IN CONNECTION WITH 1996 FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS
FINAL REPORT of the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
SENATE Rept. 105-167 - 105th Congress 2d Session - March 10, 1998
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| INVESTIGATION OF ILLEGAL OR IMPROPER ACTIVITIES IN CONNECTION WITH 1996 FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS FINAL REPORT of the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS SENATE Rept. 105-167 - 105th Congress 2d Session - March 10, 1998 |
MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATORS GLENN, LEVIN, LIEBERMAN, AKAKA, DURBIN, TORRICELLI AND CLELAND Chapter 4: John Huang............................................ 4788 Findings..................................................... 4788 Huang's Early Career......................................... 4789 Background on the Lippo Group................................ 4790 Huang's Activities on Behalf of the Lippo Group.............. 4791 Political Contributions.................................. 4792 Huang's Tenure at the Department of Commerce................. 4794 Huang's Appointment...................................... 4794 Huang's Role at Commerce................................. 4796 Huang's Security Clearance and Access to Classified Information............................................ 4798 Granting of Top Secret Clearance......................... 4799 Huang's Access to Classified Information................. 4800 Huang's Use of the Stephens Office....................... 4802 Huang's Post-Commerce Clearance.......................... 4803 No Evidence of Espionage................................. 4806 Evidence of Solicitations of Contributions............... 4808 Hiring Huang to Work at the DNC.............................. 4811 Huang's Understanding of Applicable Law.................. 4813 Huang's Fundraisers...................................... 4814 February 1996 Hay Adams APALC Events, Washington, D.C.... 4814 May 13, 1996 Sheraton Carlton Event, Washington, D.C..... 4816 July 22, 1996 Century Plaza Hotel Event, Los Angeles..... 4816 July 30, 1996 Jefferson Hotel Event, Washington, D.C..... 4817 Other Huang Activities................................... 4818 Hsi Lai Temple Event..................................... 4818 The Vice President and the Temple Event.................. 4819 John Huang and the Temple Event.......................... 4831 John H. K. Lee and the Cheong Am America Contribution.... 4832 June 18, 1996, DNC Coffee at the White House............. 4836 Rawlein Soberano......................................... 4838 The DNC's Supervision of Huang........................... 4839 Conclusion................................................... 4840 Chapter 4: John Huang John Huang, a former Lippo Group executive, Commerce Department official, and DNC fundraiser, personifies a significant aspect of the fundraising problems endemic to the 1996 elections. Apparently driven by a desire to be perceived as an important fundraiser in Democratic Party circles, Huang engaged in a number of activities that were improper and possibly illegal during and prior to his tenure at the DNC. In the end, the DNC returned over $1.6 million in contributions attributable to Huang. The evidence before the Committee supports the claim that Huang engaged in improper fundraising activities. The evidence before the Committee does not support other allegations lodged against Huang, including the serious charge that he served as a spy for the People's Republic of China or any other foreign government. FINDINGS Based on the evidence before the Committee, we make the following findings regarding Huang's activities: (1) John Huang engaged in a number of improper and possibly illegal activities during and prior to his service as a DNC fundraiser. These activities ranged from failing to ensure the legality or propriety of the contributions he solicited, to obtaining foreign reimbursement for a 1992 corporate contribution he directed, to possibly soliciting foreign contributions. In addition, he appears to have improperly solicited several contributions during his tenure at the Commerce Department, in possible violation of the Hatch Act. (2) There is no evidence before the Committee that DNC officials were knowingly involved in Huang's misdeeds, but the DNC did not adequately supervise Huang's fundraising, did not adequately review the contributions that Huang solicited, and did not respond appropriately to warning signs of his improper activities. The DNC could have avoided some of Huang's misdeeds had it more closely supervised Huang's activities and had it not unwisely abandoned its previously-existing system for checking the propriety of large contributions. (3) Huang contributed and raised substantial sums of money to benefit the DNC in order to gain access for himself and his associates to the White House and senior Administration officials. (4) The evidence before the Committee does not establish that Huang served as a spy or a conduit for contributions from any foreign government, including the People's Republic of China. The Committee's investigationyielded no direct support for the allegation that Huang acted as either a spy or a conduit for any foreign government. (5) The evidence before the Committee does not establish that Huang either misused his security clearance or improperly disseminated classified information during his service at the Commerce Department. (6) The evidence before the Committee does not allow for any definitive conclusion regarding the nature of Huang's interactions with the Lippo Group during his tenure at the Commerce Department and the DNC. Huang's frequent contacts with Lippo-related entities and his intermittent use of an office across the street from the Commerce Department to receive faxes or mail cast suspicion on Huang's activities while working for the Commerce Department. Nevertheless, the absence of specific evidence on the nature of his contacts with Lippo or the contents of the materials he received makes it difficult to draw any conclusions regarding actual misconduct or a conflict of interest within the meaning of the ethics laws governing federal employees. (7) Neither Huang's hiring at the Commerce Department nor his receipt of a security clearance was inappropriate. At the time of Huang's hiring, all Commerce Department political appointees received interim clearances as a matter of course, a practice the Department subsequently discontinued. huang's early career John Huang was born in Fujian province, China,1 and raised in Taiwan.2 In 1969, he came to the United States to study in the graduate business administration program of the University of Connecticut.\3\ He became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1976.4 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Footnotes at end of chapter --------------------------------------------------------------------------- During the 1970s, Huang began a career as a banker in the Washington area.5 In late 1979, he moved to Kentucky and worked for First National Bank of Louisville.6 Two years later, he joined Union Planters National Bank in Memphis.7 In 1983, Huang was transferred to Hong Kong to head Union Planters's Far East representative office.8 While in that post, he met Indonesian businessman James Riady, who was a legal permanent resident in the U.S. for many years and whose family owns the Lippo Group, an international conglomerate. Huang first went to work for the Riadys in February 1985, when he became a vice president and director of international banking for the Hong Kong Chinese Bank,9 in which the Riadys' Lippo Group held a large stake. Simultaneously, he served as a vice president and Far East manager of the Little Rock-based Worthen Bank, which was also partly owned by the Riady family in partnership with Stephens Inc., a major investment banking firm based in Little Rock, Arkansas. Huang reported to James Riady who was then residing in Arkansas. During Riady's tenure in Arkansas, Riady met and became friendly with then-Governor Bill Clinton.10 Huang later said he met the Governor when he led a trade mission to Asia.11 During business trips to Arkansas, Huang also met several people with ties to Governor Clinton, some of whom--like Huang himself--would later follow him to Washington after he was elected President. In 1984, after running into problems with bank regulators in Arkansas, the Riadys shifted their focus to California. In 1984, James Riady acquired control of Bank of Trade,12 a small institution that specialized in the Asian-American market,13 and renamed it LippoBank of California.14 Riady moved from Little Rock to Los Angeles and, in 1986, he appointed John Huang president and chief operating officer of the California bank.15 Huang remained with LippoBank of California until the summer of 1988, when he went to New York to become general manager of Bank Central Asia.16 Although it was not part of the Lippo Group, the Riadys were large investors in Bank Central Asia and, according to Huang, they managed it.17 In January 1990, Huang moved from New York back to California to become president of USA Operations for the Lippo Group, responsible for overseeing all of Lippo's U.S. interests. He also served as vice chairman of the California bank.18 background on the lippo group The Lippo Group was founded in Indonesia by Mochtar Riady, father of James Riady and the son of immigrants from the Fujian province of China.19 Mochtar Riady got his start in business by operating a bicycle shop in Indonesia catering to bicycle traders from his native province.20 In 1960, he entered the banking business when he raised $200,000 in equity for a failing bank from other ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. By 1990, the Lippo Group had grown astronomically and diversified from its financial services base to manufacturing and real estate development.21 Unlike most conglomerates, Lippo Group ``is an unconsolidated federation of companies with a multibillion-dollar asset base, a second major base in Hong Kong and activities throughout the Pacific Rim,'' 22 in the words of an academic study. All companies in the group are fully or partially owned and run by the Riady family.23 By the mid-1990s, the Lippo Group was a multibillion-dollar conglomerate headquartered in Indonesia and with a second large base of operations in Hong Kong. It was active in about a half-dozen countries.24 In the 1990s, the Lippo Group began a major effort to invest and conduct business in China. Like many other major companies hoping to enter the Chinese market, the Lippo Group did so by entering into joint ventures with companies controlled by the Chinese government. In particular, Lippo forged a close relationship with a Chinese government-owned trading company called China Resources, Ltd. China Resources is a multi-national company based in Hong Kong whose revenues exceeded $250 million last year.25 Despite concerns expressed by some Members of the Committee, this relationship does not signal Chinese government control of the Lippo Group.26 Thomas Hampson, a private investigator called by the Majority to testify on the structure of the Lippo Group, testified that foreign nationals who do business in mainland China--a socialist and centralized economy--very often work with government-owned companies.27 Indeed, numerous American corporations, including General Motors, Boeing, Coca-Cola, Eastman Kodak, and Microsoft, have entered the Chinese market through joint venture relationships with Chinese government-owned companies.28 The Lippo Group also has been involved in business ventures with several major American companies, including First Union Corp. and Wal-Mart Stores Inc., and with various European and Japanese concerns. One well-known American who has done business with Lippo is Pat Robertson, the television evangelist who founded the Christian Coalition. In 1995, a company chaired by Robertson teamed up with Lippo and a Malaysian real estate firm to launch a cable TV venture in mainland China.29 huang's activities on behalf of the lippo group Huang's professional responsibilities on behalf of the Lippo Group appear to have been threefold. First, he was responsible for overseeing LippoBank of California (``LippoBank'') and three U.S. holding companies: Hip Hing Holdings, San Jose Holdings, and Toy Center Holdings. Each holding company owned one or more pieces of California real estate in varying stages of development. Although the properties generated some income from rent, all of the companies apparently operated at a net loss until 1994.30 Second, Huang was responsible for building the name of the Lippo Group in the U.S. and stimulating business in the Asian American community, the financial community, and the government and political communities. Third, Huang was the country liaison between Lippo Group headquarters and their U.S. contacts. James Alexander, a former LippoBank president, best described Huang's varied roles, testifying that Huang was the person who took him around to meet important clients, who escorted him when he visited Jakarta, and was the person to whom he turned when he had a bank matter that needed to be resolved. Harold Arthur, a subsequent LippoBank president, summed up by stating, ``I presumed [what Huang did from day to day] was business relations and client development.'' 