Congressional Record: September 29, 2004 (Senate)
Page S9873-S9916
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REFORM ACT OF 2004
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will
resume consideration of S. 2845, which the clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
A bill (S. 2845) to reform the intelligence community and
the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the
U.S. Government, and for other purposes.
Pending:
Wyden Amendment No. 3704, to establish an Independent
National Security Classification Board in the executive
branch.
Collins Amendment No. 3705, to provide for homeland
security grant coordination and simplification.
Specter Amendment No. 3706, to provide the National
Intelligence Director with the authority to supervise,
direct, and control all elements of the intelligence
community performing national intelligence missions.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine is recognized.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, the debate now will resume on the
amendment offered by the Senator from Pennsylvania. As discussed last
night, we have an informal agreement that Senator Roberts would be
recognized for--is it 25 minutes, I ask Senator Roberts?
Mr. ROBERTS. I thought the agreement was 30.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, I could not hear the Senator from Maine. She
said there had been an order that the Senator be recognized?
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, if I can respond to the Democratic
leader's inquiry, there was an informal discussion
[[Page S9874]]
last night. There was not an order entered, to the best of my
knowledge, but an informal agreement that Senator Roberts would be
recognized, and it was either 25 or 30 minutes. I am uncertain.
Mr. ROBERTS. If the distinguished chairman will yield, I am not sure
of the timeframe. I think my remarks will be approximately 30 minutes.
I hope they will not go over 30 minutes. But that would be my goal.
Mr. REID. My only inquiry here is, Senator Harkin wishes to speak for
10 minutes sometime. We recognize we should have gotten to the bill
earlier than we have, but we didn't, and now with the dialog that has
gone on Senator Harkin believes he needs to speak, so we need to
somehow figure a way to allow him to do that.
The Senator from Maine has the floor. We understand that. But is
there some way between the two managers we can get Senator Harkin some
time here this morning? Otherwise he is just going to hang around and
cause trouble.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, if I could complete my sequencing here.
After Senator Roberts, Senator Levin had asked to be recognized on the
Specter amendment. They were both here last night, so I want to respect
their requests as well.
I wonder if we could arrange for Senator Harkin to speak after the
first series of votes today, for 10 minutes.
Mr. REID. That is fine. After the first vote today I ask unanimous
consent Senator Harkin be recognized.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. REID. Senator Stevens to follow Senator Harkin.
Ms. COLLINS. As part of that sequencing, it would be 10 minutes for
Senator Harkin and 10 minutes for Senator Stevens--oh, I am sorry.
Senator Stevens is on the bill?
Mr. REID. It would be 15 minutes for Stevens, 15 for Harkin? Or
unlimited for Stevens?
Ms. COLLINS. Senator Stevens is going to be speaking on the bill so
he has asked for an unlimited amount of time.
Mr. REID. We understand Senator Stevens, being the President pro
tempore of the Senate, can speak as long as he wants. Again I repeat,
after the first vote Senator Harkin will be recognized for 15 minutes,
and then Senator Stevens will be recognized.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is
so ordered.
The Senator from Kansas is recognized.
Amendment No. 3706
Mr. ROBERTS. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Specter
amendment. Before I begin, I would like to commend the managers of the
bill, Senators Collins and Lieberman, for their extraordinary patience
and their hard work as we continue working through this process.
Senators Collins and Lieberman are very prominent and hard-working
Senators. They have been given a very tough assignment and a limited
timeframe in which to complete it. Nevertheless, they have produced a
bill which is a step in the right direction.
As chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, I look forward to
working with the Senators who serve on the committee of assignment by
the leadership as the Senate attempts to make intelligence reform a
reality.
Simply put, the Specter amendment would give the national
intelligence director, or what we call now the NID, the authority to
direct and supervise and control our national intelligence collection
agencies. In doing so, it will create a clear chain of command that
will leave no doubt in anybody's mind that the national intelligence
director is in charge and is accountable.
There is no rush to judgment on this issue. The debate in which we
are currently engaged is the same debate that has been going on for
decades, centered on how to grant increased authority to the Director
of Central Intelligence, or a new national intelligence director, while
leaving undisturbed the intelligence community's structural status quo.
