The CHAIRMAN. Are there further amendments to title I?
If not, the Clerk will designate title II.
The text of title II is as follows:
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 1999 the sum of $201,500,000.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there amendments to title II?
If not, the Clerk will designate title III.
The text of title III is as follows:
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.
SEC. 303. APPLICATION OF SANCTIONS LAWS TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
Section 905 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 441d) is amended by striking out `January 6, 1999' and inserting in lieu thereof `January 6, 2000'.
SEC. 304. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRACTING.
It is the sense of Congress that the Director of Central Intelligence should continue to direct that elements of the intelligence community, whenever compatible with the national security interests of the United States and consistent with operational and security concerns related to the conduct of intelligence activities, and where fiscally sound, should competitively award contracts in a manner that maximizes the procurement of products properly designated as having been made in the United States.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there amendments to title III?
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 5 offered by Mr. Weldon of Pennsylvania:
At the end of title III, add the following new section:
SEC. 305. PROLIFERATION REPORT.
(a) Annual Report: The Director of Central Intelligence shall submit an annual report to the Members of Congress specified in subsection (d) containing the information described in subsection (b). The first such report shall be submitted not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and subsequent reports shall be submitted annually thereafter. Each such report shall be submitted in classified form and shall be in the detail necessary to serve as a basis for determining appropriate corrective action with respect to any transfer within the meaning of subsection (b).
(b) Identification of Foreign Entities Transferring Items or Technologies: Each report shall identify each covered entity which during the preceding 2 years transferred a controlled item to another entity for use in any of the following:
(1) A missile project of concern (as determined by the Director of Central Intelligence).
(2) Activities to develop, produce, stockpile, or deliver chemical or biological weapons.
(3) Nuclear activities in countries that do not maintain full scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards or equivalent full scope safeguards.
(c) Definitions: For the purposes of this section:
(1) Controlled item: (A) The term `controlled item' means any of the following items (including technology):
(i) Any item on the MTCR Annex.
(ii) An item listed for control by the Australia Group.
(iii) Any item listed for control by the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
(B) Australia group: The term `Australia Group' means the multilateral regime in which the United States participates that seeks to prevent the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.
(C) MTCR annex: The term `MTCR Annex' has the meaning given that term in section 74 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797c).
(D) Nuclear suppliers' group: The term `Nuclear Suppliers' Group' means the multilateral arrangement in which the United States participates whose purpose is to restrict the transfers of items with relevance to the nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive applications.
(2) Covered entity: The term `covered entity' means a foreign person, corporation, business association, partnership, society, trust, or other nongovernmental organization or group or any government entity operating as a business. Such term includes any successor to any such entity.
(3) Missile project: (A) The term `missile project' means a project or facility for the design, development, or manufacture of a missile.
(B) The term `missile' has the meaning given that term in section 74 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797c).
(d) Specified Members of Congress: The Members of Congress referred to in this subsection are the following:
(1) The chairman and ranking minority party member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
(2) The chairman and ranking minority party member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
(Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I offer this amendment on behalf of myself and the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey). This is a bipartisan initiative and one that I think gets at the heart of our concerns involving proliferation around the world.
This amendment is a very simple amendment, Mr. Chairman. It requires the Director of Central Intelligence each year to give a report to the Select Committee on Intelligence in the House and the Senate involving any proliferating activity from any entity around the world that this Congress needs to know about.
Now, we have heard a lot of debate over intelligence and a lot of debate over how we should stop proliferation, but let us get to the heart of the matter.
Mr. Chairman, the fact is that we have good intelligence assets that tell us when proliferation is occurring. After all, 2 years ago, working with the Jordanians and Israelis, we caught the Russians transferring accelerometers and gyroscopes to Iraq to improve their Scud missiles. In fact, we have 120 sets of those right now with Russian markings on them.
Last year, last summer, we caught the Iranians being assisted again by a Russian entity to develop a medium-range missile that we think within 12 months will threaten all of Israel, all of our Arab friends, and 25,000 of our troops in that theater. We caught the Chinese transferring ring magnets to Pakistan, and M-11 missiles to Pakistan.
