often receive little attention until a crisis
arises. The Committee also supports the Joint Reserve
Intelligence Program (JRIP), a cost-effective program that
utilizes the substantive and linguistic expertise of military
reservists to augment the IC's analytic efforts.
The Committee strongly believes that the IC must restore
its capability to conduct long-term predictive analysis and
warning. Core groups of analysts should be dedicated to doing
research-oriented projects aimed at assessing strategic issues.
In addition, the IC must educate its customers about the
importance of long-term analysis. If the focus on near-term
analysis is maintained at the expense of long-term analysis and
research, the ability of policymakers and military commanders
to deal effectively with future crises will be severely
diminished. The main function of the IC is to provide its
customers with predictive analysis and warning; if the IC loses
the capability to do so, it will fail to meet its most basic
mission.
``downstream'' intelligence activities
For the past several years, the Committee has expressed
concern about the imbalance between intelligence collection and
related ``downstream'' intelligence activities. The Committee
is disturbed by the fact that the IC continues to spend
billions on high-tech collection platforms without allocating
adequate resources to those who review the raw product, analyze
it, and put it before policymakers and military commanders in a
useable format. This is not to say that there should be no
funding for new collection systems (see the Areas of Special
Interest item on Technical Investments), and this year's
authorization provides for such investments. But to do so
without alsoplanning investment for processing, exploitation,
analysis and dissemination, serves to diminish the purpose and utility
of the collection.
The emphasis on collection at the expense of downstream
activities permeates the IC at all levels and in most
collection disciplines. The Defense Science Board, for one, has
noted the fact that collection platforms have performed
extremely well in Bosnia but that the ``warfighter'' has been
overwhelmed by the amount of collected raw data, much of which
remains unprocessed. In the Committee's analysis and production
budget hearing, witnesses testified that the IC is ``binning''
(i.e., not exploiting) much of the broad-area search imagery
that is collected. In addition, hard target analytic depth
studies by the National Intelligence Council (NIC) conclude
that the IC is ``awash'' in unexploited open source
information. Finally, program managers consistently budget for
satellite and launch requirements for new overhead collection
systems, but largely ignore the need for funding sufficient
ground processing capabilities.
The Committee's fiscal year 1998 budget authorization
emphasizes, among other things, the need to address processing,
analysis and dissemination activities. For example, the
Committee authorizes funds to create an open source
requirements management system, enhance Measurement and
Signatures Intelligence (MASINT) processing and exploitation,
and advance the acquisition and fielding of analytic tools.
These efforts, which are important first steps for addressing
the collection-downstream imbalance, are only a small part of
the solution.
The Committee believes that the IC no longer needs, nor can
it afford, to continue pouring vast amounts of money into
expensive, high-tech collection platforms if the collected data
is not exploited. Put simply, collecting information that is
not processed and analyzed is simply a waste of taxpayer
dollars. In the future, the Committee expects to see greater
effort and resources placed on downstream activities and a more
rational approach to collection activities. Requirements must
be clearly and precisely articulated and collection decisions
must be coordinated across the collection ``stovepipes.'' The
Committee urges the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), in
concern with IC managers, to address the collection-downstream
imbalance in future budget submissions.
Clandestine HUMINT Funding
The Committee is concerned about the apparently ad hoc
nature of annual funding for clandestine Human Intelligence
(HUMINT). We believe that such funding should, instead, reflect
a periodically adjusted and refined projection of the long-term
needs of analysts and consumers for the product of clandestine
HUMINT collection. To tie the funding of clandestine HUMINT to
these long-term needs, the Committee recommends that the DCI
establish an interagency task force to assess long-term
collection needs and from that assessment, define the role of
the clandestine service in the future and the funding profile
necessary to build and sustain its capabilities.
Present funding of clandestine HUMINT
The Committee is aware of three attempts by analysts in
recent years to quantify the importance of the types of
intelligence collection: A survey of the January 1993 National
Intelligence Daily (NID), the 1994 Strategic Intelligence
Review (SIR) process, and the 1995 Comprehensive Capabilities
Review (CCR). In all three studies, clandestine HUMINT made a
surprisingly strong showing, considering the small part of the
intelligence budget that it consumes. In the NID survey, CIA/DO
reporting was the dominant source cited for covertly acquired
intelligence. In the 1994 SIR process, HUMINT was, in
aggregate, the most important source of intelligence for the
376 intelligence needs evaluated. In the CCR, clandestine
HUMINT and SIGINT were found to be roughly of the same value in
pursuing the various top-tier issues of Presidential Decision
Directive 35. Uncounted in any of these studies, and adding
enormously to the value of clandestine HUMINT, is its
contribution to clandestine technical operations and in
compromising foreign cryptographic materials.
The importance of the clandestine service in the future has
not been lost on those looking at the future of the IC as a
whole. Studies undertaken in the last two years by the ``Aspin-
Brown'' Commission, the Council on Foreign Relations, and this
Committee have all emphasized that the intelligence targets of
the future will be such that clandestine HUMINT will be even
more important than it is today. The likely rapid spread of
encryption technologies and the move towards declassifying
imagery capabilities will only accelerate the reliance on
clandestine human sources to crack the hardest targets.
Yet, the cost of clandestine HUMINT remains a single digit
percentage of the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget
and has dropped in real dollar terms. As our actions in the
authorization for the CIAP demonstrate, this Committee
questions whether the annual funding requests for clandestine
HUMINT collection are sufficiently grounded in the long-term
needs of policymakers and in the operational requisites for
satisfying those requirements. We have, for example, made
recommendations for augmenting support for clandestine HUMINT
collection that we understand will be necessary for collecting
in the new environments of the post-Cold War. Underlying these
recommendations, and others, is a concern that funding for the
clandestine service enable it to begin to develop operational
capabilities and techniques now that it will need to deploy in
the future in order to meet the evolving needs of policymakers
in changing technical and political environments.
