108th Congress Report
1st Session HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 108-163
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INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004
_______
June 18, 2003.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Goss, from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
[To accompany H.R. 2417]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 2417) to authorize
appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the United States
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for
other purposes, having considered the same, report favorably
thereon with an amendment and recommend that the bill as
amended do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
Purpose.......................................................... 14
Overall Perspective on the Intelligence Budget and Committee
Intent......................................................... 15
Scope of Committee Review........................................ 16
Committee Findings and Recommendations........................... 16
Section-by-Section Analysis of the Bill as Reported.............. 33
Title I--Intelligence Activities................................. 33
Section 101--Authorization of Appropriations................. 33
Section 102--Classified Schedule of Authorizations........... 33
Section 103--Personnel Ceiling Adjustments................... 33
Section 104--Community Management Account.................... 33
Section 105--Intelligence elements of the Department of the
Treasury................................................... 34
Title II--Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability
System......................................................... 35
Section 201--Authorization of Appropriations................. 35
Title III--General Provisions.................................... 35
Subtitle A--Recurring General Provisions......................... 35
Section 301--Increase in employee compensation and benefits
authorized by law.......................................... 35
Section 302--Restriction on conduct of intelligence
activities................................................. 35
Subtitle B--Intelligence......................................... 36
Section 311--Modification of notice and wait requirements on
projects to construct or improve Intelligence Community
facilities................................................. 36
Subtitle C--Counterintelligence.................................. 36
Section 321--Counterintelligence initiatives for the
Intelligence Community..................................... 36
Subtitle D--Other Matters........................................ 37
Section 331--Extension of suspension of reorganization of
Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Program Office....... 37
Section 332--Modifications of authorities on explosive
materials.................................................. 37
Section 333--Modification of prohibition on the
naturalization of certain persons.......................... 38
Section 334--Modification to definition of financial
institution in the Right to Financial Privacy Act.......... 38
Section 335--Procedural requirements for Central Intelligence
Agency relating to products of Federal prison industries... 39
Section 336--Improvement of information sharing among
federal, State, and local government officials............. 39
Subtitle E--Reports and Technical Amendments..................... 40
Section 341--Extension of deadline for final report of the
National Commission for the Review of the Research and
Development Programs of the United States Intelligence
Community.................................................. 40
Section 342--Modification of various reports required of
intelligence community elements............................ 40
Section 343--Technical amendments............................ 40
Section 344--Report on lessons learned from military
operations in Iraq......................................... 41
Title IV--Central Intelligence Agency............................ 41
Section 401--Protection from tort liability for certain
Central Intelligence Agency personnel...................... 41
Section 402--Repeal of limitation on use of funds in Central
Services Working Capital Fund.............................. 42
Title V--Department of Defense................................... 43
Section 501--Use of funds for counter-drug and counter-
terrorism activities for Colombia.......................... 43
Section 502--Authority to provide living quarters for certain
students in cooperative and summer education programs of
the National Security Agency............................... 43
Section 503--Authority for Intelligence Community elements of
Department of Defense to award personal service contracts.. 44
Section 504--Protection of certain National Security Agency
personnel from tort liability.............................. 45
Section 505--Measurement and signatures intelligence
program.................................................... 45
Committee Position............................................... 46
Correspondence with Other Committees Regarding Particular
Provisions..................................................... 46
Letter from Chairman Hunter to Chairman Goss................. 50
Letter from Chairman Goss to Chairman Hunter................. 50
Letter from Chairman Sensenbrenner to Chairman Goss.......... 46
Letter from Chairman Goss to Chairman Sensenbrenner.......... 47
Letter from Chairman Oxley to Chairman Goss.................. 48
Letter from Chairman Goss to Chairman Oxley.................. 49
Oversight Findings and Recommendations........................... 51
Fiscal Year Cost Projections..................................... 51
Congressional Budget Office Estimates............................ 52
Committee Cost Estimates......................................... 57
Specific Constitutional Authority for Congressional Enactment of
this Legislation............................................... 57
Changes to Existing Law.......................................... 57
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the "Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004".
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified schedule of authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.
Sec. 105. Intelligence elements of the Department of the Treasury.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Subtitle A--Recurring General Provisions
Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Subtitle B--Intelligence
Sec. 311. Modification of notice and wait requirements on projects to
construct or improve intelligence community facilities.
Subtitle C--Counterintelligence
Sec. 321. Counterintelligence initiatives for the intelligence
community.
Subtitle D--Other Matters
Sec. 331. Extension of suspension of reorganization of Diplomatic
Telecommunications Service Program Office.
Sec. 332. Modifications of authorities on explosive materials.
Sec. 333. Modification of prohibition on the naturalization of certain
persons.
Sec. 334. Modification to definition of financial institution in the
Right to Financial Privacy Act.
Sec. 335. Procedural requirements for Central Intelligence Agency
relating to products of Federal prison industries.
Sec. 336. Improvement of information sharing among federal, State, and
local government officials.
Subtitle E--Reports and Technical Amendments
Sec. 341. Extension of deadline for final report of the National
Commission for the Review of the Research and Development Programs of
the United States Intelligence Community.
Sec. 342. Modification of various reports required of intelligence
community elements.
Sec. 343. Technical amendments.
Sec. 344. Report on lessons learned from military operations in Iraq.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Sec. 401. Protection from tort liability for certain Central
Intelligence Agency personnel.
Sec. 402. Repeal of limitation on use of funds in Central Services
Working Capital Fund.
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE MATTERS
Sec. 501. Use of funds for counterdrug and counterterrorism activities
for Colombia.
Sec. 502. Authority to provide living quarters for certain students in
cooperative and summer education programs of the National Security
Agency.
Sec. 503. Authority for intelligence community elements of Department
of Defense to award personal service contracts.
Sec. 504. Protection of certain National Security Agency personnel from
tort liability.
Sec. 505. Measurement and signatures intelligence program.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2004
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of the following elements of the United States Government:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(2) The Department of Defense.
(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(4) The National Security Agency.
(5) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(6) The National Imagery and Mapping Agency.
(7) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(8) The Department of State.
(9) The Department of the Treasury.
(10) The Department of Energy.
(11) The Department of Justice.
(12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(13) The Department of Homeland Security.
(14) The Coast Guard.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts
authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized
personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2004, for the conduct of the
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed
in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 2417 of the One
Hundred Eighth Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The
Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on
Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the
President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the
Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the
executive branch.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of Central
Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess
of the number authorized for fiscal year 2004 under section 102 when
the Director of Central Intelligence determines that such action is
necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions,
except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number
authorized under such section may not, for any element of the
intelligence community, exceed 2 percent of the number of civilian
personnel authorized under such section for such element.
(b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of Central
Intelligence shall notify promptly the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate whenever the Director exercises the
authority granted by this section.
SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the
Director of Central Intelligence for fiscal year 2004 the sum of
$192,640,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for the
Advanced Research and Development Committee shall remain available
until September 30, 2005.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the
Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of Central
Intelligence are authorized 320 full-time personnel as of September 30,
2004. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of
the Intelligence Community Management Account or personnel detailed
from other elements of the United States Government.
(c) Classified Authorizations.--
(1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts
authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community
Management Account by subsection (a), there are also authorized
to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management
Account for fiscal year 2004 such additional amounts as are
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred
to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts shall remain
available until September 30, 2004.
(2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel
authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence
Community Management Account as of September 30, 2004, there
are hereby authorized such additional personnel for such
elements as of that date as are specified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations.
(d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during fiscal year 2004 any
officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed
Forces who is detailed to the staff of the Intelligence Community
Management Account from another element of the United States Government
shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such
officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis
for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary
functions as required by the Director of Central Intelligence.
(e) National Drug Intelligence Center.--
(1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated
in subsection (a), $34,248,000 shall be available for the
National Drug Intelligence Center. Within such amount, funds
provided for research, development, testing, and evaluation
purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2005, and
funds provided for procurement purposes shall remain available
until September 30, 2006.
(2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of Central Intelligence
shall transfer to the Attorney General funds available for the
National Drug Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The
Attorney General shall utilize funds so transferred for the
activities of the National Drug Intelligence Center.
(3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug
Intelligence Center may not be used in contravention of the
provisions of section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(d)(1)).
(4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the
operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center.
SEC. 105. INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY.
(a) In General.--(1) Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
"bureau of intelligence and enforcement of the department of the
treasury
"Sec. 119. (a) In General.--There is within the Department of the
Treasury a Bureau of Intelligence and Enforcement headed by an
Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Enforcement, who shall be
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate.
"(b) Responsibilities.--(1) The Assistant Secretary for Intelligence
and Enforcement shall oversee and coordinate functions of the Bureau of
Intelligence and Enforcement.
"(2) The Assistant Secretary shall report directly to the Secretary
of the Treasury.
"(c) Composition of Bureau.--The Bureau of Intelligence and
Enforcement shall consist of the following offices:
"(1) The Office of Intelligence Support.
"(2) The Office of Foreign Assets Control.
"(3) The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.
"(4) Such other offices as the Assistant Secretary may
establish.".
(2) The table of contents contained in the first section of such Act
is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 118 the
following new item:
"Sec. 119. Bureau of Intelligence and Enforcement of the Department of
the Treasury.".
(b) Consultation With DCI in Appointment of Assistant Secretary for
Intelligence and Enforcement.--Section 106(b)(2) of such Act (50 U.S.C.
403-6(b)(2)) is amended by adding at the end the following new
subparagraph:
"(E) The Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and
Enforcement.".
(c) Conforming Amendments.--(1) Section 3(4) of such Act (50 U.S.C.
401a(4)) is amended--
(A) by striking "the Department of the Treasury," in
subparagraph (H);
(B) by striking "and" at the end of subparagraph (J);
(C) by redesignating subparagraph (K) as subparagraph (L);
and
(D) by inserting after subparagraph (J) the following new
subparagraph:
"(K) the Bureau of Intelligence and Enforcement of
the Department of the Treasury; and".
(2) Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended in the
item relating to Assistant Secretaries of the Treasury by striking
"(7)" and inserting "(8)".
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2004 the sum of
$226,400,000.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Subtitle A--Recurring General Provisions
SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY
LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement,
and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in
such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed
to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity
which is not otherwise permitted under the Constitution or authorized
pursuant to the laws of the United States.
Subtitle B--Intelligence
SEC. 311. MODIFICATION OF NOTICE AND WAIT REQUIREMENTS ON PROJECTS TO
CONSTRUCT OR IMPROVE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
FACILITIES.
(a) Increase of Thresholds for Notice.--Section 602(a) of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 (Public Law 103-
359; 108 Stat. 3432; 50 U.S.C. 403-2b(a)) is amended--
(1) by striking "$750,000" each place it appears and
inserting "$5,000,000";
(2) by striking "$500,000" each place it appears and
inserting "$1,000,000"; and
(3) in paragraph (2), as amended by paragraph (2) of this
subsection, by inserting after "$1,000,000" the second place
it appears, the following: "but less than $5,000,000".
