Congressional Record: October 8, 2004 (House)
Page H8863-H8873
9/11 RECOMMENDATIONS IMPLEMENTATION ACT
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827 and rule
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill,
H.R. 10.
{time} 0915
In the Committee of the Whole
Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of
the bill (H.R. 10) to provide for reform of the intelligence community,
terrorism prevention and prosecution, border security, and
international cooperation and coordination, and for other purposes,
with Mr. Kolbe (Chairman pro tempore) in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. When the Committee of the Whole rose on the
legislative day of Thursday, October 7, 2004, amendment No. 3 printed
in House Report 108-571 by the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Souder) had
been disposed of.
It is now in order to consider amendment No. 4 printed in House
Report 108-751.
Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Kirk
Mr. KIRK. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 4 offered by Mr. Kirk:
Page 60, after line 9, insert the following new section:
SEC. 1018. REPORT ON INTEGRATION OF DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY
INTO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) Report.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report on the
practicality of integrating the Drug Enforcement
Administration into the intelligence community.
(b) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate; and
(2) the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives and the Senate.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827, the
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Kirk) and a Member opposed each will
control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Kirk).
Mr. KIRK. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, this amendment corrects a critical problem with our
intelligence community and adds a needed bipartisan recommendation to
the reforms we have in the underlying legislation. We have known for
quite some time that the sale of elicit narcotics and terrorism go hand
in hand. This link is now firm and is clear with regard to the
terrorist activities and terrorist groups in Colombia. It is also clear
in Peru, but this phenomenon has spread far beyond Latin America and is
evident in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Earlier this year, I traveled to Pakistan and Afghanistan, the key
frontier border area of such concern to the United States, and there I
learned a new fact, that Osama bin Laden's connection to his family
fortune has been reduced. His connection to donations to the United
States and Europe has been reduced, but he has a new source of income.
Osama bin Laden is now becoming one of the world's largest dealers in
heroin. Through just one of his supply organizations, bin Laden's
lieutenants are earning at least $28 million from the sale of narcotics
through Pakistan.
Let us remind ourselves of the conclusion of the 9/11 Commission,
that the attacks against the World Trade Centers, Shanksville, and the
Pentagon cost al Qaeda only $500,000. With an annual income of $28
million coming from the sale of illegal narcotics, we know that one of
the key terrorist financing mechanisms is the sale of illegal
narcotics.
In the 9/11 Commission report, they briefly mentioned this but did
not focus on it. When you are on the front lines in Kandahar or
Peshawar in Pakistan, you see that this link is clear.
Our Drug Enforcement Agency has some of the best financial maps of
terrorist organizations in the world, and the Drug Enforcement Agency
used to be a formal member of the intelligence community. In my
judgment and the judgment of my bipartisan partner, the gentleman from
Washington (Mr. Larsen), on this amendment, we believe that the Drug
Enforcement Agency should become part of the intelligence community
again, that this link between terrorism and illegal narcotics is very
clear.
Roughly half of the 28 terrorist organizations identified by the
State Department in October, 2001, have links to drug activities.
Organizations like the Kurdistan Worker's Party, the National
Liberation Army, ELN, al Qaeda, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia, Shining Path, and the United Self-Defense Forces/Group of
Colombia. All of these in a worldwide phenomenon, depending on violence
and terror, funded by the sale of illegal narcotics.
This bipartisan amendment would help study the integration of the
U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency into the intelligence community. It is
supported by Karen Tandy, the administrator of the DEA. It is supported
by a number
[[Page H8864]]
of minority members. It is supported by the attorney general. I urge
adoption of this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to claim the time in
opposition to the amendment, although I rise in support of the
amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Texas?
There was no objection.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the Kirk amendment to H.R.
10. This amendment requires the President to submit to Congress a
report detailing the best way to incorporate the Drug Enforcement
Administration into the intelligence community.
The El Paso Intelligence Center, or EPIC, is an asset of the Drug
Enforcement Agency. It is located in El Paso, Texas. It is the Nation's
singular, multi-agency, tactical intelligence center for drug, alien,
and weapons trafficking intelligence. Supporting Federal, State, and
local law enforcement officers, EPIC also provides information
regarding homeland security, homeland defense and counterterrorism to
its member agencies. During my 26\1/2\ year tenure with the United
States Border Patrol, I was able to utilize the services of EPIC,
leading to a personal appreciation of the important role that the El
Paso Intelligence Center plays in homeland security defense.
Currently, EPIC accomplishes its mission by processing requests for
information received from Federal, State and local law enforcement
personnel on persons, modes of transportation, organizations or
addresses that are suspected of being engaged or associated with some
type of criminal activity. Officers have 24 hours a day, 7 days a week
access to the information in its database. It gives them the ability to
query and provide simultaneous access to a number of other Federal
databases. The El Paso Intelligence Center provides analysis of drug
movement events, trends and patterns. They also do research on criminal
investigations and communication intercept exploitation in support of
its many different customers.
It is well known that there is a link in my opinion between illegal
narcotics and the funding that it creates for terrorism. The El Paso
Intelligence Center understands this link and is known around the world
for its ability to connect the dots between actions and players.
The DEA plays an important role in this Nation's war on terrorism and
war on drugs, and should be more fully integrated with our intelligence
community. For those reasons, I urge my colleagues to support the Kirk
amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. KIRK. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra), the chairman of the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me
this time and thank the gentleman for his amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I support this amendment and appreciate the efforts of
the gentleman from Illinois on this issue. The intelligence community
looks forward to an opportunity to review this issue further.
The DEA has substantial capabilities around the world that should be
fully utilized in an appropriate fashion. The report that is provided
for in this amendment will assist Congress in its consideration of the
role of the Drug Enforcement Administration and the intelligence
community along with the other important responsibilities that the DEA
undertakes on a daily basis. I look forward to seeing the report and
look forward to the passage of this amendment.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Washington (Mr. Larsen).
Mr. LARSEN of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this
amendment along with my colleague, the gentleman from Illinois (Mr.
Kirk).
We need to consider making the DEA part of our intelligence network.
Before our own eyes, Afghanistan is re-emerging as the international
leader in the heroin trade. As this problem grows, the less control our
Nation will have over the funding sources of international terrorism. A
direct relationship exists between terrorism and the drug trade.
Therefore, a direct relationship is needed between the DEA and our
intelligence agencies. The DEA not only combats the drug trade around
the world but can gather valuable information that can transcend drug
trafficking and reach into the shadowy corners of international
terrorism.
According to the State Department, 12 of the 28 terrorist
organizations listed in the Department of State October, 2001, Report
on Foreign Terrorist Organizations have links to foreign drug
trafficking. One fitting example of this relationship happened in 2003
when a seizure of hashish from a trafficking group included suspected
al Qaeda members and involved drugs worth nearly $30 million at
wholesale.
The drug trade not only has a role in funding terrorists but also
plays a significant destabilizing role in Afghanistan. Just yesterday,
drug smugglers were implicated in a terrorist attack on Hamid Karzai's
vice presidential candidate. Free elections in Afghanistan are a threat
to the drug trade, just as free elections in Afghanistan are a threat
to global terrorism.
According to our Office of National Drug Control Policy, the
challenging security situation in Afghanistan has complicated the task
of fighting the war against drugs and vice versa. As the terrorists
lose ground, the opium poppy growers win, and much of the money from
Afghanistan's opium sales goes right back to the terrorists.
Drug traffickers and terror networks work out of the same rule book.
They both strive to undermine democratic institutions and engage in
widespread violence and corruption. Both groups also depend on money
laundering, forgery and arms deals to implement their deadly goals.
We cannot separate international terrorism from the drug trade. They
are intertwined. This amendment will examine the ways DEA can maintain
its current role while sharing information to help further protect our
Nation. I believe this amendment is in the spirit of the 9/11
Commission recommendations and will help create and consolidate the
whole intelligence picture that a president needs to defend our Nation.
I urge its support.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. KIRK. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
In closing, I thank the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes) and the
gentleman from Washington (Mr. Larsen) for supporting this amendment.
The gentleman from Texas is exactly right. El Paso Intelligence Center
already does this. It is a critical asset but should be a formal part
of the intelligence community, as are combatant commands that do a
number of key tasks with regard to drug profits and terrorism.
We know that half of the Afghan economy is now related to the sale of
illicit narcotics. We know that the Taliban and al Qaeda depend on
terrorist profits. We started winning the battle against narcoterrorism
in Colombia because we took a unified campaign on this approach against
terrorism and the sale of illegal narcotics.
The DEA is the expert on these financial organizations. If the 9/11
Commission said anything, it said we should attack the financial
support for terrorism and that financial support is increasingly
reliant on the sale of illegal narcotics, especially for Osama bin
Laden becoming one of the number one heroin dealers in Central Asia.
For these reasons, I urge adoption of the amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by
the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Kirk).
The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. KIRK. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois
(Mr. Kirk) will be postponed.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. It is now in order to consider amendment
No. 5 printed in House Report 108-751.
[[Page H8865]]
Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Sessions
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 5 offered by Mr. Sessions:
At the end of title II of the bill (page 235, after line
21), insert the following new subtitle:
Subtitle J--Prevention of Terrorist Access to Destructive Weapons Act
of 2004
SECTION 2211. SHORT TITLE.
This subtitle may be cited as the ``Prevention of Terrorist
Access to Destructive Weapons Act of 2004''.
SEC. 2212. FINDINGS AND PURPOSE.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) The criminal use of man-portable air defense systems
(MANPADS) presents a serious threat to civil aviation
worldwide, especially in the hands of terrorists or foreign
states that harbor them.
(2) Atomic weapons or weapons designed to release radiation
(``dirty bombs'') could be used by terrorists to inflict
enormous loss of life and damage to property and the
environment.
(3) Variola virus is the causative agent of smallpox, an
extremely serious, contagious, and sometimes fatal disease.
Variola virus is classified as a Category A agent by the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, meaning that it
is believed to pose the greatest potential threat for adverse
public health impact and has a moderate to high potential for
large-scale dissemination. The last case of smallpox in the
United States was in 1949. The last naturally occurring case
in the world was in Somalia in 1977. Although smallpox has
been officially eradicated after a successful worldwide
vaccination program, there remain two official repositories
of the variola virus for research purposes. Because it is so
dangerous, the variola virus may appeal to terrorists.
(4) The use, or even the threatened use, of MANPADS, atomic
or radiological weapons, or the variola virus, against the
United States, its allies, or its people, poses a grave risk
to the security, foreign policy, economy, and environment of
the United States. Accordingly, the United States has a
compelling national security interest in preventing unlawful
activities that lead to the proliferation or spread of such
items, including their unauthorized production, construction,
acquisition, transfer, possession, import, or export. All of
these activities markedly increase the chances that such
items will be obtained by terrorist organizations or rogue
states, which could use them to attack the United States, its
allies, or United States nationals or corporations.
(5) There is no legitimate reason for a private individual
or company, absent explicit government authorization, to
produce, construct, otherwise acquire, transfer, receive,
possess, import, export, or use MANPADS, atomic or
radiological weapons, or the variola virus.
(b) Purpose.--The purpose of this subtitle is to combat the
potential use of weapons that have the ability to cause
widespread harm to United States persons and the United
States economy (and that have no legitimate private use) and
to threaten or harm the national security or foreign
relations of the United States.
SEC. 2213. MISSILE SYSTEMS DESIGNED TO DESTROY AIRCRAFT.