Budgeting for the future
To achieve a less ad hoc and more forward-looking budget
request for clandestine HUMINT collection, we recommend that
the DCI appoint a task force to project the needs of
policymakers for clandestine HUMINT collection over the next
two decades and report its findings to, inter alia, this
Committee. Because of the evolving needs of policymakers since
the end of the Cold War, the advance of information
technologies, and the explosion of open source information,
this Committee believes that the all-sourceanalyst is in the
best position to predict what information gaps may exist in the future
and which gaps cannot be filled except by clandestine HUMINT
collection. Accordingly, we recommend the task force be chaired by the
Chairman of the NIC with the Deputy Director of Intelligence of the CIA
and the Deputy Director for Intelligence Production of the DIA as Vice-
Chairs.
With these findings in hand, the DDO, as the National
HUMINT Collection Manager, should be in the best position to
predict what capabilities, techniques, and operational profiles
in the clandestine service will best fulfill the needs
identified by the all-source analysts. On these bases, the DDO
should prepare a long-term fiscal program and strategic plan--
perhaps building on the DO's internally prepared strategic plan
of 1995--in consultation with the DS&T, the Defense HUMINT
Service, and other operational partners in the Intelligence
Community. This program and strategic plan, as validated by the
DCI and shared with the CIA Comptroller and this Committee,
should then become the program of record for clandestine HUMINT
within the Intelligence Community and a major premise for the
annual funding request for clandestine HUMINT collection.
technical investments
The impact of technology--including both commercial and
government investments--on the IC has had a dramatic effect in
almost all intelligence activities and operations, and the
potential for future effects is even greater. The Committee has
taken a position in previous authorization bills that
technology, and more appropriately, the application of new
technologies, are becoming key to the enhancement of all
intelligence activities, whether in the form of analytic tool
development or technical collection support to clandestine
operations. Indeed, the Committee believes the world-wide
proliferation of technologies presents new opportunities--and
challenges--for intelligence collection operations. Moreover,
with the Department of Defense's move toward a ``digitized''
force, the IC must become more adept at not only collecting,
analyzing and reporting tactical information, but must do so
within a time frame and in a digital form that is usable to the
military. The use of advanced, and in many cases, commercial,
technologies is the key to doing this.
One of the more substantial areas that can benefit from
modern technologies is overhead collection. Although heavily
influenced by leading-edge technologies already, those who
manage current and future overhead collection programs must
deal with new, again, often commercial, technologies that are
rapidly developed, made readily available and, in equally rapid
fashion, are eclipsed and outdated by even more modern
technologies. Those who remain comfortable with unjustifiably
long development and procurement times will fail.
It should also be noted that the current broad base of
technological development expands the commercial availability
of many of these evolving technologies. For example,
technologies used in overhead imagery, once the sole purview of
the Intelligence and Defense communities of the U.S. and only a
handful of other nations, are now either verging on, or are
already being employed by commercial entities worldwide.
Moreover, there are several areas where such technologies
are having a definite impact on overhead collection. Technology
is allowing for the development of smaller and less costly
satellites, which some believe will match, if not surpass,
current capabilities. The effective use of these technologies
will require increased innovation by the intelligence program
managers to ensure that the nation maintains a technological
edge over potential foes. At the same time, the availability,
and indeed the proliferation of such technologies should allow
for streamlined acquisition and significant cost savings.
The worldwide development and availability of new
technologies, combined with the continuous increase in
knowledge and understanding of U.S. collection systems and
their capabilities, also will affect how the IC collects
information and on what ``targets'' remain viable. The
Committee believes the Community must invest in new and
sometimes unanticipated collection areas/techniques to remain
viable.
In this year's authorization, the Committee is continuing
its support for more flexible systems that address the future
challenges technology is forcing on the Community. These
investments include promoting smaller systems and ensuring that
larger systems are technologically and financially justifiable.
This also includes investments in a variety of research and
development programs, and the Committee hopes the
Administration will bring forward its own new ideas in the
future. The Committee acknowledges the successes of past
overhead collection programs and hopes that the initial steps
shown in new efforts such as the Future Imagery Architecture
signal recognition of the need for new and innovative
approaches to address the challenges of the future.
a corporate and flexible community
For the past several years, the Committee has emphasized
the need for the IC to be more flexible and function as a
``corporate'' whole. In today's complex world, the IC must have
the capability to address many issues simultaneously anywhere
in the world. With fewer resources and a more diverse set of
challenges, the IC must be able to work across programmatic and
`'stovepipe'' boundaries and be flexible enough to ensure that
resources can be shifted or augmented throughout the IC when
necessary.
The Committee is encouraged by progress toward improving
coordination across IC agencies and across collection and
analytic disciplines. The DCI's Hard Target working groups have
proven that a coherent, multidisciplinary, coordinated approach
to collection is an excellent way to identify and address
collection gaps. The Committee strongly urges the DCI to
consider applying such a ``cross-INT'' approach to the process
of determining collection and production strategies for lower-
tier countries.
The Committee is less satisfied with the IC's progress in
addressing ``surge'' issues. The Committee believes there are
several problems associated with the current method of surging
resources. First, when resources are shifted to cover a crisis,
collection and analytic gaps may be created elsewhere. Second,
it is exceedingly difficult for analysts and some collectors--
particularly HUMINT-- to became instant experts on an area in
which they have little experience or background. The Committee
believes that although the IC should maintain global coverage,
agencies do not need in-house expertise on all topics.
Intelligence agencies must, however, be able to determine where
expertise resides within the IC and be able to tap that
expertise, wherever it exists, when the need arises. In
addition, as discussed elsewhere in this report, the IC must
consider creating a civilian intelligence reserve capability to
augment existing analytic and linguistic expertise.
The Committee strongly encourages the IC to continue and
expand efforts to work across traditional bureaucratic
boundaries and to implement measures to enhance flexibility.
The Committee believes that such efforts are absolutely
essential if the IC is to succeed in dealing with increasingly
complex and diverse threats to U.S. national interests.
quadrennial defense review of intelligence
The Committee is concerned on several accounts about the
handling of intelligence in the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR). The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) has
promulgated a set of new operational concepts known as Joint
Vision 2010. As the QDR report and the CJCS's congressional
testimony stress, information superiority or ``dominant
battlefield awareness'' is the underpinning for the CJCS's
concepts. The QDR, however, made almost no changes in the
Department's plans for intelligence, the notable exception
being the reduction of the planned procurement of Joint
Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft.