(b) Notice and Wait Requirements for Emergency Projects.--Section
602(b)(2) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995
(Public Law 103-359; 108 Stat. 3432; 50 U.S.C. 403-2b(b)(2)) is
amended--
(1) in the third sentence, by striking "21-day" and
inserting "7-day"; and,
(2) by adding at the end the following new sentence:
"Notwithstanding the preceding provisions of this paragraph,
when the Director of Central Intelligence and Secretary of
Defense jointly determine that an emergency relating to the
national security or to the protection of health, safety, or
environmental quality exists and that delay would irreparably
harm any or all of those interests, the project may begin on
the date the notification is received by such committees.".
Subtitle C--Counterintelligence
SEC. 321. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES FOR THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.
(a) In General.--(1) Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following
new section:
"counterintelligence initiatives
"Sec. 1102. (a) Inspection Process.--(1) In order to protect
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, the
Director of Central Intelligence shall establish and implement an
inspection process for all agencies and departments of the United
States that handle classified information relating to the national
security of the United States intended to assure that those agencies
and departments maintain effective operational security practices and
programs directed against counterintelligence activities.
"(2) The Director shall carry out the process through the Office of
the National Counterintelligence Executive.
"(b) FBI Counterintelligence Office.--The Attorney General, acting
through the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall
establish an Office of Counterintelligence within the Bureau to
investigate potential espionage activities within the Bureau.
"(c) Annual Review of Dissemination Lists.--(1) The Director of
Central Intelligence shall establish and implement a process for all
elements of the intelligence community (as defined in section 101(4))
to review, on an annual basis, individuals included on distribution
lists for access to classified information. Such process shall ensure
that only individuals who have a particularized `need to know' (as
determined by the Director) are continued on such distribution lists.
"(2) Not later than October 15 of each year, the Director shall
certify to the congressional intelligence committees that the review
required under paragraph (1) has been conducted in all elements of the
intelligence community during the preceding fiscal year.
"(d) Required Completion of Financial Disclosure Statements.--(1)
The Director of Central Intelligence shall establish and implement a
process by which heads of the elements of the intelligence community
(as defined in section 101(4)) direct that all employees, in order to
be granted access to classified information, submit financial
disclosure forms required under section 1.3(b) of Executive Order No.
12969 (August 2, 1995; 60 F.R. 40245; 50 U.S.C. 435 note).
"(2) The Director shall carry out paragraph (1) through the Office
of the National Counterintelligence Executive.
"(e) Arrangements To Handle Sensitive Information.--The Director of
Central Intelligence shall establish, for all elements of the
intelligence community (as defined in section 101(4)), programs and
procedures by which sensitive classified information relating to human
intelligence is safeguarded against unauthorized disclosure by
employees of those elements.".
(2) The table of contents contained in the first section of such Act
is amended in the items relating to title XI by adding at the end the
following new item:
"Sec. 1102. Counterintelligence initiatives.".
(b) Intelligence and National Security Aspects of Espionage
Prosecutions.--The Attorney General, acting through the Office of
Intelligence Policy and Review of the Department of Justice, in
consultation with the Office of the National Counterintelligence
Executive, shall establish policies and procedures to assist the
Attorney General in the Attorney General's consideration of
intelligence and national security equities in the development of
charging documents and related pleadings in espionage prosecutions.
Subtitle D--Other Matters
SEC. 331. EXTENSION OF SUSPENSION OF REORGANIZATION OF DIPLOMATIC
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICE PROGRAM OFFICE.
Section 311 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2002 (Public Law 107-108; 115 Stat. 1401; 22 U.S.C. 7301 note), as
amended by section 351 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2401; 22 U.S.C. 7301 note), is
amended--
(1) in the heading, by striking "TWO-YEAR" before
"SUSPENSION OF REORGANIZATION"; and
(2) in the text, by striking "ending on October 1, 2003"
and inserting "ending on the date that is 60 days after the
date on which appropriate congressional committees of
jurisdiction (as defined in section 324(d) of that Act (22
U.S.C. 7304(d)) are notified jointly by the Secretary of State
(or the Secretary's designee) and the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget (or the Director's designee) that the
operational framework for the office has been terminated".
SEC. 332. MODIFICATIONS OF AUTHORITIES ON EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS.
(a) Authority To Distribute Explosive Materials to Qualified
Aliens.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it shall be lawful
for any person knowingly to distribute explosive materials to any
qualified alien--
(1) if, in the case of a qualified alien described in
subsection (c)(1), the distribution to, shipment to,
transportation to, receipt by, or possession by the alien of
the explosive materials is in furtherance of such cooperation;
or
(2) if, in the case of a qualified alien described in
subsection (c)(2), the distribution to, shipping to,
transporting to, possession by, or receipt by the alien of
explosive materials is in furtherance of the authorized
military purpose.
(b) Authority for Qualified Aliens To Ship Explosive Materials.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it shall be lawful for a
qualified alien to ship or transport any explosive in or affecting
interstate or foreign commerce or to receive or possess any explosive
which has been shipped or transported in or affecting interstate or
foreign commerce--
(1) if, in the case of a qualified alien described in
subsection (c)(1), the possession, shipment, or transportation
by the alien of the explosive materials is in furtherance of
such cooperation; or
(2) if, in the case of a qualified alien described in
subsection (c)(2), the possession, shipment, or transportation
by the alien of explosive materials is in furtherance of the
authorized military purpose.
(c) Qualified Alien Defined.--In this section, the term "qualified
alien" means an alien--
(1) who is lawfully present in the United States in
cooperation with the Director of Central Intelligence; or
(2) who is a member of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), or other friendly foreign military force (as determined
by the Attorney General with the concurrence of the Secretary
of Defense) who is present in the United States under military
orders for training or other military purpose authorized by the
United States.
SEC. 333. MODIFICATION OF PROHIBITION ON THE NATURALIZATION OF CERTAIN
PERSONS.
Section 313(e)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
1424(e)(4)) is amended--
(1) by inserting "when Department of Defense activities are
relevant to the determination" after "Secretary of Defense";
and
(2) by inserting "and the Secretary of Homeland Security"
after "Attorney General".
SEC. 334. MODIFICATION TO DEFINITION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTION IN THE
RIGHT TO FINANCIAL PRIVACY ACT.
(a) In General.--Section 1101(1) of the Right to Financial Privacy
Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3401(1)) is amended by inserting ", except as
provided in section 1114," before "means any office".
(b) Definition.--Section 1114 of such Act (12 U.S.C. 3414) is amended
by adding at the end the following:
"(c) For purposes of this section, the term `financial institution'
has the same meaning as in section 5312(a)(2) of title 31, United
States Code, except that, for purposes of this section, such term shall
include only such a financial institution any part of which is located
inside any State or territory of the United States, the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, or the United States
Virgin Islands.".
SEC. 335. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
RELATING TO PRODUCTS OF FEDERAL PRISON INDUSTRIES.
The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.)
is amended by adding at the end the following new section:
"procedural requirements for central intelligence agency relating to
products of federal prison industries
"Sec. 23. (a) Market Research.--Before purchasing a product listed
in the latest edition of the Federal Prison Industries catalog under
section 4124(d) of title 18, United States Code, the Director shall
conduct market research to determine whether the Federal Prison
Industries product is comparable to products available from the private
sector that best meet the Agency's needs in terms of price, quality,
and time of delivery.
"(b) Competition Requirement.--If the Director determines that a
Federal Prison Industries product is not comparable in price, quality,
or time of delivery to products available from the private sector that
best meet the Agency's needs in terms of price, quality, and time of
delivery, the Director shall use competitive procedures for the
procurement of the product or shall make an individual purchase under a
multiple award contract. In conducting such a competition or making
such a purchase, the Director shall consider a timely offer from
Federal Prison Industries.
"(c) Implementation by Director.--The Director shall ensure that--
"(1) the Agency does not purchase a Federal Prison
Industries product or service unless a contracting officer of
the Agency determines that the product or service is comparable
to products or services available from the private sector that
best meet the Agency's needs in terms of price, quality, and
time of delivery; and
"(2) Federal Prison Industries performs its contractual
obligations to the same extent as any other contractor for the
Agency.
"(d) Market Research Determination Not Subject to Review.--A
determination by a contracting officer regarding whether a product or
service offered by Federal Prison Industries is comparable to products
or services available from the private sector that best meet the
Agency's needs in terms of price, quality, and time of delivery shall
not be subject to review pursuant to section 4124(b) of title 18.
"(e) Performance as a Subcontractor.--(1) A contractor or potential
contractor of the Agency may not be required to use Federal Prison
Industries as a subcontractor or supplier of products or provider of
services for the performance of a contract of the Agency by any means,
including means such as--
"(A) a contract solicitation provision requiring a
contractor to offer to make use of products or services of
Federal Prison Industries in the performance of the contract;
"(B) a contract specification requiring the contractor to
use specific products or services (or classes of products or
services) offered by Federal Prison Industries in the
performance of the contract; or
"(C) any contract modification directing the use of products
or services of Federal Prison Industries in the performance of
the contract.
"(2) In this subsection, the term `contractor', with respect to a
contract, includes a subcontractor at any tier under the contract.
"(f) Protection of Classified and Sensitive Information.--The
Director may not enter into any contract with Federal Prison Industries
under which an inmate worker would have access to--
"(1) any data that is classified;
"(2) any geographic data regarding the location of--
"(A) surface and subsurface infrastructure providing
communications or water or electrical power
distribution;
"(B) pipelines for the distribution of natural gas,
bulk petroleum products, or other commodities; or
"(C) other utilities; or
"(3) any personal or financial information about any
individual private citizen, including information relating to
such person's real property however described, without the
prior consent of the individual.
"(g) Application of Provision.--This section is subject to the
preceding provisions of this Act, and shall not be construed as
affecting any right or duty of the Director under those provisions.
"(h) Definitions.--In this section:
"(1) The terms `competitive procedures' and `procurement'
have the meanings given such terms in section 4 of the Office
of Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 403).
"(2) The term `market research' means obtaining specific
information about the price, quality, and time of delivery of
products available in the private sector through a variety of
means, which may include--
"(A) contacting knowledgeable individuals in
government and industry;
"(B) interactive communication among industry,
acquisition personnel, and customers; and
"(C) interchange meetings or pre-solicitation
conferences with potential offerors.".
SEC. 336. IMPROVEMENT OF INFORMATION SHARING AMONG FEDERAL, STATE, AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.
