Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 420 and ask for its immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) is recognized for 1 hour.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, for the purposes of debate only, I yield the customary 30 minutes to my friend, the gentlewoman from New York (Ms. Slaughter), pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume. During consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the purpose of debate only.
Mr. Speaker, H. Res. 420 is a modified open rule providing for the consideration of H.R. 3694, the Fiscal Year 1999 Intelligence Authorization Act. What makes this rule modified open instead of fully open is a preprinting requirement for amendments, whose purpose is to ensure that the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has an opportunity to work with Members seeking to offer germane amendments to ensure that important issues are addressed without threatening disclosure of sensitive, classified information. This preprinting requirement has become standard procedure for consideration of the annual intelligence authorization and has not been controversial.
Because the leadership sought to have this bill on the floor today, the rule also includes a waiver of points of order against the consideration of the bill for failure to comply with the clause 2(1)(6) of rule XI, which requires a three-day layover of a committee report.
The committee's report was properly filed on Tuesday of this week, and Members have had notice of availability of classified portions of the authorization measure since late last week when public announcements were, indeed, made from the floor.
It is my understanding that there is no objection to this slight speeding up of the schedule to accommodate changes stemming from the unrelated scheduling matters and to accommodate Members' travel plans.
The rule provides for 1 hour of general debate on the bill, time equally divided between the chairman and ranking member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
In addition, the rule makes in order as an original bill for the purpose of an amendment the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute now printed in the bill, modified by striking section 401 of the bill.
That modification, a self-executing change accomplished through the rule, is designed to addressed a Budget Act technicality relating to a provision of the bill extending the early-out retirement program for the CIA.
We were advised that, due to the fact that we still await this year's budget resolution, the early-out provision found in title IV of the bill causes a Budget Act problem, and so the provision is being removed from the bill with the understanding that the substance of the issue will be addressed at a later stage of legislative process of H.R. 3694.
The rule further provides that the amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be considered by title and that each title shall be considered as read.
The rule also waives points of order against the committee amendment for failure to comply with clause 7 of rule XVI prohibiting nongermane amendments or clause 5(b) of rule XXI, prohibiting tax or tariff provisions in a bill not reported by a committee with jurisdiction over revenue measures. Both of these waivers apply to a section of H.R. 3694 regarding the application of sanctions laws to intelligence activities in title III of the bill. That provision is nongermane to the introduced version of H.R. 3694, and it deals with subject matter falling within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means.
Based on an exchange of letters between the two committees, there is no controversy on this matter. However, these waivers are necessary under the rules of the House. And during general debate, I will introduce into the Record that correspondence between the two committees.
I would also point out for the record the Committee on National Security has, by letter, discharged itself from consideration of the matters in this bill that fall within its purview.
Mr. Speaker, the rule permits the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole to postpone the vote on any amendment and reduce voting time to 5 minutes on any series of questions provided that the first vote shall not be less than 15 minutes.
Finally, the rule provides for the traditional motion to recommit with or without instructions.
Mr. Speaker, that was a long explanation of a rule that is, in fact, straightforward, simple, and traditional for this piece of legislation. I know of no controversy about this rule. I urge Members to support this rule.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Florida for yielding to me the customary 30 minutes, and I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Ms. SLAUGHTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)
Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I do not oppose this rule. It allows amendments that are germane to be offered. However, H. Res. 420 does include one waiver of a House rule that troubles me. The rule waives clause 2(L)(6) of rule XI that provides for a 3-day layover of the committee report accompanying the bill.
This House rule allows Members time to study the report and decide whether they would like to offer or support amendments. The 3-day opportunity to study the bill and report is particularly important in this case because many provisions of the intelligence bills are classified and, if a Member wishes to review those portions, a Member must make arrangements with the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. To cut short the standard review time under these circumstances is unfortunate.
And while I understand that the majority and the minority on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence had no objection to the waiver, we should note that it is not the committee's rights but the rights of Members not on the committee that the House rule is designed to protect.
The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), the chairman of the committee, is to be commended for avoiding the need for waiver of the Budget Act by self-executing in this rule an amendment striking the offending section of the bill.
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence also worked with the Committee on Ways and Means to gain its acquiescence to a violation of a House rule designed to protect the jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means.
While I often question the need for a requirement for preprinting in the Congressional Record, the sensitivity and the complexity of the intelligence authorization bill justifies the requirement in this case. Mr. Speaker, this rule allows the full House to consider germane amendments offered by any Member. Under the rule, the House will be able to debate important questions, such as whether to reduce the overall size of the intelligence budget.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Sanders).
Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me this time, and I rise in support of the rule.
I think it is a fair rule. Among other things, it, in fact, allows this Congress to begin debating major priorities as to whether or not we are going to increase spending for the intelligence budget, despite the end of the Cold War and despite the fact that while we increase funding for the intelligence budget, we have cut spending in Medicare for our senior citizens, cut spending for veterans' programs, cut spending in a dozen different areas that the middle-class and low-income people of this country need.
So I applaud the chairman for bringing forth this rule. It is a fair rule and it is going to allow us to have a serious debate on what we want this Congress to be doing for the American people.
Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume to address the concerns of the gentlewoman from New York about the notice given and accommodating Members' schedules today.
I am happy to report that several Members did take advantage of the opportunity to come to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and participate in review of materials that were of interest to them. So I think the word has gotten out and I think we have done our job properly.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the previous question on the resolution.
The previous question was ordered.
The resolution was agreed to.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Duncan). Pursuant to House Resolution 420 and rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 3694.
Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration the bill (H.R. 3694) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1999 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, with (Mr. Thornberry) in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having been read the first time.
Under the rule, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks) each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss).
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to bring the fiscal year 1999 intelligence authorization to the floor today. As a strong believer in the congressional oversight process, I hope Members have taken the opportunity to examine this year's bill, including its classified annex and, indeed, I know several Members have come upstairs to do just that.
The annual intelligence authorization, and its exhaustive review of intelligence activities and capabilities that accompanies it, form the cornerstone of our oversight process. This is truly a valuable exercise for the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, for Congress as a whole, and I think it is beneficial to the intelligence community as well.
I want to take this opportunity to thank the members and staff of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence from both sides of the aisle whose hard work and long hours have enabled us to produce a responsible, nonpartisan bill that was unanimously approved in committee.
I would also like to thank the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Floyd Spence), chairman of the Committee on National Security, and the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Bill Young), chairman of the Subcommittee on National Security of the Committee on Appropriations, for their input and able assistance with this legislation.
H.R. 3694 authorizes funds for the fiscal year 1999 intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government. That is a big order. The National Security Act requires Congress specifically to authorize all intelligence spending. That is unique.
As Members are aware, many of the details of the intelligence budget are classified, including the total fiscal year 1999 budget request, or top line. I can say, however, that H.R. 3694's top line is substantially in line with the President's request. The committee came in a mere one-tenth of 1 percent above the President's level.
I would like to take a moment to explain the process by which the committee arrived at this recommended spending level. What we did not do was adopt an arbitrary number and fill in the blanks until we reached our goal. Instead, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence looked at each line of every program, examined its effectiveness and how it fit in with the overall U.S. intelligence requirements and priorities in today's world. Then we made our decisions based on the merit and value of each program.
