“Information Superiority and Information Assurance:
Meeting the Challenges of the 21st Century”
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee.
I am grateful for the opportunity to again address the committee on
the important topic of Information Superiority and its central role in the
military transformation process, and to discuss the Joint Staff’s
campaign plan addressing this complex issue of great importance.
I am Lieutenant General Jack Woodward, the Joint Staff Director for
Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems.
I am also the Joint Staff Coordinating Authority for Information
Superiority as it relates to implementing and enabling Joint Vision 2010.
My testimony will address Information Superiority, focusing on the
delivery of assured, protected connectivity to increase combat power for
today’s warfighter. I will
introduce you to an overarching concept referred to as the Global
Information Grid (GIG). Finally,
I will share with you some of the important progress we have made over the
previous year, and I will identify many challenges we face in achieving
At the dawn of the 21st century, the Joint community is
fully engaged in exploiting the warfighting advantages of this high tech
era. The Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff published his overarching vision, Joint
Vision 2010 (JV2010), that describes warfare in the information age.
It articulates a vision for future warfare where information
superiority is the fundamental
enabler of the four pillar warfighting concepts: Precision Engagement,
Dominant Maneuver, Focused Logistics, and Full-Dimensional Protection.
In simple terms, Information Superiority means getting the right
information to the right people at the right time in the right format
while denying an adversary the same capability.
Let me start my discussion by creating a fictional scenario of an
information-intensive battlefield and address the Information Superiority
concepts it represents.
potential future battlefield, a US Joint STARS aircraft detects a column
of vehicles nearing a sector patrolled by a German reconnaissance company,
one of our Coalition Partners, and injects the positional data of the
column into the Common Operational Picture (COP).
The Combined Joint Forces Air Component Commander (CJFACC) and the
Combined Ground Component Commander (CGCC) and the Commander of the Joint
Task Force (CJTF) all see this information simultaneously.
CGCC, using the secret Coalition Wide Area Network (CWAN), directs an
orbiting, US-controlled Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) to reconnoiter the
area and identify the vehicles as friend, foe or neutral. The resulting real time, satellite-relayed video stream is
analyzed at Allied intelligence centers on different continents and the
vehicles are identified as hostile. The
centers quickly coordinate and build an analysis and targeting package
with a common collaborative planning tool and forward this information to
the Commander of the Joint Task Force (CJTF) and his coalition component
studying the information, the CJFACC directs an air strike against the
enemy vehicles. A rapid
review of real-time status of aircraft in the area reveals the best course
of action is to direct an orbiting 4-ship cell of Joint Strike Fighters to
engage the target. In
addition, a carrier-based EA-6B is directed to provide Electronic Warfare
(EW) support. The pilots consult their onboard common tactical picture
enroute to the target to verify the German team’s position and receive
the latest targeting information. Following
the air attack by laser-guided precision weapons, satellite systems relay
the real-time strike information from the UAV to the CJFACC, the CGCC, and
CJTF commander. Immediately
after the strike, the UAV collects and transmits battle damage assessment
information to the analysts to determine if a re-attack is required.
this scenario unfolds, operators and analysts are monitoring and assessing
the military resources necessary to conduct the operations such as strike
and support aircraft, fuel states, weapons loading, system status, and
proximity of friendly forces and prohibited targets. The CJTF’s C4
coordination center monitors bandwidth requirements to support real-time
voice, data, and video streams necessary to coordinate this coalition
operation. They are ensuring
the networks are properly configured, enough bandwidth is allocated, and
the C4 systems are immune to hostile cyber attacks.
Operators are alert to jamming and are poised to respond as
necessary to ensure uninterrupted radio spectrum availability.
power of real-time, networked operations depicted here is the basis for
the Commanders’ ability to share a common operational picture,
collaboratively plan strikes, retarget weapons platforms while in flight,
and work with a multitude of coalition partners.
accomplish much of this today, but it’s HARD work. Challenges remain in
the areas of security and interoperability of our joint and coalition C4
scenario highlights the potential
power of a network-centric force -- force with the capability to
dynamically retarget on demand -- a force with the capability to
dynamically network sensors, regardless of platform; shooters, regardless
of service or country; and decision makers, regardless of location.