This recommendation prompted the National Defense Panel (NDP)
to suggest that the Department's investment decisions were not
fully in keeping with its emphasis on improving intelligence
and surveillance support. The other intelligence issues that
the QDR raised were deferred to the normal internal summer
budget review process.
The QDR was focused, to a large extent, on finding ways to
enhance the Department's investment budget. It has been
reported that DoD intends to increase the amount of procurement
funding steadily over the future years defense play (FYDP),
until the level reaches approximately $68 billion in 2003, an
increase of over $25 billion over the fiscal year 1997 dollar
levels. Yet, intelligence spending is to remain essentially
flat. Again, this does not seem to be in synchronization with
the Chairman's ``dominant battlefield awareness'' vision.
The Secretary of Defense recently announced the creation of
a special task force to find ways to reduce the costs of the
Department's infrastructure and support systems, with an
emphasis on defense agencies. Since defense agencies make up
the overwhelming majority of the National Foreign Intelligence
Program, if the task force generates substantial savings, much
of these could come from the intelligence budget. Given the
need to ``rebuild'' our intelligence resources to ensure that
they can meet future needs, especially within Defense, the
Committee believes that such a step could well be disastrous in
terms of our military's abilities to engage in whatever
situation there might be. The Committee will observe carefully
the direction of this effort, with an eye toward examining the
long-term effects on the Community and weighing them against
the short term gains.
Finally, the Committee is very much aware that the
aggregate intelligence budget generally increased at a quicker
pace than the overall national defense budget during the high-
growth period of the 1980s, and that it declined more modestly
than the overall defense budget in the years since.
Intelligence has clearly received some preferential budgetary
consideration, reflecting an appreciation that intelligence
plays an increasingly important role in military effectiveness.
Therefore, it seems, given the CJCS's focus on information
dominance and the increased role of intelligence in military
operations, that intelligence programs should continue to be
specifically and staunchly supported as the Administration
carries out its renewed and appropriate commitment to increase
funding for modernization. Therefore, again, the Committee will
closely watch these budgeting developments.
intelligence system interoperability
The President's fiscal year 1998 budget request included
significant funding for Command, Control, Communications,
Computer and Intelligence (C4I) support, system development and
interoperability, and for establishing a virtual intelligence
analysis environment. The systems included the following
programs:
1. The Joint Intelligence Virtual Architecture
(JIVA);
2. The Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System
(JDISS);
3. The All Source Analysis System (ASAS);
4. The Joint Maritime Communications Information
System (JMCIS);
5. The Combat Intelligence System (CIS);
6. The Intelligence Analysis System (IAS);
7. The JDISS--Special Operations Command Research,
Analysis, and Threat Evaluation System (SOCRATES).
The Committee supports the Department's efforts to provide
an interoperable intelligence dissemination architecture and a
``virtual'' analytic environment with which analysts world-wide
can collaborate. The Committee believes, however, that the
various projects reflected in the President's request do not
have the necessary direction and control to require the sharing
of developments and to ensure that duplication of effort is
minimized. This is easily determined by a thorough review of
the various budget request documents.
Further, the Committee believes that these systems, can be
broken down into the basic components of (1) a high powered
workstation with communications; (2) an operating environment
that, by direction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I)
must be Defense Intelligence Infrastructure (DII) Common
Operating Environment (COE) compliant; and (3) a set of
applications software. Although a common stated goal of the
above systems is to provide support to analysts and operators,
the program managers of these separate systems rarely, if ever,
work together to achieve the common goals by sharing ideas and
developments.
The Committee is convinced there is a need to establish a
management structure and focal point within the Department that
would include representation from each of the service and
agency system program offices. The mission of this organization
would be to provide oversight, integration and development of
collaborative applications for the associated C4I systems. The
function of this organization would not be to dictate specific
service/agency hardware solutions or unique software
applications, but to provide for the development of common
applications, act as a conduit for sharing analytical ideas and
processes, and to ensure world-wide interoperability via
standards. The Committee does not support the concept of
centralizing funding for these efforts, since these systems are
the responsibilities of the various services and agencies. The
Committee would however, support the ability of such a
coordinating organization to be an approval authority for
expending service/agency funds. The Committee believes both the
JDISS program office and, particularly, the Joint Reserve
Intelligence Program have been at the forefront of C41 system
collaboration, and would be good candidates to be chartered
with this integration.
Therefore the Committee is fencing 50 percent of all
authorized and appropriated fiscal year 1998 funding for the
above systems, until the Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I)
provides to the defense and intelligence authorizing committees
a plan for creating a management structure and focal point
within the Department with a charter encompassing the goals
outlined above.
FBIS Reorganization
The Committee supports the further establishment and
maintenance of a strong open source capability within the IC. A
comprehensive open source collection, translation, and analytic
effort is crucial to the IC's ability to maintain global
coverage and to understand developments both in ``lower'' and
``higher'' tier countries. Not only do open sources provide
insight into open societies, careful scrutiny of ``closed
society'' media (e.g., Iran, North Korea) can also reveal
valuable information on trends, new developments, and
leadership plans and intentions.
The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) re-
engineering strategy calls for using more modern and
commercially available technologies as FBIS's operational
linchpin and to transition from traditional large-scale, static
collection and processing centers toward a more agile and less
expensive architecture. The Committee applauds CIA's efforts to
adapt FBIS's infrastructure and operating practices to
incorporate new technologies and to meet intelligence
requirements more efficiently. The Committee has several
concerns, however, about the current FBIS re-engineering plan.
First, the Committee is concerned that important resource
allocation decisions are being made without fully taking into
consideration ``customer'' requirements; there currently is no
formal, direct open source requirements system that can be
tapped to help translate requirements into rational resource
allocation decisions. In addition, it is unclear to many FBIS
customers what regions of the world will be affected by
significant decreases in collection, translation an analytical
activities. The Committee believes that open source customers
must be kept fully informed of what changes in services they
will see as a result of the re-engineering. The Committee also
believes that open source collection should be driven by the
direct input of major customers, particularly the all-source
analysts who best understand where their information gaps lie.