31 To fulfill his responsibility to promote the Lippo Group, Huang engaged in a tremendous amount of networking and became active in numerous organizations, including the Asia Society, the Committee of 100, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, the California Taiwan Trade and Investment Council, the Asian Business League, Asian American Development Enterprises, the Chinatown Service Center, the Foreign Trade Association, the Asian Pacific American Legal Center, the National Association of Chinese Bankers, the Hong Kong Association of Southern California, the Independent Bankers Association of America, and the Indonesian Cultural Association.32 Huang also sat on two advisory state commissions: the California World Trade Commission and the California State Advisory Commission on Economic Development.33 He was not merely a member of these organizations, he held officer positions in almost all them. For example, he was a director of Committee of 100, a bipartisan national organization of Chinese American leaders in the arts, academia, public service, business and the sciences, whose membership is by invitation only. Other members of Committee of 100 include prominent Chinese American leaders, including Yo-Yo Ma, I. M. Pei, Chang-Lin Tien and David Henry Hwang.34 In his capacity as country liaison for the Lippo Group, Huang oversaw visits to the U.S. by members of the Riady family and other Lippo officials, acted as a broker for potential business associates of the group, and assisted delegations visiting from Asia as requested by Group officials. In this capacity, Huang handled such events as the Lippo delegation's attendance at the 1993 Seattle ASEAN conference, the visit to Atlanta by a visiting Chinese delegation from Beijing, and the hosting of a breakfast for a second visiting delegation from Beijing.35 As part of his role in building the Lippo and Riady profiles, Huang was also very active in government and in politics. Between the time he assumed the position as Director of U.S. Operations in 1990, and the time he went to the Department of Commerce in 1994, Huang oversaw the making of a number of political contributions through domestic subsidiaries of the Lippo Group, to state local and federal candidates. Huang also volunteered to raise funds, to host receptions, and to build support for candidates within California's Asian American community. In the course of his political fundraising,36 Huang formed relationships with members of the Asian American community who were involved in Democratic politics. In 1988, for example, he worked with Democratic activist Maria Hsia in the Pacific Leadership Council (``PLC''), ``a group formed to raise money and lobby for Asian American interests,'' 37 in the words of a press report. In April of that year, the PLC held a Democratic fundraising event in James Riady's Los Angeles home that raised about $110,000.38 Huang also personally contributed $10,000 to the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (``DSCC'') in 1988.39 In the fall of 1988, he hosted a fundraiser for Senator John Breaux of Louisiana, who was then head of the DSCC.40 The following January, Huang, Maria Hsia, and other members of the Pacific Leadership Council led a trade mission to Taiwan with then-California Lt. Governor Leo McCarthy. Then-Senator Al Gore of Tennessee joined the delegation in Taiwan.41 In 1992, Huang volunteered to raise money for the Clinton presidential campaign in the Asian-American community.42 Huang assisted with the organization of a fundraising dinner in October 1992 that raised $250,000 for the campaign from Southern California's Asian-American community.43 Huang has testified that he became a fundraising volunteer because Governor Clinton ``had been a friend to us since the Arkansas time, [and] we [felt] obligated to help a friend.'' 44 Political contributions As a part of his responsibilities as Lippo Group's country representative, Huang oversaw three domestic holding companies incorporated in California: Hip Hing Holdings, Toy Center Holdings, and San Jose Holdings. Each of the three companies owned real estate in California at various stages of development. Hip Hing Holdings owned a series of adjoining parcels of property in the Chinatown area of Los Angeles with an assessed value of $9.8 million.45 In addition to its property holdings, Hip Hing Holdings was used by the Lippo Group to pay expenses associated with the Group's activities in the United States. These expenses included salaries for John Huang and other staff and consultants employed by the Group, and costs associated with hosting visiting delegations of businessmen. Employees of Hip Hing Holding would regularly send faxes to Indonesia requesting reimbursement of itemized expenses of Hip Hing Holdings and the other subsidiaries. Records produced by Hip Hing Holdings show that on August 12, 1992, the company made a $50,000 contribution to the DNC Victory Fund. Juliana Utomo, a Hip Hing employee who handled general administration of the companies from 1994 forward, told the Committee that decision-making with regard to contributions in 1992 and 1993 rested with John Huang.46 Utomo stated that she did not know that the $50,000 paid to the Victory Fund was a political contribution; in fact, she stated that she did not know the purpose of the disbursement.47 A request for reimbursement for expenses of Hip Hing Holdings specifically sought reimbursement for the DNC contribution.48 The Committee was unable to depose or interview anyone who had actual knowledge regarding whether this contribution was reimbursed; however, in light of the fact that Hip Hing Holdings sought reimbursement for the contribution, and the fact that the holding company had not generated sufficient income in 1992 to cover the cost of such a contribution, it seems likely that the contribution was reimbursed with Lippo funds from abroad.49 A reimbursement would likely have converted the Hip Hing Holdings contribution into a foreign contribution under FEC rules for U.S. subsidiaries of foreign companies.50 In September 1993, the DNC received additional contributions from Hip Hing Holdings and from two other holding companies: San Jose Holdings and Toy Center Holdings. Hip Hing Holdings and Toy Center Holdings each made $17,500 in contributions to the DNC while San Jose Holdings contributed $15,000.51 Unlike the contribution in 1992, however, the requests for reimbursement for the months in which the contributions were made do not contain requests for reimbursements of these contributions.52 Also, unlike the $50,000 contribution from Hip Hing Holdings in 1992, each of the companies generated sufficient rental income to support the cost of the 1993 contributions. In 1993, Hip Hing Holdings generated $35,200 in income from rental of the undeveloped property, while San Jose Holdings generated $155,979 in income, and Toy Center Holdings generated $167,000 in income.53 Accordingly, unlike the 1992 contribution, there is no evidence that the 1993 contributions made by Lippo-related entities were reimbursed with money from abroad. There is no evidence that the DNC was aware of the reimbursement of the 1992 contribution. Thomas Hampson also testified that, despite being an expert corporate investigator, he was unable to discover Hip Hing Holdings's 1992 income using publicly available information.54 It appears that no one knew of the reimbursement of this contribution until the Committee's hearing. After the hearing, the DNC promptly refunded the $50,000. James Riady and his wife Aileen were also strong supporters of the Democratic Party and President Clinton. Between August and October 1992, they contributed half a million dollars to state parties in California, Michigan, Louisiana, Ohio, North Carolina, Arkansas, and Georgia.55 In addition, the Riadys made a $200,000 contribution to Clinton's 1993 Inaugural Committee.56 As James and Aileen Riady were both legal permanent residents of this country at the time, they were entitled to make the contributions. However, the size and number of the contributions have led to allegations that Huang later received his position at the Department of Commerce as a favor to the Riadys. While it appears likely that James Riady was one of several individuals who supported Huang's efforts to obtain a post in the Clinton Administration, as discussed below, the Committee found no evidence that Riady or Huang targeted the specific Department of Commerce position to which he was ultimately appointed. Prior to his employment with the Department of Commerce, Huang received a large severance package from the Lippo Group. Questions have been raised about whether this bonus was payment in advance for services it was anticipated Huang would perform while at the Department of Commerce. The reported amount of this bonus has varied widely. In February 1994, Huang received an after-tax bonus of $132,000.57 According to the testimony of Juliana Utomo, it was the policy of the Lippo Group to pay annual bonuses in the first months of the new year and that it was fair to conclude that this bonus was Huang's 1993 annual bonus.58 Upon his departure from the Group, Huang received a severance package including an after tax bonus of $284,000, slightly more than double his 1993 annual bonus.59 While very generous, a study of the Lippo Group specifically notes that the Group is known for its generous bonuses of one and a half to three months' salary, a factor which helps attract qualified management. At the time of his departure, Huang, as country representative for the U.S., ranked well up in the corporate structure of the Group.60 Allegations were also raised regarding favorable treatment of LippoBank of California as a result of the Riadys' and Huang's political contributions. The California bank, which is very small by U.S. banking standards with about $50 million in assets, has been riddled with regulatory problems and has received three cease and desist orders from the FDIC since 1990.61 The Committee was presented with no evidence that the bank ever sought or received assistance from regulators as a result of political contributions. At hearings, former bank President Harold Arthur and Hip Hing Holdings employee Juliana Utomo testified that the bank never sought special help or relief from recipients of Riady's political contributions or connections.62 Huang's Tenure At The Department Of Commerce Huang's appointment There was nothing improper or inappropriate in the appointment of Huang to a position at the Department of Commerce; nor were any procedures or regulations ignored or circumvented in the decision-making process that led to his placement. Moreover, as described below, Huang was recommended for an administration position by three United States Senators, several high-ranking state officials, and the Asian Community Outreach and Priority Placement components of the Office of Presidential Personnel. His placement was also in conformity with the stated desire of both President Clinton and then- Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown for the federal government to benefit from increased racial and gender diversity within the senior levels of the administration. Moreover, he was the personal choice of his immediate supervisor, Charles Meissner, the Assistant Secretary for International Economic Policy,63 and his appointment was made with the approval or consultation of the Undersecretary for the International Trade Administration. At the time he first sought an appointment from the Clinton Administration in 1992, Huang had over 20 years of business experience in banking and management, and much of his experience was international. As a result of his work, he had extensive contacts within the Asian business community, both in the U.S. and abroad. Huang had also personally raised funds for the Clinton campaign in 1992, and his employer, James Riady, had contributed generously to the Clinton campaign. Huang was a typical candidate for an appointed position within a new administration. Shortly after the 1992 election, Huang submitted his resume to the Office of Presidential Personnel. In the documents he submitted, Huang laid out his philosophy in seeking an appointment as follows: Our attitude toward life should totally dwell on a concept ``to serve others''--to serve others base[d] upon each individual's ability. . . . We want many good and qualified Asian Americans to answer the call to serve this country which we have all chosen to come to establish ourselves; to raise our family and to educate our children. . . . It will be an important agenda for the Administration to bring this group of resourceful people together to make further contribution to this country.64 Huang initially had been considered for a position with the Small Business Administration. A memorandum dated April 19, 1993, from Gilbert Colon and Maria Haley of the Office of Presidential Personnel to then-Director Bruce Lindsey stated: ``It should be noted that there is another qualified candidate for this position, Mr. John Huang, a banker from California, who has handled small business and has international expertise.'' 65 Although Huang was not selected for this position, the Office of Presidential Personnel continued to screen his file for a potential appointment. On October 18, 1993, Gary Christopherson, White House Associate Director for Presidential Personnel, wrote a memo to Lindsey recommending Huang for appointment as Principal Deputy Assistant for International Economic Policy at the Department of Commerce.66 Christopherson testified that his decision to recommend Huang was based on his review of Huang's resume and background, an analysis of the requirements of the Commerce position, and information supplied by Martha Wantanabe and Melinda Yee of the Asian Community Outreach section.67 He also indicated that the selection of Huang was not a major cause for deliberation in an office that handled placement of three or four thousand candidates.68 Huang had support from a number of quarters, including state and federal elected officials.69 In addition, Huang's name appeared on lists of potential appointees submitted to the Office of Presidential Personnel by both the DNC and the Asian Community Outreach section. As a result, Huang was placed on a list of priority candidates by the office's Priority Placement section. Christopherson testified: Huang was considered to be a high priority placement by the Asian community. That's how I viewed him, as a high priority placement as well. What is important to understand in this is that one of the roles I played in Presidential Personnel was to be a strong advocate of diversity coming into the administration. . . .70 Christopherson noted that the addition of Huang to the group of priority candidates ``seemed to be a reasonable fit as a priority placement, and we were clearly looking for Asian people to get into various places--we clearly needed them in the Department of Commerce.'' 