Mr. Chairman, throughout the committee's review of U.S. intelligence capabilities, whether we were looking at satellite reconnaissance or human intelligence, one fact stood out. The threats that face our Nation demand that the intelligence community maintain a worldwide vigilance and the resources to deal with a multitude of challenges and new challenges.
The Cold War is over and the threat of nuclear war has been reduced. Or has it? Unfortunately, the world still is a dangerous place for the United States and its citizens, as we read in papers almost daily about concerns about political stability in places like Russia, the chain of command in Russia over the nuclear weapons, or perhaps even the Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles which we read in the newspapers are targeted against U.S. cities, what they call city-buster bombs and an ICBM capability.
To demonstrate this, we need look no further than our continuing struggles with Iraq. Earlier this year the United States came to the brink of military confrontation with Saddam Hussein; yet we did so without all of the information necessary to support a serious campaign. There were serious shortfalls in our ability to support policymakers and military commanders at this critical time. Such gaps endanger U.S. lives and interests and are not acceptable, tolerable, or necessary in today's world.
We should not ignore Iraq or Iran or Libya or North Korea or other rogue nations that are striving for and, in many cases achieving, the means to threaten the United States. The risk that a terrorist group or a rogue country will use a chemical, biological, or nuclear weapon against the U.S. or an American citizen or American interests here or abroad is increasing. Despite this fact, U.S. intelligence capabilities have dwindled since the end of the Cold War. In effect, we are asking the intelligence community for more and we are giving them less to do it. And we are counting on them more.
The intelligence community needs to change the way it does business to address these new threats. This year's authorization identifies five areas that deserve particular attention.
One, our signals intelligence capabilities are in serious need of modernization to keep up with the fast pace of communications and technology improvement. I think it is fair to say that the golden days of SIGINT may, in fact, be behind us, and we have been enjoying the benefits of a very good SIGINT activity for many years. That may be over because of technology. We need to deal with that.
Two, our clandestine espionage, or human intelligence as it is called, that infrastructure needs to be rebuilt and refocused on current priorities. It is fair to say, I think, that the cupboard is nearly bare in the area of HUMINT. We are badly outnumbered by hostiles in a lot of dangerous places in the world. That is intolerable, unacceptable, and unnecessary.
The intelligence community needs to increase its analytical capability in order to absorb and accurately gauge the immediate and long-term implications of an ever-increasing volume of information. We have stuff on hand we have not reviewed. We have not exploited it. And it is stuff that would be useful to our decision-makers. We do not have as much analytical capacity as we need. That can be fixed.
Covert action capabilities need to be restructured. I said capabilities. Nobody is calling for covert action. We are calling for more arrows in the quiver in case we do need it to suit the needs of today's world and how to deal with problems we come against.
Fifth, and last, we need to ensure we maintain an active research and development program in all intelligence areas.
H.R. 3694 addresses each of these priorities, in some cases by providing additional funding; in others by redirecting existing programs, resources, or restructuring ongoing programs.
In addition, the committee's review raised some fundamental questions that the committee will review over the coming year. These include, what are the proper priorities for our future overheads systems? How can we manage the cost of a national reconnaissance program and yet meet other critical requirements? Is the intelligence community striking the right balance between our capacity to collect intelligence and our capacity to analyze what is collected? Is the intelligence community prepared to face the challenges of information and operations, or cyber-warfare?
The future of our intelligence programs depends on finding the answers to these and other questions. But for today, today we understand very well our needs. We have provided for them in this legislation. I think we have achieved an excellent balance. Mr. Chairman, I urge all members to support H.R. 3694 today.
Mr. Chairman, I submit the following:
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Committee on Ways and Means,
Washington, DC, May 4, 1998.
Hon. Porter Goss,
Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Porter: I am writing in response to your letter of April 29, 1998, which addresses H.R. 3694, as reported by the House Committee on Intelligence (Permanent Select) on April 29, 1998. H.R. 3694 would amend Section 905 of the National Security Act of 1947 by striking out `January 6, 1998' and inserting in lieu thereof `January 6, 1999'. The bill contains an extension of application of sanctions laws to intelligence activities.
As your letter notes, this provision falls within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means. Accordingly, the Committee would ordinarily meet to consider the bill. However, because the bill, as reported, extends for one year an already existing application of sanctions laws to intelligence activities, I do not believe that a markup of the bill is necessary.
I appreciate your consultation with the Committee in advance. I request your full support in joining me to prevent any other expansion or changes to the application of sanctions laws for intelligence activities other than the one year extension agreed to here. I would further appreciate your consultation with respect to this provision on any future Intelligence Authorization bills, including a mere reauthorization for additional periods of time. Of course, if an agreement cannot be reached, the provision would be subject to a point of order pursuant to Clause 5(b) of House Rule XXI.
I would ask that a copy of our exchange of letters on this matter be included in the record during floor consideration.
Thank you for your cooperation and assistance on this matter. With best personal regards,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, DC, April 28, 1998.
Hon. Bill Archer,
Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means,
Longworth House Office Building, Washington, DC.
Dear Bill: I am writing to you concerning the planned inclusion of a provision in the `Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal year 1999' (H.R. 3694), which we expect to mark up on Wednesday, April 29, 1998, and report to the House early next week. I have included a copy of the proposed section for your consideration.
As you know, this provision relates to the application of sanctions laws to intelligence activities and simply extends the life of the provision for one additional year. As you will recall during last year's consideration of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, and based upon our mutual understanding and agreement as to your Committee's jurisdiction over matters relating to taxes and tariffs, this provision was included in the Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 as section 304 of that Act. A copy of that provision, as enacted (P.L. 105-107), is also included for your review.
I hope that we can, consistent with the agreement reached last year, once again agree that this provision may be included in H.R. 3694, and any resulting Conference Report, without objection from the Committee on Ways and Means.
There is no doubt that this provision falls squarely within the scope of Clause 5(b) of House Rule XXI, which provides that no tax or tariff provision may be considered by the House that has not been considered by the Committee on Ways and Means.
This provision is of critical importance to the protection of intelligence sources and methods whenever a proliferation violation has been identified and sanctions are deemed to be the appropriate method of discipline. This provision supplies the President with the necessary flexibility to address the competing interests of punishing the violators and protecting our national security interests at the same time. I appreciate your recognition of this important aspect of this section of our bill.
I would also offer that any modification of this provision in future Intelligence Authorization bills, beyond a mere reauthorization for additional periods of time, will be subject to consultation between our Committees, and, if agreement cannot be reached, subject to points of order pursaunt to Clause 5(b) of House Rule XXI.
Thank you for your cooperation in this regard and I look forward to your support for H.R. 3694.
With all best wishes, I remain
Porter J. Goss,
`(b) Benefits, Allowances, Travel, Incentives: An employee detailed under subsection (a) may be authorized any benefit, allowance, travel, or incentive otherwise provided to enhance staffing by the organization from which the employee is detailed.
