Congressional Record: September 22, 2004 (Senate)
Page S9487-S9507
EXECUTIVE SESSION
______
NOMINATION OF PORTER J. GOSS TO BE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now
proceed to executive session to begin consideration of Calendar No.
815, which the clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read the nomination of Porter J. Goss, of
Florida, to be Director of Central Intelligence.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, there are 6 hours of
debate on the nomination equally divided between the chairman and vice
[[Page S9488]]
chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence.
The Senator from Kansas.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that any quorum
calls that take place during the consideration of the Goss nomination
be charged equally to both sides.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I rise today to urge my colleagues in the
Senate to confirm Mr. Porter J. Goss, of Florida, to be the next
Director of Intelligence.
On August 10, 2004, President Bush nominated Porter Goss to be the
next Director of Central Intelligence, or the DCI. In doing so, the
President stated that Mr. Goss ``is a leader with strong experience in
intelligence and in the fight against terrorism. He knows the CIA
inside and out. He is the right man to lead this important agency at
this critical moment in our Nation's history.''
The Goss nomination was received in the Senate on September 7. On
September 14 and September 20, the Select Committee on Intelligence
held extraordinary open hearings on this nomination that were televised
and widely covered in the press.
At the September 14 hearing, Mr. Goss was introduced to the committee
by both of Florida's distinguished Senators, Bob Graham, former
chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, and Bill Nelson, who
is well known to the Intelligence Committee as an interested and
informed supporter of our efforts.
That both Florida Senators reached across the aisle to support this
nomination is a testament to the wide bipartisan support that it does
enjoy.
After 2 days of thorough and wide-ranging public hearings, the Goss
nomination was placed before the Intelligence Committee membership for
a vote yesterday morning.
In yet another impressive display of bipartisanship, the committee
approved the Goss nomination and ordered it reported in a vote of 12 to
4. At this time, I would like to congratulate the Intelligence
Committee members of both parties for their sober, penetrating, and
thorough consideration of this nomination. The committee's handling of
this nomination is very much in keeping with the bipartisan spirit that
has animated its work during a very difficult year of challenges in the
global war on terrorism in Iraq and in other areas around the world.
This bipartisan spirit did produce important steps forward, such as
the committee's report on Iraq WMD, in understanding intelligence
problems and gaps and also making recommendations in that regard.
As such, the committee's work will certainly help Mr. Goss as he
strives to make the intelligence community better and to produce the
best possible intelligence product. I want to say I also appreciate Mr.
Goss's efforts during his 2 days of public hearings to respond to
members' concerns and questions. He took these hearings very seriously
and with attention to detail demanded by consideration for a position
that has in the past been part of the Cabinet.
In my opinion, during his confirmation hearings Mr. Goss showed the
qualities we want to see in a good DCI. They are coolness under
pressure, a willingness to look at alternative views and, very
importantly, a willingness to ``take a few licks'' for past judgments.
Most important of all, he demonstrated his ability to put the
lawmaker's so-called partisan hat aside and take up the strictly
nonpartisan duties of this critical executive branch office.
As I noted at Mr. Goss's first public hearing on September 14, the
role of the Director of Central Intelligence is of paramount importance
to the security of this Nation. It is also one of the most challenging
jobs in the executive branch today.
Obviously, this Nation is currently engaged in a war not only in
Iraq, not only in Afghanistan, but elsewhere around the globe. In this
war, for the most part there are no trenches. There is no barbed wire.
There is no well-defined no man's land. On the contrary, in this war of
shadows and darkness, intelligence defines the front line and indicates
its weak points and gaps.
Recently, a distinguished former National Security Adviser remarked
to Senators that during the last 3 years our world has changed
dramatically. In the old world, the threats were posed by nation states
and organized military forces. In our new world, the greatest threats
may be domestic. These threats may come from nation states and their
agents and terrorist groups such as al-Qaida. Organized military
conflict is only one of many threats.
In our new world, we are not fighting against nation states but
against a network of disparate terrorist groups that operate not only
in the shadows but at times right in our own midst. Whether Afghanistan
or Iraq or here at home, defeating this enemy depends primarily upon
the ability of our intelligence services to locate, to penetrate and,
yes, to destroy the terrorist cells. We are involved in a world war
which requires timely and actionable intelligence to ensure victory and
the safety of the American people.
The Director of Central Intelligence is personally responsible for
producing this intelligence. As we fight Islamic terror, other global
threats continue to menace our Nation, and among them are these: The
development of nuclear programs by adversary regimes such as those in
Iran and also North Korea; the steady transformation of the People's
Republic of China into a power capable of challenging our interests
broadly and exercising influence over the region; and the continuing
worldwide expansion of WMD technology.
The Director of Central Intelligence is also responsible for
producing intelligence to keep the President and policymakers informed
about these threats.
And if that were not daunting enough, Mr. Goss has been nominated for
a position which in all probability may not exist for much longer. As
Senators know, the President and many in the Congress now support the
creation of a new national intelligence director. There has been a
great deal of discussion among my colleagues about reform. Above all,
we must ensure that a national intelligence director is something more
than a weak and ineffective figurehead.
Most of the debate outside the Intelligence Committee has centered on
how to grant increased authority to the new national intelligence
director while leaving the structural status quo undisturbed.
Many on the Intelligence Committee believe this is simply unworkable.
In other words, significant structural change is vital to real reform.
I believe strongly that we must create a new structure. This new
structure must accommodate the diverse activities of our intelligence
agency by giving direct responsibility and control of primary
intelligence disciplines and the corresponding agencies to a truly
empowered national intelligence director and his assistants. And true
empowerment includes both budget authority and line authority to direct
and control the activities of the intelligence activities. One without
the other may leave us with an intelligence head who can neither
succeed nor be held accountable, and that would be a most unfortunate
outcome.
We don't know how or when reform will finally be enacted. Until then,
however, we need a strong Director of Central Intelligence with the
necessary skills to manage a community which needs reform. Porter Goss
understands these issues. As chairman of the House Intelligence
Committee he helped create momentum for reform.
Porter Goss will be a good man to have in the intelligence community
driver's seat as Congress, in cooperation with the executive branch,
goes through the consideration of major reform. His unique background
will serve him well as he meets these and other challenges while
directing our intelligence community.
For over 40 years, Porter Goss has been serving his Nation, his
State, and his community. As an Army intelligence officer, a
clandestine CIA case officer, a newspaper man, a county commissioner, a
U.S. Representative, and chairman of the House Intelligence Committee,
Porter Goss has done his duty with skill, with honor, and with
integrity. I believe, and Members on both sides agree, that his
experience makes him uniquely suited to serve as the Director of
Central Intelligence.
I have known Mr. Goss personally for 16 years. I served with him in
the other body, the House of Representatives. I have worked with him on
a weekly
[[Page S9489]]
basis since I joined the Intelligence Committee. I have formed a strong
opinion about his fitness to lead the intelligence community.
One of Porter Goss's most important characteristics is that he does
not ride in a partisan posse. In that sense and in many others, the
President has selected an outstanding public servant to be his
principal adviser on intelligence.
In concluding my opening statement on the Goss nomination, I would
like to underscore an important point. If, as I earnestly hope, the
Senate approves this nomination today, this body will not simply have
performed a routine pro forma duty. On the contrary, Porter Goss's
confirmation as the DCI represents perhaps the most important changing
of the guard for our intelligence community since 1947. This
confirmation represents a fresh start for our Nation's intelligence
community. He will be the first Director of Central Intelligence in a
new and hopefully better intelligence community. It is not the same
entity that George Tenet inherited when he was confirmed by this body 7
years ago.
It is not the same entity that existed on September 10, 2001. The
intelligence community has undergone vitally important changes since
the terrorist attacks of 2001. These changes are the result of many
factors: statutory requirements, Executive orders, and other major
changes in policy. That snapshot that we took of the intelligence
community back on September 10, 2001, and the snapshot today is much
better in terms of improvement. A key factor is the vigilance and
dedication of the intelligence community rank and file, to include
those men and women who, today, as I speak, are putting their lives at
risk in remote and dangerous places to protect our Nation.
Still other changes are on the immediate horizon as Congress
considers major intelligence reform. So let us understand clearly what
we do here today. Porter Goss, as the new DCI, will lead a new
intelligence community into a new chapter. Senate confirmation of
Porter Goss does not mean simply painting a new name on the mailbox at
Langley. It represents the opening of a new era for the intelligence
community. The errors and omissions of Iraq are well known. They must
be corrected.
Steps have been taken and will be taken to ensure that. The errors
and the omissions of 9/11 are very clearly and thoroughly described in
both the joint inquiry that was conducted by the Senate Intelligence
Committee, the House Intelligence Committee, and the 9/11 Commission
Report.
These errors and omissions must and will be corrected. Porter Goss's
task will be to build, inspire, and open a new chapter in our
intelligence activities. We must never forget the errors of the past or
their human cost. Likewise, we should not dwell on them or allow them
to paralyze us. We must grapple with them and overcome them. That is
what is happening now, with structural intelligence community reform.
Porter Goss's task will be to open the new chapter and lead the
intelligence community into that fresh start.
Today, perhaps our highest legislative priority is to repair what is
broken in the intelligence community. We must not let this laudable
desire immobilize us.
John McLaughlin, the Acting Director, has done a professional and
commendable job as the Acting DCI. He, no less than the rank and file
of the intelligence community, needs long-term, permanent leadership,
and we need it now.
One of the concerns voiced by the 9/11 Commission was that it takes
too long to put key intelligence community officials into place. In the
case of this nomination, I believe the Senate definitely got the
message. The watch word for this nomination since the beginning has
been goodwill and bipartisanship. As I stated at the beginning,
Senators Graham and Nelson of Florida introduced and strongly endorsed
this nominee at his first confirmation hearing. We had an impressive
bipartisan vote on this nomination in the Senate Intelligence
Committee. The ranking member of the House Intelligence Committee, the
Honorable Ms. Jane Harman, has pointed with pride to her committee's
involvement in intelligence reform under Mr. Goss's chairmanship.
Expressions of support for this nomination have come from both sides of
the aisle and both sides of Capitol Hill.
This nominee is ready to go to work and he is needed. I urge the
Senate to confirm him as soon as possible. I, personally, and I think I
speak for the members of the Intelligence Committee, look forward to
working with Porter Goss, the next and possibly last DCI.
I understand the vice chair is waiting to speak, but I ask his
indulgence to permit Senator Chambliss to speak first.
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Yes.
Mr. ROBERTS. How much time does the Senator request?
Mr. CHAMBLISS. I request 7 minutes.
Mr. ROBERTS. I yield him such time as he would consume.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bunning). The Senator from Georgia.
Mr. CHAMBLISS. Mr. President, I appreciate the Senator from West
Virginia allowing me to go before him. The leadership that the chairman
and the vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee have
provided has been unparalleled in this difficult time in the history of
our country. Both Senators have conducted themselves in a very
professional way and have brought continued honor and dignity to the
Senate Intelligence Committee in a bipartisan way, and I want to
publicly commend both of them for their leadership.
I rise today in support of the nomination of Porter Goss to be the
Director of Central Intelligence. There is no more important time in
the history of our country, from an intelligence perspective, than we
are in today. Porter Goss has been nominated by the President to be the
chief intelligence officer for the United States. Porter Goss brings to
the office an unparalleled wealth of experience and knowledge relative
to intelligence matters. Porter Goss has been a friend of mine for 10
years, and I bring to this argument and this debate a little bit
different perspective than any other Member of this body because I
served in the House of Representatives for 8 years with Porter Goss,
the last 2 as a member of the House Intelligence Committee under the
chairmanship of Porter Goss.