71 After review by Christopherson, Huang's name was included in a list of priority placements which was then forwarded to the Department of Commerce. The Office of Presidential Personnel did not have unilateral authority to make an appointment--Huang's placement had to be approved by the appropriate authorities at the department.72 At the time of Huang's consideration, Jeffrey Garten was the Under Secretary of the Commerce Department's International Trade Administration (the ``ITA'').73 In testimony before the Committee, Garten stated that he received a list of priority placement candidates from the White House and that Huang's name was on that list.74 Garten testified that he gave that list to Charles Meissner, one of five Assistant Secretaries within the ITA, and that Meissner selected Huang as his Principal Deputy Assistant, a position which was akin to a chief of staff.75 Huang was selected for his position in early 1994; he began work in July 1994. Huang apparently received the same level of review as other candidates for political appointments. He was never considered a ``must-hire.'' 76 In fact, his application sat for over six months before an appropriate match was found for him.77 Although perhaps not as thorough as one might wish, the process by which Huang was appointed appears to have been typical of a new administration that seeks to fill hundreds of slots in dozens of agencies as quickly and efficiently as possible.78 Huang's role at Commerce The position for which Huang was hired was viewed as primarily administrative rather than policy-making. Garten testified that at the time of Huang's hiring, he and Meissner had a conversation in which they agreed that Huang ``could be of use, someone who could basically handle the substantial administrative burdens which [Meissner] would not be able to handle because of his travels,'' but that Garten specifically voiced concerns about Huang's ability to handle matters of policy.79 As Garten explained: Under Secretary Brown, we set a very fast pace. It was extremely dynamic. We were extremely focused and I felt that Mr. Huang did not have the requisite experience for policy matters. That's not to say he didn't have it for other issues. . . .80 During his tenure at Commerce, Huang acted as anticipated by Meissner and Garten--as a functional chief of staff for Meissner. Describing Huang's role, ITA Deputy Undersecretary David Rothkopf testified in a deposition that, ``[H]is responsibility was to sort of do what Chuck [Meissner] wanted, be there when Chuck couldn't be there, handle administrative functions within IEP.'' 81 Over time, however, Huang did come to have some policy responsibilities, particularly for Taiwan. According to Garten, this came about because Meissner felt Huang's knowledge of Taiwan would be useful.82 Garten was aware of this expansion of Huang's role and did not object, so long as Huang was supervised by Meissner.83 Documents produced by Commerce reflect that Huang was the primary individual assigned to oversee the Dragon Gate power project in Taiwan and that he accompanied Meissner on a trip to Taiwan to discuss the project.84 Huang also authored a ``Taiwan Country Strategy'' for integrating Taiwan into the Big Emerging Market (``BEM'') strategy within the China Economic Area.85 The BEM strategy was the cornerstone of the International Trade Administration policy under Garten.86 Documents also reflect Huang's involvement with or attendance at meetings or briefings on Vietnam, South Korea, Japan, and Singapore.87 Huang also played a role in assisting ITA with congressional relations, another role common to the Deputy Assistant Secretary position.88 Finally Huang performed an active outreach role, attending a diverse array of events, including embassy receptions, speaking engagements, and informational briefings with high-level foreign officials. During the hearings there was a claim that Garten attempted to ``wall off'' Huang from policy matters having to do with China.89 An allegation was made that Garten felt that Huang should not receive information pertaining to China and wanted to make sure that he did not receive such information. Although Garten testified that Huang was excluded from policy matters related to China, he did not testify that Huang should not receive information about China and testified that he never issued any sort of directive that Huang not receive such information.90 It appears that the decision to exclude Huang from China policy matters resulted from internal battles over jurisdiction and control. Garten had created an ``inside team'' within ITA to deal with the high-profile trading areas of Asia and, specifically, with China. As Garten testified before the Committee: We created a real high performance team. The only people that in my view were qualified to deal especially with China given its enormous significance and sensitivity were people that had a lot of experience in the policy area. . . . A lot of people didn't make the cut. I don't want to say [Huang] was the only one.91 Indeed, not even Meissner was allowed to play a role in China policy. Garten acknowledged that responsibility for China, which ordinarily would have been under the purview of Meissner and the IEP division, was handled by himself and by his deputy, David Rothkopf.92 The creation of the ``inside team'' caused a great deal of tension and resentment within various factions of the ITA.93 Various witnesses have suggested that Meissner and the IEP division he oversaw were particularly affected and that Garten and Rothkopf had essentially removed all authority for key trading countries from the respective division heads in order to work on these high-profile issues personally.94 This tension between Garten and Meissner is reflected in an October 4, 1994, memorandum from Garten to Meissner.95 In the memorandum, Garten specifically noted that Huang and another Asian-American appointee ``are not up to what I need at this time. I am not running a training program so I have to be brutal in terms of getting results.'' 96 The real point of the memo however, was to respond to Meissner's perception that the responsibilities of his division are being usurped. Garten stated: I know I have created a big problem for you particularly on Asia, but even more broadly. I am truly sorry. But the reason we have achieved such good results in the first 18 months, even though confirmations were very late is because I ignored the fiefdoms in ITA and spread responsibility to those who could handle them including David [Rothkopf]ing. . . . It works because I have flattened the structure and spread responsibility.97 It is clear, then, that Huang was not singled out as someone to be ``walled off'' from matters pertaining to China. Numerous people who otherwise would have had responsibilities relating to China--including the Assistant Secretary for IEP-- were similarly ``walled off'' from Garten's power team. None of those individuals were in any way formally restricted from participating in, or receiving information about, countries in their official areas of responsibility. This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that Huang was permitted to receive briefings with respect to China. Garten's decision that Huang was not to be involved in China policy did not result in an instruction that he was not to receive any information about China. Indeed, that very question was put to John Dickerson, the security officer responsible for briefing Huang: Senator Specter. Did you know that there had been a judgment made by higher-ups, by Mr. Garten, that Mr. Huang should be walled off from information about China? Mr. Dickerson. No, I did not.98 When asked during his deposition if he would have changed his briefings to Huang had he been ``aware that Jeff Garten had told Charles Meissner. . . that he wanted John Huang to be walled off from China issues,'' Dickerson indicated that, like other witnesses, he believed Garten was excluding Huang from China policy to retain personal control over those issues: As I started to say before, I think I would have had to have a better understanding of what Jeff Garten was talking about. My understanding of the article that I read in the press was that this was sort of bureaucratic squabbling between officials of Commerce and that I do not think the implication was that Jeff Garten thought John Huang was a person who could not be believed with intelligence information. I think it was more a foil played by Frank [sic] Garten and people directly under him to retain the policy-making decisions on some of these issues.99 Huang's security clearance and access to classified information Perhaps as a result of the misimpression that Huang was excluded from information pertaining to China, another impression has been created that Huang obtained access to classified material to which he was not entitled. This, in turn, fueled speculation that Huang was somehow passing classified material on to the Lippo Group, the Chinese government, or both. The Committee's investigation of Huang's security clearance and his access to classified information revealed no evidence that Huang gained--or even attempted to gain--access to classified information beyond that to which he was entitled in the normal course of his duties. Nor did the investigation reveal any evidence that Huang misused or compromised any of the information to which he had access. Granting of top secret clearance Huang was granted an interim security clearance prior to assuming his duties at Commerce. While there has been no evidence presented to the Committee that Huang even knew he had such a clearance, much less used it, this fact has been used by some to suggest that for some nefarious reason Huang was given special treatment. In fact, between January 1993 and March 1997, all political appointees to the Department of Commerce-- totaling close to 240--were granted interim top secret clearances.100 Interim security clearances were granted on the basis of a review of the appointee's job application, his application for a security clearance, a credit check, and a check of the NCIC law enforcement database.101 An interim clearance allowed an appointee access to classified material pending a complete background investigation.102 The policy of granting interim security clearances to all political appointees was established in January 1993 by Steven Garmon, a career government employee and the head of the Commerce Department's Security Office. Garmon had established this policy in reaction to criticism which had been leveled at the Security Office in previous administrations over the delays political appointees had faced in obtaining their clearances and their consequent inability to attend certain meetings or receive certain information.103 In accordance with this policy, the Security Office, after receiving paperwork authorizing Huang's hiring in February 1994, performed a limited background check and granted an interim clearance.104 The procedure used in the granting of Huang's interim clearance was identical to that used for all other political appointees to the Commerce Department.105 Indeed, a memorandum regarding Huang's interim clearance which cited ``the critical need for his expertise in the new Administration for Secretary Brown'' was nothing more than a form memorandum containing boilerplate language and was not specifically related to Huang.106 Huang was never notified of this approval prior to beginning work at the agency, nor was he given a security briefing by the Security Office until assuming his position.107 He thus could not have made any use of this interim clearance until he actually started working at Commerce.108 The Commerce Department made a blanket decision to grant interim top secret clearances to all political appointees with no consideration as to whether a particular appointee needed access to top secret information or whether the need for the information was so immediate that it justified the granting of an interim clearance pending a full background investigation. This procedure was largely designed to insulate the Security Office from complaints from new appointees that the lack of a clearance was interfering with their work, but it was properly reversed by Secretary William Daley in 1997.109 Huang's access to classified information Huang was the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Economic Policy. This position could have entitled him to a broad array of classified information; however, there was no evidence presented to the Committee that Huang exploited his position to gain access to information beyond that appropriate to his duties. Indeed, the record before the Committee shows that Huang declined opportunities to expand his access.110 Huang's predecessor at the Department of Commerce, Republican appointee Richard Johnstone, held a clearance at a higher level than Huang's top secret clearance.111 Robert Gallagher, Director of the Office of Executive Support in the Office of the Secretary of Commerce, testified that to the best of his recollection, he was approached by Huang's supervisor, Meissner, about getting a higher level clearance for Huang because of Huang's responsibilities in filling in for Meissner when Meissner was on travel. Gallagher stated: I believe that Mr. Huang's superior suggested that Mr. Huang could receive a higher level of clearance and I concurred. And then I believe I probably talked to Mr. Huang about receiving that higher level of clearance and what it would entail for him to do so, how long it would take, how much paperwork was involved and how much it would cost. And at that point, I believe that Mr. Huang said he didn't think it was worth it in either time or money and so we dropped the matter.112 If Huang had a desire to have access to the most highly sensitive information available to the Department, a higher level clearance would have provided him with that access. Despite the suggestion of his superior and the example of his predecessor, Huang declined the opportunity.113 Another opportunity for Huang to increase his access to sensitive information lay in his cable profile. A cable profile is an internal document which determines the clearance level and subject matter for which an official will receive State Department cable traffic. Huang's profile indicated that he was to receive material up to the secret level. Because Huang held a top secret clearance, he could have restructured his cable profile to receive significantly more cable information. He never did so.114 In addition, Huang's profile called for him to receive only traffic addressed directly to him or to the office of the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary. By contrast, Johnstone, Huang's predecessor, had established a cable profile for himself that included material relevant to all areas of IEP's business, regardless of his level of involvement in the work.115 Johnstone based his need for this information on his desire to have general background information on all of the work of IEP.116 This profile included all information on the General Agreement on Tarrifs and Trade (``GATT''), China, the Middle East, APEC, information on areas where travel was planned, information on individual projects of the IEP, and political issues of the regions of IEP.117 Although Huang could have done similarly, he never attempted to change his profile, as noted above. While much has been made of the number of intelligence briefings Huang received, he was actually briefed far less frequently than Johnstone and other Commerce officials who received weekly briefings.118 Huang received oral briefings from John Dickerson of the Department's Office of Intelligence Liaison (``OIL'') 37 times in 14 months, an average of 2.5 times per month.119 Dickerson testified that the subjects of the briefings included ``areas of international relations and trade that we seem to feel were his responsibility.'' 