It should be noted that the Committee will closely
scrutinize any fiscal year 1997 FBIS reprogramming request to
determine whether the request fits into the overall
reengineering strategy. The Committee requests that it be kept
fully and currently informed of the plans and implementation of
the re-engineering effort. In addition, the Committee requests
that the DCI submit a report on the FBIS re-engineering plan to
the intelligence oversight Committees by 1 September 1997. The
report should include the following information:
What is the timeline for implementing the re-
engineering plan?
What is the mechanism for reviewing the progress and
effects of the re-engineering plan?
For what countries/regions/issues will FBIS reduce
its coverage (collection, translation, analysis)?
What countries/regions/issues will FBIS no longer
cover?
How will the ``new way'' of doing business be managed
(i.e., telecommuting employees, regional hubs, etc.)?
What disruptions in service are anticipated? and
How will FBIS work with ``customers'' to ensure their
requirements are being met?
dci nonproliferation center
Collecting against, analyzing, preventing and countering
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction present some
of the most difficult challenges facing the IC today.
Nonproliferation-related intelligence programs and personnel
are numerous and widely dispersed throughout the IC and the
Defense Department. When the DCI's Nonproliferation Center
(NPC) was established in 1991, one of its core missions was to
coordinate the disparate IC nonproliferation activities,
improve communication between programs and eliminate
duplication of effort. As coordinator of IC assessments
onproliferation topics, but not an analytic group per se, the NPC was
to serve as a one-stop nonproliferation information shop for policy
makers.
After its formation, the NPC took on a number of additional
responsibilities. It developed strategic plans to help guide
the U.S. Government's response to the proliferation problem and
provided support to CIA's Operations Directorate (DO), as well
as other collectors and law enforcement agencies. The NPC also
worked on collection deck development and produced a ``gaps''
study that identified deficiencies in proliferation-related
collection activities. The NPC was also chartered to review the
IC's performance on proliferation activities and to make
relevant budget recommendations. In addition, the NPC Director
was designated the issue manager for nonproliferation
activities. With these and other responsibilities, the NPC has
made numerous contributions to the IC's nonproliferation
effort.
The NPC has attempted to bring a Community focus to the
proliferation issue, but has been thwarted in these efforts by
internal (CIA) and external turf battles. Because of this, the
NPC has not been able to position itself as the focal point for
IC-wide nonproliferation activities. Nonetheless, the NPC has
several successes of which to be proud. For example, the NPC
review of the IC's proliferation budget gave this Committee
insight into how proliferation resources were obligated within
the Community. This budget review function should be continued,
fully endorsed by the DCI, and done much earlier in the budget
process to make it more useful to this Committee in its annual
budget review process. In addition, the NPC has promoted or
sponsored several new biological and chemical weapons research
and development efforts that are successful because of the
concentrated focus NPC brings to these issues.
In the past, the Committee has noted that there were
serious questions regarding the NPC that pertained less toward
its contributions--which have been significant--than to its
future form and function. In recent years, the NPC has been
reorganized. For example, the operational support section was
relocated to the DO, within the newly created
Counterproliferation Division, that brought centralized
management to the DO's counterproliferation activities. In
addition, NPC authority, personnel and budgets have been
affected by downsizing. Moreover, the NPC Director is no longer
the nonproliferation issue manager. Some question the
appropriateness of the reductions, reorganizations and changes;
others maintain that the NPC still has too many resources
compared to other intelligence programs.
In 1992, the Committee conducted a detailed study of NFIP
proliferation programs, with a specific focus on the new NPC.
This year, the Committee plans to conduct a follow-up study on
this topic. The Committee assessment will involve a thorough,
top-down review of the NPC organization, mission and
activities. The Committee will: review the NPC's efficacy as
coordinator of nonproliferation programs; review NPC funding
levels and staffing assignments; consider where the NPC should
be located within the IC; examine NPC's relationship with the
CIA's Directorates of Intelligence (DI) and Operations (DO);
and examine the NPC's role in the collection and issue manager
processes. Likewise, the Committee will review other
proliferation-related programs throughout the IC, including
within the DI and DO, with an eye toward recommending a logical
construct to the Intelligence Community's efforts on the
proliferation issue.
The Committee believes that additional support for the NPC
and its objectives is warranted, and remains concerned about
future commitment to the NPC. The Acting DCI's (ADCI's)
suggestion that better coordination of IC and Defense
proliferation efforts might be obtained through National
Security Council (NSC) control is highly debatable. Regardless,
the Committee believes that NSC control over this issue may not
adequately address the management of critical interagency
nonproliferation requirements that must be satisfied. Although
the Committee firmly believes that the NPC's roles and missions
need to be evaluated further, it continues to see utility in
NPC's existence and its efforts.
declassification
The Committee has authorized additional resources in the
fiscal year 1998 budget for CIA classification management,
including declassification activities in support of Executive
Order 12958. It should be noted, however, that the Committee is
highly skeptical that the true costs of declassification have
been determined accurately. It is possible that additional
resources for declassification may be required to ensure that
it is accomplished without compromise of intelligence sources
and methods. In addition, the Committee is very concerned about
the criteria and techniques used in the process of
declassifying intelligence documents. Over the next year, the
Committee will study carefully a range of declassification and
collateral intelligence sharing activities across the NFIP to
determine what resources are needed for these efforts and
whether current declassification and intelligence sharing
activities adequately protect sources and methods.
Specifically, the Committee will examine the
declassification programs of various intelligence agencies,
including issues relating to personnel qualifications,
contractor support and training in declassification
methodologies. As part of this review, the Committee will
examine the implementation of bulk declassification
techniques--that may be used in lieu of page-by-page review--
and consider the applicability of both methods for
declassifying documents with differing classification levels.
In addition, the Committee will review specific
declassification case histories to assess the performance of
the ``risk management'' approach to declassification.
Furthermore, the review will examine the process and progress
of Community-wide efforts to declassify archival records. Any
lessons learned from problems and successes related to current
declassification activities should be used to redirect present
day information handling and storage policies and make future
declassification efforts less problematic.
The Committee also will examine the Community's processes
for sharing intelligence with military consumers and allied
partners. The Committee also believesthat in the area of
intelligence information management, there is a need for improved
security controls and audit capabilities. Likewise, the Committee will
examine issues relating to risk management, personnel training and
qualifications, accountability, and record keeping.