Mr. Chairman, the problem is not our ability to detect when technology is being transferred. In fact, Mr. Chairman, I would at this time insert into the Record detailed examples of 21 specific cases of China transferring technology in violation of every major arms control agreement that we are a signatory to, including the MTCR, the Chemical Test Ban Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Treaty, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Arms Control Export Act, and every other arms control agreement that is the basis of this administration's security arrangements.
Mr. Chairman, I also would like to insert in the record detailed examples of 16 instances of Russia transferring technology. In each of these cases, Mr. Chairman, the problem was not the intelligence community, it was not having the assets upon which to make an intelligent decision.
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Date of transfer or report Reported Russian transfers that may have violated a regime or law Possibly applicable treaties, regimes, and/or U.S. laws Administration's reponse
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Early 1990's Russians sold drawings of a sarin plant, manufacturing procedures, and toxic agents to a Japanese terrorist group AECA sec. 81; EAA sec. 11C No publicly known sanction.
1991 Transferred to China three RD-120 rocket engines and electronic equipment to improve accuracy of ballistic missiles MTCR; AECA sec. 73; EAA sec. 11B No publicly known sanction.
1991-1995 Transferred Cryogenic liquid oxygen/hydrogen rocket engines and technology to India MTCR; AECA sec. 73; EAA sec. 11B Sanctions against Russia and India under AECA and EAA imposed on May 6, 1992; expired after 2 years.
1992-1995 Russian transfers to Brazil of carbon fiber technology for rocket motor cases for space launch programs MTCR; AECA sec. 73; EAA sec. 11B Sanctions reportedly secretly imposed and waived.
1992-1996 Russian armed forces delivered 24 Scud B missiles and 8 launchers to Armenia MTCR; AECA sec. 73; EAA sec. 11B No publicly known sanction.
June 1993 Additional Russian enterprises involved in missile technology transfers to India MRCR; AECA sec. 73; EAA sec. 11B Sanctions imposed on June 16, 1993 and waived until July 15, 1993; no publicly known follow-up sanction.
1995-present Construction of 1,000 megawatt nuclear reactor at Bushehr in Iran IIANPA sec. 1604 and 1605; FOAA; NPPA sec. 821; FAA sec. 620G Refused to renew some civilian nuclear cooperation agreements; waived sanctions on aid.
Aug. 1995 Russian assistance to Iran to develop biological weapons BWC; AECA sec. 81; EAA sec. 11C; IIANPA sec. 1604 and 1605; FAA sec. 620G and 620H No publicly known sanctions.
Nov. 1995 Russian citizen transferred to unnamed country technology for making chemical weapons AECA sec. 81; EAA sec. 11C Sanctions imposed on Nov. 17, 1995.
Dec. 1995 Russian gyroscopes from submarine launched ballistic missiles smuggled to Iraq through middlemen United Nations Sanctions; MTCR; AECA sec. 73; EAA sec. 11B; IIANPA sec. 1604 and 1605; FAA sec. 620G and 620H No publicly known sanction.
July-Dec. 1996 DCI reported Russia transferred to Iran `a variety' of items related to ballistic missiles MTCR; AECA sec. 73; EAA sec. 11B; FAA sec. 620G and 620H; IIANPA sec. 1604 and 1605; FOAA No publicly known sanctions.
Nov. 1996 Israel reported Russian assistance to Syria to build a chemical weapon plant AECA sec. 81; EAA sec. 11C; FAA sec. 620G and 620H No publicly known sanction.
1996-1997 Delivered 3 Kilo diesel-electric submarines to Iran IIANPA sec. 1604 and 1605; FAA sec. 620G and 620H No publicly known sanction.
Jan.-Feb. 1997 Russia transferred detailed instructions to Iran on production of the SS-4 medium-range missile and related parts MTCR; AECA sec. 73; EAA sec. 11B; FAA sec. 620G and 620H; IIANPA sec. 1604 and 1605; FOAA No publicly known sanction.
