107th Congress S. Prt.
COMMITTEE PRINT
1st Session 107-43
_________________________________________________________________________
STRATEGIES FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE
__________
A COMPILATION
BY THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota BILL FRIST, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia
BILL NELSON, Florida SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming
Virginia
Edwin K. Hall, Staff Director
Patricia A. McNerney, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman, Letter of Transmittal to the
United States Senate........................................... v
"Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism,"
Executive Summary from the report of the National Commission on
Terrorism, June 5, 2000........................................ 1
"Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change," the
Phase III Report of the U.S. Commission on National Security/
21st Century, Excerpt on "Securing the National Homeland,"
February 15, 2001.............................................. 17
"A Report Card on the Department of Energy's Nonproliferation
Programs With Russia," Executive Summary, by Howard Baker and
Lloyd Cutler, Co-Chairs, Russia Task Force, the Secretary of
Energy Advisory Board, January 10, 2001........................ 41
"The Threat of Bioterrorism and the Natural Spread of Infectious
Diseases," U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
hearing of September 5, 2001 55
Nunn, Sam, former United States Senator, Co-Chairman of the
Nuclear Threat Initiative, prepared statement............ 57
Henderson, Dr. Donald A., MD, MPH, director, Center for
Civilian Biodefense Studies, Johns Hopkins University,
Baltimore, MD, prepared statement........................ 69
"Report of the Accountability Review Boards on the Embassy
Bombings in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam," January 1999.
Executive Overview............................................. 77
"First Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for
Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction: I. Assessing
the Threat," December 15, 1999. Executive Summary............. 89
"Second Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for
Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction: II. Toward a
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism," December 15, 2000.
Executive Summary.............................................. 99
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC, September 26, 2001.
Dear Colleague:
The tragic and unconscionable attacks of September 11 have
awakened all Americans to the very real threat posed by
international terrorism. As Congress works to ensure that the
awful events of September 11th will never be repeated, it is
instructive for us to review several recent studies of the
issue. In recent years, a number of major commissions and
distinguished witnesses before Congress have highlighted the
emergence of both nation-states and sub-national groups with
the desire and the capability to employ asymmetric means,
including weapons of mass destruction, to strike at the United
States homeland. Their reports and statements have underscored
the real vulnerability of the United States in responding to
such attacks and mitigating their consequences.
The Committee on Foreign Relations has reprinted the
executive summaries and key excerpts from some of the leading
reports on emerging threats to U.S. national security. For your
benefit, I include a brief summary of each of the six reports
included in this Committee reprint:
I. The National Commission on Terrorism (June 2000)
The final report of the National Commission on Terrorism,
chaired by L. Paul Bremer III, declares in no uncertain terms,
"Today's terrorists seek to inflict mass casualties, and they
are attempting to do so both overseas and on American soil.
They are less dependent on state sponsorship and are, instead,
forming loose, transnational affiliations based on religious or
ideological affinity and a common hatred of the United
States."
The National Commission urged the U.S. intelligence and law
enforcement communities to use the full scope of their
authorities to collect information regarding terrorist plans
and attack. Some of the specific measures suggested, including
loosened restrictions on CIA recruitment methods and expanded
electronic surveillance capabilities, are now being considered
in the current environment. It encouraged the United States to
firmly target all states that support terrorists through
diplomatic, financial, economic, and military means, including
the imposition of sanctions on states not fully cooperative
with counter-terrorism efforts.
II. The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century: Excerpt on
Homeland Defense (February 2001)
This commission, known as "Hart-Rudman" after its co-
chairs, former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman, concluded
that "attacks against American citizens, possibly causing
heavy casualties, are likely over the next quarter century."
Citing a growing diffusion of technology and an abundance of
actors with grievances against the United States, the Hart-
Rudman commission urged making the security of the American
homeland the primary national security mission of the U.S.
government.
To begin carrying out this mission, the commission
recommends creation of a National Homeland Security Agency to
coordinate all U.S. government activities on homeland defense.
The commission urges the United States to rely on three main
instruments in deterring and defending against threats to the
homeland: (1) diplomacy, (2) the overseas U.S. diplomatic,
intelligence, and military presence, and (3) vigilant border
security and surveillance.
III. A Report Card on the Department of Energy's Non-Proliferation
Programs with Russia ("Baker-Cutler Task Force") (January 2001)
This bipartisan task force called on the President to
quickly formulate a strategic plan to secure and/or neutralize
in the next eight to ten years all nuclear weapons-usable
material located in Russia. To carry out this goal, the task
force suggested that the U.S. government set aside
approximately $30 billion over the next eight to ten years.
Co-chaired by former U.S. Senator Howard Baker and former
White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler, the task force declared that
the most urgent threat facing the United States is the danger
that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable material,
i.e., plutonium and highly enriched uranium, could be stolen
and sold to terrorists or hostile nation-states. The task force
concluded that current U.S. government efforts, including the
Nunn-Lugar programs and the Department of Energy nuclear non-
proliferation programs, were on the right track but were
insufficient to meet the enormity of this threat.
IV. Statements by former Senator Sam Nunn and Dr. D.A. Henderson before
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on "The Threat of
Bioterrorism and the Natural Spread of Infectious Diseases" (September
2001)
According to Senator Nunn, "Biological terrorism is one of
our greatest national security threats, and one that cannot be
addressed by Department of Defense standard operating
procedures." Both he and Dr. D.A. Henderson, an architect of
the global campaign to eradicate smallpox more than twenty
years ago, testified before the Committee on Foreign Relations
earlier this month on their participation in "Dark Winter," a
recent exercise simulating the U.S. government's response to a
smallpox attack on three American cities.
Senator Nunn and Dr. Henderson drew a number of lessons
from the Dark Winter exercise. First, the measures we can take
to deter or prevent bioterrorism are cost effective measures in
countering natural epidemics. Second, the United States must
recognize the central role of public health and medicine and
seek to recapitalize our medical infrastructure. These efforts
should include an adequate surge capability to handle
emergencies and a strong surveillance and monitoring network,
both domestic and international, to detect, track, and contain
epidemics and provide evidence of biological weapons attacks.
Third, we should build our national pharmaceutical stockpile to
capacity, including extra production capability for drugs and
vaccines, and increase funding for biomedical research to
develop new medicines and diagnostic tests.
V. Crowe Report on Embassy Security (January 1999)
The Crowe Report called for the appropriation of $1.4
billion per year over ten years to fund capital building
programs, security operations, and personnel to ensure maximum
security at U.S. embassies around the world. The final report
of the Department of State Accountability Review Boards, better
known as the Crowe Report after the former Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff William J. Crowe, examined the August
1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. It
criticized the State Department for an "institutional
failure" in not fully recognizing the threat posed by
transnational terrorism and the particular use of large car
bombs.
VI. The Gilmore Commission: Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response
Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction
(December 1999 and December 2000)
The so-called "Gilmore Commission," named for its chair,
Virginia Governor James Gilmore III, recognized terrorism
employing weapons of mass destruction as a serious threat to
homeland defense and focused on the need to improve domestic
capabilities in responding to such attacks. The Gilmore
Commission called upon the U.S. government to develop a viable
strategy on national domestic preparedness plans to combat
terrorism. To carry out this national strategy, the Commission
recommends that the President should establish a National
Office for Combating Terrorism in the Executive Office of the
President. The director of this office, a Senate-confirmed
appointee, would exercise program and budget authority over all
federal efforts to fight terrorism.
Certainly, we should not rush to adopt all of these
recommendations; some of these proposals, under closer
scrutiny, may not advance our objectives in the war on
terrorism. But it is my hope that these reports will help frame
our debate on comprehensive legislation to counter terrorism
and other emerging threats to U.S. national security in coming
weeks and months. I welcome the chance to speak in further
detail with each of you on these critical issues.
Sincerely,
Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman.
=======================================================================
COUNTERING THE CHANGING THREAT OF
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
Report of the National Commission on Terrorism
June 5, 2000
=======================================================================
Commission Members and Staff
----------
Commissioners
L. Paul Bremer III, Chairman, is the Managing Director of
Kissinger Associates. During a 23-year career in the
American diplomatic service, Ambassador Bremer served
in Asia, Africa, Europe and Washington, D.C. He was
Ambassador to the Netherlands from 1983 to 1986. From
1986-1989, he served as Ambassador-at-large for
Counter-Terrorism, where he was responsible for
developing and implementing America's global polices to
combat terrorism.
Maurice Sonnenberg, Vice Chairman, is the senior international
advisor to the investment banking firm of Bear, Stearns
& Co. Inc. and the senior international advisor to the
law firm of Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP. He is a
member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board. He recently served as a member of the U.S.
Commission on Reducing and Protecting Government
Secrecy and as the senior advisor to the U.S.
Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S.
Intelligence Community.
Richard K. Betts is Leo A. Shifrin Professor of War and Peace
Studies in the political science department, Director
of the Institute of War and Peace Studies, and Director
of the International Security Policy program in the
School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia
University. He is also Director of National Security
Studies and Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign
Relations, and author of Surprise Attack: Lesson for
Defense Planning.
Wayne A. Downing, General, U.S. Army, retired in 1996 after a
34-year career, where he served in a variety of command
assignments in infantry, armored, special operations
and joint units culminating in his appointment as the
Commander-in-Chtef of the U.S. Special Operations
Command. Since retirement, he was appointed to assess
the 1996 terrorist attack on the U.S. base at Khobar
Towers, Saudi Arabia, and to make recommendations to
protect people and facilities world wide from terrorist
attack. General Downing serves on several boards and
panels in both the private and government sectors.
Jane Harmon just completed a year as Regents Professor at
U.C.L.A. where she taught at the Department of
Political Science and Center for International
Relations. Harmon represented California's 36th
Congressional District from 1992-1998 where she served
on the National Security, Science and Intelligence
Committees. Prior government experience includes
Senate Counsel, White House Deputy Cabinet Secretary
and DoD Special Counsel. Harmon is currently seeking
election to her former seat.
Fred C. Ikle is a Distinguished Scholar, Center for Strategic
and International Studies. Dr. Ikle is Chairman of the
Board of Telos Corporation and a Director of the
Zurich-American Insurance Companies and of CMC Energy
Services. Prior to joining the Center, Dr. Ikle served
as Undersecretary of Defense for Policy and Director
for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
Juliette N. Kayyem is an Associate of the Executive Session on
Domestic Preparedness, John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University. She writes and teaches
courses on counter-terrorism policy and the law. Ms.
Kayyem has most recently served as a legal advisor to
the Attorney General at the U.S. Department of Justice
and as Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General for
Civil Rights.
John F. Lewis, Jr. is Director of Global Security for Goldman,
Sachs & Co., New York. Previously, he was Assistant
Director-in-Charge of the National Security Division of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Mr. Lewis managed
the FBI's national counterintelligence and
counterterrorism programs. Mr. Lewis has held a variety
of positions, including an appointment as Director of
Intelligence and CI Programs, National Security Staff
and previous Chairman of the International Association
of Chiefs of Police Committee on Terrorism.
