Congressional Record: October 5, 2001 (House)
Page H6383-H6407
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call
up House Resolution 252 and ask for its immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:
H. Res. 252
Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this
resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 2(b) of rule
XVIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the
Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of
the bill (H.R. 2883) to authorize appropriations for fiscal
year 2002 for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the United States Government, the Community
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes. The
first reading of the bill shall be dispensed with. Points of
order against consideration of the bill for failure to comply
with clause 3(c) of rule XIII are waived. General debate
shall be confined to the bill and shall
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not exceed one hour equally divided and controlled by the
chairman and ranking minority member of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence. After general debate the bill
shall be considered for amendment under the five-minute rule.
It shall be in order to consider as an original bill for the
purpose of amendment under the five-minute rule the amendment
in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence now printed in the bill. The
committee amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be
considered by title rather than by section. Each title shall
be considered as read. Points of order against the committee
amendment in the nature of a substitute for failure to comply
with clause 7 of rule XVI are waived. No amendment to the
committee amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be in
order except those printed in the portion of the
Congressional Record designated for that purpose in clause 8
or rule XVIII and except pro forma amendments for the purpose
of debate. Each amendment so printed may be offered only by
the Member who caused it to be printed or his designee and
shall be considered as read. At the conclusion of
consideration of the bill for amendment the Committee shall
rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as
may have been adopted. Any Member may demand a separate vote
in the House on any amendment adopted in the Committee of the
Whole to the bill or to the committee amendment in the nature
of a substitute. The previous question shall be considered as
ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage
without intervening motion except one motion to recommit with
or without instructions.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, for the purposes of debate only, I yield the
customary 30 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Florida (Mr.
Hastings), my friend and colleague on Committee on Rules, pending which
I yield myself such time as I may consume. During the consideration of
this resolution, all time is yielded for purposes of debate only on
this matter, as is customary.
Mr. Speaker, this is a fairly traditional rule for this type of
legislation. As far as I know, it is not controversial in any way.
Given the September 11 terrorist attacks, some may have wondered why we
might not have responded with a closed rule on intelligence on a hurry-
up basis, which would have precluded the opportunity for a lot of
extensive deliberation under the extraordinary circumstances of the
moment, as we all recall them, tragically.
But on the contrary, we felt that in these tumultuous times, we
thought it best to allow Members the opportunity to fully review the
bill and debate the issues that they feel are important to our Nation's
security. Each of us, I know, feels that responsibility very strongly.
Therefore, as in past years, the rule is a modified open rule
providing for 1 hour of general debate, equally divided between the
chairman and ranking member of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence. The rule makes in order as an original bill for the
purpose of amendment the committee amendment in the nature of a
substitute now printed in the bill, which shall be considered by title
as read.
In addition, based on consultation with the Parliamentarian, the rule
waives points of order against the committee amendment for failure to
comply with clause 7 of rule XVI, the germaneness rule. It also waives
points of order against consideration of the bill for failure to comply
with clause 3(C) of rule XIII (requiring the inclusion of a statement
of general performance goals and objectives.)
The rule further provides for the consideration of only pro forma
amendments for the purpose of debate and those amendments printed in
the Congressional Record prior to their consideration, which may be
offered only by the Member who caused it to be printed or his designee,
and shall be considered as read.
This has allowed for vetting of amendments regarding classified
matters in years past, and proved to be a good practice, actually.
Finally, this rule provides for one motion to recommit, with or without
instructions.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of this fair rule and the
underlying legislation, as well. This is late in the year to bring this
bill to the House floor, but obviously the timing has been dictated by
forces well beyond the control of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence: We have a new administration, a comprehensive defense and
intelligence review ongoing, the delayed arrival of the budget request,
and of course, the tragic consequences of September 11, to name just a
few.
If there is a silver lining here, it is that in marking up this bill,
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has addressed many of
the immediate and critical intelligence needs in the wake of the
September 11 attacks on the United States.
In the upcoming general debate, no doubt we will discuss many of the
specific provisions in H.R. 2883 in some detail. That is the
intelligence authorization bill. But I would like to highlight a few of
the ways that this legislation seeks to tackle both critical
counterterrorism challenges, as well as long-term problems facing the
intelligence community in the United States in the 21st century.
To combat terrorism, the intelligence authorization increases
investments for the FBI's counterterrorism efforts, increases funding
for language training, promotes a more focused analytical effort
against the terrorist target, and it calls for a more aggressive
approach to learning the plans and intentions of terrorists through
human intelligence.
The war on terrorism will be won through the acquisition of specific,
accurate, and timely intelligence. The Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence has stepped up to provide the President, the State
Department, the Department of Defense, and President Bush's national
security team with the intelligence tools they will need to win this
war. That is one of the strong reasons I urge support for this
legislation.
However, we have also addressed the long-term needs of the
intelligence community, making specific changes today to avoid serious
problems in the years to come. H.R. 2883 provides the resources to
continue rebuilding our human intelligence capabilities; promotes
investment in new technologies for intelligence collection, processing,
and analysis; and it provides the committee's view on where future bold
changes need to be made in the basic structure of the U.S. intelligence
establishment.
I believe it is a very good bill. I think it is a fine rule. I
encourage support for both the bill and the rule.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
Mr. Speaker, it is a distinct, pleasure and honor to serve with the
gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) on both the Committee on Rules
and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this rule providing for the
consideration of H.R. 2883, the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2002, House Resolution 252. This is a modified open rule
requiring that amendments be preprinted in the Congressional Reocrd.
However, Mr. Speaker, the preprinting requirement has been the accepted
practice for a number of years because of the sensitive nature of much
of the bill and the need to protect its classified documents.
The bill is not controversial and was reported from the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence by a unanimous vote. I underscore that
in these times, since the events of September 11. The Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence is fully mindful of the extraordinary pain
suffered by the victims and all of us in America as it pertains to
those events. Thus, this year, this bill becomes as important as at any
time in America's history.
Members who wish to do so can go to the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence offices to examine the classified schedule of
authorizations for the programs and activities of the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the national intelligence program,
which includes the CIA as well as the foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence programs within, among others, the Department of
Defense; the National Security Agency; the Departments of State,
Treasury, and Energy; and the FBI.
Also included in the classified documents are the authorizations for
the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities and Joint Military
Intelligence Program of the Department of Defense.
Mr. Speaker, last week the House considered and passed the
authorization for the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2002. The
intelligence bill we consider today is another critical component in
our national defense.
[[Page H6385]]
Today, as I indicated earlier, more than ever we need to be vigilant
about the myriad threats to our national security.
Mr. Speaker, while there may be debate on a few worthy amendments,
this is a noncontroversial bill providing authorizations for important
national security programs. I urge my colleagues to support this rule
and to support the underlying bill.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Speaker, it is a bit of serendipity that the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Hastings) and I both do serve on the Committee on Rules
and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. And that is not by
design, but it is a great pleasure to work with my colleague.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr.
LaHood), a distinguished member of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence.
Mr. LaHOOD. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to
me.
First of all, I want to rise in support of the rule. I agree with the
two previous speakers, that this is a good rule and generally a very
good bill. I want to compliment, in particular, the chairman of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the gentleman from Florida
(Mr. Goss), for the hard work that he has been doing to really improve
the intelligence-gathering capability of our country.
The bill that we are going to consider today is a bill that has been
fashioned by his hand and after long hours of work. I think it is an
extraordinary bill that really reflects meeting the needs of the
intelligence community for America.
One other purpose for rising, not only to support the rule, is to
alert the House to my intention to offer an amendment to strike a
section of the bill, section 306, a provision that creates a
"Commission on Preparedness and Performance of the Federal Government
for the September 11 Acts of Terrorism."
America has responded to terrorism attacks of September 11 with
determination, compassion, and a resounding unity of purpose: the
defeat of international terrorism. To achieve this goal, Congress and
the administration are working to strengthen our defense intelligence
capability.
Our diplomats are building an international coalition to fight al
Qaeda and other terrorist organizations; and we are seeking ways to
bolster first responders, such as our dedicated police officers, fire
officials, firefighters, and paramedics, who will have to deal with the
aftermath of any future attacks. These are all positive, necessary, and
forward-looking actions.
It is my fear, though, that investing time and effort and money on a
commission designed to assign blame will be a giant step backwards.
There have been at least three high-profile commissions as recently as
a year ago on terrorism and homeland defense.
The problems that existed prior to September 11 have been well
documented, and the solutions outlined in great detail. I do not
believe that any other high-profile commission would add anything new
to our understanding of the problems or the solutions. We know what the
problems are, and we also know the solutions.
To compound the problem, the commission structure is flawed. It has
an agenda based on calling high profile people from the intelligence
community with great understanding before a group of people who have
little understanding of the intelligence community. I believe this sets
up potential conflicts that could do further damage to our ability to
gather intelligence about terrorists and disrupt their activities.
This is a bad idea. It is a bad idea because we have a lot of
information and we do not need a new commission. I hope that the
Members of the House, after they hear the debate on my amendment, will
support it and strike this provision.
We already possess the expertise and the authority to look at the
lessons learned from September 11. The gentleman from Illinois (Speaker
Hastert) and the Democratic leader, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr.
Gephardt), have taken the right action when they designated the
Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, chaired by the gentleman from Georgia (Mr.
Chambliss) and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), to
coordinate congressional review of terrorist threats.
The subcommittee has the expertise, the staff, and the ability to
review both classified and unclassified material, and the authority
through Congress to do the job. If we want to look back, if we want to
really analyze and examine, that is the subcommittee, that is the
jurisdiction that has the responsibility for doing this, not some kind
of an ad hoc commission with little or no expertise.
So I urge my colleagues to support the amendment that I will offer.
This is a good rule. I support the rule. This is a good bill. It is a
bill that, again, has been fashioned by one of the most distinguished
Members of the House, the chairman of our Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence; and I applaud him for that. I hope consideration will be
given to my amendment. I thank the chairman for his consideration of my
remarks.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may
consume to the distinguished gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi),
the ranking member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to
me.
Just very briefly, Mr. Speaker, I want to rise in support of the
rule. We have worked together to put together a bill which had
consensus under the leadership of our chairman, our distinguished
chairman, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss).
I think we should just move on to that debate about the bill and
about the commission and other considerations; but the rule is a rule
that is appropriate for this intelligence bill. It is in keeping with
past rules on the intelligence bills which were designed to protect
classified information, but to give every Member an opportunity to see
the classified part of the bill, although that is not part of the rule,
but to have their amendments printed in the Record in advance to
protect classified information.