During the last 2 years as a Member of the Senate and as a member of
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I have continued a
relationship with Porter Goss in the intelligence community. Both
before September 11 and subsequent to September 11, I have seen Porter
Goss in the trenches doing the kind of work that lawmakers have to do
relative to their day-to-day jobs. Nobody has provided stronger
leadership on the issue of intelligence than Porter Goss has, both
before September 11 as well as after September 11, and more
significantly after.
As I think about the arguments that have been brought forth in the
public hearings over the last couple of weeks regarding Mr. Goss, the
primary thrust of the negative arguments have been that he is too
partisan and too political to carry out the job of the DCI.
Well, I will say this about this man for whom I have so much respect:
I have seen him in an atmosphere of committee work. I have seen him in
an atmosphere of social work. I have seen him in an atmosphere of
operating on the floor of the House of Representatives. Certainly,
there is nobody who is a stronger advocate for his position on any
issue than Porter Goss. He is very direct. He is very plain spoken, and
it is pretty obvious which side of the issue he is on. But he always
does his arguing in a very respectful way, and in a way which advocates
his position but does not get into personalities. Unfortunately, that
is where the partisanship occurs in both this body and the body across
the U.S. Capitol.
Porter Goss has conducted himself in a professional and nonpartisan
way as chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, as well
as a member of the Rules Committee and otherwise in the U.S. House. He
is a strong advocate for his positions but he is not a partisan person.
I will discuss very quickly why I feel so strongly about his
background and what it brings to the table relative to his
confirmation. Porter Goss started out early in his career as a military
intelligence officer in the U.S. Army. He then moved into the realm of
the Central Intelligence Agency and was a
[[Page S9490]]
clandestine officer for the CIA in two different overseas posts. He
knows the people within the CIA. A number of individuals who he served
with during his CIA years are still employees at the CIA. He knows not
only the organization, but he knows the personalities, and he knows the
kinds of people who are led, and the kinds of people who need to lead
at the Central Intelligence Agency.
Porter Goss followed his time as an Intelligence Officer in the field
with 8 years as chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence.
He has covered the spectrum from an intelligence perspective. He has
been on the ground as an Army intelligence officer, and the Department
of Defense is the largest customer of the CIA. He has been at the
ground level of the CIA, where the real work is done and where the real
intelligence is gathered, by being a clandestine officer within the
CIA. Then in his years as chairman of the House Select Committee on
Intelligence he has been in a position to provide oversight for the
work that not only he did as an active member of the intelligence
community but following, particularly, post-September 11 he has
provided the oversight and been critical where he needed to be
critical, and yet complimentary where he needed to compliment the
intelligence community relative to the work they were doing.
I don't know of anyone else who has the same diversified background
as a soldier, a clandestine case officer, and a legislator as does
Porter. It is pretty obvious that his background and vast experience
are two of the main reasons why the President selected Mr. Goss to be
the next Director of Central Intelligence.
Porter Goss is a personal friend and he is somebody for whom I have
great respect. I know what kind of family man he is, I know the
strength of his character, and I know his dedication to duty, which is
why he accepted the nomination to become our next DCI. I also know the
wealth of intelligence background he will bring to the table as our
next DCI.
The main point I want to conclude with is the fact that we are in a
very complex world. We are in a world where intelligence matters. We
are in a world where we need to have the cooperation of our allies
around the world to collect intelligence against common enemies and
common threats.
I have been with Porter Goss when he has had meetings with numerous--
too many to detail--heads of the intelligence communities of our
allies, both abroad as well as here in Washington. I have seen the
rapport and the relationship he enjoys with these individuals. I have
been to other countries around the world to meet with the heads of
their intelligence agencies, and the first question they will ask is
not how am I doing but, ``How is my friend Porter Goss doing?'' He has
an unparalleled relationship with the intelligence community around the
world--not because he is just a good guy but because they respect him
for the work he has done and they respect him for the knowledge and the
experience he brings to the table relative to the intelligence
community.
I strongly support the nomination of Porter Goss to be the next
Director of Central Intelligence. I ask my colleagues to review the
record on Mr. Goss, listen to the debates, but at the end of the day I
hope we will send a resounding message to the President, and that is:
You have picked the right man. Let's confirm Porter Goss as Director of
Central Intelligence and move forward.
I yield the floor.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I yield such time as he may use to the
distinguished Senator from Missouri, a member of the Intelligence
Committee.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri.
Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I thank my distinguished chairman.
It is a pleasure today to rise in support of Porter Goss to be
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Senate Intelligence
Committee has done its due diligence. It has done its duty with regard
to examining the nominee's fitness and qualification for the post of
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. His nomination should be
approved without delay.
Much of the work that goes on in the Intelligence Committee is
conducted in confidence because of the need to maintain
confidentiality. But I will say that the thorough hearings we had on
Congressman Goss were similar to the thorough hearings we have had on
all of the subjects brought under the jurisdiction and supervision of
our distinguished chairman from Kansas, along with the ranking
Democratic member from West Virginia.
There is no question that there is a lot of important work awaiting
the new Director of Central Intelligence. Somebody has to be in charge.
We are at war with those who seek to destroy us and all freedom-loving
people's way of life.
Whether we have a new national Director of Intelligence, whether we
have a CIA Director with expanded powers or limited powers, the fact
remains that we need to move forward with the nomination of Porter
Goss.
We have a long way to go to hash out what kinds of changes we are
going to make to the organization of the intelligence committee. The
more I hear, the more I watch other committees working, the more
divergence of opinions I see. Whatever structure we have, we need
somebody to control intelligence and make sure we put it on the right
path.
A cornerstone of our fight in the war against terrorists, as well as
other challenges that confront us, is the paramount need for timely and
actionable intelligence to ensure good policy decisions, to ensure
adequate preparation for actions that we may take, and to ensure
victory for our forces that are deployed in the real-life battles
against those who threaten us or threaten national security. Our
national security depends on the ability of intelligence services to
locate, penetrate, identify targets, and/or destroy terrorist cells.
In addition, we need a Director of Central Intelligence who will keep
policymakers informed about other global threats facing our Nation.
And, yes, while we are looking at the war on terrorism, we need to be
concerned about and following developments about the possible nuclear
program advances or missile advances in Iran and North Korea, the
steady growth of troubling developments in other major world powers,
and the continuing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
technology.
The intelligence community needs a leader right now, the support of
the President, and the support of this body who has the experience
coupled with a commitment to reform. I am convinced that Porter Goss
possesses these qualities. He was a former intelligence officer, a
former CIA clandestine officer, and as chairman of the House
Intelligence Committee, where he probably also went in harm's way to
handle that post, Porter Goss clearly knows the intelligence business
and has the experience.
As cochairman of the joint House-Senate inquiry into the 9/11
intelligence failures, he is intimately aware of the problems currently
existing within the intelligence community's ability to counter
terrorists. He is someone who will work with the Congress and the
administration to implement needed reforms.
Mr. Goss has also earned the respect of his colleagues and fellow
policymakers on both sides of the aisle. One of the most, if not the
most important principles that applies to our intelligence community
and our oversight should be our nonpartisanship.
Porter Goss has been praised by his Democratic colleagues year after
year for being nonpartisan on national security.
Senator Graham of Florida said of Porter Goss, in our hearing:
He is uniquely qualified to be here today as the
President's nominee to serve as the Director of Central
Intelligence. . . . He is a man of great character, unusual
intelligence, a tremendous work ethic and an outstanding
personal and professional standard of integrity.
Senator Graham also went on to say:
In addition to those personal qualities, when it comes to
the intelligence community, Congressman Goss has, in my
judgment, a balanced perspective, a perspective gained both
as an insider and then as an outsider. For a decade, early in
his career, Congressman Goss served our Nation in both the
Army and the CIA. He knows firsthand the value and the risk
of clandestine operations.
I could cite many other statements by leaders in both bodies. Senator
Bill Nelson of Florida, last month, said of Representative Goss:
[[Page S9491]]
He's a class act. Goss combines all of those
characteristics, which are kind of somebody I like.
My colleague and friend from Missouri, Representative Ike Skelton,
the minority leader on the Armed Services Committee, said, in 1997,
talking about the work on the intelligence authorization bill:
I salute both the chairman, the gentleman from Florida [Mr.
Goss], and the ranking Democrat, the gentleman from
Washington [Mr. Dicks] for their dedicated and bipartisan
work.
I believe he can work on a bipartisan basis. In addition, Porter Goss
understands the endemic deficiencies within the intelligence community.
There can only be true, meaningful changes if there is a solid
understanding of why change is necessary. Porter Goss understands what
is broken and is determined to work with us to fix what needs to be
fixed and not to mess with what does not need to be fixed.
There are some glaring problems we identified in our report on the
prewar intelligence on Iraq. One of them was the poor state of human
intelligence. That is spies on the ground, HUMINT as it is called in
intel-speak. We did not have any. What a disaster. We also have
problems in collection in general, analysis, and the consistent
problems with information sharing. These are problems that Porter Goss
has, during his tenure as chairman of the House Intelligence Committee,
devoted himself to improving.
As Chairman Roberts mentioned in yesterday's open session, Porter
Goss held over 62 hearings on intelligence community reform issues this
year.
Under Chairman Goss's leadership, the House Intelligence Committee
advocated changes and added resources annually to address the
intelligence community's most pressing problems, especially those
related to HUMINT and analysis.
His commitment to reform forced the CIA to repeal its restrictive
internal guidelines that had a ``chilling effect'' on HUMINT
operations. He attempted to refocus CIA analytic resources toward
longer term, predictive, strategic intelligence, and directed that more
attention be paid to language training, breaking down stovepipes, and
enhancing information sharing.
I can tell you, the stovepipes still exist. We still have
bureaucracies that only want to share information up and down within
their little fiefdoms, and we need somebody in charge who is willing to
break down those barriers and make sure sensitive information is shared
on a need-to-know basis.
Porter Goss was a member of the Aspin-Brown commission which was
formed to assess the future direction, priorities, and structure of the
intelligence community in the post-Cold-War world. The commission made
a number of recommendations, including looking how to streamline the
DCI's responsibilities and give him more flexibility in managing the
intelligence community.
Those who question Porter Goss's commitment to change must remember
that his leadership and dedication to intelligence community reform is
apparent in his work on the ``Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community
Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11,
2001.'' This report contained 19 recommendations. It laid the
foundation for the 9/11 Commission recommendations--the changes that
have been the subject of much discussion in the press over the last
several months.
Those who question Representative Goss's commitment to reform as well
as his commitment to operate independent of the current administration
should recall that Mr. Goss took the initiative to introduce his
intelligence reform legislation on June 16 of this year, H.R. 4584,
which called for significant changes in the intelligence community
structure in addition to providing a DCI or DNI the much needed
personnel and budgetary authority required to be a truly effective
leader. It should be noted that Porter Goss's legislation did not fall
in lockstep with the recent Executive order issued by the President,
thus proving that Mr. Goss will take the necessary bold steps to do
what is right for the community.
I quoted Senator Nelson of Florida earlier, but he also said of
Porter Goss:
. . . Congressman Goss is someone whose public life has been
illustrative of being nonpartisan, fair and independent.
When Porter Goss was pressed to defend past partisan statements
before our committee, he acknowledged there are times on Capitol Hill
when partisanship will rear its head. That is, unfortunately, part of
the job. However, he told our committee the following:
I well understand that I am leaving one arena and, if
confirmed, heading to another arena that operates completely
differently where partisan politics are not part of the job.
A considerable record has been created, embracing both substantial
comment on Porter Goss on his nomination and several commitments by him
on intelligence matters involving counterterrorism and other important
activities. I stress again the importance of approving Mr. Goss's
nomination at this time of paramount importance in the intelligence
community. I hope my colleagues will join with the chairman, with me,
and other members of the committee in extending him our support.