Gardner Peckham is Managing Director of the government
relations firm of Block, Kelly, Scruggs & Healey with a
practice focused on international trade, defense and
foreign policy issues. Prior to joining the firm, Mr.
Peckham served as Senior Policy Advisor to the Speaker
of the United States House of Representatives. He also
held several other senior positions in Congress and
during the Bush Administration served as Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs at the U.S.
Department of State and Director for Legislative
Affairs at the National Security Council Staff.
R. James Woolsey is a partner at the law firm of Shea & Gardner
with a practice in the fields of civil litigation,
alternative dispute resolution, and corporate
transactions; he also serves on several corporate
boards. Previous to returning to the firm, Mr. Woolsey
served as Director of Central Intelligence. His U.S.
Government service includes Ambassador to the
Negotiations on CFE, Under Secretary of the Navy, and
General Counsel of the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed
Services. He has served on many Presidential and
Congressional delegations, boards, and commissions.
Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism
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Executive Summary
International terrorism poses an increasingly dangerous and
difficult threat to America. This was underscored by the
December 1999 arrests in Jordan and at the U.S./Canadian border
of foreign nationals who were allgedly planning to attack
crowded millennium celebrations. Today's terrorists seek to
inflict mass casualties, and they are attempting to do so both
overseas and on American soil. They are less dependent on state
sponsorship and are, instead, forming loose, transnational
affiliations based on religious or ideological affinity and a
common hatred of the United States. This makes terrorist
attacks more difficult to detect and prevent.
Countering the growing danger of the terrorist threat
requires significantly stepping up U.S. efforts. The government
must immediately take steps to reinvigorate the collection of
intelligence about terrorists' plans, use all available legal
avenues to disrupt and prosecute terrorist activities and
private sources of support, convince other nations to cease all
support for terrorists, and ensure that federal, state, and
local officials are prepared for attacks that may result in
mass casualties. The Commission has made a number of
recommendations to accomplish these objectives:
Priority one is to prevent terrorist attacks. U.S.
intelligence and law enforcement communities must use the full
scope of their authority to collect intelligence regarding
terrorist plans and methods.
CIA guidelines adopted in 1995 restricting
recruitment of unsavory sources should not apply when
recruiting counterterrorism sources.
The Attorney General should ensure that FBI is
exercising fully its authority for investigating
suspected terrorist groups or individuals, including
authority for electronic surveillance.
Funding for counterterrorism efforts by CIA, NSA,
and FBI must be given higher priority to ensure
continuation of important operational activity and to
close the technology gap that threatens their ability
to collect and exploit terrorist communications.
FBI should establish a cadre of reports officers to
distill and disseminate terrorism-related information
once it is collected.
U.S. policies must firmly target all states that support
terrorists.
Iran and Syria should be kept on the list of state
sponsors until they stop supporting terrorists.
Afghanistan should be designated a sponsor of
terrorism and subjected to all the sanctions applicable
to state sponsors. The President should
impose sanctions on countries that, while not direct
sponsors of terrorism, are nevertheless not cooperating
fully on counterterrorism. Candidates for consideration
include Pakistan ond Greece.
Private sources of financial and logistical support for
terrorists must be subjected to the full force and sweep of
U.S. and international laws.
All relevant agencies should use every available
means, including the full array of criminal, civil, and
administrative sanctions to block or disrupt
nongovernmental sources of support for international
terrorism.
Congress should promptly ratify and implement the
International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism to enhance international
cooperative efforts.
Where criminal prosecution is not possible, the
Attorney General should vigorously pursue the expulsion
of terrorists from the United States through
proceedings which protect both the national security
interest in safeguarding classified evidence and the
right of the accused to challenge that evidence.
A terrorist attack involving a biological agent, deadly
chemicals, or nuclear or radiological material, even if it
succeeds only partially, could profoundly affect the entire
nation. The government must do more to prepare for such an
event.
The President should direct the preparation of a
manual to guide the implementation of existing legal
authority in the event of a catastrophic terrorist
threat or attack. The President and Congress should
determine whether additional legal authority is needed
to deal with catastrophic terrorism.
The Department of Defense must have detailed plans
for its role in the event of a catastrophic terrorist
attack, including criteria for decisions on transfer of
command authority to DoD in extraordinary
circumstances.
Senior officials of all government agencies involved
in responding to a catastrophic terrorism threat or
crisis should be required to participate in national
exercises every year to test capabilities and
coordination.
Congress should make it illegal for anyone not
properly certified to possess certain critical
pathogens and should enact laws to control the transfer
of equipment critical to the development or use of
biological agents.
The President should establish a comprehensive and
coordinated long-term research and development program
for catastrophic terrorism.
The Secretary of State should press for an
international convention to improve multilateral
cooperation on preventing or responding to cyber
attacks by terrorists.
The President and Congress should reform the system for
reviewing and funding departmental counterterrorism programs to
ensure that the activities and programs of various agencies are
part of a comprehensive plan.
The executive branch official responsible for
coordinating counterterrorism efforts across the
government should be given a stronger hand in the
budget process.
Congress should develop mechanisms for a
comprehensive review of the President's
counterterrorism policy and budget.
The International Terrorism Threat is Changing
Who are the international terrorists?
What are their motives and how do they get their
support?
How can we stop them?
The answers to these questions have changed significantly
over the last 25 years. There are dramatically fewer
international terrorist incidents than in the mid-eighties.
Many of the groups that targeted America's interests, friends,
and allies have disappeared. The Soviet bloc, which once
provided support to terrorist groups, no longer exists.
Countries that once excused terrorism now condemn it. This
changed international attitude has led to 12 United Nations
conventions targeting terrorist activity and, more importantly,
growing, practical international cooperation.
However, if most of the world's countries are firmer in
opposing terrorism, some still support terrorists or use
terrorism as an element of state policy. Iran is the clearest
case. The Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Ministry of
Intelligence and Security carry out terrorist activities and
give direction and support to other terrorists. The regimes of
Syria, Sudan, and Afghanistan provide funding, refuge, training
bases, and weapons to terrorists. Libya continues to provide
support to some Palestinian terrorist groups and to harass
expatriate dissidents, and North Korea may still provide
weapons to terrorists. Cuba provides safehaven to a number of
terrorists. Other states allow terrorist groups to operate on
their soil or provide support which, while falling short of
state sponsorship, nonetheless gives terrorists important
assistance.
The terrorist threat is also changing in ways that make it
more dangerous and difficult to counter.
International terrorism once threatened Americans only when
they were outside the country. Today international terrorists
attack us on our own soil. Just before the millennium, an alert
U.S. Customs Service official stopped Ahmad Ressam as he
attempted to enter the United States from Canada--apparently to
conduct a terrorist attack. This fortuitous arrest should not
inspire complacency, however. On an average day, over one
million people enter the United States legally and thousands
more enter illegally. As the World Trade Center bombing
demonstrated, we cannot rely solely on existing border controls
and procedures to keep foreign terrorists out of the United
States.
Terrorist attacks are becoming more lethal. Most terrorist
organizations active in the 1970s and 1980s had clear political
objectives. They tried to calibrate their attacks to produce
just enough bloodshed to get attention for their cause, but not
so much as to alienate public support. Groups like the Irish
Republican Army and the Palestine Liberation Organization often
sought specific political concessions.
Now, a growing percentage of terrorist attacks are designed
to kill as many people as possible. In the 1990s a terrorist
incident was almost 20 percent more likely to result in death
or injury than an incident two decades ago. The World Trade
Center bombing in New York killed six and wounded about 1,000,
but the terrorists' goal was to topple the twin towers, killing
tens of thousands of people. The thwarted attacks against New
York City's infrastructure in 1993--which included plans to
bomb the Lincoln and Holland tunnels--also were intended to
cause mass casualties. In 1995, Philippine authorities
uncovered a terrorist plot to bring down 11 U.S. airliners in
Asia. The circumstances surrounding the millennium border
arrests of foreign nationals suggest that the suspects planned
to target a large group assembled for a New Year's celebration.
Overseas attacks against the United States in recent years have
followed the same trend. The bombs that destroyed the military
barracks in Saudi Arabia and two U.S. Embassies in Africa
inflicted 6,059 casualties. Those arrested in Jordan in late
December had also planned attacks designed to kill large
numbers.
The trend toward higher casualties reflects, in part, the
changing motivation of today's terrorists. Religiously
motivated terrorist groups, such as Usama bin Ladin's group,
al-Qaida, which is believed to have bombed the U.S. Embassies
in Africa, represent a growing trend toward hatred of the
United States. Other terrorist groups are driven by visions of
a post-apocalyptic future or by ethnic hatred. Such groups may
lack a concrete political goal other than to punish their
enemies by killing as many of them as possible, seemingly
without concern about alienating sympathizers. Increasingly,
attacks are less likely to be followed by claims of
responsibility or lists of political demands.
The shift in terrorist motives has contributed to a change
in the way some international terrorist groups are structured,
Because groups based on ideological or religious motives may
lack a specific political or nationalistic agenda, they have
less need for a hierarchical structure. Instead, they can rely
on loose affiliations with like-minded groups from a variety of
countries to support their common cause against the United
States.
Al-Qaida is the best-known transnational terrorist
organization. In addition to pursuing its own terrorist
campaign, it calls on numerous militant groups that share some
of its ideological beliefs to support its violent campaign
against the United States, But neither al-Qaida's extremist
politico-religious beliefs nor its leader, Usama bin Ladin, is
unique. If al-Qaida and Usama bin Ladin were to disappear
tomorrow, the United States would still face potential
terrorist threats from a growing number of groups opposed to
perceived American hegemony. Moreover, new terrorist threats
can suddenly emerge from isolated conspiracies or obscure cults
with no previous history of violence.
These more loosely affiliated, transnational terrorist
networks are difficult to predict, track, and penetrate. They
rely on a variety of sources for funding and logistical
support, including self-financing criminal activities such as
kidnapping, narcotics, and petty crimes. Their networks of
support include both front organizations and legitimate
business and nongovernment organizations. They use the Internet
as an effective communications channel.
Guns and conventional explosives have so far remained the
weapons of choice for most terrorists. Such weapons can cause
many casualties and are relatively easy to acquire and use. But
some terrorist groups now show interest in acquiring the
capability to use chemical, biological, radiological, or
nuclear (CBRN) materials. It is difficult to predict the
likelihood of a CBRN attack, but most experts agree that
today's terrorists are seeking the ability to use such agents
in order to cause mass casualties.
Still, these kinds of weapons and materials confront a non-
state sponsored terrorist group with significant technical
challenges. While lethal chemicals are easy to come by, getting
large quantities and weaponizing them for mass casualties is
difficult, and only nation states have succeeded in doing so.
Biological agents can be acquired in nature or from medical
supply houses, but important aspects of handling and dispersion
are daunting. To date, only nation states have demonstrated the
capability to build radiological and nuclear weapons.