Chapter 113B of title 18, United States Code, is amended by
adding after section 2332f the following:
``Sec. 2332g. Missile systems designed to destroy aircraft
``(a) Unlawful Conduct.--
``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (3), it
shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly produce,
construct, otherwise acquire, transfer directly or
indirectly, receive, possess, import, export, or use, or
possess and threaten to use--
``(A) an explosive or incendiary rocket or missile that is
guided by any system designed to enable the rocket or missile
to--
``(i) seek or proceed toward energy radiated or reflected
from an aircraft or toward an image locating an aircraft; or
``(ii) otherwise direct or guide the rocket or missile to
an aircraft;
``(B) any device designed or intended to launch or guide a
rocket or missile described in subparagraph (A); or
``(C) any part or combination of parts designed or
redesigned for use in assembling or fabricating a rocket,
missile, or device described in subparagraph (A) or (B).
``(2) Nonweapon.--Paragraph (1)(A) does not apply to any
device that is neither designed nor redesigned for use as a
weapon.
``(3) Excluded conduct.--This subsection does not apply
with respect to--
``(A) conduct by or under the authority of the United
States or any department or agency thereof or of a State or
any department or agency thereof; or
``(B) conduct pursuant to the terms of a contract with the
United States or any department or agency thereof or with a
State or any department or agency thereof.
``(b) Jurisdiction.--Conduct prohibited by subsection (a)
is within the jurisdiction of the United States if--
``(1) the offense occurs in or affects interstate or
foreign commerce;
``(2) the offense occurs outside of the United States and
is committed by a national of the United States;
``(3) the offense is committed against a national of the
United States while the national is outside the United
States;
``(4) the offense is committed against any property that is
owned, leased, or used by the United States or by any
department or agency of the United States, whether the
property is within or outside the United States; or
``(5) an offender aids or abets any person over whom
jurisdiction exists under this subsection in committing an
offense under this section or conspires with any person over
whom jurisdiction exists under this subsection to commit an
offense under this section.
``(c) Criminal Penalties.--
``(1) In general.--Any person who violates, or attempts or
conspires to violate, subsection (a) shall be fined not more
than $2,000,000 and shall be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment not less than 30 years or to imprisonment for
life.
``(2) Life imprisonment.--Any person who, in the course of
a violation of subsection (a), uses, attempts or conspires to
use, or possesses and threatens to use, any item or items
described in subsection (a), shall be fined not more than
$2,000,000 and imprisoned for life.
``(3) Death penalty.--If the death of another results from
a person's violation of subsection (a), the person shall be
fined not more than $2,000,000 and punished by death or
imprisoned for life.
``(d) Definition.--As used in this section, the term
`aircraft' has the definition set forth in section
40102(a)(6) of title 49, United States Code.''.
SEC. 2214. ATOMIC WEAPONS.
(a) Prohibitions.--Section 92 of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 (42 U.S.C. 2122) is amended by--
(1) inserting at the beginning ``a.'' before ``It'';
(2) inserting ``knowingly'' after ``for any person to'';
(3) striking ``or'' before ``export'';
(4) striking ``transfer or receive in interstate or foreign
commerce,'' before ``manufacture'';
(5) inserting ``receive,'' after ``acquire,'';
(6) inserting ``, or use, or possess and threaten to use,''
before ``any atomic weapon'';
(7) inserting at the end the following:
``b. Conduct prohibited by subsection a. is within the
jurisdiction of the United States if--
``(1) the offense occurs in or affects interstate or
foreign commerce; the offense occurs outside of the United
States and is committed by a national of the United States;
``(2) the offense is committed against a national of the
United States while the national is outside the United
States;
``(3) the offense is committed against any property that is
owned, leased, or used by the United States or by any
department or agency of the United States, whether the
property is within or outside the United States; or
``(4) an offender aids or abets any person over whom
jurisdiction exists under this subsection in committing an
offense under this section or conspires with any person over
whom jurisdiction exists under this subsection to commit an
offense under this section.''.
(b) Violations.--Section 222 of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 (42 U.S.C. 2272) is amended by--
(1) inserting at the beginning ``a.'' before ``Whoever'';
(2) striking ``, 92,''; and
(3) inserting at the end the following:
``b. Any person who violates, or attempts or conspires to
violate, section 92 shall be fined not more than $2,000,000
and sentenced to a term of imprisonment not less than 30
years or to imprisonment for life. Any person who, in the
course of a violation of section 92, uses, attempts or
conspires to use, or possesses and threatens to use, any
atomic weapon shall be fined not more than $2,000,000 and
imprisoned for life. If the death of another results from a
person's violation of section 92, the person shall be fined
not more than $2,000,000 and punished by death or imprisoned
for life.''.
SEC. 2215. RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSAL DEVICES.
Chapter 113B of title 18, United States Code, is amended by
adding after section 2332g the following:
``Sec. 2332h. Radiological dispersal devices
``(a) Unlawful Conduct.--
``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), it
shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly produce,
construct, otherwise acquire, transfer directly or
indirectly, receive, possess, import, export, or use, or
possess and threaten to use--
``(A) any weapon that is designed or intended to release
radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human
life; or
``(B) or any device or other object that is capable of and
designed or intended to endanger human life through the
release of radiation or radioactivity.
``(2) Exception.--This subsection does not apply with
respect to--
``(A) conduct by or under the authority of the United
States or any department or agency thereof; or
``(B) conduct pursuant to the terms of a contract with the
United States or any department or agency thereof.
``(b) Jurisdiction.--Conduct prohibited by subsection (a)
is within the jurisdiction of the United States if--
[[Page H8866]]
``(1) the offense occurs in or affects interstate or
foreign commerce;
``(2) the offense occurs outside of the United States and
is committed by a national of the United States;
``(3) the offense is committed against a national of the
United States while the national is outside the United
States;
``(4) the offense is committed against any property that is
owned, leased, or used by the United States or by any
department or agency of the United States, whether the
property is within or outside the United States; or
``(5) an offender aids or abets any person over whom
jurisdiction exists under this subsection in committing an
offense under this section or conspires with any person over
whom jurisdiction exists under this subsection to commit an
offense under this section.
``(c) Criminal Penalties.--
``(1) In general.--Any person who violates, or attempts or
conspires to violate, subsection (a) shall be fined not more
than $2,000,000 and shall sentenced to a term of imprisonment
not less than 30 years or to imprisonment for life.
``(2) Life imprisonment.--Any person who, in the course of
a violation of subsection (a), uses, attempts or conspires to
use, or possesses and threatens to use, any item or items
described in subsection (a), shall be fined not more than
$2,000,000 and imprisoned for life.
``(3) Death penalty.--If the death of another results from
a person's violation of subsection (a), the person shall be
fined not more than $2,000,000 and punished by death or
imprisoned for life.''.
SEC. 2216. VARIOLA VIRUS.
Chapter 10 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by
inserting after section 175b the following:
``Sec. 175c. Variola virus
``(a) Unlawful Conduct.--
``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), it
shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly produce,
engineer, synthesize, acquire, transfer directly or
indirectly, receive, possess, import, export, or use, or
possess and threaten to use, variola virus.
``(2) Exception.--This subsection does not apply to conduct
by, or under the authority of, the Secretary of Health and
Human Services.
``(b) Jurisdiction.--Conduct prohibited by subsection (a)
is within the jurisdiction of the United States if--
``(1) the offense occurs in or affects interstate or
foreign commerce;
``(2) the offense occurs outside of the United States and
is committed by a national of the United States;
``(3) the offense is committed against a national of the
United States while the national is outside the United
States;
``(4) the offense is committed against any property that is
owned, leased, or used by the United States or by any
department or agency of the United States, whether the
property is within or outside the United States; or
``(5) an offender aids or abets any person over whom
jurisdiction exists under this subsection in committing an
offense under this section or conspires with any person over
whom jurisdiction exists under this subsection to commit an
offense under this section.
``(c) Criminal Penalties.--
``(1) In general.--Any person who violates, or attempts or
conspires to violate, subsection (a) shall be fined not more
than $2,000,000 and shall be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment not less than 30 years or to imprisonment for
life.
``(2) Life imprisonment.--Any person who, in the course of
a violation of subsection (a), uses, attempts or conspires to
use, or possesses and threatens to use, any item or items
described in subsection (a), shall be fined not more than
$2,000,000 and imprisoned for life.
``(3) Death penalty.--If the death of another results from
a person's violation of subsection (a), the person shall be
fined not more than $2,000,000 and punished by death or
imprisoned for life.
``(d) Definition.--As used in this section, the term
`variola virus' means a virus that can cause human smallpox
or any derivative of the variola major virus that contains
more than 85 percent of the gene sequence of the variola
major virus or the variola minor virus.''.
SEC. 2217. INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS.
Section 2516(1) of title 18, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) in paragraph (a), by inserting ``2122 and'' after
``sections'';
(2) in paragraph (c), by inserting ``section 175c (relating
to variola virus),'' after ``section 175 (relating to
biological weapons),''; and
(3) in paragraph (q), by inserting ``2332g, 2332h,'' after
``2332f,''.
SEC. 2218. AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 2332B(G)(5)(B) OF TITLE 18,
UNITED STATES CODE.
Section 2332b(g)(5)(B) of title 18, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) in clause (i)--
(A) by inserting before ``2339 (relating to harboring
terrorists)'' the following: ``2332g (relating to missile
systems designed to destroy aircraft), 2332h (relating to
radiological dispersal devices),''; and
(B) by inserting ``175c (relating to variola virus),''
after ``175 or 175b (relating to biological weapons),''; and
(2) in clause (ii)--
(A) by striking ``section'' and inserting ``sections 92
(relating to prohibitions governing atomic weapons) or''; and
(B) by inserting ``2122 or'' before ``2284''.
SEC. 2219. AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 1956(C)(7)(D) OF TITLE 18,
UNITED STATES CODE.
Section 1956(c)(7)(D), title 18, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) by inserting after ``section 152 (relating to
concealment of assets; false oaths and claims; bribery),''
the following: ``section 175c (relating to the variola
virus),'';
(2) by inserting after ``section 2332(b) (relating to
international terrorist acts transcending national
boundaries),'' the following: ``section 2332g (relating to
missile systems designed to destroy aircraft), section 2332h
(relating to radiological dispersal devices),''; and
(3) striking ``or'' after ``any felony violation of the
Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938,'' and after ``any
felony violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act'',
striking ``;'' and inserting ``, or section 92 of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2122) (relating to prohibitions
governing atomic weapons)''.
SEC. 2220. EXPORT LICENSING PROCESS.
Section 38(g)(1)(A) of the Arms Export Control Act (22
U.S.C. 2778) is amended--
(1) by striking ``or'' before ``(xi)''; and
(2) by inserting after clause (xi) the following: ``or
(xii) section 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the Prevention of Terrorist
Access to Destructive Weapons Act of 2004, relating to
missile systems designed to destroy aircraft (18 U.S.C.
2332g), prohibitions governing atomic weapons (42 U.S.C.
2122), radiological dispersal devices (18 U.S.C. 2332h), and
variola virus (18 U.S.C. 175b);''.
SEC. 2221. CLERICAL AMENDMENTS.
(a) Chapter 113B.--The table of sections for chapter 113B
of title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting the
following after the item for section 2332f:
``2332g. Missile systems designed to destroy aircraft.