I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from West Virginia.
Mr. ROCKEFELLER. I thank the Presiding Officer.
Mr. President, the nomination of Representative Porter Goss to be the
next Director of the Central Intelligence Agency comes, obviously, at
an absolutely critical time in our Nation's history.
The documented intelligence failures prior to the terrorist attacks
of September 11 and leading up to the war in Iraq have left the
intelligence community's credibility bruised and their image tarnished,
which none of us wants.
The community's objectivity, their independence, and their competency
have been called into question. That is fair in some cases. As a
result, a bipartisan call for reform has steadily grown to the point
where the Congress is on the threshold of passing landmark legislation,
I believe and I hope, to create a stronger, better managed intelligence
community before we adjourn this year. I do not think we should stretch
it out and wait. I think we should do it, and do it now.
The next Director of Central Intelligence will be the most important
person for that position ever confirmed by the Senate. Our decision on
who should lead the Central Intelligence Agency, and the other 14
intelligence agencies, according to the law, should not be a
rubberstamp job.
The importance of this position requires a thorough examination of
the nominee's record and his ability to carry out the weighty
responsibilities of the job.
As I have indicated, never before in the 57-year history of the
intelligence community has there been such a need for a Director of
Central Intelligence with unimpeachable character, proven leadership
and management experience, and strong national security credentials.
The new Director will face, in my judgment, no fewer than four major
challenges: waging an unrelenting offensive clandestine campaign
against al-Qaida and other terrorist organizations around the world;
supporting ongoing military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq;
managing an intelligence community in a state of transition; and,
restoring the intelligence community's lost credibility.
The next Director of Central Intelligence must be extraordinarily
qualified in order to successfully carry out these and other national
security tasks.
I simply say all of this to say the stakes are enormous. Perhaps most
importantly, the next Director of Central Intelligence must be
nonpartisan, independent, and objective. This standard is not simply
this Senator's; it is what the law, the National Security Act law,
requires specifically in language.
I know of no other position of importance in Government requiring
that independence, objectivity, and non-partisanship as a requirement
for confirmation. The very first responsibility of the Director of
Central Intelligence under the National Security Act--and these are the
words--says that his advice to the President, the executive branch, the
military, and the Congress must be timely, must be objective, and must
be independent of political considerations, and based upon all sources
available to the intelligence community. That is the law.
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I have reviewed Representative Goss's record closely. I have gone
over his writings and his speeches of the past 10 years. We have just
completed two open hearings, which I thought were good hearings, in the
Intelligence Committee, where Representative Goss was asked questions
about his past record, his commitment to reform the intelligence
community, and his ability to be forthright, objective, and
independent.
Representative Goss is, without question, qualified in many respects.
He is a fine person. I have been able to work with him well over the
past few years--that is not one of the requirements, but it happens to
be true--both in the joint congressional inquiry into 9/11, and also in
House-Senate conferences. His past employment with the Central
Intelligence Agency, doing extremely dangerous work, and his 7-year
tenure as chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, have given him
both an insider's and outsider's perspective of the intelligence
community. There is no doubt that he is an extremely knowledgeable
person with respect to the inner workings of the Central Intelligence
Agency and the other agencies he is nominated to manage.
But Representative Goss's record is troubling in other regards. I
wish to speak about them. He has made a number of statements relative
to intelligence matters--many in the past year--that are, in fact,
highly partisan and displayed a willingness on his part to use
intelligence issues as a political broadsword against members of the
Democratic Party. Again, ordinarily, that is kind of routine around
here, but with respect to the Director of Central Intelligence, that
should not be and cannot be according to the law. When taken
collectively, this list of partisan statements and actions on
intelligence matters raise a serious doubt in my mind as to whether
Porter Goss can be the type of nonpartisan, independent, and objective
national intelligence adviser our country needs.
What is the public record of the person the President has nominated
to be the next director of the CIA? Has he been independent, objective,
and nonpartisan on intelligence issues, again, as required by law?
In March of this year, Representative Goss coauthored an intelligence
op-ed piece entitled ``Need Intelligence? Don't ask John Kerry.'' In
this political attack piece, he made a number of highly charged
political allegations relating to intelligence spending. These are
quotes from the Congressman:
. . . when Democrats controlled the Congress, the cuts were
deep, far-reaching, and devastating to the ability of the CIA
to do its job to keep America safe.
. . . during the Clinton years, the Intelligence Community
was given a clear message that if they failed in politically
risky operations . . . there would be no backing from the
Clinton White House or the Democratic-controlled Congress.
And then Representative Goss targeted Senator Kerry, who he claims
``was leading the way to make deep and devastating cuts in the
intelligence community's budget'' and ``was leading efforts in Congress
to dismantle the Nation's intelligence capabilities.'' Severe
criticism. A few months later, in a June 23, 2004 statement on the
floor of the House, Representative Goss claimed that ``the Democratic
Party did not support the Intelligence Community.'' And in the same
June floor debate, he offered the following justification for his
claim:
My comment is that when there was opposition to
intelligence and, year after year, efforts to cut the
intelligence budget, they did come from the Democratic side
through the period of the 1990s.
I have gone back over the record and determined that Representative
Goss's election year claims mischaracterize the intelligence record of
both the Democratic Party and Senator Kerry, in my judgment. He also
failed to point out his own record as a member, and eventual chairman,
of the House Intelligence Committee during this time. Had he stated the
intelligence record factually, it would have taken the sting out of his
political attacks and created an entirely different picture than the
one he painted.
It is true that during the first two years of the Clinton
administration, the intelligence budgets declined. That is true. This
was a period of deep cuts in almost all areas of Government, as we
tried to grapple with the legacy of the previous 12 years of
uncontrolled deficits. Over the next 6 years, however, the Clinton
administration's budget increased every single year for intelligence.
During that 6-year period, fiscal years 1996 to 2001, Republicans
controlled both Houses of Congress, and the Congress cut the
President's request in 1996, 1997, 1998, and 2001. In 1999, the
Republican-controlled Congress initially cut the intelligence budget,
but then passed a large one-time supplemental appropriation.
In fiscal year 2001, the Republican-controlled Congress returned to
its pattern of cutting intelligence funding. After the 9/11 attacks,
Congress once again passed emergency supplemental funding. By that
point, the Democrats had a majority of the Senate--briefly.
Representative Goss voted for every Intelligence authorization bill
and every Defense appropriation bill during this period. So he must
have thought that the so-called underfunding President Clinton was
requesting was acceptable.
Now, I want to look at exactly what Senator Kerry proposed in 1994,
and I want to contrast that with a bill, H.R. 1923, introduced by
Representative Solomon that had as its first cosponsor Congressman
Goss.
In 1994, Senator Kerry introduced a bill to cut the deficit by $45
billion over 5 years--at a time when Congress was searching for ways to
undo the 12 years of uncontrolled deficits under the Reagan and Bush
administrations. Senator Kerry's proposal would have rescinded $1
billion from the 1994 Intelligence appropriations and then increased
intelligence spending over the next 4 years by the inflation rate.
Representative Goss's proposal in 1995 would have cut not less than 4
percent of the personnel from all intelligence agencies in each of the
following 5 years. After the initial cut in 1994, Senator Kerry's
proposal would have provided significantly more funding for
intelligence than was appropriated by the Congress controlled by the
Republicans, beginning with the fiscal year 1996 budget.
Representative Goss's proposal, on the other hand, would have
resulted in dramatically lower intelligence funding and, in fact John
Kerry's proposal would have resulted in $8.8 billion more for
intelligence than Congressman Goss's lead-cosponsored bill.
And worse, all of the cuts Representative Goss proposed in 1995 would
have been achieved by firing 20 percent, by law, of America's
intelligence officers at the very time the terrorist threat from al-
Qaida was growing. In fact, had the Congress followed the Goss plan,
the intelligence community would have had tens of thousands fewer
intelligence officers in the year 2000: fewer intelligence collectors
in the CIA, NSA, and elsewhere; fewer intelligence analysts across the
community; fewer intelligence officers in the military service; and
fewer counterterrorism officers in the FBI.
The Goss plan would have made, using his own words, in fact, ``deep
and devastating cuts in the intelligence community budget.'' But this
year, an election year, Representative Goss chose to level that charge
against the Democratic Party as a whole and Senator John Kerry by name.
Why? When asked at the nomination hearing to reconcile these facts with
his charge that it was the Democrats who did not support intelligence,
Representative Goss simply said, ``The record is the record,'' about
four or five times. He also refused to admit that his accusations might
have been in error.
When asked whether anyone from the White House or the President's
reelection campaign asked him to write the March editorial and to give
the June floor statement against John Kerry, he said he couldn't
recall.
Representative Goss's unwillingness to be forthright in his answers
on this matter were troubling to me and a number of my colleagues on
the committee. His dismissive answers to tough, but as I said
repeatedly, I thought fair questions lacked candor.
I was left with doubt that as Director of Central Intelligence, he
would have a forceful and independent voice on intelligence assessments
that do not necessarily support a political agenda, if there is one, of
the current President.
There are other instances where Representative Goss, as chairman of
the House Intelligence Committee, played the partisan blame game. It is
against the law for the Director of the CIA to
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be involved in such. That was then. He is being confirmed now. Does
this man's life change completely after 15 years from partisanship to
total nonpartisanship?
In 1999, when it was disclosed that the Chinese espionage efforts
against our Department of Energy weapons laboratories may have resulted
in loss of sensitive nuclear weapons design information, a counter-
investigation was begun, eventually resulting in charges being brought
against Los Alamos scientist Wen Ho Lee.
Representative Goss repeatedly laid the blame for this espionage
activity on the Clinton administration's failure to protect national
security. In the final days of the 2000 Presidential election campaign,
Representative Goss took to the House floor and stated:
We have in the Clinton-Gore administration seen a cultural
disdain for security.
Again, Representative Goss's statements on important intelligence
issues mischaracterized the record in the attempt to score political
points.
The Cox Commission, which Porter Goss served on as vice chairman,
found that the security problems at the Department of Energy weapons
laboratories predated the Clinton administration and that the Chinese
espionage collection program against the weapons lab began in the
1970s.
The Cox Commission report also noted it was the Clinton
administration that issued Presidential Decision Directive 61 requiring
the Department of Energy to improve counterintelligence programs.
Evidently, mentioning these points was not helpful to Representative
Goss when he was making sweeping statements about ``a cultural disdain
for security,'' which is highly offensive to me as a Democrat who is
vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, and I think all
Republicans and all Democrats care desperately, seriously about what
happens in intelligence.
In the rush to assign partisan blame, Representative Goss ignored the
record. In a number of other statements, Representative Goss
erroneously singled out the Clinton administration and congressional
Democrats for cutting human intelligence programs in the 1990s that, in
turn, he said, limited the intelligence community's ability to carry
out its mission.
Yet it was Representative Goss himself who said in 1998 that human
intelligence collection programs needed to be cut by the time the 1990s
began. His comment specifically was:
I am convinced that the U.S. clandestine service, the CIA
Directorate of Operations was in the mid to late 1980s too
large.
When the identity of Valerie Plame, an intelligence officer with the
CIA whose clandestine identity is protected by law from unauthorized
disclosure, was leaked and published by columnist Robert Novak,
Representative Goss was asked whether the disclosure warranted
investigation. His response was stunning. He said:
Someone sends me a blue dress and some DNA, I'll have an
investigation.
The whole basis for the law protecting the identity of covered
intelligence community employees from being disclosed is to protect the
lives of American intelligence officials that are endangered if their
true identity is known to our adversaries.