I do not want to take any more time. It is Friday. We want to move on
to a full discussion of the bill and to general debate. I urge our
colleagues to support the rule.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Traficant).
(Mr. TRAFICANT asked and was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Speaker, America's soft underbelly was shown on
September 11. Now is the time to get down to business. I believe the
CIA and the FBI have been not only negligent; but, by God, I do not
think we have much of an intelligence program.
That is no slight or offense to the gentleman from Florida (Mr.
Goss), the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), or our
intelligence apparatus here in the House. I believe the editorial that
says that Mr. Tenet should step down is absolutely correct.
My amendment today deals with an issue that has been controversial,
to say the least. Mr. Speaker, we have one border patrol agent for
every two miles of border, and that does not include the Canadian
border. My God, a guerrilla force could cross our border with a nuclear
device and kill millions of Americans; and we have taken it lightly.
I think Congress had better take a close look at the national
security checkpoint of the United States, which is our border, and take
a look. A lot of people, I believe, are on the payroll who are not
doing their jobs.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my
time.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I
move the previous question on the resolution.
The previous question was ordered.
The resolution was agreed to.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaHood). Pursuant to House Resolution
252 and rule XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of
the Whole House on the State of the Union for consideration of the
bill, H.R. 2883.
[[Page H6386]]
{time} 0928
In the Committee of the Whole
Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill
(H.R. 2883) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2002 for
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other
purposes, with Mr. LaTourette in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having
been read the first time.
Under the rule, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi) each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss).
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, at the outset, let me thank the members of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, each and every one of them,
both sides of the aisle, for their very hard work, especially over the
past 3 weeks, which have been extremely trying for all of us and
certainly for our committee. The hard work in the last 3 weeks have
allowed us to get to this point where we have, I think, an excellent
piece of authorization legislation to bring to the House.
Mr. Chairman, we will hear from many of our Members over the next
hour. I would especially like to thank our ranking member, the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi) for extraordinary efforts in
ensuring that our thorough review of the President's budget put the
good of the Nation first in a manner that has been truly bipartisan
and, perhaps more appropriately, we should say nonbipartisan.
There are many other people to thank, of course, including our
amazing staff, and we will get to that by and by.
{time} 0930
Mr. Chairman, the bill before us is part of our normal annual
authorization by which by law must be passed in order for the
intelligence community to spend appropriated dollars. But the setting
in which we find ourselves today as we debate the bill is hardly
normal.
Over the debate, we surely will hear several references to the
infamous events of September 11 and the efforts to handle these and
other types of threats to Americans at home and abroad. There is no way
to overemphasize the importance of the demoniacal acts we witnessed.
They do bear tragic witness to how the world has changed and how
critical it is to have knowledge about our surroundings, about those
who have made it their life's quest to destroy American freedoms,
rights and values. That knowledge comes from intelligence, pure and
simple and we have to have it.
No one can seriously doubt that we need the best possible
intelligence to prosper and be safe at home and abroad in today's
world. There are some who believe that the September 11 terrorist acts
were successful because of, quote, "intelligence failures." I will
certainly agree there are intelligence community shortcomings, that
must be reviewed and fixed. That is what we do.
What went wrong relative to September 11 goes well beyond the
intelligence community however. Moreover, those who have complaints
often do not understand what threats we actually face today, what
capabilities we really do have and do not have, and, more importantly,
what vital distinctions exist between intelligence and law enforcement
and how we cope with those distinctions.
The intelligence community operates overseas and cannot arrest
anyone. Law enforcement is domestic and does not do spying; and somehow
we have to have a good marriage of the two. If we look back over the
past 6 years worth of our authorizations, we will see that the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence have consistently
highlighted shortfalls and concerns calling on the administration to
take action so that risks to our security could be reduced, not removed
but reduced.
Certainly our committee was stunned and deeply saddened by the events
of September 11 as we all were. We were aware homeland America was
vulnerable to terrorist attack of some type from some quarter, and we
were and are aware of limitations of our intelligence system to provide
specifics or better early warning or 100 percent guarantees.
This bill again addresses ways to overcome some of those limitations.
The solutions that get us the intelligence community that we need to
protect our future must be new and it must be innovative. This bill
starts us on that course while sending I think a good message to the
administration about how to do it. We are working closely with the
administration to translate these ideas into real capabilities which
will protect Americans.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume
and rise in support of H.R. 2883.
At the outset I want to commend our chairman, the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Goss), our distinguished chairman, for the manner in which
he conducted the committee's business. His willingness to be sensitive
to the views of committee Democrats and to ensure they are reflected in
the work of the committee is much appreciated. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Chairman, the bill was prepared in the aftermath of the horrific
events of September 11, but it is not a comprehensive response to them.
Some additional resources in areas where these events demonstrated an
obvious need are provided, but it will take more time and more facts
before we can, or should, go further. At this point one thing is clear.
We did not know about the plans of the terrorists who attacked our
country with sufficient specificity to prevent those attacks. What is
not clear is why.
In the weeks ahead much time will be devoted in the intelligence
community and elsewhere in trying to determine why we did not know,
but, more especially, to prevent anything like this from happening
again.
Mr. Chairman, I have tremendous respect for the men and women who
serve in our national security agencies, whether they be diplomats,
military personnel, intelligence officers, law enforcement officials or
those who protect our borders and our skies. They perform with great
courage and dedication under conditions which are routinely challenging
and frequently dangerous, and they have had much successes combatting
terrorism. They just cannot talk about their successes.
As the events of September 11 demonstrate, however, more needs to be
done. Determining the best steps to take to lessen the chances that
last month's events could be repeated will require critical and
innovative thinking. I am hopeful that the independent commission
established by Section 306 of the bill will play a constructive role in
that regard.
For intelligence needs generally the bill provides several billion
dollars more than appropriated last year and several hundred million
dollars more than requested by the President for fiscal year 2002. It
continues several initiatives begun earlier, among them an effort to
ensure that the technologically complex and expensive information
collection systems that have been developed are paired with effective
systems to process, exploit and disseminate intelligence to those who
need it to make decisions or to take actions.
There is currently an imbalance between collection and processing,
exploitation and dissemination that, if not addressed, will greatly
lessen the value of some extremely capable collection systems.
To be effective, our human intelligence officers need to have a
better grounding in the languages and cultures of the regions where
difficult targets, like terrorists, are most comfortable. A much
greater emphasis needs to be placed on recruiting and maintaining a
workforce with diverse skills, backgrounds and ethnicity. This is an
area in which the intelligence community as not been as aggressive as I
would like. I hope for measurable improvement in the future with the
encouragement and resources provided by the bill.
There have been suggestions in recent years that an insufficient
emphasis has been placed on human intelligence. That has certainly not
been
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true with respect to the work of this committee. Funds have been
consistently provided above those requested for this intelligence
discipline, and the committee has sought to ensure that the added funds
were used exclusively to enhance the performance of clandestine
collectors in the field.
Human intelligence was once again the focus of our work this year,
and that would have been true even if the events of September 11 had
not occurred.
There have been concerns that case officers have been discouraged
from taking the risks necessary to recruit assets with access to
important information, particularly in areas like narcotics
trafficking, weapons proliferation and terrorism.
Attention has centered on guidelines promulgated in the CIA in 1995
which require headquarters-level approval before an individual with a
record of human rights abuses or violations of U.S. criminal law may be
recruited. These guidelines were intended to protect officers in the
field from charges that they had committed the United States to a
relationship with unsavory individuals without adequate consideration.
Despite repeated assurances from senior CIA officials that these
guidelines had not had a negative impact on the quality or quantity of
assets, it has become clear that the perception that the opposite was
true has taken root.
Section 403 of the bill deals with that perception by directing the
guidelines be rescinded. It is very important, however, that there be
some rules in this area, not because anyone is so naive as to believe
that we can get more information about the plans of drug traffickers or
terrorists without associating with individuals involved in those
activities, but because decisions about committing the United States to
those kinds of associations are too important to be made exclusively by
relatively junior officers in the field.
They should be made, instead, by senior managers better able by
virtue of their experience and their access to reporting from a wide
variety of sources, to weigh the potential value of the information to
be provided by a possible recruit against the potential harm to the
United States should the fact of our association with that person
become known.
That kind of risk versus gain analysis is essential if human
intelligence activities are to be seen as consistent, rather than at
odds with, U.S. policy and values.
Section 402, besides rescinding the current guidelines, directs that
new guidelines be established. It is my expectation these new
guidelines will streamline the approval process without weakening the
protections that process is meant to provide. I especially want to
commend our colleague, the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter) for
his leadership in this area and his willingness to reach consensus with
us on it. I think the language of this bill is an improvement on the
past and I thank him for his leadership and his cooperation.
Mr. Chairman, intelligence is a risky, dangerous and expensive
undertaking. It is also crucial to our security as a Nation. I urge the
adoption of the bill.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield as much time as he may consume to the
distinguished gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Bereuter), the chairman of
one of our subcommittees of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence.
(Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, as vice-chairman of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence and the chair of the Subcommittee on
Intelligence Policy and National Security, this Member rises in the
strongest possible support for H.R. 2883.
This Member congratulates and commends the chairman of the committee,
the distinguished gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) for his
extraordinary leadership in preparing a bipartisan bill that was
approved unanimously by the committee. Under his guidance, this body is
preparing to move rapidly to address a number of long-standing
deficiencies in our intelligence collection and analysis.
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has not suddenly
awakened to the very real inadequacies of the intelligence agencies and
programs of our government and the financial resources and legislative
tools they need. As Chairman Goss has said on numerous occasions: "The
message is not new; the audience is new."
The American people understand now, through tragedy, that our
intelligence and counterterrorism programs are extremely important.
With that in mind, this Member congratulates the chairman and my
colleagues on the committee for the clear and decisive message sent by
this legislation. I also congratulate the ranking member of the
committee, the distinguished gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi),
for her assistance in crafting this bipartisan legislative product.
The committee comes before this body today in an amazing degree of
unanimity regarding our concept of the terrorist threat, among other
threats to our national security, and for the necessary intelligence
community response. This level of bipartisanship is a tribute to the
gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and the gentlewoman from California
(Ms. Pelosi).