`(c) Annual Report: Not later than March 1, 1999, and annually thereafter, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report describing the detail of intelligence community personnel pursuant to subsection (a) during the 12-month period ending on the date of the report. The report shall set forth the number of personnel detailed, the identity of parent and host agencies or elements, and an analysis of the benefits of the details.'.
(b) Technical Amendment: Sections 120, 121, and 110 of the National Security Act of 1947 are hereby redesignated as sections 110, 111, and 112, respectively.
(c) Clerical Amendment: The table of contents in the first section of such Act is amended by striking out the items relating to sections 120, 121, and 110 and inserting in lieu thereof the following:
`Sec. 110. National mission of National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
`Sec. 111. Collection tasking authority.
`Sec. 112. Restrictions on intelligence sharing with the United Nations.
`Sec. 113. Detail of intelligence community personnel--intelligence community assignment program.'.
(d) Effective Date: The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply to an employee on detail on or after January 1, 1997.
SEC. 304. EXTENSION OF APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS LAWS TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
Section 905 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 441d) is amended by striking out `January 6, 1998' and inserting in lieu thereof `January 6, 1999'.
SEC. 305. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRACTING.
It is the sense of Congress that the Director of Central Intelligence should continue to direct that elements of the intelligence community, whenever compatible with the national security interests of the United States and consistent with operational and security concerns related to the conduct of intelligence activities, and where fiscally sound, should competitively award contracts in a manner that maximizes the procurement of products properly designated as having been made in the United States.
SEC. 306. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON RECEIPT OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.
It is the sense of Congress that Members of Congress have equal standing with officials of the Executive Branch to receive classified information so that Congress may carry out its oversight responsibilities under the Constitution.
SEC. 307. PROVISION OF INFORMATION ON CERTAIN VIOLENT CRIMES ABROAD TO VICTIMS AND VICTIMS' FAMILIES.
(a) Sense of Congress: It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) it is in the national interests of the United States to provide information regarding the killing, abduction, torture,
(2) Conforming amendment: Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking out the following item: `Assistant Directors of Central Intelligence (3).'.
(b) Expansion of Duties of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management: Subsection 102(d)(2) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(d)(2)) is amended by striking out subparagraph (B) through (D) and inserting in lieu thereof the following new subparagraphs:
`(B) Carrying out the responsibilities of the Director under paragraphs (1) through (5) of section 103(c).
`(C) Carrying out such other responsibilities as the Director may direct.'.
SEC. 304. APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS LAWS TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
Section 905 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 441d) is amended by striking out `January 6, 1999' and inserting in lieu thereof `January 6, 2000.'.
SEC. 305. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRACTING.
It is the sense of Congress that the Director of Central Intelligence should continue to direct that elements of the intelligence community, whenever compatible
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence strives to report an authorization bill each year which is free of partisan division. While we have been generally successful in that effort, from time to time we have been divided on significant issues of substance.
This year, I am pleased to report that we have produced legislation which is not only bipartisan but without major substantive disagreement as well.
Credit for that result goes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) who has worked tirelessly to ensure that the views of all Members are reflected in the work of the committee. I commend him for the leadership he has exhibited as chairman and for his willingness to work with committee Democrats on matters of importance to us.
For two of the Democratic Members, the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. Skaggs) and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), this will be the final intelligence authorization bill they will bring to the floor. Although I look forward to working with them to get a conference report enacted, I want to thank them for their many contributions to the work of the committee.
The willingness of the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. Skaggs) to tackle issues like declassification and the need to make greater use of intelligence in nontraditional ways has been invaluable. And the efforts of the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) to encourage development of the complex systems through which intelligence will be collected in the future were also of great assistance.
This will be my last authorization bill, as well. I have enjoyed my 8 years of service on the committee and look forward to keeping up with intelligence issues when they come before the Committee on Appropriations. I have been impressed tremendously by not only the importance of intelligence to our Nation's security, but by the dedication, often under circumstances of great hardship and danger, of the men and women who work in our intelligence agencies.
The authorization bill for fiscal year 1999 will make improvements in intelligence capabilities that need to be modernized either because of technological advances or because they require greater emphasis to respond to changing threats. The bill is only marginally more, in the aggregate 0.1 percent, than the amount requested by the President. Although the committee chose to place a different spending priority on certain items than did the administration, I do not believe that we have done harm to any initiative or activity which the Director of Central Intelligence or the Secretary of Defense consider crucial.
Generating public support for spending on intelligence programs, given their classified nature, is never going to be easy. Although it should be common sense that the possession of information in advance about the military plans of an enemy, the bottom-line position of another government in a diplomatic negotiation, the location of a terrorist cell, or the scientific and technical capability of someone trying to develop a weapon of mass destruction should be invaluable, we sometimes forget that the acquisition of access to that kind of information is time consuming and expensive. I do not believe we need to justify intelligence spending on the basis of some esoteric calculation about whether our national security is more or less at risk than when the Soviet Union was in place.
We will always have threats to our security. Some will be predictable, some will not. Dealing with them requires accurate and timely information, some of which can be provided only by intelligence agencies. There is a cost to maintaining the capability to provide that information when required, and that cost is significant. The cost if the information is not available, however, is potentially far greater.
Our job on the committee is to ensure that the means necessary to provide intelligence on matters
which demonstrably affect national security are available at a cost which is not excessive relative to their importance. I believe the 21-year record of the committee in this effort, including the bill now before the House, has been exceptional.
Besides recommending spending levels, an authorization bill and accompanying report also make judgments about the manner in which programs are being managed. I believe that one of the chief responsibilities of an oversight committee is to monitor the activities of the agencies under its jurisdiction in a manner which is both aggressive and thorough. I also believe that oversight should be constructive and fair. I am concerned about the tone of some of the recent criticism of the work of two agencies, the National Reconnaissance Office, (NRO), and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA).
The United States has an intelligence capability second to none in the world. Much of that preeminence is due to the performance of the systems acquired and operated by the NRO. These systems are extraordinarily complex and expensive. We are now in the midst of an effort to modernize these systems. When the need for modernization was made clear several years ago by then-Director of Central Intelligence Jim Woolsey, and Congress agreed to embark on a plan to accomplish it, it was with the understanding that substantial amounts of money would have to be expended in the short term to produce savings in the future.
We have spent much of the intervening years altering in sometimes significant ways the components of the plan, which has added to the costs that have to be met in the near term and delayed the realization of the expected long-term savings as well. It is disingenuous to have been a part of this practice and then to complain about the effects it has produced on the NRO's budget.
NIMA is a new agency created less than 2 years ago through the merger of the Defense Mapping Agency and the imagery analysis elements of the CIA and DIA. Like most mergers, this one, which I strongly supported was not without problems, but I believe that NIMA personnel are committed to having the agency fulfill its important mission successfully.
Earlier this year I wrote to NIMA's customers to ask for an evaluation of their performance. Secretary of Commerce Daley responded that `After working through some initial confusion regarding authority and responsibility for certain products and services, support to civilian agencies is now better than before the individual components were combined into NIMA.'
James L. Witt, the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, wrote, `The support and service provided by NIMA to support disaster response activities have been and continue to be outstanding.' Sandy Berger, the President's National Security Advisor, complimented NIMA on making a strong effort to provide high-quality analysis and pronounced himself `generally satisfied' with the results.