As a former CIA case officer and chairman of the House Intelligence
Committee, Representative Goss knows this. For him to make such a
statement, with its clearly implied shot at President Clinton, was
wrong, inappropriate, and insensitive to the gravity of the matter. I
hope Representative Goss, if confirmed by the Senate to lead the CIA,
will have a more serious attitude toward the outing of CIA employees
undercover.
When Richard Clarke, the coordinator for counterterrorism for the
National Security Council from 1993 to October 2001, provided testimony
to the 9/11 Commission that was clearly damaging to Bush administration
claims, Representative Goss, and others, questioned his integrity and
claimed he may have lied before the joint congressional inquiry in
closed session, vowing to declassify his testimony to prove it.
These claims were never substantiated, and when the National Security
Council forwarded to Chairman Goss, as requested, a declassified
version of Richard Clarke's testimony on June 25, nearly 3 months ago,
he took no action to publicly release it so that allegations of perjury
and the like could be laid to rest.
While the Senate voted to support the creation of the independent
National 9/11 Commission, which eventually became the Commission led by
Governor Tom Kean and Representative Lee Hamilton, Representative Goss
opposed the measure on the House floor.
When the Senate and House Intelligence Committees met in the fall of
2002 to conference this issue, he continued to oppose the creation of
an independent 9/11 Commission stating that the issue would be decided
``above my pay grade.''
When the Senate Intelligence Committee undertook an investigation
into the use of intelligence--not the collection, analysis, and
production of intelligence, but when you hand it to policymakers--the
use of intelligence by the administration officials prior to the war as
part of our broader Iraq intelligence inquiry, Representative Goss made
disparaging comments about two Democratic Senators in particular who,
like many others in this body, are profoundly concerned about the
veracity of public statements made about the U.S. intelligence agency,
calling them ``two old attack dogs gumming their way through artificial
outrage about something they should know a lot more about and be more
responsible about.''
What makes this particular criticism curious is Representative Goss's
lack of action on the issue of pre-war intelligence. Despite assurances
over a year ago that the House Intelligence Committee was evaluating
the intelligence community's performance on Iraq since the end of the
gulf war, Chairman Goss failed to issue the promised report on the
failures and mistakes leading up to the war.
Chairman Roberts and I, in a thoroughly bipartisan fashion, did so in
a 17-to-0 vote. I think we are both proud of that, and justifiably so,
along with our colleagues on the committee. The House produced nothing.
They produced press releases, but nothing else.
When both the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate
Intelligence Committee, as committees with shared jurisdiction, began
holding difficult but necessary oversight hearings into the improper
treatment and interrogation of prisoners in Iraq, Representative Goss
viewed our actions with disdain, saying:
I am not comfortable with what the Senate is doing . . . I
do honestly question whether or not they have balance over
there on this issue . . . We've got a circus in the Senate,
which is always the likely place to look for this circus.
Porter Goss chose to denigrate the Senate's investigation, while the
House chose to largely ignore the matter and not ask the tough
questions about what happened inside Abu Ghraib prison and at other
detention facilities in Iraq or elsewhere.
All too often, Representative Goss's statements and actions as
chairman of the House Intelligence Committee seemed designed to protect
the administration by avoiding contentious issues which could be
embarrassing to the administration and placing blame on Democrats for
shortcomings in the intelligence community.
Not surprisingly, one thing missing from Representative Goss's
records is any public statements on intelligence critical of Members of
his own party or the administration. During his nomination hearing,
Representative Goss assured the committee that these partisan
inclinations of the past would not prevent him from carrying out his
duties as Director of Central Intelligence. He said he understood the
Director must be an independent adviser to the President and the
Congress, beyond reproach and beyond the reach of politics.
While I appreciate his testimony and commitment to being a
nonpartisan Director of Intelligence, I cannot say with absolute
certainty that he will be exactly that. I must vote on his record. I
cannot vote on his promise, and I do not think the Senate should. His
record is his record. He said it.
The truth is, Chairman Goss and I have a very good working
relationship, one that I expect will continue and improve in the
future. We had a good exchange in recent days, even during difficult
nomination hearings. In contrast to those who wish to gloss over this
issue, Porter Goss himself understands exactly the dilemma that I and
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many of my colleagues face with this nomination. He knows this is one
of only a handful of positions in the entire U.S. Government that
requires by law nonpartisanship and objectivity, and in this case the
demand is all the greater because it is about our national security.
Porter Goss openly acknowledged in his testimony before the committee
this week that he has at times approached national security issues with
excessive partisanship, and he expressed regret about that. And I
respect that. I believe Porter Goss knows that in essence, on this
whole question of independence, he is asking us to take it on faith, so
to speak, that he can make a clean break from the last 10 to 20 years
of his political career.
I hope he is right. I very much want him to be right about that, but
at end of the day I do not think taking it on faith is enough for this
vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee when it comes to such a
critical position of Director of Central Intelligence. It does not meet
the legal standard, and it does not meet my obligation, in my judgment,
as vice chairman.
These are troubled times for the intelligence community in our
country. In so many ways, we are still recovering from the tragedy of
9/11. We are grappling with the tragic impact of flawed and exaggerated
intelligence leading up to the war in Iraq, and we are struggling still
to understand the truth about what is happening in the world.
Just yesterday, our President surprised and shocked many of us by
dismissing outright the highest level of consensus view of the
intelligence community when he said they were ``just guessing'' about
the gravity of the situation in Iraq.
In light of all of this, I believe I owe it to the men and women of
the intelligence community to send a clear and strong signal about the
paramount importance of independence and objectivity. It needs to be
said not only in words but in action. So I will vote against the
nomination of Porter Goss to be the next DCI.
I sincerely hope Porter Goss will prove my vote wrong, and I told him
that. In fact, I intend to work with him in order to help him prove me
wrong. But based on his record of partisanship, based on the dictates
of the law, and based on my own strong conviction against mixing
politics and intelligence at the CIA, I must vote no.
I yield the floor.
I yield such time as he may consume to the Senator from Oregon.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Oregon.
Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, in beginning my comments, I first want to
commend the chairman, Senator Roberts, for the way in which he
conducted the hearing. He was eminently fair. I believe I had five
rounds of questions myself for the nominee, and I want to express my
appreciation to the chairman for the way he conducted the hearings, and
also express my thanks to Senator Rockefeller. His leadership on the
committee has been invaluable to me.
I also want to commend the vice chairman for an excellent statement
this afternoon, much of which I agree with, as he knows.
Porter Goss is a good man and a good Congressman, but his long record
of supporting business-as-usual intelligence policies is not good
enough to warrant his appointment as CIA Director at this dangerous
hour. Mr. Goss showed that on his watch, as chairman of the House
Intelligence Committee, he passed on virtually every opportunity to
move aggressively for reform. His commitment to public service is
unquestioned, but his unwillingness to displease the powerful to force
change in our intelligence community is unfortunate.
In the committee, there were three major areas that came up as we
sought to evaluate the nominee. The first, as the distinguished Senator
from West Virginia has talked about today, has been the issue of
partisanship. The second area at which the senior Senator from
Michigan, Mr. Levin, looked at some length, was the question of the
nominee's ability to objectively analyze intelligence. The third was
the area that I focused on, which was why the nominee has been so slow
to push aggressively for intelligence reform.
I have come to the conclusion that it is possible--and we have all
tried, as the Senator from West Virginia has said, to give one the
benefit of the doubt in these various areas. I have come to the
conclusion that I can give the nominee the benefit of the doubt on the
issue of partisanship. I can give the nominee the benefit of the doubt
with respect to his pledge to be objective in analyzing intelligence.
But I just cannot get over the answers we were given during almost 9
hours of hearings with respect to why the nominee was so slow to be an
agent for change in the intelligence community.
It is really that leadership that I find so central. I have tried, as
a member of the committee, to be as bipartisan as I possibly can. We
understand politics should stop at our borders. We all stand ready to
put in place the policies necessary to protect America's security, but
to do that we need leadership.
I and others try to be bipartisan. Senator Lott, Senator Snowe,
Senator Graham, and others sought, for example, to change the way
Government documents are classified. I think that is an important
issue, to make the right structural changes in intelligence. But if we
do not get the right information, information consistent with national
security and not classified for political purposes, we are still going
to have problems making reforms in the intelligence area.
I want to be bipartisan. I listened carefully to the questions that
were asked in the committee, good questions by Senator Rockefeller, and
I am willing to give the nominee the benefit of the doubt with respect
to the partisanship issue.
But I will tell you, the answers that we were given with respect to
why it took the nominee so long to push for changes in the intelligence
community still leave me unconvinced. For example, at one point in our
hearings the nominee told me it was difficult to get attention to the
issues of intelligence on his watch. He said the reason he had not
introduced legislation is that people were not focused on it; it was
hard to get people's attention.
Let's think about what happened in those years when we evaluate the
nominee's response on that question. Porter Goss was chairman of the
Intelligence Committee in 1998 when al-Qaida bombed our embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania. He was chairman of the Intelligence Committee in
1999 when the United States was investigating allegations of Chinese
theft of our nuclear materials. He was chairman of the Intelligence
Committee when the USS Cole was bombed by al-Qaida in October of 2000.
And, of course, he was chairman of the House Intelligence Committee
when we faced 9/11.
It took him nearly 3 years to introduce reform legislation after 9/
11. I believe that is not good enough. I believe a chairman of a key
committee can get attention when that chairman wants to use that
chairmanship as a bully pulpit to be an agent for change. I believe a
chairman who is committed to intelligence reform has the chance, when
he bangs his gavel, to speak out for why changes are needed.
A leader must lead. We all get election certificates, in the U.S.
Congress, to try to tackle problems, important problems, but chairmen
have a special opportunity. If you look at the long record--and he said
the record is the record--the nominee passed on virtually every
opportunity to use his bully pulpit, to use his gavel, and to work for
the kind of changes that would make this country as safe as necessary.
We, all of us, understand it takes courage to rock the boat. It takes
courage to be an agent for bold change. But if you want an example of
an individual who did it, an individual who is a prominent Republican,
you need look no further than former New Jersey Governor Tom Kean and
his performance as the Chair of the 9/11 Commission. This stalwart
Republican made truth his only goal. He pressed Republicans and
Democrats alike to do the same. He was more successful and has already
begun to engineer more change than hardly anybody thought possible in
this fractured political climate. What a boon it would have been, had
we had the same commitment to change on the issue of intelligence,
intelligence reform, by the current nominee to head the CIA.
The current nominee had a front row seat during all those years, the
years I
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outlined when those terrible acts of terrorism occurred, when he could
have pushed for reform. Yet after weeks of going through the nominee's
record and 2 full days of questioning, I am hard pressed to find
anywhere--in a bill, a vote, or an inquiry--anything that demonstrates
the nominee will hold people accountable, for example, rather than just
going along with the status quo.
The record shows, to me, again and again, the nominee chose to play
it safe rather than take the risks necessary to bring about change in
the intelligence community. When I looked at Mr. Goss's record, the
first question that occurred to me was could he give us some examples,
some concrete examples of when he was willing to stand up, to go
against the popular wisdom and even his own party to bring about
change; whether he was willing to take the far less dangerous risks
that we take as Congressmen and elected officials than lots of other
people do, certainly those wearing the uniform.
Right now, we need somebody to head the CIA who is willing to stand
up, who is willing to help this country come up with policies that
leave the Cold War mentality behind--those are fit for a very different
kind of threat--and to hold himself and others accountable.
Mr. Goss has a long, distinguished career as a Member of Congress. I
know him personally. I served with him in the other body. It would be
hard to find a more decent individual. I will say there are very few
jobs in the Government of our country at which I don't think Porter
Goss would do a good job. But being effective here on Capitol Hill and
in other parts of the Government is not where I set the bar for this
key appointment. The bar ought to be set very high because we know we
have great challenges ahead of us.