The 1995 release of a chemical agent in the Tokyo subway by
the apocalyptic Aum Shinrikyo group demonstrated the
difficulties that terrorists face in attempting to use CBRN
weapons to produce mass casualties. The group used scores of
highly skilled technicians and spent tens of millions of
dollars developing a chemical attack that killed fewer people
than conventional explosives could have. The same group failed
totally in a separate attempt to launch an anthrax attack in
Tokyo.
However, if the terrorists' goal is to challenge
significantly Americans' sense of safety and confidence, even a
small CBRN attack could be successful.
Moreover, terrorists could acquire more deadly CBRN
capabilities from a state. Five of the seven nations the United
States identifies as state sponsors of terrorism have programs
to develop weapons of mass destruction. A state that knowingly
provides agents of mass destruction or technology to a
terrorist group should worry about losing control of the
terrorists' activities and, if the weaoons could be traced back
to that state, the near certainty of massive retaliation.
However, it is always difficult and sometimes dangerous to
attempt to predict the actions of a state. Moreover, a state in
chaos, or elements within such a state, might run these risks,
especially if the United States were engaged in military
conflict with that state or if the United States were
distracted by a major conflict in another area of the world.
The Commission was particularly concerned about the
persistent lack of adequate security and safeguards for the
nuclear material in the former Soviet Union (FSU). A Center for
Strategic International Studies panel chaired by former Senator
Sam Nunn concluded that, despite a decade of effort, the risk
of "loose nukes" is greater than ever. Another ominous
warning was given in 1995 when Chechen rebels, many of whom
fight side-by-side with Islamic terrorists from bin Ladin's
camps sympathetic to the Chechen cause, placed radioactive
material in a Moscow park.
Cyber attacks are often considered in the same context with
CBRN. Respectable experts have published sobering scenarios
about the potential impact of a successful cyber attack on the
United States. Already, hackers and criminals have exploited
some of our vulnerabilities.
Certainly, terrorists are making extensive use of the new
information technologies, and a conventional terrorist attack
along with a coordinated cyber attack could exponentially
compound the damage. While the Commission considers cyber
security a matter of grave importance, it also notes that the
measures needed to protect the United States from cyber attack
by terrorists are largely identical to those necessary to
protect us from such an attack by a hostile foreign country,
criminals, or vandals.
Not all terrorists are the same, but the groups most
dangerous to the United States share some characteristics not
seen 10 or 20 years ago:
They operate in the United States as well as abroad.
Their funding and logistical networks cross borders,
are less dependent on state sponsors, and are harder to
disrupt with economic sanctions.
They make use of widely available technologies to
communicate quickly and securely.
Their objectives are more deadly.
This changing nature of the terrorist threat raises the
stakes in getting American counterterrorist policies and
practices right.
Good Intelligence is the Best Weapon Against International Terrorism
Obtaining information about the identity, goals, plans, and
vulnerabilities of terrorists is extremely difficult. Yet, no
other single policy effort is more important for preventing,
preemepting, and responding to attacks.
The Commission has identified significant obstacles to the
collection and distribution of reliable information on
terroriswm to analysts and policymakers. These obstacles must
be removed.
In addition, this information, often collected at great
risk to agents and officers in the field, must be safeguarded.
Leaks of intelligence and law enforcement information reduce
its value, endanger sources, alienate friendly nations and
inhibit their cooperation, and jeopardize the U.S. Government's
ability to obtain further information.
Eliminate Barriers to Aggressive Collection of Information on
Terrorists
Complex bureaucratic procedures now in place send an
unmistakable message to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
officers in the field that recruiting clandestine sources of
terrorist information is encouraged in theory but discouraged
in practice.
Pursue a More Aggressive Strategy Against Terrorism
Since the 1980s, the United States has based its
counterterrorism policy on four pillars:
Make no consessions to terrorists and strike no
deals:
Bring terrorists to justice for their crimes:
Isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor
terrorism to force them to cange their behavior; and
Bolster the counterterrorism capabilities of
countries that work with the United States and require
assistance.
The government uses multiple tools to pursue this strategy.
Diplomacy is an important instrument, both in gaining the
assistance of other nations in particular cases and convincing
the international community to condemn and outlaw egregious
terrorist practices. Law enforcement is often invaluable in the
investigation and apprehension of terrorists. Military force
and covert action can often preempt or disrupt terrorist
attacks. But meeting the changing terrorist threat requires
more aggressive use of these tools and the development of new
policies and practices.
Prepare to Prevent or Respond to Catastrophic Terrorist Attacks
A terrorist attack in the United States using a biological
agent, deadly chemicals, or nuclear or radiological material,
even if only partially successful, would profoundly affect the
entire nation, as would a series of conventional attacks or a
single bombing that caused thousands of deaths. Given the trend
toward more deadly terrorist attacks and indications that mass
casualties are an objective of many of today's terrorists, it
is essential that America be fully prepared to prevent and
respond to this kind of catastrophic terrorism.
Over the past few years, the U.S. Government has taken a
number of positive steps. Several Presidential Directives have
effected major changes in organizational responsibilities and
improved cooperation. The Department of Health and Human
Services' Strategic Plan, the Attorney General's Five-Year
Plan, the establishment of a military Joint Task Force for
Civil Support, and improvement in first responders'
capabilities are valuable efforts, but there is still more to
do.
There is a risk that, in preventing or responding to a
catastrophic terrorist attack, officials may hesitate or act
improperly because they do not fully understand their legal
authority or because there are gaps in that authority.
There is some statutory authority that does not now exist
that should be considered for catastrophic conditions. For
example:
Federal quarantine authority cannot be used in a
situation that is confined to a single state.
Not all cities or states have their own quarantine
authority.
There is no clear federal authority with regard to
compelling vaccinations, or rationing scarce
vaccinations, or requiring autopsies when necessary for
a terrorism investigation.
The Constitution permits extraordinary measures in the face
of extraordinary threats, To prevent or respond to catastrophic
terrorism, law enforcement and public health officials have the
authority to conduct investigations and implement measures that
temporarily exceed measures applicable under non-emergency
conditions. These may include cordoning off of areas, vehicle
searches, certain medical measures, and sweep searches through
areas believed to contain weapons or terrorists.
Determining whether a particular measure is reasonable
requires balancing privacy and other rights against the public
interest in coping with a terrorist threat which may lead to
massive casualties. Advance preparation is the best way to deal
successfully with a terrorist incident without jeopardizing
individuals' Constitutional rights.
Recommendations:
The President should direct the preparation of a
manual on the implementation of existing legal
authority necessary to address effectively a
catastrophic terrorist threat or attack. The manual
should be distributed to the appropriate federal,
state, and local officials and be used in training,
exercises, and educational programs.
The President should determine whether any
additional legal authority is needed to deal with
catastrophic terrorism and make recommendations to
Congress if necessary.
The U.S. Government's plans for a catastrophic terrorist
attack on the United States do not employ the full range of the
Department of Defense's (DoD's) capabilities for managing large
operations. Additionally the interagency coordination and
cooperation required to integrate the DoD properly into
counterterrorism planning has not been accomplished.
The Department of Defense's ability to command and control
vast resources for dangerous, unstructured situations is
unmatched by any other department or agency. According to
current plans, DoD involvement is limited to supporting the
agencies that are currently designated as having the lead in a
terrorism crisis, the FBI and the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA). But, in extraordinary circumstances, when a
catastrophe is beyond the capabilities of local, state, and
other federal agencies, or is directly related to an armed
conflict overseas, the President may want to designate DoD as a
lead federal agency. This may become a critical operational
consideration in planning for future conflicts. Current plans
and exercises do not consider this possibility.
An expanded role for the DoD in a catastrophic terrorist
attack will have policy and legal implications. Other federal
agencies, the states, and local communities will have major
concerns. In preparing for such a contingency, there will also
be internal DoD issues on resources and possible conflicts with
traditional military contingency plans. These issues should be
addressed beforehand.
Effective preparation also requires effective organization.
The DoD is not optimally organized to respond to the wide range
of missions that would likely arise from the threat of a
catastrophic terrorist attack. For example, within DoD several
offices, departments, Unified Commands, the Army, and the
National Guard have overlapping responsibilities to plan and
execute operations in case of a catastrophic terrorist attack.
These operations will require an unprecedented degree of
interagency coordination and communication in order to be
successful.
There are neither plans for the DoD to assume a lead agency
role nor exercises rehearsing this capability. Hence, these
demanding tasks would have to be accomplished on an ad hoc
basis by the military.
Recommendations:
The President should direct the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs, in
coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the
Attorney General, to develope and adopt detailed
contingency plans that would transfer lead federal
agency authority to the Department of Defense if
necessary during a catastrophic terrorist attack or
prior to an imminent attack.
The Secretary of Defense should establish a unified
command structure that would integrate all catastrophic
terrorism capabilities and conduct detailed planning
and exercises with relevant federal, state, and local
authorities.
The interagency program and plan for exercising the
government's preparedness to respond to a catastrophic
terrorist attack is inadequate.
In addition to DoD exercises, a realistic interagency
exercise program, with full participation by all relevant
federal agencies and their leaders, is essential for national
preparedness to counter a catastrophic terrorist attack. In
June 1995, the President established an interagency
counterterrorist Exercise Subgroup and program which included
preparation for a catastrophic terrorist attack. However, not
all federal agencies have participated in or budgeted for these
exercises.
Additionally, in September 1998, Congress funded and
mandated the Department of Justice and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency to conduct a counterterrorism and consequence
management exercise, called TOPOFF, involving relevant federal
agencies and their senior leadership, with select state and
local governments participating, to evaluate the U.S.
Government's preparedness for a catastrophic terrorist
incident. However, sufficient funding was not provided and
there is no requirement to exercise on a regular schedule.
Recommendation:
The President should direct (1) the Exercise
Subgroup, under the direction of the national
coordinator for counterterrorism, to exercise annually
the government's responses to a catastrophic terrorism
crisis, including consequence management; and (2) all
relevant federal agencies to plan, budget and
participate in counterterrorism and consequence
management exercises coordinated by the Exercise
Subgroup and ensure senior officer level participation,
particularly in the annual exercises.
Given the urgency of near-term needs, long-term research
and development (R&D) projects on technologies useful to
fighting terrorism will be short-changed unless Congress and
the President can agree on special procedures and institutional
arrangements to work on research that is risky and has more
distant payoffs.
Research and Development spending for new technologies to
cope with catastrophic terrorism has significantly increased
over the past three years. Most of the funds, however, are
targeted on near-term improvements to meet immediate needs for
better detectors, more vaccines, and requirements of first
responders.
To prevent or cope with terrorist attacks in the future, in
particular attacks using CBRN agents, the U.S. Government must
make greater use of America's dominance in science and
technology. No other country, much less any subnational
organization, can match U.S. scientific and technological
prowess in biotechnology and pharmaceutical production and
quality control, electronics, computer science and other
domains that could help overcome and defeat the technologies
used by future terrorists. But this kind of R&D requires time--
five to ten years or more--to develop new ideas, test
hypotheses, craft preliminary applications, and test them.