120 Briefings of this type took an average of 20 minutes, and the contents were largely at the discretion of the briefing officer. Huang was shown documents during briefings; however, the documents were not left with him, and he was not allowed to take notes about them. Dickerson further testified that Huang was not particularly interested in the material on which he was briefed: Q: During your briefings, did he ask you a lot of questions? A: I would say he asked very few questions. Q: Did he seem to be aggressively pursuing classified information? A: No, to the contrary. He was not very aggressive in that regard at all. Q: Do you have any reason to believe that he handled classified information in an improper fashion? A: I have no reason to believe that.121 Overall, Huang appears to have been a passive recipient of briefings provided to him as a matter of routine. He further appears to have had minimal interest in gaining access to classified information.122 Dickerson told the Committee that had he believed Huang to be a security risk he would not have given him classified information.123 No evidence was presented to the Committee that Huang mishandled or compromised any classified material provided to him. Indeed, this very question was put to three security officials from the Department of Commerce: Q: To your knowledge, was there ever any time when he divulged any classified information that was not given to people fully cleared to receive it, or misused any of this intelligence information in any way, all three of you? Mr. Dickerson. No. Mr. Gallagher. No, sir. Mr. McNair. No, sir.124 The fact that Huang had made use of a spare office in the Washington, D.C., offices of Stephens, Inc. (``Stephens'') during his tenure at Commerce was thought to support an allegation that Huang was passing classified information to the Lippo Group, the Chinese government, or both.125 No evidence was presented to the Committee, however, to prove that Huang used the Stephens office for such purposes. Indeed, no conclusive evidence was ever presented to the Committee as to exactly what Huang did at the Stephens office. Huang's use of the Stephens office Stephens, Inc. is one of the largest investment banking firms in the U.S. It is based in Little Rock and has offices in Washington and other cities. Stephens has a business relationship with the Lippo Group that dates back to 1977. In the 1980s, Huang, as a Lippo employee, was involved in Lippo's dealings with Stephens. As a result, Huang has had a long personal relationship with Vernon Weaver, who headed Stephens's Washington office. It was this office, located across the street from the Department of Commerce, that Huang made use of while employed at Commerce. Indeed, many of Huang's visits to the Stephens office involved a meeting or lunch with Weaver.126 The Committee's investigation of Huang's use of the Stephens office focused on the testimony of two clerical employees: Paula Greene and Celia Mata. Greene worked as an administrative assistant in the Stephens office from 1993 through 1996, while Mata worked as a receptionist. Vernon Weaver was interviewed by committee staff in the early stages of the investigation, but was not later asked to give a deposition or public testimony. According to the testimony of Greene and Mata, Stephens had a spare office that was used by visiting Stephens employees and friends of the firm. The office was not specifically set aside for Huang's use and there was no special arrangement for him to use this office.127 The office, which contained a desk, a telephone, and a chair, was located two doors down from where Greene sat.128 In order to enter the suite where the office was located, a visitor would have to ring a bell and be buzzed in by Mata.129 Regular Stephens employees all had a key to the suite--Huang was never given a key.130 According to Greene, anyone who used the spare office had unrestricted access to the photocopier and fax machines.131 There were no security or recordkeeping measures in place to monitor such use.132 Green testified that anyone using the machines would have to pass two receptionists and several other offices to get to the machines.133 No testimony was ever presented from anyone in the Stephens office who had witnessed Huang using either the photocopier or the facsimile machine. Greene did testify that Huang used the phone in the Stephens office. The Committee subpoenaed Stephens's telephone records; however, even after analyzing the records, the Committee was unable to find a reasonable basis for attributing specific calls to Huang's use of the spare office and was unable to indentify any inappropriate calls on the records.134 Greene testified that Huang was the most frequent non- employee user of the spare office, visiting about once or twice a week.135 Mata's testimony, however, was that Huang ``would come, you know, once or twice every week or there would be, like, weeks where he wouldn't come.'' 136 She also stated that his visits would last ``the most, ten minutes'' 137 Not only were Huang's visits short in length, but they occurred primarily at lunchtime,138 a time when he would have been seen by a number of people moving in or out of the office. This would hardly seem to comport with the behavior of someone who was trying to surreptitiously pass classified information to foreign contacts. Greene testified that she would notify Huang if any packages or facsimiles came into the Stephens office for him.139 This was done at Weaver's request.140 Greene testified that she was specifically instructed by Weaver to speak directly to Huang if she had to notify him of a package or fax, and not to leave a detailed message if he was unavailable.141 While it was insinuated that this was a peculiar practice (and indeed, Greene stated this was not Weaver's usual practice), Greene testified that it was her impression that Weaver merely did not want his name to ``appear on the logs very frequently'' in order to ``avoid bad appearances.'' 142 Greene stated that she would put any packages or faxes for Huang in the ``in'' box of the spare office. She said that she was not aware of Huang sending packages from the Stephens office, only receiving them.143 With regard to facsimile transmissions, Greene testified that Huang received two to three such transmissions per week.144 She was unaware, however, of the nature or source of these transmissions.145 The evidence received by the Committee failed to support allegations that Huang used the Stephens office to pass classified information to the Lippo Group, the Chinese government, or anyone else. Indeed, the evidence before the Committee failed to establish in any manner what Huang's purpose was in using the Stephens office. What the evidence showed was that Huang stopped by the Stephens office from time to time at lunch to visit with Weaver, to use the telephone, or to pick up packages or messages. It is possible that Huang's use of the Stephens office was for no other purpose than maintaining personal contacts. Indeed, the Committee did receive evidence that throughout his tenure at Commerce, Huang continued his personal involvement with many organizations, including the Committee of 100.146 The evidence simply does not allow conclusive determinations to be made. What is clear, though, is that Huang's use of the Stephens office was open and obvious, not secretive as might be expected from one attempting to pass classified information. Huang's post-Commerce clearance The final issue pertaining to Huang's access to classified information concerns the fact that he had an active security clearance for over a year following his departure from Commerce. This fact has been used to insinuate that Huang was involved in a scheme to continue obtaining classified material. Once again, however, there is no evidence that Huang used this clearance after leaving Commerce or that he even knew that his clearance was active.147 Indeed, the evidence establishes that due to procedures required for any use of a security clearance, Huang would not have been able to make use of the clearance even if he had attempted to do so.148 During his tenure at Commerce, Huang found himself in the midst of a turf battle among several factions due to the changes that Garten had made to the way the ITA conducted business. Huang, Assistant Secretary Meissner, and several other officials had been marginalized in favor of those supported by Garten.149 After a little more than one year, Huang began to make inquiries and ultimately secured a position at the Democratic National Committee as a fundraiser. Evidence presented to the Committee established that Meissner attempted to retain Huang as a consultant after he announced his intention to leave Commerce.150 Such an arrangement was conceived as a way for Huang to assist Meissner during the transition period between the time he left and the time his replacement was found.151 Before obtaining approval for the arrangement, Meissner initiated paperwork for such a consulting position, an application for a clearance through the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office of the Department of Defense (``DISCO''). This type of clearance is generally used for government contractors. Meissner discussed this proposed arrangement with Alan Neuschatz, Director of Personnel, and Tim Hauser, Deputy Under Secretary. Both men immediately disagreed with the idea and told Meissner that the appointment would not be approved. Meissner, however, determined to take the proposal up with more senior officials. In response, Neuschatz penned a note which was attached to the paperwork for this proposed appointment. Neushchatz described the note in deposition testimony in the following terms: I knew Meissner had wanted to make this appointment, and what I was saying to them here is . . . I think this issue is dead, and that's because we told him, no, we weren't going to do it. But it may not be, and the ``may not be'' reflects Meissner's parting shot that he was going to discuss this upstairs. So what I'm telling them is to hold on to this package for a while, or at least until the smoke clears, meaning we get absolute clear and final guidance. I didn't want to throw paperwork away that might actually be needed eventually, but I didn't think it would be needed.152 Meissner did, in fact, take the issue up with Will Ginsberg, Secretary Brown's Chief of Staff. Ginsberg ultimately denied the request, and Huang never became a consultant. While the consultant position was in the process of being denied, the paperwork for the security clearance that went along with the position was still going forward. An administrative assistant at IEP stated that she had walked the application for the security clearance up to the security office at the direction of Meissner prior to the final decision not to make Huang a consultant.153 The request for the security clearance went forward in one office, while the authority to make the underlying appointment was being considered, and ultimately denied, in another. Neuschatz described this process in the following terms: The fact that the ITA Security Office acted without authorization, I think, reflects more their desire to support management than any intent to circumvent it. Clearly what happened was staff approached the ITA Security Office and said ``Meissner . . . is going to convert Huang to a consultant and we'll need the appropriate clearance.'' These people, I think, in the interest of minimizing red tape and minimizing confusion, put the train on the track assuming that they had Meissner's authorization. What they could not have known was that when Meissner approached me and [Deputy Undersecretary] Tim Hauser who do have the authority to approve positions such as this, we turned it down cold.154 On December 14, 1995, the Defense Department sent a form to the Commerce Security Office indicating that Huang had been granted a clearance through the DISCO. According to the testimony of the two highest-ranking members of the Commerce Security Office,155 a clerk filed Huang's DISCO clearance form with all other DISCO clearance forms received from the Defense Department. The form remained in the file until it was discovered in January 1997.156 According to the Deputy Director of the Security Office, proper procedure would have been for the DISCO clearance to have been input into the Security Office database. Due to personnel changes in the Security Office, however, some 90 days went by during which no one was inputting incoming DISCO clearances into the database. Had the clearance been input in mid-December, it conceivably would have raised issues because Huang was still on the payroll and still had a clearance. Further, had it been properly input, the Security Office would have been aware of the DISCO clearance when it was notified in January 1996 that Huang had left Commerce.157 In his deposition, Neuschatz stated that after learning that Huang's clearance had been extended, he investigated whether Huang had used the clearance to gain access to classified material.158 This investigation led him to conclude that Huang had never attempted to gain such access nor could he have done so had he tried.159 According to Neuschatz, classified document access has two components: clearance and need to know. The granting agency has to verify clearance for any request for access from outside of that agency.160 Neuschatz told Senate investigators that for Huang to have used his clearance, a request would have to have been forwarded from the issuer, and a record would have been kept. No such request was ever found in Commerce's records. Furthermore, Huang's clearance was contingent on his contemporaneous employment in some manner with Commerce. As Neuschatz described it: Because the requirements for the issuance of the clearance went away with the disappearance of his job; therefore, this really was not a valid clearance once he terminated his employment with [DOC].161 Testimony is unequivocal that no one in ITA was notified of the clearance. In fact, there is no evidence that anyone other than the clerk who initially filed the form was aware that the clearance existed. This includes Huang. Neuschatz testified, ``I have no reason to believe that Huang would have been aware of this [extension].'' 