For example, I have come to the conclusion that on the intelligence
reform legislation we, hopefully, will be dealing with on the floor of
the Senate shortly, it may not be the structural problems that are our
greatest challenge in improving intelligence and making our country
safer. I think there is more to it than moving the boxes around on an
organizational chart with respect to intelligence. I think this is as
much a people problem as a structural problem. If you are going to
solve those problems, in the area of people, human interaction, you
have to have leadership, you have to have somebody who is willing to
stick his or her neck out.
That is where I set the bar. I think the long record and the
questions I asked established beyond a doubt that Porter Goss is a good
man. He has been a good legislator. But there simply is no evidence
that he is willing to rock the boat in the intelligence community,
which I think is necessary to make this country as safe as it needs to
be.
For that reason I join the distinguished vice chairman of our
committee in opposing the nomination. Like the vice chairman, I am very
hopeful I will be proved wrong. As I said, on the issue of
partisanship, on the issue of objectivity of analysis, I give the
nominee the benefit of the doubt. With respect to his willingness to
fight aggressively for bold change, I remain unconvinced. For that
reason I will oppose the nominee.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Hagel). The distinguished Senator from
Kansas.
Mr. ROBERTS. I yield as much time as he may need to a valued member
of the Intelligence Committee, the distinguished Senator from Ohio.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.
Mr. DeWINE. Mr. President, I believe Porter Goss is the right
man certainly in this crucial time in the history of our intelligence
community.
Porter Goss spent over a decade at the CIA. He had the opportunity to
see it from the inside, to work there in a distinguished career. For
the last few years, he has had the opportunity to serve in the
Congress, to serve on the Intelligence Committee in the House, and then
for the last few years as the chairman. I think it is significant that
he has been the chairman for the last few years at the same time many
of us have served on the Senate Intelligence Committee, when the force
of history has compelled all of us to examine as we have never done
before the role of the intelligence community in the world we live in
today, a world confronted by the failures of the intelligence
community, where we have taken a magnifying glass for the last several
years as Members of the House and Members of the Senate to see exactly
what is wrong with the intelligence community. There has only been a
handful of people who have had that experience. Some of them are in
this room today.
Porter Goss has distinguished himself in that exercise as chairman of
the House Intelligence Committee, as the leader in the House when we
went through the joint Senate-House investigation. I had the chance to
watch him through that endeavor. I had the chance to watch him learn,
as all of us did, about the tragedy of September 11 and how the
intelligence community did not function the way we want it to function.
In Porter Goss we will have someone who knows the community from the
inside, but also has stood back, been on the other side, been on the
outside, and has looked at it to see what is wrong, and has looked at
it in a critical time in our history. I think that is so very important
as we begin the task as a country and he begins the task as the new
Director of the CIA to bring about needed reform.
This is a tough job, but I believe Porter Goss is a tough man. I
believe he is the right man. Some people might say this is an
impossible job. I do not know if it is an impossible job, but it is a
very difficult job. Let us think about it for a moment.
This is the man who walks in to see the President every morning,
walks in to the Oval Office and greets him, gives him the intelligence
report. I think we all understand there has to be a chemistry between
the President and the Director; that if there isn't, that
relationship--and we have seen that in the past with Presidents and
Directors, sometimes there isn't that relationship--if there isn't that
relationship, they do not talk and the country suffers.
There has to be a relationship of trust, of confidence. Yet that same
man who comes in to see the President every morning where there has to
be that relationship, that trust, that rapport, is also a man who has
to tell the President what the President does not want to hear; a man
who has to have the guts to do it; a man who has to look the President
in the eye and have the guts to tell the President of the United
States, the most powerful man in the world, Mr. President, that is not
the way it is; or maybe a more difficult thing to say, Mr. President,
we messed up, we were wrong 6 months ago or 3 months ago, what we told
you was not right; or maybe this is the toughest thing of all to say to
the President, Mr. President, we don't know.
And when we look at some of the problems, some hypothetical, some
factual, some of the things that occurred, those have been some of the
problems. That man has to also be able to look at the President of the
United States and say, Well, here is what we think it is, but also
there are people in the intelligence community who have a minority
view. That man has to have the guts to tell the President that as well.
That is a difficult job.
This man also is the person who protects us every day in this world
because he is the one who has to be in charge of putting together all
of the intelligence. And today it is the intelligence that protects us
just as much as our national defense. The facts he comes up with, our
intelligence community comes up with, are our first line of defense
today. Yet we are telling this man today, if you get this job, at the
same time you are carrying on this war on terrorism and you are
providing these facts, we expect you to go as fast as you can to carry
out reform.
Further, we tell this man that he has to deal with whatever today's
crisis is. What we are focused on, of course, is terrorism today. But
he has to deal with the long-term crises--nuclear proliferation, what
is going on in China, you pick the challenge. He has to be 5 years out,
or 10 or 15 years out, and he had better not get it wrong.
This is a new era for the CIA, a new era for the intelligence
community which came to maturity in the Cold War, the Soviet Union
versus the United States. We sort of understood in those decades when
we developed that
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intelligence community. Official cover worked pretty well. The new head
of the intelligence community has to continue that change, continue to
change away from that. We have to move out from the official cover to a
nonofficial cover. That is just one of the changes that has to take
place. It is a tough job.
I think when you vote on someone's confirmation, a lot of this is
kind of a gut check. You don't know what the exact issues are going to
be in the future. This is an intensely personal job, as I have pointed
out. The person who runs the agency, I suspect we are going to end up
giving a lot more power. If Porter Goss is confirmed, he may end up
with an entirely different job later on. He is going to run a big
intelligence community, but it is also an intensely personal job in
that relationship with the Congress and that relationship with all of
the consumers. And the ultimate consumer, of course, being the
Commander in Chief, the President of the United States.
I think it gets down to a lot of the person. What do you think of
this guy, or woman if that be the case? Can they handle it?
I think it is helpful to talk to some of the persons who know this
person best. I was struck by the testimony of the two Senators from
Florida, Senator Bob Graham, of course, the senior Senator, but also
significantly the chairman of the Select Intelligence Committee of the
Senate, and a pretty harsh critic of the intelligence community and of
the administration. This is what he had to say:
Let me say at the beginning that I am not unbiased. I
believe that Porter Goss is an exceptional human being and
will be an exceptional head of our Central Intelligence.
Senator Graham also said:
Mr. Chairman, I have known Porter Goss for well over two
decades, and I can tell you from personal experience that he
is uniquely qualified to be here today as the President's
nominee to serve as the Director of Central Intelligence. He
is a man of great character, unusual intelligence, a
tremendous work ethic, and an outstanding personal and
professional standard of integrity.
Senator Graham added that as Governor of Florida, when he first met
the nominee:
Party affiliation did not matter then. What was necessary,
good men and women who could carry out a difficult task.
My colleagues, I believe party affiliation does not matter today. The
challenge that Porter Goss, on a much magnified scale, will face as
Director of Central Intelligence is very analogous to the challenge he
faced 20 years ago in restoring integrity to his local community and
completing a very complex project.
As to Porter Goss's fitness to serve as an independent, unbiased DCI,
this is what Senator Graham of Florida said.
. . . when it comes to the intelligence community,
Congressman Goss has, in my judgment, a balanced perspective,
a perspective gained both as an insider and then as an
outsider. For a decade, early in his career, Congressman Goss
served our Nation in both the Army and the CIA. He knows
firsthand the value and the risk of clandestine operations.
Since he has been in Congress, especially as a member and
chair of the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, he came to know the agencies from an oversight
capacity.
Senator Graham continued:
Some have said he is too close to the intelligence
agencies, that he would be too protective of the status quo.
Well, most of you served with Porter and myself on the joint
inquiry into the events of 9/11. I believe you would join me
in saying from that experience Porter is a man who will be
independent in his judgments and unflinching in his criticism
where he believes they are necessary.
Senator Graham concluded with these words:
I am confident he will not be a part of the problem but
rather a leader in taking us toward principled, thoughtful
solutions when it comes to reforming the intelligence
community. I strongly recommend the confirmation of Porter
Goss.
Senator Bill Nelson also participated in the September 14 Goss
confirmation hearing. These are some of the things Senator Nelson had
to say:
I think we need intelligence reform. I think we need it
now. And I think Porter Goss is the man to lead the effort.
Senator Nelson also called Porter Goss:
. . . a uniquely gifted individual whose public life has
been illustrative of being nonpartisan, fair, and
independent.
The Senator further pointed out that:
Those characteristics in this town that is so highly
charged with partisanship are sorely needed in a Director of
Central Intelligence.
Those statements are from his two colleagues on the other side of the
aisle from Florida.
I think sometimes it is good to know and talk to people who know
someone best.
Mr. President and Members of the Senate, let me conclude by saying I
have known Porter Goss for a long time. I have dealt with him on issues
not just in the area of intelligence. Sometimes you get to know people
in the Senate and the House working in Congress on a variety of issues.
Porter Goss and I had shared a tragic situation when we had
constituents, hemophiliacs who acquired AIDS because they had to take
massive amounts of blood because of their condition. The blood was
tainted. It is a long story. I will not go into it now. But the blood
was tainted because we thought there was an error made by the Federal
Government, that the Federal Government did not become involved early
enough, that the Federal Government made mistakes.
I had constituents. I listened to their tragic story. Porter Goss
listened to some constituents of his. So we both moved in our
respective bodies to try to bring about some help for these folks. I
saw how compassionate he was and how strongly he felt about the issue
and what he did about it and how he took that passion and feeling he
felt for those folks in wanting to do something about it. I worked with
him. I traveled with him to Haiti, the poorest country in this
hemisphere. I have seen his compassion for the people of Haiti.
I have worked with him on the Intelligence Committee. I will be
honest with you, I have had the occasion, many times, to pick up the
phone and call across the Capitol and ask Porter: What is really going
on in the intelligence community? What is really going on at the CIA? I
will tell you, each time he had an insight that was unrivaled, or
rivaled by very few people I have talked to, of what was really going
on inside the intelligence community. That is an insight that came
about from his years of experience inside the community and his years
of experience of watching the community in the oversight capacity while
being on the committee and of being the chairman.
He has a passion and an understanding of the intelligence community
and of what needs to be done to change it. He understands the
importance of human intelligence. Long before it was fashionable in
this town to be saying, oh, we have to have more human intelligence,
Porter Goss was pushing, pushing, and pushing the intelligence
community for more human intelligence.
It may not have been flashy, it may not have been with a lot of big
speeches, but he was there. He understood it. He understood what the
needs were. This man gets it. If you want someone to lead the reform of
this community, if you want someone who understands what the problems
are, who can do it from the inside, if you want someone who will have
the guts to report to the President of the United States and tell it
like it is, Porter Goss is your man.
So, Mr. President, I am proud to come to the floor today to recommend
to my colleagues, based on my personal experience with this man, what I
have seen over the years, that we vote for his confirmation. He has a
tough job and, yes, it may be almost an impossible job, but I think he
is the right man at the right time at this point in our history.
I thank the Chair and yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, may I inquire how much time is remaining on
each side?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority has 124 minutes remaining; the
minority has 128 minutes remaining.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I believe the chairman of the committee had
indicated a desire to yield 5 minutes, or what time the Senator may
consume, to Senator Allard of Colorado. It would be my intent to follow
Senator Allard.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Colorado.
[[Page S9497]]
Mr. ALLARD. Mr. President, I thank the acting chairman for yielding 5
minutes.