Developing mass production for successful applications further
delays getting products into the hands of users.
The following list illustrates, but by no means exhausts,
the type of projects that could constitute a long-term R&D
program.
New sensors to detect nuclear weapons in transit
(e.g., gamma-ray imaging systems, including stimulation
to elicit detectable emissions).
High power ultraviolet beams to destroy BW agents
and to clean up contaminated areas.
New types of "tripwires" suitable for many
different entry-points (e.g., expolsive-sniffers, body-
scanners, and their proto-typing for mass-production.
Advanced development of anti-virals for smallpox.
The Commission considered several institutional
arrangements to manage long-term R&D. One option is
establishing a large program at one of the Department of Energy
(DoE) or other national laboratories to conduct in-house
research, contract for external research, initiate prototyping
for production, and involve qualified outside experts. This
last task is particularly important in the fields of
biotechnology and pharmaceutical production techniques. The
goal would be to attract talented biotechnology and
pharmaceutical industry scientists and engineers to work with
the government for one or two years on high priority projects.
Recommendation:
The President should establish a comprehensive and
coordinated long-term Research and Development program
to counter catastrophic terrorism.
Current controls on transfers of pathogens that could be
used in biological terrorism are inadequate and controls on
related equipment are nonexistent. In addition, current
programs of the Department of Health and Human Services are not
adequate to ensure physical security of pathogens or to monitor
disease outbreaks overseas.
Terrorists, without serious risk of detection, could obtain
pathogens from domestic natural sources, steal them, or import
them into the United States. Most pathogens in the United
States are tightly controlled, but regulation of laboratories
as well as of dangerous agents during transport are designed to
prevent accidents, not theft. Moreover, these controls are not
as rigorous as controls over nuclear material.
Creating pathogens small and sturdy enough to disperse
broadly over a target population for an effective period of
time remains, fortunately, a complex process. Thus, regulating
the sophisticated equipment required to turn pathogens into
weapons could hamper terrorist efforts to acquire this
capability.
However, no regulatory scheme is foolproof. Moreover,
contagious diseases do not require sophisticated dispersion
devices. Thus, it is important to have the ability to detect
outbreaks of infectious diseases and to distinguish
bioterrorist attacks from natural outbreaks. Some detection and
analytical systems are in place domestically, but the
international community's ability to distinguish natural
disease from terrorism lags far behind even these modest U.S.
efforts.
Recommendations:
The Secretary of Health and Human Services should
strengthen physical security standards applicable to
the storage, creation, and transport of pathogens in
research laboratories and other certified facilities in
order to protect against theft or diversion. These
standards should be as rigorous as the physical
protection and security measures applicable to critical
nuclear materials.
The Congress should:
--Make possession of designated critical pathagens illegal
for anyone who is not properly certified.
--Control domestic sale and transfer of equipment critical
to the development or use of biological agents by
certifying legitimate users of critical equipment and
prohibiting sales of such equipment to non-certified
entities.
--Require tagging of critical equipment to enable law
enforcement to identify its location.
The Secretary of Health and Human Services, working
with the Department of State, should develop an
international monitoring program to provide early
warning of infectious disease outbreaks and possible
terrorist experimentation with biological substances.
=======================================================================
ROAD MAP FOR NATIONAL SECURITY: IMPERATIVE FOR CHANGE
The Phase III Report of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st
Century
Excerpt on "Securing the National Homeland"
February 15, 2001
=======================================================================
U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Disclaimer: This Commission has striven successfully to achieve
consensus on all major issues, and each Commissioner stands by all the
major recommendations made in this report. However, as is to be
expected when discussing complex issues, not every Commissioner agrees
completely with every statement in the text that follows.
Gary Hart Warren B. Rudman
Co-Chair Co-Chair
Anne Armstrong Norman R. Augustine
Commissioner Commissioner
John Dancy John R. Galvin
Commissioner Commissioner
Leslie H. Gelb Newt Gingrich
Commissioner Commissioner
Lee H. Hamilton Lionel H. Olmer
Commissioner Commissioner
Donald B. Rice James Schlesinger
Commissioner Commissioner
Harry D. Train Andrew Young
Commissioner Commissioner
Charles G. Boyd, Executive Director
Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change
----------
I. Securing the National Homeland
One of this Commission's most important conclusions in its
Phase I report was that attacks against American citizens on
American soil, possibly causing heavy casualties, are likely
over the next quarter century.\7\ This is because both the
technical means for such attacks, and the array of actors who
might use such means, are proliferating despite the best
efforts of American diplomacy.
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\7\ See New World Coming, p. 4, and the Report of the National
Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st
Century (Washington, DC: December 1997), p. 17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These attacks may involve weapons of mass destruction and
weapons of mass disruption. As porous as U.S. physical borders
are in an age of burgeoning trade and travel, its "cyber
borders" are even more porous--and the critical infrastructure
upon which so much of the U.S. economy depends can now be
targeted by non-state and state actors alike. America's present
global predominance does not render it immune from these
dangers. To the contrary, U.S. preeminence makes the American
homeland more appealing as a target, while America's openness
and freedoms make it more vulnerable.
Notwithstanding a growing consensus on the seriousness of
the threat to the homeland posed by weapons of mass destruction
and disruption, the U.S. government has not adopted homeland
security as a primary national security mission. Its structures
and strategies are fragmented and inadequate. The President
must therefore both develop a comprehensive strategy and
propose new organizational structures to prevent and protect
against attacks on the homeland, and to respond to such attacks
if prevention and protection should fail.
Any reorganization must be mindful of the scale of the
scenarios we envision and the enormity of their consequences.
We need orders-of-magnitude improvements in planning,
coordination, and exercise. The govemment must also be prepared
to use effectively--albeit with all proper safeguards--the
extensive resources of the Department of Defense. This will
necessitate new priorities for the U.S. armed forces and
particularly, in our view, for the National Guard.
The United States is today very poorly organized to design
and implement any comprehensive strategy to protect the
homeland. The assets and organizations that now exist for
homeland security are scattered across more than two dozen
departments and agencies, and all fifty states. The Executive
Branch, with the full participation of Congress, needs to
realign, refine, and rationalize these assets into a coherent
whole, or even the best strategy will lack an adequate vehicle
for implementation.
This Commission believes that the security of the American
homeland from the threats of the new century should be the
primary national security mission of the U.S. government. While
the Executive Branch must take the lead in dealing with the
many policy and structural issues involved, Congress is a
partner of critical importance in this effort. It must find
ways to address homeland security issues that bridge current
gaps in organization, oversight, and authority, and that
resolve conflicting claims to jurisdiction within both the
Senate and the House of Representatives and also between them.
Congress is crucial, as well, for guaranteeing that
homeland security is achieved within a framework of law that
protects the civil liberties and privacy of American citizens.
We are confident that the U.S. government can enhance national
security without compromising established Constitutional
principles. But in order to guarantee this, we must plan ahead.
In a major attack involving contagious biological agents, for
example, citizen cooperation with government authorities will
depend on public confidence that those authorities can manage
the emergency. If that confidence is lacking, panic and
disorder could lead to insistent demands for the temporary
suspension of some civil liberties. That is why preparing for
the worst is essential to protecting individual freedoms during
a national crisis.
Legislative guidance for planning among federal agencies
and state and local authorities must take particular cognizance
of the role of the Defense Department. Its subordination to
civil authority needs to be clearly defined in advance.
In short, advances in technology have created new
dimensions to our nation's economic and physical security.
While some new threats can be met with traditional responses,
others cannot. More needs to be done in three areas to prevent
the territory and infrastructure of the United States from
becoming easy and tempting targets: in strategy, in
organizational realignment, and in Executive-Legislative
cooperation. We take these areas in turn.
A. THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK
A homeland security strategy to minimize the threat of
intimidation and loss of life is an essential support for an
international leadership role for the United States. Homeland
security is not peripheral to U.S. national security strategy
but central to it. At this point, national leaders have not
agreed on a clear strategy for homeland security, a condition
this Commission finds dangerous and intolerable. We therefore
recommend the following:
1: The President should develop a comprehensive
strategy to heighten America's ability to prevent and protect
against all forms of attack on the homeland, and to respond to
such attacks if prevention and protection fail.
In our view, the President should:
Give new priority in his overall national security
strategy to homeland security, and make it a central
concern for incoming officials in all Executive Branch
departments, particularly the intelligence and law
enforcement communities;
Calmly prepare the American people for prospective
threats, and increase their awareness of what federal
and state governments are doing to prevent attacks and
to protect them if prevention fails;
Put in place new government organizations and
processes, eliminating where possible staff duplication
and mission overlap; and
Encourage Congress to establish new mechanisms to
facilitate closer cooperation between the Executive and
Legislative Branches of government on this vital issue.
We believe that homeland security can best be assured
through a strategy of layered defense that focuses first on
prevention, second on protection, and third on response.
Prevention.--Preventing a potential attack comes first.
Since the occurrence of even one event that causes catastrophic
loss of life would represent an unacceptable failure of policy,
U.S. strategy should therefore act as far forward as possible
to prevent attacks on the homeland. This strategy has at its
disposal three essential instruments.
Most broadly, the first instrument is U.S. diplomacy. U.S.
foreign policy should strive to shape an international system
in which just grievances can be addressed without violence.
Diplomatic efforts to develop friendly and trusting relations
with foreign governments and their people can significantly
multiply America's chances of gaining early warning of
potential attack and of doing something about impending
threats. Intelligence-sharing with foreign governments is
crucial to help identify individuals and groups who might be
considering attacks on the United States or its allies.
Cooperative foreign law enforcement agencies can detain,
arrest, and prosecute terrorists on their own soil. Diplomatic
success in resolving overseas conflicts that spawn terrorist
activities will help in the long run.
Meanwhile, verifiable arms control and nonproliferation
efforts must remain a top priority. These policies can help
persuade states and terrorists to abjure weapons of mass
destruction and to prevent the export of fissile materials and
dangerous dual-use technologies. But such measures cannot by
themselves prevent proliferation. So other measures are needed,
including the possibility of punitive measures and defenses.
The United States should take a lead role in strengthening
multilateral organizations such as the International Atomic
Energy Agency.
In addition, increased vigilance against international
crime syndicates is also important because many terrorist
organizations gain resources and other assets through criminal
activity that they then use to mount terrorist operations.
Dealing with international organized crime requires not only
better cooperation with other countries, but also among
agencies of the federal government. While progress has been
made on this front in recent years, more remains to be done.\8\
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\8\ See International Crime Threat Assessment (Washington, DC: The
White House, December 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The second instrument of homeland security consists of the
U.S. diplomatic, intelligence, and military presence overseas.
Knowing the who, where, and how of a potential physical or
cyber attack is the key to stopping a strike before it can be
delivered. Diplomatic, intelligence, and military agencies
overseas, as well as law enforcement agencies working abroad,
are America's primary eyes and ears on the ground. But
increased public-private efforts to enhance security processes
within the international transportation and logistics networks
that bring people and goods to America are also of critical and
growing importance.