(a) Pilot Project To Encourage State and Local Officials, As Well As
Representatives of Critical Infrastructure, To Collect and Share
Relevant Information.--Section 892(c) of the Homeland Security Act of
2002 (Public Law 107-296; 6 U.S.C. 482) is amended by adding at the end
the following new paragraph:
"(3)(A) The Under Secretary for Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection of the Department of Homeland
Security, in consultation with the Director of Central
Intelligence, may conduct projects in several cities to
encourage officials of State and local government, as well as
representatives of industries that comprise the critical
infrastructure in those cities to lawfully collect and to pass
on to the appropriate Federal officials information vital for
the prevention of terrorist attacks against the United States.
"(B) The Director of Central Intelligence shall carry out
any duty under this paragraph through the Director of the
Terrorist Threat Integration Center.
"(C) Under the projects, training shall be provided to such
officials and representatives to--
"(i) identify sources of potential threats through
such methods as the Secretary determines appropriate;
"(ii) report information relating to such potential
threats to the appropriate Federal agencies in the
appropriate form and manner; and
"(iii) assure that all reported information is
systematically submitted to and passed on by the
Department for use by appropriate Federal agencies.
"(D) The Under Secretary shall carry out the pilot project
under this paragraph for a period of 3 years.
"(E) Not later than 1 year after the implementation of the
pilot project, and annually thereafter, the Under Secretary
shall submit to Congress a report on the pilot project
conducted under this paragraph. Each such report shall
include--
"(i) an assessment of the effectiveness of the
project; and
"(ii) recommendations on the continuation of the
project as well as any recommendations to improve the
effectiveness of information collection and sharing by
such officials and representatives and the Federal
government.".
(b) Pilot Project To Test Use of Tear-line Intelligence Reports.--(1)
Subtitle C of title II of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law
107-296) is amended by adding at the end the following new section:
"SEC. 226. PILOT PROJECT TO TEST USE OF TEAR-LINE INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS.
"(a) Authority.--The Under Secretary for Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection of the Department of Homeland Security, in
consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, may carry out a
pilot program under which the Under Secretary may make intelligence
information in the possession of the Department available to officials
of State and local governments through the use of tear-line
intelligence reports.
"(b) Tear-line Intelligence Reports Described.--For purpose of this
section, a tear-line report is a report containing intelligence
gathered by an agency or department of the United States that is in the
possession of the Department that is prepared in a manner such that
information relating to intelligence sources and methods is easily
severable from the report to protect such sources and methods from
disclosure. Such a report may be in a paper or an electronic format.
"(c) Duration of Project.--The Under Secretary shall carry out the
pilot project under this section for a period of 3 years.
"(d) Reports to Congress.--Not later than 1 year after the
implementation of the pilot project, and annually thereafter, the Under
Secretary shall submit to Congress a report on the pilot project
conducted under this section, and shall include in the report an
assessment of--
"(1) the effectiveness of the use of the tear-line reports
in providing intelligence information on a timely basis to
State and local authorities; and
"(2) if the use of such tear-line reports were to be made
permanent, whether additional safeguards are needed with
respect to the use of such reports.
"(e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be
appropriated to the Under Secretary such sums as may be necessary to
carry out this section.".
(2) The table of contents in section 1(b) of such Act is amended in
subtitle C of title II by adding at the end the following new item.
"Sec. 226. Pilot project to test use of tear-line intelligence
reports.".
(c) Homeland Defender Intelligence Training Program.
(1) Establishment of program.--The Director of Central
Intelligence may establish a comprehensive program of
orientation and training to qualified State and local officials
in accessing and using available resources of the intelligence
community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401(4))).
(2) Consultation.--Insofar as the Director establishes the
intelligence training program under paragraph (1), the Director
shall consult and coordinate with the director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and the Secretary of Homeland Security
on the development and administration of the program.
(3) Program goals.--Any intelligence training program
established under paragraph (1) shall provide qualified State
and local officials instruction on the mission and roles of the
intelligence community to promote more effective information
sharing among Federal, State, and local officials to prevent
terrorist attacks against the United States.
(4) Curriculum.--Insofar as the Director establishes the
intelligence training program under paragraph (1), the Director
shall develop a curriculum for the program after consultation
with qualified State and local officials. The curriculum shall
include classroom instruction with respect to and orientation
to the various elements of the intelligence community.
(5) Reports to congress.--Not later than 1 year after the
initial implementation of the intelligence training program
under paragraph (1), and annually thereafter, the Director
shall submit to Congress a report on the program. Each such
report shall include--
(A) an assessment of the effectiveness of the
project; and
(B) recommendations on the continuation of the
project as well as any recommendations to improve the
effectiveness of information collection and sharing by
qualified officials and representatives and the Federal
government.
(6) Qualified state and local officials defined.--For
purposes of this subsection, the term "qualified State and
local officials" means officials of State and local government
agencies that Director of Central Intelligence determines--
(A) have received appropriate security clearances
from the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation for access to classified information; and
(B) oversee or manage first responders or
counterterrorism activities.
(7) Authorization of appropriations.--There is authorized to
be appropriated to the Director such sums as are necessary to
carry out the intelligence training program under this
subsection.
(d) Advisory Councils.--(1) The Director of the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center shall establish two advisory councils (described in
paragraph (2)) to provide the Director such advice and recommendations
as the Director may require to effectively carry out the functions of
the Center.
(2)(A) One advisory council shall have as its focus privacy and civil
liberties issues.
(B) The other advisory council shall have as its focus State and
local government information needs.
Subtitle E--Reports and Technical Amendments
SEC. 341. EXTENSION OF DEADLINE FOR FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED STATES
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 1007 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C.
401 note; 116 Stat. 2442) is amended by striking "September 1, 2003"
and inserting "September 1, 2004".
(b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take
effect as if included in the enactment of section 1007 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003.
SEC. 342. MODIFICATION OF VARIOUS REPORTS REQUIRED OF INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY ELEMENTS.
(a) Reports on Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions.--Subsection (b)(1) of
section 721 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997
(Public Law 104-293; 110 Stat. 3474; 50 U.S.C. 2366), as amended by
section 811(b)(5)(C) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2424; 50 U.S.C. 2366), is
amended by striking "a semiannual" and inserting "an annual".
(b) Periodic and Special Reports on Disclosure of Intelligence
Information to United Nations.--Section 112(b)(1) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404g(b)(1)) is amended by striking
"semiannually" and inserting "annually".
SEC. 343. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS.
(a) National Security Act of 1947.--Section 112(d)(1) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404g(d)(1)) is amended by striking
"section 103(c)(6)" and inserting "section 103(c)(7)".
(b) Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.--(1) Section 6 of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403g) is amended by
striking "section 103(c)(6)" and inserting "section 103(c)(7)".
(2) Section 15 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 403o) is amended--
(A) in subsection (a)(1), by striking "special policemen of
the General Services Administration perform under the first
section of the Act entitled `An Act to authorize the Federal
Works Administrator or officials of the Federal Works Agency
duly authorized by him to appoint special policemen for duty
upon Federal property under the jurisdiction of the Federal
Works Agency, and for other purposes' (40 U.S.C. 318)," and
inserting "officers and agents of the Department of Homeland
Security, as provided in section 1315(b)(2) of title 40, United
States Code,"; and
(B) in subsection (b), by striking "the fourth section of
the Act referred to in subsection (a) of this section (40
U.S.C. 318c)" and inserting "section 1315(c)(2) of title 40,
United States Code".
(c) National Security Agency Act of 1959.--Section 11 of the
National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)(1), by striking "special policemen of
the General Services Administration perform under the first
section of the Act entitled `An Act to authorize the Federal
Works Administrator or officials of the Federal Works Agency
duly authorized by him to appoint special policemen for duty
upon Federal property under the jurisdiction of the Federal
Works Agency, and for other purposes' (40 U.S.C. 318)" and
inserting "officers and agents of the Department of Homeland
Security, as provided in section 1315(b)(2) of title 40, United
States Code,"; and
(2) in subsection (b), by striking "the fourth section of
the Act referred to in subsection (a) (40 U.S.C. 318c)" and
inserting "section 1315(c)(2) of title 40, United States
Code".
(d) Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003.--Section 343
of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law
107-306; 116 Stat. 2399; 50 U.S.C. 404n-2) is amended--
(1) in subsection (c), by striking "section 103(c)(6) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(6))" and
inserting "section 103(c)(7) of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(7))"; and
(2) in subsection (e)(2), by striking "section 103(c)(6)"
and inserting "section 103(c)(7)".
(e) Public Law 107-173.--Section 201(c)(3)(F) of the Enhanced Border
Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-173; 116
Stat. 548; 8 U.S.C. 1721(c)(3)(F)) is amended by striking "section
103(c)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-
3(c)(6))" and inserting "section 103(c)(7) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(7))".
(f) Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002.--Section
3535(b)(1) of title 44, United States Code, as added by section
1001(b)(1) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296),
and section 3545(b)(1) of title 44, United States Code, as added by
section 301(b)(1) of the E-Government Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-347),
are each amended by inserting "or any other law" after "1978".
SEC. 344. REPORT ON LESSONS LEARNED FROM MILITARY OPERATIONS IN IRAQ.
(a) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a report on the intelligence lessons
learned as a result of Operation Iraqi Freedom, including lessons
relating to the following:
(1) The tasking, collection, processing, exploitation,
analysis, and dissemination of intelligence.
(2) Accuracy, timeliness, and objectivity of intelligence
analysis.
(3) Intelligence support to policymakers and members of the
Armed Forces in combat.
(4) Coordination of intelligence activities and operations
with military operations.
(5) Strengths and limitations of intelligence systems and
equipment.
(6) Such other matters as the Director considers appropriate.
(b) Recommendations.--The report under subsection (a) shall include
such recommendations on improvement in the matters described in
subsection (a) as the Director considers appropriate.
(c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, the
term "appropriate committees of Congress" means--
(1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives;
and
(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on
Armed Services of the Senate.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SEC. 401. PROTECTION FROM TORT LIABILITY FOR CERTAIN CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY PERSONNEL.
(a) In General.--Section 15 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 (50 U.S.C. 403o) is amended by adding at the end the following new
subsection:
"(d)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any Agency
personnel designated by the Director under subsection (a) shall be
deemed for purposes of chapter 171 of title 28, United States Code, or
any other provision of law relating to tort liability, to be acting
within the scope of their office or employment if the Agency personnel
take reasonable action, which may include the use of force, to--
"(A) protect an individual in the presence of the Agency
personnel from a crime of violence;
"(B) provide immediate assistance to an individual who has
suffered or who is threatened with bodily harm; or
"(C) prevent the escape of any individual whom the Agency
personnel reasonably believe to have committed a crime of
violence in the presence of such personnel.
"(2) In this subsection, the term `crime of violence' has the
meaning given that term in section 16 of title 18, United States
Code.".