This is what the ongoing transformation of military capability is
it is a secure, reliable network that makes an effective warfighting
force. As a result,
securing the network is not just about securing information. It is about enabling assured operations and mission success.
plan to achieve Information Superiority through an overarching concept
called the Global Information Grid (GIG).
Global Information Grid is a unifying concept and one of the key enablers
of Information Superiority. We
think of the Global Information Grid in the same way that most people
think of the “Internet,” a single concept that describes something
that is very complicated and constantly evolving.
General Shelton, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told
Congress during his recent posture statement: An
important aspect of future operations will be the development of a Global
Information Grid, or GIG, to provide the network-centric environment
required to achieve information superiority.
The GIG is the globally interconnected, end-to-end set of
information capabilities, associated processes, and personnel to manage
and provide information on demand to
warfighters, policy makers, and supporting personnel.
It will enhance combat power through greatly increased battlespace
awareness, improved ability to employ weapons beyond line-of-sight,
employment of massed effects instead of massed forces, and reduced
decision cycles. It will
contribute to the success of non-combat military operations as well.”
overarching rationale for the Global Information Grid is supported by the
ongoing shift to network-centric operations, the principle component of
the Revolution in Military Affairs transformation.
In the military context, weapon systems are essential for mission
success. In times past with
platform-centric operations, the link between sensors and shooters was
tenuous and lacked the timeliness required.
In today’s network-centric operations, the timely exchange of
information is key to leveraging all available sensors and weapons systems
to generate increased combat power. The
secure, networking capabilities inherent in the Global Information Grid
provide the fused, timely information essential for joint mission success. It enables commanders to create a dynamically integrated
fighting force by linking sensors to shooters to generate massed effects.
Because of this inextricable tie to combat power, the Global
Information Grid must be treated like a weapon system.
Treating the Global Information Grid like a weapon system has
several significant implications for its deployment and employment.
the GIG: Our CINCs and warfighters must be
confident they have the information superiority capabilities they need to
fight and win. We must
standardize our network operational concepts and doctrine.
We must institutionalize our tactics, techniques and procedures (TT&P)
and demand the requisite training of our network system administrators and
the personnel who employ the GIG’s global applications (e.g. Global
Command and Control System). We
must provide end-to-end visibility into the health and readiness of these
critical components to decision makers as they make trade-off decisions to
balance limited resources against operational demands.
We must organize units that operate, maintain, and protect our networks as
an integral part of our warfighting command structure, just as we do with
all other warfighting resources. We
need to consolidate responsibility and operational control under a single
warfighting commander. This
will place the authority for allocating essential, limited resources based
on operational exigencies under a commander charged with the
responsibility for the Global Information Grid.
Defend the GIG: Defending our military capabilities
is second nature to us. Protecting
and defending our networks and the information that is collected,
processed, aggregated and stored over them should be as well.
We are committed to protecting the network with the same vigor that
we protect other important elements of our force structure, such as the
deployed Carrier Battle Group or a bomber enroute to its target. All of these weapons systems use an analogous
This strategy employs techniques on the perimeter to detect
intruders, capabilities to assess threats within our boundaries and
technology to respond to attacks when necessary to restore the force
Performance: As quickly as the technology
evolves to allow us to prioritize and manage the flow of information over
the network, we must adopt the means to optimize our systems. There must be enough capacity to support the way
the warfighter wants to fight now and in the future. A key lesson learned
from Operation Allied Force is
that today’s battlefield is information intensive.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), Video Teleconferencing, and
Imagery require lots of bandwidth. Precision
guided munitions rely on global positioning data for accuracy.
Dispersed units rely on secure voice and data for situational
awareness and command and control. Our
networks must be optimized to support all of these capabilities when
needed. Another key
lesson learned was that our ability to manage the radio spectrum and the
limitations of current tactical ground terminals directly impact the
end-to-end network performance. During
Operation Allied Force, over
44,000 radio frequencies were deconflicted, permitting an uninterrupted
flow of information.