162 While the fact that Huang neither knew about nor used the clearance dispels any concern about sinister motives with respect to this episode, the fact that the security clearance was granted even though the consultancy was not reveals a failure in the Department of Commerce security screening procedures. No evidence of espionage While the Committee's investigation uncovered some serious shortcomings in the operation of the Commerce Department's Security Office, there was no evidence presented to the Committee that any security measures were circumvented, ignored, or compromised specifically to benefit Huang. Indeed, to the extent that these shortcomings led to the approval of Huang's clearance prior to his arrival at Commerce and to the extension of his clearance after he had departed, the evidence before the Committee shows that Huang was not even aware of these facts. More importantly, there was no evidence presented to the Committee that Huang exploited his position at the Commerce Department to pass classified information to the Lippo Group, the Chinese government, or anyone else. Indeed, the evidence shows that Huang availed himself of considerably less information than he could have obtained in light of his position. He declined the opportunity to obtain a higher level of clearance, he declined the opportunity to broaden his access to cable traffic, and he declined the opportunity to use his intelligence briefings from the OIL to aggressively pursue classified information. Evidence before the Committee does not allow for any conclusion with respect to Huang's continued contact with the LippoBank in California. In his deposition, James Per Lee, current President of the LippoBank California, testified that he had undertaken an internal investigation of Huang's calls to the bank that showed Huang's calls from the Department of Commerce to the bank were largely an exchange of telephone messages received for Huang by the executive secretary and that conversations with Huang lasted an average of three minutes.163 Per Lee later publicly stated that in his investigation of the calls he saw no indication Huang was ``in any way relaying messages abroad.'' 164 Despite being interviewed and deposed by the Committee, subpoenaed to appear for hearing, and given a date and time for testimony, less than forty-eight hours before his scheduled appearance, Per Lee's testimony was abruptly canceled. It should also be noted that at the outset of this Committee's hearings Huang offered to come before the Committee and to testify fully about any allegations that he may have misused his position on behalf of foreign governments or corporations. While he requested limited immunity, he offered to testify without immunity with respect to matters pertaining to espionage, economic espionage, or the unlawful disclosure of classified information. Although the Minority does not conclude that Huang's offer of testimony is proof of his innocence, we do believe that in light of the lack of evidence to the contrary, his offer to testify without reservation regarding these allegations--and with all the applicable penalties of perjury attendant to such testimony--should be given some consideration. Unfortunately, the Committee did not pursue Huang's offer and, as a result, a potentially important opportunity to receive a response to these allegations was lost. The evidence before the Committee--or more appropriately, the lack thereof--was encapsulated in the following exchange during the Committee's questioning of the CIA's John Dickerson and Robert Gallagher of the Department of Commerce Security Office: Senator Durbin. Gentlemen, if I can try to summarize my own view of where we have come to this point in regard to Mr. Huang, I think there are two concerns and perhaps a third. The first concern is whether or not Mr. Huang played fast and loose in his fundraising activities, especially when it came to raising foreign funds, and the second concern is whether or not he compromised our national security. . . . I want to ask you open-ended questions, not shepherding you in any direction here, just to get your opinion based on what you knew then and what you know now. Mr. Gallagher, maybe I will start with you, and maybe Mr. Dickerson can follow. First, is it your opinion that Mr. Huang was properly cleared to learn classified information at the Department of Commerce? Mr. Gallagher. Yes, sir. Senator Durbin. Mr. Dickerson, is that your opinion, or do you have an opinion? Mr. Dickerson. That is my opinion, yes. Senator Durbin. Has anything come to light since this controversy has arisen to change your view on that? Mr. Gallagher? Mr. Gallagher. I have seen no evidence to the contrary. No, sir. Senator Durbin. Mr. Dickerson? Mr. Dickerson. And similarly, I have seen no evidence that would indicate that. Senator Durbin. Now, the second thing, the second charge is that Mr. Huang while at the Department of Commerce was shown things he should not have seen for any number of reasons, his business connections, his security clearance, whatever. Mr. Gallagher, based on what you knew then, is there any question in your mind as to what you showed Mr. Huang and whether or not what Mr. Dickerson showed Mr. Huang and whether he should have seen it? Mr. Gallagher. In terms of the information that my office controls, we were 100-percent correct in what we showed him. Senator Durbin. Now, with all the information that has come out and all the allegations since today, do you believe there are things that Mr. Huang should not have seen at the U.S. Department of Commerce? Mr. Gallagher. I think we have to distinguish between the information and allegations. All I have seen is allegations. Until I saw hard evidence of these allegations and as long as he continued to have both his need-to-know and his clearance, we would continue to brief him as we had. Senator Durbin. Mr. Dickerson, the same questions. Did you feel that you were showing things, did you have any suspicion in your mind, that Mr. Huang should not have seen while he worked at the Department of Commerce? Mr. Dickerson. No, I had no suspicions whatsoever that what I was showing him was inappropriate for him. Senator Durbin. And today, based on allegations and information, do you have a different view? Mr. Dickerson. No, I don't have a different view because I have no personal knowledge that he did anything in an unauthorized manner in the handling of this classified information. Senator Durbin. The third allegation appears to be that he may have misused the information which was given to him, may have compromised a source or compromised the information. As you sit there today, Mr. Gallagher, do you have any information to suggest that that is the case? Mr. Gallagher. I have never been presented with any evidence to prove or disprove that allegation. Senator Durbin. Mr. Dickerson? Mr. Dickerson. I would echo what Mr. Gallagher has said in that regard. Senator Durbin. Now, I assume in your business, when you are sharing delicate and secured classified information that there is a counterintelligence aspect to this to determine whether or not the people that you are sharing it with are keeping it to themselves, is there not? Mr. Gallagher? Mr. Gallagher. Certainly, with all intelligence, sir. Senator Durbin. Now, in terms of this period of time, some 13 months at the Department of Commerce, was there any evidence that the information that was being shared with Mr. Huang or anyone at the Department at that time was being compromised? Mr. Gallagher. I was not presented with any such evidence. Senator Durbin. Mr. Dickerson? Mr. Dickerson. To the best of my knowledge, no.165 Evidence of solicitations of contributions While there was no evidence presented to the Committee to support an allegation that Huang engaged in espionage while employed at the Commerce Department, there were indications that he may have engaged in soliciting donors to the Democratic National Committee while so employed. Specifically, Huang may have been involved in soliciting donations by Kenneth and A. Sihwarini Wynn, Mi Ahn, and Arief and Soraya Wiriadinata while employed at the Commerce Department. Although the evidence is not conclusive, it is sufficient to warrant further investigation by appropriate authorities. Evidence before the Committee shows that on August 1, 1994, Wynn, the president of Lippoland, Ltd., and his wife each made a $5,000 contribution to the DNC in connection with an event celebrating the President's birthday.166 The check tracking form completed by the DNC for these donations listed John Huang as the solicitor.167 This was only one month after Huang had begun working for the Department of Commerce and almost a year and a half before he began working for the DNC. When questioned in a deposition about this listing, David Mercer, DNC deputy finance director (and the individual responsible for filling out the form), testified that he did not know at the time that Huang was working at the Commerce Department.168 He further testified that he did not recall who solicited the Wynns, nor how he received the checks from the Wynns.169 Slightly over a year later, on October 12, 1995, Wynn contributed $12,000 to the DNC in connection with another event.170 This time, the DNC tracking form listed Jane Huang (John Huang's wife) as the solicitor.171 Just before Jane Huang's name, however, is a word that has been crossed out. This word appears to be ``John.'' 172 When questioned about this contribution, Mercer testified that he did not know if Jane Huang had solicited this contribution and further, that he ``did not know the circumstances leading to this check being submitted.'' 173 When asked how he knew to put Jane Huang's name down as the solicitor, Mercer first stated that someone told him to, but he could not remember who it was.174 Mercer then suggested in the alternative that he may have done so because of his recollection that the Huangs were associated with the Wynns.175 Upon being asked why he chose to put Jane Huang's name down if his recollection was that the Huangs generally were associated with the Wynns, Mercer stated he could not recall.176 The DNC's listing of John Huang as the solicitor for the Wynns' August 1994 contributions, followed by what appears to be a listing of John Huang's name on the October 1995 contribution--only to be crossed out in favor of Jane Huang-- tends to support the allegation that Huang was involved in soliciting contributions while a Commerce employee. Moreover, Mercer's testimony with respect to these contributions raises more questions than it answers. Similar questions are raised with respect to a contribution by Mi Ahn. On June 12, 1995, Ahn, the president of Pan Metals, contributed $10,000 to the DNC in connection with a Presidential Gala.177 The DNC check tracking form filled out by Mercer lists Jane Huang as the solicitor.178 When asked in his deposition why he listed Jane Huang as the solicitor, Mercer testified that he did not have a clear recollection and that it ``either [had] something to do with either sending the check or getting the check to us in some way involved or knowing Mi Ahn. . . .'' 179 Asked directly if he knew Jane Huang had solicited Ahn's check, Mercer stated, ``I don't know that for a fact.'' 180 It appears, however, that John Huang may have been involved in the Mi Ahn solicitation. Evidence was presented to the Committee that on May 26, 1995--two-and-a-half weeks before Ahn's contribution--four telephone calls were placed between Huang and Ahn.181 Ten days later--on June 5, 1995-- two more phone calls were placed.182 On June 6, 1995, Mercer called Huang at the Commerce Department and left the following message: ``Have talked to Mi, thank you very much.'' 183 When asked why he was thanking Huang, Mercer testified: ``I don't know. I don't recall. It could have been he gave me her number. It could have been a number of things. I don't know particularly what I was thanking him for.'' 184 Again, Mercer's testimony with regard to his listing of Jane Huang as the solicitor and his inability to recall his reason for thanking John Huang leaves room for concern about Huang's role as the possible solicitor of this contribution. Jane Huang was also listed as the solicitor of two contributions made in November 1995 by Arief and Soraya Wiriadinata.185 The Wiriadinatas, who were permanent legal residents at the time of their contributions, are the daughter and son-in-law of Hashim Ning, a business associate of Lippo founder Mochtar Riady. Between 1995 and 1996, the Wiriadinatas contributed about $450,000 to the DNC in multiple checks. Once again, when questioned as to how he knew to credit the two 1995 contributions to Jane Huang, Mercer stated that it was ``[t]hrough an understanding prior of the Wiriadinatas having association with the Huangs.'' 186 Mercer could not recall, however, how he had come to that understanding,187 nor could he recall what his understanding was as to how they were associated.188 When asked why he didn't put John Huang down as the solicitor, Mercer testified as follows: ``I don't recall why. I, you know, I don't recall. I didn't, you know--I don't. . . [sic] I don't recall. Jane could have--I could have been told that Jane was the one that brought these checks in. I don't know.'' 189 Committee staff interviewed the Wiriadinatas concerning their contributions. According to Arief Wiriadinata, they first met John Huang when he came to visit Soraya's father in the hospital in the summer of 1995.190 Huang encouraged the Wiriadinatas to support the Democratic Party at that time, although it does not appear that he directly solicited a specific contribution.191 Indeed, the Wiriadinatas first contributions were not until November 1995.192 According to the Wiriadinatas, the November 1995 contributions were solicited by John Huang.193 In fact, Arief Wiridiadinata told the Committee staff that all of their contributions were made in consultation with John Huang.194 When asked if any of their contributions had been solicited by Jane Huang, the Wiriadinatas stated that they had never met Jane Huang, nor did they believe that they had ever spoken to her.195 The evidence clearly indicates that John Huang played a role in the contributions from the Wiridinatas and that this role began while he was still an employee of the Department of Commerce. Moreover, the evidence also points to his having played a role in the contributions of the Wynns and Mi Ahn. These instances are all worthy of further investigation by the appropriate authorities to determine whether John Huang violated the Hatch Act, which limits certain political activity by federal employees, or other campaign laws. Perhaps even more disturbing is the documentary evidence which shows the DNC listing Huang as a solicitor during a time when he was a Commerce Department employee. The fact that David Mercer, DNC's deputy finance director, listed Huang as a solicitor and called him at the Commerce Department, combined with Mercer's questionable recollection regarding the tracking form containing Jane Huang's name, raises serious questions about the forthrightness of Mercer, the procedures at the DNC at this time, and the level of oversight that was provided in connection with Huang's activities. Indeed, this lack of oversight proved even more problematic once Huang joined the DNC staff. hiring huang to work at the dnc Having perhaps become disillusioned with his position at the Department of Commerce as a result of internal power struggles within the ITA, Huang began searching for another way to serve the Administration. That search led him to the DNC. Although he had raised money for the 1992 Clinton campaign,196 he had done so at that time as an unpaid volunteer fundraiser. The position he sought in 1995 was that of a full-time paid fundraiser. In seeking this position, Huang apparently utilized the network of contacts he had developed while working for the Lippo Group. In his deposition before the Committee, C. Joseph Giroir, an Arkansas lawyer for the Lippo Group and a friend of John Huang, said he learned of Huang's interest to move to the DNC to raise money in the Asian-American community.197 As he conveyed this information to then-DNC Finance Chairman, Truman Arnold, he learned that Arnold was leaving his post at the DNC. As a result, in the summer of 1995, Giroir arranged a meeting with DNC Chairman Donald Fowler to suggest that Fowler hire Huang as a fundraiser.198 Because Giroir was viewed by the DNC as a potential contributor, DNC Finance Director Richard Sullivan attended the meeting with Fowler. In his deposition, Sullivan testified that he thought Giroir came on too strong and, for some reason, ``had rubbed him [Fowler] the wrong way during their meeting.'' 