U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVESThe Honorable George J. Tenet
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6415
May 22, 2003
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Dear Director Tenet:
The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) believes that it is now time to reevaluate US intelligence regarding the amount or existence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq and that country's linkages to terrorist groups, such as al-Qaida. As you know, the existence of -- and danger posed by -- WMD in Iraq and the concern that these capabilities could be transferred to terrorist groups remains of vital interest. The Committee wants to ensure that the intelligence analysis relayed to our policymakers from the Intelligence Community (IC) was accurate, unbiased, and timely -- in light of new information resulting from recent events in Iraq.
The Committee is interested in learning, in detail, how the intelligence picture regarding Iraqi WMD was developed and would appreciate your answers to the following questions: Were sources and methods that contributed to the community's analysis on the presence and amount of WMD in Iraq of sufficient quality and quantity to provide sufficient accuracy? How was information disseminated and what lines of analysis developed? Did the analytic assessment change over time? If so, please explain how analytic conclusions shifted based on what and when. In addition, did components of the IC or internal elements of IC agencies express dissenting analytic perspectives? If so, were those dissenting views properly weighed and why was that analysis determined to be inaccurate?
The Committee is also interested in understanding how the CIA's analysis of Iraq's linkages to terrorists groups [sic], such as al-Qaida, was derived. The Committee would like to know if that analysis changed over time, what analytic conclusions were provided to policymakers, including to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, regarding the presence of al-Qaida in Iraq, and how the IC coordinated this analysis?
We look forward to your response by 1 July 2003.
PORTER J. GOSS