Finally, the Committee will focus in detail on the GULFLINK
case. The recent GULFLINK damage assessment report concluded
that the declassification process associated with Gulf War
intelligence documents resulted in serious damage to
intelligence sources and methods. Those working on
declassifying Gulf War intelligence documents were directed to
declassify an enormous amount of documents in a relatively
short amount of time. Furthermore, the Department of Defense
directed those declassifying these documents to err on the side
of declassification and post documents on the GULFLINK Internet
site unless instructed otherwise on a case-by-case basis, by
officials at the highest levels of the Department of Defense.
Clearly, the reported damage done to intelligence sources and
methods in the case of GULFLINK are directly due to these
declassification criteria. The Committee will closely examine
the declassification processes and requirements used in the
GULFLINK project to ensure that such mistakes are not made in
future declassification projects.
review of national drug intelligence architecture
Given the magnitude of the illicit drug problem and the
threat that it poses to the national security of the United
States, many believe that the IC should become even more
actively involved in the effort to ``combat illicit''
international drug trafficking. Before any changes are
undertaken in this area, however, there should be an assessment
of structure and performance of the existing drug intelligence
collection and analysis activities. Moreover, since the
establishment of the Office of National Drug Control Policy in
1988 and the creation of the CIA's Counternarcotics Center in
1989, there has never been a comprehensive effort by the
executive branch to evaluate the effectiveness of the national
security and law enforcement drug intelligence systems--the
drug intelligence architecture.
The Committee recommends that the Office of National Drug
Control Policy, in coordination with the DCI's Crime and
Narcotics Center (CNC) and the Community Management Staff,
undertake a study of current drug intelligence programs, with
the view toward developing an architecture for a national drug
intelligence system to provide the best possible support to all
levels of the international counternarcotics effort: policy
development, strategic and operational planning, targeting,
tactical execution, and information dissemination. The
recommended architecture would include suggestions for clear
and specific mission statements for each drug-control entity
(including principal support roles), an articulation of the
relationships among the centers and activities and an ADP/
communications plan that will facilitate processing of
appropriate drug intelligence information at all levels. The
report, which would be furnished to the President and the two
intelligence oversight Committees, is due on March 31, 1998.
Joint Military Intelligence Program
National Imagery and Mapping Agency civilian personnel, -$15.0 million
The budget request contained $680.3 million for in
Operations and Maintenance, Defense-wide, running the National
Imagery and Mapping Agency's (NIMA) mapping and geospatial
information operations, including funding for 6,389 civilian
personnel positions.
The Director of NIMA has stated that NIMA's Digital
Production System (DPS) will no longer be operational by the
year 2000, and that NIMA's primary role in mapping will evolve
to that of maintaining information databases instead of
producing imagery and other intelligence products. If realized,
this approach should result in a greater decline in required
personnel over the current mandatory downsizing reductions,
since the majority of NIMA personnel currently support the
development of intelligence products. The Committee supports
the effort to move away from DPS. The Committee believes,
however, that NIMA has failed to properly take into account the
effect this plan will have on personnel. Therefore, the
Committee recommends a decrease of $15.0 million in civilian
personnel funds to accelerate the downsizing of NIMA's
personnel consistent with the DPS phase out.
Further, personnel costs account for more than half of
NIMA's operations and maintenance request and consequently,
more than half of its budget. The Committee believes that NIMA
must drastically reduce its workforce and become more efficient
if it is to be able to fulfill its mission in the information
age. Therefore, the Committee directs the Director of NIMA to
submit a personnel plan to the Congressional defense and
intelligence committees. This plan should include an assessment
of the types of skills required in the future versus what NIMA
now possesses, a breakdown per year of the types of personnel
slots that shows how NIMA's demographics will change as NIMA
moves to its required skill mix, an assessment of whether
cartographer personnel slots can be transformed into imagery
analyst slots and the potential for retaining cartographers
into imagery analysts, and an assessment of the challenges and
obstacles facing the agency in achieving the necessary
personnel reductions, including suggested remedies for such
obstacles. An interim response is requested by August 31, 1997
with a final report due by December 1, 1997.
U.S. imagery and geospatial system production, -$40.0 million
The budget request contained $541.8 million for continued
operations of National Imagery and Mapping Agency's (NIMA)
Geospatial System Production and Customer support.
The Director of NIMA has officially stated that, because of
the large operations and maintenance cost of older production
equipment, the Agency will completely phase out the legacy
Digital Production System (DPS) by the year 2000. Although the
overall NIMA operations and maintenance budget decreases
slightly in fiscal year 1998, very little of this decrease is
due to a reduction in legacy system funding. The committee
notes that migration away from DPS began in fiscal year 1997,
and a more significant decline in O&M should have resulted in
fiscal year 1998.
Therefore, the Committee recommends an authorization of
$501.4 million for this activity, a decrease of $40.0 million.
Mission support, -$10.0 million
The budget request included $147.6 million for National
Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) facilities management.
As NIMA consolidates facilities, the Committee expects to
see a marked decline in mission support costs. Such a decline
is not apparent in the budget request documentation. Therefore,
the Committee recommends a decrease of $10.0 million. Further,
the Committee requests that the Director of NIMA submit a
facilities plan that lays out locations and functions of all
current facilities, and describes NIMA's strategy to
consolidate and reduce its facility holdings. The Committee
requests this plan be submitted to the defense and intelligence
committees no later than August 31, 1997.
Synthetic aperture radar for mapping, +$10.0 million
The budget request included $109.4 million in program
element 0305102BQ, line 130, partially to develop the
capability to use synthetic aperture radar (SAR) data for
providing geospatial information for customers.
The Committee believes that the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency (NIMA) specifically, and the intelligence
community generally, has focused insufficient attention on the
use of SAR data for geospatial product development. The
Committee believes this technology can provide critical data,
in all weather conditions, and that it should be exploited more
extensively than it has been in the past.
Therefore, the Committee recommends an additional $10.0
million in this program element to improve current, limited
NIMA capabilities to use SAR data to provide geospatial
information.