199 Sullivan speculated that, perhaps because of this, Fowler did not want to hire Huang.200 Fowler testified in his own deposition that he did not immediately commit to hiring Huang because the DNC did not have room on its staff for any new fundraisers at that time.201 On September 13, 1995, Huang, Riady, and Giroir met with Sullivan and Fowler in the Four Seasons Hotel in Washington, D.C.202 Sullivan recalled this meeting as fairly social; it was called for Riady to get to know Fowler, since ``he thought Don was a player and that they wanted to get to know each other on a social basis.'' 203 Fowler testified that Giroir ``made it clear . . . that he would like Mr. Huang hired at the DNC.'' 204 Later that same day, Huang, Giroir, Riady, and Riady's wife, Aileen, went to the White House for a visit with White House staff and the President.205 Also in attendance was Bruce Lindsey, deputy counsel to the President. By all accounts, this visit was a social call.206 Riady had lived in Little Rock during the 1980s and met the President during that period. Riady supported the President during his gubernatorial campaigns, during his presidential campaign, and after his election as well. Giroir testified that there was no structure to the September 13 visit; people were just talking. In fact, Giroir had no recollection of any mention of Huang going to the DNC.207 But Lindsey recalled a discussion of the importance of the Asian-American community to the President's re-election effort and the suggestion that Huang would be well-suited to work on such an initiative at the DNC.208 After that visit, and because, according to Lindsey, it was his experience that most people preferred to move from politics to government, rather than vice versa, he subsequently contacted Huang to ensure that he was interested in moving to the DNC. Lindsey testified in a deposition that the President may have indicated to him that if Huang, in fact, wanted to move to the DNC, that it would be a ``good idea,'' but he stated that this was not a directive 209 from the President to ``follow up'' on the discussion.210 Lindsey ultimately informed White House Deputy Chief of Staff Harold Ickes of Huang's interest.211 On September 26, 1995, Huang and Giroir also met informally with newly-appointed DNC Finance Chairman Marvin Rosen to discuss Huang's desire to move to the DNC.212 This meeting had been arranged by Mark Middleton, a former White House staffer from Arkansas. Rosen indicated during this meeting that he would look into the idea of initiating a DNC outreach program within the Asian-American community.213 At the time, the DNC had employees who were responsible for political and fundraising outreach in most minority communities, including the African-American community, the Hispanic community, and women's groups. During the period that Huang was being interviewed, the DNC had an employee who was responsible for political outreach in the Asian-American community, Bill Kaneko; however, it did not yet have a staff person responsible for Asian-American fundraising. In his deposition before the Committee, Kaneko testified that he understood that Huang left Commerce to ``give the Asian community an opportunity to participate in the political process.'' 214 Other witnesses confirm that when Huang was being interviewed by the DNC, he indicated that he was interested in Asian-American outreach generally, not just fundraising, and witnesses involved in Huang's hiring testified that they perceived Huang as capable of providing the necessary assistance to the DNC's political and fundraising outreach efforts for the Asian-American community, particularly in California.215 Rosen testified that Ickes subsequently asked him to formally interview Huang.216 Such an interview took place at DNC headquarters in November 1995, with Rosen and Sullivan, who were later joined by Fowler.217 During the interview, Huang suggested that he could help to raise money in the Asian-American community for the 1996 campaign, citing his effectiveness in raising funds during the 1992 campaign.218 According to Sullivan, Huang felt ``there was a void in terms of outreach from the national parties to the Asian-American community.'' 219 Fowler, Rosen, and Sullivan agreed.220 Recognizing the untapped potential of the Asian-American community for Democratic fundraising efforts and political outreach, Fowler decided, on Rosen and Sullivan's recommendation, to hire Huang to manage the DNC's outreach efforts to this community.221 In negotiating his position and salary with the DNC, Huang said that he needed credibility to raise money in the Asian- American community because he was older than most other fundraisers.222 Fowler called it ``a technique to convey respect and prestige,'' 223 and thought that giving Huang an elevated title would ultimately benefit the DNC.224 They negotiated the title of Vice Chair of Finance, a title normally reserved for volunteer fundraisers who are elected as honorary officers of the DNC and do not raise money full time. While Rosen was unfazed by the title,225 DNC General Counsel Joseph Sandler was concerned because this position did not actually exist for paid staff. Sandler ultimately acceded to the request.226 Salary was another concern for Huang. Seeing himself as a successful, older, more experienced person (he was 50 years old), Huang initially wanted a salary comparable to the one he had received at Commerce.227 Sullivan testified that they decided to pay Huang a salary of $60,000 and also to give him a lump-sum, bonus-type payment at some point.228 Huang readily accepted this arrangement; indeed, Sullivan testified that Huang did not seem all that concerned about his salary.229 Huang's understanding of applicable law DNC procedures require every paid fundraiser to receive an oral briefing on campaign finance law and to familiarize himself with a written packet of information.230 During the 1996 election cycle, the briefings were conducted by DNC General Counsel Sandler or his deputy, Neil Reiff. Reiff testified in his deposition that these briefings covered many topics, including which contributions are allowable under the law, as well as what the DNC considers appropriate or inappropriate contributions. Most importantly, Reiff said, fundraisers were told to seek advice from the general counsel's office if they had any questions about specific contributions.231 Sullivan testified that he was ``nervous'' about Huang's fundraising because Huang was inexperienced in raising money full time. Sullivan testified that he requested Huang be given a special, individualized briefing.232 Sam Newman, director of the DNC's National Finance Council, who shared an office with Huang, testified that he recalled Huang attending one of the group briefings; Sandler had a vague recollection of this.233 Although there is some discrepancy between the testimony of Sandler and Sullivan as to what type of briefing Huang received, there is no dispute that he was briefed on the applicable law, and, in fact, a copy of the DNC's training materials was found in Huang's files after he left.234 In addition to whatever type of initial briefing he may have received, Huang also received assistance from the general counsel's office following his first major fundraising event. According to Sandler, DNC Treasurer Scott Pastrick suggested that Sandler review with Huang some of the checks Huang had collected from that event. Sandler testified that he believed this suggestion was made because the Asian-American community for which Huang was responsible was a new one being tapped for funds, and therefore some of the donors would be unfamiliar to the DNC.235 Marvin Rosen, DNC Finance Chair, also believed that this briefing was necessary because some of the contributors to that event were connected to American subsidiaries of foreign corporations. In Rosen's mind, this automatically raised a red flag and called for review, especially for contributions from a new fundraiser.236 DNC policy required that all contributions by U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corporations be approved by the general counsel's office.237 Sandler testified that he did conduct such a review with Huang. Within days of Huang's first event, a February 19, 1996 fundraiser at the Hay Adams Hotel in Washington, D.C., Sandler had a 45-minute meeting with Huang during which he reviewed checks about which Huang had questions, asked Huang the citizenship status of each individual who wrote a check, and inquired into the ownership of corporations that donated.238 He then inquired into the basis of Huang's knowledge and was satisfied from Huang's disclosures and claims of firsthand knowledge (which, according to Sandler, is traditionally the best information on which to rely) that the checks were legal. During this meeting, Sandler and Huang reviewed the legal limits on contributions. Sandler testified that he felt comfortable that Huang was familiar with the rules he was to follow.239 Having received an initial briefing on the laws and procedures applicable to campaign contributions, and having gone over specific instances of concern following his first fundraiser, Huang should have known what kinds of contributions the DNC could and could not accept. In light of this training, Huang's involvement in organizing a number of fundraisers which brought in questionable--and in some cases, illegal-- contributions is disturbing. Huang's fundraisers As was true of other fundraisers targeting ethnic communities, Huang was assigned various dates for events to organize at which the President or the Vice President would be in attendance. Once given a date, Huang would have been responsible for reaching a certain fundraising goal. During his tenure at the DNC, Huang oversaw the following fundraising events, all held in 1996:February 19 event at the Hay Adams Hotel, Washington, D.C.; May 13 event at the Sheraton Carlton Hotel in Washington, D.C.; July 22 event at the Century Plaza Hotel in Los Angeles; and July 30 event at the Jefferson Hotel in Washington, D.C.240 In addition, after the July 30 event, Huang continued to help raise money at events,241 such as the President's birthday party in August 1996 at Radio City Music Hall in New York City. February 1996 Hay Adams APALC events, Washington, DC The first fundraising event for which Huang was responsible was actually a series of two events on February 19 and 20, 1996 at the Hay Adams Hotel in Washington, D.C. These events were held in connection with the Asian Pacific American Leadership Council (``APALC''). The APALC had been created to engage and empower Asian-Pacific Americans, give them a stronger voice in the Democratic Party, and focus on issues of concern to the community.242 Ultimately, it was also used as the fundraising arm for this community within the DNC. Mona Pasquil testified that she was responsible for forming the APALC in late 1995. She testified that it was born out of her traveling and meeting with Asian-Pacific American leaders who recognized that there was no caucus within the DNC for this ethnic group.243 The events included a dinner with the President on February 19 and breakfast with the Vice President and a tour of the White House on February 20. Individuals paid $12,500 each to attend these events.244 The Hay Adams events were organized to coincide with a ``summit'' of Asian-Pacific Americans at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C. on February 24, 1996.245 It is estimated that around 100 people attended the Hay Adams event. By all accounts, these events were successful in bringing Asian-Americans into the DNC. Fowler testified in his deposition that he recalled the events as positive in terms of outreach to the Asian-American community. He stated that there were a number of Asian nationalities represented and that he appreciated that diversity. He said he never gave a second thought to the citizenship of these individuals.246 According to DNC records, the DNC raised $716,000 from this event from 50 individuals or corporations.247 A number of these contributions turned out to be suspect, however, leading the DNC ultimately to return over $100,000 from this event. A total of $50,000 was returned to Charlie Trie, Keshi Zhan, Yue Chu and Xiping Wang. Trie attended the event and, in fact, was the event's co-chairman. Neither Chu nor Wang attended. These contributions--which are discussed in detail in Chapters 5 and 21 of the Minority Report--were returned because of questions as to the source of the funds contributed. Pauline Kanchanalak, a Thai businesswoman, and her sister- in-law, Duagnet Kronenberg, attended the event and contributed $35,000. Their contributions were similarly returned by the DNC when it was determined that the funds contributed by Kanchanalak were actually those of her mother-in-law (see Chapter 21). Finally, monastics from the Hsi Lai Buddhist Temple are also recorded as having contributed $25,000 to this event. Although none attended, Maria Hsia, a longtime Democratic activist