I do not believe that these comments reflect an agency that is failing to do its job or one that is ignoring the needs of nonmilitary consumers to concentrate on those of the military, as some had feared. Any enterprise involving human beings can be made better, but I think it is not helpful to make final judgments, pro or con, about an agency in its infancy. I offer these thoughts in the hope that they will provide perspective in evaluating the performance of the NRO and NIMA in the days ahead.
Mr. Chairman, H.R. 3694 is a good bill which will advance the interest of military and civilian consumers of intelligence. I urge that it be approved by the House.
I would also like to compliment both the majority staff and the Democratic minority staff. I think this committee has been blessed over the years with an outstanding staff. And I want to particularly thank Mike Sheehy and the Democratic staff members whom I have had the privilege of working with for the last 4 years.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I simply want to say that I am very proud to have worked with and learned from the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks) as the ranking member. He has been an extraordinary asset of the United States of America in his capacity as a manager of the portfolio. He brings wisdom, judgment and knowledge about military intelligence and equipment to the table in our committee to the extent that I think no other member has or can at this time. I hope he is not going to leave. But if it turns out that way, we will miss him.
I also hope we are not going to lose anybody else. And for the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. Skaggs) and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), I share that view with all the other members. I happen to feel that we have got an extraordinary committee and staff, we are doing our job timely and well.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 1/2 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Boehlert) to allow him to demonstrate what I have just said.
(Mr. BOEHLERT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, we find ourselves in both a fiscal and political environment in which we simply cannot fund every system and program we would like. This applies whether intelligence or not intelligence.
However, it is important for the American people to understand just how critical intelligence is to the very survival of our Nation and our way of life. On the way over to the Capitol this morning, I heard a radio announcer refer to this bill as `the bill to authorize America's cloak-and-dagger operation.' That sort of a label is correct in a way, but unfortuantely, I believe it unintentionally misrepresents what this bill is all about.
What this bill is about is the wise and prudent funding and oversight of those intelligence collection analysis and dissemination function necessary to provide for the security of our Nation, its interests, and its citizens around the world. We are talking about what I refer to as `counterprograms.' We are not engaged in a world war, but we have some very important counterprograms, counterterrorism, counternarcotics, counterproliferation. These are all very important activities, and this bill funds them.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out a couple of funcational intelligence areas of particular interest in this bill. The first is the emphasis this bill places on rebuilding leading-edge technology, research and development. It is the basic research and development of new technologies that are the easiest to cut in lean fiscal times. But it is precisely these efforts that our future depends on and that we must pay particular attention to and fund properly.
This bill puts great emphasis on future capabilities, albeit sometimes imprudently at the expense of older so-called legacy systems. Also, this bill emphasizes the need for a strong, well-trained and funded reserve intelligence component.
Mr. Chairman, there are a lot of things I could say about this bill, and I do not have the time to say them. Just let me say that as someone who tried to be very attentive to my important responsibilities on this committee, I admire the way the chairman and ranking member have worked cooperatively. I admire the seriousness of purpose of all of the members. I admire the product that we are producing, and I commend it to the attention of all my colleagues and the American people.
We are doing the people's business in a wise and prudent manner.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi).
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks), the ranking member, for yielding this time to me and for his leadership on this important committee.
I rise, Mr. Chairman, to engage the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), the distinguished chair of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, in a colloquy concerning section 303 of the bill.
Before doing so, I want to commend our chairman for his leadership also and to thank him for including full funding for the environmental program in this legislation before us today, the recognition that new issues need to be addressed, not that the environment is a new issue, but new compared to its being a priority on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and in the intelligence authorization bill. In any event, I rise to engage the gentleman in a colloquy.
As the chairman knows, this section of the bill extends for 1 year the authority of the President to delay the imposition of a sanction upon a determination that to proceed with the sanction would risk the compromise of an ongoing criminal investigation or an intelligence source or method.
My first question, Mr. Chairman, is whether the legislative history of this provision, enacted in 1995, would be applicable to the extension of the authority for 1 more year?
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. PELOSI. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
Mr. GOSS. I would assure the gentlewoman from California that is the intent of the committee, that the legislative history of this provision, as it was developed in the debate in 1995, is applicable to the exercise of this authority. Indeed, the report to accompany H.R. 3694 reaffirms the joint explanatory statement of the committee of conference on the Intelligence Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 1996 to make completely clear that the original legislative history of this provision continues to govern its implementation.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, is it then the case that the committee intends that the provision will be narrowly construed and used only in the most serious of circumstances when a specific sensitive intelligence source or method or criminal investigation is at risk?
Mr. GOSS. If the gentlewoman would further yield, that is certainly the intent of the committee.
Ms. PELOSI. Is it also the case that the law requires the intelligence source or method or law enforcement matter in question must be related to the activities giving rise to the sanction and the provision is not to be used to protect generic or speculative intelligence or law enforcement concerns?
Mr. GOSS. That is also the case.
Ms. PELOSI. Finally, Mr. Chairman, does the committee expect that reports concerning a decision to stay the imposition of a sanction shall include a determination that the delay in the imposition of a sanction will not be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of the United States' nonproliferation objectives or significantly increase the threat or risk to U.S. military forces?
Mr. GOSS. Yes, it does.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished chairman of our committee for engaging in this colloquy and for his confirmation of the understanding that we had when this provision was first enacted.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. PELOSI. I am pleased to yield to the gentleman from Washington.
Mr. DICKS. I wanted just to say that I concur in all the statements made by the chairman. This is also the understanding that I have of this provision.
Ms. PELOSI. I thank the ranking member for his cooperation and concurrence in the view of the chairman.
Mr. DICKS. And I want to compliment the gentlewoman for her diligence on this important matter.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Young), chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on National Security.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Young).
Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this intelligence authorization bill. I want to compliment the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss). He has done an outstanding job. I have had the privilege of working on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for 14 years now, two different terms. I have to say that the gentleman from Florida has been outstanding in the leadership that he provides for the committee and also to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks), we have worked together for so many years, he is a member of our subcommittee. We have the unusual relationship of being members of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence as well as members of the appropriations subcommittee that provides the funding for the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The gentleman from Washington does a really good job. He is very dedicated to a good intelligence bill.
That is what this is. This is a good intelligence bill. It provides not as much as we would like to have provided for our intelligence activities, but it provides the best that we can with the budget constraints that we are faced with today.
There are those of us who believe that we are not making a strong enough investment in our national security, at any part of our national defense structure, whether it be the operational military forces or the intelligence community. But the intelligence community is the eyes and ears of our national capabilities. We have to have information, we have to know what is happening in the world, we have to know what threats there might be out there.
The intelligence community does an outstanding job, I might say. I might be criticized for that statement because all you ever hear is the bad news. If an intelligence agent happens to go bad, which does happen on occasion, or if a mistake is made, you hear about that but you do not hear about the good things that the intelligence community brings to our overall national security effort. I wish we could talk about some of those on the floor in open session today, but obviously we cannot because it is essential that the sources that we use for developing our own intelligence information and the methods that we use and the people who are involved in this have to be protected. Their mission is extremely important and their lives could very well be at risk if we went into a lot of detail.