April 1997 Sale of S-300 anti-aircraft/anti-missile missile system to Iran to protect nuclear reactors at Bushehr and other strategic sites IIANPA sec. 1604 and 1605; FAA sec. 620G and 620H No publicly known sanction.
Oct. 1997 Israeli intelligence reported Russian technology transfers for Iranian missiles developed with ranges between 1,300 and 10,000 km. Transfers include engines and guidance systems MTCR; AECA sec. 73; EAA sec. 11B; IIANPA sec. 1604 and 1605; FAA sec. 620G and 620H; FOAA No publicly known sanction.
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Date of transfer or report Reported transfer by China Possible violation Administration's response
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Nov. 1992 M-11 missiles or related equipment to Pakistan (The Administration did not officially confirm reports that M-11 missiles are in Pakistan.) MTCR; Arms Export Control Act; Export Administration Act Sanctions imposed on Aug. 24, 1993, for transfer of M-11 related equipment (not missiles); waived on Nov. 1, 1994.
Mid-1994 to mid-1995 Dozens or hundreds of missile guidance systems and computerized machine tools to Iran MTCR; Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act; Arms Export Control Act; Export Administration Act No sanctions.
2d quarter of 1995 Parts for the M-11 missile to Pakistan MTCR; Arms Export Control Act; Export Administration Act No Sanctions.
Dec. 1994 to mid-1995 5,000 ring magnets for an unsafeguarded nuclear enrichment program in Pakistan NPT; Export-Import Bank Act; Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act; Arms Export Control Act Considered sanctions under the Export-Import Bank Act; but announced on May 10, 1996, that no sanctions would be imposed.
July 1995 More than 30 M-11 missiles stored in crates at Sargodha Air Force Base in Pakistan MTCR; Arms Export Control Act; Export Administration Act No sanctions.
Sept. 1995 Calutron (electromagnetic isotope separation system) for uranium enrichment to Iran NPT; Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act; Export-Import Bank Act; Arms Export Control Act No sanctions.
1995-1997 C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles and C-801 air-launched cruise missiles to Iran Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act No sanctions.
Before Feb. 1996 Dual-use chemical precursors and equipment to Iran's chemical weapon program Arms Export Control Act; Export Administration Act Sanctions imposed on May 21, 1997.
Summer 1996 400 tons of chemicals to Iran Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act 1 ; Arms Export Control Act; Export Administration Act No sanctions.
Aug. 1996 Plant to manufacture M-11 missiles or missile components in Pakistan MTCR; Arms Export Control Act; Export Administration Act No sanctions.
Aug. 1996 Gyroscopes, accelerometers, and test equipment for missile guidance to Iran MTCR; Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act; Arms Export Control Act; Export Administration Act No sanctions.
Sept. 1996 Special industrial furnace and high-tech diagnostic equipment to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in Pakistan NPT; Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act; Export-Import Bank Act; Arms Export Control Act No sanctions.
July-Dec. 1996 Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) reported `tremendous variety' of technology and assistance for Pakistan's ballistic missile program MTCR; Arms Export Control Act; Export Administration Act No sanctions.
July-Dec. 1996 DCI reported `tremendous variety' of assistance for Iran's ballistic missile program MTCR; Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act; Arms Export Control Act; Export Administration Act No sanctions.
July-Dec. 1996 DCI reported principal supplies of nuclear equipment, material, and technology for Pakistan's nuclear weapon program NPT; Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act; Export-Import Bank Act; Arms Export Administration Act No sanctions.
July-Dec. 1996 DCI reported key supplies of technology for large nuclear projects in Iran NPT; Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act; Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act; Export-Import Bank Act; Arms Export Administration Act No sanctions.
July-Dec. 1996 DCI reported `considerable' chemical weapon-related transfers of production equipment and technology to Iran Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act; Arms Export Control Act; Export Administration Act No sanctions.
Jan. 1997 Dual-use biological items to Iran BWC; Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act; Arms Export Control Act; Export Administration Act No sanctions.
1997 Chemical precursors, production equipment, and production technology for Iran's chemical weapon program, including a plant for making glass-lined equipment Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act; Arms Export Control Act; Export Administration Act No sanctions.
