STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOHN L. WOODWARD, USAF DIRECTOR FOR
COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS,
AND COMPUTER SYSTEMS
I am grateful for the opportunity to address the committee on the topic of Information Superiority and its central role in the military transformation process, and to discuss the Joint Staff's plan to address a complex issue of great importance to our nation and the military forces sworn to defend it. I am Lieutenant General Jack Woodward, the Joint Staff Director for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems, and the Joint Staff Coordinating Authority for Information Superiority. I will begin my testimony this afternoon by first discussing the topics of Information Superiority and network centric warfare. I will then address the policies and procedures we have established and put in place to facilitate the implementation of Information Superiority and identify some of the challenges we face in moving forward.
As you are aware at the dawn of the 21st century, the Joint Warfighting community is fully engaged in the information age. The overarching vision that describes warfare in the information age is Joint Vision 2010 (JV 2010). This Joint Vision, signed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, articulates a vision for future warfare where information is a fundamental enabler of the emerging operational concepts of Precision Engagement, Dominant Maneuver, Focused Logistics, and Full-Dimensional Protection. The term that is used to describe the fundamental enabler of these concepts is Information Superiority. A closely related concept of increasing importance is network-centric warfare. Information Superiority and network-centric warfare are multi-faceted concepts with significant and far-reaching implications for all of the Services, Agencies, and CINCs. In an effort to define and bound Information Superiority, the Joint Staff, in conjunction with the Services, Agencies, and CINCs, has identified three primary Information Superiority Challenges:
Information Transport and Processing
The magnitude of achieving Information Superiority becomes very apparent when viewed from the position of Joint Task Force Commander. To assist this format we have highlighted some of our Service contributions to this effort.
Let's start with the challenge of Battlespace Awareness. There are three fundamental elements of battlespace awareness: information on blue forces, information on the adversary, and information on the environment. Each of the Services makes important contributions to generating battlespace awareness for a broad range of mission areas. Let's work our way from space to the surface of the earth and then to the depths of the ocean.
Space: Air Force and Navy sensors play a key role in performing surveillance of space as well as tracking objects in space in support of a broad range of mission areas. Our ground based space surveillance radars track satellites and other objects in orbit, such as space debris. Our space based sensors, such as the Defense Support Program, track certain classes of objects that are in the process of being launched on trajectories that traverse the upper atmosphere, such as ballistic missiles. Indeed, one of our major ongoing acquisition efforts, the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS), will provide the nation with significantly improved capabilities for increasing battlespace awareness in this area. One of our near term priorities is improving sensing and dissemination capabilities to improve our ability to provide Theater Ballistic Missile Warning information to Joint Task Forces.
Air: In this domain, the Joint Staff and Services have articulated a concept for battlespace awareness that we call the single integrated air picture, or SIAP. The SIAP provides commanders and their forces with a near-real time description of the location and disposition of blue forces, as well as the location of all known red forces, and potentially non-combatant air traffic as well. In a Joint Task Force environment, our awareness of red forces operating in the atmosphere comes from multiple types of sensors. The primary sensors that are employed by a Joint Task Force for broad area surveillance and tracking include air based radars, such the E-3 AWACS and the Navy's E-2 Hawkeye; surface based sensors, such as ship based AEGIS radar; and ground based air defense radar. Airborne surveillance and reconnaissance systems, such as RIVET Joint, also make key contributions to the SIAP, as do the radar on our fighter aircraft. Our awareness of the status and location of blue forces operating in a JTF's area of responsibility is primarily generated through use of tactical data links, such as Link 16. In addition to providing position of blue forces, tactical data links also provide the primary mechanism for distributing and sharing awareness of red and blue forces between and among the elements of the force needing the single integrated air picture.