I know that there will probably be some amendments offered to reduce the authorized level of funding in this bill. I would urge the Members not to support this. This bill does not provide enough authorization for funding to do the things that we ought to be doing in our national security effort, but it is the best we could do with the budget constraints.
I suggest that we defeat any amendments that would tend to reduce the investment in our intelligence capability and let us pass this good bill and get it on to the Senate so we can get it to the President.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. YOUNG of Florida. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I just want to compliment the gentleman for his statement and I want to concur in it. Sometimes I think there is a question out there about whether intelligence is really that important. I think it is our ace in the hole. I think it is what gives America an extraordinary advantage over any potential foe. Our human intelligence, our national technical means, are remarkable assets to this country. In every conflict we have been in in recent years, they have given us a tremendous advantage. I think the work of the defense subcommittee and the authorization committee to come up with a good bill that keeps that going is essential to the future of the country.
Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman's comments. He is right on track.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Skelton), the ranking member of the Committee on National Security.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 3694. I have a rather unique position and opportunity. As ranking member of the Committee on National Security and as a member of this Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, I can personally testify to the importance of intelligence to our military commanders in the field, to our troops who are daily supporting our peacekeeping efforts in places like Iraq, in Macedonia and to our pilots in the Iraqi no-fly-zone.
Cicero once said that gratitude is the greatest of all virtues. I am not sure we say thank you enough to the members of the intelligence community. What they do so often is not known. Yet it pays off in knowledge to the commanders in chief in the field, to the President, to the Secretary of Defense, to the Secretary of State, and, of course, to this body.
Intelligence is critical to successful operations and to the safety of our men and women in uniform. Intelligence also plays a crucial role in the Joint Chiefs of Staff's plan for the 21st century, Dominant Battlespace Awareness, which hinges on our intelligence investment.
Critical to the Joint Chiefs' plan, as well as to daily air, sea, and ground operations, are the mapping products created by the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. Although I support this bill, I am frankly concerned with the reductions in the operations and maintenance funds for the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. I think the cuts are unjustified and excessive. I fear that they will have an unacceptable impact on the production of products for the unified commands and for the State Department peacekeeping negotiations. I am also concerned that these cuts will result in the unwarranted elimination of jobs from an agency that does not have sufficient staffing to meet military requirements today.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 1/2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from New Hampshire (Mr. Bass).
Mr. BASS. Mr. Chairman, as a member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, I welcome the opportunity to speak in support of H.R. 3694, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999. I would also like to associate myself with the very good comments of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Young) and the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks) concerning the strategic importance of intelligence. I would only add to that by saying that intelligence is also more than military and tactical in nature. There are civilian aspects to intelligence that are very important to the national security of this country that go beyond support to our military and provide the kind of protection for the citizens of the United States, not only domestically but abroad, that we all need and cherish.
This is one of the safest countries in the world in which to live. Part of the reason for that is the fact that we know what our enemies are doing and we know what their plans and intentions are better perhaps than anybody else in the world.
I would like to address if I could for a second the budget itself. The legislation before us today refocuses the President's request upon four major priorities for intelligence in the next century. Firstly, it accelerates the recapitalization of a signals intelligence program that has produced invaluable information against the new transnational targets of the post-Cold War world.
Secondly, our bill begins the process, after years of drawdowns and reductions, of rebuilding a clandestine human intelligence program that has provided much of our intelligence on the plans and intentions of terrorists, traffickers and other adversaries.
Thirdly, our bill continues the strengthening of the analysis part of intelligence collection that provides both assessment to our policymakers and guidance to the collectors.
Finally, our bill enhances the capability of the President to direct and accomplish covert actions when he deems such actions necessary to U.S. foreign policy and our national security. The purpose of our mark in each of these areas is to strengthen the capabilities that will provide policymakers with the intelligence that they will need in the next century.
Mr. Chairman, there were also strategic cuts in the budget, made after much investigation and on a line-by-line basis, on programs that will mostly be effective in the 21st century. The intelligence community has for the most part moved forward effectively against new and difficult issues. There are some areas where we can make some reductions and do so in a prudent fashion.
Once again, Mr. Chairman, I am happy to rise in support of this bipartisan authorization bill. I want to commend both the gentleman from Florida and the gentleman from Washington for having done an excellent job working together to produce this important bill.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Cardin), a good solid member of the Committee on Ways and Means.
Mr. CARDIN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time and congratulate both the gentleman from Florida and the gentleman from Washington for bringing forward a product that deserves the support of this House. I have said before that whenever an intelligence authorization or appropriations is before us, the proponents are at a disadvantage because people can attack the intelligence community. A lot of this is confidential. They do not have the opportunity sometimes to defend themselves.
The United States has the most sophisticated intelligence apparatus in the world. We have the best trained professionals in the world. Yet we have the most difficult challenges of any nation in this world. We work in a bipartisan manner in order to provide authorization and appropriations for our intelligence agencies. I really do applaud the leadership of this House for doing that. For the security of our country and for the manner in which this has been handled in the House, it deserves our support.
I must tell my colleagues, though, that I was somewhat disappointed by some of the tone in the language as it related to some of our intelligence agencies. But I am very pleased to see that the report acknowledges that we must invest in the recapitalization and modernization of our SIGINT capacities. I think that is very important for this country.
I have visited NSA on numerous occasions and know the dedication of the men and women in public service for our country. They represent some of our brightest minds in our Nation. But if we are going to be able to attract the best from our universities and colleges so that we can maintain that capacity in the future, it is important that we authorize adequate funds and appropriate adequate funds for our intelligence operation.
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased that we were able to bring this product forward in a bipartisan manner. I hope that this body will support the work of the committee, support the authorization and later support the appropriation.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the distinguished gentleman from Maryland's remarks. We have worked together on many things. His support is very important.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Hastert), the chairman of the task force to counter the drug problem.
Mr. HASTERT. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the fine work of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. I am pleased to join my colleagues from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in support of H.R. 3694, the fiscal year 1999 intelligence authorization bill. As chairman of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Subcommittee on National Security, and the Task Force for a Drug-Free America, I have had an opportunity to visit a wide range of counternarcotic programs in this country and overseas during the past few years. I have seen the effectiveness of the information produced by our intelligence community in identifying and tracking major narcotics trafficking activities. This intelligence information is essential to facilitating the law enforcement community's effort to slow the flood of cocaine and heroin that is pouring into our country. I have been particularly impressed by the growing coordination between the intelligence community and the law enforcement agencies to jointly target major narcotrafficking groups.
Despite this good news, I regret to report that we are stopping no more than 15 to 20 percent of the drugs flowing from the source countries of Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. We have the best intelligence organization in the world, but we lack the capability to act effectively on the information that we collect against narcotraffickers. It is clear that the administration's current source zone strategy is having only a very limited impact on cocaine and opium production in the source countries. We need to provide sufficient political will, sufficient resources and sufficient personnel to this effort.