Mr. Chairman, the cowardly and horrific terrorist attack of September
11 highlighted for our citizens and the world the fact that we live in
a new world, a world where many of our commonly held assumptions about
security and safety are being re-examined. Even before the attacks on
the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, the Bush administration had
embarked upon a comprehensive review of U.S. intelligence policy, led
by the retired Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft and the deputy
director of Central Intelligence for Community Management, Joan
Dempsey.
Obviously, this intelligence review has assumed an even greater
importance and urgency, for ultimately the outcome in this war in which
we find ourselves will be determined by the quality of our
intelligence. The review is not yet complete, and the executive branch
has not firmly established the criteria and emphases that will guide us
in the 21st century. However, this bill provides much of the important
guidance to ensure that its policies can quickly be implemented.
This committee's task has been made particularly difficult because in
the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, there naturally
is, in some quarters, a desire to find a simple solution, a quick fix.
Certainly the legislation before this body today provides much needed
additional funds to improve our intelligence capabilities and to wage
the war against terrorism.
At a more fundamental level, H.R. 2883 seeks to respond to serious
policy and structural problems. In some cases, these are problems that
have been years in the making and will take a long time to turn around.
For example, there is, within the intelligence community, a critical
shortage of language specialists that are particularly relevant in a
war against terrorism. The legislation before this body today seeks to
further address the language shortage and to facilitate the recruitment
of native speakers drawn from the various relevant ethnic American
communities.
Similarly, this bill continues the committee's longstanding and
urgent needs for increased support for human intelligence collection.
Human intelligence, or HUMINT, is the placement of highly trained,
language capable officers into positions where they can acquire
information vital to our national interest. Our HUMINT capability was
decimated by former Director Stansfield Turner, and in the years
following the end of the Cold War.
Also, our human intelligence collection effort was understandably
directed during the Cold War period at collection on the Soviet Union
and its client states, not on Africa, Latin America, the Middle East,
South Asia, and especially not on the problems of terrorism and
narcotics trafficking. This is a resource problem, while long
emphasized by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, it is a
problem now all too apparent. This legislation continues the
committee's effort to address this deficiency but with more emphasis.
Mr. Chairman, H.R. 2883 also reverses the 1995 limitations on asset
recruitment. These restrictions, called "the Deutsch guidelines,"
were promulgated
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as a means to limit our association with unsavory characters with human
rights or other criminal problems. While the concern underlying these
guidelines was certainly understandable, the reality is that the
Deutsch guidelines have had a chilling effect on the recruitment of
people who can actually and effectively penetrate the inner circle of
the terrorist cells and networks and the narcotics rings.
The recruitment of assets with unique knowledge or access to these
terrorists and drug cartels is the key to successful HUMINT in this
area. The regrettable real world reality is that, certainly in the
crucial battle against terrorism and drug rings, we must allow our
foreign officers to recruit assets that are some rather unsavory
characters. To break the back of the al Qaeda terrorist network, we
will, in all likelihood, have to recruit individuals who are already
influential members of al Qaeda, who themselves have committed acts of
terror.
To win the war on terrorism we have to end the cycle of risk
aversion. Recruiting the equivalent of A-1 grade boy scouts or straight
arrows will not give us the penetration and the intelligence we need.
In many cases, there will be difficult decisions to make, but the
United States has professionals and intelligence and law enforcement
fields who can and must make those decisions. This legislation makes it
clear that the foreign intelligence personnel can recruit those
individuals who possess the information the United States needs to
defend its people and its interests. There will be checks and balances
put in place, but even though some of these assets will go bad, we need
to be careful about our criticism. If the risks are realistically
weighed against the chances of operational success, this body must not
rashly second-guess those decisions.
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this legislation, and
again, I commend the Chairman, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss),
and the ranking member, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi),
for their leadership and all of my colleagues who have contributed so
much to this legislation.
Our staff, of course, is outstanding. Certainly it continues to be
among the very best in the Congress, and we owe a great deal of our
success in bringing this legislation to our staff. They are crucial.
They are competent. My colleagues should have every confidence in them
as we do.
{time} 0945
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the
gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Bishop), a distinguished member of our
committee and a ranking member on the Subcommittee on Technical and
Tactical Intelligence.
Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me
this time.
No one yet knows why we did not receive warning of this tragedy, and
indeed whether such warning could have been acquired in this instance
short of some stroke of luck. We must answer those questions in order
to do better. But that will take time of course.
I commend the chairman and the gentlewoman from California (Ms.
Pelosi), our ranking member, as well as all my colleagues on the
committee for thinking hard about what steps should appropriately be
taken in this bill in the short time available between September 11 and
today, and as the executive branch prepares for its upcoming global
campaign. I believe the committee took sensible steps to mandate
changes where needs and solutions seemed clear, and to inform the
executive branch of issues and problems that as of now we think must be
addressed in the coming months and years.
Intelligence is clearly important to every step in the
counterterrorism campaign: trying to detect plans and preparations,
attempting to interdict the terrorists and their equipment and funds,
helping the recovery from an attack, tracking down the perpetrators and
striking back at them. I serve as the ranking member of the
subcommittee overseeing the intelligence community's technical
collection systems, such as satellites and aircraft and other means to
take pictures and listen to communications. These systems contribute to
all phases of counterterrorism.
Besides human intelligence, signals intelligence offers the greatest
potential to discern the plans and intentions of terrorists. It is well
known that NSA, the largest and most important element of our SIGINT
system, is handicapped by technical and management problems. The
committee, for several years, has been trying to work with the
executive branch to overcome these problems. It remains to be seen
whether NSA's present difficulties played any role in our ability to
get wind of this attack. The bill before the House sustains our
emphasis on instilling rigor in NSA's program management processes and
improves significant increases in resources.
Imagery can provide good information on terrorists' infrastructure
and training activities, but not on plans. Imagery also provides
critical support to operations against terrorists because it can help
to track them, to target them, to assess the effects of military
strikes. The National Imagery and Mapping Agency, like NSA, has for
years suffered from lack of expertise and program planning and
management, and inadequate support from the DCI and Secretary of
Defense. In particular, NIMA clearly has insufficient funds to meet
even the minimum performance goals set for it by the intelligence
community and the Defense Department. The committee, once again, is
recommending steps to help remedy these changes.
I point out also that NIMA and its predecessors have always helped in
recovery from disasters, whether natural or man-made. The relationships
with FEMA and the State and local governments are strong and efficient.
Contributions to homeland security in the future will be very
substantial, in partnership with the Geological Survey.
Before September 11, the administration was exploring new approaches
to satellite intelligence collections. The committee agrees that these
ideas need to be looked at carefully, especially in light of new
changes.
Mr. Chairman, in the interest of time, I will confine the balance of
my remarks to border security.
As I think all of us understand by now, there is virtually no
inspection of cargo entering the country by ship, rail, and truck. It
is in practice very difficult to expand inspections substantially using
current methods. We must instead use new information technologies and
sensing technologies and forge new ways of inspecting and securing
cargoes in cooperation with industry and trading partners.
The bill begins to address this issue. It adds money to begin
acquiring a capability to identify and track merchant ships. It also
provides funds and direction to various executive branch agencies and
Departments, including the Department of State, to expand cargo
tracking capabilities. Finally, the bill would authorize funds to test
new technology to detect dangerous and illegal material and any kind of
container rapidly and automatically.
The bill does not provide explanations or a cure for the crisis we
are in, but it does provide the basis for conducting the coming
campaign, sustaining our position with respect to all our other
intelligence requirements, and preparing for future improvements. I
urge its adoption.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Georgia (Mr. Chambliss), who is the chairman of our Working Group on
Terrorism and Homeland Security.
(Mr. CHAMBLISS asked and was given permission to revise and extend
his remarks.)
Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman for his work that
he has done on this bill, and to our ranking member, the gentlewoman
from California (Ms. Pelosi). It has been a great bipartisan effort. I
rise in support of H.R. 2883, the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2002.
As chairman of the committee's new Working Group on Terrorism and
Homeland Security, and as a former firefighter, I have had a particular
interest in ensuring the swift passage of this critically important
bill before us today. There is much in this bill that enhances our
Nation's counterterrorism capabilities, and I will address some of
these provisions in just a moment.
In the aftermath of the tragic terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001, the President came here and told us that America is at war. He
mentioned
[[Page H6389]]
the new battlefield we have now to navigate as a Nation. It is a
battlefield that is not clearly defined and that will often be devoid
of clear targets. It is a battlefield that stretches across the globe
and involves a complex support network, false documents, illicit
financial transactions, and fanatical individuals who are willing to
commit suicide to further their twisted causes, whatever they may be.
On this new battlefield, conventional weapons and conventional
thinking will not be sufficient, nor will a fortress mentality ensure
adequate protection for our citizens both here and abroad. We can
better secure our embassies and our military bases, and we have been
and should continue to do this. But as we saw on September 11, the
terrorists will always search for and find that weak spot, that chink
in our armor that makes us vulnerable; and in a free society, there
will necessarily be weak spots. Therefore, we need to recognize what
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has recognized for some
time, and that is that intelligence rules this battlefield like never
before.
Intelligence is the only way in which we will get at this problem. It
is the only way in which we can discover the plans and intentions of
the enemy, thwart his efforts to attack us, and locate him so that we
can punish him swiftly and decisively when he manages to get through
our defenses.
H.R. 2883 addresses a number of key shortfalls in the capability of
our intelligence and law enforcement communities to combat terrorism.
The bill substantially increases investments for FBI counterterrorism
capabilities. It increases funding for language training across the
intelligence community. A lack of linguists with fluency in languages
spoken by most terrorists has plagued the intelligence and law
enforcement communities and must be addressed more decisively than ever
before.
H.R. 2883 also promotes a more focused analytical effort against the
terrorist target. More and better threat analysis needs to be applied
to all forms of threat reporting to give us the maximum chance for
piecing together the puzzle that might help us to avert attacks such as
occurred on September 11. This bill makes analysis a top priority.
The capabilities of CIA's counterterrorism center, our first line of
defense overseas, also have been significantly augmented by provisions
contained in this bill. Our subcommittee, headed by myself and my
colleague, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), has been
working very hard, very diligently, not only on the September 11
incident but on other issues involving international terrorism and
homeland security, and this bill gives us more flexibility. I urge
support for 2883.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the very
distinguished gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman), just praised by
her colleague, the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Chambliss). She is the
ranking member, as was mentioned, on the Working Group on Terrorism and
Homeland Security of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
(Ms. HARMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend her
remarks.)