Vigilant systems of border security and surveillance are a
third instrument that can prevent those agents of attack who
are not detected and stopped overseas from actually entering
the United States. Agencies such as the U.S. Customs Service
and U.S. Coast Guard have a critical prevention role to play.
Terrorists and criminals are finding that the difficulty of
policing the rising daily volume and velocities of people and
goods that cross U.S. borders makes it easier for them to
smuggle weapons and contraband, and to move their operatives
into and out of the United States. Improving the capacity of
border control agencies to identify and intercept potential
threats without creating barriers to efficient trade and travel
requires a sub-strategy also with three elements.
First is the development of new transportation security
procedures and practices designed to reduce the risk that
importers, exporters, freight forwarders, and transportation
carriers will serve as unwitting conduits for criminal or
terrorist activities. Second is bolstering the intelligence
gathering, data management, and information sharing
capabilities of border control agencies to improve their
ability to target high-risk goods and people for inspection.
Third is strengthening the capabilities of border control
agencies to arrest terrorists or interdict dangerous shipments
before they arrive on U.S. soil.
These three measures, which place a premium on public-
private partnerships, will pay for themselves in short order.
They will allow for the more efficient allocation of limited
enforcement resources along U.S. borders. There will be fewer
disruptive inspections at ports of entry for legitimate
businesses and travelers. They will lead to reduced theft and
insurance costs, as well. Most important, the underlying
philosophy of this approach is one that balances prudence, on
the one hand, with American values of openness and free trade
on the other.\9\ To shield America from the world out of fear
of terrorism is, in large part, to do the terrorists' work for
them. To continue business as usual, however, is irresponsible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Note in this regard Stephen B. Flynn, "Beyond Border
Control," Foreign Affairs (November/December 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The same may be said for our growing cyber problems.
Protecting our nation's critical infrastructure depends on
greater public awareness and improvements in our tools to
detect and diagnose intrusions. This will require better
information sharing among all federal, state, and local
governments as well as with private sector owners and
operators. The federal government has these specific tasks:
To serve as a model for the private sector by
improving its own security practices;
To address known government security problems on a
system-wide basis;
To identify and map network interdependencies so
that harmful cascading effects among systems can be
prevented;
To sponsor vulnerability assessments within both the
federal government and the private sector; and
To design and carry out simulations and exercises
that test information system security across the
nation's entire infrastructure.
Preventing attacks on the American homeland also requires
that the United States maintain long-range strike capabilities.
The United States must bolster deterrence by making clear its
determination to use military force in a preemptive fashion if
necessary. Even the most hostile state sponsors of terrorism,
or terrorists themselves, will think twice about harming
Americans and American allies and interests if they fear direct
and severe U.S. attack after--or before--the fact. Such
capabilities will strengthen deterrence even if they never have
to be used.
Protection.--The Defense Department undertakes many
different activities that serve to protect the American
homeland, and these should be integrated into an overall
surveillance system, buttressed with additional resources. A
ballistic missile defense system would be a useful addition and
should be developed to the extent technically feasible,
fiscally prudent, and politically sustainable. Defenses should
also be pursued against cruise missiles and other sophisticated
atmospheric weapon technologies as they become more widely
deployed. While both active duty and reserve forces are
involved in these activities, the Commission believes that more
can and should be done by the National Guard, as is discussed
in more detail below.
Protecting the nation's critical infrastructure and
providing cyber-security must also include:
Advanced indication, warning, and attack
assessments;
A warning system that includes voluntary, immediate
private-sector reporting of potential attacks to enable
other private-sector targets (and the U.S. government)
better to take protective action; and
Advanced systems for halting attacks, establishing
backups, and restoring service.
Response.--Managing the consequences of a catastrophic
attack on the U.S. homeland would be a complex and difficult
process. The first priority should be to build up and augment
state and local response capabilities. Adequate equipment must
be available to first responders in local communities.
Procedures and guidelines need to be defined and disseminated
and then practiced through simulations and exercises.
Interoperable, robust, and redundant communications
capabilities are a must in recovering from any disaster.
Continuity of government and critical services must be ensured
as well. Demonstrating effective responses to natural and
manmade disasters will also help to build mutual confidence and
relationships among those with roles in dealing with a major
terrorist attack.
All of this puts a premium on making sure that the
disparate organizations involved with homeland security--on
various levels of government and in the private sector--can
work together effectively. We are frankly skeptical that the
U.S. government, as it exists today, can respond effectively to
the scale of danger and damage that may come upon us during the
next quarter century. This leads us, then, to our second task:
that of organizational realignment.
B. ORGANIZATIONAL REALIGNMENT
Responsibility for homeland security resides at all levels
of the U.S. government--local, state, and federal. Within the
federal government, almost every agency and department is
involved in some aspect of homeland security. None have been
organized to focus on the scale of the contemporary threat to
the homeland, however. This Commission urges an organizational
realignment that:
Designates a single person, accountable to the
President, to be responsible for coordinating and
overseeing various U.S. government activities related
to homeland security;
Consolidates certain homeland security activities to
improve their effectiveness and coherence;
Establishes planning mechanisms to define clearly
specific responses to specific types of threats; and
Ensure that the appropriate resources and
capabilities are available.
Therefore, this Commission strongly recommends the
following:
2: The President should propose, and Congress should
agree to create, a National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA)
with responsibility for planning, coordinating, and integrating
various U.S. government activities involved in homeland
security. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) should
be a key building block in this effort.
Given the multiplicity of agencies and activities involved
in these homeland security tasks, someone needs to be
responsible and accountable to the President not only to
coordinate the making of policy, but also to oversee its
implementation. This argues against assigning the role to a
senior person on the National Security Council (NSC) staff and
for the creation of a separate agency. This agency would give
priority to overall planning while relying primarily on others
to carry out those plans. To give this agency sufficient
stature within the government, its director would be a member
of the Cabinet and a statutory advisor to the National Security
Council. The position would require Senate confirmation.
Notwithstanding NHSA's responsibilities, the National
Security Council would still play a strategic role in planning
and coordinating all homeland security activities. This would
include those of NHSA as well as those that remain separate,
whether they involve other NSC members or other agencies, such
as the Centers for Disease Control within the Department of
Health and Human Services.
We propose building the National Homeland Security Agency
upon the capabilities of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), an existing federal agency that has performed
well in recent years, especially in responding to natural
disasters. NHSA would be legislatively chartered to provide a
focal point for all natural and manmade crisis and emergency
planning scenarios. It would retain and strengthen FEMA's ten
existing regional offices as a core element of its
organizational structure.
While FEMA is the necessary core of the National Homeland
Security Agency, it is not sufficient to do what NHSA needs to
do. In particular, patrolling U.S. borders, and policing the
flows of peoples and goods through the hundreds of ports of
entry, must receive higher priority. These activities need to
be better integrated, but efforts toward that end are hindered
by the fact that the three organizations on the front line of
border security are spread across three different U.S. Cabinet
departments. The Coast Guard works under the Secretary of
Transportation, the Customs Service is located in the
Department of the Treasury, and the, Immigration and
Naturalization Service oversees the Border Patrol in the
Department of Justice. In each case, the border defense agency
is far from the mainstream of its parent department's agenda
and consequently receives limited attention from the
department's senior officials. We therefore recommend the
following:
3: The President should propose to Congress the
transfer of the Customs Service, the Border Patrol, and Coast
Guard to the National Homeland Security Agency, while
preserving them as distinct entities.
Bringing these organizations together under one agency will
create important synergies. Their individual capabilities will
be molded into a stronger and more effective system, and this
realignment will help ensure that sufficient resources are
devoted to tasks crucial to both public safety and U.S. trade
and economic interests. Consolidating overhead, training
programs, and maintenance of the aircraft, boats, and
helicopters that these three agencies employ will save money,
and further efficiencies could be realized with regard to other
resources such as information technology, communications
equipment, and dedicated sensors. Bringing these separate, but
complementary, activities together will also facilitate more
effective Executive and Legislative oversight, and help
rationalize the process of budget preparation, analysis, and
presentation.
Steps must be also taken to strengthen these three
individual organizations themselves. The Customs Service, the
Border Patrol, and the Coast Guard are all on the verge of
being overwhelmed by the mismatch between their growing duties
and their mostly static resources.
The Customs Service, for example, is charged with
preventing contraband from entering the United States. It is
also responsible for preventing terrorists from using the
commercial or private transportation venues of international
trade for smuggling explosives or weapons of mass destruction
into or out of the United States. The Customs Service, however,
retains only a modest air, land, and marine interdiction force,
and its investigative component, supported by its own
intelligence branch, is similarly modest. The high volume of
conveyances, cargo, and passengers arriving in the United
States each year already overwhelms the Customs Service's
capabilities. Over $8.8 billion worth of goods, over 1.3
million people, over 340,000 vehicles, and over 58,000
shipments are processed daily at entry points. Of this volume,
Customs can inspect only one to two percent of all inbound
shipments. The volume of U.S. international trade, measured in
terms of dollars and containers, has doubled since 1995, and it
may well double again between now and 2005.
Therefore, this Commission believes that an improved
computer information capability and tracking system--as well as
upgraded equipment that can detect both conventional and
nuclear explosives, and chemical and biological agents--would
be a wise short-term investment with important long-term
benefits. It would also raise the risk for criminals seeking to
target or exploit importers and cargo carriers for illicit
gains.\10\
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\10\ See the Report of the Interagency Commission on Crime and
Security in U.S. Seaports (Washington, DC: Fall 2000).
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The Border Patrol is the uniformed arm of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service. Its mission is the detection and
prevention of illegal entry into the United States. It works
primarily between ports of entry and patrols the borders by
various means. There has been a debate for many years about
whether the dual functions of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service--border control and enforcement on the
one side, and immigration facilitation on the other--should be
joined under the same roof. The U.S. Commission on Immigration
Reform concluded that they should not be joined.\11\ We agree:
the Border Patrol should become part of the NHSA.
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\11\ See the Report of the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform
(Washington, DC: 1997).
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The U.S. Coast Guard is a highly disciplined force with
multiple missions and a natural role to play in homeland
security. It performs maritime search and rescue missions,
manages vessel traffic, enforces U.S. environmental and fishery
laws, and interdicts and searches vessels suspected of carrying
illegal aliens, drugs, and other contraband. En a time of war,
it also works with the Navy to protect U.S. ports from attack.
Indeed, in many respects, the Coast Guard is a model
homeland security agency given its unique blend of law
enforcement, regulatory, and military authorities that allow it
to operate within, across, and beyond U.S. borders. It
accomplishes its many missions by routinely working with
numerous local, regional, national, and international agencies,
and by forging and maintaining constructive relationships with
a diverse group of private, non-governmental, and public
marine-related organizations. As the fifth armed service, in
peace and war, it has national defense missions that include
port security, overseeing the defense of coastal waters, and
supporting and integrating its forces with those of the Navy
and the other services.