Sept. to Dec. 1997 China Great Wall Industry Corp. provided telemetry equipment used in flight-tests to Iran for its development of the Shahab-3 and Shabab-4 medium range ballistic missiles MTCR; Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act; Arms Export Control Act; Export Administration Act No sanctions.
Nov. 1997/April 1998 May have transferred technology for Pakistan's Ghauri medium-range ballistic missile that was flight-tested on April 6, 1998 MTCR; Arms Export Control Act; Export Administration Act No sanctions.
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Mr. Chairman, the problem was, we did not have the will to impose sanctions. In fact, in only two of those 37 instances were sanctions imposed.
The problem is a simple one. The Congress is not brought into the process until after the State Department has made a ruling that they are not going to impose sanctions. The Congress is not brought into the process until after the proliferating action has taken place.
My amendment is simple. My amendment asks the Director of Central Intelligence, and I know they collect this data anecdotally, to each year submit to the chairmen of the House Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence an unsanitized listing of all of those occasions that we should know about, unsanitized by the State Department, involving proliferation of technology, involving weapons of mass destruction. In that way, we can play our rightful role in saying that we want arms control agreements enforced.
Mr. Chairman, we know what happened last November. This Congress voted overwhelmingly in favor of a bipartisan bill to force the administration to impose sanctions on Russia because of transferring of technology to Iran. This Congress has spoken unequivocally, in fact, in that case, with 400 Members voting in the affirmative that we want arms control agreements enforced. That is the problem, Mr. Chairman. It is not the intelligence collection, it is not the analysis of the data, although I disagree from time to time with NIE, it is the use of that data by the State Department and by the administration where they have not imposed sanctions.
Mr. Chairman, we are not trying to incite a conflict with Russia. I happen to believe in the Ronald Reagan philosophy: Trust, but verify.
I am engaged with Russia. Next week I will host a group of senior Russian leaders in this city. I want to help Russia stabilize itself. I want to help them have a middle class.
However, I understand one very important fundamental thing about Russia and China: We must be consistent, we must be candid, and we must be strong, and when we fail to follow through on any one of those three areas, we send the wrong signal to entities that cannot be controlled in those countries.
That is why, after Russia transferred the accelerometers and gyroscopes 2 years ago, I was not surprised this past summer when we found they were transferring technology to Iran; because we have been sending the wrong signal.
I ask my colleagues to support this very simple amendment.
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Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, for 40 years our country, this planet operated under a doctrine of mutually assured destruction, meaning that both the United States and the Soviet Union stockpiled nuclear weapons in vertical proliferation, 5,000, 10,000, 15,000 nuclear weapons apiece, when only 200 apiece would be necessary in order to destroy totally the populations of both the United States and the Soviet Union. It was important for the Cold War to come to an end, because there was a very slight likelihood that either country would ever use these weapons, because the other country would have guaranteed their sure and certain total destruction.
The greater threat has always been horizontal proliferation. The spread of weapons from country to country to country, to subgroups, to terrorist groups, to other parties around the globe who do not live under this threat of mutually assured destruction.
The problem is that we in the United States do not on a consistent basis get enough information about this threat so that we can formulate policies, sanctions, that will guarantee that those around the world who are intent on gathering these technologies to themselves and then using them against their enemies or against the American people, know that we have a strong policy of deterrence against their use.
The Weldon-Markey amendment, as it was originally formulated, ensured that we would desubsidize any country, any company in the world that was identified as one which was trafficking in materials which could be used for proliferation purposes. That is putting real teeth, financial teeth into the American policy towards these issues.
Unfortunately, in negotiating with the intelligence community and others who are not yet ready to embrace that policy, we are unable to bring that full amendment with all of the power of the American purse string to this floor here today. But what we do is we ensure that there will be a report made to the Intelligence Committees.
I believe it should go to other committees as well so that there is a broader understanding of the importance of this issue. In the post-Cold War period, there are only two great agendas for our country. One is ensuring that the American people finally get the full benefits of the prosperity which is being created in this world and that our people benefit from it, and secondly, that we deal with the aftermath of the Cold War in terms of these national rivalries that manifest themselves both in human rights violations, religious violations, and in proliferation threats spreading across this planet.