``2332h. Radiological dispersal devices.''.
(b) Chapter 10.--The table of sections for chapter 10 of
title 18, United States Code, is amended by inserting the
following item after the item for section 175b:
``175c. Variola virus.''.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827, the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sessions) and the gentleman from Virginia
(Mr. Scott) each will control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sessions).
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Today, I rise to offer my legislation, Prevention of Terrorist Access
to Destructive Weapons Act, an amendment to H.R. 10. This amendment
will aid the hard-working Federal investigators and agents on the front
line in the war on terror by establishing a zero tolerance policy
towards the illegal importation, possession or transfer of shoulder-
fired missiles, atomic weapons, dirty bombs, and the smallpox virus.
{time} 0930
Mr. SESSIONS. Today, maximum penalties of only 10 years in prison
apply to the unlawful possession of shoulder-fired missiles. The same
weak penalty also currently applies to the unlawful possession of an
atomic weapon. Today, there is no law criminalizing the possession of
dirty bombs with criminal intent, and the unregistered possession of
the smallpox virus carries a maximum penalties of only 5 years in
prison.
Given the terrorist threats that we currently face in the United
States, weak punishments for the possession or use of these weapons is
simply unacceptable in light of the fact that we know that 26 terror
groups already have shoulder-fired missiles in their possession.
My amendment imposes stringent, mandatory minimum criminal penalties
for these heinous crimes similar to the laws that we already use to
prosecute drug kingpins. Specifically, for each of the weapons covered
by the bill, unlawful possession would result in mandatory imprisonment
for up to 30 years to life. Using, attempting, or conspiring to use, or
possessing and threatening to use these weapons would result in
mandatory life in prison. And if one death were to result from the
unlawful possession of one of these weapons, this amendment would allow
the death penalty to be applied to anyone who targets America in a
terrorist attack.
Although tougher penalties may not deter homicidal terrorists
determined to attack the United States, they will help to deter those
middlemen who are
[[Page H8867]]
essential to the transfer of such weapons. Many of these middlemen aid
terrorists purely for financial gain, and significantly tougher
mandatory penalties would dramatically alter their cost-benefit
calculations.
When the middleman is caught importing or hiding these weapons, the
existence of tough penalties will also assist prosecutors and
investigators in obtaining cooperation and moving swiftly to identify
terrorists. Long mandatory sentences, including life without parole,
provide a fast and powerful incentive to cooperate, as has already been
proven in cracking the code of silence for organized crime. In the case
of these dangerous weapons, the speed with which persons choose to
cooperate could also save thousands of lives.
These increased penalties are completely justified in light of the
catastrophic destruction that could be caused by the use of any of
these weapons, and supporting my amendment will send a strong message
of America's resolve to win the war on terrorism.
Mr. Chairman, I encourage my colleagues to join me in supporting and
giving Federal investigators and prosecutors the tools they have asked
for to aid them in their fight against terrorism by supporting this
commonsense, effective amendment.
[From the Associated Press, Aug. 5, 2004]
Two Arrested in Missile Sting Operation
Washington.--Two leaders of a mosque in Albany, New York,
were arrested on charges stemming from an alleged plot to
help a man they thought was a terrorist who wanted to
purchase a shoulder-fired missile, federal authorities said
Thursday.
The men have ties to a group called Ansar al-Islam, which
has been linked to the al Qaeda terror network, according to
two federal law enforcement authorities speaking on condition
of anonymity.
The two arrests came as FBI, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement and other agents executed search warrants at the
Masjid As-Salam mosque and two Albany-area homes, officials
said. The men were identified as Yassin Aref, 34, the imam of
the mosque, and 49-year-old Mohammed Hoosain, one of the
mosque's founders.
According to law enforcement officials, the two are being
charged with providing material support to terrorism by
participating in a conspiracy to help an individual they
believed was a terrorist purchase a shoulder-fired missile.
The individual was an undercover government agent and no
missile ever changed hands. Aref and Hoosain were allegedly
involved in money-laundering aspects of the plot, the
officials said.
The investigation has been going on for a year and is not
related to the Bush administration's decision earlier this
week to raise the terror alert level for certain financial
sector buildings in New York and Washington, the officials
said.
In Albany, some mosque members gathered early Thursday
outside the institution for morning prayers.
More details about the case were expected to be released
later Thursday by the Justice Department.
____
[From the Los Angeles Times, Mar. 4, 2004]
2 Convicted of Seeking Missiles for Al Qaeda Ally
(By Tony Perry)
San Diego.--A Pakistani national and a naturalized American
pleaded guilty Wednesday to a conspiracy to help the Al Qaeda
terrorist group by selling five tons of hashish and a half-
ton of heroin in exchange for money and four Stinger
missiles.
Muhamed Abid Afridi, 30, and a naturalized citizen from
Inida, Ilyas Ali, 56, admitted in U.S. District Court here
that they planned to sell the missiles to the Taliban, an
ally of Al Qaeda.
Afridi, Ali and a second Pakinstani were arrested in Hong
Kong in September 2002 after meeting with undercover FBI
agents posing as arms dealers with Stingers to sell. They
allegedly offered to sell the agents heroin and hashish in
return for missiles and money.
``They both had the will and the means to carry out the
transaction they were negotiating,'' said Assistant U.S.
Atty. Michael Skerlos.
Stingers are shoulder-launched missiles distributed widely
by the CIA to Afghan rebels fighting the Soviet army in the
1980s. Easy to use and deadly accurate at hitting low-flying
aircraft, Stingers were credited with helping the Afghans
demoralize and rout the much stronger Soviets.
``Because of the actions taken in this investigation,
America is safer and our citizens are more secure,'' Atty.
General John Ashcroft said in a statement.
Initial meetings between Ali and the FBI agents occurred in
San Diego, according to court documents. Afridi and Ali are
scheduled to be sentenced June 29 by Judge M. James Lorenz; a
plea bargain recommends that each be sentenced to up to 10
years in prison.
The case against the second Pakistani, Syed Mustajab Shah,
has a court date April 5.
Ali was a grocer in Minneapolis before his arrest.
____
[From Jane's Intelligence Review, Sept. 2001]
The Proliferation of MANPADS
(By Thomas B. Hunter)
Man-portable surface-to-air missiles, also known as
MANPADs, represent a significant potential threat to military
and civilian aircraft.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
proliferation of SA-series MANPADs has increased, and the
diffusion of these weapons now exceeds the infamous spread of
US-made Stinger missiles from Afghanistan during the 1990s.
Today, MANPADs of various types are in the hands of as many
as 27 guerrilla and terrorist groups around the world.
Tracking the proliferation of MANPADs is a difficult
endeavour. Often, the only verification of use by non-state
actors has been post-event in nature--recovery of a used
launcher or fragments from expended missiles. The black
market is the primary source for these weapons. Unlike state-
to-state transfers, usually documented and visible, the
illicit black market MANPAD trade defies accurate tracking.
The inability of governments to correctly identify seized
weapons also contributes to inaccurate reports. In many
cases, soldiers and government officials have identified
rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and other handheld rocket
launchers as MANPADs. Moreover, the word `Stinger' has become
an all-encompassing term for any MANPAD among many civilian,
military, and non-state groups, further complicating efforts
to verify proliferation activity.
In many cases of surface-to-air attacks on aircraft,
misreporting is quite common. Airbursts occurring near low-
flying aircraft have frequently been reported as attacks by
MANPADs, when in fact they are usually RPGs. Attacks on
aircraft at very low altitudes, those occurring under 1,000
feet, are almost exclusively RPGs. Guerrilla and terrorist
forces have successfully adapted the RPG to the anti-aircraft
role. This skill was demonstrated perhaps most clearly when
two US MH-60 Black Hawk helicopters were shot down by Somali
gunmen in October 1993.
One popular misconception is that these missiles become
unusable after several years due to battery or other systems
failures, and are therefore useless after a period of time.
While it is true that all MANPAD batteries have a finite
shelf life, these can be replaced with commercially purchased
batteries available on the open market and technically
proficient terrorist groups might also be able to construct
hybrid batteries to replace used ones.
Other concerns include deterioration of missile propellants
and seeker coolant, and general storage issues. While these
concerns merit attention, the commonly held assumption that
these weapons have short shelf lives is erroneous. Most
missiles are hermetically sealed in launchers designed for
rough handling by soldiers in the field. Temperature extremes
are also factored into the design of these weapons, reducing
the threat of environmental degradation.
Clearly, the shelf life of MANPADs is, in large part,
dependent on the conditions in which the weapon is stored.
However, under ideal (factory specified) conditions, some
versions of these weapons can remain operational for 22 years
or more. So while it can be assumed that some weapons have
not been stored in ideal conditions, many weapons previously
believed to be inoperative, such as the Afghan Stingers, may
indeed be operational.
Furthermore, MANPADs remain a popular commodity on the
global black arms market. With the exception of the Soviet-
Afghan war, these weapons are more widespread today than at
any time since their introduction in the late 1960s.
Guerrilla and terrorist organisations can obtain them with
relative ease, with the primary limitation being money. As
some of these groups increase their profits through drug
trafficking and other activities, the likelihood of further
illicit purchases will also increase.
MANPADs have proliferated to non-state groups throughout
sub-Saharan Africa. These weapons can be found in the hands
of insurgent groups in Angola, the Democratic Republic of
Congo, Ethiopia. Rwanda and Somalia.
Of these states, Angola has seen the greatest activity. The
CIA covertly provided FIM-92A Stinger missiles to UNITA
rebels in the late 1980s as part of its effort to assist in
the overthrow of Angola's pro-communist government. As in
Afghanistan, efforts to recover the missiles following the
end of hostilities proved futile. Today UNITA retains an
unknown number of advanced weapons, which may be augmented
with SA-7 (NATO reporting name `Grail,' Russian name Strela-
2) and FIM-43 Redeye missiles captured from government
forces.
UNITA has also shown willingness to use them, sometimes
against civilian aircraft. UNITA fired missiles at three
World Food Programme (WFP) aircraft in June 2001, for
example. One plane was struck but managed to land safely at a
nearby airport. This attack was of particular concern in that
the missile struck the aircraft at an altitude of 15,000
feet--3,500 feet beyond the weapon's published maximum range.
While this is not the first report of Stinger missiles
reaching
[[Page H8868]]
this height, it is clear that aircraft travelling at an
altitude believed to be out of the range of these weapons
should be aware of this proven capability.
During the Soviet-Afghan War, the CIA working in
conjunction with the Pakistani Army's Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI), delivered over 1,000 Stingers to
Mujahideen rebels. While the rebels fired many of the
missiles against Soviet aircraft, hundreds remained after
the fighting ended in 1987. Poor bookkeeping at the CIA,
combined with the dispersal of the weapons to numerous
clans throughout the country, made accounting for and
recovering them impossible. The result was a proliferation
of advanced anti-aircraft weaponry throughout the region.
It is well-known that the rebels did not retain all of the
Stingers left behind after the war. Many found their way onto
the global grey and black arms markets and ended up in
guerrilla arsenals from Sri Lanka to Chechnya. With a
reported black market price of between US$80,000 and
$250,000, Stingers represent a significant profit potential
due in no small part to widespread demand.