and Temple devotee, did.248 These contributions were returned to the U.S. Treasury over questions that the monastics may have been reimbursed for their contributions (see Chapter 21). As noted above, Joseph Sandler, DNC general counsel, testified that after the event, Huang came to see him with contributions about which he had questions. Sandler testified in his deposition that he did not recall whether any of the contributions they reviewed were returned as a result of their conversation, but Huang initiated the return of several contributions within a month of the event because of questions of citizenship of the donors.249 The evidence before the Committee does not establish that Huang, or any other DNC employee or official, knew at the time that any of the returned contributions had problems. Kanchanalak appeared as a successful businessperson and had a long history of contributions. Trie likewise also appeared successful. There is no hard evidence establishing Huang's knowledge of reimbursements to the monastics, as explained below and in Chapter 21 of the Minority Report. In addition, Jessica Elnitiarta, who runs her family's real estate company, Panda Estates Investment Inc., had been contacted by Huang about attending this event. On February 10, 1996, Elnitiarta contributed $100,000 to purchase eight seats at the event. Among Elnitiarta's guests at the event were her father, Ted Sioeng, and two of Sioeng's business associates. Elnitiarta did not attend the event herself because of an unexpected illness in her family.250 Elnitiarta was eligible to contribute (she is a legal permanent resident), and her contributions have not been returned. (Sioeng-related contributions are discussed in detail in Chapter 7.) May 13, 1996 Sheraton Carlton event, Washington, DC Huang's next major event was held at the Sheraton Carlton Hotel in Washington, D.C., on May 13, 1996, attended by the President. This event was attended by approximately 100 people. Approximately $579,000 was raised at this event from 20 individuals and corporations.251 Over half of the money raised at this event came from one individual--Yogesh Gandhi. Gandhi, a permanent legal resident of the United States, contributed $325,000 to the DNC in exchange for 26 tickets to the event.252 This contribution was attributed in DNC records to both Huang and Trie.253 This contribution was ultimately returned when the DNC could not verify the source of Gandhi's funds; it was later determined that Gandhi used foreign funds from Japan supplied by an associate to pay for the contribution.254 A detailed discussion is provided in Chapter 21. In addition, contributions totalling $125,000 were deemed inappropriate and were returned to legal permanent residents Soraya and Arief Wiriadinata, the daughter and son-in-law of Lippo associate Hashim Ning, because the source of the funds could not be verified.255 The Wiriadinatas are not listed as having attended the event. Their contributions are discussed in detail in Chapter 21 of the Minority Report. Charlie Trie's $10,000 contribution to this event was also returned.256 In all, the DNC returned $475,000 of the $579,000 raised at this event.257 July 22, 1996 Century Plaza Hotel event, Los Angeles One event for which there is relatively little testimony and only a few documents is an APALC gala organized by Huang at the Century Plaza Hotel in Los Angeles on July 22, 1996. A three-page briefing paper prepared for the President, the keynote speaker at the event, shows that the DNC expected to raise one million dollars from the 700 expected attendees; this was to be a ``hard money'' event. Most of the attendees were from California.258 News organizations have reported that the event was a ``who's who of Asian Americans,'' including Ted Sioeng and James Riady.259 Monastics from the Hsi Lai Buddhist Temple were recorded as having contributed $30,000 to this event, although only the Temple's abbess attended.260 These contributions have been returned as a result of questions as to whether the monastics were reimbursed for their contributions, as explained in Chapter 21 of the Minority Report. A contribution of $3,000 from one of Charlie Trie's companies was returned for insufficient information. Other contributions totalling $25,000 were returned because, according to the DNC, it was inappropriate for the DNC to have accepted such contributions, contributions were not made by the named donor, the decision to contribute was participated in by a foreign national, or simply because there was insufficient information.261 A total of $58,500 worth of contributions was returned by the DNC from this event,262 which the DNC recorded as having raised $367,850.263 July 30, 1996 Jefferson Hotel event, Washington, DC Richard Sullivan testified that the White House had open dates for July 1996 which were available to the DNC for events. He and Marvin Rosen offered one of these dates to Huang. According to Sullivan, he and Huang were clear that Huang should only agree to organize an event on this date if he thought he could organize another ``hard'' money event that would raise $400,000 to $500,000. According to Sullivan, Huang said he could meet these criteria.264 This event--which turned out to be the final event Huang organized--was held on July 30 at the Jefferson Hotel in Washington, D.C. It turned out to be a small gathering of individuals, many of whom were not eligible to contribute to the DNC.265 Contrary to the instructions given to Huang for this event, most, if not all, of the contributions Huang raised at this event were large, soft-money contributions. In addition to the President and other DNC officials, attendees at the event, many of whom brought spouses and children, included James Riady of the Lippo Group,266 his wife Aileen, and three prominent Taiwanese businessmen: Eugene T.C. Wu, chairman of the Shin Kong Group, a conglomerate that includes Taiwan's second- largest life insurance company; Sen Jong (Ken) Hsui, president of Prince Motors Co. in Taipei and a former member of the central committee of Taiwan's Kuomintang party; and James L.S. Lin, a Taiwanese business associate of Wu.267 Hsui, who has U.S. residency status, contributed $150,000 to the DNC which has been attributed to this event.268 Other contributions attributed to this event were from Jessica Elnitiarta's Panda Investments; Loh Sun International, a Los Angeles firm that imports Chinese cigarettes to the U.S.; and Edmund Pi of Hacienda Heights, California.269 In total, this event took in $259,000 270--far short of expectations.271 Neither Wu nor Lin made contributions to the DNC in connection with this event, nor did anyone else who attended this event who was ineligible to contribute. The question has been raised, however, as to why the President was dining at a DNC event with such a small group of individuals, many of whom were ineligible to contribute to the DNC. Although this event was designed as a fundraiser, videotapes of the event show that the President discussed current events and issues of ethnic diversity but did not discuss fundraising.272 While there is nothing illegal about such an event--so long as those who are ineligible to contribute do not in fact do so--there is a legitimate issue that can be raised with respect to the perception that such an event creates. This issue could have-- and should have--generally been addressed in advance through a more careful review of attendees at small dinners with the President, Vice President or First Lady and greater supervision of DNC fundraisers and the fundraising process. Another important question is why Huang, who had promised to raise $400,000 to $500,000 in ``hard'' money at this event, would put together an event with only a limited number of participants, a large proportion of whom were ineligible to contribute. Unfortunately, the Committee was unable to obtain an answer to this question from Huang. All we are left with is Sullivan's speculation that perhaps Huang was trying to impress the attendees (all of whom he knew) with his ability to arrange an intimate gathering for them with the President of the United States.273 With respect to this event, and all of Huang's other events, there is no evidence that either the White House or the DNC had any knowledge of any illegal contributions as a result of these events to the DNC at the time the contributions were made. Other Huang activities In addition to organizing fundraising events, Huang was involved in a number of other activities on behalf of the DNC that were of questionable propriety. Hsi Lai Temple event On April 29, 1996, Vice President Gore attended an event organized by Huang and held at the Hsi Lai Temple in Hacienda Heights, California. The Hsi Lai Temple is the largest U.S. branch of the Fokuangshan Buddhist Order, a Taiwan-based Buddhist sect. The Temple operates under an umbrella organization called the International Buddhist Progress Society, a nonprofit organization incorporated in California.274 Approximately 100 community leaders and others from the Asian-American community had lunch with the Vice President at this event. Criticism of the Temple event arises from three sets of allegations: that the event was a DNC fundraiser in possible violation of tax laws barring religious organizations from engaging in campaign activities; that the Temple reimbursed Temple monastics for DNC contributions in possible violation of federal election laws barring contributions in the name of another; and that the Temple used foreign funds for the reimbursements in possible violation of federal election laws barring foreign contributions. The latter two allegations are discussed in detail in Chapter 21 of the Minority Report which concludes that Temple reimbursements did take place, though without the use of foreign funds and without the knowledge of the Vice President or officials at the DNC. This section focuses on the event itself and the involvement of Huang and the Vice President. In 1996, the Vice President routinely attended fundraisers and community outreach events organized by the DNC to motivate financial and political supporters during the campaign.275 Documents show that the Vice President's office was involved in scheduling two possible events for the Vice President in the Los Angeles area in April 1996, one of which was supposed to be a fundraising lunch at a private restaurant and the other a community outreach event at the Hsi Lai Temple. The evidence suggests that the fundraising lunch was canceled a few weeks before it was to take place, and Huang invited the persons scheduled to attend the lunch to the Hsi Lai Temple instead. The evidence before the Committee shows that the Temple event was not a DNC fundraiser. It was not proposed, agreed to, organized or conducted as a fundraiser. The event was proposed by the Temple, and the Vice President agreed to it as a community outreach event. Invitations made no mention of fundraising or an admission price to attend the event. No tickets were taken or sold at the door; no campaign materials were present; neither the Vice President nor any other speaker ever solicited contributions or thanked attendees for contributing; and most of those who attended did not contribute to the DNC. The evidence also shows, however, that Huang did use the Temple event to raise money for the DNC, both from a small number of persons who attended the event and from Temple monastics who did not attend the event. Contributions totaling $159,000 were attributed in DNC records by Huang to this event.276 There is no evidence before the Committee, however, that the Vice President had any knowledge of Huang's activities or reason to believe that Huang used the Hsi Lai Temple event to raise funds for the DNC. The Vice President and the Temple event In 1996, the DNC frequently requested that the Vice President attend fundraisers and community outreach events in different cities across the country. The Vice President's office worked with the DNC to schedule dates and locations that fit into his busy schedule.Typically, the DNC would identify a city where they wanted to hold an event and then request a date from the Vice President's office to schedule it. During the early planning stages, the only details provided to the Vice President's office were cities and dates for proposed DNC events.277 The scheduling staff would then present the DNC proposals to the Vice President for his approval. The Vice President would sign off on cities and dates, not the exact sites for events.278 Kimberly Tilley, the Vice President's director of scheduling, testified about the general process of scheduling the Vice President at a DNC event in another city. She stated: . . . as an example there would be a request for the Vice President, let's say, to go to Chicago, and we--I would talk to the Vice President and say there is a request for you to go to Chicago for a DNC event and here's what's happening on your family schedule, are you okay with this, and he would sign off on that.279 Tilley explained that as the date drew near, the scheduling office would work on the details and often discovered that the site had been changed. She testified, ``many times we would find out that it was not in Chicago. It was in Winnetka.'' 280 When the Vice President attended a DNC event in a particular city, other events were generally scheduled before and after the DNC event. The other events on the Vice President's schedule would often include speeches, meetings and appearances at other locations near the DNC event.281 The different events scheduled for a particular day would often change and not be finalized until shortly before the Vice President's trip to a city. Scheduling by the Vice President's office for April 1996 events was handled in the usual manner. Early in the planning process for April 1996, the Vice President agreed to travel to California long before the details of the trip were determined. The details, including the number of events he would attend, the cities he would visit and the sites of each event, were determined over a period of time and were not finalized until shortly before the Vice President's trip. Beginning in January 1996, the DNC proposed a series of fundraisers for the President and Vice President to schedule in April, May and June.282 No specific dates or sites were identified; the DNC simply suggested in its proposed calendar a month and a city in which to hold a fundraiser. A January 2, 1996 memo from Harold Ickes to the Vice President and others included a proposal that the Vice President attend three DNC fundraisers in the month of April in Washington, D.C., Los Angeles and San Jose.283 The event sites for the proposed cities were not identified in the DNC's proposal. Between January 2 and February 22, 1996, the Vice President's office worked on the general DNC request to schedule fundraisers for the Vice President to attend in California in April 1996. As an example, the Vice President's ever-changing California trip included a proposal to add an event in San Francisco that was later dropped.284 While the schedule changed often, there is no evidence that the Hsi Lai Temple was considered as a potential site for an event during the early planning stages of the Vice President's trip to California. In March 1996, the dates of the Vice President's trip to California and the events he would attend were still not determined. Tilley received an e-mail message from one of her assistants on March 12, 1996, that showed the Vice President would travel to San Jose and Los Angeles for three days, from April 27th to the 29th, and that he could attend ``some combination of possible Olympic torch event in LA, DNC fundraisers in San Jose & LA'' and ``Family/Private time.'' 285 On March 15, Tilley sent the Vice President an electronic message asking if he would like to give a keynote address at an event in New York on ``the same evening that you wanted to fly out to California overnight and then do the two fund-raisers in San Jose and L.A. while Sarah and Mrs. Gore visit colleges. . . . We've confirmed the fund-raisers for Monday, April 29th.'' 286 The Vice President responded that, ``If we have already booked the fund-raisers, then we have to decline.'' 