The Multinational warfighting and peacekeeping environment in which the
military operates today requires an ability to be able to “connect”
with allied and coalition partners in order to operate effectively.
The need for a Coalition-wide WAN (Wide Area Network) has been
validated over and over again in recent operations involving our
multi-national partners. Security
technology, information releasability and other policy matters are key to
making this a reality. We
must continue developing technology to reduce the manual burden of
information releasability and secure connectivity while also working the
policy issues to ensure we can share information within an international
scenario. In addition, improved cryptographic capabilities supporting
high speed, high bandwidth communications must be part of the gameplan.
and Acquire GIG Capabilities: We have to compete and resource the
Global Information Grid like any other weapon system. The Global
Information Grid is a continually evolving system of systems that must be
funded in a synchronized and coordinated manner.
Training to operate and protect these complex systems must be an
integral component of our fielding strategy for successful employment of
forces. Research and
development for advanced technologies to improve the communications and
computing capability of the network must be a priority.
the GIG: In today’s military, we value what we can depend on for
mission success. The Global
Information Grid is the linchpin in both our military operations and
business processes. We must
consider it an essential, precious resource in our arsenal of weapons.
The Global Information Grid is the entry fee for the DoD
transformation and the combat power associated with our Joint Vision and
it must be valued as any other essential component.
Deploying the Global
Information Grid is a Strategic, not a Tactical decision. It is not a C4
decision -- it is a decision about increasing combat power.
The Joint Community is making real and tangible
progress towards treating the network like a weapon system and making the
GIG a reality. Examples of
this transformation are abundant.
States Pacific Command (PACOM) is in the midst of operationalizing theater
networks by establishing a Theater C4ISR Coordination Center (TCCC) and
developing associated Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures (TT&P).
The TCCC will provide USCINCPAC with unprecedented visibility into
theater networks. The TCCC will provide a readiness assessment based on
specific metrics enabling USCINCPAC to provide operational direction to
Service components and other operators of networks, systems, and
applications to optimize the Global Information Grid for current
operations. The TCCC will
provide health and status information concerning theater networks to the
Global Network Operations and Security Center that monitors DoD’s
backbone communications networks.
first step in acquiring and funding the components of the Global
Information Grid occurs in the requirements generation process.
Two separate but interrelated events are currently taking place
which have significant impact on the evolution of the Global Information
U.S. Joint Forces Command is responsible for authoring a Capstone Requirements Document (CRD) describing the essential elements of the Global Information Grid. This is the first time a single, overarching capstone document will provide a definitive architectural framework describing the inter-relationships and components of the weapons systems, connectivity, computing capabilities, applications, basic foundation concepts, network operations and information management components that comprise the Global Information Grid. Rather than disparate, isolated networks, the CRD will call for interoperable, accessible, secure, reliable, inter-networked capabilities to enable effective global military operations.
addition, the requirements generation system as a whole has been
strengthened with the rewrite of the Joint Staff instruction that governs
this process. It specifically
requires C4 interoperability in future systems be demonstrated at key
acquisition milestones. This
will improve the link between systems acquisition and end-to-end
interoperability in an operational context.
The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) along with the
Military Communications-Electronics Board (MCEB) and the new DoD Chief
Information Officer (CIO) Executive Board will collaborate throughout the
systems acquisition process to ensure capabilities are fielded that meet
CINC, Service and Joint interoperability requirements.
network performance is being enhanced through modeling and simulation.
The Network Warfare Simulation (NETWARS) initiative provides the
first modeling and simulation capability to assess the performance of the
Global Information Grid. The
Joint Staff-led NETWARS program was developed from a leading commercial
network simulation tool, OPNET. NETWARS
is being used today to model the effectiveness of operational plans using
the Global Information Grid as it currently exists.
Not only will we begin to assess the capability of our networks to
support specific Joint operations during the planning stage, but NETWARS
will help us understand where and how to employ advanced technologies to
expand and improve the Global Information Grid.