Equally, the transit zone strategy is undermined by an unwillingness to seek sufficient air, ground and maritime resources to track, pursue and stop narcotrafficking moving through Central America, the Caribbean and Mexico. Based on numerous meetings with foreign narcotics officials and U.S. Government personnel serving in the field, I am quite persuaded that much more could be achieved if we would be willing to come forward and seek the necessary resources to step up the eradication and interdiction of cocaine and heroin.
Mr. Chairman, this is an important piece of legislation. Intelligence is the key to stopping narcotics traffic in this country and this hemisphere. I support this legislation.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Bishop).
Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of H.R. 3694, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999. Let me first congratulate the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks) for their tireless efforts in producing a bipartisan bill that addresses the needs of the intelligence community. There is arguably no greater consumer of intelligence than our Nation's Armed Forces. Despite the end of the Cold War, the requirements of our military for better and more timely intelligence has actually increased rather than decreased.
This is the result of a number of factors, including transitional issues such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Perhaps no incident better illustrates the threat that terrorism poses to the men and women of our armed services than the cowardly and callous terrorist bombing of Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia.
Our forces in Bosnia remain exposed to the threat of terrorism, and it is the intelligence that is collected, processed, analyzed and disseminated that continues to aid in shielding our sons and daughters against this deadly threat.
Additionally, our military has drawn down significantly in the aftermath of the Cold War. In fact, the military has experienced more cutbacks than any other Federal agency, and quite frankly in my view the reductions have gone too far.
Despite these reductions, the missions have increased as has the tempo of operations associated with those missions. Today we have members of our services in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia conducting missions ranging from peacekeeping to enforcement of United Nations sanctions to defense of nations.
Intelligence is a force multiplier, and if we are to continue on a downward path of funding our Nation's armed services, then we definitely need to take every step we can to ensure that our intelligence capabilities are sufficient to provide the policymakers with the information needed to make key decisions affecting national security. This bill provides the necessary resources to ensure that our intelligence capabilities are sufficient to meet the contingencies of the next generation.
Mr. Chairman, last January I traveled to Southeast Asia to review our intelligence activities and our operations in that region of the world, and I focused my attention specifically on efforts aimed at achieving a full accounting of Americans that are still unaccounted for as a result of the Vietnam war. I want to ensure our Nation's veterans and the families of those soldiers, airmen, and sailors that are still unaccounted for that the bill that is being considered today contains the necessary resources to permit the intelligence community to continue its efforts to determine the fate of those who have yet to come home.
Mr. Chairman, the intelligence community historically has had a poor record in maintaining a diverse work force. In fact, the intelligence community as a whole lags far behind the Federal labor sector in its representation of minorities and women. This committee recognizes the difficulty faced by intelligence agencies, that of competing with the private sector for minority applicants possessing high technical skills that are critical to intelligence missions. The fact of the matter is that these agencies cannot match the financial incentives and rewards offered by the private sector firms that attract individuals with skills of importance to the intelligence community.
This committee has been a supporter of a number of recruitment and training programs aimed at ensuring equal employment opportunity within the intelligence community agencies and developing and retaining personnel that are trained in the skills essential to the effective performance of intelligence missions. I am pleased to report that this bill continues this committee's commitment to those programs, specifically including the Stokes program.
I also want to note that I intend to review these programs in the succeeding years to ensure that the desired goals are being achieved and that the programs are being administered in an effective manner.
Mr. Chairman, the Intelligence Authorization Act for this year, for 1999, provides critical support to all facets of our intelligence community. Resources are authorized that permit the sustainment of the intelligence community's efforts to assist in providing force protection intelligence to our troops and to assist in the collection and analysis of critical intelligence bearing on such challenging issues as counterproliferation, counternarcotics, and counterterrorism.
I am proud to support this bill, and I urge my colleagues to do the same.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Mr. Shuster), Chairman of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, and a valued member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence as well.
Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Chairman, when General Schwarzkopf came back from the Gulf War, he told us that he had better intelligence than any battlefield commander in the history of the world. He also was asked by the media if there were any improvements that could be made, and he said yes, there were, and he went on to outline what further improvements could be made. The headlines then became `Schwarzkopf Criticizes Intelligence,' rather than the emphasis on his tremendous complimentary comments about the extraordinarily good intelligence which he had during that war.
Mr. Chairman, I think that there is a pervasive feeling across this country somehow, at least in some quarters, that criticizing intelligence is the thing to do. Indeed there has been a drum beat of criticism of intelligence rather than the kind of support which I believe it deserves. And it is largely as a result of that, I believe, that there has developed, particularly in the clandestine service, what might be called a culture of timidity, and I do not fault the clandestine service for that at all. I think it is a rational response, if each time someone raises their head they get a shot taken at it, they learn to keep their head down. Unfortunately, by its very nature, the clandestine service must be a careful but bold risk-taking service, and I think we are losing that in this country, and I think it is a very, very serious matter, and it is going to take years to rebuild it.
And so I would urge all of us to be aware of that and to be supportive where we can.
And finally with regard to the so-called drug war, this is something which deserves much, much more attention, much more funding, and I would urge support for the blueprint of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. McCollum) to wage war on drugs. We need to focus and spend more funds on this important issue.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Stokes) who has served as chairman of this committee and in many important assignments in this House, and he is going to be one of the Members that next year we are going to miss the most. He has done an outstanding job for his district and an outstanding job for this country.
Mr. STOKES. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished ranking member for yielding this time to me and also for his very kind remarks. I also want to express my appreciation to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) for the work that he does with this committee.
I want to address the House on an area of this legislation which is of particular concern to me. That area is the undergraduate training program. I rise as a former member and chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. When I served on the committee, I was struck by the lack of minorities employed in ranking and policymaking positions throughout the intelligence community. In questioning area agency directors about this, I was told that they were unable to find qualified minorities who were interested in employment in the intelligence community.
The solution to this problem took the form of legislation which is included in the intelligence authorization bill of 1987, creating the undergraduate training program. We were able to secure the cooperation of the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency, to become the first intelligence agencies to include in their budgets the funds to provide full scholarships for minority and disadvantaged students.
Mr. Chairman, through the UTP program, students have their undergraduate education fully funded and, following completion of college, are placed in mid-level positions at the agencies. To date, more than 150 individuals have participated in the undergraduate training program at the National Security Agency. The Central Intelligence Agency has graduated 135 students from the program. Many of these students have 4.0 averages at top universities around the nation. Some of them have 4.1 averages.
I am proud that the undergraduate training program is changing the face of America's work force, particularly in the intelligence field. Mr. Chairman, when I met with these graduates, they have expressed how this program has provided them with challenging career choices, helped them to realize their full potential. The success of this initiative has resulted in its adoption now in other agencies, including the DIA, the FBI, the National Institutes for Health and other agencies.
It is my strong belief that the undergraduate training program represents our commitment to diversity in the workplace and equal employment opportunity. It has proven successful, and I want to thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks) and all the members of the committee on both sides of the aisle for their efforts in maintaining this initiative, which I think is a credit to both the Congress and to our Nation.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to associate myself with the remarks of the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks) about the gentleman from Ohio (Chairman Stokes). He has always been Chairman Stokes to me. He was chairman of the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct when I started out, and the vision and contribution he has made to this institution are immeasurable. That is all I can say, and I thank the gentleman for his words.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Gibbons) a distinguished veteran of the Gulf War, an Air Force officer and a member of our committee.