The case for preserving and enhancing the Coast Guard's
multi-mission capabilities is compelling. But its crucial role
in protecting national interests close to home has not been
adequately appreciated, and this has resulted in serious and
growing readiness concerns. U.S. Coast Guard ships and aircraft
are aging and technologically obsolete; indeed; the Coast Guard
cutter fleet is older than 39 of the world's 41 major naval
fleets. As a result, the Coast Guard fleet generates excessive
operating and maintenance costs, and lacks essential
capabilities in speed, sensors, and interoperability. To
fulfill all of its missions, the Coast Guard requires updated
platforms with the staying power, in hazardous weather, to
remain offshore and fully operational throughout U.S. maritime
economic zones,\12\
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\12\ See Report of the Interagency Task Force on U.S. Coast Guard
Roles and Missions, A Coast Guard for the Twenty First-Century
(Washington, DC: December 1999).
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The Commission recommends strongly that Congress
recapitalize the Customs Service, the Border Patrol, and the
Coast Guard so that they can confidently perform key homeland
security roles.
NHSA's planning, coordinating, and overseeing activities
would be undertaken through three staff Directorates. The
Directorate of Prevention would oversee and coordinate the
various border security activities, as discussed above. A
Directorate of Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) would
handle the growing cyber threat. FEMA's emergency preparedness
and response activities would be strengthened in a third
directorate to cover both natural and manmade disasters. A
Science and Technology office would advise the NHSA Director on
research and development efforts and priorities for all three
directorates.
Relatively small permanent staffs would man the
directorates. NHSA will employ FEMA's principle of working
effectively with state and local governments, as well as with
other federal organizations, stressing interagency
coordination. Much of NHSA's daily work will take place
directly supporting state officials in its regional offices
around the country. Its organizational infrastructure will not
be heavily centered in the Washington, DC area.
NHSA would also house a National Crisis Action Center
(NCAC), which would become the nation's focal point for
monitoring emergencies and for coordinating federal support in
a crisis to state and local governments, as well as to the
private sector. We envision the center to be an interagency
operation, directed by a two-star National Guard general, with
full-time representation from the other federal agencies
involved in homeland security.
NHSA will require a particularly close working relationship
with the Department of Defense. It will need also to create and
maintain strong mechanisms for the sharing of information and
intelligence with U.S. domestic and international intelligence
entities. We suggest that NHSA have liaison officers in the
counter-terrorism centers of both the FBI and the CIA.
Additionally, the sharing of information with business and
industry on threats to critical infrastructures requires
further expansion.
NHSA will also assume responsibility for overseeing the
protection of the nation's critical infrastructure.
Considerable progress has been made in implementing the
recommendations of the President's Commission on Critical
Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) and Presidential Decision
Directive 63 (PDD-63). But more needs to be done, for the
United States has real and growing problems in this area.
U.S. dependence on increasingly sophisticated and more
concentrated critical infrastructures has increased
dramatically over the past decade. Electrical utilities, water
and sewage systems, transportation networks, and communications
and energy systems now depend on computers to provide safe,
efficient, and reliable service. The banking and finance
sector, too, keeps track of millions of transactions through
increasingly robust computer capabilities.
The overwhelming majority of these computer systems are
privately owned, and many operate at or very near capacity with
little or no provision for manual back-ups in an emergency.
Moreover, the computerized information networks that link
systems together are themselves vulnerable to unwanted
intrusion and disruption. An attack on any one of several
highly interdependent networks can cause collateral damage to
other networks and the systems they connect. Some forms of
disruption will lead merely to nuisance and economic loss, but
other forms will jeopardize lives. One need only note the
dependence of hospitals, air-traffic control systems, and the
food processing industry on computer controls to appreciate the
point.
The bulk of unclassified military communications, too,
relies on systems almost entirely owned and operated by the
private sector. Yet little has been done to assure the security
and reliability of those communications in crisis. Current
efforts to prevent attacks, protect against theft most damaging
effects, and prepare for prompt response are uneven at best,
and this is dangerous because a determined adversary is most
likely to employ a weapon of mass disruption during a homeland
security or foreign policy crisis.
As noted above, a Directorate for Critical Infrastructure
Protection would be an integral part of the National Homeland
Security Agency. This directorate would have two vital
responsibilities. First would be to oversee the physical assets
and information networks that make up the U.S. critical
infrastructure. It should ensure the maintenance of a nucleus
of cyber security expertise within the government, as well.
There is now an alarming shortage of government cyber security
experts due in large part to the financial attraction of
private-sector employment that the government cannot match
under present personnel procedures.\13\ The director's second
responsibility would be as the Critical Information Technology,
Assurance, and Security Office (CITASO). This office would
coordinate efforts to address the nation's vulnerability to
electronic or physical attacks on critical infrastructure.
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\13\ We return to this problem below in Section IV.13
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Several critical activities that are currently spread among
various government agencies and the private sector should be
brought together for this purpose. These include:
Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs),
which are government-sponsored committees of private-
sector participants who work to share information,
plans, and procedures for information security in their
fields;
The Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO),
currently housed in the Commerce Department, which
develops outreach and awareness programs with the
private sector;
The National Infrastructure Protection Center
(NIPC), currently housed in the FBI, which gathers
information and provides warnings of cyber attacks; and
The Institute for Information Infrastructure
Protection (I3P), also in the Commerce Department,
which is designed to coordinate and support research
and development projects on cyber security.
In partnership with the private sector where most cyber
assets are developed and owned, the Critical Infrastructure
Protection Directorate would be responsible for enhancing
information sharing on cyber and physical security, tracking
vulnerabilities and proposing improved risk management
policies, and delineating the roles of various government
agencies in preventing, defending, and recovering from attacks.
To do this, the government needs to institutionalize better its
private-sector liaison across the board--with the owners and
operators of critical infrastructures, hardware and software
developers, server/service providers, manufacturers/producers,
and applied technology developers.
The Critical Infrastructure Protection Directorate's work
with the private sector must include a strong advocacy of
greater government and corporate investment in information
assurance and security. The CITASO would be the focal point for
coordinating with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
in helping to establish cyber policy, standards, and
enforcement mechanisms. Working closely with the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) and its Chief Information Officer
Council (CIO Council), the CITASO needs to speak for those
interests in government councils.\14\ The CITASO must also
provide incentives for private-sector participation in
Information Sharing and Analysis Centers to share information
on threats, vulnerabilities, and individual incidents, to
identify interdependencies, and to map the potential cascading
effects of outages in various sectors.
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\14\ The Chief Information Officer Council is a government
organization consisting of all the statutory Chief Information Officers
in the government. It is located within OMB under the Deputy Director
for Management.
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The directorate also needs to help coordinate cyber
security issues internationally. At present, the FCC handles
international cyber issues for the U.S. government through the
International Telecommunications Union, As this is one of many
related international issues, it would be unwise to remove this
responsibility from the FCC. Nevertheless, the CIP Directorate
should work closely with the FCC on cyber issues in
international bodies.
The mission of the NHSA must include specific planning and
operational tasks to be staffed through the Directorate for
Emergency Preparedness and Response. These include:
Setting training and equipment standards, providing
resource grants, and encouraging intelligence and
information sharing among state emergency management
officials, local fast responders, the Defense
Department, and the FBI;
Integrating the various activities of the Defense
Department, the National Guard, and other federal
agencies into the Federal Response Plan; and
Pulling together private sector activities,
including those of the medical community, on recovery,
consequence management, and planning for continuity of
services.
Working with state officials, the emergency management
community, and the law enforcement community, the job of NHSA's
third directorate will be to rationalize and refine the
nation's incident response system. The current distinction
between crisis management and consequence management is neither
sustainable nor wise. The duplicative command arrangements that
have been fostered by this division are prone to confusion and
delay. NHSA should develop and manage a single response system
for national incidents, in close coordination with the
Department of Justice (DoJ) and the FBI. This would require
that the current policy, which specifies initial DoJ control in
terrorist incidents on U.S. territory, be amended once Congress
creates NHSA. We believe that this arrangement would in no way
contradict or diminish the FBI's traditional role with respect
to law enforcement.
The Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate should
also assume a major resource and budget role. WIth the help of
the Office of Management and Budget, the directorate's first
task will be to figure out what is being spent on homeland
security in the various departments and agencies. Only with
such an overview can the nation identify the shortfalls between
capabilities and requirements. Such a mission budget should be
included in the President's overall budget submission to
Congress. The Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate
will also maintain federal asset databases and encourage and
support up-to-date state and local databases.
FEMA has adapted well to new circumstances over the past
few years and has gained a well-deserved reputation for
responsiveness to both natural and manmade disasters. While
taking on homeland security responsibilities, the proposed NHSA
would strengthen FEMA's ability to respond to such disasters.
It would streamline the federal apparatus and provide greater
support to the state and local officials who, as the nation's
first responders, possess enormous expertise. To the greatest
extent possible, federal programs should build upon the
expertise and existing programs of state emergency preparedness
systems and help promote regional compacts to share resources
and capabilities.
To help simplify federal support mechanisms, we recommend
transferring the National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO),
currently housed at the FBI, to the National Homeland Security
Agency. The Commission believes that this transfer to FEMA
should be done at first opportunity, even before NHSA is up and
running.
The NDPO would be tasked with organizing the training of
local responders and providing local and state authorities with
equipment for detection, protection, and decontamination in a
V/MD emergency. NUSA would develop the policies, requirements,
and priorities as part of its planning tasks as well as oversee
the various federal, state, and local training and exercise
programs. In this way, a single staff would provide federal
assistance for any emergency, whether it is caused by flood,
earthquake, hurricane, disease, or terrorist bomb.
A WMD incident on American soil is likely to overwhelm
local fire and rescue squads, medical facilities, and
government services. Attacks may contaminate water, food, and
air; large-scale evacuations may be necessary and casualties could be extensive.
Since getting prompt help to those who need it would be a
complex and massive operation requiring federal support, such
operations must be extensively planned in advance.
Responsibilities need to be assigned and procedures put in
place for these responsibilities to evolve if the situation
worsens.
As we envision it, state officials will take the initial
lead in responding to a crisis. NHSA will normally use its
Regional Directors to coordinate federal assistance, while the
National Crisis Action Center will monitor ongoing operations
and requirements. Should a crisis overwhelm local assets, state
officials will turn to NHSA for additional federal assistance.
In major crises, upon the recommendation of the civilian
Director of NHSA, the President will designate a senior
figure--a Federal Coordinating Officer--to assume direction of
all federal activities on the scene. If the situation warrants,
a state governor can ask that active military forces reinforce
National Guard units already on the scene. Once the President
federalizes National Guard forces, or if he decides to use
Reserve forces, the Joint Forces Command will assume
responsibility for all military operations, acting through
designated task force commanders. At the same time, the
Secretary of Defense would appoint a Defense Coordinating
Officer to provide civilian oversight and ensure prompt civil
support. This person would work for the Federal Coordinating
Officer.