For example, NETWARS will help understand the extent to which a new
capability, such as the Advanced Wideband Satellite System, will improve
the performance of the Global Information Grid.
performance and radio frequency (RF) spectrum usage are inextricably
linked. Over the past year,
Congress has championed protection of the RF spectrum that is so critical
to military operations. You
have returned 8 Megahertz of previously reallocated spectrum for DoD use.
Under your scrutiny the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
reassigned 50 Megahertz to preserve contiguous bandwidth required by the
Navy’s Cooperative Engagement Capability - a program which provides
networked sensor capability to shooters.
These and similar initiatives saved hundreds of millions of dollars
for the Department and had a direct impact on our ability to employ and
protect our fighting forces. Thank you for your tenacity and objective assessment of our
and defending the Global Information Grid is a fundamental, mainstream
military imperative. Our
strategy for information assurance is one which employs multiple layers
that we call “defense in depth.”
This strategy establishes a set of minimum capabilities required
for each of the four levels of Defense in Depth: the network, the enclave,
the computing environment and the infrastructure.
These capabilities include automated and verifiable access control
of database and software applications as well as a department-wide policy
for virtual private network configurations.
They will enable the Department to keep pace with rapid
technological advances while allowing for the integration of legacy
equipment with existing capability. Procedural
changes are underway as well to take advantage of the technology currently
employed. We learned much from our experience with the most significant
threat to the Global Information Grid that we have ever experienced –
Y2K from both a technological as well as a procedural perspective.
We now have the tightest configuration control of the networks and
computer systems that we have ever had and we intend to maintain this
Department is well on its way to organizing the Global Information Grid
for combat operations. A
significant development in FY99 was the assignment of the Computer Network
Defense (CND) mission to USCINCSPACE through the Unified Command Plan (UCP)
99. This change
gave a Commander in Chief (CINC) the responsibility and authority to
protect and defend the Global Information Grid for assured operations and
mission success. The action
arm of USCINCSPACE is the Joint Task Force Computer Network Defense (JTF-CND)
operating here in Washington DC and co-located with the Global Network
Operations Systems Center (GNOSC) of the Defense Information Systems
Agency. The GNOSC can display
the operational picture of critical DoD networks worldwide. The
co-location of these two operations results in tremendous synergy and
synchronization. One of the success stories of placing the CND mission
under a CINC was the operationalizing of readiness conditions as they
apply to our worldwide networks. Global
Information Conditions or INFOCONs, are set by USCINCSPACE based on the
level of threat to the Global Information Grid.
Each INFOCON level requires specific actions by personnel at every
camp, post, base, station, and deployed unit.
This standardizes protection of this resource; a resource that is
only as strong as its weakest link.
ongoing Navigation Warfare (NAVWAR) initiative addresses potential
vulnerabilities to the Global Positioning System (GPS).
This initiative is a major step in assuring access to the Global
to the Global Information Grid come from technological as well as
procedural advances. There
has been much discussion about the challenges associated with exploiting
rapidly emerging technology. Let
me tell you about some of our successes using Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstrations (ACTDs), Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstrations (JWID),
the Joint C4ISR Battle Center and evolutionary acquisition processes.
currently have a Pilot Program in the Pacific that employs the information
dissemination management capabilities developed in the Battlefield
Awareness and Data Dissemination Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration
(ACTD). This capability will
allow Commanders to “pull” information from multiple sources on demand
as well as allow information sources to “push” critical information to
specific warfighters as required. The
Information Assurance: Automated Intrusion Detection Environment (IA:
AIDE) ACTD at U.S. Strategic Command promises to provide analysis and
warning of information attack by integrating and displaying data from
multiple intrusion detection sensors.
This capability will decrease time required to assess attacks on
our networks and help discriminate serious threats from casual hacking
Warrior Interoperability Demonstrations provide an opportunity for the
evaluation of emerging technology within a warfighting scenario to solve
interoperability problems. The
last demonstration focused on coalition interoperability and resulted in
establishing a coalition federated battlelab network that continues today. This network will allow further studies in the operation of a
secure network with our coalition partners.
Upon completion, warfighters identify the most promising, low cost
technologies for immediate fielding.