(Mr. GIBBONS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished gentleman and chairman of the committee for an opportunity to speak today.
Mr. Chairman I rise to join my colleagues today in strong support of H.R. 3694,the intelligence authorization bill for fiscal year 1999.
Mr. Chairman, I have the distinct pleasure of being able to serve on both the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Committee on National Security. This allows me the opportunity to look across both operation military and defense issues as well as the intelligence functions that not only support but in fact participate in those various defense operations.
I can tell my colleagues, Mr. Chairman, this is a very prudent bill. It is a bill that not only sustains currently required capabilities but, importantly, begins to rebuild critical intelligence capabilities lost as a result of security changes brought about by the end of the bipolar cold war. It is a bill that provides our military forces with the information resources necessary to build our fighter confidence and perhaps even to keep them out of harm's way. It also seeks to provide them with the indications and warnings intelligence to allow them the advantage in a conflict.
Let there be no mistake Mr. Chairman. Contrary to arguments that will be made today, this is not a more secure world since the end of the cold war. While it is true that we do not face the imminent threat of nuclear annihilation today from the former Soviet Union, the threats posed by international terrorism, transnational threats such as narcotics trafficking, organized international crime, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, any use of chemical and biological weapons by rogue nation states are more pressing and considerably more dangerous than they ever have been before. The problems associated with collecting and understanding information about today's risks are in many ways more difficult because formal government boundaries are not limiting the threats to our peace and security.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to note that the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has stated that information dominance is one of the most important characteristics of his Joint Vision 2010 strategy.
Intelligence, intelligence, Mr. Chairman, is the bedrock for that information dominance. This bill provides our intelligence community with military forces, the infrastructure necessary to give United States that information dominance.
And finally, Mr. Chairman, I need to point out that this bill provides a fiscally sound increase of less than one-tenth of 1 percent to the President's request for intelligence. This increase reflects the proper emphasis on the information gathering, exploitation and dissemination activities necessary to ensure the security of the United States. And that is the bottom line: the security of the United States.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Traficant), my good friend, who every year has offered a Buy America amendment. This year we just put it in the bill because we thought it was the right thing to do, and the gentleman has made a very important contribution, and we appreciate his interest in the intelligence bill.
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the chairman of the committee and the ranking member for this bill, and I will vote for it. And I am for the first time going to vote against any cuts in their bill because I believe they deserve the chance, as stated by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Stokes), the chairman and one of the great Members in the body, that there is some hope here.
But I would like to give one observation specifically on this business about the war on drugs. See, I am one that believes that the CIA is not as bad as the critics proclaim, but I also believe the CIA is certainly not as good as its proponents proclaim, and I think there must be some improvement. Certainly the war on drugs is a good example.
Mr. Chairman, our intelligence community should know the source of drugs. They should know the land that grows them, the farmers that tend to those crops and harvest those crops. They should know the cartels that take those rough products and manufacture them into a finished product. They should further know the networking system that arranges for the export of those narcotics to our borders where 100 percent of all heroin and cocaine comes into this country across our borders, and Congress keeps philosophically debating the war on drugs.
I also believe the CIA should know who arranges for the importation of these drugs, what groups in America are also a part of the distribution, marketing and networking of making these drugs available; and finally, which international politicians not only turn their backs, but help to make these narcotics available.
Now, here is what I am saying: If the intelligence community does not know that, we should save the money and throw it all out. Now, I am offering an amendment today that is a very little, safe amendment. It calls for a report from the CIA as to their networking and coordination of efforts with law enforcement agencies in this country relative to the dynamics of this war on drugs.
But let me say this. I believe the time will come where Congress should mandate that the CIA should network and cooperate with domestic law enforcement and international law enforcement specifically on this war on drugs. I believe we have failed in the war on drugs.
Networking and coordination are very important. Oftentimes, agencies compete against one another for funds, and Congress at times takes stands and plays and takes sides on the floor for appropriations. We must have better coordination, better networking, and the intelligence community must be the heart of this success. Quite frankly, I do not think they are.
I am willing to give it a chance; I think that focus needs to be taken.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 1/2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Castle), former Governor of the State of Delaware and a member of our committee.
Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Chairman, I also rise in strong support of H.R. 3694, the intelligence authorization bill, and I offer my congratulations to the ranking member and to the chairman of this committee, both of whom are extraordinarily dedicated to this and, I think, do a wonderful job in performing this function.
Mr. Chairman, I do share the chairman's concerns about the current state of the intelligence community, and I do fully support his recommendations within this legislation for finding its deficiencies. Like my chairman, I believe that we must invest sufficient resources toward the development of the intelligence community's all-source analytical infrastructure. United States policymakers must have the most comprehensive, responsive and timely strategic perspective on major global changes.
During the Cold War, the wide-ranging nature of the Soviet threat simplified the analytical tasks faced by the intelligence community. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the unpredictability of emerging global challenges such as those of Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia and Iraq, requires the development of a national analytical capability that can provide policymakers with sufficient warning and with a range of policy options.
The failure of the Clinton administration's efforts to contain Saddam Hussein may, in part, reflect the inadequacy of our government's analysis of Iraqi internal dynamics, as well as gaps in our understanding of Iraq's policies and economy. Like other rogue states, Iraq demands a rigorous and aggressive analytical posture on the part of our intelligence community. We must do a better job of analyzing trends within such hard targets.
As a member of both the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, I am quite aware of the intelligence community's role and performance in analyzing significant global economic trends for policymakers, as well as its efforts to respond to the emerging threat of global organized crime.
I must confess that I have heard that the intelligence community may not be as capable of assessing global economic trends as a number of private sector firms. Economic and banking specialists and such government entities as the Federal Reserve, the Treasury Department and the U.S. Trade Representative's Office, have not been shy in criticizing the value of the community's economic intelligence reporting. While some of this criticism may not be justified, I believe that a prudent approach would be to initiate some sort of interagency review process to evaluate the quality and relevance of the community's economic intelligence reporting.
In response to emerging national security threats, such as money laundering by global criminal organizations, efforts should be made to clarify the respective roles of the intelligence community and law enforcement agencies. The nature and scope of the threat posed to our national security by money laundering groups is apparently large, but not well defined.
Numerous U.S. agencies have some responsibility for monitoring and responding to the global money-laundering threat, but no single agency takes the lead in tracking illicit financial flows and tracking down major launderers. I believe we can do it here. I urge members to support H.R. 3964.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Sanders), who has been very diligent over the years in reviewing the intelligence budget. We do not always agree on this, but I certainly want to yield to him to present his perspective.
Mr. SANDERS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I do not know that I will take the 2 minutes.
Let me just say this: We have heard a lot of discussion about the bipartisan nature of support for the intelligence budget, and that may well be on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; I do not think it is in the general House.