To be capable of carrying out its responsibilities under
extreme circumstances, NHSA will need to undertake robust
exercise programs and regular training to gain experience and
to establish effective command and control procedures. It will
be essential to update regularly the Federal Response Plan. It
will be especially critical for NHSA officials to undertake
detailed planning and exercises for the full range of potential
contingencies, including ones that require the substantial
involvement ofmililary assets in support.
NHSA will provide the overarching structure for homeland
security, but other government agencies will retain specific
homeland security tasks. We take the necessary obligations of
the major ones in turn.
Intelligence Community. Good intelligence is the key to
preventing attacks on the homeland and homeland security should
become one of the intelligence community's most important
missions.\15\ Better human intelligence must supplement
technical intelligence, especially on terrorist groups covertly
supported by states. As noted above, fuller cooperation and
more extensive information-sharing with friendly governments
will also improve the chances that would-be perpetrators will
be detained, arrested, and prosecuted before they ever reach
U.S. borders.
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\15\ We return to this issue in our discussion of the Intelligence
Community in Section IlI.F., particularly in recommendation 37.
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The intelligence community also needs to embrace cyber
threats as a legitimate mission and to incorporate intelligence
gathering on potential strategic threats from abroad into its
activities.
To advance these ends, we offer the following
recommendation:
4: The President should ensure that the National
Intelligence Council: include homeland security and asymmetric
threats as an area of analysis; assign that portfolio to a
National Intelligence Officer; and produce National
Intelligence Estimates on these threats.
Department of State. U.S. embassies overseas are the
American people's first line of defense. U.S. Ambassadors must
make homeland security a top priority for all embassy staff,
and Ambassadors need the requisite authority to ensure that
information is shared in a way that maximizes advance warning
overseas of direct threats to the United States.
Ambassadors should also ensure that the gathering of
information, and particularly from open sources, takes full
advantage of all U.S. government resources abroad, including
diplomats, consular officers, military officers, and
reptesentatives of the various other departments and agencies.
The State Department should also strengthen its efforts to
acquire information from Americans living or travelling abroad
in private capacities.
The State Department has made good progress in its overseas
efforts to reduce terrorism, but we now need to extend this
effort into the Information Age. Working with NHSA's CIP
Directorate, the State Department should expand cooperation on
critical infrastructure protection with other states and
international organizations. Private sector initiatives,
particularly in the banking community, provide examples of
international cooperation on legal issues, standards, and
practices. Working with the CIP Directorate and the FCC, the
State Department should also encourage other governments to
criminalize hacking and electronic intrusions and to help track
hackers, computer virus proliferators, and cyber terrorists.
Department of Defense. The Defense Department, which has
placed its highest priority on preparing for major theater war,
should pay far more attention to the homeland security mission.
Organizationally, DoD responses are widely dispersed. An
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support has
responsibility for WMD incidents, while the Department of the
Army's Director of Military Support is responsible for non-WMD
contingencies. Such an arrangement does not provide clear lines
of authority and responsibility or ensure political
accountability. The Commission therefore recommends the
following:
5: The President should propose to Congress the
establishment of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Security within the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
reporting directly to the Secretary.
A new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security
would provide policy oversight for the various DoD activities
within the homeland security mission and ensure that mechanisms
are in place for coordinating military support in major
emergencies. He or she would work to integrate homeland
security into Defense Department planning, and ensure that
adequate resources are forthcoming. This Assistant Secretary
would also represent the Secretary in the NSC interagency
process on homeland security issues.
Along similar lines and for similar reasons, we also
recommend that the Defense Department broaden and strengthen
the existing Joint Forces Command/Joint Task Force-Civil
Support (JTF-CS) to coordinate military planning, doctrine and
command and control for military support for all hazards and
disasters.
This task force should be directed by a senior National
Guard general with additional headquarters personnel. JTF-CS
should contain several rapid reaction task forces, composed
largely of rapidly mobilizable National Guard units. The task
force should have command and control capabilities for multiple
incidents. Joint Forces Command should work with the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security to ensure the
provision of adequate resources and appropriate force
allocations, training, and equipment for civil support.
On the prevention side, maintaining strong nuclear and
conventional forces is as high a priority for homeland security
as it is for other missions. Shaping a peaceful international
environment and deterring hostile military actors remain sound
military goals. But deterrent forces may have little effect on
non-state groups secretly supported by states, or on
individuals with grievances real or imagined. In cases of clear
and imminent danger, the military must be able to take
preemptive action overseas in circumstances where local
authorities are unable or unwilling to act. For this purpose,
as noted above, the United States needs to be prepared to use
its rapid, long-range precision strike capabilities. A decision
to act would obviously rest in civilian hands, and would depend
on intelligence information and assessments of diplomatic
consequences. But even if a decision to strike preemptively is
never taken or needed, the capability should be available
nonetheless, for knowledge of it can contribute to deterrence.
We also suggest that the Defense Department broaden its
mission of protecting air, sea, and land approaches to the
United States, consistent with emerging threats such as the
potential proliferation of cruise missiles. The department
should examine alternative means of monitoring approaches to
the territorial United States. Modern information technology
and sophisticated sensors can help monitor the high volumes of
traffic to and from the United States. Given the volume of
legitimate activities near and on the border, even modern
infonnation technology and remote sensors cannot filter the
good from the bad as a matter of routine. It is neither wise
nor possible to create a surveillance umbrella over the United
States. But Defense Department assets can be used to support
detection, monitoring, and even interception operations when
intelligence indicates a specific threat.
Finally, a better division of labor and understanding of
responsibilities is essential in dealing with the connectivity
and interdependence of U.S. critical infrastructure systems.
This includes addressing the nature of a national
transportation network or cyber emergency and the Defense
Department's role in prevention, detection, or protection of
the national critical infrastructure. The department's sealift
and airlift plans are premised on largely unquestioned
assumptions that domestic transportation systems will be fully
available to support mobilization requirements. The department
also is paying insufficient attention to the vulnerability of
its information networks. Currently, the department's computer
network defense task force (JTF-Computer Network Defense) is
underfunded and understaffed for the task of managing an actual
strategic information warfare attack. It should be given the
resources to carry out its current mission and is a logical
source of advice to the proposed NHSA Critical Information
Technology, Assurance, and Security Office.
National Guard. The National Guard, whose origins are to be
found in the state militias authorized by the U.S.
Constitution, should play a central role in the response
component of a layered defense strategy for homeland security.
We therefore recommend the following:
6: The Secretary of Defense, at the President's
direction, should make homeland security a primary mission of
the National Guard, and the Guard should be organized, properly
trained, and adequately equipped to undertake that mission.
At present, the Army National Guard is primarily organized
and equipped to conduct sustained combat overseas. In this the
Guard fulfills a strategic reserve role, augmenting the active
military during overseas contingencies. At the same time, the
Guard carries out many state-level missions for disaster and
humanitarian relief, as well as consequence management. For
these, it relies upon the discipline, equipment, and leadership
of its combat forces. The National Guard should redistribute
resources currently allocated predominantly to preparing for
conventional wars overseas to provide greater support to civil
authorities in preparing for and responding to disasters,
especially emergencies involving weapons of mass destruction.
Such a redistribution should flow from a detailed
assessment of force requirements for both theater war and
homeland tecurity contingencies. The Department of Defense
should conduct such an assessment, with the participation of
the state governors and the NHSA Director. In setting
requirements, the department should minimize forces with dual
missions or reliance on active forces detailed for major
theater war. This is because the United States will need to
maintain a heightened deterrent and defensive posture against
homeland attacks during regional contingencies abroad. The most
likely timing of a major terrorist incident will be while the
United States is involved in a conflict overseas.\16\
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\16\ See the Report of the National Defense University Quadrennial
Defense Review 2001 Working Group (Washington, DC: Institute for
National Strategic Studies, November 2000), p. 60.
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The National Guard is designated as the primary Department
of Defense agency for disaster relief. In many cases, the
National Guard will respond as a state asset under the control
of state governors. While it is appropriate for the National
Guard to play the lead military role in managing the
consequences of a WMD attack, its capabilities to do so are
uneven and in some cases its forces are not adequately
structured or equipped. Twenty-two WMD Civil Support Teams,
made up of trained and equipped full-time National Guard
personnel, will be ready to deploy rapidly, assist local first
responders, provide technical advice, and pave the way for
additional military help. These teams fill a vital need, but
more effort is required.
This Commission recommends that the National Guard be
directed to fulfill its historic and Constitutional mission of
homeland security. It should provide a mobilization base with
strong local ties and support. It is already "forward
deployed" to achieve this mission and should:
Participate in and initiate, where necessary, state,
local, and regional planning for responding to a WMD
incident;
Train and help organize local first responders;
Maintain up-to-date inventories of military
resources and equipment available in the area on short
notice;
Plan for rapid inter-state support and
reinforcement; and
Develop an overseas capability for international
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
In this way, the National Guard will become a critical
asset for homeland security.
Medical Community. The medical community has critical roles
to play in homeland security. Catastrophic acts of terrorism or
violence could cause casualties far beyond any imagined
heretofore. Most of the American medical system is privately
owned and now operates at close to capacity. An incident
involving WMD will quickly overwhelm the capacities of local
hospitals and emergency management professionals.
In response, the National Security Council, FEMA, and the
Department of Health and Human Services have already begun a
reassessment of their programs. Research to develop better
diagnostic equipment and immune-enhancing drugs is underway,
and resources to reinvigorate U.S. epidemiological surveillance
capacity have been allocated. Programs to amass and regionally
distribute inventories of antibiotics and vaccines have
started, and arrangements for mass production of selected
pharmaceuticals have been made. The Centers for Disease Control
has rapid-response investigative units prepared to deploy and
respond to incidents.
These programs will enhance the capacities of the medical
community, but the momentum and resources for this effort must
be extended. We recommend that the NHSA Directorate for
Emergency Preparedness and Response assess local and federal
medical resources to deal with a WMD emergency. It should then
specify those medical programs needed to deal with a major
national emergency beyond the means of the private sector, and
Congress should fund those needs.
C. EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE COOPERATION
Solving the homeland security challenge is not just an
Executive Branch problem. Congress should be an active
participant in the development of homeland security programs,
as well. Its hearings can help develop the best ideas and
solutions. Individual members should develop expertise in
homeland security policy and its implementation so that they
can fill in policy gaps and provide needed oversight and advice
in times of crisis. Most important, using its power of the
purse, Congress should ensure that government agencies have
sufficient resources and that their programs are coordinated,
efficient, and effective.
Congress has already taken important steps. A bipartisan
Congressional initiative produced the U.S. effort to deal with
the possibility that weapons of mass destruction could "leak"
out of a disintegrating Soviet Union.\17\ It was also a
Congressional initiative that established the Domestic
Preparedness Program and launched a 120-city program to enhance
the capability of federal, state, and local first responders to
react effectively in a WMD emergency.\18\ Members of Congress
from both parties have pushed the Executive Branch to identify
and manage the problem more effectively. Congress has also
proposed and funded studies and commissions on various aspects
of the homeland security problem.\19\ But it must do more.