(b) Construction.--Subsection (d) of section 15, as added by
subsection (a), shall not be construed as affecting the authorities of
the Attorney General under the Federal Employees Liability Reform and
Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (Public Law 100-694; 28 U.S.C. 2671,
2674, 2679(b), 2679(d)).
SEC. 402. REPEAL OF LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS IN CENTRAL SERVICES
WORKING CAPITAL FUND.
Section 21(f)(2) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C. 403u(f)(2)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A), by striking "(A) Subject to
subparagraph (B), the Director" and inserting "The
Director"; and
(2) by striking subparagraph (B).
TITLE V--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE MATTERS
SEC. 501. USE OF FUNDS FOR COUNTERDRUG AND COUNTERTERRORISM ACTIVITIES
FOR COLOMBIA.
(a) Extension of Authority.--Subsection (a) of section 501 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-
306; 116 Stat. 2404) is amended by striking "for fiscal years 2002 and
2003" and inserting "for each of fiscal years 2002 through 2005".
(b) Modification.--Subsection (e) of such section is amended to read
as follows:
"(e) Prohibition.--No United States Armed Forces personnel, United
States civilian employee or contractor engaged by the United States
will participate in any combat operation in connection with assistance
made available under this section, except for the purpose of acting to
protect the life or the physical security of others, in self defense,
or during the course of search and rescue operations.".
(c) Technical Amendment.--Subsection (d) of such section is amended
by striking "Sections 556, 567, and 568 of Public Law 107-115, section
8093 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2002," and
inserting "Section 553 and the certification requirements of section
564(a)(2) of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 2003 (division E of Public Law 108-7; 117
Stat. 200, 205), and section 8093 of the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 2003 (Public Law 107-248; 116 Stat. 1558; 10 U.S.C.
182 note),".
(d) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsections (b) and (c)
shall apply to assistance made available under such section 501 during
fiscal years 2004 and 2005.
SEC. 502. AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE LIVING QUARTERS FOR CERTAIN STUDENTS IN
COOPERATIVE AND SUMMER EDUCATION PROGRAMS OF THE
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY.
Section 2195 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at
the end the following new subsection:
"(d)(1) The Director of the National Security Agency may provide a
qualifying employee of a defense laboratory of that Agency with living
quarters at no charge, or at a rate or charge prescribed by the
Director by regulation, without regard to section 5911(c) of title 5.
"(2) In this subsection, the term `qualifying employee' means a
student who is employed at the National Security Agency under--
"(A) a Student Educational Employment Program of the Agency
conducted under this section or any other provision of law; or
"(B) a similar cooperative or summer education program of
the Agency that meets the criteria for Federal cooperative or
summer education programs prescribed by the Office of Personnel
Management.".
SEC. 503. AUTHORITY FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ELEMENTS OF DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE TO AWARD PERSONAL SERVICE CONTRACTS.
(a) In General.--Subchapter I of chapter 21 of title 10, United
States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section:
"Sec. 426. Personal services contracts: authority and limitations
"(a) Personal Services.--(1) The Secretary of Defense may,
notwithstanding section 3109 of title 5, enter into personal services
contracts in the United States if the personal services directly
support the mission of a defense intelligence component or counter-
intelligence organization.
"(2) The contracting officer for a personal services contract shall
be responsible for ensuring that a personal services contract is the
appropriate vehicle for carrying out the purpose of the contract.
"(b) Definition.--In this section, the term `defense intelligence
component' means a component of the Department of Defense that is an
element of the intelligence community, as defined in section 3(4) of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).".
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the beginning of
such subchapter is amended by adding at the end the following new item:
"426. Personal services contracts: authority and limitations.".
SEC. 504. PROTECTION OF CERTAIN NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY PERSONNEL FROM
TORT LIABILITY.
Section 11 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402
note) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
"(d)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, agency personnel
designated by the Director of the National Security Agency under
subsection (a) shall be considered for purposes of chapter 171 of title
28, United States Code, or any other provision of law relating to tort
liability, to be acting within the scope of their office or employment
when such agency personnel take reasonable action, which may include
the use of force, to--
"(A) protect an individual in the presence of such agency
personnel from a crime of violence;
"(B) provide immediate assistance to an individual who has
suffered or who is threatened with bodily harm; or
"(C) prevent the escape of any individual whom such agency
personnel reasonably believe to have committed a crime of
violence in the presence of such agency personnel.
"(2) Paragraph (1) shall not affect the authorities of the Attorney
General under section 2679(d)(1) of title 28, United States Code.
"(3) In this subsection, the term `crime of violence' has the
meaning given that term in section 16 of title 18, United States
Code.".
SEC. 505. MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURES INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH PROGRAM.
(a) Research Program.--The Secretary of Defense, acting through the
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency's Directorate for MASINT
and Technical Collection, shall carry out a program to incorporate the
results of basic research on sensors into the measurement and
signatures intelligence systems of the United States, to the extent the
results of such research is applicable to such systems.
(b) Program Components.--The program under subsection (a) shall
review and assess both basic research on sensors and technologies
conducted by the United States Government and by non-governmental
entities. In carrying out the program, the Director shall protect
intellectual property rights, maintain organizational flexibility, and
establish research projects, funding levels, and potential benefits in
an equitable manner through Directorate.
(c) Advisory Panel.--(1) The Director shall establish an advisory
panel to assist the Director in carrying out the program under
subsection (a).
(2) The advisory panel shall be headed by the Director who shall
determine the selection, review, and assessment of the research
projects under the program.
(3)(A) The Director shall appoint as members of the advisory panel
representatives of each entity of the MASINT community, and may appoint
as such members representatives of national laboratories, universities,
and private sector entities.
(B) For purposes of this subsection the term "MASINT community"
means academic, professional, industrial, and government entities that
are committed towards the advancement of the sciences in measurement
and signatures intelligence.
(C) The term for a member of the advisory panel shall be established
by the Director, but may not exceed a period of 5 consecutive years.
(D) Members of the advisory panel may not receive additional pay,
allowances, or benefits by reason of their service on the advisory
panel, but may receive per diem in lieu of subsistence, in accordance
with applicable provisions under subchapter I of chapter 57 of title 5,
United States Code.
(4) The Director may accept contributions from non-governmental
participants on the advisory panel to defray the expenses of the
advisory panel.
Purpose
The bill would:
(1) Authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for
(a) the intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the U.S. Government, (b) the Community
Management Account, and (c) the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability System;
(2) Authorize the personnel ceilings on September 30,
2004 for the intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the U.S. Government and permit the
Director of Central Intelligence to authorize personnel
ceilings in Fiscal Year 2003 for any intelligence
element up to two percent above the authorized levels,
with the approval of the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget;
(3) Authorize $226.4 million for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund
(CIARDS) in order to fully fund the accruing cost of
retirement benefits for individuals in the Civil
Service Retirement System, CIARDS, and other federal
retirement systems;
(4) Establish a Bureau of Intelligence and
Enforcement within the Department of the Treasury, to
be headed by an Assistant Secretary for Intelligence
and Enforcement, that will enhance the government's
ability to gather and process information about the
financial support of terrorism and other illegal
activity;
(5) Improve the government's ability to identify and
prosecute individuals engaged in espionage against the
United States;
(6) Require the DCI to report on lessons learned as a
result of military operations in Iraq;
(7) Improve information sharing among federal, State,
and local government officials;
(8) Extend the reporting deadline for the National
Commission for the Review of the Research and
Development Programs of the United States Intelligence
Community;
(9) Extend the authority for the use of funds
designated for intelligence and intelligence-related
purposes for assistance to the Government of Colombia
for counter-drug activities to be used also to fund
counterterrorism activities in Colombia for each of
fiscal years 2004 through 2005; and
(10) Provide limited immunity from tort liability to
those Special Police Officers of the Central
Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency.
Overall Perspective on the Intelligence Budget and Committee Intent
The classified annex to this public report includes the
classified Schedule of Authorizations and its associated
language. The Committee views the classified annex as an
integral part of this legislation. The classified annex
contains a thorough discussion of all budget issues considered
by the Committee, which underlies the funding authorization
found in the Schedule of Authorizations. The Committee intends
that all intelligence programs discussed in the classified
annex to this report be conducted in accord with the guidance
and limitations set forth as associate language therein. The
classified Schedule is incorporated directly into this
legislation by virtue of section 102 of the bill. The
classified annex is available for review by all Members of the
House of Representatives, subject to the requirements of clause
13 of rule XXIII of the House, and the Rules of Procedure of
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Scope of Committee Review
U.S. intelligence and intelligence-related activities under
the jurisdiction of the Committee include the National Foreign
Intelligence Program (NFIP), the Tactical Intelligence and
Related Activities (TIARA), and the Joint Military Intelligence
Program (JMIP) of the Department of Defense.
The NFIP consists of all programs of the Central
Intelligence Agency, as well as those national foreign
intelligence and/or counterintelligence programs conducted by:
(1) the Department of Defense; (2) the Defense Intelligence
Agency; (3) the National Security Agency; (4) the National
Reconnaissance Office; (5) the National Imagery and Mapping
Agency; (6) the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force;
(7) the Department of State; (8) the Department of the
Treasury; (9) the Department of Energy; (10) the Department of
Justice; (11) the Federal Bureau of Investigation; (12) the
Department of Homeland Security; and (13) the Coast Guard.
The Department of Defense TIARA are a diverse array of
reconnaissance and target acquisition programs that are a
functional part of the basic military force structure and
provide direct information support to military operations.
TIARA, as defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Secretary of Defense, include those military intelligence
activities outside the General Defense Intelligence Program
that respond to the needs of military commanders for
operational support information, as well as to national
command, control, and intelligence requirements. The Armed
Services Committee in the House of Representatives has shared
oversight and authorizing jurisdiction of the programs
comprising TIARA.
The JMIP was established in 1995 to provide integrated
program management of defense intelligence elements that
support defense-wide or theater-level consumers. Included
within JMIP are aggregations created for management efficiency
and characterized by similarity, either in intelligence
discipline (e.g., Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Imagery
Intelligence (IMINT)), or function (e.g., satellite support,
aerial reconnaissance). The following aggregations are included
in the JMIP: (1) the Defense Cryptologic Program (DCP); (2) the
Defense Imagery and Mapping Program (DIMAP); (3) the Defense
General Intelligence Applications Program (DGIAP), which itself
includes (a) the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Program
(DARP), (b) the Defense Intelligence Tactical Program (DITP),
(c) the Defense Intelligence Special Technologies Program
(DISTP), (d) the Defense Intelligence Counterdrug Program
(DICP), and (e) the Defense Space Reconnaissance Program
(DSRP). As with TIARA programs, the Armed Services Committee in
the House of Representatives has shared oversight and
authorizing jurisdiction of the programs comprising the JMIP.
Committee Findings and Recommendations
The Committee completed its review of the President's
fiscal year 2004 budget request, carrying out its annual
responsibility to prepare an authorization based on close
examination of intelligence programs and proposed expenditures.