Time and time again, those who have struggled with this conundrum have
found we simply can't get there from here under that context. In other
words, I believe it takes significant organizational change to overcome
the inherent conflicts in the current structure of our national
intelligence community.
True empowerment requires a national intelligence director with both
budget authority and the authority to direct and control the activities
of the intelligence collection agencies. One without the other will
once again leave us with an intelligence head who can neither succeed
nor be held fully accountable.
Let me state that the bill reported by the Governmental Affairs
Committee does address the question of budget authority very
effectively. It is significant and well contained. The bill leaves
unaddressed, however, the issue of the national intelligence director's
authority to direct, to supervise, and control the activities of our
national intelligence collection agencies.
In short, the bill, in my opinion, preserves divided loyalties
inherent in the current structure. Why is it so difficult to give this
new NID direct control over all of the intelligence community agencies?
It is no secret. The issue centers on the fact that the National
Reconnaissance Office, which designs and acquires our spy satellites,
the National Security Agency, which collects our signal intelligence,
and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, which processes and
disseminates our satellite imagery, all fall under the direct control
of the Secretary of Defense.
These agencies, while essential to the collection of national
intelligence, have also been deemed essential to the Pentagon's ability
to fight and to win wars. In essence, these agencies serve two masters:
The head of the intelligence community and the Secretary of Defense.
This tension has existed for decades, and it continues today. As long
as the Secretary of Defense directs the day-to-day activities of these
agencies, the new national intelligence director will continue to
struggle with a structure that undermines his ability to succeed as the
head of the intelligence community.
It appears to me that under today's bill the national intelligence
director's authority concerning collection will be about the same as
the DCI's has been for over 50 years. I do not mean to be a pessimist,
but history has shown in practice that these authorities to ``establish
requirements,'' ``manage the collection task,'' and ``resolve the
conflicts'' have limited ability when an agency works with the
Secretary of Defense and not for the head of the intelligence
community.
Why has it been so difficult to streamline the chain of command in
the intelligence community? Because when the Defense Department comes
up on the radar screen and announces to Congress and the media that its
ability to defend America will be undermined if it loses direct control
over its intelligence agencies, Members of Congress rightfully pause
and they certainly take note. This is especially true today when
American forces are engaged in combat. This, however, should not lead
to what we call paralysis.
During this debate, we have heard a great deal about support to our
dedicated, brave men and women in uniform, i.e., the warfighters. Many
of my colleagues have argued and will continue to argue that the
national intelligence director must not be allowed to direct and
supervise the control of activities of our national intelligence
collection agencies. In their view, granting such an authority would
undermine the Secretary of Defense's ability to fight and win wars. For
this to be true, the national intelligence director would have to deny
our military commanders the information they need to wage war. I cannot
conceive of any circumstance where that would be the case.
I am a member of the Armed Services Committee. I am a former Marine
officer. I would not sanction any legislation that I thought would
limit the ability of our troops to fight and to win wars. I recognize
the special requirements of the Department of Defense. As chairman of
the Intelligence Committee, I also know that the Department of Defense
is only one of the major consumers of intelligence. Important, yes;
major, yes; but one.
I often hear people referring to the Department of Defense as the
principal consumer of intelligence. While the Department is a
significant and important consumer of intelligence, we need
[[Page S9875]]
to remember one thing: The principal consumers of intelligence are the
President of the United States, the Congress, and the National Security
Council. They are the principal consumers. The Department of Defense is
a major consumer.
In time, the Department of Homeland Security is likely to become a
voracious consumer of intelligence, perhaps on a par with the
Department of Defense.
I do not believe the defense of the homeland is any less important
than prosecuting the war. Consequently it does not make sense to have
80 percent of our intelligence collection apparatus controlled by one
consumer, and that is the Department of Defense.