Cancellation of interferometric synthetic aperture radar, -$23.2
million
The budget request included $23.2 million to continue
development of the Interferometric Synthetic Aperture Radar
(IFSAR) mission to collect Digital Terrain Elevation Data
(DTED) level 2 information. The IFSAR mission is scheduled to
fly on the Space Shuttle in the 2000 timeframe. The IFSAR
mission itself will cost $163.3 million, with $98.4 million
remaining to be spent through fiscal year 2000.
The Committee continues to believe that there are other,
more cost-effective alternatives to the IFSAR mission for
collecting DTED level 2 data. One such alternative appears to
be an algorithm developed by commercial industry that allows
DTED level 2 data to be derived from the European Resource
Satellites (ERS-1 and ERS-2). The Canadian RADARSAT also
appears to be able to satisfy this requirement. Additionally,
new processes for aircraft with SAR capabilities hold great
potential. Therefore, the committee recommends cancellation of
the IFSAR mission and corresponding reduction of $23.2 million
in the National Imagery and Mapping Agency budget.
U.S. imagery and geospatial system improvements, +$15 million
The budget request included $109.4 million in Research and
Development, Defense-wide, for National Imagery and Mapping
Agency's (NIMA) development, procurement and integration of an
end-to-end imagery production capability for geospatial
information.
The Director of NIMA has officially embraced the Defense
Science Board's (DSB) direction to move NIMA from production of
products to the maintenance of geospatial information, a move
the committee strongly supports. One of the DSB's
recommendation included trading off production of lower
priority products and less critical functions in order to fund
NIMA's more pressing technical needs, thereby allowing it to
move quickly to its future technical capabilities. Based on
NIMA's request, the committee does not believe NIMA's
technology investment is sufficient to efficiently and
effectively move to this new leading-edge technological
capability.
Therefore, the Committee recommends a total of $124.4
million in this account for developing and fielding the modern
imagery and mapping technologies. The Committee believes this
increase of $150.0 million will provide needed capital that
will effectively reduce NIMA operating costs in the near-term.
Predator unmanned aerial vehicle, transfer $15 million
The budget request included $15.0 million in program
element 0305205D, line 138, for modifications to the Predator
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV).
The Committee is concerned by the overly bureaucratic
management and acquisition structure the Department of Defense
has put in place for the Predator. The Committee believes the
DoD's efforts to maximize UAV ``jointness,'' by directing all
tactical UAV development and procurement through the Navy-led
UAV Joint Program Office (JPO), has had the unintended
consequences of forcing funding transfers between services,
slowing Predator procurement and minimizing contracting
flexibility. It appears that, even though Predator is owned and
operated by a single service, the basic management concept of
unity of control has been violated.
The Committee believes the management and control of all
aspects of Predator funding, contracting, procurement and
operation need to be with the Air Force. Therefore, section 603
directs all Predator functions currently maintained within the
UAV JPO be transferred to the Air Force. It also directs that
all Predator funding within the Defense-wide program element
0305205D be transferred to the Air Force program element
0305154F.
Further, the Committee is aware of the Air Force's
``Lightning bolt'' acquisition initiatives in general, and the
Big Safari streamlined acquisition program, specifically. The
Committee has been keenly interested in the rapid, flexible,
and innovative acquisition approaches that hallmark Big Safari,
and it strongly urges the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Acquisition) to consider using the Big Safari streamlined
acquisition and management program for Predator.
Finally, the Committee is aware of a past demonstration
wherein the Predator UAV was launched via the land-based ground
control station and handed off to a submarine-based mini-
control station. This demonstration unquestionably proved the
flexibility of, and the potential need to have, a down-sized
portable ground station that can be forward deployed. Such a
ground station could be used to take direct control of a
Predator UAV for those missions (special operations, for
example) where an Air Force forward control element that has
been physically deployed with a Navy (or other Service/Agency)
element is the best possible mode of operation. The Committee
firmly believes that, as the Air Force brings the Predator
forward into the operational realm, such unconventional
missions will dictate the need for a deployable control
capability. Therefore, the Committee strongly urges the Air
Force to consider such a capability when planning for future
multi-service support with Predator.
Tactical unmanned aerial vehicle, -$57.5 million
The budget request contained $122.0 million for Tactical
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (TUAV) in program element 0305204D,
including $87.5 million for the Outrider Advanced Concept
Technology Demonstration (ACTD) program and $34.5 million for
the Tactical Control Station.
The Committee understands that the purpose of the Outrider
ACTD is to assemble and demonstrate a significant new tactical
reconnaissance capability that is based on mature technology.
The Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO) established
the Joint Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (JTUAV) program from
two previously unsuccessful programs, the close range and the
maneuver UAVs. In May 1996, the DARO conducted a competitive
selection that evaluated nine candidate air vehicles, chose the
Hellfox TUAV and awarded a twenty-four month contract for the
Outrider JTUAV. The ``best value'' selection was based on the
Hellfox's superior aircraft design and capabilities and the
winning contractor's presumed ability to successfully develop
and deliver, within the 24 months, six ACTD Outrider UAV
systems, each consisting of four air vehicles, a ground control
station and associated equipment. The Committee isinformed that
Outrider ACTD is well behind schedule and experiencing serious
performance problems. In fact, its first flight, scheduled for November
1996, did not occur until March 1997.
The Committee supports efforts to streamline the
acquisition process and enable demonstrated capabilities to
transition quickly to production and operation. However, the
Committee is extremely concerned that the Outrider ACTD appears
to have circumvented important acquisition criteria and
milestones, including the need for the program to address a
validated military requirement. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) has failed to formally
validate a joint operational requirement for the JTUAV.
Therefore, the JTUAV ACTD appears to contradict the
Department's own guidance that ACTDs must address validated
user requirements clearly enough to be able to firmly establish
operational utility and system integrity.
The Committee is fully aware of the technical problems that
have plagued development of the Outrider UAV. The ACTD is
experiencing serious shortcomings that indicate that the joint
Outrider program is not using mature technologies, despite
being based on the successful Hellfox UAV technologies
demonstrated in the competition phase. The Committee
understands that the program is under special review by the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, and
is being considered for cancellation by the Department. This,
coupled with the Outrider's technical problems and recent
observations/statements by the Director, DARO, that the
Department was ``going to cut its losses'' on the program,
appear to lend credibility to this notion.