The Committee, and in some cases, its component subcommittees,
held 12 budget-related hearings covering all major intelligence
programs within the National Foreign Intelligence Program, the
Joint Military Intelligence Program, and the Tactical
Intelligence and Related Activities accounts.
As always, the Committee's legislative and budgetary
actions are based on more than these budget-specific hearings.
The actions taken in this bill are the result of the
Committee's ongoing, rigorous oversight of the U.S.
Intelligence Community. This oversight activity includes scores
of Committee and subcommittee hearings on intelligence
capabilities, strategies, plans, and challenges each year. In
addition, the Committee Members and staff undertake hundreds of
briefings and site visits annually.
Members of this Committee (and other observers) have noted
repeatedly that the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) has focused
greater public attention on the Intelligence Community and its
mission. In the 21 months since the terrorist attacks on the
World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and United Flight 93, the men
and women of the United States Intelligence Community have
faced many and varied challenges. They have responded with
commendable skill and determination.
Overall, the Committee finds that the U.S. Intelligence
Community is making progress in many areas and that there has
been a degree of recovery from the cutbacks in budgets,
personnel, and capabilities that occurred following the end of
the Cold War. As this Committee has stressed repeatedly,
however, intelligence capabilities cannot be created--or
bought--overnight. It takes time, sustained effort, and a long-
term strategy to bring human intelligence (HUMINT), signals
intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), and other
intelligence systems and disciplines to life successfully. A
similar commitment is required to build and maintain the
analytic expertise and depth of coverage necessary to make wise
and timely use of the information collected.
Therefore, increased investments in resources and
personnel, while necessary, are only a partial answer to the
question of how to build an effective Intelligence Community
for the decades to come. The Committee has sought to understand
where those investments are made, how they will be sustained in
the future, what specific intelligence capabilities are
created, and how the information collected and analyzed as a
result of those capabilities will be shared across the
Community.
This legislation, along with its accompanying report and
classified annex, contains the Committee's specific
recommendations for where the U.S. Intelligence Community
should be heading and how the fiscal year 2004 intelligence
budget should be invested. The Committee's budgetary oversight
activities have resulted in the Committee recommending in this
legislation unanimously an authorization of appropriations that
is just above the President's request.Underlying the individual
provisions of this bill is the continued belief that the nation's
security would benefit from fundamental structural and management
changes within the Intelligence Community.
Specifically, H.R. 2417:
Provides full support for the Intelligence
Community's efforts in the war on terrorism;
Postures the Intelligence Community for the future
with a unified overhead imagery architecture;
Makes needed investments in analysis and analytic
tools; and
Focuses on counterintelligence issues, including the
adoption of several recommendations that stem from the
Hanssen damage assessment.
Finally, the Committee continues to have significant
concerns regarding the extent to which the Intelligence
Community relies on supplemental appropriations to support a
range of activities that the Committee considers core mission
areas. The Committee reiterates its belief that supplemental
funding may provide short-term fixes for specific emergencies,
but the widespread, long-term reliance on supplemental funds
has an erosive, negative effect on planning, investment, and
oversight.
AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST
In the following several pages, the Committee highlights
areas of concern that it believes must be addressed with a high
priority by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) as the
leader of the Intelligence Community, and by the administration
generally if intelligence sufficient to protect our national
security is to be obtained and provided. The Committee places
particular emphasis on issues that impact the Intelligence
Community as a whole or that involve several various programs.
CIA's Compensation Reform Plan
The Committee is disconcerted that many of the rank and
file at the Central Intelligence Agency believe that the
Congress is no longer interested in or engaged on the issue of
compensation reform at the Agency. This is most certainly not
the case. The Committee is further concerned that the
prevailing belief is that the proposed compensation reform will
become a reality regardless of the results of the ongoing pilot
program.
The Congress directed, in the fiscal year 2003 Intelligence
Authorization Act, that CIA establish a one-year pilot program
to test a revised "pay for performance" compensation system
proposed by CIA management. Given that the pilot program was
not begun until February 1, 2003, the Committee considers it
premature for CIA management to promote the idea that the
compensation reform proposal is successful and will be
implemented immediately upon completion of the pilot program.
Clearly, an objective evaluation will need to be conducted once
the pilot program has been completed. The Committee wants to
make it clearly understood that any implementation of
compensation reform will occur only after CIA management and
the oversight committees have had ample opportunity to
thoroughly review and fully address the conclusions of the
pilot program evaluation.
The Intelligence Community Imperative: The Primacy of the Analyst
The Committee notes that the Intelligence Community (IC)
has regularly touted the importance of the analyst. If one of
the main goals of the IC is to put evaluated information before
policy makers, then the importance of the analyst should be
self-evident. There has been little evidence, however, to
suggest that analytical efforts have received the primacy they
deserve.
Part of this is driven by an imbalance of monetary
requirements. Collection systems simply cost much more than do
analytical efforts. The Committee is not suggesting that the IC
reduce collection or that it invest in fewer collection
mechanisms. On the contrary, the Committee believes that the IC
must position itself to analyze more of what it collects. This
is not an either/or choice. Collection is meaningless unless
there are analysts available to work on the collected
intelligence.
Several management issues are presented:
New analysts must be trained and retained. The formal
training analysts receive remains brief and uneven across the
Community. More emphasis must be placed on analyst training, on
consistent career development, and on better mentoring.
Analytic tools can be helpful, but they cannot replace
analysts in either numbers or in quality. A highly skilled and
motivated analyst is more important than any analytic tool and
far more dependable.
Analytic needs should drive collection, not vice versa.
This has been repeated time after time by the Committee and
across the Community, to little effect. A "collection
dominated" system does not serve policy makers well. In such
systems chances grow of a disjuncture between policy and
intelligence.
Analysis is sharpened when there is competition among
agencies on specific issues. It has become more difficult for
agencies to take part in competitive analysis as the numbers of
analysts have shrunk. The Committee expects that with increased
hiring and better retention of the analytic cadre, that
competitive analysis will likewise increase.
The Committee notes that some positive steps have been
taken on these matters. The National Intelligence Priorities
Framework (NIPF) that the Assistant Directors of Central
Intelligence (ADCI) for Analysis & Production and for
Collection have developed to carry out the President's
intelligence priorities make strides to correcting many of
these issues. The Committee believes that the Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI) must develop a coherent, focused
program to achieve the above goals, in order to assure that
analysis finally has the primacy it needs for the Intelligence
Community to best serve the needs of policy makers and the
nation's security.
Global HUMINT and Core Mission
Supporting the global war on terrorism is currently the top
priority of America's intelligence agencies. The Committee
believes that, with few exceptions, they are doing a
commendable--and sometimes remarkable--job. One of the
casualties of this war, however, is adequate HUMINT coverage in
areas of the world that easily could produce America's next
security crisis. Given the very limited numbers of experienced
HUMINT officers, and especially those with deep geographical
area and foreign language expertise, the agencies have been
forced to make whole regions of the world, and certain key
issues, a lower intelligence collection priority. The primary
reason for this inadequacy is the underinvestment in this core
capability during the mid to late 1990s.
As a result of that underinvestment, experienced HUMINT
officers have needed to be "surged" time and again from their
home areas to provide crisis support. Gaps in intelligence
collection and production are the immediate, noticeable result.
Less noticeable, but perhaps more ominous, is the inevitable
damage to America's future security. Quality human-sourced
intelligence is entirely dependent on carefully nurtured human
relationships, and the key elementof such relationships is
mutual trust. Human partnerships of this sort cannot be built
overnight. Trusted, quality, human-sourced intelligence cannot be
treated like water in a fire hydrant; to be opened only in cases of
emergency. Rather, it needs to be a deep reservoir that is consistently
available.
When officers are "surged" away from their areas of
expertise, their existing relationships often wither, and the
new relationships they are expected to build in a compressed
timeframe, and with pressing national security imperatives,
never come into being. The sources of future HUMINT, to include
intelligence on the plans and intentions of future foes, and
erstwhile friends, are like seeds for future crops. An
inadequate number of seeds were planted over the past decade.
Far too few are being planted currently. The Committee would
note, with disapproval, that in some areas they are not being
planted at all. This is an entirely unacceptable state of
affairs.
The Committee recognizes the extraordinary demands being
made on our limited HUMINT cadres, and likewise understands
management's inclination to mass resources on the terrorist
target. Still, it seems that more attention must be given, as
well, to the development of quality human-sourced intelligence
that is forward looking and not constrained predominately by
the counterterrorism collection requirements. This need not be
an "either/or" proposition. The Committee believes that
keeping expert officers in the area of their expertise, for the
sake of America's future needs, is critical to meeting this
enhanced HUMINT collection capability.
The Committee has received welcome assurances that the
situation in the future will be better with the hiring and
training of increased numbers of HUMINT officers. The Committee
will only be completely assured, however, when these new
officers, with their new tradecraft and foreign language
skills, are sent abroad to acquire core mission experience and
establish area expertise. If they, too, are "surged" away to
areas of crisis in response to the needs of the moment, then
the current rebuilding of core mission capabilities and global
HUMINT coverage will not be seen as a promising exercise.
Needless to say, the Committee will be aggressive in its
oversight on this issue. The United States and its citizens can
afford nothing less.
FBI Reform Efforts
The Committee wishes to commend the Federal Bureau of
Investigation for its remarkable efforts and progress since
September 11, 2001. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, has
undertaken a critical reevaluation of both its priorities and
its methods of accomplishing its national security obligations
and objectives. In order to meet emerging threats and to
counter the means used to carry out those threats, the FBI has
developed a new strategic focus.
In order to meet each of its priorities, the FBI's
workforce is being realigned in several ways. The FBI Director
has, among other initiatives,
shifted approximately 1,000 Special Agents to
counterterrorism, thereby doubling the FBI's prior
commitment;
established Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) in
every FBI field office and a National JTTF at FBI
Headquarters (which includes representatives from 30
federal, State, and local agencies);
created the Counterterrorism Prevention and Analysis
Branch;
hired approximately 100 counterterrorism analysts in
fiscal year 2002;
strengthened its language translation capabilities by
more than 200% over pre-9/11 levels, with a particular
emphasis in languages pertinent to the threat posed by
al Qaeda; and
enabled State and local law enforcement authorities
to participate more fully in the national
counterterrorism effort by placing relevant information
in the Violent Gang/Terrorist Organizations File
(VGTOF) of the National Crime Information Center
(NCIC), which is a database available to over 600,000
State and local law enforcement officers.
The FBI, likewise, leads the Foreign Terrorist Tracking
Task Force (FTTTF), which is a multi-agency task force
established by the President to keep foreign terrorists and
their supporters out of the U.S. through entry denial, removal,
or other appropriate action. The FBI is a main participant in
the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). Finally, the
FBI operates with the Central Intelligence Agency, the National
Security Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency in a
Document Exploitation working group to review documents,
electronic media, videotapes, and other materials obtained as a
result of military and intelligence community actions,
particularly in Afghanistan and Pakistan. All of this is
progress, and the Committee anticipates continued improvements
in this regard.