If we give the national intelligence director the authority to manage
all of the national collection agencies, that will ensure one office is
responsible and accountable for meeting the intelligence requirements
of all consumers including, of course, that of the Department of
Defense. If any Cabinet member believes their intelligence requirements
are not being met, he or she can address the issues to the national
intelligence director. If a Cabinet member does not agree with NID's
decision, they can take it up with the President of the United States.
I also note that in testimony before Congress, the directors of two
of the Pentagon's intelligence collection agencies--the National
Security Agency and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency--stated
that having their agencies transferred to the control of a national
intelligence director would not degrade their level of support to the
military.
Let me repeat that. The directors of two of the Pentagon's
intelligence collection agencies--the National Security Agency and the
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency--stated that having their
agencies transferred to the control of a national intelligence director
would not degrade their level of support to the military.
Additionally, some have argued that giving the national intelligence
director line control of agencies with uniformed military personnel
would be complicated. There will certainly be some issues to be
resolved, to be sure. But the Department of Defense regularly details
military personnel to agencies and offices outside of the Department of
Defense. We would not be breaking new ground here. We have had civilian
control of the military since the founding of this Nation, and I don't
see how civilian control by a national intelligence director is
qualitatively different than civilian control by the Secretary of
Defense. They both work for the President.
There has been a lot of talk about that fact in regard to meetings we
have had with people in uniform and the Secretary of Defense and a
certain Senator asking, How would you feel if your budget was
controlled by somebody who didn't wear a uniform? Well, the Secretary
of Defense doesn't wear a uniform. When the military appears before the
Congress, they don't wear a uniform. Neither does the Secretary of
Army, Navy, or Air Force wear a uniform.
Let me detail a few examples to illustrate why direct control is so
important to the success of the national intelligence director.
As recently as last week--I would like for Members to pay attention
to this--as recently as last week, the Senate Intelligence Committee
received a very troubling briefing in closed session that clearly
demonstrated that even on matters relating to the terrorist threat to
our homeland, today, now, the terrorist threat that we face, the
intelligence agencies still stubbornly refuse to adequately share
information. Why are these agencies still not sharing? Some progress
has been made. But why are they still not sharing? Is it because the
DCI doesn't have adequate budget authority? No. They don't share it
because they work for 15 different bosses and no one holds them
accountable for information sharing. The national intelligence director
can cajole, he can plead, he can consult all he wants; he can
promulgate policies and guidelines all day long. He can create grand,
trusted information networks. But without a national intelligence
director with direct control, there will be no one to force adequate
information sharing within the intelligence community.
Let us take another example.
We have all heard former DCI Tenet's now famous declaration of war
against al-Qaida in 1998. Mr. Tenet ordered that no resource was to be
spared in this critical effort. He declared war as a result of Osama
bin Laden issuing fatwas to kill Americans.
What happened as a result of this bold order? Not much. The National
Security Agency went its own way, saying: Thank you, Mr. DCI, for your
interest in national security, but we are going to retool for a threat
that has nothing to do with terrorism.
What would have happened if Mr. Tenet had the authorities granted to
the national intelligence director under the Collins-Lieberman bill
when he made his 1998 declaration? He might have said: We are at war,
and the NSA will see that reflected in the budget you will receive in
the next year or so, assuming Congress does not make any changes to it.
That is budget authority. That is the crowbar he would use in terms of
influence. However, with the authorities to direct, supervise, and
control, which are provided in the Specter amendment, Mr. Tenet would
have been able to order the NSA to stop retooling for the other threat,
get to work that day, focus their efforts on al-Qaida. In the 21st
century, threats evolve too quickly to wait a year or so for the
national intelligence director's budget change to have any effect. The
NID must have direct control in order to make immediate changes.
The bill before the Senate today is a significant step in the right
direction. Credit goes to Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman. There
are many good provisions in the bill which should improve the
intelligence community, but it is missing something very important--a
clear chain of command and accountability.
As the examples I have cited demonstrate, a clear chain of command
and accountability that comes with it are essential to real and lasting
reform. If we do not make the hard choices now, I fear after yet
another series of intelligence failures--and Lord knows I do not want
to sit as chairman of the Intelligence Committee and have any more ``Oh
my God'' hearings in regard to past tragedies from Khobar Towers to
embassy bombings to the Khartoum chemical plant to the failure to even
try to come as close as possible to predicting the India nuclear blast,
Somalia, the USS Cole, and obviously September 11. We do not want to go
back down that road.