Terrorist leader Osama bin Laden also reportedly possesses
a number of MANPADs, including SA-7s and Stingers. As Bin
Laden has both the financial resources and black market
connections to make procurement possible, these reports are
probably accurate. Persistent rumours also indicate that Bin
Laden's personal bodyguards may be equipped with Stingers,
ostensibly to counter an airborne attack.
Regardless of the veracity of the latter information, it is
logical to assume that Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda (`The Base')
network is in possession of additional MANPADs. If this is
true, then Al-Qaeda represents the most significant threat to
international civil aviation. Given Bin Laden's specific
threats against U.S. citizens, this threat is especially
relevant with regard to U.S.-owned airlines.
While the Russian military is certainly not confronted with
the same threat level that it experienced in Afghanistan, the
increased proliferation of MANPADs to Chechen rebels has
dramatically increased the danger to close air support (CAS)
aircraft operating in theatre. A number of aircraft have been
shot down, including Su-25 `Frogfoot' and Su-24 `Pencer'
fighter-bombers. MANPADs have also shot down a number of
military helicopters.
The sources of Chechen MANPADs are varied. However, a large
number of systems have been seized by Russian authorities,
indicating that the rebels have established an effective
pipeline for delivery. For example, three SA-7 missiles were
found in the territory of Ingushetia near the Russian-
Georgian border in September 2000. Just one month later, an
unspecified number of SA-7s were discovered in a building
near Severy airport. The following month a Russian military
operation resulted in the seizure of four SA-7 missiles with
their launchers from a lorry in Dagestan. A rebel spokesman
later announced that the weapons were part of a shipment of
arms destined for use in Chechnya. The shipment reportedly
cost the Chechens $40,000.
Another report indicated that Bin Laden might have
delivered as many as 50 Stinger missiles to the Chechens. The
weapons were to have been transported from either Georgia or
Azerbaijan and delivered in December 1999. Eight Stinger
missiles were reportedly airdropped in the mountains of
Sharoyskiy District on the night of 12-13 June 2001. The
source of these weapons was not reported.
The primary MANPAD threat in the Western Hemisphere is
their possible future use by the two main Colombian insurgent
groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia--FARC) and the National
Liberation Army (Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional--ELN).
Complicating analysis of the Colombia MANPAD situation is a
plethora of false of misleading reporting.
Colombian electronic and print press outlets have regularly
reported that both the FARC and ELN possess these missile
systems. Government officials have also fanned this fire by
issuing corroborating statements. These reports, both
military and civilian, cumulatively suggest that the FARC
currently possesses SA-7, SA-14 ``Gremlin'', SA-16 ``Gimlet''
and Redeye missiles. The Redeye missiles were variously
reported to have come from Nicaraguan (former Contra) or
Syrian arsenals and the SA-series weapons from various
sources. There is no definitive evidence, however, to confirm
that any Colombian guerrilla group currently possesses
MANPADs of any type.
This misreporting is usually a matter of an honest mistake
due to lack of familiarity with MANPADs, the Colombian
situation may mask an ulterior motive. While the threat to
the Colombian government from insurgent and narcotics
trafficking groups is quite real, it is well-known that
officials from that government have frequently overstated the
sophistication of rebel groups in an effort to garner greater
financial and political support from the USA. Given this
history, it is possible that MANPAD events have occasionally
been intentionally overstated.
According to Colombia expert Steven Salisbury, FARC
commanders have admitted to possessing MANPADs. ``The FARC
commanders who told me the FARC has shoulder-fired SAMs
[surface-to-air missiles] were field commanders talking
privately to me,'' he said. ``They said, yes, they have
SAMs.'' This information given to Salisbury was corroborated
by two FARC block commanders as well as other guerrillas.
Four additional factors must be highlighted. The first of
these is that FARC commanders have stated that they do indeed
possess MANPADs. The second is that both the FARC and ELN are
known to be aggressively seeking these weapons. The third
factor is that the guerrillas have received training on these
weapons. In one instance, a Colombian government source
stated that 25 guerrillas travelled to Nicaragua to attend an
anti-aircraft course taught by former Sandanista soldiers.
This course reportedly included MANPAD training as well as
gunnery techniques involving 0.50-calibre heavy machine guns
and the use of RPG-7s in the anti-air role. FARC members may
also have travelled to Syria and Libya to receive similar
training. Finally, both the FARC and ELN have the financial
resources to make such a purchase possible.
With these factors in mind, it appears likely that the FARC
will procure at least one type of MANPAD--if it has not done
so already. Colombian guerrilla groups have had very little
difficulty obtaining weapons for use in their war against the
government. Well-established arms transit routes are in place
to facilitate these shipments. The arms pipelines through
which the FARC and ELN may obtain MANPADs run through the
following countries Albania, Belgium, Ecuador, Jordan, North
Korea, Peru, Romania, and Russia. Of specific concern is the
Russian relationship, as the FARC and Russian mafias have a
well-established arms-for-drugs pipeline in place. The
Russian mafias have demonstrated the ability to obtain
virtually any type of weapons system. If the Colombian
guerrillas are to obtain these weapons, and have not been
successful already, they will most likely come from this
black market channel.
It must be noted that when the FARC obtains these weapons,
it will almost certainly use them only in critical
situations, such as the defence of important base camps or
headquarters facilities. They will most likely not be used
against drug-spraying aircraft or other non-threatening
targets due to the high value of MANPADs to the FARC
leadership.
If the FARC does indeed maintain a small inventory of these
weapons, this is the most likely explanation for why they
have not yet been employed. If employed, targets would
most likely include Colombian Air Force CAS aircraft or
possibly high-value civilian flights such as aircraft
transporting senior government officials.
Hizbullah probably took its first delivery of MANPADs in
1982 with the acquisition of a small number of SA-7s.
Reporting since that time indicates that these stocks were
supplemented with PIM-92A Stingers in the mid-1990s, provided
by Islamic Mujahideen rebels in Afghanistan. Most recently,
the group may have received a small number of Chinese-made
Qianwei (`Advanced Guard')--1 (QW-1) systems. If true, the
acquisition of this latter system represents a significant
upgrade in the surface-to-air capabilities of Hizbullah.
The Palestinian Authority also maintains a stock of SA-7
missiles and launchers. Reports also indicates that the
Palestinians may have a small number of Stinger systems as
well. The source of the SA-7 weapons is unclear, but it is
possible some were delivered from Egypt aboard fishing boats,
a common local method of arms smuggling.
For example, on 8 May 2001, Israeli security services
intercepted the Lebanese-flagged vessel Santorini off the
coast between Haifa and Tel Aviv. A search of the ship
revealed a large quantity of arms, including 60 mm mortars,
landmines, grenades, and four SA-7 missiles with launchers.
The shipment was reportedly sent by the Palestinian Front for
the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and intended for
use by Palestinian militants. The MANPADS were confiscated by
the Israelis and probably added to their own arsenal.
Apart from the Afghan Mujahideen, the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have enjoyed the greatest success with
MANPADs. LTTE guerrillas have fired an estimated 20 missiles
at government aircraft since 1996, shooting down three
helicopters and probably two fixed-wing transports. These
attacks killed a total of 179 personnel.
It is estimated that the LTTE possesses SA-7, SA-1a, and
other MANPADs. One Chinese-built Hongying-5 (HN-5A) system
was also discovered during government operations; however,
there is no indication that the LTTE possesses additional
units. It is possible that this weapon was procured from
sources within the Burmese military.
In December 2000 Sri Lankan news carried video of a Tamil
rebel holding what appeared to be a Stinger missile during an
October operation against the Trincomalee naval facility.
However, later analysis indicated this weapon was most
probably a double barrelled 107 mm Katyusha rocket, believed
to be a variant of the Chinese Type 63 107mm launcher, and
not a MANPAD.
The LTTE reportedly acquired these weapons from a variety
of sources. Press reports indicated that the Kurdistan's
Worker's Party (PPK), working with the Greek 17 November
terrorist organisation, sold 11 Stinger missiles to the LTTE
in 1994. These weapons were reportedly built in Greece, which
is a member of European consortium manufacturing PIM-92A/C
Stinger systems under license from the USA. Other Stingers
may have been sold or donated to the Tamils by the Afghan
Taliban during the 1990s. LTTE
[[Page H8869]]
weapons buyers have also been reported in Cambodia and
Thailand, reportedly seeking MANPADs Given the Tamils success
with these weapons, it is likely that procurement efforts
will continue.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 4 minutes.
Mr. Chairman, this did not go through the Committee on the Judiciary
and it is somewhat complicated and it appears to be overlapping and
recreates and reauthorizations present law. For example under title
XVIII, chapter 10 already criminalizes the use of biological weapons;
chapter 11(b) criminalizes chemical weapons; chapter 39 criminalizes
nuclear weapons; chapter 4 criminalizes the use of explosives, and on
and on.
In addition, many of those, all of those offenses are predicates to
18 U.S.C. (a) 2332(b) which provides for the death penalty if death
results from any violation of those statutes.
The only change appears to be a mandatory 30 years for attempts and
conspiracies. There is no differentiation for a role in a conspiracy,
relative knowledge of the crime, or even if death were an accident that
had not been intended. What we have is new mandatory minimums.
We have, in the Committee on the Judiciary, often cited many findings
and recommendations from researchers, sentencing professionals, even
the judicial branch, justices on the Supreme Court, including the chief
justice, citing problems created by mandatory sentences. They have been
found to be a waste of money compared to alternatives such as treatment
or traditional sentencing. They disrupt the ability of the Sentencing
Commission and the courts to apply an orderly, proportional,
nondisparate sentencing system. They discriminate against minorities
and they transfer an inordinate amount of discretion to prosecutors in
an adversarial system.
Mandatory minimum sentences increase disparities in sentencing
because they do not allow distinctions between major players and bit
players in a crime. In a recent letter to the subcommittee, the U.S.
Judicial Conference, headed by the chief justice of the Supreme Court,
noted and I quote: In addition to resulting in unwarranted sentencing
disparities, mandatory minimums often lead to treatment of dissimilar
offenders in a similar manner by requiring courts to impose the same
sentence on offenders, when sound policy and common sense call for
reasonable differences in punishment to reflect differences in the
seriousness of the conduct or danger to society.
In other words, mandatory minimums violate common sense. That is the
chief justice and the U.S. Judicial Conference.
Mr. Chairman, this bill, the underlying bill, is a reorganization
bill. We should not include controversial criminal penalties,
especially when the Judicial Conference headed by the chief justice
tells us that these things violate common sense. We also need to study
the international implications of this, because when we add in the
death penalty, we add in complications of international cooperation.
Most countries around the world do not have the death penalty and we
have had problems where they would not even extradite criminals to the
United States because we have all of these death penalties.
We need to study this, and having a floor amendment is not the
appropriate way to legislate. Mr. Chairman, I would hope that we would
defeat this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Chairman, the several very important articles in my added
materials that I have submitted speak not only to the threat to the
United States, but also the reality of the groups who were engaged in
the transfer, the trafficking of shoulder-fired missiles, of weapons of
mass destruction, in terms of viruses that could be placed in the
United States of America.
Mr. Chairman, I respect the gentleman for not liking the minimum
mandatory sentences. I would also say that it is up to this body, Mr.
Chairman, to make sure that we provide the tools necessary to the
Attorney General and other U.S. attorneys who may be prosecuting these
cases, to give to the frontline agents and investigators those
abilities to find and stop those people who are perpetrators of crime,
mass murder against the United States of America.