The FBI has also acknowledged the need for improving its
counterintelligence capabilities. The Hanssen damage assessment
and the recent criminal charges leveled against Katrina Leung
and J.J. Smith make plain the need for immediate corrective
action in this regard. Moreover, the foreign intelligence
threat currently facing the U.S. from foreign nation-state and
non-state actors is increasingly complex and asymmetrical. The
Committee supports steps the FBI has taken so far, such as:
Developing a national CI strategy with specified
objectives;
Establishing a centrally managed analysis program to
assess foreign intelligence threats on a national
level;
Designating a counterespionage section to focus
investigative efforts on espionage activities.
The Committee notes with concern the lack of management
oversight of CI cases that has become apparent in the Leung
case, and while it may be a vestige of past historical
practices,looks forward to regular updates on how management
practices and CI guidelines, including asset validation efforts, are
currently being implemented.
The Committee notes that there are still several proposals
relating to the enhancement of the FBI's CI program that are in
various stages of development and implementation. The Committee
anticipates positive movement in this regard and anticipates
status reports from the FBI as these matters move closer to
completion.
The Committee applauds the FBI for its acknowledgment that
few things are more critical to the ability of the FBI to
accomplish its counterterrorism and other missions than the
establishment of a solid relationship between it and the larger
law enforcement community at all levels of government. In order
to ensure that the communication flow and valued relationships
continue to improve, the FBI created the Office of Law
Enforcement Coordination to build and strengthen relationships
among and between the FBI and its federal, State, and local law
enforcement colleagues. Committee members remain concerned that
information sharing between the FBI and State and local law
enforcement colleagues still needs improvements. The Committee
strongly urges the FBI to place a high priority on making
additional progress on this issue.
Finally, the Committee supports the FBI's plan to improve
its information technology infrastructure. The development of
flexible, powerful, and user-friendly information management
tools is central to the FBI's ability to meet its requirements
with respect to counterterrorism as well as
counterintelligence. The Committee is aware of the progress the
FBI has made in this regard, including the development of a
Virtual Case File. The importance of such improvements
continuing and being sustained in the out-years cannot be
overstated.
Funding by Supplemental Appropriations
The Committee is compelled to restate its concern with
respect to the use of supplemental appropriations to fund lower
priority, but still important, intelligence and intelligence-
related programs. But these have not been the only programs
funded through this process. Core mission and core mission
support programs have also been included in supplemental
appropriations. The Committee recognizes that this practice has
its genesis in a fiscal strategy presented due to crisis
response. The repeated reliance on supplemental appropriations
has an erosive negative effect on planning, and impedes long-
term, strategic planning. The Committee hopes that the IC has
finally reached a plateau of resources and capabilities on
which long-term strategic planning can now begin.
It is imperative that the FY 2005 budget request for the IC
identify both the strategic and tactical needs of the IC. The
Committee expects that the FY 2005 budget request will
prioritize rationally across the various agencies. The
Committee anticipates that it will provide the necessary
funding to accomplish core mission, core mission support, and
strategic posturing. It should anticipate the intelligence
needs of the future and provide sufficient research and
development funds to position the IC well for the next
generation of national security issues facing the nation.
The Committee cannot help but note that budgeting by
supplemental consequentially limits congressional oversight.
The Committee strongly believes that the health of the IC is
directly related to the oversight from Congress it receives.
Certainly, the confidence of the American people in the
activities and programs of the IC is increased significantly as
a result of the transparency that exists between the IC and its
congressional overseers.
Consolidation of Information Technology
In the Fiscal Year 2003 Intelligence Authorization Act, the
Conferees directed that funds authorized within the
Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP) could be obligated or
expended on information technology (including computers,
storage capability, servers, switches, etc.) only after review
and approval by the Information Technology Directorate. The
Committee notes, however, that the fiscal year 2004 CCP
Congressional Budget Justification Book and NSA briefings have
not provided the assurance that this review and approval is
occurring. Duplication of effort, for example, continues to
occur as efforts to recapitalize the information technology
infrastructure at SIGINT field site progresses. Numerous
examples can be identified. The Information Technology
Directorate should be managing these information technology
infrastructure modernization efforts in a prioritized method
based on user needs. The Senior Acquisition Executive should be
responsible for ensuring the acquisition programs directed to
deliver the needed information technology capabilities are
executing the acquisitions properly.
For the GROUNDBREAKER program, the Information Technology
Directorate conducted a wall-to-wall inventory of
"administrative" information technology resources. As a
result, most of the "administrative" information technology
resources are also used as "mission" information technology
resources. The boundaries between administrative and mission
information technology are artificial, and are apparently used
to justify developing and purchasing information technology
resources without the knowledge and consent of the Director of
Information Technology, who is responsible for information
technology resources.
Accordingly, to ensure that funding for information
technology resources is effectively spent, the Committee
directs that no funding within the CCP may be obligated or
expended for any information technology hardware used for
administrative or mission purposes without the review and
approval of the Director of Information Technology. This review
is intended to ensure that information technology solutions are
not being provided elsewhere, and that they are consistent with
the information technology configuration baseline, support
agreements and modernization plans. The NSA Senior Acquisition
Executive remains responsible and accountable for acquisition
of all such capability.
National Foreign Intelligence Support to Homeland Security
The Committee understands that certain Department of
Defense agencies funded within the National Foreign
Intelligence Program (NFIP) have been directed to limit the
amount of resources dedicated to supporting the Department of
Homeland Security. The Committee notes that the Director of
Central Intelligence is, through the resources and activities
of the NFIP,responsible for supporting all U.S. government
national security interests, as directed by the President. The
Committee would find very troubling any direction to NFIP agencies that
would limit the DCI's ability to provide intelligence to any
appropriate U.S. government entity, particularly the Department of
Homeland Security.
The Intelligence Community's Role in Protecting the Homeland
The Committee supports the goal of developing an effective
intelligence architecture for protecting the homeland. The
Committee, of course, supports innovation in the IC's missions,
structures, and processes to improve its role in securing the
homeland. The Committee notes, however, a number of important
challenges facing the IC.
The first challenge is that of focusing sufficient
attention on the role of State, local, and private sector
actors. The Committee recognizes the tremendous progress made
in sharing information and coordinating operationally with
State and local officials on counterterrorism matters.
Nevertheless, with anecdotal evidence indicating improvements
are still needed, the Committee encourages renewed attention to
these efforts, and would highlight the need for incorporating
private sector security officials within the information cycle.
In particular, the Committee suggests reinforcing the
information sharing mechanisms inherent in the FBI's JTTF
program. The IC should also complement the significant but
informal verbal communication channels with increasingly
automated and more useful near-real-time electronic
dissemination mechanisms. Additionally, efforts should be made
to ensure that State, local, and private sector
counterterrorism officials are appropriately-trained and tied
in to federal counterterrorism efforts through the FBI, the
Department of Homeland Security, and all other relevant federal
mechanisms.
The next challenge involves building an effective IT
infrastructure ensuring interoperability and information
sharing across federal, State, and local (to include the
private sector) levels. This "virtual" reorganization is
important to any degree of success in this area. The Committee
notes that these efforts are just beginning within the
Intelligence Community and within a number of other federal
agencies. Senior managers across the intelligence agencies,
including particularly the newly-established Terrorist Threat
Integration Center (TTIC), should ensure that new phases of
implementation of IT information sharing infrastructure are
appropriately coordinated to ensure an effective and productive
government-wide enterprise architecture.
Thirdly, building new capabilities that are not just
available, but that are coordinated parts of an integrated
whole may be the most difficult challenge faced by federal,
State, local, and private sector counterterrorism authorities.
Since the September 11th terrorist attacks, a range of
initiatives have been undertaken to focus on improving the
architecture for the collection, analysis, and use of
intelligence for the protection of the U.S. homeland. The FBI,
as noted, has undertaken a number of structural, personnel, and
information management reforms to improve its counterterrorism
capabilities, as well as its intelligence collection, analysis,
and exploitation capabilities. Part of this effort included the
expansion of the JTTF program into 66 locations across the
nation in order to address information sharing and operational
coordination needs between federal, State, and local
counterterrorism personnel. The Committee notes this progress
with approval. The Committee would suggest, however, that the
FBI still has much to do to transform itself into something
that is more than just a highly capable criminal investigative
organization. The Committee's vision for the FBI is for the FBI
to also provide the U.S. government with a distinct preemptive
capability and to engage both domestically and internationally,
in coordination with other IC elements, wherever and whenever
the threat of terrorism affects U.S. interests. Moving the FBI,
strategically and aggressively, into the international arena,
in close coordination with other IC elements, can be a force
multiplier for the American people.
In addition to the FBI, the new Department of Homeland
Security opened for business on March 1, 2003, with the goal of
creating a stronger homeland protection capability, while also
building a new Directorate for Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) to link threat information to
critical infrastructure vulnerabilities. Moreover, the
Department of Defense has established a new command, Northern
Command (NORTHCOM), to provide an intelligence picture for DOD
components supporting the defense of the homeland. Finally, on
May 1, 2003, the TTIC opened its doors, with plans to move
elements of the FBI's Counterterrorism Division and CIA's
Counterterrorism Center into a collocated facility within a
year. Undoubtedly, the Committee welcomes all of this action in
defense of the American homeland. The Committee looks to the
IC, along with the revitalized Homeland Security Council, to
play a central coordinating role in terms of helping government
avoid unnecessary duplication, inefficient use of resources,
and managing the inevitable interagency squabbles that will
develop.
The Committee urges the President and the DCI to continue
to devote significant attention to the process of coordination
and interagency management on these restructuring efforts.
Ultimately, the Committee supports efforts to ensure a
strategic focus on innovation and on building necessary new
capabilities. It will remain a primary focus of the Committee's
attention.
Congressional Budget Justification Books
For over three years the intelligence and appropriations
committees have requested that National Foreign Intelligence
Program (NFIP) Congressional Budget Justification Books (CBJB)
follow the same format and contain at least the same detail
level as the Department of Defense TIARA Congressional
Justification Books (CBJ's). The Committee believes that this
format change would result in greater understanding of NFIP
budgets, resulting in many fewer formal questions for the
record. Some agencies have been able to produce more detailed
budgetary information when specifically requested, but in most
cases this information is not provided in the CBJBs. The
Committee believes, for example, that acquisition program
details in the CBJBs should include major milestones and
deliverables for contracted projects for the entire length of a
contract and contain more specificity for the budget year of
the request. Many of the project milestones in the CBJBs are,
however, at such a high-level that the Committee is unable to
determine the stage of the development activity or what will be
accomplished in the coming year. The project descriptions are
often so vague that the Committee is unable to determine the
valueof, or even what is being developed. The Committee
discusses this issue further in the classified annex to accompany this
bill.