Mr. President, I would like to associate myself with the comments of
the distinguished Senator from Ohio. I, too, proudly claim Porter Goss
as a friend and somebody who I think will do a great job.
There is no doubt that the intelligence community right now is in
somewhat disarray, concerned about their jobs and the job they are
doing and the public perception.
I say, first, there are a lot of good people at the Central
Intelligence Agency. I think Congressman Goss recognizes that. I think
there are some bureaucratic problems over there, too.
I think he has the temperament to deal with some of those problems.
Porter Goss is a strong leader. He is a quiet individual. He doesn't
grandstand. He is a hard worker. He is intelligent and he understands
the intelligence community.
I have had an opportunity to serve on the Intelligence Committee in
the Senate for 4 years, and I even developed a greater appreciation for
the job Mr. Goss did on the House side in his service on the
Intelligence Committee.
For those reasons, I rise to support the President's nomination to
head the Central Intelligence Agency. That nominee is Representative
Porter Goss. I believe he is the right man at the right time for the
job. That has been stated a couple of times already. I truly think that
is the case. I am glad to see other colleagues recognize that fact. I
am asking my colleagues to join me in voting for his confirmation.
The intelligence community is at a critical juncture. It is clear
that after the horrific attacks of September 11, and the problems
involved with uncovering weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the
intelligence community needs firm leadership during a time when reforms
are needed. The President has heeded that call.
President Bush has put into motion, through executive order, most of
the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, and he is committed to
strengthening the budget authority given to the intelligence community
head administrator. The next step in intelligence reform is to bring in
someone who is committed to reforming the Central Intelligence Agency
from the inside out. That man is Porter Goss.
I have had the pleasure of knowing Representative Goss personally and
professionally. I was lucky enough to serve with him in the House of
Representatives, and I value his knowledge of national security issues.
Even then, when I served with him in the House, he was a voice both
Democrats and Republicans turned to when debating important
intelligence issues, and he continues to be a leader in the House
today. More importantly, I got to know Porter Goss on a personal level.
He is someone I trust and have come to call my friend. There is no one
I would rather see as director of the agency.
I am convinced Representative Goss is ready for this challenging
task. Representative Goss will bring a unique perspective to the
Director's office in the Central Intelligence Agency. His perspective
will not only drive the much-needed changes in the CIA, but will also
bring our concerns as a Congress to the agency.
Porter Goss has been an Army intelligence officer. He has served as a
clandestine agent in the CIA and has chaired the House Intelligence
Committee. There is no one better prepared or qualified to be the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. There should be no doubt
that the combination of experience Representative Goss has will serve
the American people well.
I have heard concerns raised that Mr. Goss is too partisan. I simply
have to discount those concerns. This is a man who has served as an
officer in the Army and understands very well his duty to the United
States and to the citizens he will soon swear to defend.
I am pleased to see the bipartisan support Representative Goss has
already received. His nomination was approved by the Senate
Intelligence Committee by a 12-to-4 vote. His colleague from Florida,
Bob Graham, has come out strongly in favor of Mr. Goss.
It is time for the Senate to act on this nomination so we can
continue the reforms to the intelligence community that are badly
needed. Representative Goss is prepared to take the agency in a
direction that will strengthen our collection and analytical
intelligence activities and provide the information we need to keep
America safe. He is a man who is truly interested in the needs of our
country. He is somebody that I feel I can work with on the Armed
Services Committee. I have some of the intelligence programs under my
jurisdiction in the subcommittee which I chair, and they are extremely
important programs. They are programs that are badly needed, they are
expensive programs, and they do have some problems. We need somebody
who has the background in intelligence to tackle those, and somebody I
think I can work with.
I ask my colleagues to support his nomination because I personally
think he is the best man for the job.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Mississippi is recognized.
Mr. LOTT. I yield to the chairman.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I will be happy to soon yield to the
distinguished Senator from Mississippi, a valued member of the
Intelligence Committee.
On the issue of the HPSCI activity, the House intelligence activity,
in regard to reform and other intelligence challenges during the last 3
Congresses, which has been brought up, I ask unanimous consent to have
printed in the Record the Survey of Activities of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence During the 107th Congress. I also commend to
my colleagues the Survey of Activities of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence during the 106th Congress and the 105th
Congress.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Survey of Activities of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
During the 107th Congress
Mr. Goss, from the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence submitted the following report.
This report covers the activities of the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence during the One Hundred
Seventh Congress. Porter J. Goss (Republican, Florida) served
as Chairman; Nancy Pelosi (Democrat, California) served as
the Ranking Minority Member.
The stated purpose of H. Res. 658 of the 95th Congress,
which created the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, was to establish a committee ``to oversee and
make continuing studies of the intelligence and intelligence-
related activities and programs of the United States
Government and to submit to the House appropriate proposals
for legislation and report to the House concerning such
intelligence and intelligence-related activities and
programs.''
H. Res. 658 also indicated that the Committee ``shall make
every effort to assure that the appropriate departments and
agencies of the United States provide informed and timely
intelligence necessary for the executive and legislative
branches to make sound decisions affecting the security and
vital interests of the Nation. It is further the purpose of
this resolution to provide vigilant legislative oversight
over the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of
the United States to assure that such activities are in
conformity with the Constitution and the laws of the United
States.''
In carrying out its mandate from the House regarding
oversight of U.S. intelligence and intelligence-related
activities, the Committee created four subcommittees:
Subcommittee on human intelligence, analysis, and counterintelligence
Jim Gibbons (R-NV), Chairman,
Leonard L. Boswell (D-IA), Ranking Member,
Sherwood Boehlert (R-NY),
Alcee L. Hastings (D-FL)*,
Ray LaHood (R-IL),
Silvestre Reyes (D-TX)*,
Randy ``Duke'' Cunningham (R-CA),
Gary Condit (D-CA),
Peter Hoekstra (R-MI),
Collin C. Peterson (D-MN),
Richard M. Burr (R-NC),
Sanford D. Bishop, Jr. (D-GA)*,
Saxby Chambliss (R-GA),
Robert E. (Bud) Cramer, Jr.* (D-AL).
subcommittee on technical and tactical intelligence
Michael N. Castle (R-DE), Chairman,
Sanford D. Bishop, Jr. (D-GA), Ranking Member,
Jim Gibbons (R-NV),
Jane Harman (D-CA),
Sherwood L. Boehlert (R-NY),
Alcee L. Hastings (D-FL)*,
Randy ``Duke'' Cunningham (R-CA),
Silvestre Reyes (D-TX),
Peter Hoekstra (R-MI),
Leonard L. Boswell (D-IA),
Richard M. Burr (R-NC),
Robert E. (Bud) Cramer, Jr.* (D-AL),
Terry Everett (R-AL).
subcommttee on intelligence policy and national security
Douglas K. Bereuter (R-Nebraska), Chairman,
[[Page S9498]]
Gary A. Condit (D-CA), Ranking Member,
Ray LaHood (R-IL),
Sanford D. Bishop, Jr. (D-GA),
Michael N. Castle (R-DE),
Tim Roemer (D-IN),
Saxby Chambliss (R-GA),
Collin C. Peterson (D-MN),
Jim Gibbons (R-NV),
Terry Everett (R-AL).
subcommittee on terrorism and homeland security
Saxby Chambliss (R-GA), Chairman,
Jane Harman (D-CA), Ranking Member,
Peter Hoekstra (R-MI),
Gary A. Condit (D-CA),
Jim Gibbons (R-NV),
Tim Roemer (D-IN),
Ray LaHood (R-IL),
Alcee L. Hastings (D-FL)*,
Richard M. Burr (R-NC),
Silvestre Reyes (D-TX)*,
Terry Everett (R-AL),
Robert E. (Bud) Cramer, Jr.* (D-AL).
*Member served on Subcommittee for only part of 107th
Congress.
scope of committee review
U.S. intelligence and intelligence-related activities under
the jurisdiction of the Committee include the National
Foreign Intelligence Program (NFEP), the Joint Military
Intelligence Program (JMIP), and the Department of Defense
Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA).
The National Foreign Intelligence Program consists of
activities in the following departments, agencies or other
intelligence elements of the government: 1) the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA); 2) the Department of Defense; 3)
the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); 4) the National
Security Agency (NSA); 5) the National Reconnaissance Office
(NRO); 6) the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force;
7) the Department of State; 8) the Department of Treasury; 9)
the Department of Energy; 10) the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI); 11) the National Imagery and Mapping
Agency (NIMA); and, 12) the Coast Guard (USCG).
The JMIP was established in 1995 to provide integrated
program management of defense intelligence elements that
support defense-wide or theater-level consumers. Included
within the JMIP are aggregations created for management
efficiency and characterized by similarity, either in
intelligence discipline (e.g., Signals Intelligence and
Imagery Intelligence) or function (e.g., satellite support
and aerial reconnaissance). The programs comprising the JMIP
also fall within the jurisdiction of the House Armed Services
Committee.
The TIARA are a diverse array of reconnaissance and target
acquisition programs that are a functional part of the basic
military force structure and provide direct information
support to military operations. TIARA, as defined by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense, include
those military intelligence activities outside the defense
intelligence programs that respond to requirements of
military commanders for operational support information, as
well as to national command, control, and intelligence
requirements. The programs comprising TIARA also fall within
the jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committee.
oversight activities
During the 107th Congress, the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), under the leadership of
Chairman Porter Goss--
-- Responded effectively to the catastrophic attacks on
September 11, 2001, by the al Qai'da terrorists by conducting
investigations jointly with its sister committee in the
Senate, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, to
determine whether the IC should have been more adept, better
resourced and more capable of thwarting the attacks;
-- Promoted a bipartisan effort to continue rebuilding and
refining the nation's intelligence capabilities to meet
increasingly complex geopolitical and technological
challenges to national security; and
-- Advanced the education of Members of Congress and the
public on matters of vital interest to national security and
the distinct role intelligence plays in its defense.
Although the end of the Cold War warranted a reordering of
national priorities, the steady decline in intelligence
funding since the mid-1990s left the nation with a diminished
ability to address emerging threats--such as global
terrorism--and the technical challenges of the 21st Century.
Further, the IC's lack of a corporate approach to addressing
enduring intelligence problems helped to create a culture
that hindered data collection (especially human
intelligence collection), data sharing, and collaborative
analysis.
The revitalization of the National Security Agency (NSA)
was the Committee's top priority during the 107th Congress.
Although this continues to be one of the Committee's priority
concerns, the focus has turned to information sharing and
cross community analysis. The Committee notes that the
individual intelligence agencies and, moreover, their
extremely talented and dedicated people, labor continuously
to provide the absolute best intelligence products possible
in defense of the Nation. These efforts are, however,
generally conducted in isolation from one another, and, most
disturbingly, existing rules and procedures often restrict
information from the community's depth and breadth of
analytic talent. Therefore, those individual efforts can
usually only piece together fragments of the overall
intelligence puzzle. Crucial in the post-9/11 era is having a
community that is, to the maximum extent possible, liberated
from information sharing restrictions and one that fosters a
culture focused on greater collaborative analysis. The
Authorizations for fiscal years 2002 and 2003 included
detailed language on the need for the IC to breakdown
barriers to information sharing and the need to cease the
practice of allowing agencies to routinely restrict ``their
data'' from other agencies, including law enforcement.
In order to maximize further the IC's analytic
effectiveness and output, we must ensure that the dedicated
professionals of the IC are properly trained and provided the
skills necessary for the tasks that are required to fight the
global war on terrorism and other daunting threats. For a
number of years, the Committee has articulated its specific
concerns about the dearth of language skills throughout the
IC. The lack of depth in the so-called ``low-density'
languages was acutely experienced during operations in
Afghanistan The Committee finds this situation unacceptable
and has emphasized the critical need for a robust effort to
improve foreign language capabilities throughout the
Intelligence Community.