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\17\ Sponsored by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Luger.
\18\ Public Law 104-201, National Defense Authorization Act for FY
1997: Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction. This legislation,
known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Amendment, was passed in July 1996.
\19\ We note: the Rumsfeld Commission [Report of the Commission to
Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (Washington,
DC: July 15, 1998)]; the Deutch Commission [Combating Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington. DC: July 14, 1999)]; Judge
William Webster's Commission [Report on the Advancement of Federal Law
Enforcement (Washington, DC: January 2000)]; the Bremer Commission
[Report of the National Commission on Terrorism, Countering the
Changing Threat of International Terrorism (Washington, DC: June
2000)]; and an advisory panel led by Virginia Governor James Gilmore
[First Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory
Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving
Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: December 15, 1999)].
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A sound homeland security strategy requires the overhaul of
much of the legislative framework for preparedness, response,
and national defense programs. Congress designed many of the
authorities that support national security and emergency
preparedness programs principally for a Cold War environment.
The new threat environment--from biological and terrorist
attacks to cyber attacks on critical systems--poses vastly
different challenges. We therefore recommend that Congress
refurbish the legal foundation for homeland security in
response to the new threat environment.
In particular, Congress should amend, as necessary, key
legislative authorities such as the Defense Production Act of
1950 and the Communications Act of 1934, which facilitate
homeland security functions and activities.\20\ Congress should
also encourage the sharing of threat, vulnerability, and
incident data between the public and private sectors--including
federal agencies, state governments, first responders, and
industry.\21\ In addition, Congress should monitor and support
current efforts to update the international legal framework for
communications security issues.\22\
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\20\ The Defense Production Act was developed during the Korean War
when shortages of critical natural resources such as coal, oil, and gas
were prioritized for national defense purposes. [See Defense Production
Act of 1950, codified at 50 USC App. Sec. 2061 et seq. Tide I includes
delegations to prioritize and allocate goods and services based on
national defense needs.] Executive Order 12919, National Defense
Industrial Resources Preparedness, June 6, 1994, implements Title I of
the Defense Production Act. Congressional review should focus on the
applicability of the Defense Production Act to homeland security needs,
ranging from prevention to restoration activities. Section 706 of the
Communications Act of 1934 also needs revision so that it includes the
electronic media that have developed in the past two decades. [See 48
Stat. 1104, 47 USC Sec. 606, as amended.] Executive Order 12472,
Assignment of National Security and Emergency Preparedness
Telecommunications Functions, April 3, 1984, followed the breakup of
AT&T and attempted to specify anew the prerogatives of the Executive
Branch in accordance with the 1934 Act in directing national
communications media during a national security emergency. It came
before the Internet, however, and does not clearly apply to it.
\21\ For more than four years, multiple institutions have called on
national leadership to support laws and policies promoting security
cooperation through public-private partnerships. See, for example, the
President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, Critical
Foundations, Protecting America's Infrastructures (Washington, DC:
October 1997), pp. 86-88 and Report of the Defense Science Board Task
Force on Information Warfare (Washington, DC: November 1996).
\22\ This includes substantial efforts in multiple forums, such as
the Council of Europe and the G8, to fight transnationsl organized
crime. See Communique on principles to fight transnational organized
crime, Meeting of the Justice and Interior Ministers of the Eight,
December 9-10, 1997.
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Beyond that, Congress has some organizational work of its
own to do. As things stand today, so many federal agencies are
involved with homeland security that it is exceedingly
difficult to present federal programs and their resource
requirements to the Congress in a coherent way. It is largely
because the budget is broken up into so many pieces, for
example, that counter-terrorism and information security issues
involve nearly two dozen Congressional committees and
subcommittees. The creation of the National Security Homeland
Agency will redress this problem to some extent, but because of
its growing urgency and complexity, homeland security will
still require a stronger working relationship between the
Executive and Legislative Branches. Congress should therefore
find ways to address homeland security issues that bridge
current jurisdictional boundaries and that create more
innovative oversight mechanisms.
There are several ways of achieving this. The Senate's Arms
Control Observer Group and its more recent NATO Enlargement
Group were two successful examples of more informal Executive-
Legislative cooperation on key multi-dimensional issues.
Specifically, in the near term, this Commission recommends the
following:
7: Congress should establish a special body to deal
with homeland security issues, as has been done effectively
with intelligence oversight. Members should be chosen for their
expertise in foreign policy, defense, intelligence, law
enforcement, and appropriations. This body should also include
members of all relevant Congressional committees as well as ex-
officio members from the leadership of both Houses of Congress.
This body should develop a comprehensive understanding of
the problem of homeland security, exchange information and
viewpoints with the Executive Branch on effective policies and
plans, and work with standing committees to develop integrated
legislative responses and guidance. Meetings would often be
held in closed session so that Members could have access to
interagency deliberations and diverging viewpoints, as well as
to classified assessments. Such a body would have neither a
legislative nor an oversight mandate, and it would not eclipse
the authority of any standing committee.
At the same time, Congress needs to systematically review
and restructure its committee system, as will be proposod in
recommendation 48. A single, select committee in each house of
Congress should be given authorization, appropriations, and
oversight responsibility for all homeland security activities.
When established, these committees would replace the function
of the oversight body described in recommendation 7.
In sum, the federal government must address the challenge
of homeland security with greater urgency. The United States is
not immune to threats posed by weapons of mass destruction or
disruption, but neither is it entirely defenseless against
them. Much has been done to prevent and defend against such
attacks, but these efforts must be incorporated into the
nation's overall security strategy, and clear direction must be
provided to all departments and agencies. Non-traditional
national security agencies that how have greater relevance than
they did in the past must be reinvigorated. Accountability,
authority, and responsibility must be more closely aligned
within government agencies. An Executive-Legislative consensus
is required, as well, to convert strategy and resources into
programs and capabilities, and to do so in a way that preserves
fundamental freedoms and individual rights.
Most of all, however, the government must reorganize itself
for the challenges of this new era, and make the necessary
investments to allow an improved organizational structure to
work. Through the Commission's proposal for a National Homeland
Security Agency, the U.S. government will be able to improve
the planning and coordination of federal support to state and
local agencies, to rationalize the allocation of resources, to
enhance readiness in order to prevent attacks, and to
facilitate recovery if prevention fails. Most important, this
proposal integrates the problem of homeland security within the
broader framework of U.S. national security strategy. In this
respect, it differs significantly from issue-specific
approaches to the problem, which tend to isolate homeland
security away from the larger strategic perspective of which it
must be a part.
We are mindful that erecting the operational side of this
strategy will take time to achieve. Meanwhile, the threat grows
ever more serious. That is all the more reason to start right
away on implementing the recommendations put forth here.
=======================================================================
A REPORT CARD ON THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY'S NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS
WITH RUSSIA
Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler, Co-Chairs, Russia Task Force
The Secretary of Energy Advisory Board
January 10, 2001
=======================================================================
Task Force Members
Howard Baker (Co-Chair), Baker, Donelson, Bearman & Caldwell,
Former United States Senator
Lloyd Cutler (Co-Chair), Wilmer Cutler & Pickering, Former
White House Counsel
Graham T. Allison, Director, The Belfer Center, Kennedy School
of Government, Harvard University
Andrew Athy, Chairman, Secretary of Energy Advisory Board,
Partner, O'Neill, Athy & Casey PC
J. Brian Atwood, Executive Vice President, Citizens Energy,
Former Administrator, USAID
David Boren, President, University of Oklahoma, Former United
States Senator from Oklahoma
Lynn Davis, Senior Fellow, RAND Corporation
Butler Derrick, Partner, Powell, Goldstein, Frazer & Murphy,
LLP, Former Member of Congress from South Carolina
Susan Eisenhower, President, The Eisenhower Institute, Founder,
Center for Political and Strategic Studies
Lee Hamilton, Director, Woodrow Wilson Center, Former Member
of Congress from Indiana
Robert I. Hanfling, Senior Advisor, Putnam, Hayes and Bartlett
Gary Hart, \1\ Of Counsel, Coudert Brothers, Former United
States Senator from Colorado
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\1\ Senator Hart has been prevented from full participation in the
Task Force's deliberations by other government service.
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Daniel Mayers, Of Counsel, Wilmer, Cutler, & Pickering
Jim McClure, McClure, Gerard & Neuenschwander, Inc., Former
United States Senator from Idaho
Sam Nunn, Senior Partner, King & Spalding, Former United States
Senator from Georgia
Alan Simpson, Director, Institute of Politics, Harvard
University, Former United States Senator from Wyoming
David Skaggs, Executive Director, Democracy and Citizenship
Program, The Aspen Institute, Former Member of Congress
from Colorado
John Tuck, Senior Advisor, Baker, Donelson, Bearman & Caldwell,
Former Under Secretary of Energy
A Report Card on the Department of Energy's Nonproliferation Programs
with Russia
----------
Executive Summary
Introduction
Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, we have witnessed
the dissolution of an empire having over 40,000 nuclear
weapons, over a thousand metric tons of nuclear materials, vast
quantities of chemical and biological weapons materials, and
thousands of missiles. This Cold War arsenal is spread across
11 time zones and lacks the Cold War infrastructure that
provided the control and financing necessary to assure that
chains of command remain intact and nuclear weapons and
materials remain securely beyond the reach of terrorists and
weapons-proliferating states. This problem is compounded by the
existence of thousands of weapons scientists who, not always
having the resources necessary to adequately care for their
families, may be tempted to sell their expertise to countries
of proliferation concern.
In order to assess the Department of Energy's part of
current U.S. efforts to deal with this critical situation, in
February 2000 Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson asked former
Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker and former White House
Counsel Lloyd Cutler to co-chair a bipartisan task force to
review and assess DOE's nonproliferation programs in Russia and
to make recommendations for their improvement. After nine
months of careful examination of current DOE programs and
consideration of related nonproliferation policies and programs
of the U.S. Government, the Task Force reached the following
conclusions and recommendations.
1. The most urgent unmet national security threat to the
United States today is the danger that weapons of mass
destruction or weapons-usable material in Russia could be
stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states and used
against American troops abroad or citizens at home.
This threat is a clear and present danger to the
international community as well as to American lives and
liberties.
2. Current nonproliferation programs in the Department of
Energy the Department of Defense, and related agencies have
achieved impressive results thus far, but their limited mandate
and funding fall short of what is required to address
adequately the threat.
The Task Force applauds and commends Secretary Richardson,
his predecessors and colleagues for their dedication,
commitment and hard work in seeking to address this issue. The
cooperation of the Russian Federation has also been a critical
and significant factor in the work carried out to date.
But the Task Force concludes that the current budget levels
are inadequate and the current management of the U.S.
Government's response is too diffuse. The Task Force believes
that the existing scope and management of the U.S. programs
addressing this threat leave an