I fear the Senate Intelligence Committee will be right back in its
hearing room listening to the newly minted national intelligence
director testify while he enjoys a great deal of budget authority he
still lacks the real authority to perform the day-to-day operations of
our intelligence agencies and therefore lacks ability to lead as we
expect and as he must. I urge my colleagues to support the Specter
amendment so there is no doubt in anyone's mind that the national
intelligence director is in charge and is accountable.
I will take a few more moments to comment on some of the debate I
have heard concerning this amendment. This is not a new debate. What I
heard in the Senate yesterday and today represents an age-old tension
that has existed since the intelligence community was created.
Ms. COLLINS. Would the Senator yield briefly for a unanimous consent
request?
Mr. ROBERTS. Certainly, I would be more than happy, in the middle of
shining the light of truth into darkness, to yield for a unanimous
consent request.
Ms. COLLINS. I apologize for interrupting the Senator. Mr. President,
I ask unanimous consent that the only amendments remaining to the bill
other than the pending amendments be the two lists I now send to the
desk; provided further that they be subject to second degrees that are
related to the subject matter of the first degree; further, that all
other provisions governing the consideration of this bill remain in
effect.
Mr. SPECTER. Reserving the right to object, would the distinguished
chairwoman repeat that unanimous consent request?
Mr. REID. Mr. President, basically what we have done, we now have a
finite list of amendments. The two cloakrooms have hotlined every
Senator, and we have, I am sorry to say, more than 200 amendments, but
that is
[[Page S9876]]
the finite list, and the Senator from Pennsylvania is on the list.
Mr. SPECTER. Parliamentary inquiry: For how many amendments am I on
the list?
Mr. REID. Seven.
Ms. COLLINS. Seven plus the pending amendment.
Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Chair.
Mr. ROBERTS. If the Senator will yield, may I ask if the 21
amendments I have drafted, amendments that would improve the nature of
the bill, are they included in that list?
Ms. COLLINS. They are indeed.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Ms. COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. President.
I thank the Senator.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, if the Senator will allow me to make a
statement as to what we are going to do here for a minute, I will be
very brief.
The two leaders have directed the two managers of the bill that the
next step will be to get a filing deadline. Hopefully that will be in
the next few hours. We may not be able to do it until tomorrow, but we
are working as quickly as we can to make sure amendments people have
submitted will be drafted. We are moving along as quickly as we can.
The list of amendments is as follows:
Shelby, Domestic Preparedness; Shelby, Domestic
Preparedness; Shelby, NID; Ensign, Relevant; Ensign,
Relevant; Inhofe, Relevant; Inhofe, Relevant; Inhofe,
Relevant; Inhofe, Relevant; Inhofe, Relevant; Inhofe,
Relevant; Inhofe, Relevant; Lugar, Relevant; Lugar, Relevant;
Voinovich, Presidential Appointments; Cornyn, Human
Smuggling; Cornyn, State and Local Law Enforcement; Cornyn,
Drivers Licenses.
Snowe, IG; Snowe, Red Teams; Snowe, NIE Reports; Snowe,
NCTC Reports; Snowe, Relevant; Snowe, Relevant; Allard,
Marshall Imagery; Allard, Personnel Authorities; Allard,
Personnel Authorities; Allard, Geospatial Informatrion;
Cornyn, Cyber Security; Grassley, Money Laundering/Terror
Financing; Grassley, IG/Whistleblower Protection; Grassley,
Visas; Grassley, Visas; Grassley, Related; Grassley, Related;
Grassley, Related.
Hutchison, Center for Alternative Intel. Analysis;
Hutchison, Relevant; McConnell, Related; McConnell, Related;
McConnell, Related; McConnell, Related; Domenici, Natl.