Intelligence Community Efforts To Improve Its Skills Mix, Expertise,
and Capabilities through Diversity
The Committee has previously expressed the view that
diversity throughout the Intelligence Community (IC)
population, and in its management ranks, can pay dividends with
respect to the richness it brings to the work of the IC,
particularly as it relates to cultural understanding of
particular target sets, increased language capabilities, and
increased skills to address particular intelligence problems.
The Committee urges the IC to continue to work to improve its
efforts in this regard.
The Committee supports the Director of Central
Intelligence's (DCI) programs to improve diversity throughout
the IC and encourages the DCI to place special attention on
recruitment initiatives, retention programs, student programs,
and management training. The Committee notes, however, the
apparent lack of progress made by the IC with respect to
improvements in the hiring, promotion, and retention of women
and individuals from minority communities throughout the IC,
particularly in senior ranks and in core mission areas. The
Committee is concerned about a failure to improve in this area.
Therefore, the Committee urges the DCI to refocus his efforts
to increase among the IC population the diversity of skills,
languages, talents, expertise, and people that is critical to
the success of the IC's mission.
The Committee requests that the DCI submit a report no
later than February 15, 2004, outlining the current program
plan, including the IC's short term and long-term goals with
respect to these issues. The report should also detail the
progress that has been made by each element of the IC in
implementing the current plan. The Committee has limited the
use of a portion of the funds authorized to be appropriated to
the Community Management Account until such time as the
requested report has been provided to the Committee.
The Committee also requests that the DCI submit to the
Committee any and all completed studies conducted within the
CIA relating to hiring, promotion, or retention trends for
women and individuals from minority communities.
Information Technology and Information Management
The tragedy of September 11th, the ensuing war in
Afghanistan, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and recent studies and
analyses demonstrate conclusively the importance of digital
information sharing, electronic collaboration, and "horizontal
integration" across sensor types and intelligence disciplines.
These capabilities cannot be realized across the Intelligence
Community (IC) and the operational arms of the Department of
Defense (DOD) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) without
a thorough electronic "makeover" and a cultural revolution
regarding access to information and personnel networking. The
needed changes do not involve moving boxes around on an
organization chart or feuding about authorities; the changes
required, though "virtual," are nonetheless profound. The
Committee has identified a number of issues that require
serious IC leadership attention. Many of the issues that are
addressed generally in the following six sections are more
specifically addressed elsewhere in this report, or in the
classified annex.
Information Sharing Policies
The Committee has, in the past several years and
particularly since September 11, 2001, repeatedly noted the
need for better data sharing among the various Intelligence
Community (IC) agencies, organizations, and entities. In fact,
the Director of Central Intelligence, during a hearing by the
Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11 2001,
stated "we also need systems that enable us to share critical
information quickly across bureaucratic boundaries." He went
on to say, "Now, more than ever before, we need to make sure
our customers get from us exactly what they need--which
generally means exactly what they want--fast and free of
unnecessary restrictions."
The Committee notes that information sharing within the IC
has improved since the terrorist attacks on the United States.
Problems and "unnecessary restrictions," however, continue to
exist. Failure to share information across the IC is simply
unacceptable. Nevertheless, the Committee understands fully the
need for protecting sources and methods, but, believes that the
protection of sources and methods can be managed sufficiently
through the use of appropriate technological applications.
Technical shortfalls in communications and collaboration
systems are often cited as reasons for not being able to fully
share information. Although the Committee understands the need
to overcome such technical hurdles, it notes that with proper
IC management and capital investments those technical
limitations can be overcome. In this respect, the Committee is
favorably impressed by, and supports the efforts of, the IC
Chief Information Officer and the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Networks and Information Integration to jointly
develop the communications and information technology
infrastructure necessary to allow for a more robust information
sharing technical architecture.
As part of correcting the technical limitations to
information sharing, IC leadership should institute a program
to share useful information management tools, capabilities and
operating systems across the IC. For example, the IC has a
great number of "analytic tool" developments and operational
systems. These capabilities often provide unique solutions to
unique needs. The Committee generally supports these
initiatives. Often, however, such solutions may have a wide
application across the IC, but, for whatever reason, are not
shared with the other IC elements. Reasons for this include
jeopardizing organic acquisitions, or, more likely, agency
funding. This is an IC management failure and is indefensible.
More important than technological solutions to information
sharing are the needs for updated policies to direct such
sharing. IC management has not clarified sufficiently
information sharing policies to all the IC agencies. As a
result, information stagnates and perishes as a result of
outdated directives or misperceptions about what information
can or cannot be shared and with whom. There are simply too
many examples of the need for improvements and clarifications
of such policies to list here.
Suffice to say, the Committee strongly believes that the
current situation cannot continue. Corrective measures must be
undertaken immediately. To that end, the Committee requests the
DCI to document the analytical needs of each agency and review
all current IC information sharing policies to determine what
corrections must be made. This should include a review of the
policies of individual IC agencies. Once this review is
complete, the DCI should formulate and promulgate specific,
written policy guidance to the IC that results in dramatically
improved information sharing across the IC. The Committee
requests periodic status updates on the progress being made in
this regard. The Committee urges the DCI to complete this
review by July 1, 2004.
Data Tagging
The Committee has learned that one of the most challenging
impediments to finding, accessing, and retrieving information
from, and across, the many Intelligence Community (IC)
databases is the lack of data tagging. With respect to the IC,
data tagging provides information, or the so-called `metadata,'
about collected, processed or exploited intelligence data or
information. Timothy West, chairman of the Intelligence
Community Metadata Working Group, has noted that "metadata is
the key to sharing information." Since standardized metadata
tagging can allow users to precisely, repeatedly, and
accurately recall data, according to Mr. West, "the consumer
can spend more time using the information and less time
searching" for the information.
The Committee understands that many within the IC have come
to the realization that data tagging has become an imperative.
The Committee, however, is not aware of a formal IC-wide
strategy for agreeing on a set of tagging standards. Nor is it
certain that any policy decisions have been made or standards
set for tagging both new data as it is collected, or the
massive amounts of existing information currently in the many
data repositories across the IC. In fact, the Committee has
learned from many within the analysis community that one of the
greatest analytic needs is for collected data to be tagged, at
the point of collection, so that it can be discovered, more
readily and with improved efficiency by analysts across the
intelligence enterprise.
The Committee believes that the Director of Central
Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense jointly should
mandate metadata tagging standards for all components of the
IC. Further, the Committee believes that the DCI should develop
a plan to begin metadata tagging all IC collected information,
at the point of collection, and to develop a plan for tagging
all other archived data residing in Community databases. The
Committee requests the DCI and the Secretary provide the
congressional intelligence committees a briefing on their plans
to tag collected information to improve analysis by January 30,
2004.
Electronic Collaboration
The importance of electronic collaboration between
analysts, collectors, and operations personnel located far from
one another requires no elaboration. Modern tools allow close
interaction between peers and rapid shifts in the composition
of networks in response to shifting priorities and crises.
Exploiting fully the advantages of this technology necessitates
changes in management. The practice of lengthy, hierarchical
reviews of single agency reports to ensure quality and
conformity must give way to an environment where personnel have
more latitude and responsibility to create products and take
actions within a network of multi-intelligence discipline
peers.
With respect to the collaboration tools themselves, the
Committee is disappointed at the many reports it has received
that the Joint Intelligence Virtual Architecture (JIVA) Joint
Collaboration Environment (JCE) program is failing to live up
to its earlier promise. By several accounts, JCE is not keeping
up with the commercial marketplace and is not meeting the need
for community-wide, seamless collaboration. Some years ago, the
Committee endorsed the decision of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence (ASD/
C3I) to adopt Microsoft's NetMeeting for DoD's unclassified
collaboration needs, and JCE as a compatible classified
collaboration system. DoD is now shifting to a standards-based
approach as the commercial marketplace has matured, whereby
organizations can procure the collaboration tools that best
meet their needs provided that compliance with the standard is
proven through testing. If JCE is no longer the best avenue for
advanced collaboration with full interoperability across the
intelligence and operational communities, a new path should be
charted. The DoD and IC CIOs, with guidance from the USD(I) and
the DDCI/CM, must come to an agreement quickly on a strategy to
achieve seamless collaboration throughout the IC on a time
scale that matches the fielding of the Global Information Grid-
Bandwidth Expansion (GIG-BE) and Intelligence Community System
for Information Sharing (ICSIS). A summary of this strategy
should be available to the congressional intelligence and
defense committees by January 30, 2004.
Horizontal Integration
Networking the IC internally, and networking the IC with
DoD's combatant commands is critical to support fast-moving
military or law enforcement operations. If once the CIA might
have questioned the need for the National Foreign Intelligence
Program (NFIP) to provide extensive tactical support, the war
on terrorism and the war in Iraq demonstrate clearly that the
CIA is a significant consumer and producer of operational
information.
The Committee requests that the DDCI/CM and the USD(I)
produce at least an initial plan by May 15, 2004, to achieve
integrated tasking and exploitation capabilities to support
policy and operations, and report to the congressional
intelligence and defense committees.
Communications
After years of complaining about the lack of coordination
and effective planning for high-capacity, interoperable
communications in the DoD and the IC, the Committee is
gratified that excellent progress has been made over the last
year and that the prospects for the future are bright. The IC
CIO has a good plan for servicing the entire IC. The Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration
(NI2), likewise, has done an excellent job of rationalizing the
Defense Information Systems Agency's (DISA) investment in a
parallel fibernetwork, and as of this writing was on the verge
of winning approval for a new pricing policy for DISA's services.
Moreover, DoD and IC CIO planners appear to be converging on how to
interconnect the two networks, to share bandwidth, to achieve
interoperability, and to maintain security. After years of needless
delay, these decisions and agreements may finally allow the
intelligence agencies and their consumers to move high volumes of data
affordably, the prerequisite for network-centric operations.
Counterterrorism Document Exploitation
The Committee cannot overstate its view that it is
critically important to rapidly exploit terrorism related
documents and to make those documents available to counter-
terrorism analysts across the community.
The Committee understands that seized or collected
documents are initially reviewed for immediate threat
information, and that there then is a determination to restrict
further dissemination. The Committee notes that documents
deemed restricted typically have value beyond explicit threat
reporting and should therefore be provided to counter-terrorism
analysts expeditiously.
The Committee requests that the Associate Director for
Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production (ADCI A&P)
provide the intelligence authorization committees with an
assessment of the current state of document exploitation
processing and analysis. This should include a review of
materials that have not been released to all IC-wide terrorism
analysts. The Committee expects this review to contain general
information on what these materials are, when they were
collected, who has them, and why the material has not been
released for broader Intelligence Community analysis. Finally,
the Committee requests the ADCI/A&P to develop a process for
reviewing the status of DOCEX information sharing on a
quarterly basis.