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the ranking member for yielding me
this time and for her graciousness, and also thank the chairman of the
full committee and the chairman of the Working Group on Terrorism and
Homeland Security for their bipartisanship and professionalism at all
times on this committee.
Mr. Chairman, intelligence is a field in which I have worked for many
years and in several different capacities. I was privileged to serve on
this committee during my prior tenure in Congress and welcomed my
reappointment. I represent a district where the Nation's sophisticated
intelligence satellites are built, and served on the congressionally
mandated National Commission on Terrorism, which made important
recommendations in June of last year.
I have long been critical of the ad hoc ways in which our
intelligence community has operated; how a community built with Cold
War priorities was ill prepared to meet the challenges of the 21st
century. On September 11, everything and everyone changed. But let me
be clear: the men and women in our intelligence agencies are as
devastated as the rest of America by the horrific attacks against our
homeland. These are good and talented people who work in an
organizational structure and under a Cold War-era culture that needs to
change. Today, we take the fundamental steps necessary to change both
the structure and the culture.
As my committee colleagues have said, the bill directly addresses
shortfalls in the intelligence community's counterterrorism efforts,
intelligence collection and analysis, and threat reporting. It revamps
and reinvigorates our intelligence agencies. The bill provides new
tools and resources for preventing terrorism and supporting our Armed
Forces in future conflicts. This bill authorizes aggressive recruitment
of human assets, makes significant investments in foreign language
capabilities, and unravels the knots that have impeded the sharing and
integration of intelligence information and analysis across all levels
of government.
We have removed many of the stovepipes that have characterized the
organizational structures of our intelligence community and worked to
substitute a more seamless integration of responsibilities and
missions.
Mr. Chairman, once this bill passes, we still have more to do. The
Working Group on Terrorism and Homeland Security, of which, as you
heard, I am ranking member, has an aggressive agenda of public
hearings, classified briefings/hearings, visits, and possibly
legislative action. I believe we must pass the legislation that six
committee Members introduced yesterday to give Cabinet-level status and
budgetary authority to Pennsylvania Governor Ridge, who assumes his new
job as Director of the Office of Homeland Security on Monday.
Mr. Chairman, the events of September 11 will be an ever-present
reminder of the threats we now face. Reform starts today. I urge
support of this legislation.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to the
distinguished gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Castle), who is chairman of
our Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence.
Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time, and I also rise in strong support of the intelligence
authorization bill.
As chairman of the Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical
Intelligence, I have had the opportunity to closely review the
President's intelligence budget request and participate in the creation
of this bill. I should note that our review occurred both before and
after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
There is no question that in the wake of these heinous attacks on
America and the world there were some significant changes made to this
legislation and some additional funds that are recommended. However, I
would offer that, on the whole, this bill changed very little from the
direction it was headed prior to September 11. Even before the attacks,
the committee had taken some very tough positions with respect to the
form and function of the United States intelligence community. Indeed,
the committee has, over the past 6 years, tried to persuade the
administration to more properly fund the Nation's first line of
defense, that is, its intelligence community.
However, the fact is since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet
Union, too little funding priority has been given to our national
intelligence functions. Many intelligence needs have been left wanting
for lack of funding, and the Congress has been forced to intercede in
an effort to begin to rebuild our human and technical intelligence
collection and analysis capabilities.
{time} 1000
Our focus was on changing the Cold War footing to one that is more
flexible and adaptable to the new world order threats.
Prior to the attacks, our funding efforts were limited to working
"at the edges" of many the problems, because we had to live within a
set of artificial constraints. After the attacks, however, the
gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) and the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Pelosi), had to "take off the gloves."
With their superb leadership, we crafted a bill which took on tough
and
[[Page H6390]]
seemingly intractable problems with additional funding authorizations
necessary to begin to make a real difference.
Mr. Chairman, the post September 11 bill before us makes a real
difference. It recommends significant funding to gain, train, and
maintain a quality workforce. There is increased funding for language
instruction and follow-on maintenance training. It recommends:
Additional funding for counterterrorism analysis and focused regional
studies; significant additions for processing, exploiting, and
disseminating the vast amount of data that we collect around the world;
investments in a more dynamic and flexible technical collection
architecture for the future; and a down payment on replacing one of our
most critical, but aging, ballistic missile intelligence collection
systems.
Mr. Chairman, this is a good bill; and I recommend support of it by
everybody in this Chamber.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Condit) who is the ranking member on the Subcommittee
on Policy and National Security, a new subcommittee of our committee.
(Mr. CONDIT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. CONDIT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this bipartisan
authorization act. In the wake of the tragic attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon, nothing is more timely than addressing the
needs of the intelligence community.
Nothing is clearer to me than the need to increase our resources in
the area of human intelligence and highly skilled analysts and people
with specialties in foreign languages. The bill encourages the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to invest in the
intelligence capital by pushing recruitment efforts and funding
advanced training programs. It will help increase our ranks of human
intelligence collectors, the critical key in gaining precise
information on terrorist organizations. It is critical that we not only
increase the number of intelligence gathering analysts, but we must
also provide them with the tools to do the job.
This bipartisan bill will provide our intelligence community with the
assets that they need to wage an aggressive campaign against terrorism.
I commend the chairman and the ranking member for their leadership in
this area. I would like to thank the chairman for his openness to take
suggestions from our side of the aisle and to make this a strong
bipartisan effort. I would commend both of them for their efforts.
I rise in strong support of this bipartisan authorization act. In the
wake of the tragic attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon,
nothing is more timely than addressing the significant issues facing
the intelligence community. We must provide direction, resources and
guidelines to carry out the crucial mission of providing intelligence
to policy makers and our armed forces.
As the ranking member of the Intelligence Policy and National
Security Subcommittee nothing is clearer to me than the need to
increase our resources in the area of human intelligence and highly
skilled analysts. We are experiencing an information revolution. Events
transpire today on a global scale faster than we ever imagined making
our need to collect, interpret and exploit gathered intelligence
paramount.
This bill encourages the intelligence community to invest in
intellectual capital by pushing recruitment efforts and funding
advanced training programs. It will help increase our ranks of human
intelligence collectors--the critical keys to gaining precise
information on terrorist organizations. Alarming as it may seem, we
currently are in a situation where there is more information available
than our analysts can review. Given the most recent attacks on the
United States, that is an unconscionable position to find ourselves in.
It is critical that we not only increase the number of intelligence
gatherers and analysts but we must also provide them the tools to do
their job.
In May, the subcommittee reviewed intelligence sharing with our NATO
allies. I would add this review was very useful after Operation Allied
Force--the 1999 Kosovo air campaign. During that campaign, the
intelligence community shared critical information such as bomb damage
assessment and force protection intelligence with our NATO allies. We
investigated the sharing process and procedures to ensure both the
protection of classified material and a timely, seamless sharing of
intelligence with our allies. In the current campaign against global
terrorism, these procedures will continue to be vital to NATO military
operations and our own national security.
In June, in conjunction with the Subcommittee on Terrorism and
Homeland Security, we heard testimony on terrorism. As a member of the
Terrorism and Homeland Security subcommittee, we are currently holding
a series of open meetings on this important topic.
Make no mistake, though we have been aggressively pursuing the
terrorist threat--and in fact, our intelligence community has disrupted
many planned acts of terrorism--it is clear the threat is growing at an
alarming rate in terms of its infrastructure and in its sophistication.
This bill supports key efforts by our national security agencies to
counter these realities.
I commend Chairman Goss and Ranking Member Pelosi for their
leadership and for producing a bipartisan bill that will strengthen our
national security. I urge my colleagues to support this bill.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Cunningham), a valued member of our committee.
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I came on this committee thinking I was
going to show them something. They have taught me. It is a bipartisan
committee. It works very, very well; and I would like to thank the
gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) and the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Pelosi). I should have known better, one can always
learn something from a good woman.
On this particular committee, there is so much information out there
that a Member can always learn a lot. I also want to thank the staff.
Many of the staff were former members from our intelligence community.
Twenty-four hours a day they will sit and brief Members on any area in
the classified area, and I recommend that Members do that more.
I would also like to talk about the defense budget. It is about $200
billion in the deficit primarily because of the 124 deployments that
our services were asked to go on during the last administration. If one
transposes that over to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
they had to deploy 124 times along with the military. That funding
deficit caused them the inability to modernize the systems and
equipment that all of us say that they need to do their job.
When I hear some Members, especially from the other body, criticize
our intelligence agencies, remember that they did not have the assets.
They were denied modernization. Personally, I think they are doing a
good job.
I would like to speak to the chairman of the committee. I understand
that block 5, long-lead funding for Global Hawk, was eliminated in
this, but the chairman has full commitment to support the Global Hawk
and Predator programs. Is that correct?
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, that is correct.
Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Florida.
Those assets, to know where the enemy is, is very, very important. In
January 1972, we were told that there were no SAM sites over the
hourglass just south of Hanoi. We did not have the reconnaissance
assets that we needed. We went in to strike that target by the
hourglass. We lost six airplanes because we did not have that
knowledge. The Predator and Global Hawk gives us that knowledge.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Indiana (Mr. Roemer), a valued member of our committee.
(Mr. ROEMER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, first of all, before even September 11, I
want to applaud the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) and the
ranking member, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi), for
working in a bipartisan way even before that tragic event. I also thank
the very talented staff that we have in this committee for working in a
bipartisan manner as well.
Francis Bacon once said, "He who will not apply new remedies, must
expect new evils." I have encouraged, as this committee has
encouraged, new ways to reorganize and restructure our culture and our
targeting in the intelligence community. In the culture, we
[[Page H6391]]
need to push reforms and new ideas even more, to move from a culture
that targets sometimes too often nation states, militaries, to a
culture that will promote targeting sinister and seamless cell groups
of terrorists. We need to move a culture from guards and guns and gates
to a culture of targeting tents and terrorism and technology. That is
the kind of reform that we need in this bill.
We are moving in that direction. We have an independent commission in
this bill. We have emphasis on foreign language skills. We have more
emphasis on HUMINT, human spies telling us where people's motivations
and targets are; and we have more money for counterterrorism.
I have worked hard on the foreign language skill area, and on page 19
of the report we state, "Written materials can sit for months, and
sometimes years, before a linguist with proper security clearances and
skills can begin a translation."