Ground: Generating awareness of objects on land, both moving and stationary, is a Joint effort. We are just in the process of deploying major capabilities for detecting and tracking moving objects to our warfighting CINCs. These capabilities, in the form of the E-8 JSTARS and the U-2, have radar sensors that have the capability to operate in what is referred to as Moving Target Indicator (MTI) mode. These sensors enable us to detect objects that are moving, such as tanks and armored personnel carriers, in real-time. As you can imagine, this information on moving targets is very important to Commanders and their forces involved in air and ground operations. Our traditional imaging sensors, such as the U2 and space systems, enable us to identify, locate, and target fixed targets with a very high degree of precision. These sensor platforms also play a key role in the performance of post-strike battle damage assessment (BDA). As you may be aware, our ability to perform precision targeting and BDA in an accurate and timely fashion was a key contributor to success in Operation Desert Fox.
Sea: The surveillance of objects on the surface of the ocean and below is primarily a Navy mission. As the Navy and Marine Corps place an increased emphasis on operating in the littorals, the challenges of Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) and anti-mine warfare grow more complex. Recent exercises and demonstrations have highlighted the potential of network-centric warfighting solutions in these high priority mission areas.
Air, Ground and Sea: An exciting initiative for increasing battlespace awareness in the 2010 plus timeframe is Discover II. This Joint Initiative between the Air Force, DARPA, and the National Reconnaissance Organization (NRO) will explore the potential for performing wide area MTI tracking of objects operating in the air, on the ground, and on the surface of the oceans from space.
Navigation: Precision navigation, an emerging JV 2010 concept, is fundamental to precision weapons and precision sensing. Our primary system for providing precision navigation both now and in the future is the Global Positioning System.
Within the Information Transport and Processing Challenge area, we have identified four desired operational capabilities: Capacity, Interoperability, Assurance, and Information Management. The ability to transport and process information between all elements of the warfighting enterprise is a key characteristic of Information Superiority. The emerging Joint construct for accomplishing this Information Superiority challenge is what we call the "Global Information Grid." The "Global Information Grid" can best be understood as the provider of worldwide Dial Tone, Web-Tone, Data-Tone, and Video Teleconference -Tone. The information services provided by the "Global Information Grid" are enabled by multiple types of components, from satellites deployed 22,000 miles up in space to the fiber optic cables at the bottom of the ocean and through every possible media available. These components consist of Service provided tactical networks, the Defense Information Infrastructure, and the transmission systems supporting our camps, posts, stations, and bases. The fielding of the "Global Information Grid" is a high priority for all Services, because as I will discuss in some detail later, it is one of the primary components of a network-centric force.
Each of the Services makes significant contributions to meeting these challenges and deploying the "Global Information Grid." The Air Force, for example, has the primary responsibility for acquiring, launching, and operating the preponderance of the Military's satellite communications capabilities. Our major satellite communications systems include MILSTAR, which provides highly secure, low and medium data rate communications; Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS), which provides very high capacity services; our ultra-high frequency satellites, which provide mobile services; and the Global Broadcast Service. These communications systems are absolutely essential to our ability to deploy U.S. forces worldwide today, and they will only grow in importance as we move toward 2010 and beyond. We also understand commercial satellite communication systems play a key role in the transport layer of the "Global Information Grid." Systems such as Iridium, Globalstar, Teledesic and many other Mobile Satellite concepts are on the economic horizon. We are actively working with the commercial sector to understand how to fully exploit commercial capabilities in achieving Information Superiority for JV 2010.
Tactical data links provide the next primary "brick and mortar" component of the "Global Information Grid." These data links provide the information transport and processing capabilities that are key to generating a common operational picture of Joint operations. The Common Operational Picture is constructed by fusing information that characterizes the space, sea, air and ground battlespaces. Component commanders have the operational flexibility to tailor their information domain to create relevant pictures of their respective battlespaces. An example of one of these common relevant pictures is the Single Integrated Air Picture (SIAP). A key for enabling a Single Integrated Air Picture is for all fixed and rotary wing aircraft to be data link capable.
Developing a common picture of ground operations is very important to the Ground Component Commander and his forces. Developing this picture in a Joint warfighting environment is a daunting operational challenge, in part because of the large number of moving parts. However, the Army and Marine Corps, through implementation of the Tactical Internet, are working this problem very hard, and recent experiments and exercises have highlighted the increased combat power associated with increased battlespace awareness. The Joint Tactical Radio System (a programmable tactical radio system born Joint) will play a key role in improving the Tactical Internet. It is critically important that our allied and coalition partners also be outfitted with appropriate data links to conduct integrated cooperative warfare engagements.