287 While some have tried to claim that the Vice President's use of the word ``fund-raisers'' in this message proves that he knew the Temple event was a fundraiser, it proves only that the Vice President was planning to attend a fundraising event in Los Angeles well before the Temple event was added to his schedule and had coordinated the date with when his daughter was visiting colleges.288 As discussed below, an invitation to visit the Temple was extended by the Temple for the first time on March 15th and was not formally incorporated into the Vice President's schedule for another month, after an evaluation by the Vice President's national security adviser. The Vice President's deputy chief of staff David Strauss testified at the Committee hearing that the confirmed ``fund- raisers'' referenced in the Tilley message could not possibly refer to the Temple event because that event had not yet been scheduled.289 ``There wasn't even an event scheduled at the temple on the 15th of March,'' Strauss said. ``That occurred much later.'' 290 The Tilley message demonstrates that the Temple event was a separate consideration from the DNC fundraising events that the Vice President had agreed to attend in California. The Temple event was first proposed during a March 15th meeting between the Vice President and the head of the Temple, the Venerable Master Hsing Yun.291 This meeting had been arranged by Huang and Maria Hsia, a fellow Democratic activist in the Asian-American community.292 In an interview with Committee investigators, the Master said, ``I only met with Gore for 10 minutes. We had a very polite conversation, then I departed.'' 293 Briefing papers for the Vice President state that the two ``discussed Master Hsing Yun's charity work in California and elsewhere.'' 294 At the end of this brief meeting, the Master invited the Vice President to visit the Hsi Lai Temple in California.295 Vice President Gore responded that he would consider it since he was expecting to be in California in late April.296 This exchange reinforces the fact that the Vice President was already planning to visit California at the time of this meeting, and the Temple visit was a possible additional event, rather than the original reason for his visiting the area. The evidence indicates that after the meeting between the Temple's master and the Vice President, Huang and Hsia began planning two events in the Los Angeles area for April 29, a fundraising lunch at the Harbor Village Restaurant in Monterey Park and an Asian-American community outreach event at the Temple. Although the Harbor Village Restaurant in Monterey Park has no record of a reservation for April 1996,297 a draft invitation produced to the Committee by Hsia corroborates the planning for this event and that the organizers originally proposed two different events at two different locations for the Vice President.298 Moreover, a March 23, 1996, letter from Hsia to the Vice President demonstrates that the Vice President was specifically told of the plans for two events. The letter to the Vice President stated: John Huang has asked me to help with organizing a fundraising lunch event, with your anticipated presence, on behalf of the local Chinese community. After the lunch, we will attend a rally at Hsi Lai Temple where you will have the opportunity to meet representatives from the Asian American community and visit again with Master Hsing Yun. The event is tentatively scheduled for April 29 and I am hoping you will be able to attend.299 [emphasis added] Further corroboration that two events were planned was provided by Charlie Woo, an attendee of the Temple event and contributor to the DNC, who told Committee staff that Huang had contacted him to attend an April event with the Vice President.300 Woo identified this event as originally scheduled to be held at the Harbor Village Chinese Restaurant in Monterey Park. Woo said Huang called with the location change to the Hsi Lai Temple less than a month before the event and Woo was told that due to scheduling problems, there would only be this one event. Because Huang never told him otherwise, Woo said he arrived at the Temple event ``with a check in my pocket'' believing that he was going to a fundraiser. He said that he thought it was ``weird'' that there was ``no mention of money at the event.'' 301 At some point in early April 1996, the DNC canceled the Los Angeles fundraiser but not the community outreach event at the Hsi Lai Temple.302 Huang contacted Richard Sullivan, the DNC's finance director, to inform him that there were problems with the proposed site for the fundraiser.303 Sullivan testified, I think Maura (McManimon) and/or John said they were having problems working in the location, and then . . . subsequently, I believe John told me that the place that he wanted--that the home--I believe it was a home that he wanted to have it at--would not work with the Vice President's schedule, that he was doing things downtown and couldn't put enough time in the schedule to get out to this home--it may have been a restaurant, but I remember it as a home--and that he had to change the location. Then he came back, I think a day or two later, and said that he wanted to do it at a temple.304 One or two days later Huang and Sullivan discussed the Hsi Lai Temple as a possible site for a DNC event. Sullivan told Huang ``you can't do a fundraiser at a temple,'' 305 and Sullivan was assured by Huang that the temple event would not be a fundraiser.306 Instead, the Hsi Lai Temple event was intended to express appreciation to past contributors to the DNC and to encourage others in the Asian American community to contribute in the future.307 Huang told Sullivan that he ``would not charge people'' and that he ``was going to invite people for free'' to attend the ``community outreach'' event at the temple on April 29, 1996.308 On or about April 3, 1996, Sullivan informed the Vice President's office of the changes and told them that the temple event would be an ``outreach event,'' not a fundraiser.309 Strauss does not recall this specific conversation with Sullivan and Huang, but he testified that he had no reason to believe that he did not have such a conversation with them.310 The evidence before the Committee indicates that the Temple event was not actually incorporated into the Vice President's schedule until the latter half of April. Documents prepared for a scheduling meeting for the Vice President's California trip and a memorandum by Huang reflect the fact that as late as April 11th, two weeks beforehand, the Hsi Lai Temple had not been confirmed by either the White House or the DNC as the site for an event.311 In mid-April 1996, the Hsi Lai Temple event was characterized by some staff members as a fundraiser while others, who worked closest on the April 29, 1996 schedule, believed it was a community outreach event. In several internal communications, including e-mails and memos between staff members, the term ``fundraiser'' was used to describe the Hsi Lai Temple event. The director of the scheduling office, Tilley, testified, ``I think that there was a certain sloppiness in the terms we were using, whether it was finance or fundraising.'' 312 The scheduling office usually referred to an event from the DNC Finance Department as a fundraiser, even though it may not have been a fundraiser.313 Tilley testified that: A: ``There were traditional fundraisers that were ticketed events at the door. There were events that were community outreach like this Asian-Pacific where it was part of the DNC Finance plan, where in order for someone to be a member, there was a certain amount of money they paid to be a part of that, you know, committee or whatever they called; and then there were those people to whom they wanted to reach out to, who they hoped would become donors. Q: And would you define outreach events as different than fundraisers? A: Yes, I would.317 On April 11, 1996, the day of the ``Preliminary California Meeting'' Huang faxed a memorandum to Kim Tilley regarding a ``Fundraising lunch for Vice President Gore 6/29/96 [sic] in Southern California.'' in which he wrote: Per our discussion this morning, I have furnished the following information to you regarding the proposed event. 1. Proposed location: Hsi Lai Temple, Hacienda Heights, California. This temple was established by Venerable Master Hsing Yun during 1980's with many structures including Large dinning [sic] facility . . . To show his appreciation and friendship to Vice President Gore, Master Hsing Yun would like to host this upcoming Vice Presidential event in L.A. . . . 3. Hsi Lai Temple has hosted other political events before . . . 5. . . . Please let me know if I can provide any further information. I certainly would appreciate to know the answer asap if we can proceed on this matter. If so, in what parameters can we do, or not do.315 Jackie Dycke, who worked on the April 29, 1996 schedule until mid-April, before it was reassigned to Ladan Manteghi, prepared notes for the April 11th meeting which included the following information: ``DNC Luncheon in LA/Hacienda Heights: 1000-5000 head/150-200 people.'' 316 Dycke testified that she obtained this information for a proposed event from Maura McManimon who worked with John Huang for the DNC.317 The character of an event would often change during the scheduling process. Strauss was questioned during the Committee hearings about the scheduling process and he testified: Q: Is it common in your experience with regard to the Vice President's schedule and how it evolves that an event may be contemplated, but that over time and indeed on fairly short notice, its character could change or the event itself could be canceled? Mr. Strauss. That is correct. Q: Does that happen often? Mr. Strauss. That is correct.318 As of April 11, 1996, Huang, an organizer of the Hsi Lai Temple event, had not yet received confirmation that the Vice President would even be attending an event at the Hsi Lai Temple on April 29, 1996. Other documents, including an April 19th message just ten days before the event, indicate that a decision on the Temple event was delayed pending an evaluation by the Vice President's national security advisers who approved the event but cautioned against permitting it to be characterized as one favoring Taiwan.319 John Norris, who works in the Vice President's foreign policy office, wrote a note to Bill Wise, deputy director of the Vice President's foreign policy office, regarding the Hsi Lai Temple event. In his April 16, 1996 note, Norris wrote: State notes that any affair involving Taiwan involves some risk of political exploitation by people from Taiwan. State's advice is to make John Huang of the DNC responsible for managing the event to ensure the VP is not embarrassed-- --the event is for the Chinese community of Southern California; it is not a ``Taiwan'' event; --there are no Taiwan flags or KMT symbols or other signs that would be embarrassing for the VP; --no Taiwan politician should be allowed to exploit this event.320 Wise wrote a hand note to Leon Feurth, the Vice President's National Security Advisor, on the bottom of Norris's April 16, 1996, note with his opinion regarding the Hsi Lai Temple site. Wise wrote: I think it may be difficult for the sponsors to meet the three criteria suggested by State--but they will certainly claim that they can. * * * * * I suspect the VP might get to go ahead since we cannot point to a specific problem.'' 321 On April 19, 1996, Norris received an e-mail message from Robert Suettinger regarding the foreign policy ramifications of holding an event at the Hsi Lai Temple. Suettinger wrote: This is terra incognita to me. Certainly from the perspective of Taiwan/China balancing, this would be clearly a Taiwan event and would be seen as such. I guess my reaction would be one of great, great caution. They may have a hidden agenda.322 Tilley explained that the Vice President's National Security Office needed to approve the Hsi Lai Temple as an appropriate site for the Vice President to visit, based on foreign policy considerations. Tilley testified, ``for an event like this, we would not have proceeded--the Vice President would not have done it if the National Security Office had not signed off.'' 323 In response, the Vice President's office informed the Temple that the Vice President could attend the event only if all Taiwanese national symbols were removed from the site before the event took place.324 The Temple agreed to this condition. Once the event was agreed to, the evidence indicates that the Vice President's staff organized it as a community outreach effort, rather than a fundraiser. When the event was officially added to the Vice President's schedule in the latter half of April, the key scheduler responsible for the event in the Vice President's office was Ladan Manteghi who, in mid-April, had assumed responsibility for the Vice President's April 29 schedule. Manteghi testified at her deposition that she clearly understood the event to be a community outreach event and not a fundraiser.325 She testified as follows: Q. Do you recall ever discussing with Kim Tilley whether or not the event at the Hsi Lai Temple--what type of an event it was? A. She and I had conversations