The Committee remains concerned about the viability and
effectiveness of a future overhead architecture, given the
apparent lack of a comprehensive architectural plan for the
overhead system of systems, specifically in the area of
imagery. For example, the Committee believes the
Administration is facing a major challenge in addressing
technical and funding problems with the Future Imagery
Architecture (FIA) program that could force untenable trades
between critical future capabilities and legacy systems. In
the Authorization for fiscal year 2003, the Committee has
addressed the known FIA problems as well as the need to
develop imagery alternatives if developmental problems exist
or persist. The Committee noted, however, that the
Intelligence Community has engaged in a continuing pattern by
which many individual programs have been provided resources
with little or no regard to the entire set of IC collection
capabilities, including space-based and airborne. The
Committee believes that, although individual systems
certainly have specific merit, it would be wiser for the
Intelligence Community to consider whether the overall
collective mix brings the appropriate assets to bear against
the range of threats to U.S. national security. Moreover, the
ability to fund all legacy, developmental, and desired
systems has a finite limit. Therefore, there is a critical
need to review each program mindful of the strategic needs so
that and necessary tradeoffs are made based on substantive
requirements.
Finally, the Committee continued its focus on a number of
enduring IC challenges--the need to improve NSA acquisition
efforts, the need to improve the depth and breadth of Human
Intelligence (HUMINT), and improving research and development
(R&D). With respect to NSA, the Committee has been pleased
with the Director's attempts to baseline current capabilities
so that future needs can be properly identified and resulting
acquisition decisions can be appropriately made. To assist
the Director in completing these efforts, the Committee
included incentives in the Authorization Act for fiscal year
2003. Regarding, HUMINT, the Committee focused on
improvements in training, enhancing technical resources to
operations, and properly funding analytic efforts. All of
these capabilities are supported by R&D efforts. Therefore,
the Committee has supported the Administration's increases in
basic R&D programs. The Committee believes that the IC must
continuously renew itself in this ever-changing world.
Intelligence is the first line of defense against elusive and
unstructured threats and enemies that use asymmetric means to
harm America and her people. Only through providing these
much needed resources and a long-term commitment can the IC
be prepared for the global challenges that confront us.
intelligence authorizations for fiscal years 2002 and 2003
During the 107th Congress, particularly in the aftermath of
the September 11th attacks, the Committee continued to pursue
its objective of rebuilding and revitalizing our national
intelligence capabilities to better meet the threats of the
21st century. Finally, after eight years of congressional
admonition to the executive branch to develop a long term
funding program to correct serious and critical Intelligence
Community (IC) deficiencies, the President's budget requests
provided a down payment on the resources necessary to ensure
that our policymakers and military commanders have timely and
reliable intelligence support that is crucial to our nation's
security.
The Committee reviewed extensively the President's budget
submissions for Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003, fulfilling its
responsibility to closely examine the nation's intelligence
programs and proposed expenditures. These reviews included
substantive and programmatic hearings, Member briefings, and
numerous staff briefings. Testimony on the President's budget
submissions was taken from the Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI); the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C31); the
Directors of DIA, NSA, NIMA, NRO, and the FBI; and other
major intelligence program managers.
[[Page S9499]]
The Committee's examination of the President's Fiscal Years
2002 and 2003 intelligence budgets included 13 committee
budget-related hearings principally on a program level.
Additional hearings were held addressing the DCI's overall
budget submission, the state of health of the IC, and the
DCI's views and plans for the future of intelligence and the
IC.
In reviewing the President's budget requests, the Committee
found that the President has begun to aggressively address
the lack of investment and years of neglect that has harmed
our nation's intelligence capabilities. The fiscal year 2002
budget request, submitted before the tragic events of
September 11, 2001, reflected no major improvements or
investment in intelligence capabilities. The fiscal year 2003
budget submitted by the President included the most
substantial increase for programs funded in the National
Foreign Intelligence Program in history, however, the
intelligence authorizations for both fiscal years 2002 and
2003 reiterated the need for renewed investment by focusing
on enhancing programs and information sharing across the
various IC agencies.
In addition to budget-related hearings, the Committee held
over 58 committee hearings and briefings on various issues
vital to our IC and national security. Among the subjects
examined by the Committee were: terrorism, HUMINT, and
developments in Colombia, Southeast Asia, and rogue states.
Given the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the
Committee's immediate priority was, and continues to be, the
effectiveness of our counterterrorism efforts and the
security of our nation. In the last two budget authorization
bills, the Committee addressed critical and immediate
counterterrorism needs as well as long-term intelligence
issues facing the United States.
The ``Intelligence Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2002'',
(P.L. 107-108), in addition to authorizing generally the
activities of the U.S. IC, directly addressed IC shortfalls
in domestic counterterrorism efforts, intelligence collection
and analysis, threat reporting, aggressive recruitment of
human assets, foreign language capabilities, and sharing of
intelligence information and analysis across the government.
For example, the Congress specifically enacted legislation
that repealed restrictions on human intelligence sources. In
the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks on America, the
House and Senate significantly increased spending
authorizations for intelligence activities well beyond that
level requested by the President. The committee also directed
significant resource allocation to countering terrorism.
The ``Intelligence Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2003'',
(P L. 107-306), in addition to authorizing the intelligence
activities of the U.S. IC highlighted five priority areas
that must receive significant, sustained attention if
intelligence is to fulfill its role in our national security
strategy. Those areas are: (1) improving information sharing
and all-source analysis; (2) improving IC professional
training with a major emphasis on developing language skills;
(3) ensuring national imagery collection program viability
and effectiveness; (4) correcting enduring systemic problems,
deficiencies in HUMINT, and rebuilding a robust research and
development program; and (5) establishing a budgeting process
that no longer relies so heavily on supplemental
appropriations. For example, the fiscal year 2003 legislation
provided very clear policy direction to the Administration to
improve the cross-community sharing of information from
material seized as part of the global war on terrorism. This
resulted in new processes and procedures being implemented to
improve the access that community analysts have to this
material. Further, the fiscal year 2003 authorization
legislation provided significantly enhanced funding for
skills training in areas such as foreign languages,
analyst-to-analyst technical exchanges and in-area
familiarization travel. And finally, the Committee's
legislation also provided critically needed direction and
funding to ensure the nation's imagery architecture will
be capable of supporting customer needs long into the
future.
committee investigations
Terrorism Review
The Committee, through its THLS Subcommittee at the behest
of the Speaker and Minority Leader as the focal point and
coordinating mechanism in the House of Representatives for
post-9-11 counterterrorism and homeland security oversight
activities.''
Prior to the 9-11 terrorist attacks, the Committee's
Working Group on Terrorism and Homeland Security held
numerous classified hearings and briefings on the terrorist
threat, gaps in the IC's counterterrorism capabilities, the
need for a more focused and better coordinated national
effort on homeland security, and a variety of related
matters.
Following 9-11, the Working Group was converted into a full
subcommittee with expanded powers of jurisdiction to act as
the lead entity in formulating the House's response to the
attacks. The new Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland
Security held what for the Committee was an unprecedented
series of televised hearings culminating in a field hearing
with then-Mayor Rudy Giuliani in New York City. A significant
number of closed hearings and briefings on all aspects of the
attacks followed; along with a report to the Speaker and
Minority Leader on the gaps in counterterrorism capabilities
at CIA, NSA, and the FBI leading up to 9-11. Following
publication of this report, the Committee, in conjunction
with the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, established
a Joint Investigative Staff on 9-11 that conducted a thorough
investigation of the Intelligence Community's inability to
prevent the 9-11 attacks. The work of the JIS included a
series of open and closed hearings, and the publication of a
classified report.''
Committee Investigations
At the behest of the Speaker and Minority Leader, the
Committee's Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security
was directed in the immediate aftermath of 9-11 to evaluate
the performance of the CIA, and FBI against the terrorist
target. To this end, the Subcommittee issued a report in July
2002 that offered the fo11owing conclusions:
America's intelligence capability shortfalls prior to 9-11
were significantly affected by resource constraints imposed
during much of the 1990s, but also by a series of
questionable Intelligence Community management decisions on
funding priorities.
As a first step, the USG should adopt a single definition
of terrorism, which it currently does not have at a cost of
significant inefficiencies.
CIA: The availability and allocation of resources,
including the redirection by CIA managers of funds for core
field collection and analysis to headquarters bureaucracy,
hurt CIA's counterterrorism (CT) capabilities prior to 9-11.
Internal human rights guidelines issued in 1995 also had a
``chilling effect'' on CT operations, and these guidelines
were only repealed after the Subcommittee's report was
released in July 2002. CIA chronically lacks foreign language
skills and core CT-specific training, and has become overly
reliant on foreign liaison at a cost to its unilateral
capability.
FBI: Preventing terrorism was less important than solving
crimes prior to 9-11, when FBI decentralized CT information
and investigations. FBI also had insufficient linguists and
analytic capability and an outdated IT infrastructure. It
paid little attention to financial tracking, and did not
share information.
NSA: The CT mission was not given a high enough priority in
the competition for limited resources prior to 9-11, and NSA
must reform program management, systems engineering and
integration, and budget management for new investments to
have a lasting impact. NSA has been chronically short of
linguists, and must better leverage industry for technical
solutions to collection problems.
Congressional oversight of counterterrorism is highly
duplicative and inefficient. A leadership staff mechanism
should be created to streamline the oversight process on both
counterterrorism and homeland security matters.''
joint inquiry investigations
In February, 2002, the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
authorized an investigation, to be conducted as a Joint
Inquiry, into the Intelligence Community's activities before
and after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against
the United States. This bicameral investigation, supported by
a separate, unified, professional staff, sought to identify
what the Community knew or should have known regarding those
attacks prior to September 11th, the nature of any systemic
problems that may have impeded the Community's ability to
prevent those attacks, and recommendations for reform to
improve the Community's ability to uncover and prevent
similar attacks in the future.
In the months that followed, the Inquiry's investigative
staff reviewed massive amounts of information within the
Intelligence Community. This included the review of almost
500,000 pages of relevant documents, 300 interviews, and
participation in numerous briefings and panel discussions,
involving about 600 individuals. Although the inquiry was
primarily focused on the Intelligence Community, the
investigation also considered relevant information from
federal agencies outside the Intelligence Community; from
state and local authorities; from foreign government
authorities; and from private sector individuals and
organizations. Building on the extensive investigative work,
the Committees held nine joint public hearings and, given the
highly classified nature of much of this information,
thirteen joint closed sessions. In December, 2002, both
Committees approved, by separate votes, the classified Final
Report of the Joint Inquiry. The Committees are currently
working with the Intelligence Community in an effort to
declassify, consistent with national security interests, as
much as possible of the Final Report for public release.
The work of the Joint Inquiry confirmed that although the
Intelligence Community had relevant information that was, in
retrospect, significant regarding the September 11th attacks,
the Community too often failed to focus on the information
and to appreciate its collective significance in terms of a
probable terrorist attack. The Inquiry's factual record
identified not only the information that was overlooked but
also a number of systemic weaknesses that contributed to the
Community's inability to detect and prevent the attacks.
These included a lack of sufficient focus on the potential
for a domestic attack, a lack of a comprehensive
counterterrorist strategy, insufficient analytic focus and
quality, a reluctance to develop and implement new technical
capabilities aggressively, and inadequate sharing of
[[Page S9500]]
relevant counterterrorism information. To correct such
deficiencies, the Final Report includes nineteen
recommendations for reform, including such things as the
creation of a Cabinet-level Director of National Intelligence
and prompt consideration of whether the FBI, or a new agency,
should perform the domestic intelligence functions of the
U.S. Government.
open hearings
During the 107th Congress, the Committee held 13 open
hearings on issues of concern to the Intelligence Community
and the American people. While committed to the protection of
sources and methods and ensuring the security of our nation's
secrets, it is the intention of the Committee, whenever
possible, to hold open hearings in an unclassified setting on
issues of vital importance and concern to the public.