Most of all, I would remind this body how important it is to make
sure that we keep terrorism away from our doorsteps. I believe in
effective law enforcement, effective use of the laws of this country,
and making sure that we have looked at this from the perspective of the
Attorney General of the United States and U.S. attorneys across this
country who support this important legislation.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my
time.
Mr. Chairman, I would just point out that we already have in the Code
serious penalties for all of these crimes. The appropriate way to
legislate would be to go through the committee so that we could see
exactly how these fit into the present sentencing scheme. I would hope
that we defeat the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that the Members of this body understand that
there is a need to make sure that we protect this country and the laws
of this country. We have consulted with the Attorney General of the
United States and other U.S. attorneys who are asking for this. I
support this amendment. I believe it will help the President of the
United States to ensure the safety of our country.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Kolbe). The question is on the
amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Sessions).
The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr.
Sessions) will be postponed.
Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mr. Bonilla
Mr. BONILLA. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 6 offered by Mr. Bonilla:
At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following
(and redesignate provisions and amend the table of contents
accordingly):
SECTION ___. INCREASE IN DETENTION BED SPACE.
Subject to the availability of appropriated funds, the
Secretary of Homeland Security shall increase by not less
than 2,500, in each of fiscal years 2006 and 2007, the number
of beds available for immigration detention and removal
operations of the Department of Homeland Security above the
number for which funds were allotted for the preceding fiscal
year.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827, the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Bonilla) and a Member opposed each will
control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Bonilla).
Mr. BONILLA. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
First, let me compliment the committees who put this bill together.
They have done a great job facing very complicated circumstances.
Specifically, they did a very good job about increasing the Border
Patrol staff, that we need to deal with the increased flow of illegal
immigration along the southwest border, along with other Federal agents
that are necessary to do the job.
Unfortunately, there was an oversight in the bill in providing bed
space for the people that we catch. Let me point out as well that the
overwhelming number of them now are categorized as they are by the
Border Patrol as OTMs, ``other than Mexicans,'' people trying to enter
our country that have figured out a different way to come in versus the
ports of entry on either coast or using other means.
Mr. Chairman, in many cases the OTMs, are now arrested, processed,
interrogated and released into communities because the Department of
Homeland Security does not have
[[Page H8870]]
enough bed space. So, believe it or not, in Texas alone, since January,
there have been over 15,000 OTMs released in communities throughout the
State in the neighborhood. They might have been introduced into any
neighborhood in Texas, no matter where one lives.
Mr. Chairman, this is an outrage. Homeland Security claims the
problem is bed space, so in this amendment we deal with that problem,
calling for 2,500 additional bed spaces in 2006 and another 2,500 in
2007.
This is an amendment that is supported by the gentleman from
California (Mr. Cox), Chairman of Homeland Security. It is also
supported by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Ortiz), my good friend, who
represents an area near the Mexican border and the Gulf Coast in Texas
and who has been working very hard on this issue.
Mr. Chairman, this is a nonpartisan issue. We have strong support by
other members of the committees working on this. The gentleman from
Texas (Mr. Smith), my good colleague and friend from San Antonio and
central Texas area, has been working hard on this issue as well. This
is also something that is supported by, again no matter what ethnic
group or political party one belongs to, especially on the southwest
border. There is strong support by the mayors, the county judges, the
county commissioners that are working very hard to deal with this
illegal immigration problem every day.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to just single out the wonderful
Border Patrol agents that are patrolling day and night, sometimes
working with fewer resources than they should have, and doing a great
job of patrolling the border. Help is on the way for them in terms of
manpower and hopefully this amendment, when adopted, will provide the
bed space as well to house the illegal aliens that are coming across
our border and taking advantage of what we now have along the Mexican
border.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. TURNER of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to claim
the time in opposition to the amendment, although I support the
amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Texas?
There was no objection.
The gentleman from Texas (Mr. Turner) is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. TURNER of Texas. Mr. Chairman, there is no example any better of
the failure of the administration to make America safe than is
illustrated by the amendment offered by my colleague from Texas today.
What the amendment says is that we need 2,500 more bed spaces so that
we can end this deplorable, unacceptable practice of catching illegal
immigrants who come across our borders every day from countries other
than Mexico and seeing them immediately released into our country,
knowing that 80 to 90 percent of them will never show up again for a
deportation hearing.
Mr. Chairman, it is a practice that must end, but our administration
has allowed this to go on for year after year after year. And it is
very unfortunate, even though I appreciate greatly the intent expressed
by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Bonilla), my colleague, it is very
unfortunate that all the amendment does is direct the Department of
Homeland Security to somewhere in their budget find the money for an
additional 2,500 beds so we can end this practice that represents a
serious threat to the security of our country.
The truth of the matter is the gentleman from Texas is on the
Committee on Appropriations, and when we look at what the Committee on
Appropriations did to try to help solve this problem, all they did was
what the President asked for. He asked for 117 additional bed spaces,
when the President knows that even today we have only appropriated
money to hold 1,944 detainees who cross the border illegally every day
and we are holding 22,500. We are stretched to the limit now.
As the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Bonilla) points out, we need at
least 2,500 more and probably 5,000 more beds, which is provided for in
his amendment but not funded.
Nowhere is the gap between the rhetoric of the administration on
protecting America and the reality of the failure to protect America
any clearer than it is right here.
The Democrats on the House Committee on Homeland Security did a 6-
month investigation of the problems of our border. We produced a report
entitled Transforming the Southern Border. It pointed out a lot of
interesting facts, one of which is the one we are discussing. As our
staff traveled along the Rio Grande south of El Paso, we took this
picture. What it shows is a cargo van backed up to a school bus just
across the border inside the United States, along with an 18-wheeler,
another cargo van, and another school bus.
As the staff flew over, nobody was to be seen who would be a part of
our Border Patrol. So they called into the Border Patrol to tell them
about this suspicious-looking activity. When they flew back over, the
bus and the van and all the vehicles were gone. We do not know if they
were exchanging illegal immigrants, illegal goods, narcotics, or
nuclear weapons.
As the 9/11 Commission said, our borders are porous and we must
remedy this problem. But to do so it is going to take more than
rhetoric.
Mr. Chairman, when we look at what we are spending on homeland
security today, we are spending $20 billion more than we did in the
year of 9/11. That is a lot of money, but maybe not in an $850 billion
discretionary budget. But last year alone, while we had increased
homeland security spending, $20 billion, the richest 1 percent of
Americans, those making over a million dollars, got four times the tax
relief, almost $90 billion.
The reality is that we have made the wrong choice. We have failed to
make America safe. And when illegal immigrants can come across our
borders in the numbers that they are coming, last year alone 25,000
illegal immigrants were actually caught coming across our border from
places other than Mexico. Every year there is close to a million that
get across that are caught. No telling how many are not caught. But of
those 25,000, because we did not have the detention space, the jail
space to hold them, 80 to 90 percent of them never showed up because
the 25,000 were given a free pass into America, released on personal
bond.
Mr. Chairman, it does not surprise anybody that 80 to 90 percent of
those 25,000 never show up. They are in our country today. This failure
to protect America is inexcusable. I think we have got to stop it.
Mr. Chairman, I think I will vote for the amendment offered by my
colleague, but I want to point out that we failed to fund the very
issue he raises.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BONILLA. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I would yield to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Turner)
for a quick question.
Mr. Chairman, did the gentleman acknowledge in the end that he would
vote for the amendment? I wanted to understand that clearly.
Mr. TURNER of Texas. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman would yield, yes,
I will vote for the amendment because I believe it is based on a
sincere intent to solve a serious problem. But I was simply pointing
out that it provides no funding. The gentleman's Committee on
Appropriations only provided funding for 117 beds in next year's budget
and there is no money to do what is provided for in this amendment. To
simply direct the department to take it out of their hide is simply
unrealistic.
Mr. BONILLA. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I thank the gentleman
from Texas for his answer.
I wanted to reiterate that in spite of the rhetoric that was just
heard from the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Turner), my colleague, he is
supporting the amendment. I am delighted to hear that.
The gentleman makes a lot of good points about problems that the
Department of Homeland Security has faced over the last couple of
years. I agree with the gentleman. That is why I am here trying to do
something about it.
But, again, in spite of the rant that we just heard about how bad the
problem is, and I can assure the gentleman that I have probably
delivered the same remarks in my district, and here in Washington as
well, about the problems that the Department of Homeland Security is
facing, but ultimately we are all here to try to do something about it.
[[Page H8871]]
So I would hope that the gentleman would not only vote for the
amendment, as he has indicated he will, but also tell his friends that
we need this help for our good agents that are patrolling the border
and for all of us who are trying to do something about it.
Mr. COX. Mr. Chairman, I am proud to rise in support of this
amendment. Congressman Bonilla's amendment seeks to increase alien
detention bed space by 2,500 beds per year for fiscal years 2006 and
2007. It is a very simple provision, but it will have a material impact
on improving the security of our homeland and discouraging illegal
immigration.
In order to have a successful border security strategy, it must be
balanced. That is why this amendment is so important. There are other
provisions in H.R. 10 that will increase staffing levels for the Border
Patrol and ICE investigators. These, too, are important initiatives and
will result in many more illegal aliens and immigration violators being
apprehended. But in order to make the best use of these new assets, we
must have adequate facilities to detain those additional immigration
violators who are caught, especially those considered high-risk or in
mandatory detention categories.
The Department of Homeland Security's Detention and Removal Office,
or DRO, is currently authorized to fund approximately 19,000 detention
beds. However, they consistently hold over 22,000 illegal aliens each
day in facilities around the Nation. In the first year, this amendment
would increase available bed space to meet the minimum demand and then
would go above that in FY 2007 to provide additional detention
resources to meet the expected demand that these other new border
control initiatives will create.
It is a well-known fact that the majority of aliens not detained and
released, pending an immigration hearing, never return for their
scheduled hearing but seek instead to melt into U.S. communities. There
are approximately 300,000 non-citizens in the United States who have
received deportation orders, but who have not left the country. There
is no doubt that more of these individuals would have left the country
if they had been detained in the beginning.
Approximately 50 percent of DRO detainees are Mexicans, but there is
a growing number of individuals from different countries, called
``other than Mexicans'' or OTMs. Less is known about their motivation
for coming to the U.S., and I have serious concerns about individuals
illegally entering America who originally are from countries of
interest with respect to terrorism. We must have the resources to
detain these individuals to guarantee that we have an opportunity to
verify their identity and motives, and that they are deported if
necessary.
In order to monitor more of the individuals that are released, DRO
utilizes alternative methods of detention. This includes release on
recognizance, release on bond, electronic monitoring devices (EMD), and
the Intensive Supervision Appearance Program (ISAP). While these
alternative methods are appropriate and responsible initiatives, it is
essential that we have sufficient detention bed space for high-risk
individuals, those with criminal records, and repeat immigration
violators.
As Chairman of the Select Committee on Homeland Security, I would
like to thank Mr. Bonilla for offering this critical amendment and
request the support of my colleagues in ensuring passage. Thank you,
Mr. Speaker, and I yield back the remainder of my time.
Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Chairman, thousands of illegal aliens pour
over our southern border each day. A significant number of these aliens
are not Mexican, and cannot simply be sent back over the border.
Border Patrol agents must process aliens from countries other than
Mexico and are forced to release them into our communities pending a
hearing. This is because there is not enough bed space in our detention
facilities.
When illegal aliens are released pending a hearing, it is estimated
that 85 percent will never be heard from again.