Critical Infrastructure Center; Domenici, Border
Surveillance; Domenici, WMD Intel. Center; Sessions,
Relevant; Sessions, Relevant; Sessions, Relevant; Sessions,
Relevant; Sessions, Relevant; Sessions, Relevant; Sessions,
Relevant; Sessions, Relevant; Sessions, Relevant; Sessions,
Relevant.
Kyl, Relevant; Kyl, Relevant; Kyl, Relevant; Kyl, Relevant;
Kyl, Relevant; Kyl, Relevant; Chambliss, Border Security;
Chambliss, Document Security; Chambliss, Relevant; Chambliss,
Relevant; Chambliss, Military Intel.; McCain, Relevant;
McCain, Relevant; McCain, Relevant; McCain, Relevant; McCain,
Relevant; McCain, Relevant; McCain, Relevant; McCain,
Relevant; McCain, Relevant; McCain, Relevant.
Roberts, NID Agency Control; Roberts, Definitions; Roberts,
IC/NFIP Programs; Roberts, IC/NFIP Programs; Roberts, Non-
NFIP DIA Programs; Roberts, Intel-Sharing; Roberts, NIDs
Authorities; Roberts, NIA; Roberts, NID; Roberts, Sect. 504
of Natl. Sec. Act of 1947; Roberts, NID Control of CIA;
Roberts, Reprogramming and Transfers; Roberts, New
Positions Subject to NID Concurrence; Roberts, NID
Authority; Roberts, NID Authority; Roberts, Analytic
Review Unit; Roberts, GC Provision; Roberts, IG Provision;
Roberts, NCTC and NIC Responsibilities; Roberts, SecDef
Responsibilities to NID for NIP; Roberts, NID Authority;
Roberts, NID Authority; Roberts, NID; Roberts, Relevant;
Roberts, Relevant.
Hatch, Punishment for Stowaways; Hatch, FBI Translators;
Hatch, Expedited Terrorist Removal; Warner, Relevant; Warner,
Relevant; Warner, Relevant; Warner, Relevant; Warner,
Relevant; Warner, Relevant; Warner, Relevant; Warner
Relevant; Warner, Relevant; Warner, Relevant; Warner,
Relevant; Warner, Relevant; Warner, Relevant; Warner,
Relevant; Warner, Relevant.
Stevens, Relevant; Stevens, Relevant; Stevens, Relevant;
Stevens, Relevant; Stevens, Relevant; Stevens, Relevant;
Stevens, Relevant; Stevens, Relevant; Stevens, Relevant;
Stevens, Relevant; Stevens, Relevant; Stevens, Relevant;
Stevens, Relevant; Stevens, Relevant; Stevens, Relevant;
Stevens, Relevant; Stevens Relevant; Stevens, Relevant;
Stevens, Relevant; Stevens, Relevant; Gregg, FBI; Gregg,
Relevant; Coleman, Information Network; Coleman, Strike;
Collins, Relevant; Collins, Relevant; Collins, Relevant.
Talent, Relevant; Burns, Federal Flight Deck Officer Prog.;
Burns, Relevant; Burns, Relevant; Specter, Relevant; Specter,
Relevant; Specter, Relevant; Specter, Relevant; Specter,
Relevant; Specter, Relevant; Specter, Relevant; Specter,
Relevant; Specter, Relevant; Specter, Relevant; Frist,
Relevant; Frist, Relevant; Frist, Relevant; Frist, Relevant;
Frist, Relevant; Frist, Relevant to any on list; Frist,
Relevant to any on list; Frist, Relevant to any on list;
Frist, Relevant to any on list; Frist, Relevant to any on
list.
Collins, Relevant; Collins, Relevant; Collins, Relevant;
Collins, Relevant; Collins, Relevant; Collins, Relevant to
any on list; Collins, Relevant to any on list; Collins,
Relevant to any on list; Collins, Relevant to any on list;
Collins, Relevant to any on list; Collins, Managers'
amdendments; Voinovich, Ethics in government.
____
Akaka, 1. Relevant; 2. Relevant; 3. Relevant; 4. Relevant.
Baucus, 1. Relevant.
Bayh, 1. Congressional Reform.
Biden, 1. Relevant; 2. Relevant.