We are providing aggressive recruiting for new employees,
particularly those with ethnic and language backgrounds needed by the
intelligence community. We are providing additional language
incentives, especially in the toughest, most critical languages. We are
providing increases in funding in counterterrorism for the FBI
counterterrorism program, the DCI's counterterrorism program, and
HUMINT collection.
Mr. Chairman, we need to do more. While I applaud the bipartisan
nature of this committee, while I warmly applaud some of the reforms in
this bill, I will be reserved as I watch the process go through the
conference later with the Senate to encourage, to push reform, not to
lay blame, not to blame individuals where we have so many brilliant and
talented people in the CIA and other communities, but to push the
reforms needed to change the culture, the target, and the organization
that is so critical for us to defend our homeland.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra).
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, first I would like to offer my strong
support for the fiscal year 2002 intelligence authorization bill. I
believe it is a good, bipartisan product that addresses both the urgent
short-term needs, as well as the long-term rebuilding requirements in
human and signals intelligence.
As a relatively new member of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, I would like to address just a portion of the bill which
I think is very, very critical. It comes out of the tragic incident of
April 20, 2001 when the Peruvian military, relying on information
provided by the U.S. Government, mistakenly shot down a civilian
airplane as part of a drug interdiction operation. Two innocent
Americans, constituents of mine, lost their lives due to this error.
In an effort to ensure that this type of incident does not occur
again, I have worked closely with the gentleman from Florida (Chairman
Goss) and the committee to secure greater accountability from the
executive branch with respect to the oversight of these
counternarcotics activities. Section 504 amends current law relating to
the immunity of employees and agents of the United States and foreign
countries engaged in the interdiction of drug trafficking aircraft.
Under this section, the President will annually certify to Congress
both the existence of a drug threat in the country at issue and the
existence in that country of the appropriate procedures to protect
against innocent loss of life.
If our drug interdiction efforts in Latin America are intended to
protect the American people from the threat of narcotics, we need to be
sure that the methods we use do not create more innocent victims like
the Bowers family.
Mr. Chairman, I congratulate the gentleman from Florida (Chairman
Goss) and the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi) on an excellent
bipartisan bill.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Texas (Mr. Reyes), another valued member of our committee.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding me this
time.
Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) and
the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi) for developing a bill that
is designed to meet the intelligence challenges that our Nation is
facing at a critical point in our history. Their leadership on critical
intelligence issues has been extremely important to all of us on the
committee, in particular to those of us that are on the committee for
the first time.
The gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) and the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Pelosi) have recently been the focus of the press.
However, it is important to note, Mr. Chairman, that everyone here
knows that both the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi) and the
gentleman from Florida (Chairman Goss) have been working behind the
scenes for years on critical intelligence issues. I thank them for
their continued commitment to our Nation and the intelligence system
that we rely on so heavily.
In a number of hearings that we have had in the committee, I
expressed two very important observations. First, the intelligence
community needs to pay attention to the diversity that is so critical
and representative of our Nation. Both the chairman and the ranking
member have been very supportive on that issue.
Secondly, as some of the other Members have mentioned, the emphasis
on language diversification is vitally important as we face the
challenges in today's intelligence gathering and analysis world.
We need analysts and case officers with language skills and expertise
in many foreign areas. At the NSA and the CIA, thousands of pieces of
data are never analyzed or analyzed after the fact because there are
too few analysts and even fewer with the necessary language skills.
This is a deficiency that must be corrected immediately.
Our bill provides bonuses to intelligence employees of the CIA and
the Pentagon who are fluent in languages of the toughest and most
important targets that we face as a Nation. It is clear that we must do
more, and this bill takes the necessary steps to provide the tools
necessary for the intelligence community. I urge all Members to support
a strong bipartisan bill.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New
York (Mr. Boehlert).
(Mr. BOEHLERT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, I am constrained, and understandably so,
in dealing with the specifics of this bill in terms of dollars and
numbers. I would urge all of my colleagues to follow the suggestion of
the chairman and the ranking member to visit the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence to get the classified briefing and to examine
the figures for themselves.
Mr. Chairman, let me stress this to my colleagues. This is a very
good bill because it provides more resources for people, for our human
intelligence, for our eyes and ears around the world. More resources to
add to their numbers and their training, with particular emphasis in
language capabilities.
Our dedicated and well-trained linguists who are case officers and
covert operatives and intelligence operatives are critically important
to operations. They are the essential people part of the equation.
{time} 1015
They are the essential people part of the equation. All the
sophisticated technical means in the world, the satellites in the
heavens and the specialty electronic devices all over every place are
important, but there is no substitute for people. And, quite frankly,
with linguistic skills, there simply are not enough of them. This bill
recognizes that and supports additional funding directed to the Defense
Language Institute. This funding is targeted for linguistic training,
not just for the training, but also for the recruitment and retention
of proficient instructors. It promotes computer-based training to keep
those skills honed, and aims at keeping those classes fully populated
with the best and the brightest.
Let me stress, there is no substitute for the people part of this
equation. The dedicated men and women in the intelligence community who
are serving this Nation at distant points in the globe are to be
applauded and supported and we do just that.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the
distinguished gentleman from Iowa (Mr.
[[Page H6392]]
Boswell) who serves as the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Human
Intelligence, Analysis and Counterintelligence of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence.
(Mr. BOSWELL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BOSWELL. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say to whoever is
listening that it is my observation in my few months on this committee
that we have outstanding leadership with our chairman and ranking
member, and I really appreciate it, and I hope all America does. In my
former life as a teacher at the command general staff college at the
Department of Tactics, I want to assure you that I am aware and I want
you to be aware that intelligence is something you have to have. You
have to have reliable information before you act.
And I want to tell you this, that I have made also the observation
that we have dedicated and professional men and women who work in this
community. Nevertheless, the horrendous attacks acts of September 11
require us to think hard about how U.S. intelligence is gathered,
analyzed and disseminated so that we are sure intelligence is providing
the very best first line of defense for our country.
As the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Human Intelligence,
Analysis and Counterintelligence, I believe we need better global
coverage, allowing us to collect more human intelligence in more places
worldwide. As we all are now too well aware, we face terrorist networks
with global reach. We are forced into a serious situation regarding our
security. We must ourselves place overt and covert collectors in every
corner of the world to fight back and utilize well the assistance of
our international allies. In addition, for our HUMINT collectors to be
effective, their language skills and foreign area expertise overall
must be improved and maintained. Career paths for specialists must be
fostered. This bill provides the resources and encourages the efforts
in the intelligence community to increase the number of front-line
field officers and improve their skills.
Furthermore, we have to get smarter at using effectively, across the
agencies of the Federal Government, all available information that
bears on terrorism. Different agencies of the government have different
roles to play, and no one agency can do the job alone. Currently, our
capacity to collect information outstrips our ability to exploit what
we have. Furthermore, we have not always given proper weight to the
most predictive sources of information. The analytic effort in the
fight against terrorism must be an all-inclusive effort, with
sufficient numbers of analysts deployed where they are needed to make a
difference. The Congress may soon vote to authorize new methods and
procedures for sharing information. This is all well and good, but the
agencies now expected to share information must have state-of-the-art
information technology tools and the personnel they need to process,
analyze and disseminate critical intelligence to make new
authorizations effective.
I urge your support of this bill.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the
distinguished gentlewoman from New Mexico (Mrs. Wilson), a former
member of our committee.
Mrs. WILSON. Mr. Chairman, in the front of this report, the
unclassified version which is really worth reading for my colleagues,
it says that intelligence is our first line of defense, but too often
it is an afterthought. This document and this bill explains why we must
have a renewed focus on intelligence. I commend the chairman and the
ranking member and the committee for their excellent work on this bill
in providing some direction for the future.
The one thing I do want to highlight, and we have discussed this
among ourselves, is the need to move forward with the problem of
homeland intelligence. It is the most obvious, gaping hole in our
protection against terrorism, the ability to prioritize, direct,
collect, analyze and inform about activities within the United States
and to share information among agencies, much of it completely
unclassified, in order to make sure we can defend the homeland of the
United States.
I look forward to working with the chairman and my other colleagues
in the House to make sure that the intelligence capability of the
United States remains strong.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the
distinguished gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, let my say to the gentleman
from Florida (Mr. Goss) whom I see a lot in the Committee on Rules and
to the ranking member, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi),
thank them for a very excellent legislative initiative. The American
people understand the word intelligence, and I think as we have
reflected on the enormous tragedy of September 11, they will be more
informed about the importance of our intelligence community.
This legislation advocates the enhancement of the intelligence
community. Let me thank both the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) and
the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi) for the new commission to
find out the facts of the September 11, tragedy. Many might say that we
give out too much information, but I believe this commission will help
us understand better the necessity for enhanced funding, resources,
technology for our intelligence community.
I had thought of offering an amendment as the ranking member on the
Immigration Subcommittee to deal with seeking to promote collaborative
efforts between the INS and the intelligence community. Two days ago,
we in the Committee on the Judiciary passed an antiterrorism bill
unanimously with a balance between the rule of law and tools for law
enforcement. I believe it is important that we realize that though
immigration does not equate to terrorism, it is important the INS be
able to be advised on intelligence that would help them further thwart
those trying to enter the country with the purpose of terrorist
activities.
I hope we will have a chance to discuss that issue so that we can
work together for homeland security, we can balance our committee's
work and provide the necessary collaboration to secure our Nation.
I ask my colleagues to support this important legislation.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the
distinguished gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Simmons), a man who has
had great experience in the intelligence business.
(Mr. SIMMONS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. SIMMONS. Mr. Chairman, I commend the chair and the ranking member
and the members of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for
their bipartisan work on this legislation.
Specifically, I want to state my strong support for provisions in
section 105 that codifies the U.S. Coast Guard as a National Foreign
Intelligence Program agency under the National Security Act.
Fifteen years ago, the Coast Guard was primarily a consumer of
intelligence. Now and into the future, it can be a collector, a
processor and a producer as well as a consumer of intelligence. The
Coast Guard is involved in counternarcotics, counterterrorism, illegal
alien smuggling, maritime drug interdiction, sea enforcement of
immigration laws, port security and waterways security.
The integration of the Coast Guard into the intelligence community
makes them more responsive to the threats we face, and in particular,
to the threats of terrorism. It also enhances the training and
activities of the Coast Guard intelligence program and professionalizes
their activities.