This process has become known as the ``catch and release'' program,
and it threatens our national security.
The Department of Homeland Security recently reported that from
October through June over 44,000 non-Mexican aliens were apprehended on
the southern border from countries such as Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt,
Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.
The hard work of our Border Patrol agents is wasted when we do not
have enough detention space.
The Bonilla amendment would help correct this problem by authorizing
an increase of 2,500 detention bed spaces for each of the next two
years.
The lack of detention space has reached a crisis.
Every day we are releasing aliens from dozens of countries into our
communities. We don't know if these individuals are criminals or
terrorists.
The Bonilla amendment curtails the catch and release program on our
southern border. It lets the U.S. detain illegal immigrants who enter
our country rather than release them in our communities.
Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment by my
friend from Texas, and the co-chair of the House Border Caucus, Mr.
Bonilla.
Let me begin by thanking the gentleman for his hard work to find a
way to stop the current ``catch and release'' policy propounded by this
government . . . by releasing many of the illegal immigrants we are
catching into the U.S. population. This is frightening for all of us.
Now, the basis for this ``catch and release'' policy is a lack of
beds for the Department of Homeland Security to hold these illegal
immigrants from countries other than Mexico (OTMs). The gentleman's
amendment today specifically addresses this shortcoming and I join him
in advocating it to the House.
We are apprehending an alarming number of OTMs with not enough space
to detain them--forcing us to release them into our community--we need
additional beds. The gentleman's amendment is certainly a good
beginning and I am grateful for his efforts to end this policy.
Mr. BONILLA. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by
the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Bonilla).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 7 Offered by Mrs. Capito
Mrs. CAPITO. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 7 offered by Mrs. Capito:
At the end of title II add the following:
Subtitle J--Railroad Carriers and Mass Transportation Protection Act of
20004
SEC. 2111. SHORT TITLE.
This subtitle may be cited as the ``Railroad Carriers and
Mass Transportation Protection Act of 2004''.
SEC. 2112. ATTACKS AGAINST RAILROAD CARRIERS AND MASS
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS.
(a) In General.--Chapter 97 of title 18, United States
Code, is amended by striking sections 1992 through 1993 and
inserting the following:
``Sec. 1992. Terrorist attacks and other violence against
railroad carriers and against mass transportation systems
on land, on water, or through the air
``(a) General Prohibitions.--Whoever, in a circumstance
described in subsection (c), knowingly--
``(1) wrecks, derails, sets fire to, or disables railroad
on-track equipment or a mass transportation vehicle;
``(2) with intent to endanger the safety of any person, or
with a reckless disregard for the safety of human life, and
without the authorization of the railroad carrier or mass
transportation provider--
``(A) places any biological agent or toxin, destructive
substance, or destructive device in, upon, or near railroad
on-track equipment or a mass transportation vehicle; or
``(B) releases a hazardous material or a biological agent
or toxin on or near any property described in subparagraph
(A) or (B) of paragraph (3);
``(3) sets fire to, undermines, makes unworkable, unusable,
or hazardous to work on or use, or places any biological
agent or toxin, destructive substance, or destructive device
in, upon, or near any--
``(A) tunnel, bridge, viaduct, trestle, track,
electromagnetic guideway, signal, station, depot, warehouse,
terminal, or any other way, structure, property, or
appurtenance used in the operation of, or in support of the
operation of, a railroad carrier, without the authorization
of the railroad carrier, and with intent to, or knowing or
having reason to know such activity would likely, derail,
disable, or wreck railroad on-track equipment;
``(B) garage, terminal, structure, track, electromagnetic
guideway, supply, or facility used in the operation of, or in
support of the operation of, a mass transportation vehicle,
without the authorization of the mass transportation
provider, and with intent to, or knowing or having reason to
know such activity would likely, derail, disable, or wreck a
mass transportation vehicle used, operated, or employed by a
mass transportation provider; or
``(4) removes an appurtenance from, damages, or otherwise
impairs the operation of a railroad signal system or mass
transportation signal or dispatching system, including a
train control system, centralized dispatching system, or
highway-railroad grade crossing warning signal, without
authorization from the railroad carrier or mass
transportation provider;
``(5) with intent to endanger the safety of any person, or
with a reckless disregard for the safety of human life,
interferes with, disables, or incapacitates any dispatcher,
driver, captain, locomotive engineer, railroad conductor, or
other person while the person is employed in dispatching,
operating, or maintaining railroad on-track equipment or a
mass transportation vehicle;
[[Page H8872]]
``(6) commits an act, including the use of a dangerous
weapon, with the intent to cause death or serious bodily
injury to any person who is on property described in
subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (3), except that this
subparagraph shall not apply to rail police officers in
acting the course of their law enforcement duties under
section 28101 of title 49, United States Code;
``(7) conveys false information, knowing the information to
be false, concerning an attempt or alleged attempt that was
made, is being made, or is to be made, to engage in a
violation of this subsection; or
``(8) attempts, threatens, or conspires to engage in any
violation of any of paragraphs (1) through (7);
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
20 years, or both.
``(b) Aggravated Offense.--Whoever commits an offense under
subsection (a) of this section in a circumstance in which--
``(1) the railroad on-track equipment or mass
transportation vehicle was carrying a passenger or employee
at the time of the offense;
``(2) the railroad on-track equipment or mass
transportation vehicle was carrying high-level radioactive
waste or spent nuclear fuel at the time of the offense;
``(3) the railroad on-track equipment or mass
transportation vehicle was carrying a hazardous material at
the time of the offense that--
``(A) was required to be placarded under subpart F of part
172 of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations; and
``(B) is identified as class number 3, 4, 5, 6.1, or 8 and
packing group I or packing group II, or class number 1, 2, or
7 under the hazardous materials table of section 172.101 of
title 49, Code of Federal Regulations; or
``(4) the offense results in the death of any person;
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for any term of
years or life, or both. In the case of a violation described
in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the term of imprisonment
shall be not less than 30 years; and, in the case of a
violation described in paragraph (4) of this subsection, the
offender shall be fined under this title and imprisoned for
life and be subject to the death penalty.
``(c) Circumstances Required for Offense.--A circumstance
referred to in subsection (a) is any of the following:
``(1) Any of the conduct required for the offense is, or,
in the case of an attempt, threat, or conspiracy to engage in
conduct, the conduct required for the completed offense would
be, engaged in, on, against, or affecting a mass
transportation provider or railroad carrier engaged in or
affecting interstate or foreign commerce.
``(2) Any person travels or communicates across a State
line in order to commit the offense, or transports materials
across a State line in aid of the commission of the offense.
``(d) Definitions.--In this section--
``(1) the term `biological agent' has the meaning given to
that term in section 178(1);
``(2) the term `dangerous weapon' means a weapon, device,
instrument, material, or substance, animate or inanimate,
that is used for, or is readily capable of, causing death or
serious bodily injury, including a pocket knife with a blade
of less than 2\1/2\ inches in length and a box cutter;
``(3) the term `destructive device' has the meaning given
to that term in section 921(a)(4);
``(4) the term `destructive substance' means an explosive
substance, flammable material, infernal machine, or other
chemical, mechanical, or radioactive device or material, or
matter of a combustible, contaminative, corrosive, or
explosive nature, except that the term `radioactive device'
does not include any radioactive device or material used
solely for medical, industrial, research, or other peaceful
purposes;
``(5) the term `hazardous material' has the meaning given
to that term in chapter 51 of title 49;
``(6) the term `high-level radioactive waste' has the
meaning given to that term in section 2(12) of the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act of 1982 (42 U.S.C. 10101(12));
``(7) the term `mass transportation' has the meaning given
to that term in section 5302(a)(7) of title 49, except that
the term includes school bus, charter, and sightseeing
transportation;
``(8) the term `on-track equipment' means a carriage or
other contrivance that runs on rails or electromagnetic
guideways;
``(9) the term `railroad on-track equipment' means a train,
locomotive, tender, motor unit, freight or passenger car, or
other on-track equipment used, operated, or employed by a
railroad carrier;
``(10) the term `railroad' has the meaning given to that
term in chapter 201 of title 49;
``(11) the term `railroad carrier' has the meaning given to
that term in chapter 201 of title 49;
``(12) the term `serious bodily injury' has the meaning
given to that term in section 1365;
``(13) the term `spent nuclear fuel' has the meaning given
to that term in section 2(23) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
of 1982 (42 U.S.C. 10101(23));
``(14) the term `State' has the meaning given to that term
in section 2266;
``(15) the term `toxin' has the meaning given to that term
in section 178(2); and
``(16) the term `vehicle' means any carriage or other
contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of
transportation on land, on water, or through the air.''.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--
(1) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 97 of
title 18, United States Code, is amended--
(A) by striking ``RAILROADS'' in the chapter heading and
inserting ``RAILROAD CARRIERS AND MASS TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS
ON LAND, ON WATER, OR THROUGH THE AIR'';
(B) by striking the items relating to sections 1992 and
1993; and
(C) by inserting after the item relating to section 1991
the following:
``1992. Terrorist attacks and other violence against railroad carriers
and against mass transportation systems on land, on
water, or through the air.''.
(2) The table of chapters at the beginning of part I of
title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking the item
relating to chapter 97 and inserting the following:
``97. Railroad carriers and mass transportation systems on land, on
water, or through the air...............................1991''.....
(3) Title 18, United States Code, is amended--
(A) in section 2332b(g)(5)(B)(i), by striking ``1992
(relating to wrecking trains), 1993 (relating to terrorist
attacks and other acts of violence against mass
transportation systems),'' and inserting ``1992 (relating to
terrorist attacks and other acts of violence against railroad
carriers and against mass transportation systems on land, on
water, or through the air),'';
(B) in section 2339A, by striking ``1993,''; and
(C) in section 2516(1)(c) by striking ``1992 (relating to
wrecking trains),'' and inserting ``1992 (relating to
terrorist attacks and other acts of violence against railroad
carriers and against mass transportation systems on land, on
water, or through the air),''.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827, the
gentlewoman from West Virginia (Mrs. Capito) and the gentleman from
Virginia (Mr. Scott) each will control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from West Virginia (Mrs.
Capito).
Mrs. CAPITO. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin by thanking the gentleman from
Wisconsin (Chairman Sensenbrenner) the Committee on Rules, the
Departments of Justice and Transportation, the Subcommittee on
Railroads of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, and
the many others who are supporting me in this initiative.
Mr. Chairman, in the wake of the September 11th attacks, as well as
the recent bombing of four commuter trains in Madrid, Spain, the need
for stronger criminal laws to deal with terrorists and other violence
has never been stronger. Intelligence reports last spring indicate that
some terrorists might try to bomb U.S. rail lines or buses in major
U.S. cities. We have also heard reports of so-called ``dirty bombs''
that can be easily transported over our extensive mass transportation
system.
Mr. Chairman, I do not have to remind anyone in this body of the
potential loss of life and disruption to our economy and way of life
from this modern new threat.
In order to help meet this threat head on, I have introduced an
amendment that revises, enhances, and consolidates two Federal criminal
law statutes into one comprehensive statute in order to deter and more
effectively punish terrorist acts against railroad carriers and other
mass transportation providers.
Specifically, under current Federal criminal law, terrorist acts
against railroad carriers are prosecuted under the so-called ``Wrecking
Trains'' statute which was enacted in 1940. This statute is in many
ways outdated, full of gaps and inconsistencies, and quite literally
inadequately addresses modern threats like radioactive materials or
biological agents.