Iraq: Lessons Learned to Strengthen Intelligence Capabilities to
Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction
Before and during the military conflict in Iraq, the
Intelligence Community was asked to do many tough jobs. The
dangerous work of intelligence officers continues today, and
the Committee applauds the bravery, patriotism, and sacrifices
of the personnel of the Intelligence Community leading up to
and during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Now that regime change has
occurred, however, the Committee believes a retrospective will
be helpful in order to learn lessons regarding the effective
execution of intelligence roles and missions before, during,
and after the military conflict in Iraq.
The Committee has requested that the DCI conduct an after-
action review of the IC's activities related to the Iraq
conflict and provide a report to the Congressional oversight
committees within one year of the enactment of this Act
reviewing intelligence lessons learned as a result of Operation
Iraqi Freedom. The DCI has been asked to include lessons
relating to the tasking, collection, processing, exploitation,
and dissemination of intelligence; accuracy, timeliness, and
objectivity of intelligence analysis; intelligence support to
policymakers and members of the Armed Forces in combat;
coordination of intelligence activities and operations with
military operations; strengths and limitations of intelligence
systems and equipment; and other matters the Director deems
appropriate. This request is entirely consistent with previous
"after action" studies undertaken following past conflicts.
The Committee also believes a comprehensive effort is
warranted to determine whether major new collection,
analytical, and operational capabilities are needed to improve
the US Intelligence Community's performance in combating the
spread of WMD in the future. An after-action review is
appropriate to ensure sensible investments are made in our
future intelligence capabilities against WMD.
In the Committee's view, the current task for the IC is to
try to figure out who has the WMD and how they got there. The
Committee believes the IC must ensure that it focuses on the
highest-priority national intelligence missions. These include
the identification of the WMD infrastructure, determining the
whereabouts of Saddam Hussein and key regime leadership, use of
Iraqi territory as a sanctuary by terrorist groups, and
strategic intelligence to support post-conflict reconstruction
efforts to build a new, viable, and peaceful Iraq.
The Committee acknowledges that gathering intelligence
related to WMD is difficult. Yet, the WMD challenges in Iran
and North Korea, terrorist interest in WMD, and enforcement of
international nonproliferation regimes are among the nation's
most pressing intelligence and security issues. The Iraq
conflict brings into sharp focus the need for a marshaling of
intelligence resources for counterproliferation of WMD.
EP-3E ARIES II Recapitalization
The Committee is aware that the U.S. Navy's EP-3E ARIES II
signals intelligence (SIGINT) reconnaissance fleet is rapidly
reaching its end of service life. The Committee has learned
that because of dramatically increased operations tempo rates
in support of the global war on terrorism and Operation Iraqi
Freedom, nearly one-half of the EP-3E aircraft may reach end of
service life beginning in fiscal year 2004, with the remainder
of the fleet by fiscal year 2009. Unfortunately, there is no
program to replace these vital intelligence aircraft, and a
replacement is late to need.
Dating back to 1992, the Congress has repeatedly urged the
Department of Defense to develop a plan for replacing or
integrating the Navy's EP-3 and the Air Force's RC-135 RIVET
JOINT manned SIGINT reconnaissance aircraft. However, despite
nearly two dozen various studies on this issue, there is no
plan, no program and no dedicated funding for any effort to
replace the aging EP-3s or to integrate the Navy operations
with the Air Force. The Committee believes that, because of the
imminent loss of the EP-3E aircraft, continued study or debate
on this issue is no longer an option.
The Committee understands that the Navy is currently
executing a contract to, once again, study options for
replacing the EP-3 fleet. The Committee further understands
that options under consideration include service life extension
of the current aircraft, the Navy's futureMulti-Mission
Aircraft, the Army's future Aerial Common Sensor, and the Air Force's
RC-135. The Committee believes that of the options available, the only
choice that provides replacement aircraft in the near-term, has long-
term service-life applicability beyond 2020, and that, most
importantly, allows the integration of Navy and Air Force operators is
the RC-135 option. The Committee understands that the Chief of Naval
Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force agree that there is
a great deal of synergy that could be achieved by integrating the Navy
and Air Force operators on joint missions. The Committee agrees that
side-by-side operations would bring the best operational concepts of
both services to these Joint Staff-directed, theater-level,
reconnaissance missions, and that this is an opportunity that should
not be lost.
Further, the Committee understands that most vehement
objections to this integrated mission approach have been
focused on the need for naval fleet support and the cost of the
RC-135 versus the EP-3. As for fleet support tasking, the
Committee notes that the Navy's EP-3 aircraft are tasked in
precisely the same manner, and by the same authorities, as are
the RC-135 aircraft. Further, these two aircraft are fielded
around the world in precisely the same locations, flying the
same mission routes. With respect to the cost of the aircraft,
the Committee understands that past cost comparisons of the two
aircraft have not considered all direct and indirect costs,
and, that in fact, when all factors are considered the two
aircraft are not dramatically different in cost, particularly
when the additional mission capacity of the RC-135 is factored
into the calculus. Finally, the Committee understands that six
to eight RC-135s could replace the 12 EP-3s now in service, and
that the resulting smaller single fleet of aircraft would
provide the same mission capability as today's two separate
fleets. The logic of this approach appears overwhelming.
The Committee believes that the benefits of consolidated
Air Force and Navy manned SIGINT reconnaissance operations are
many, and therefore recommends $180.0 million to begin
replacing EP-3s with RC-135 aircraft.
Finally, the Committee understands that the Air Force Chief
of Staff believes that new generation aircraft such as the
Boeing 767 must be pursued for the long-term replacement of the
RC-135. The Committee supports moving towards a more modern
aircraft at the proper time and when the proper funding can be
provided. When such a program can be logically pursued, the
Committee directs that the consolidated mission approach
outlined above must be continued.
International Narcotics Trafficking and Other Transnational Organized
Crime Threats to U.S. National Security
The Committee is concerned about the level of resources and
personnel being allocated to combatting the threats posed by
international narcotics trafficking and other transnational
organized crime, such as arms smuggling and money laundering.
Given the clear and well-documented linkages between terrorist
activity, narcotics trafficking, and other transnational
organized crime in Colombia, Afghanistan, and North Korea, the
Committee urges the DCI to identify and allocate sufficient
additional IC personnel and funding to restore the IC's efforts
in combatting transnational drug trafficking and other
organized crime activities. These programs address significant
threats to the country's national security and must have
adequate personnel and funding in their own right. The
Committee believes they deserve additional support and senior-
level engagement. The Committee expects to see a reinvigorated
strategy to combat narcotics trafficking and other
transnational organized crime--with appropriate funding and
personnel levels for the DCI's Crime and Narcotics Center
(CNC)--in the Administration's FY 2005 budget submission.
Options for Fort Ritchie, Maryland
The Committee has noted the remarkable facility located at
the recently closed Fort Ritchie, Maryland. Its proximity to
Washington, D.C., within the pastoral vicinity of the Catoctin
Mountains, makes it a location that the Committee believes
should be strongly considered by the DCI, the Undersecretary of
Defense for Intelligence, and the Director of the FBI, as the
home of a future IC-wide College for Analytical Studies or IC-
wide language training facility. The facilities can accommodate
either or both of the endeavors suggested above. The facilities
and the surrounding region easily could also provide an idyllic
setting for IC conferences.
Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation
Title I--Intelligence Activities
Section 101--Authorization of appropriations
Section 101 lists the United States Government departments,
agencies, and other elements for which the Act authorizes
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities for fiscal year 2004.
Section 102--Classified schedule of authorizations
Section 102 makes clear that the details of the amounts
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities and applicable personnel
ceilings covered under this title for fiscal year 2004 are
contained in a classified Schedule of Authorizations. The
Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of
Representatives and to the President.
Section 103--Personnel ceiling adjustments
Section 103 authorizes the Director of Central Intelligence
(DCI), with the approval of the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), in fiscal year 2004 to authorize
employment of civilian personnel in excess of the personnel
ceilings applicable to the components of the Intelligence
Community under section 102 by an amount not to exceed two
percent of the total of the ceilings applicable under section
102. The DCI may exercise this authority only if necessary to
the performance of important intelligence functions. Any
exercise of this authority must be reported to the intelligence
committees of the Congress.
Section 104--Community Management Account
Section 104 authorizes appropriations for the Community
Management Account (CMA) of the DCI and sets the personnel end-
strength for the Intelligence Community Management Staff for
fiscal year 2004.
Subsection (a) authorizes appropriations of $192,640,000
for fiscal year 2004 for the activities of the CMA of the DCI.
Subsection (a) also authorizes funds identified for advanced
research and development to remain available for two years.
Subsection (c) explicitly authorizes the classified portion of
the Intelligence Community Management Account.
Subsection (b) authorizes 320 full-time personnel for
elements within the CMA for fiscal year 2004 and provides that
such personnel may be permanent employees of the CMA element or
detailed from other elements of the United States Government.
Subsection (c) authorizes additional appropriations and
personnel for the CMA as specified in the classified Schedule
of Authorizations and permits the additional funding amount to
remain available through September 30, 2005.
Subsection (d) requires that, except as provided in section
113 of the National Security Act of 1947, personnel from
another element of the United States Government be detailed to
an element of the CMA on a reimbursable basis, or for temporary
situations of less than one year on a non-reimbursable basis.
Subsection (e) authorizes $34,248,000 of the amount
authorized in subsection (a) to be made available for the
National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC). Subsection (e)
requires the DCI to transfer these funds to the Department of
Justice to be used for NDIC activities under the authority of
the Attorney General, and subject to section 103(d)(1) of the
National Security Act.
Section 105--Intelligence elements of the Department of the Treasury
Section 105 authorizes the establishment of a Bureau for
Intelligence and Enforcement within the Treasury Department,
headed by a Presidentially nominated and Congressionally
approved Assistant Secretary. The Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury for Intelligence and Enforcement would be appointed
following consultations between the Treasury Secretary and the
Director of Central Intelligence. The Bureau would consist of
personnel drawn from Treasury's Office of Intelligence Support,
the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), and the Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN).
Given the findings of the 9/11 Joint Inquiry, the Committee
is very interested in ensuring that there is full, appropriate,
and timely sharing of information and analysis within the U.S.
Government concerning the financial networks associated with
international terrorism. Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks, the U.S. Government has blocked the assets of over 260
individuals and groups supporting terrorist causes, and has
frozen approximately $120 million in terrorist assets.
There is currently no single office in the executive branch
that is tasked by statute with ensuring that all elements of
the intelligence and law enforcement communities cooperate and
coordinate in the identification and the targeting of terrorist
financial assets. The Committee is increasingly concerned that
the Department of the