The Committee therefore recommends an authorization of
$64.5 million for TUAV, with no funding authorized for
continuation of the Outrider ACTD. The Committee recommends
that of the funds authorized, $10.0 million be provided to
support a vertical takeoff and landing UAV competition that was
recently initiated by the DARO. The Committee recommends $11.5
million be made available to provide a dedicated Predator UAV
system and associated equipment, including at least two
aircraft equipped with synthetic aperture radar and Ku-band
link, for operational experimentation and testing of the common
UAV Tactical Control System (TCS). To ensure a viable
transition from the Outrider ACTD, elsewhere in the report the
Committee recommends an additional $10.0 million in operations
and maintenance, Army, for operating currently owned Hunter UAV
systems. The Committee does not authorize additional or
attrition Hunter air vehicle purchases, nor does it authorize
technical improvements to the air vehicle or its electronic
systems. The Committee notes that this is a Congressional
interest item and directs that the Army receive prior defense
and intelligence Committee approval before redistributing these
funds for any purpose other than that authorized above.
Finally, the Committee believes there are a number of
existing tactical UAVs, including the Hellfox, the Prowler, and
others, that could satisfy the Army TUAV requirements.
Therefore, the Committee recommends $20.0 million in aircraft
procurement, Army, for purchasing an ``off-the shelf'' tactical
UAV. The Committeerequires the Army to provide a purchase plan
before any of these funds can be obligated or expended.
Airborne reconnaissance advanced development, -$3.0 million
The budget request for Airborne Reconnaissance Advanced
Development in program element 0305206D included $4.5 million
for continuing refinement of the Joint Airborne Reconnaissance
Architecture (JASA) standards. Included in this amount was
funding for verifying compliance and interoperability of new
upgrades and developments.
The Committee recommends a total of $1.5 million for this
effort, a decrease of $3.0 million.
Airborne reconnaissance advanced development, -$3.0 million
The budget request for Airborne Reconnaissance Advanced
Development in program element 0305206D included $3.0 million
for initiating development of a heavy fuel engine for the
tactical UAV.
Department of Defense budget documentation shows
justification for developing an HFE both within this program
element and within program element 03035204D. Additionally, the
Committee is aware that previous authorizations and
appropriations for this effort have not been fully obligated or
expended. Therefore, the Committee recommends a decrease in
program element 0305206D of $3.0 million.
Senior year electro-optical system, +$5.0 million
The budget request included $136.7 million in aircraft
procurement, Air Force, line 73 for continued procurement of
spares and repair parts for the U-2 aircraft and sensors. The
Committee understands the request does not adequately fund
upgrades and spare parts for the Senior Year Electro-Optic
System (SYERS).
U-2 SYERS imagery satisfies a large percentage of theater
commanders' imagery requirements, and the Committee is
committed to ensuring the availability of this aircraft and the
viability of its sensors. Further, Congress initiated and
sustained for several years an upgrade to the SYERS imaging
sensor that, among other things, would allow the sensor to be
carried in the `Q-bay' of the aircraft such that a radar sensor
and the SYERS sensor could be flown simultaneously. In wartime,
this dual capability could free up an entire orbit's worth of
U-2 aircraft. This appeared to Congress to be well worth the
small investment in the SYERS system.
The Committee has now learned that the aircraft fuselage
may have to be modified in order to carry SYERS in the Q-bay.
Specifically, a ``canoe'' would have to be added to allow the
camera to image out beyond about 45 degrees. The Committee is
more than a little irritated to learn of this constraint at
this late juncture. Also, it has beensuggested to the Committee
that the Air Force is, at a minimum, reluctant to undertake any
modification to the U-2 airframe, no matter how small, aside from
issues relating to safety or flight, in anticipation of the replacement
of the U-2 by platforms such as Global Hawk. The Committee does not
believe the U-2 will be fully replaced or retired for many years and is
not willing to forego improvements to this workhorse aircraft.
Based on the above, the Committee recommends an
authorization of $141.7 million, an increase of $5.0 million
for the upgrade and procurement of additional spares for the
SYERS.
Further, the Committee directs the Secretary of the Air
Force to provide a report to the congressional defense and
intelligence committees by March 15, 1998, on the need and the
costs to design and procure the number of ``canoes'' necessary
to allow SYERS and ASARS to be flown simultaneously. The report
shall include a statement of DoD policy regarding modifications
of the U-2.
Airborne information transmission, +$3.0 million
The budget request included $10.8 million in program
element 0305206D to continue testing and evaluation of the
Airborne Information Transmission (ABIT) system.
The Committee believes that all major airborne
reconnaissance systems should have the ability to communicate
and cooperatively operate sensor systems using widebandwidth,
high data rate communications. Such a capability would allow
real-time database sharing, cooperative target location, a long
haul ``reach back'' capability to national processing
facilities, and use/control of collection systems from platform
to platform (i.e., control of UAVs from manned reconnaissance
aircraft, remote operation of collection systems, etc.). To
that end, the Committee is pleased with the Department's Common
Data Link (CDL) and ABIT efforts.
Accordingly, the Committee requests the Department to
conduct a study on the costs, requirements, and benefits of
adding wide-band data links (both for air-to-air and air-to-
ground applications, and point-to-point and broadcast modes) on
all major airborne reconnaissance/surveillance aircraft.
Specifically, this study should examine the benefits of:
providing a capability to route signals that cannot
be processed tactically directly from the collection
platforms to national processing sites in the CONUS:
allowing split basing of assets;
maximizing intelligence community collection and
analysis potential by providing a capability to route
excess raw data collection to other processing/analysis
platforms or ground sites;
providing the ability to complete high speed data
base transfers from aircraft departing station to
aircraft coming on to station;
allowing precision target location via cooperation
direction finding and correlation of multiple
intelligence disciplines; and
allowing cooperative remote system operation;
The study should also provide the costs for developing and
installing this capability on the various aircraft. The
Committee requests the results of this study be provided to the
defense and intelligence authorization committees by March
1998.
The Committee notes, and applauds, the ongoing USAF efforts
to integrate CDL/ABIT capabilities on the RC-135 reconnaissance
aircraft, and believes this effort should be basis for all
future manned reconnaissance interoperability efforts,
including an ABIT capability on the Joint Surveillance Target
Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft. The Committee recommends
an increase of $3.0 million for the USAF to lead this effort.