Additionally, the September 11 attacks on our homeland gave rise to
the creation of another Federal criminal statute which covers terrorist
acts against mass transportation systems. By combining these two
statutes to cover all forms of transportation and railway carriers, we
can introduce more consistency, predictability, and effectiveness into
Federal prosecutorial powers.
First, it would reduce our criminal law's vulnerability to bogus
legal claims and also prevent prosecutors from having to prosecute for
lesser offenses because of discrepancies or gaps in the current law.
Richard Reid, known as the Shoe Bomber, was actually able to have a
charge against him
[[Page H8873]]
dismissed because the new mass transportation statute did not
explicitly define an airplane as a vehicle for purposes of prosecuting
under the statute. My amendment will prevent oversights like this from
happening.
Secondly, my amendment will bring more consistent and uniform
protections to all modes of railroad carriers and mass transportation
providers.
Third, my amendment will expand the jurisdictional reach of criminal
law to cover more offenses, such as the release of biological agents or
radioactive material, and cover more property if the prohibited conduct
affects interstate commerce or travel, or communicating, or
transporting prohibited materials across State lines.
Fourth, my amendment will make capital punishment an option under
aggravating circumstances that involve terrorist acts that result in
the death of a person. If our jurisdictional system is unable to have
this tool at their disposal in order to meet the new threats that
terrorism has brought upon us, then we will lose a critical opportunity
to deter and prevent more terrorism from happening.
And fifth, my amendment protects all law enforcement, railroad
carriers, and mass transportation providers from criminal liability if
they are performing their duties in the course of lawful and authorized
activities. In other words, my amendment protects conduct that should
be protected, but does not protect conduct that should not be protected
such as terrorist or imposters posing as rail or mass transportation
employees.
Mr. Chairman, overall, Congress has taken dramatic steps in the last
3 years to improve our security here and abroad, but there is more work
to be accomplished. I strongly urge passage of this amendment to H.R.
10.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 3 minutes.
Mr. Chairman, this is a 10-page amendment with mandatory minimum
sentences, mandatory sentences of life imprisonment, and a death
penalty provision. It has not been considered by any subcommittee or
the full Committee on the Judiciary, and I am not sure it has even been
considered by the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. We
have information that the Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure has not considered it and, in fact, may not support it.
It appears to make, but it is not clear whether conspiracies,
attempts and threats are subject to the same penalties as the
underlying offense. Not only have these provisions not been considered
by the appropriate committees of jurisdiction, but because of the
mandatory minimum sentences, neither sentencing experts nor judges on
the U.S. Sentencing Commission who have the responsibility to assure a
rational and proportional sentencing system, nor any Federal judge who
would review all the facts and circumstances of the case, will get to
assess whether or not these sentences make any sense.
Mr. Chairman, I remind my colleagues that the Judicial Conference has
written a letter saying that these mandatory minimums violate common
sense, and yet here we are asked to decide in a 5-minute debate whether
or not they are appropriate in this case.
Mr. Chairman, the author of the amendment indicates that we are
trying to conform one code section to another. I would ask that we do
that when we consider the code sections. We are going to consider the
PATRIOT Act. That is one of the code sections involved. And the time to
consider the PATRIOT Act and amending the PATRIOT Act is when we have
the PATRIOT Act before us; not when we are doing a reorganization bill
without any serious committee of jurisdiction considering the
underlying amendment.
I say again, Mr. Chairman, when we have death penalty, that makes
life complicated from an international point of view. We may have
terrorists who are caught in another country. We cannot get them
extradited because of all of these death penalties and we need to
consider that.
We have heard that the Shoe Bomber was complicated as to which code
section he was under. We have an easy case for attempted murder, plain
and simple. It gives life imprisonment. Certainly the death penalty, if
he had completed the act, would not have made any sense. The death
penalty for a suicide bomber is obviously not going to be much of a
deterrent.
Mr. Chairman, I would hope that we would consider all the
implications and not adopt this amendment at this time.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mrs. CAPITO. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the comments of the gentleman from
Virginia (Mr. Scott). I would like to say that in working through this
amendment, we did work with the Committee on the Judiciary and the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. We are also trying to
reform an act here, the 1940 Wrecking Trains statute, that is sorely
outdated and full of gaps. When it was conceived, there was no
conception of a terrorist bombing on mass transportation. I think we
know, obviously from the events in Spain, that that is a very real
possibility in terms of acts of terrorism.
Mr. Chairman, the purpose of my amendment is to not only pull that
1940s Wrecking Train statute into the modern era, but also to combine
it with other mass transportation sections so that not only the
deterrent but the prosecutorial powers are available to our prosecutors
to be able to use the most stringent and severe punishments that could
possibly be available to try to use as a deterrent to terrorism.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.
Mr. Chairman, in 2001, we considered this provision when we put it in
the PATRIOT Act. It was inconsistent with an older version. We need to
consider whether we want to conform the law to the newer version or to
the older version. That is why we have committees, so we can assess
what the appropriate punishment is.
Mr. Chairman, 5-minute debates on the floor without committee
consideration does not give us that opportunity. I would hope that we
would delay consideration of this by defeating the amendment and
consider the issue when we do the PATRIOT Act.
Mr. Chairman, I would ask the gentlewoman from West Virginia whether
or not conspiracies, attempts, and threats are subject to the same
penalties as the underlying offense.
{time} 1000
Mrs. CAPITO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. I yield to the gentlewoman from West Virginia.
Mrs. CAPITO. I think there is a lot of prosecutorial discretion in
the bill, and I think that would probably be left up to the prosecutor.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Reclaiming my time, I would say again, you
have mandatory minimums in the bill which would not give anybody any
flexibility, and if a conspiracy attempt and threat are subject to the
same mandatory minimums as actually completing the crime, that would be
something that we would want to consider. It is just not clear.
If the gentlewoman wants time to respond, I will give her time.
Mrs. CAPITO. In terms of the death penalty, I think that is
definitely at the discretion of the prosecutor, and there are two sets
of offenses there. One is a 20-year and one is a 30-year minimum, and I
think that is also at the discretion of the prosecutors. That is my
understanding.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Reclaiming my time, I would hope we would
defeat the amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. Kolbe). All time has expired.
The question is on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from West
Virginia (Mrs. Capito).
The amendment was agreed to.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
The motion was agreed to.
Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mrs.
Capito) having assumed the chair, Mr. Kolbe, Chairman pro tempore of
the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported
that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 10)
to provide for reform of the intelligence community, terrorism
prevention and prosecution, border security, and international
cooperation and coordination, and for other purposes, had come to no
resolution thereon.
____________________
Congressional Record: October 8, 2004 (House)
Page H8874-H8894
9/11 RECOMMENDATIONS IMPLEMENTATION ACT
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827 and rule
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill,
H.R. 10.
{time} 1002
In the Committee of the Whole
Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of
the bill (H.R. 10) to provide for reform of the intelligence community,
terrorism prevention and prosecution, border security, and
international cooperation and coordination, and for other purposes,
with Mr. Kolbe (Chairman pro tempore) in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. When the committee of the whole rose
earlier today, amendment No. 7 printed in House Report 108-751 by the
gentlewoman from West Virginia (Mrs. Capito) had been disposed of.
Pursuant to the order of the House of today, it shall be in order at
any time for the chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence or a designee to offer amendments en bloc consisting of
any of the amendment numbers 9, 16, 18, 20, and 22 printed in House
report 108-751.
The amendments en bloc shall be considered read, shall be debatable
for 10 minutes, equally divided and controlled by the chairman and the
ranking minority member of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence or their designees, shall not be subject to amendment, and
shall not be subject to a demand for a division of the question.
The original proponent of the amendment included in the amendments en
bloc may insert a statement in the Congressional Record immediately
before disposition of the amendments en bloc.
It is now in order to consider amendment No. 8 printed in House
Report 108-751.
Amendment No. 8 Offered by Mr. Carter
Mr. CARTER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 8 offered by Mr. Carter:
At the end of title II insert the following:
Subtitle J--Terrorist Penalties Enhancement Act of 2004
SEC. 2221. SHORT TITLE.
This subtitle may be cited as the ``Terrorist Penalties
Enhancement Act of 2004''.
SEC. 2222. PENALTIES FOR TERRORIST OFFENSES RESULTING IN
DEATH; DENIAL OF FEDERAL BENEFITS TO
TERRORISTS.
(a) In General.--Chapter 113B of title 18, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:
``Sec. 2339E. Terrorist offenses resulting in death
``(a) Whoever, in the course of committing a terrorist
offense, engages in conduct that results in the death of a
person, shall be punished by death or imprisoned for any term
of years or for life.
``(b) As used in this section, the term `terrorist offense'
means--
``(1) a Federal felony offense that is--
``(A) a Federal crime of terrorism as defined in section
2332b(g) except to the extent such crime is an offense under
section 1363; or
``(B) an offense under this chapter, section 175, 175b,
229, or 831, or section 236 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954;
or
``(2) a Federal offense that is an attempt or conspiracy to
commit an offense described in paragraph (1).
``Sec. 2339F. Denial of Federal benefits to terrorists
``(a) An individual or corporation who is convicted of a
terrorist offense (as defined in section 2339E) shall, as
provided by the court on motion of the Government, be
ineligible for any or all Federal benefits for any term of
years or for life.
``(b) As used in this section, the term `Federal benefit'
has the meaning given that term in section 421(d) of the
Controlled Substances Act, and also includes any assistance
or benefit described in section 115(a) of the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, with the same limitations and to the same extent as
provided in section 115 of that Act with respect to denials
of benefits and assistance to which that section applies.''.
(b) Conforming Amendment to Table of Sections.--The table
of sections at the beginning of the chapter 113B of title 18,
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the
following new items:
``2339E. Terrorist offenses resulting in death.
``2339F. Denial of federal benefits to terrorists.''.
(c) Aggravating Factor in Death Penalty Cases.--Section
3592(c)(1) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by
inserting ``section 2339E (terrorist offenses resulting in
death),'' after ``destruction),''.
SEC. 2223. DEATH PENALTY IN CERTAIN AIR PIRACY CASES
OCCURRING BEFORE ENACTMENT OF THE FEDERAL DEATH
PENALTY ACT OF 1994.
Section 60003 of the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, (Public Law 103-322), is amended, as
of the time of its enactment, by adding at the end the
following:
``(c) Death Penalty Procedures for Certain Previous
Aircraft Piracy Violations.--An individual convicted of
violating section 46502 of title 49, United States Code, or
its predecessor, may be sentenced to death in accordance with
the procedures established in chapter 228 of title 18, United
States Code, if for any offense committed before the
enactment of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994 (Public Law 103-322), but after the enactment of
the Antihijacking Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-366), it is
determined by the finder of fact, before consideration of the
factors set forth in sections 3591(a)(2) and 3592(a) and (c)
of title 18, United States Code, that one or more of the
factors set forth in former section 46503(c)(2) of title 49,
United States Code, or its predecessor, has been proven by
the Government to exist, beyond a reasonable doubt, and that
none of the factors set forth in former section 46503(c)(1)
of title 49, United States Code, or its predecessor, has been
proven by the defendant to exist, by a preponderance of the
information. The meaning of the term `especially heinous,
cruel, or depraved', as used in the factor set forth in
former section 46503(c)(2)(B)(iv) of title 49, United States
Code, or its predecessor, shall be narrowed by adding the
limiting language `in that it involved torture or serious
physical abuse to the victim', and shall be construed as when
that term is used in section 3592(c)(6) of title 18, United
States Code.''