On this basis, I am very pleased to see that this bill codifies the
Coast Guard as an element of the intelligence community.
Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the Intelligence
Authorization Act of FY 2002. I commend the chairman, ranking member
and members of the House Intelligence Committee for their bipartisan
work on this important piece of legislation.
Specifically, I would like to state my strong support for the
provisions in section 105 of this bill that codifies the U.S. Coast
Guard as a National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) Agency under
the National Security Act.
[[Page H6393]]
Mr. Chairman, I have the privilege of representing New London, CT,
which is the home of the U.S. Coast Guard Academy. I also serve as vice
chairman of the Coast Guard Subcommittee of the Transportation
Committee. These associations have introduced me to some of the unique
activities of the Coast Guard.
Fifteen years ago the Coast Guard was an intelligence consumer. When
I offered a course on the Intelligence Community at the Academy, I was
told that it was not necessary. These circumstances are no longer the
case today.
Now and into the future, the Coast Guard can be a collector, a
processor, and a producer as well as a consumer of intelligence. On
this basis, including the Coast Guard Intelligence Program (CGIP) into
the NFIP is an important and timely initiative.
To a certain degree, the integration of elements of the Coast Guard
into the Intelligence Community is a formality. The men and women of
the Coast Guard have been taking part in homeland protection through
the multitude of tasks; tasks that it performs better than any other
agency of our Government.
The Coast Guard is involved in counternarcotics, counterterrorism,
illegal alien smuggling, maritime drug interdiction, and sea-
enforcement of immigration laws, port security and waterways security
to name a few.
Threats to our country are met and thwarted along and off our shores
every day through the diligence and professionalism of the Coast Guard.
The routine activities of the Coast Guard also place it in a position
to collect information, disseminate information and participate in the
production of intelligence. This can be a valuable contribution to the
Intelligence Community.
The integration of the Coast Guard into the Intelligence Community
makes them more responsive to some of the threats we face--particularly
the threat of terrorist attacks. It also enhances the training and
activities of the Coast Guard Intelligence Program, and
professionalizes their activities.
On this basis I am glad to see that section 105 of this bill codifies
the Coast Guard as an element of the Intelligence Community.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Traficant).
Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, it is not popular to say, but I believe
America's intelligence network is very poor. Americans are now being
killed by the thousands, and money alone is not going to solve it.
I think Congress must address our Mideast policy. I think we can and
should support Israel, but we must be more objective in dealing with
Arab nations. I believe the Palestinian issue must be resolved and the
Palestinian people deserve a homeland, and that is not popular to say.
But, ladies and gentlemen, Americans are now being killed by the
thousands, and we have exported through our policies the terrorism in
the Mideast to the United States of America. I think it is time to tell
it like it is, stop addressing the symptoms and look at the root
causations. We can maintain our friendships and strong alliance with
Israel, but by God we have to show objectivity in the Mideast or there
will be more bin Ladens and more terrorist attacks on the United States
of America.
Finally, our borders are wide open. Congress better look at that
issue, because we have exposed a very vulnerable, soft underbelly.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the
distinguished gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Kirk), also knowledgeable on
matters of national security.
Mr. KIRK. Mr. Chairman, I want to speak as a Naval Reserve
intelligence officer who knows the value of linguistic abilities in
intelligence. The United States Government has two large institutions
dedicated to international languages used by many countries, the
Foreign Service Institute and the Defense Language Institute. But the
real reserve of linguistic abilities among tribal and less-used
languages across countries is the Peace Corps.
I think the United States needs to develop in the national security
community an ability to speak these other languages, especially
obviously in Central Asia and countries where terrorist threats might
emerge. This is going to require a huge effort, focusing on some of the
abilities and the institutional knowledge in the Army's foreign area
officer expertise. I think it is necessary for the Navy and Air Force
and intelligence agencies to develop this FAO capability in other
services, especially so that there is a full career path for such
officers and that the United States looks to the long term.
I also want to commend the committee on the recruitment guidelines
and hope that when we look to the Director of Central Intelligence,
that he reports back on those guidelines early and gives the Chief of
Station the ability to set the guidelines in unique circumstances.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Smith).
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I thank my good friend for yielding me this
time.
Mr. Chairman, I rise to engage Chairman Goss in a brief colloquy on
the matter of border security. The State Department has the legal
responsibility to issue visas at our U.S. embassies and consulates.
Over the years, we have vastly improved the process by which visas are
issued. Name check systems are now computerized, allowing the consular
officer at a post to have a reliable method of vetting a person's entry
into the United States.
This system of name checking is only as good, however, as the
information that is entered into the system. I would like to ask the
chairman that in the course of the intelligence bill conference, that
he work to ensure that the best cooperation is received from relevant
agencies to be sure that current information is provided on a timely
basis to the State Department for purposes of securing a better name
check system. I would note that all 18 of the suicide hijackers were
granted visas. Something is wrong and we need to fix it.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, I would
certainly agree that the gentleman raises an excellent point with
regard to the full need for cooperation among agencies for purposes of
strengthening our border security programs. I will work in conference
to come up with appropriate language to direct that such information
sharing occurs among the intelligence agencies and the State Department
so that we have the best and most secure visa issuing system possible.
I will further pledge that we will try and improve the handoff between
the other law enforcement agencies that are involved as well.
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I thank the distinguished chairman.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I just want to address another point in the bill that the gentleman
from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) referenced, and, that is section 504,
relating to official immunity for employees and agents of the United
States and foreign countries engaged in the interdiction of aircraft
used in illicit drug trafficking. This springs from the unfortunate,
and that is a very mild word to use, shooting down of the aircraft in
Peru. Under this section, the President must make an annual
certification to Congress concerning both the existence of a drug
threat in the country at issue and the existence in that country of
appropriate procedures to protect against innocent loss of life. An
annual report to Congress by the President concerning United States
government assistance to such interdiction programs is also required by
this section.
I call that to the attention of our colleagues, because many Members
had concerns about that incident. And doing so gives another reason to
acknowledge the cooperation of our chairman, the gentleman from
Florida, for including this language. I recognize the gentleman from
Michigan's leadership in this because his constituent was directly
affected by it. I thank him for his leadership.
{time} 1030
Mr. Chairman, I did want to make a couple of remarks in closing here.
This bill contains an independent review of the events leading up to
September 11. I believe that as we proceed to talk about anything
regarding September 11, we are walking on sacred ground. We have to
proceed with great dignity to honor, and out of respect for, the losses
suffered by so many.
Our entire country wants us to do everything possible to stop
terrorism in our country, terrorism against our interests worldwide,
and, indeed, terrorism against any target, and to stamp out terrorism
wherever it exists.
I do believe that it is important in light of the horrific acts of
September
[[Page H6394]]
11 that there be an independent assessment of the performance of the
agencies and departments of the federal government responsible for
dealing with terrorism. That assessment must be broad in scope and
conducted by individuals as free as possible of the interests of the
organizations they will review.
Section 306 as approved by the committee would produce those results.
I will offer an amendment to address some of the concerns expressed by
some of our colleagues about the breadth of jurisdiction of the
commission under the amendment time. But I think it is a mistake to
just proceed without an independent review of the events that happened.
For that reason I thank the chairman for his support in making the
commission a part of the bill, and I appreciate the Republican majority
support on that.
Sensitive to the concerns raised by some on both sides of the aisle
about the scope of that commission I intend to offer an amendment as a
compromise.
I wanted to acknowledge and join my distinguished chairman in
acknowledging the great work of the staff on both sides of the aisle,
headed up by Tim Sample as the majority chief of staff and Mike Sheehy,
our staff chief on the Democratic side. We are all very well served by
all the staff on both sides of the aisle. We do not think of it in a
partisan way.
I also want to again thank our distinguished chairman for the manner
in which he conducted the markup, indeed, the business of our
committee, and for his receptivity to the concerns presented by the
minority side. I want to particularly commend my minority members for
the valuable contributions they have made to the debate and, again, of
course, the work of every member of the committee.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, we have heard over the course of the last hour or so
many Members talk about our intelligence needs, and especially the need
to address the shortfalls related to counterterrorism. We have also
heard about the need to invest in the broader areas of intelligence. It
is this investment in time, thought, funding, and actually action that
I would like to address as we close on our side of the general debate.
The President, his Cabinet and Members of this body have rightly told
the American people that the war on terrorism is going to be a long-
term effort, and that even if we were to get Mr. bin Laden tomorrow
that would not put an end to terrorist activities, sadly.
Likewise, Mr. Chairman, if we only make fixes to the intelligence
community to address counterterrorism capabilities, we will not fully
protect our national security and other quarters from the multitude of
others threats that could befall us.
In a recent classified publication called the Quadrennial
Intelligence Community Review, there are some specific unclassified
trends that speak to the challenges of our future. Briefly, adversaries
increasingly will target the U.S. homeland; military threats will be
quantitatively and qualitatively different, involving very short-notice
contingencies and a very high premium on flexibility response; warning
of global crisis will be more difficult by 2015 because of the scope
and complexity of requirements and the speed of events; revolutionary
information technology capabilities will be available to friend and to
foe; and adversaries will use new, highly-effective means to select and
neutralize sensitive clandestine operations or technically
sophisticated collection devices. These are just a few of the kinds of
challenges out there.
Mr. Chairman, all of these points go to the fact that this country
will need a vibrant, flexible, and strong intelligence community.
More importantly, however, is that these points, in my view,
challenge the wherewithal of our current national security structure.
Therefore, in this bill we send a message to the administration that
now is not the time to circle the wagons and attempt to address the
issues with a status quo approach. We must take a look at whether the
structure of the intelligence community can meet the challenges that we
know are out there; and I believe the answer is that it cannot in its
present form, and whether our overall national security apparatus needs
to be updated and revised, and I believe it should, and I do not think
anybody disagrees with that.
The reason that this is so important at this time is thrown into
stark relief obviously by the horrible tragic events of September 11,
which I agree with my ranking member, is sacred soil. The same attacks
demonstrate that the issue of the safety and security of the rights and
freedoms of the civilized world as a whole are at stake.
If you do not believe me, I would like you to take a moment just to
take a look at this map, which shows in the red countries, those are
the countries that suffered loss during the September 11 attacks. There
is a lot of red on that map around the globe; and that is what I
suggest, that national security is a global issue and we indeed are
looked at as the leaders.