Last year, when we offered an amendment to lower the intelligence budget by 5 percent, we had 142 Members who said, no, those do not reflect our priorities. And I think, Mr. Chairman, that when we go out on Main Street and we go to rural America and we go to urban America and we say to the folks there, many of whom, I should add, no longer vote, by and large have given up on the political process because they do not believe that this Congress represents their interests, and we say to them, should we increase funding for the intelligence budget and cut funding for Medicare, should we allow a situation to continue where millions of elderly people in this country cannot afford their prescription drugs or should we build more spy satellites, I say to my colleagues, those people will tell us, in my view, and tell us overwhelmingly, they will say, Congress, get your priorities right. This is an intelligence budget, so let us talk about how we can improve intelligence in America.
Let us make sure that the little kids are able to get into the Head Start program. Let us make sure that millions of kids in this country who would like to go to college, but today cannot afford to go to college, have that opportunity by significantly increasing the appropriations for Pell grants. That is what we are talking about.
Now, nobody here is saying this is a peaceful world, that there are no problems. Nobody here is saying, let us cut the intelligence budget to zero. Nobody here is saying that the intelligence agencies do not serve a useful purpose. What we are saying is, get your priorities right.
The Cold War is over. The middle class, the working families of this country are hurting. Do not cut programs for them in the name of deficit reduction and increase funding for the intelligence budget.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute and 55 seconds.
I would just like to remind my colleague that if we subtract 142 from 435, we come up with 293, or a better than 2-to-1 ratio of the members of the House who voted in favor of the intelligence bill as reported by the committee.
I would just say this. We have to look at this in perspective. The intelligence bill is part of the defense bill. We have cut defense over the last 14 years every single year. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Secretary of Defense decide how much of the defense budget, which has been cut for 14 straight years, will be allocated to intelligence. We are not going to take money out here and put it over in Health and Human Services. That is just not what we are talking about.
If we cut the money out of intelligence, it is going to go to some other aspect of the defense bill, because it is part of the 050 function. I support all of these programs that the gentleman from Vermont is talking about.
We were here last night in support of education, and I agree with him that we need to protect Medicare and Social Security and the safety net. But we also have to protect our national security, and that is the foremost responsibility of the Federal Government.
I think the bill this year provides a prudent amount. There were 16 members of this committee, and from the most liberal to the most conservative, every single one of them present in the committee voted to approve this bill.
I urge my colleagues to support this bill. We have done a responsible, balanced job, and I think this bill deserves the support of the House.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I just want to gather an understanding of where we are on the time left on the floor on either side.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) has 5 minutes remaining; the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks) has 1 minute remaining.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, does the distinguished gentleman from Washington have any other speakers?
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to yield back at this time.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I would just yield myself such time as I may consume to present a closing thought.
I would like to point out that the United States is a pioneer in legislative oversight in intelligence. I think the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks) and I can both attest to the fact that we have met with parliamentarians from around the world whose countries are just beginning to take the first tentative steps toward independent oversight of intelligence activities. They are very interested to learn how our system works. I think we have the best system, the safest system, and a system where we can absolutely assure the citizens of the United States of America that things are under control.
I thank the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks) for assisting in that, and if the gentleman is willing to yield back at this time, I am as well.
Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired.
Pursuant to the rule, the amendment in the nature of a substitute printed in the bill, modified by striking section 401 and redesignating the succeeding sections, shall be considered as an original bill for the purpose of amendment under the 5-minute rule. Consideration shall proceed by title, and each title shall be considered read.
No amendment to the committee amendment is in order unless printed in the Congressional Record. Those amendments shall be considered read.
The Chairman of the Committee of the Whole may postpone until a time during further consideration in the Committee of the Whole a request for a recorded vote on any amendment, and may reduce to not less than 5 minutes the time for voting by electronic device on any postponed question that immediately follows another vote by electronic device, without intervening business, provided that the time for voting by
electronic device on the first in any series of questions shall not be less than 15 minutes.
The Clerk will designate section 1.
The text of section 1 is as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title: This Act may be cited as the `Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999'.
(b) Table of Contents: The table of contents for this Act is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Community management account.
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Application of sanctions laws to intelligence activities.
Sec. 304. Sense of Congress on intelligence community contracting.
Sec. 401. Extension of the CIA Voluntary Separation Pay Act.
Sec. 402. Enhanced protective authority for CIA personnel and family members.
Sec. 403. Technical amendments.
Sec. 501. Extension of authority to engage in commercial activities as security for intelligence collection activities.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there amendments to section 1?
If there are no amendments to section 1, the Clerk will designate title I.
The text of title I is as follows:
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1999 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the following elements of the United States Government:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Department of Defense.
(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(4) The National Security Agency.
(5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force.
(6) The Department of State.
(7) The Department of the Treasury.
(8) The Department of Energy.
(9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(10) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(11) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings: The amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 1999, for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 3694 of the 105th Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations: The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Adjustments: With the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 1999 under section 102 when the Director of Central Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized under such section may not, for any element of the intelligence community, exceed two percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under such section for such element.
(b) Notice to Intelligence Committees: The Director of Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate whenever he exercises the authority granted by this section.
SEC. 104. COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations: There is authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 1999 the sum of $139,123,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for the Advanced Research and Development Committee shall remain available until September 30, 2000.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels: The elements within the Community Management Account of the Director of Central Intelligence is authorized 283 full-time personnel as of September 30, 1999. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the Community Management Staff or personnel detailed from other elements of the United States Government.
(c) Classified Authorizations:
(1) Authorization of appropriations: In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management Account by subsection (a), there is also authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management Account for fiscal year 1999 such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).
(2) Authorization of personnel: In addition to the personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Community Management Account as of September 30, 1999, there is authorized such additional personnel for such elements as of that date as is specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations.
(d) Reimbursement: Except as provided in section 113 of the National Security Act of 1947, during fiscal year 1999, any officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the staff of the Community Management Account from another element of the United States Government shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary functions as required by the Director of Central Intelligence.
(e) National Drug Intelligence Center:
(1) In general: Of the amount appropriated pursuant to the authorization in subsection (a), the amount of $27,000,000 shall be available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. Within such amount,
funds provided for research, development, test, and evaluation purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2000, and funds provided for procurement purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2001.
(2) Transfer of funds: The Director of Central Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General of the United States funds available for the National Drug Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The Attorney General shall utilize funds so transferred for the activities of the National Drug Intelligence Center.
(3) Limitation: Amounts available for the National Drug Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)).
(4) Authority: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center.
(f) Transfer Authority for Funds for Security Requirements at Overseas Locations:
(1) In general: Of the amount appropriated pursuant to the authorization in subsection (a), the Director of Central Intelligence may transfer funds to departments or other agencies for the sole purpose of supporting certain intelligence community security requirements at overseas locations, as specified by the Director.
(2) Limitation: Amounts made available for departments or agencies under paragraph (1) shall be--
(A) transferred to the specific appropriation;
(B) allocated to the specific account in the specific amount, as determined by the Director;
(C) merged with funds in such account that are available for architectural and engineering support expenses at overseas locations; and
(D) available only for the same purposes, and subject to the same terms and conditions, as the funds described in subparagraph (C).