The robust communications infrastructure of our post, camps, stations and bases is increasingly important due to our transition to network-centric operations. Emerging concepts call for us to move more information - and less people. Consequently, CONUS based forces will be key to enabling the command and control of deployed forces, as well as contributing to the development of shared battlespace awareness. When we do deploy and operate in theater, we face significant challenges with respect to frequency landing rights, host nation approval, as well as the broader issue of local infrastructures that range from well developed to almost non-existent. Dealing effectively with these issues is key to acquiring and deploying the theater-based C4 capabilities required to support a Joint Task Force.
In focusing on the support we need to provide Joint Task Forces, it becomes apparent that we need to provide the Joint warfighter with significantly improved capabilities for Joint Network Management, Information Management, and Network Operations. These capabilities are essential for enabling network-wide attributes such as quality of service, which will help us prioritize the flow of information into and out of theater, as well as between the elements of the Joint warfighting force that are deployed in theater. Rapidly emerging commercial products will help us accelerate these operational capabilities.
Unfortunately, some challenges we face when attempting to operate in theater with our Allied and Coalition partners cannot be solved solely with technology. The complex issue of interoperability has at least three key components: technology, doctrine and policy. The doctrine and policy issues associated with interoperability are being worked in conjunction with the J3 and ASD(C3I). The associated policy issue of wanting to fight with systems manufactured by "own country" exacerbates the problem almost to the point of intractability.
Underlying the Information Transport and Processing Challenge is the fundamental role of frequency spectrum in deploying and operating key elements of the Global Information Grid. As I have discussed, information has become the enabler in modern warfare that preserves and multiplies combat power. Warfighters must have assured access to frequency spectrum to accomplish the full range of military operations, and training for these operations. Frequency spectrum is a requirement for "wireless" communication. And wireless communication provides the warfighter mobility. Without spectrum we lose our mobility and potentially the campaign. Assured warfighter access to frequency spectrum is at risk. The rapid pace of developments in the commercial information technology sector has fueled the commercial sector's appetite for increased spectrum. When FCC auctions frequency spectrum our warfighters are forced to use other frequencies because of spectrum allocation. Existing operating equipment in that frequency region must be replaced. This forces divergence of multinational allocation tables and will eventually cost DoD significant resources. Joint Warfighters are concerned with the loss of adequate training and operational capabilities as we participate in a broad range of peacekeeping activities in the international arena in areas where frequency spectrum is unavailable for our use.
We understand that spectrum pricing is economically lucrative. However, loss of spectrum and spectrum pricing is having a serious impact on the warfighter in the theater and future military operational readiness. The Federal Government needs to address these issues and formulate a National Spectrum Strategy that balances economic interests with national security needs. Since our continued access to this precious resource is fundamental to our ability to enable Information Superiority, we need to be vigilant in this area.
The third category of the Information Superiority Challenges is Information Operations. As Dr. Hamre testified this morning, it is increasingly clear that our ability to protect our information is another key component of Information Superiority. Consequently, our efforts in establishing a defense-in-depth for the "Global Information Grid" are very focused. Recent significant developments in the area of Information Assurance include the formation of a Joint Task Force for Computer Network Defense (CND), which incorporates a Reserve Component Squadron with a specific mission focused on Web Site Security. The Joint Task Force, with forces assigned from all Services, concentrates on computer attack intrusions, detections, the analysis and assessment of operational impacts, and reporting structures. This JTF is structured to support the CINCs and their Components, as well as to provide an operational DoD focus on CND matters with Interagency Groups. These initiatives associated with policy and institutional directions will help us to significantly improve our capabilities for protecting our information and ensuring its integrity. We are also very involved in developing and refining operational capabilities for putting an adversary's information infrastructure at risk.