In closing, let me again thank all the members of the committee, and
I mean each and every one, especially our subcommittee chairmen and the
ranking members. I know it has been a lot of hard work, and we have
reorganized HPSCI this year to take on the extra load.
I thank the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi) particularly for
her cooperation and very sincere consideration of the provisions of
this bill. The management of her side of these matters has been
extraordinary.
I also want to pay special attention to our committee staff, Mr.
Chairman. The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence staff is a
group of very professional, very experienced, dedicated people who have
gone through a great deal since September 11. They have worked
literally tirelessly through weekends, nights to respond to several
additional tasks that the Speaker and, of course, circumstances have
placed on the committee, as well as to prepare this bill for Members'
consideration, and other bills that are coming shortly on the subject
of intelligence, as we all know.
This was always a bipartisan effort, and I am thankful we have such
an extraordinary professional staff. I would name each and every one of
them for citation for their extraordinary work, and I will put their
names in the Record. I am most grateful that they work so well together
and so professionally.
I also need to point out the Speaker of the House and the minority
leader, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Gephardt), have done an
amazing job of staying tuned to what our extraordinary circumstances
and being there for the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and
intelligence matters when we needed them; and I must also include the
appropriators, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Young), of course, a
former member of the committee; the gentleman from California (Mr.
Lewis), of course, a former member of the committee; the gentleman from
Pennsylvania (Mr. Murtha), for the work they have done to understand
our problems.
Finally, I want to pause for a moment to recognize those from the
intelligence communities who lost their lives on September 11 in the
service of the Nation at the Pentagon. Mr. Chairman, 15 people from the
community lost their lives, seven from the Defense Intelligence Agency,
seven from the Office of Naval Intelligence. They will be sorely missed
by the community, and, of course, extremely missed by their families
and loved ones.
It is in their honor we will push to ensure that the proper
investments and changes are made to ensure that their comrades and
Americans around the world can enjoy the rights, the freedoms, the
securities at home and abroad. These are the symbols of the American
culture, these are what we stand for, this is what we seek to protect
and provide for.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) has
expired.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, we have been joined by two distinguished
Members who were in markup.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentleman from
Maryland (Mr. Cardin).
Mr. CARDIN. Mr. Chairman, let me thank the gentlewoman for yielding
me time, and just concur in the comments that the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Goss) has just made.
[[Page H6395]]
These are difficult times for our entire Nation and for the people
who work in our intelligence agencies. They are at a disadvantage. When
they have a victory, when they are able to stop terrorist activities
here or abroad, they cannot issue a press release when they do their
work successfully.
Obviously, we need to do a better job on the intelligence front for
our Nation, and the legislation before us moves us in that direction
and I strongly support it. We all need to do a better job, including
what we do here on the Hill in providing the resources to our
intelligence community.
Mr. Chairman, I just really wanted to rise to thank the men and women
who give public service to this country in the intelligence field. They
do public service for this Nation, they do it in a very fine way, and
they need additional support. We all need to come together so that we
can make this Nation a stronger Nation.
I want to thank the chairman and ranking member for the legislation
they have brought forward.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the
distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. Farr), a member of the
Committee on Appropriations.
Mr. FARR of California. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for
yielding me this valuable time.
Mr. Chairman, I rise commending the committee in their realization
that you cannot have better intelligence unless we have better
linguistic training. I happen to represent what we call the language
capital of the world, Monterey, California, which is the home for the
Defense Language Institute, the largest language school in the world.
Four thousand young men and women of every ethnic background are
studying in Monterey to become linguists for our military and Federal
Government.
We also have the AT&T Language Line; and many of you, if you do have
any language problems, can dial up and get immediate translation on
that line. We have the Monterey Institute of International Studies,
which is the home for the Nonproliferation Center, which we understand
is where all the dangerous material in the world is located.
This emphasis on languages is the only way we are going to better
understand the world we live in and better understand the
communications that go on in the world. Thank you for putting it in the
report.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, how much time do I have remaining?
The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman from California (Ms. Pelosi) has 1\1/2\
minutes remaining, and the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Goss) has no
time remaining.
Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, in the minute and a half I have remaining, I want to
join our distinguished chairman in remembering those people in the
defense intelligence community who lost their lives at the Pentagon,
indeed all of the people who lost their lives at the Pentagon. Those of
us who have had the opportunity to spend any time over there to extend
the condolences of this entire Congress and of our own constituents
know that the sorrow that we all experienced has moved to resolve.
I also wanted to mention John O'Neill, a former FBI special agent in
charge of the National Security Division, who lost his life in the
World Trade Center attack. His service is well known to many of us in
the intelligence community; and we extend condolences to his family,
and, indeed, to the families of all who lost their lives, whether it is
in planes or in the buildings that were attacked.
There have been unimaginable acts of terrorism designed to instill
fear in the American people, but the terrorists will not succeed in
that. Their behavior is outside the circle of civilized human behavior,
and I agree with President Bush that we will bring them to justice or
bring justice to them; but justice must be done.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the remainder of my time be a
moment of silence in honor of those that lost their lives.
The CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired.
Pursuant to the rule, the committee amendment in the nature of a
substitute printed in the bill shall be considered as an original bill
for the purpose of amendment under the 5-minute rule by title, and each
title shall be considered read.
No amendment to that amendment shall be in order except those printed
in the portion of the Congressional Record designated for that purpose
and pro forma amendments for the purpose of debate. Amendments printed
in the Record may be offered only by the Member who caused it to be
printed or his designee and shall be considered read.
The Clerk will designate section 1.
The text of section 1 is as follows:
H.R. 2883
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the
"Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002".
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence community management account.
Sec. 105. Codification of the Coast Guard as an element of the
intelligence community.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Sense of the Congress on intelligence community contracting.
Sec. 304. Requirements for lodging allowances in intelligence community
assignment program benefits.
Sec. 305. Technical amendment.
Sec. 306. Commission on September 11 government preparedness and
performance.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Sec. 401. Modifications to Central Intelligence Agency's central
services program.
Sec. 402. Extension of CIA Voluntary Separation Pay Act.
Sec. 403. Guidelines for recruitment of certain foreign assets.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 501. Authority to purchase items of nominal value for recruitment
purposes.
Sec. 502. Funding for infrastructure and quality-of-life improvements
at Menwith Hill and Bad Aibling stations.
Sec. 503. Continuation of Joint Interagency Task Force at current
locations in Florida and California.
Sec. 504. Modification of authorities relating to interdiction of
aircraft engaged in illicit drug trafficking.
Sec. 505. Undergraduate training program for employees of the National
Imagery and Mapping Agency.
Sec. 506. Technical amendments.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there amendments to section 1?
If not, the Clerk will designate title I.
The text of title I is as follows:
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal
year 2002 for the conduct of the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the following elements of
the United States Government:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Department of Defense.
(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(4) The National Security Agency.
(5) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(6) The Department of State.
(7) The Department of the Treasury.
(8) The Department of Energy.
(9) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(10) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(11) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
(12) The Coast Guard.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The
amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and
the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2002,
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the elements listed in such section, are those
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 2883 of the One Hundred
Seventh Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of
Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made
available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate
and House of Representatives and to the President. The
President shall provide for suitable distribution of the
Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within
the executive branch.
[[Page H6396]]
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director
of Central Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian
personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year
2002 under section 102 when the Director of Central
Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the
performance of important intelligence functions, except that
the number of personnel employed in excess of the number
authorized under such section may not, for any element of the
intelligence community, exceed two percent of the number of
civilian personnel authorized under such section for such
element.
(b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of
Central Intelligence shall promptly notify the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate whenever the Director exercises the authority
granted by this section.
SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management
Account of the Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal
year 2002 the sum of $152,776,000. Within such amount, funds
identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in section 102(a) for the Advanced Research and
Development Committee shall remain available until September
30, 2003.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the
Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of
Central Intelligence are authorized 313 full-time personnel
as of September 30, 2002. Personnel serving in such elements
may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community
Management Account or personnel detailed from other elements
of the United States Government.
(c) Classified Authorizations.--
(1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence
Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are
also authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence
Community Management Account for fiscal year 2002 such
additional amounts as are specified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).
Such additional amounts shall remain available until
September 30, 2003.
(2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the
personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the
Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30,
2002, there are hereby authorized such additional personnel
for such elements as of that date as are specified in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations.
(d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during
fiscal year 2002, any officer or employee of the United
States or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the
staff of the Intelligence Community Management Account from
another element of the United States Government shall be
detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such
officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a
nonreimbursable basis for a period not to exceed one year for
the performance of temporary functions as required by the
Director of Central Intelligence.
(e) National Drug Intelligence Center.--
(1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be
appropriated in subsection (a), $27,000,000 shall be
available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. Within
such amount, funds provided for research, development, test,
and evaluation purposes shall remain available until
September 30, 2003, and funds provided for procurement
purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2004.
(2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central
Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General funds
available for the National Drug Intelligence Center under
paragraph (1). The Attorney General shall utilize funds so
transferred for the activities of the National Drug
Intelligence Center.
(3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug
Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the
provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)).
(4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the
operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center.
SEC. 105. CODIFICATION OF THE COAST GUARD AS AN ELEMENT OF
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
Section 3(4)(H) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 401a(4)(H) is amended--
(1) by striking "and" before "the Department of
Energy"; and
(2) by inserting ", and the Coast Guard" before the
semicolon.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there amendments to title I?
If not, the Clerk will designate title II.
The text of title II is as follows:
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal
year 2002 the sum of $212,000,000.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there amendments to title II?
If not, the Clerk will designate title III.
The text of title III is as follows:
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay,
retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be
increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may
be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits
authorized by law.
SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not
be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any
intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by
the Constitution or the laws of the United States.
SEC. 303. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
CONTRACTING.
It is the sense of the Congress that the Director of
Central Intelligence should continue to direct that elements
of the intelligence community, whenever compatible with the
national security interests of the United States and
consistent with operational and security concerns related to
the conduct of intelligence activities, and where fiscally
sound, should competitively award contracts in a manner that
maximizes the procurement of products properly designated as
having been made in the United States.
SEC. 304. REQUIREMENTS FOR LODGING ALLOWANCES IN INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY ASSIGNMENT PROGRAM BENEFITS.