The Committee held four open hearings: Defining Terrorism--
September 26, 2001; Asymmetric Threats to Homeland--October
3, 2001; Role of NSC in Current Crisis--October 11, 2001;
Domestic Preparedness & Emergency Response--October 29, 2001.
The Joint Inquiry Committee held nine open hearings: Family
Advocates for September 11 Victims--September 18, 2002 and
September 19, 2002; Intelligence Community Knowledge of
September 11 Hijackers--September 20, 2002; Phoenix Memo--
September 24, 2002 and September 26, 2002; Counterterrorism
Information Sharing--October 1, 2002; Intelligence Community
Reform Proposals--October 3, 2002; Past Terrorist Attacks--
October 8, 2002; Factual Finding of Inquiry--October 17,
2002.
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I yield as much time as he may consume to
the distinguished Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I thank the chairman. I also commend the
chairman and the vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee for the
very difficult job they have been performing, leading the Intelligence
Committee. It has to be one of the toughest jobs that I have witnessed
in the Senate. It takes time, it takes experience, and it takes
intellect to be able to deal with the issues that come before this
committee.
I also commend them for the way they have handled this particular
nomination. They were patient. They gave every Senator ample time to
make their points and ask questions, and they have been commended by
Members of both sides of the aisle for the way they handled the
nomination. That is why I think the nomination was approved by the
Intelligence Committee, and why I believe this nomination will be
confirmed by a wide margin.
Before I get into a little more discussion about why I support Porter
Goss to be head of the CIA and director of intelligence, I will talk
about my overall concerns regarding the intelligence area.
As a member of the leadership over the years, I was able to have
briefings and meet with Director Tenet. There are specific requirements
in the law that certain Members have to be notified when particular
actions are taken. I always took those matters very seriously and spent
the time that was necessary to get those briefings. For the last year
and a half, I have been on the Intelligence Committee. I must confess
that when I went on the committee, I thought I would be a big defender
and big supporter of our intelligence community, because I think that
what they do is so important. I do support the men and women who work
in that community.
But I must say, over the last year and a half, I have developed many
concerns about how that job is being done, how the Congress does its
job. I didn't appreciate how important oversight is regarding
intelligence matters, how important it is that a Senator develop
expertise to be able to ask the right questions, do the oversight, and
understand what is going on.
I have come to the conclusion that our intelligence community is not
set up properly and we are not doing our job in the Congress. We can
point fingers and blame somebody else, but a lot of the problem resides
here in this body and in the Congress--not because we don't try to do
our job, but we are not organized properly to do it. We have this
multifaceted process of so many committees claiming jurisdiction, and
with good reason. Armed Services needs to be aware of what's going on,
as do Foreign Relations, Appropriations, and Governmental Affairs. Is
there anybody who doesn't have their finger in this intelligence pie a
little bit? Basically, nobody is doing the oversight job properly,
because the members of the Intelligence Committee are not there
permanently; they come and go and are on the Committee maybe 2 years, 4
years, or 8 years. Once you get to where you know what to ask and what
is going on, you leave the Committee.
Frankly, I think the CIA and the intelligence community's attitude
is: Don't give them anything; give them a little bit of a courtesy, a
brush-off, and we will get what we want from the appropriators in the
end.
I think we have real problems in the intelligence community and in
the Congress, and we need to fix them. I don't have a magic design. I
want to hear what the experts have to say and see what legislation is
proposed. I know this: Something has to be done in the way the
intelligence community operates. You cannot operate under a construct
where you have 15 different agencies and 80 percent of the money going
to the Defense Department, with the director of intelligence having
little or no control over the money or many of those intelligence
agencies.
We need major changes, and we need them now. I am concerned about
concerns that were raised yesterday that if we do not do this right, if
we rush to reorganize the intelligence community, we could do damage
because the job of gathering intelligence has to go on every day. Men
and women are putting their lives on the line to gather intelligence.
We need to be careful, but we need to press forward with change.
I know this body is loath to change anything. Any kind of reform is
looked at suspiciously: Oh, we can't do that; it has always been done
this way. I have taken the time over the years to look at a lot of
these issues, and it has not always been done this way. A lot of what
we do and say around here, which some say is sacrosanct and cannot be
changed, is relatively new. It evolved over the years.
At some point, you have to say there is a higher priority, that there
is something more important than turf or jurisdiction or the way it was
or is being done.
What is most important is how we are going to do the best job for the
men and women in uniform, men and women in intelligence, and for the
American people. So I think we need to make necessary changes.
The important point is that we have to have somebody in charge. We
have good people in the CIA doing the job. We have an Acting Director
who is a good man doing a good job. But we do not need an Acting
Director forever. We need a man or woman in charge making decisions,
making changes that need to be carried out even without legislation
that overhauls the whole operation, and we need it now.
This is a dangerous time we are in. We need to not only confirm this
nominee right away, but we need to do it overwhelmingly. We need to
show him, we need to show the agencies, and we need to show the
departments that he has the confidence of the American people through
their representatives in the Senate. We are dealing with very important
issues, and it is so important that we have leadership at the top. We
need to do it right away.
We have a good man who has been nominated. A lot of thought went into
his selection. I know the President sought out the counsel, advice, and
the thinking of a number of Members of Congress on both sides of the
aisle, in the House and Senate, before he went forward with this
nomination. He has nominated a man who is uniquely qualified to be the
Director of Intelligence.
Porter Goss is the right age. He is in his mid-sixties, still young
enough to do the job, and old enough to know what needs to be done. He
has a background of military experience, where he was in Army
intelligence for 2 years. He worked in the Directorate of Operations of
the CIA for many years. Most of this is in the Record, but I think it
is worth repeating so that my statement will make sense, hopefully, in
its entirety.
When he left the CIA, he continued to be involved in trying to serve
his fellow man and his community. He was a leader in his hometown in
Florida. He served on the city council, was mayor, was a member of the
board of commissioners, and has served in Congress since 1988, which is
a pretty good period of time. He eventually became chairman of the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence where I know he did a
good job.
[[Page S9501]]
I have watched him. I have watched him deal with difficult issues. I
have watched him take a leadership role, and I have watched him work
with the ranking member of that committee and with Democrats, and I
have been impressed with the job he has done on the Intelligence
Committee in the House.
So he knows the CIA. He knows it from having been in Army
intelligence, he knows it from having been in the CIA, and he knows it
from the position he held as chairman of the Intelligence Committee. He
knows where the problems are because he was there, and he knows how to
strengthen the intelligence community and make it better. He is no
stranger to the difficulty and the complexity of foreign intelligence.
When I look back on some of the former heads of the CIA, frankly,
some of them did not have much of a background in that area. But here
is a man who is uniquely qualified. He has been in the intelligence
community. I know that some people say that if you are in the
institution, you are part of the problem. But, my experience leads me
to ask, how can you solve a problem if you do not really understand an
institution? There are some in Washington that say, if you know the
subject, whether it is transportation or oil or intelligence, you
should not be in government because you have been coopted.
I think absolutely the opposite is the case. Practical experience is
invaluable. You have to understand the culture, you have to understand
the people, and anybody who has paid close attention to the
intelligence community in recent months and years knows what changes
should be made and have to be made.
Porter Goss, a Member of Congress, has been critical of the
intelligence community. He does not sugar-coat it. He has called the
human intelligence program dysfunctional. He has spoken the truth about
the way we have funded the CIA, which he says has not been adequate, it
has not been done in the right way, and we have not put enough emphasis
on human intelligence. In fact, Congress stopped this nation from
having the human intelligence we needed, if we go back and look at the
results of the Church Commission some 30 years ago. Once again, we are
part of the problem.
He knows we need to do more in linguistic training, and he has raised
these questions as chairman of the committee and in his communications
with the DCI.
His confirmation would bring stability and experience to the
intelligence community. One thing that worries me, as I have talked to
some of our intelligence personnel, is a certain concern about whether
they are really appreciated, and are the old experienced hands going to
stay, or are they going to leave. I have noticed some of the
intelligence people I see are getting younger, younger, and younger.
They need a firm and experienced leader. They need a person who has
been there with them, understands their needs, and appreciates the job
they do, and Porter Goss would do that.
He does support what Congress is about to do. We are going to create
a national intelligence director position, and we are going to pass
legislation that is going to reorganize the intelligence community at
some point, maybe sooner than later.
Again, he has the right attitude and supports the position I believe
that Congress is going to be taking.
There are those who have questioned his independence. Is he a
partisan? Is he a politician? Whatever happened to congressional
courtesy? Over the years, I have supported Members of the other party
from this body and the other body, even though they have sometimes been
very partisan politicians, very aggressive in their speeches on the
floor of the House and Senate, but I knew them to be good men and
women, and I knew when they took on a different role. When you are in
Congress, when you are in politics, you are a politician. That is not a
damnation. That is somebody involved in the art of government. When you
are a member of a party, sometimes members of the other party get under
your skin, and you speak out.
I noticed over the years, Porter Goss has not been one of those rabid
partisans. He has been very calm and very stable. Sometimes he gets a
little upset. Maybe he thought perhaps the Senate was getting carried
away with some of our hearings recently. On occasion, I have thought we
did a little grandstanding in the Senate, and I said so even though it
was sometimes directed at my own party.
I know he is an independent thinker, and I know he will put his job
as head of the CIA, uppermost. He will put his political past and his
partisanship behind him. He also will be a man, I believe, who can go
in and meet with the President at those early morning meetings and say:
Mr. President, this is what we know, this is the truth about the
situation, and if you go this way, you are going to have certain
problems.
He has that stature, he has that credibility, and he will have the
independence to do that.
I think having served so many years, having been on the Intelligence
Committee, and having the record he built at the Intelligence
Committee, is proof that he will be independent to do that job for the
American people. I believe he will be more candid with the Congress.
Quite often when we had testimony before the Intelligence Committee,
I felt as if I did not get a complete story. Frequently, testimony was
less than fully satisfactory or sufficient. Porter Goss is going to be
able to speak to us on a level basis, not from the perspective of a
former staff member. He was one of us, and he will not try to fool us.
I think he will tell us the truth.
By the way, I think we will be very comfortable telling him: Mr.
Director, we don't believe that. We will be able to be very candid with
him. I believe he will show flexibility as we move from where we are to
where we need to be.
He has been questioned about the positions he has taken, but he
satisfied the members of the Intelligence Committee by a vote of 12 to
4 with several Democrats voting for his confirmation. They asked him
the tough questions. They had their reservations, and those
reservations have been satisfied.
I cite one point of how he dealt with the former Director. On
September of 2003, he wrote a letter to DCI Tenet pointing out concerns
he had with intelligence. He joined with the ranking member of the
Intelligence Committee in the House, Congresswoman Harman, and
indicated there were significant deficiencies with respect to the
intelligence community's collection activities concerning Iraq's WMD
programs and ties to al-Qaida prior to the commencement of hostilities
there.
So he did not wait until after the fact; he raised concerns when they
needed to be raised. If my colleagues have taken a look at that letter,
it certainly shows independence and it was the kind of thing that the
DCI needed to hear at that particular time.
So I can attest from experience, from observation, and from a written
record that this Congressman will be an independent, thoughtful, strong
voice at the CIA.
I urge my colleagues, let us have our discussion but let us have a
vote and let us make it overwhelming. Let us do it now because we need
strong leadership and we have the right man to do th