Examples of these “golden nuggets” include data compression,
collaborative planning tools, and secure information exchange
Joint C4ISR Battle Center (JBC) is focussed on assessing new and emerging
technologies to meet current and near-term CINC C4ISR requirements.
They measure the efficiency, effectiveness, and technical
feasibility of commercial products. For example, the Joint Battle Center evaluated and
recommended Rosetta technology as a near-term solution to tactical data
link interoperability problems. Once
deployed, this technology will help us provide the warfighter with a
consistent composite air/ground picture.
acquisition processes have been developed to leverage the advantages
offered by a technology that leaps ahead every 12-18 months. Our Global Command and Control System (GCCS) serves as the
model for this novel approach to acquisition.
The GCCS model, supported by the Defense Information Infrastructure
Common Operating Environment (DII COE) and the Joint Technical
Architecture (JTA), allows rapid insertion of applications which add value
to the warfighter. Tight
configuration control, stringent security and standard software are the
keys to GCCS. Our premier
command and control capability provides the warfighter with a fused, near
real-time common operational picture of the battlespace and the ability to
coordinate, direct and respond vertically and horizontally to prosecute
the mission. The lessons we
have learned in the GCCS program over the last three years are being
applied directly to the Global Combat Support System (GCSS) today – an
evolving capability whose utility was demonstrated during the war in
efforts to partner with Industry are proceeding along a number of fronts.
We have entered into an ongoing dialogue to address technological
advances in the satellite communications and computing arenas to increase
our understanding of how technology can improve our warfighting
capabilities, as well relaying our broad requirements for the future.
These technical exchange opportunities help pave the way for
capability development with an eye toward the feasible and the practical.
levels of funding for the components of the Global Information Grid must
be considered in relationship to the global capability as a whole.
The Global Information Grid satisfies requirements of tactical and
strategic missions in an integrated and complex end-to-end fashion.
Lack of funding in one area, such as connectivity or computers,
impacts the capability of the whole.
The Services and Agencies have submitted plans to provide
bandwidth, computing power, network operations, information assurance, and
applications as well as other related programs, all designed to achieve
the single goal of the Global Information Grid.
These funding requests approach our minimum requirements today
within the resources available. The Services’ budget requests are based on operational
requirements, many of which were highlighted in demonstrations and
experiments. The unifying
theme of the Global Information Grid provides a conceptual framework for
developing an investment strategy to achieve Information Superiority.
across Service experimentation efforts has given us insights into the
joint combat power enabled by the Global Information Grid. In the Army’s Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWEs)
tactical internets increased combat power by up to 250% as compared to a
non-networked environment. The
Air Force has demonstrated a 250% increase in the kill ratio of an F-15C
employing data links. The
Navy has demonstrated significant improvement in warfighting effectiveness
in the counter-Special Forces mission area.
Similar results have been seen in the Marine Corps.
capabilities highlight the key role of “the network” in enabling
Information Superiority and demonstrates that Information Superiority is
not just about technology, but about using people who use information to
develop a competitive advantage. This,
however, provides both challenges and opportunities.
is no shortage of challenges and opportunities in the Information
Superiority arena. Let me
outline a few of the ones we face, with a special emphasis on Information
The Military and
Commercial Sectors must co-exist. A
strong economy and a strong military are both increasingly dependent on
networks. In some
cases, our information rides through the same pipes. In other cases, we
are in contention for resources that cannot be shared, such as frequency
spectrum. To preclude mutual
interference, we continue to work with our civil, commercial and
international partners to preserve our access to RF spectrum.
As we move forward in deploying the Global Information Grid, we must
continue to balance investments in our satellite communications capacity.
Our objective is to determine the appropriate mix of military and
commercial capabilities to ensure worldwide coverage for our tactical and
strategic users. We are
entering an era of great technological improvements in the satellite
communications marketplace that provide significant promise for increased
capability for the warfighter.
working with coalition partners, we must accommodate multi-national
technologies, many of which are developed outside of the U.S.
Our challenge is to ensure interoperability of these different but
similar capabilities to ensure success with our coalition partners.
pointed out the need for more communications capacity in our theaters.
Thanks to some quick reaction by our Services and Agencies, we were able
to provide adequate communications capacity to support the Air war.