Section 113(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 404(h)) is amended--
(1) by inserting "(1)" before "An employee"; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
"(2) The head of an agency of an employee detailed under
subsection (a) may pay a lodging allowance for the employee
subject to the following conditions:
"(A) The allowance shall be the lesser of the cost of the
lodging or a maximum amount payable for the lodging as
established jointly by the Director of Central Intelligence
and--
"(i) with respect to detailed employees of the Department
of Defense, the Secretary of Defense; and
"(ii) with respect to detailed employees of other agencies
and departments, the head of such agency or department.
"(B) The detailed employee maintains a primary residence
for the employee's immediate family in the local commuting
area of the parent agency duty station from which the
employee regularly commuted to such duty station before the
detail.
"(C) The lodging is within a reasonable proximity of the
host agency duty station.
"(D) The distance between the detailed employee's parent
agency duty station and the host agency duty station is
greater than 20 miles.
"(E) The distance between the detailed employee's primary
residence and the host agency duty station is 10 miles
greater than the distance between such primary residence and
the employees parent duty station.
"(F) The rate of pay applicable to the detailed employee
does not exceed the rate of basic pay for grade GS-15 of the
General Schedule.".
SEC. 305. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT.
Section 106(b)(2)(C) of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 403-6(b)(2)(C)) is amended by striking
"Nonproliferation and National Security" and inserting
"Intelligence and the Director of the Office of
Counterintelligence".
SEC. 306. COMMISSION ON SEPTEMBER 11 GOVERNMENT PREPAREDNESS
AND PERFORMANCE.
(a) Establishment.--There is established a commission to be
known as the "Commission on Preparedness and Performance of
the Federal Government for the September 11 Acts of
Terrorism" (in this section referred to as the
"Commission").
(b) Duty.--
(1) Assessment of agency performance.--The Commission
shall, with respect to the acts of terrorism committed
against the United States on September 11, 2001, assess the
performance of those agencies and departments of the United
States charged with the responsibility to prevent, prepare
for, or respond to acts of terrorism up to and including that
date. For purposes of the preceding sentence, those agencies
and departments include--
(A) the Department of Defense (including the intelligence
elements of the Department),
(B) the Department of Justice (including the intelligence
elements of the Department),
(C) the Department of State (including the intelligence
elements of the Department),
(D) the Department of the Transportation (including the
intelligence elements of the Department),
(E) the Department of the Treasury (including the
intelligence elements of the Department),
(F) the Central Intelligence Agency, and
(G) the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
(2) Report.--The Commission shall submit the report
described in subsection (g).
(c) Membership.--
(1) Number and appointment.--The Commission shall be
composed of 10 members appointed as follows:
(A) The President shall appoint 4 members.
(B) The Speaker of the House of Representatives shall
appoint 2 members.
(C) The majority leader of the Senate shall appoint 2
members.
(D) The minority leader of the House of Representatives
shall appoint 1 member.
(E) The minority leader of the Senate shall appoint 1
member.
[[Page H6397]]
(2) Terms.--
(A) In general.--Each member shall be appointed for the
life of the Commission.
(B) Vacancies.--Any member appointed to fill a vacancy
occurring before the expiration of the term for which the
member's predecessor was appointed shall be appointed only
for the remainder of that term. A member may serve after the
expiration of that member's term until a successor has taken
office. A vacancy in the Commission shall be filled in the
manner in which the original appointment was made.
(3) Basic pay.--
(A) Rates of pay.--Members shall serve without pay.
(B) Travel expenses.--Each member shall receive travel
expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in
accordance with applicable provisions under subchapter I of
chapter 57 of title 5, United States Code.
(4) Quorum.--6 members of the Commission shall constitute a
quorum but a lesser number may hold hearings.
(5) Chairperson.--The Chairperson of the Commission shall
be elected by the members.
(d) Director and Staff of Commission.--
(1) Director.--The Commission shall have a Director who
shall be appointed by the Chairperson.
(2) Staff.--The Chairperson may appoint and fix the pay of
additional personnel as the Director considers appropriate.
(3) Applicability of certain civil service laws.--The
Director and staff of the Commission shall be appointed
subject to the provisions of title 5, United States Code,
governing appointments in the competitive service, and shall
be paid in accordance with the provisions of chapter 51 and
subchapter III of chapter 53 of that title relating to
classification and General Schedule pay rates, except that an
individual so appointed may not receive pay in excess of the
annual rate of basic pay for GS-15 of the General Schedule.
(4) Experts and consultants.--With the approval of the
Chairperson, the Director may procure temporary and
intermittent services under section 3109(b) of title 5,
United States Code, but at rates for individuals not to
exceed the daily equivalent of the maximum annual rate of
basic pay for GS-15 of the General Schedule.
(5) Staff of federal agencies.--Upon request of the
Chairperson, the head of any Federal department or agency may
detail, on a reimbursable basis, any of the personnel of that
department or agency to the Commission to assist it in
carrying out its duties under this section.
(e) Powers of Commission.--
(1) Hearings and sessions.--The Commission may, for the
purpose of carrying out this section, hold hearings, sit and
act at times and places, take testimony, and receive evidence
as the Commission considers appropriate. The Commission may
administer oaths or affirmations to witnesses appearing
before it.
(2) Powers of members and agents.--Any member or agent of
the Commission may, if authorized by the Commission, take any
action which the Commission is authorized to take by this
section.
(3) Obtaining official data.--The Commission may secure
directly from any department or agency of the United States
information, including classified information, necessary to
enable it to carry out this Act. Upon request of the
Chairperson of the Commission, the head of that department or
agency shall furnish that information to the Commission.
(4) Mails.--The Commission may use the United States mails
in the same manner and under the same conditions as other
departments and agencies of the United States.
(5) Administrative support services.--Upon the request of
the Commission, the Administrator of General Services shall
provide to the Commission, on a reimbursable basis, the
administrative support services necessary for the Commission
to carry out its responsibilities under this section.
(6) Subpoena power.--
(A) In general.--The Commission may issue subpoenas
requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the
production of any evidence relating to any matter under
investigation by the Commission. The attendance of witnesses
and the production of evidence may be required from any place
within the United States at any designated place of hearing
within the United States.
(B) Failure to obey a subpoena.--If a person refuses to
obey a subpoena issued under subparagraph (A), the Commission
may apply to a United States district court for an order
requiring that person to appear before the Commission to give
testimony, produce evidence, or both, relating to the matter
under investigation. The application may be made within the
judicial district where the hearing is conducted or where
that person is found, resides, or transacts business. Any
failure to obey the order of the court may be punished by the
court as civil contempt.
(C) Service of subpoenas.--The subpoenas of the Commission
shall be served in the manner provided for subpoenas issued
by a United States district court under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure for the United States district courts.
(D) Service of process.--All process of any court to which
application is made under subparagraph (B) may be served in
the judicial district in which the person required to be
served resides or may be found.
(E) Immunity.--Except as provided in this paragraph, a
person may not be excused from testifying or from producing
evidence pursuant to a subpoena on the ground that the
testimony or evidence required by the subpoena may tend to
incriminate or subject that person to criminal prosecution. A
person, after having claimed the privilege against self-
incrimination, may not be criminally prosecuted by reason of
any transaction, matter, or thing which that person is
compelled to testify about or produce evidence relating to,
except that the person may be prosecuted for perjury
committed during the testimony or made in the evidence.
(7) Contract authority.--The Commission may contract with
and compensate government and private agencies or persons for
supplies and services, without regard to section 3709 of the
Revised Statutes (41 U.S.C. 5).
(f) Report.--The Commission shall transmit a report to the
President and the Congress not later than 6 months after the
date by which the Director has been appointed by the
Chairperson. The report shall contain a detailed statement of
the findings and conclusions of the Commission, together with
its recommendations for legislation and administrative
actions the Commission considers appropriate.
(g) Termination.--The Commission shall terminate on 30 days
after submitting the report required under subsection (g).
The CHAIRMAN. Are there amendments to title III?
Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Goss
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 1 offered by Mr. Goss:
Strike the heading of section 306 (page 12, lines 1 and 2)
and insert the following:
SEC. 306. COMMISSION ON NATIONAL SECURITY READINESS.
Page 12, beginning on line 4, strike "Commission on
Preparedness and Performance of the Federal Government for
the September 11 Acts of Terrorism" and insert "Commission
on National Security Readiness".
Page 12, strike lines 9 through 17 and insert the
following:
(1) Review.--With respect to the acts of terrorism
committed against the United States on September 11, 2001,
the Commission shall review the national security readiness
of the United States to identify structural impediments to
the effective collection, analysis, and sharing of
information on national security threats, particularly
terrorism. For purposes of the preceding sentence, the scope
of the review shall include--
Page 13, line 8, strike "subsection (g)" and insert
"subsection (f)".
Page 13, line 11, strike "10" and insert "8".
Page 13, line 13, strike "4" and insert "2".
Page 13, after line 21, insert the following new paragraph
and redesignate the succeeding paragraphs accordingly:
(2) Qualifications.--(A) A member of the Commission shall
have substantial Federal law enforcement, intelligence, or
military experience with appropriate security clearance.
(B) A member of the Commission may not be a full-time
officer or employee of the United States.
Page 16, beginning on line 5, strike "hold hearings,".
Page 16, beginning on line 8, strike "The Commission" and
all that follows through the end of line 9.
Strike paragraph (6) of section 306(e) (page 17, beginning
on line 7 through page 19, line 3) and redesignate the
succeeding paragraph accordingly).
Page 19, line 10, strike "6 months" and insert "one
year".
Page 19, beginning on line 17, by striking "subsection
(g)" and insert "subsection (f)".
Mr. GOSS. Mr. Chairman, I rise to offer an amendment to section 306
regarding the establishment of an independent commission to review the
national security readiness of the United States, to identify
structural impediments to the effective collection analysis and sharing
of information on national security threats, particularly terrorism.
{time} 1045
By way of explanation, in its markup, the committee debated the
purposes, mandate, and composition of this national commission that we
talked about that would review our Nation's readiness to address the
national security threat posed by terrorism in the wake of events that
we all witnessed on September 11 in New York and Pennsylvania and the
Pentagon. There was some disagreement among members as to whether there
was an immediate need for such a commission and how broad its scope
should actually be. Some members argued that there should be no
commission at all as it might fall into the trap of focusing only on
who was to blame for events of September 11, which is hardly the time
to do that. Other members were concerned about the independence of
commission members. Some of our members felt that the role of such a
commission overlapped substantially with the responsibilities of our
own Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security, and there were
other thoughts as well.
I