Conform the table of sections accordingly.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 827, the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Carter) and a Member opposed each will
control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Carter).
Mr. CARTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, today I offer an amendment, the Terrorist Penalties
Enhancements Act, which will provide new and expanded penalties to
those who commit fatal acts of terrorism.
Since September 11, Federal and State officials continue to work hard
to prevent further terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. However, despite
some changes to the law to increase penalties after deadly terrorist
attacks, a jury is still denied the ability to consider a death
sentence or life imprisonment for a terrorist in many cases, even when
the attacks result in death and the court believes it is necessary to
prevent further harm to our citizens.
For example, in the case in which a terrorist causes massive loss of
life by sabotaging a nuclear power plant or a national defense
installation, there would be no possibility of imposing the death
penalty under the statutes defining these offenses because they contain
[[Page H8875]]
no death penalty authorizations. In contrast, dozens of other Federal
violent crime provisions authorize up to life imprisonment or the death
penalty in cases where victims are killed. Because the potential
tragedy here is so great, we must hope that changing this law to allow
a sentence of death or life imprisonment will serve as a deterrent to
would-be terrorists. It is one more tool in our arsenal.
Mr. Chairman, hearings have been held on this straightforward
legislation, and it has been agreed to by the House Committee on the
Judiciary. It will make terrorists who kill eligible for the Federal
death penalty. This legislation will also deny these same terrorists
any Federal benefits they otherwise may have been eligible to receive.
These Federal benefits denied include Social Security, welfare,
unemployment and food stamps.
As a former State District Judge for over 20 years, I have presided
over five capital murders trials, three of which resulted in the death
penalty. I understand the gravity of seeking and imposing the death
penalty. However, from my experience, I believe the death penalty is a
tool that can deter acts of terrorism and can serve as a tool for
prosecutors when negotiating sentences.
I am pleased that President George Bush expressed his support for
this legislation. In a speech to the FBI Academy, President Bush said,
``For the sake of American people, Congress should change the law and
give law enforcement officials the same tools they have to fight terror
that they have to fight other crime.''
In Hershey, Pennsylvania, President Bush reemphasized the inequity in
current law. President Bush said, ``We ought to be sending a strong
signal: If you sabotage a defense installation or a nuclear facility in
a way that takes an innocent life, you ought to get the death penalty,
the Federal death penalty.''
This legislation today puts all would-be terrorists on notice that
they will receive ultimate justice should they decide to plan and
execute a future attack.
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I claim the time in opposition.
Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 3 minutes.
Mr. Chairman, this bill creates 23 new death penalties, making all
Federal crimes of terrorism punishable by death. We would remind people
that a 23-year study of over 4,500 death penalty cases found reversible
error in 68 percent of the cases. We suspect that approximately 100
people in the last 10 years have been wrongfully executed. This burden
falls disproportionately on minorities.
So when you talk about a strong signal, the signal, I guess, is you
put people to death because, well, they might have been guilty. We know
in the end the death penalty will not deter suicide bombers from
completing their crimes. Furthermore, we have the problem of
international law, the fact that most countries in the world,
particularly our allies, do not have the death penalty and will not
extradite criminals to the United States if they will be subject to the
death penalty.
One of the problems with the Federal crimes of terrorism is that it
is somewhat vague. It could include some kind of a political protest.
The death could occur by accident. It was not even intended. Somebody
got trampled in the protest, for example, and here you are talking
about the death penalty. But because it includes not only completing
the crime and killing somebody, it includes support for someone. You
might want to rename this the ``Put Mama to Death Bill.'' If a mother
harbors her son, lets him stay at home, she would then become and
everybody in the family becomes subject to the death penalty.
Mr. Chairman, this has nothing to do with reorganization of the
intelligence community. I would hope that we would reserve judgment on
this and consider this bill and others when we consider the Patriot
Act.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. CARTER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Wisconsin (Mr. Green).
Mr. GREEN of Wisconsin. Mr. Chairman, it is simple. We must do
everything we can to stop terrorists, and that starts with ensuring
that all terrorist acts are punished swiftly and severely. This
amendment sends a clear message that we take terrorism seriously; that
we understand that terrorist acts are not really crimes, they are
combat; that on 9/11 we were not merely assaulted, we were invaded; and
when there is combat, when terrorists invade our soil in deadly
fashion, we will punish those responsible with the heaviest possible
penalties. To do less would be a disservice to those who have lost
their lives and would send a signal of softness to those who still seek
our destruction.
I was proud to work with the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Carter) on
this subject. I commend him for carrying it forward. It is important
work. It is good work that he is doing. I urge my colleagues to support
this amendment.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I would point out that we will be considering the
Patriot Act. I would hope that we would consider this legislation as
part of that.
Mr. Chairman, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back
the balance of my time.
Mr. CARTER. Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this
amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by
the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Carter).
The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. CARTER. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas (Mr.
Carter) will be postponed.
Amendment En Bloc Offered By Mr. Hoekstra
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, pursuant to the unanimous consent
agreement, I offer the amendments en bloc.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendments en
bloc.
The text of the amendments en bloc is as follows:
Amendments en bloc offered by Mr. Hoekstra consisting of
amendments numbered 9, 16, 18, 20 and 22:
Amendment No. 9 Offered by Mr. Castle
At the end of the bill, insert the following new section:
SEC. 5__. REMOVAL OF CIVIL LIABILITY BARRIERS THAT DISCOURAGE
THE DONATION OF FIRE EQUIPMENT TO VOLUNTEER
FIRE COMPANIES.
(a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Good
Samaritan Volunteer Firefighter Assistance Act of 2004''.
(b) Liability Protection.--A person who donates fire
control or fire rescue equipment to a volunteer fire company
shall not be liable for civil damages under any State or
Federal law for personal injuries, property damage or loss,
or death proximately caused by the equipment after the
donation.
(c) Exceptions.--Subsection (b) does not apply to a person
if--
(1) the person's act or omission proximately causing the
injury, damage, loss, or death constitutes gross negligence
or intentional misconduct; or
(2) the person is the manufacturer of the fire control or
fire rescue equipment.
(d) Preemption.--This section preempts the laws of any
State to the extent that such laws are inconsistent with this
section, except that notwithstanding subsection (c) this
section shall not preempt any State law that provides
additional protection from liability for a person who donates
fire control or fire rescue equipment to a volunteer fire
company.
(e) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Person.--The term ``person'' includes any governmental
or other entity.
(2) Fire control or rescue equipment.--The term ``fire
control or fire rescue equipment'' includes any fire vehicle,
fire fighting tool, communications equipment, protective
gear, fire hose, or breathing apparatus.
(3) State.--The term ``State'' includes the several States,
the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, American
Samoa, Guam, the Virgin Islands, any other territory or
possession of the United States, and any political
subdivision of any such State, territory, or possession.
(4) Volunteer fire company.--The term ``volunteer fire
company'' means an association of individuals who provide
fire protection and other emergency services, where at least
30 percent of the individuals receive little or no
compensation compared with an entry level full-time paid
individual in that
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association or in the nearest such association with an entry
level full-time paid individual.
(f) Effective Date.--This section applies only to liability
for injury, damage, loss, or death caused by equipment that,
for purposes of subsection (b), is donated on or after the
date that is 30 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act.
(g) Attorney General Review.--
(1) In general.--The Attorney General of the United States
shall conduct a State-by-State review of the donation of
firefighter equipment to volunteer firefighter companies
during the 5-year period ending on the date of the enactment
of this Act.
(2) Report.--Not later than 6 months after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Attorney General of the United
States shall publish and submit to the Congress a report on
the results of the review conducted under paragraph (1). The
report shall include, for each State, the most effective way
to fund firefighter companies, whether first responder
funding is sufficient to respond to the Nation's needs, and
the best method to ensure that the equipment donated to
volunteer firefighter companies is in usable condition.
____
Amendment No. 16 Offered by Mr. Barton of Texas
After section 5010 insert the following new section:
SEC. 5011. DIGITAL TELEVISION CONVERSION DEADLINE.
(a) Findings.--The Congress finds the following:
(1) Congress granted television broadcasters additional 6
MHz blocks of spectrum to transmit digital broadcasts
simultaneously with the analog broadcasts they transmit on
their original 6 megahertz blocks of spectrum.
(2) Section 309(j)(14) of the Communications Act of 1934
requires each television broadcaster to cease analog
transmissions and return 6 megahertz of spectrum by December
31, 2006, or once just over 85 percent of the television
households in that broadcaster's market can view digital
broadcast television channels using a digital television, a
digital-to-analog-converter box, cable service, or satellite
service, whichever is later.
(3) Twenty-four megahertz of spectrum currently occupied by
the television broadcasters has been earmarked for use by
first responders once the television broadcasters return the
spectrum broadcasters currently use to provide analog
transmissions.
(4) This spectrum would be ideal to provide first
responders with interoperable communications channels.
(5) Large parts of the vacated spectrum could be auctioned
for advanced commercial services, such as wireless broadband.
(6) The ``85-percent penetration test'' could delay the
termination of analog television broadcasts and the return of
spectrum well beyond 2007, hindering the use of that spectrum
for these important public-safety and advanced commercial
uses.
(7) Proposals to require broadcasters to return, on a date
certain, just the spectrum earmarked for future public-safety
use would not adequately resolve the identified need for
improved public-safety communications interoperability.
Broadcasters estimate that the public-safety only approach
would dislocate as many as 75 stations, including some in
major markets, airing major network programming, sometimes
even in digital form. Unless broadcasters are required to
return concurrently all the spectrum currently used for
analog transmissions, it will be exceedingly difficult to
relocate these 75 stations, which also serve a critical
public safety function by broadcasting weather, traffic,
disaster, and other safety alerts.
(8) Proposals to require broadcasters to return, on a date
certain, just the spectrum earmarked for future public-safety
use also would neither address the digital television
transition in a comprehensive fashion nor free valuable
spectrum for advanced commercial services.
(b) Sense of Congress.--Now, therefore, it is the sense of
Congress that section 309(j)(14) of the Communications Act of
1934 should be amended to eliminate the 85-percent
penetration test and to require broadcasters to cease analog
transmissions at the close of December 31, 2006, so that the
spectrum can be returned and repurposed for important public-
safety and advanced commercial uses.
____
Amendment No. 18 Offered by Mr. Fossella
Page 606, after line 17, insert the following (and
redesignate the subsequent subsections accordingly):
(d) Multi-Year Interoperability Grants.--
(1) Multi-year commitments.--In awarding grants to any
State, region, local government, or Indian tribe for the
purposes of enhancing interoperable communications
capabilities for emergency response providers, the Secretary
may commit to obligate Federal assistance beyond the current
fiscal year, subject to the limitations and restrictions in
this subsection.
(2) Restrictions.--
(A) Time limit.--No multi-year interoperability commitment
may exceed 3 years in duration.
(B) Amount of committed funds.--The total amount of
assistance the Secretary has committed to obligate for any
future fiscal year under paragraph (1) may not exceed
$150,000,000.
(3) Letters of intent.--
(A) Issuance.--Pursuant to paragraph (1), the Secretary may
issue a letter of intent to an applicant committing to