Had we been involved in a ground operation in Kosovo our
communications limitations would have impacted the conduct of operations.
Although we are working on ways to reduce the communications
demand, our need for bandwidth has grown dramatically in the last few
years because of the increased reliance on video teleconferencing,
real-time video, imagery and web-based technology.
We need your continued support in funding critical components of
the Global Information Grid, especially connectivity and computing power.
Information Assurance (IA) studies conducted over the past few
years have provided ample guidance in determining the technology required
for our defense in depth strategy. The
challenge before us is to apply precious resources to field capabilities.
We can’t afford to allow the “best” to get in the way of the
“good enough.” The
difficult part is determining the “good enough.”
we continue to operationalize information assurance, we will field
equipment and promulgate policies to optimize CINC-centric operations.
We are developing an Information Assurance Concept of Operations (CONOPs)
for the deployed environment. This
document will help standardize and professionalize IA in every Joint Task
Force we send to the field. We
are also orchestrating the deployment of a suite of equipment and software
to ensure Joint Task Force Commanders leave home with the right IA
capabilities to protect initial and follow-on operations rather than
evolving to some level of protection over time.
directed exercises and training are critical evolutions in
institutionalizing joint doctrine and TT&P associated with operating
and securing our critical networks, and maintaining our Global Information
Grid. Future exercises will
focus on specific cyber threats and risk mitigation techniques as well as
dynamic allocation of network resources.
We must expand these activities into the coalition training
are engaged in an aggressive validation of our current doctrine and
guidance documentation that provides the direction to the components of
the Global Information Grid. These
include two doctrinal publications, 22 policy and guidance instructions
and five detailed procedural manuals.
Particular emphasis is being paid to the Defense in Depth strategy
that directs the CINCs, Services and Agencies to put in place a minimum
set of capabilities for the network, enclave, computing environment and
the critical security infrastructure including use of Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) technology. Although
we are moving in the right direction, we are only moving as fast as the
Another area needing attention is our ability to “red team”—that is, allowing our technical experts to attack and exploit our own networks. These teams would act as independent assessors, able to show us our own vulnerabilities. Currently, however, the red teaming process is cumbersome and sometimes slow. As a result, there are very few “no-notice” red teaming efforts today. We must address the barriers that inhibit our ability to identify our own weaknesses before the enemy has the opportunity to exploit them.
DOD networks were not affected by the rash of recent attacks against
commercial web sites such as E-Bay and CNN, DoD continues to see an
ever-growing number of attacks against our information systems.
It is time to reevaluate the penalties associated with deliberate
hacking. The recent case law
developed from cases such as Melissa virus attacks, and numerous, highly
publicized hacking events provides enough evidence for the legal community
to review current laws to determine if they are sufficient to deter future
attacks against our systems.
cannot operate the Global Information Grid without people. We are using “special skill” rewards to attract, train,
and retain our best Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines.
However, our Total Force Information Technology Warriors are faced
with choosing between their military professions and opportunities in the
commercial sector that will compensate them at a much higher rate.
We must continue to assess our retention programs, proficiency pay,
and operational tempo, which affect these highly trained and experienced
people. They are truly our
Nation’s most precious resource.
we cannot view the command, control, communications and computers (C4)
systems and the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)
budgets as bill payers for traditional Weapon Systems, but rather as the
entry fee for the transformation that must be paid up front.
Ten to twenty years from now, I believe that people will look back on this period at the beginning of the 21st century and say one of two things. There was an tremendous opportunity for transformation – but it was squandered, because the key role of the Global Information Grid was not appreciated, or... there was a tremendous opportunity and it was capitalized upon by the DoD and Congress working together to make a difference.
conclusion, I believe we are making solid progress toward implementing a
Joint Strategy for Information Superiority that supports our Warfighters.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I look forward to
helping make the Information Superiority strategies that I have shared
with you this afternoon a reality, and to addressing you in the future
regarding our successes and way ahead.
On behalf of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I
appreciate the opportunity to present the Joint Staff's insights on how to
advance this issue of growing national importance – Information