Further, specifically with respect to JSTARS program,
elsewhere in this report the Committee raised the issue of
whether the Navy requires unprocessed data from JSTARS and
other platforms that collect moving target indicator (MTI) and
synthetic aperture radar (SAR), in addition to processed tracks
transmitted via the narrow band Link 16. If DoD decides that
there is such a requirement, and the Committee considers that
to be likely, the Navy and DoD generally will need to decide
whether the existing JSTARS wide bank link, the Secure Common
Data Link (SCDL), is a practical choice for the Navy and other
potential users. First, all other MTI and SAR platforms (the U-
2, the endurance UAVs, and the Army ARL) are or likely will be
equipped with a wide band common data link (CDL), and the CDL
is already the Navy's standard and will be widely fielded on
large ships. It may not be feasible or practical to outfit
these ships with the SCDL, which is unique to JSTARS. It might
make sense to add CDL to JSTARS, or even to replace SCDL with
CDL.
The Committee appreciates fully that SCDL provides
excellent anti-jam capabilities and has a very large ground
footprint, which is essential to support widespread Army ground
stations. However, DoD is developing a CDL broadcast
capability, which might be sufficient for the Army in light of
the changed threat situation and the increased emphasis on
commonality and interoperability. The Committee believes that
the Army needs to consider also that shifting from SCDL to CDL
would enable the Army common ground stations to receive MTI and
SAR data from the U-2, the Army's own ARL platform (assuming it
is equipped with a downlink at all), and any future UAVs.
In addition, as discussed elsewhere in this report, in
connection with the proposed Joint Mobile Target Engagement
ACTD, centralized processing of MTI data from all possible
sources (U-2s, Airborne Reconnaissance Low, UAVs. etc.), and
merging thecorrelated results with target identification
information, might be extremely important to battlefield awareness and
targeting. These processes might be greatly facilitated by common use
of CDL. Adding CDL to JSTARS would enable any appropriately equipped
ground site to perform the MTI correlation and target identification
function, including Navy ships. A CDL capability on JSTARS that could
operate in an air-to-air mode as well would enable JSTARS aircraft to
transfer MTI track histories and other databases as they are relieved
from station, and conceivably also to act as a central MTI processing
and correlation site--for situations where there is no ground presence
established.
The Committee directs the USD(A&T) to submit the report
requested above to the congressional intelligence and defense
committees by January 15, 1998. The Committee believes that the
USD(A&T) study effort should be coordinated with all the
services, the JROC, DARPA, and the JMTE ACTD program office.
Endurance unmanned aerial vehicles, +$3.0 million
The budget request contained $282.1 million for endurance
unmanned aerial vehicles (EUAV). The research and development
request for high altitude endurance (HAE) UAVs contained $96.0
million for Global Hawk and $54.6 million for DarkStar, while
$116.5 million was requested for procuring the medium altitude
endurance (MAE) UAV Predator.
The Committee notes that, in 1995, the Department initiated
two Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTD) to
develop and demonstrate HAE UAVs at a cost estimate of
approximately $900 million. The purpose of these ACTDs was to
permit the rapid and affordable evaluation of advanced
capabilities resulting in air vehicles that could provide
military utility. The HAE ACTDs also included the specific
requirement that the air vehicles have a unit fly away cost of
$10.0 million in fiscal year 1994 dollars.
The Committee supports the need for determining the
military utility of the two long-dwell HAE UAVs for broad area
coverage. The Committee notes that OSD has unilaterally
determined to, at this time, scale back the number of air
vehicles, the number of ground stations and the length of the
user demonstration period. The Committee understands this is
due to cost growth and the desire to fly successfully and to
prove design configurations before producing more flight
vehicles. The cost growth, due to developmental problems, is
troublesome and lends support to the DoD Inspector General
conclusion that the technologies were not, in fact, fully
mature and ready for demonstration. While the ACTD model may
not have been the best approach for these programs, the
Committee supports the development and evaluation of these
systems. However, the Committee does not see the need to rush
these programs to the point where their success is imperiled.
The Committee strongly recommends that the Department
complete the ACTDs, including the complete user evaluation with
the Air Force's Air Combat Command over the period first
proposed, before authorizing a follow-on HAE UAV acquisition
program.
Due to the Department's reduction in Global Hawk air
vehicles from eight to five, the Committee believes there
should be a corresponding reduction in funds required for long
lead item purchases, and recommends a $22.0 million reduction
in this line.
The MAE UAV, the Predator, was established as an ACTD in
response to an urgent requirement identified by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in 1993. The Committee notes that while
there have been some operational issues with this system, it is
the first ACTD to make the transition to a production program.
The success of the Predator in a number of continental United
States exercises and two operational deployments to Bosnia has
prompted the Joint Chiefs of Staff to seek additional funding
for Predator, including a number of pre-planned product
improvement (P3I) upgrades to be included with production
systems. The Committee has learned, however, that as result of
this vehicle's success, the amount of spare parts and attrition
vehicles available appears to be insufficient. Therefore, the
Committee recommends an increase of $25.0 million to purchase
spare parts and attrition air vehicles for the operators.
High altitude endurance unmanned aerial vehicle, common ground segment,
-$9.0 million
The budget request included $51.1 million in program
element 0305205D, line 138, for the high altitude endurance
(HAE) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) common ground segment
(CGS). Of this, $9.0 million was for testing purposes.
The Committee understands that $10.0 million of fiscal year
1997 funds were authorized and appropriated for this same
testing. The Committee also understands that such testing was
not completed due to the delay in both HAE advanced concept
technologies demonstrations.
Therefore, the Committee recommends an authorization of
$42.1 million, a reduction of $9.0 million.
Defense airborne reconnaissance office, -$14.0 million
The budget request included $21.5 million in program
element 0305209D, line 142, and 31 billets for operation of the
Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO). Section 608
directs abolishment of this defense organization office
chartered under the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and
Technology).
The Defense Authorization Act of 1994 directed the
development of an organization to oversee and coordinate the
activities of the military Services with respect to the
development of airborne reconnaissance systems. The intent of
this law was to ensure the most effective expenditure of
defense funds within this mission area by forcing the services
to work closely