This overview of Information Superiority Challenges provides a framework for understanding how warfighters can translate Information Superiority to increased combat power. The concept of network-centric warfare, which will be addressed thoroughly by VADM Cebrowski, emphasizes the increased combat power that can be generated by a warfighting force robustly networked via the "Global Information Grid." When we take a close look at the mission areas where network-centric concepts have emerged to date, we can observe that a primary driver has been the need to defeat a threat that cannot be easily defeated by platforms operating in stand-alone mode. This is clearly the case with the Navy's Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), which was primarily developed to counter the threat posed by high speed, low signature missiles. In the CEC concept, the robust networking of sensors is the primary source of increased combat power. Similarly, the shift to network-centric operations taking place in the Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defense mission area is being driven by the need to improve our ability to find, fix and engage targets in near real-time. A close examination of the Space Based Infrared Systems reveals this same trend, the robust networking of sensors to increase battlespace awareness.
My motivation for discussing the concept of network-centric warfare is to provide a logical model for understanding the source of increased combat power associated with Information Superiority. There is an increasing body of evidence supporting the hypothesis that increased battlespace awareness combined with agile forces with flexible force employment options will enable increased synchronization and speed. The net result will be increased speed of command, resulting in an ability to get inside an adversary's decision loop and rapidly lock-out an adversary's courses of action.
At the tactical level, the benefits of network-centric warfare are clear and unambiguous. For example, the Air Force, by robustly networking the elements of their command and control capabilities, is taking steps to reduce the required footprint for a Joint Air Operations Center in theater. Accomplishing this will enable the Air Force to deploy Aerospace Expeditionary Forces to a theater faster and arrive with more punch. In addition, they can launch long range bombers, such as B-1s or B-2s, and provide them with precise targets and precision targeting information while they are en-route to the target area. Furthermore, the transport aircraft that are freed-up as a result of a smaller in-theater footprint can be used to transport additional combat power into the theater. The Navy's Fleet Battle Experiment series is providing equally compelling insights into the increased combat power associated with a network-centric naval force. Fleet Battle Experiment Delta demonstrated the potential for a land-sea engagement grid to exploit shared battlespace awareness and enable self-synchronization. As you will hear from Admiral Clemins, the Navy is already getting a payoff from the deployment of improved information technology capabilities in the Fleet.
Although the process of transitioning to a network-centric force is just getting started, key insights are already evident from some of our successes and failures to date. First, we have learned there are non-trivial technology, organizational, and doctrinal components associated with enabling network-centric warfare. We can't just go out and deploy advanced C4 and ISR systems and expect an immediate increase in combat power. Consequently, both Service and Joint Warfighting Experiments are focused on helping us address fundamental organizational and doctrinal issues that must be wrestled with to achieve Information Superiority and enable the JV 2010 operational concepts. With that said, let me also emphasize that synchronizing the C4 systems and technology components required to enable a network-centric force is also a daunting challenge. In the remainder of my comments I will highlight some of our successes to date in achieving Information Superiority, and address in detail some of the road ahead challenges.
To deploy the "Global Information Grid" with the capabilities required for 2010, we need to focus our investments and more effectively exploit rapidly emerging information technology. Our emerging focus on the "Global Information Grid" as the entry fee for Information Superiority and network-centric warfare provides a logical model for synchronizing the initiatives of both the Services and the Agencies as they field or provide the advanced technology piece parts, or components of the grid and the information services provided by the grid. These programs, many of which I have mentioned previously, include the Joint Tactical Radio System; Joint Links (e.g.; Link 16); Satellite Communications (both commercial and military); Global Command and Control System (GCCS); Global Combat Support System (GCSS); Global Positioning System (GPS); as well as our Service digitization efforts, like the Army's Digitized Battlefield and Warfighter Internet, the Navy and Marine Corps Team's IT-21 initiative, the Air Forces "Combat Information Transport System" and Theater Deployable Communications; and DoD's initiatives such as the Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) and the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII). Our approach for synchronizing and integrating C4 and ISR initiatives employs a combination of architectures, procedures, standards, and processes with an approach focusing first and foremost on the JTF Warfighter.