This is a good first step. I hope that the House adopts this amendment. It will at least begin the process of giving us the information which we need, and hopefully, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) and I, and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) and others can come back here next year and we can ensure that there are teeth which are built into this system so that the Congress votes to deny any financial assistance to any country or any company which sells these technologies into the hands of those who are not abiding by the nonproliferation safeguards which this world has to have in the 21st century.
So I thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon), for his leadership. I thank the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) and all of those who have worked on this issue, and I hope that the House, in its wisdom, adopts this very important first step here today.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.
Mr. Chairman, first let me say that as a member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, I have learned an enormous amount from its leaders, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), chairman of the committee, and its ranking member, the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks); and I want to thank them for their nice words about me because, as my colleagues know, I will be leaving the Congress after this term.
I intend to support this bill in full. It is a good bill that was developed with broad, bipartisan support, and as I have said for many years, intelligence spending is intelligent spending.
I rise in support now of this excellent amendment by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) and the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey), because it deals with part of a subject that has concerned many of us for some time, and that is technology transfer from Russia and China to rogue regimes.
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We know from published reports that that transfer is continuing. It is continuing in spite of laws on the books in the United States that could cause our government to invoke sanctions against those firms which we have identified as aiding Iran's missile program, and which are doing business with the United States.
I authored a concurrent resolution last fall and the same resolution was offered in the other body, both passed by overwhelming margins, to direct the administration to impose sanctions on firms we have identified as transferring technology to Iran to build its indigenous missile industry. Sanctions have not been imposed.
From what we know, some list of firms is circulating and people are being encouraged not to do business with those firms, but sanctions on the proliferators have not been imposed.
Mr. Chairman, I am a cosponsor and strong supporter of the measure authored by the gentleman from New York (Mr. Gilman), which has passed this body. An identical measure authored by Senator Lott is likely to pass the other body very soon. Hopefully then a strong majority of the United States Congress will have expressed its will to make certain that strong sanctions are imposed on firms that are proliferating.
Meanwhile, we do what we can. And in this case, this amendment makes clear that we want to develop the most complete list of proliferators, and we want our intelligence agencies to share that list with our Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Mr. Chairman, I want that list. I think it will be very helpful. But more than the list, I want the technology transfers stopped. The United States can do this if it has the will. I call on the administration, despite its multiple agendas with Russia, to act now against proliferation that has been publicly identified by Russia to Iran. It is dangerous. It threatens our national security. We cannot wait any longer.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Weldon) for his comments, as well as the comments of the gentleman from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Mr. Markey) and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman).
I understand with regard to the gentleman from Pennsylvania that it is his decision to withdraw this amendment at this time. But I also want to quickly say, I want to make sure that he knows and the others that we will work closely with him. In fact, we have already started that process to make sure that we do have the necessary information so that Congress does have the unfettered truth about the proliferation issue. Certainly the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence wants to have it on both sides. The goal is great and we will get the goal done.
The gentleman is very well respected for his commitment to our Nation's security. I have heard him speak many times. He speaks with knowledge and conviction, a great deal of information, and he certainly has an extraordinary list of contacts. His concern regarding whether our intelligence community is free to deliver the bad news that it sometimes must is very relevant.
Mr. Chairman, the gentleman's efforts on the Committee on National Security are obviously very much appreciated by our committee and by myself personally. We share the same jurisdiction on many programs, and I think we work together very well and I want to continue that and in fact enhance it.
The gentleman's views and concerns on the most difficult and important problem of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are indeed respected and have been a great trigger in this effort.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GOSS. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss), my friend and colleague, for yielding and I am not here to disrupt the proceedings of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, as both Members know, the ranking member and the chairman. I have the highest respect for their leadership and for their commitment.
Mr. Chairman, my concern is with our State Department and with our ability in this institution to get access to relevant data when it occurs in a timely manner.
Mr. Chairman, because of the commitment of the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) and the distinguished gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks), the ranking member, to work with me and with the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey) and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) and others on this issue, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw my amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?
There was no objection.