The collection of processes and control mechanisms that the CINCs, Services, and Agencies employ to control and synchronize the new fielding of C4 and ISR systems and capabilities include: the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) complemented by the Joint Requirements Board (JRB) and Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) teams; the Military Communications and Electronics Board (MCEB), which works C4 issues in the CINC, Service, and Agency arena; the Combined Communications and Electronics Board (CCEB), which provides a forum for addressing C4 allied issues, and the Military Intelligence Board (MIB). The most recent addition to this integrated set of decision mechanisms is the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) process. This process provides the Joint Staff with the opportunity to more effectively align Service and Agency investments with the emerging Information Superiority vision vector. This process is not perfect. Sometimes, despite our best efforts, carefully planned synchronization efforts fall short of the mark. But on the whole, the processes that we have established greatly assist our synchronization efforts starting at the requirements front end through the acquisition process to the actual Service fielding schedule. Improving our ability to synchronize Service and Agency Information Superiority initiatives is one of my most important priorities. I am working closely with the CINCs, Services, Agencies, and especially the J-8 to accomplish this. One of the tools we are developing to help us with the synchronization process is NETWARS, a leading edge effort to develop a C4 warfighter simulation capable of addressing the extremely complex functionality, behavior, and performance of the "Global Information Grid" and all aspects of user services. The core of this modeling and simulation tool is a leading commercial off-the-shelf software tool that we are using to address the unique characteristics of the "Global Information Grid." Our intent is to make this tool available online for use by the CINCs, Services, and Agencies to perform bandwidth management, investment decision making, information prioritization, and evaluation of alternative military courses of action from the smallest contingency to two Major Regional Conflicts.
Despite these challenges, we have made and continue to make important progress. For example, the Chief of Naval Operations' strong endorsement of network-centric warfare has played a key role in enabling the Navy to increase its investment in Information Technology for the 21st Century (IT-21), the Navy's umbrella strategy for enabling the IT elements of network-centric warfare.
As the recent GAO Report ("Information Superiority: Progress Made, But Significant Challenges Remain") pointed out, architectures play a pivotal role in synchronizing and integrating C4 and ISR initiatives. The two most important architectures are the Joint Technical Architecture (JTA) and the Joint Operational Architecture (JOA). The JTA consists of standards and specifications, sixty-seven percent of which are commercial, for use in procuring and integrating the information technology systems needed to support the warfighter. JTA Version 2.0 exists and is mandatory for all emerging systems, system upgrades, and pre-acquisition programs. The next iteration, JTA Version 3.0 is under development. As the GAO report pointed out, the JOA plays a key role in describing how information exchanges will be used and fused in military operations to enable the JV 2010 operational concepts. The JOA is an extremely complex undertaking that is progressing at a slow pace. The Joint Staff in conjunction with the CINCs, Services, and Agencies are engaged and invigorated to produce at least a first good draft in the next six months. OSD's system architecture template was the first step in paving the way for this Joint Operational Architecture undertaking.
The emergence of the internet and the associated concept of intranets rendered many Business Process Reengineering projects obsolete. The resultant "Web-Browser" created an entirely new way to share information and perform transactions with internet technologies. As a result, one of the primary rationales for developing a detailed, information architecture disappeared, and entirely new modes of operation were enabled. I believe a similar phenomenon is occurring in military operations as we constantly move forward with the deployment of the "Global Information Grid." As our warfighters are provided with new ways to access and transport information, they are creating new concepts for performing existing missions. Two excellent examples are the Joint Intelligence Virtual Architecture (JIVA) and the Web-Centric Anti-submarine Warfare Network (WeCAN). Consequently, if we take this logic to its natural conclusion, I believe what we should also be concentrating on a high level rule set which provides operational commanders with the flexibility to "plug and play" sensors, shooters, and C2 capabilities of their Joint, Allied, and Coalition forces as required to prosecute their missions.
The GAO report also addressed the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) in some detail. GCCS is a "born joint" success story and is currently deployed worldwide in support of all CINCs and components. Its power has been demonstrated in every major deployment and military operation since Operation Just Cause in 1996. Clearly, most of the early growing pains, which were cogently addressed in the report, are now a distant memory. However, we are applying the lessons we learned in deploying GCCS as we pursue a number of other Joint C4 Initiatives: the Joint Tactical Radio System, the Joint Network Management System, and the Global Combat Support System (GCSS). As you may be aware, one of the keys to our success in deploying GCCS was a set of standards that we refer to as the Defense Information Infrastructure Common Operational Environment (DII COE). This set of standards, which is primarily COTS based, as directed in the Joint Technical Architecture, continues to play a key role in our acquisition and deployment of complex command and control systems.
Significant progress has been made in synchronizing the Department's S&T investment strategy with the Information Superiority vision vector. The Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan (JWSTP) ensures the Defense Science and Technology (S&T) program supports priority future joint warfighting capabilities. It does this by taking a joint perspective horizontally across the applied research (6.2) and advanced technology development (6.3) plans of the Services and Defense Agencies. The JROC endorses this plan and the ten Joint Warfighting Capability Objectives (JWCOs) used in its development. Information Superiority is one of the ten JWCOs. The JWCOs provide an important focus for the S&T program--they are the fabric used for synchronizing the fielding of advanced technologies. They drive the formulation and execution of Advanced Technology Demonstrations (ATDs) and Advanced Concept and Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) to ensure that they are warfighter-oriented. The JWSTP is issued annually as defense guidance. Advanced concepts and technologies identified as enhancing future joint warfighting capabilities receive funding priority in the FYDP. Overall the JWSTP presents an integrated approach--technology development and acquisition--to achieve the Chairman's Joint Vision 2010.
In the commercial sector, it is often easier for CIOs to relate investments in information technology (IT) to the bottom line, and to pay for investments in IT with a combination of increased sales and increased earnings. In many cases however, establishing a direct linkage is tenuous, due to the complex dynamics of the marketplace. In these cases, investment decisions are made based on a fundamental commitment to information based strategies. In the current competitive landscape, failing to develop and employ an information based strategy and invest adequately in information technology is a prescription for rapid obsolescence. The DoD may find it necessary to formulate a more holistic appropriated category for Information Superiority versus the multiple, fractured, individual approach we use today. Our measures for increased competitiveness don't reflect a corporate bottom line like "profits" but rather national security matters like Joint combat power, deterrence, and fighting and winning. Nevertheless, we recently have made significant progress in relating Information Superiority to increased combat power. Recent analytic studies have provided us with significant insight, and helped to shape and develop our existing investment strategy. For example, the Sensor-to-Shooter II study identified C4I Improvements (i.e., Link-16, GBS) that could significantly improve our capabilities for Precision Strike. As a result of this study, the JROC provided guidance to the Services that resulted in the redirection of existing monies to fund C4I Improvements. The C4ISR Mission Assessment, which addressed a much broader range of issues, also identified numerous opportunities for investment, many of which are currently not funded. Our C2 Joint Warfighting Assessment activities coupled with Chairman's Joint Monthly Readiness Review have pointed out continued deficiencies in:
C4 interoperability at the CINC, JTF and coalition level
C4 force structure modernization
Training for C4 fielding
Transmission capacity and information management
Joint network management
The C4 infrastructure of posts, camps, stations and bases
Technical workforce for operations and maintenance of C4 systems
The buying process versus the technology explosion.
All of these deficiencies have assigned responsible, accountable agents and the subject matter is under a senior review process. The Joint Staff is aggressively working CINC funding for C2 Improvement Projects, technology infusion through projects like ACTDs, Joint Experimentation, Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstrations, and Information Superiority Experiments under USACOM's capable management.
Before I conclude, let me put the spotlight on the key to our success - our intellectual capital. The men and women with the technical acumen to develop, deploy, and operate and defend the " Global Information Grid" and our ISR Systems are a precious commodity. We need to make appropriate investments to attract, train, promote and retain military and civilian personnel with IT and information warfighting skills. In addition, we need to support these personnel by making prudent investments in corporate outsourcing of selected IT functions. America needs to develop these same national skill sets through our colleges, universities, and vocational schools in the area of information technology.
In conclusion, I believe we are making solid progress toward implementing a Joint Strategy for Information Superiority that supports our Warfighters. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I look forward to helping make the Information Superiority challenges that I have shared with you this afternoon a reality, and to addressing you in the future and relating our successes and lessons learned. On behalf of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I appreciate the opportunity to present the Joint Staff's insights on how to advance this issue of growing national importance - Information Superiority.