Bingaman, 1. Terrorism; 2. Lab Employees; 3. Chief Science
Officer; 4. Relevant.
Boxer, 1. Relevant; 2. Relevant; 3. Relevant.
Byrd, 1. Relevant; 2. Relevant; 3. Relevant; 4. Relevant.
Cantwell, 1. Biometric Visas.
Carper, 1. Rail Security.
Clinton, 1. Relevant; 2. Relevant; 3. 2nd degree to Collins
Formula Grants.
Conrad, 1. Relevant; 2. Relevant; 3. Relevant.
Corzine, 1. Relevant; 2. Relevant; 3. Relevant.
Daschle, 1. Related; 2. Related; 3. Related to any on the
list; 4. Related to any on the list.
Dayton, 1. NID Communication with Congress.
Dorgan, 1. Nano-technology.
Durbin, 1. Civil liberties; 2. Civil liberties; 3. Foreign
language, Science, technology education.
Feingold, 1. Information sharing; 2. Relevant.
Feinstein, 1. State and Local; 2. DoD Tactical; 3. National
Intel University; 4. Clarify sub-official role; 5.
Colocation; 6. FBI General; 7. Reserve Corps; 8. Related; 9.
Related.
Graham, 1. NIC; 2. Education and Training; 3. Relevant; 4.
Relevant.
Jeffords, 1. Interoperability; 2. Preparedness; 3.
Security; 4. Critical Infrastructure.
Harkin, 1. Civil Liberties; 2. Civil Liberties; 3. Related.
Hollings, 1. MTSA deadlines.
Inouye, 1. TSA.
Lautenberg, 1. NID Five year term (re-newable); 2. Close
Business with Terrorists Loophole; 3. Risked Based Homeland
Security; 4. Port Security; 5. Rail Security; 6. Saudi
Arabia.
Leahy, 1. Relevant; 2. Relevant; 3. Translators Report Act;
4. FISA Oversight; 5. FBI Reform Act; 6. USA Patriots
Restoration Act; 7. Whistle Blower Protections; 8.
Information Sharing Enhancement; 9. Civil Liberties Review
Board Improvements; 10. Passenger Screening/Watch Lists; 11.
Passenger ID verification.
Levin, 1. Intel Requirements; 2. Alternative Intel; 3.
Critical Infrastructure Protection; 4. Budget Authority; 5.
Relevant; 6. Relevant.
Lieberman 1. Relevant; 2. Relevant; 3. Relevant; 4.
Relevant to any on list; 5. Relevant; 6. Relevant; 7.
Relevant to any on list; 8. Relevant to any on list; 9.
Relevant to any on list; 10. Relevant to any on list.
Hollings, 1. Creating National Intelligence Coordinator.
Nelson (FL), 1. Relevant; 2. Relevant; 3. Relevant.
Reed, 1. LNG; 2. Transit Security.
Reid, 1. Relevant; 2. Relevant.
Rockefeller, 1. Relevant; 2. Relevant; 3. Relevant to any
on the list; 4. Relevant to any on the list.
Sarbanes, 1. Civil liberties.
Schumer, 1. Signal Corps; 2. Biometric Screening; 3. Port
Security; 4. Cyber Security; 5. Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act; 6. Saudi Arabia; 7. Truck Security; 8. Rail
Security; 9. Relevant; 10. Relevant; 11. Relevant.
Wyden, 1. Independent Security Classification Board (S.A.#
3704); 2. Databases.
Mr. ROBERTS. What I heard in the Senate yesterday in regard to
comments on this debate represents an age-old tension that has existed
since the intelligence community was created.
Members heard numerous quotes from statutes such as title 10, title
50. The heart of this debate, however, is whether we will give an
individual unambiguous control of intelligence activities in the United
States. We can quote from the United States Code all day. The point is
the laws could be changed. That is what we do in the Congress. The
debate today is about what the law should be, not what the law is.
Arguing the status quo is convenient, but it is not always correct.
This bill gives the new national intelligence director one very good
tool. It is called budget authority. It does not give him control. The
Specter amendment gives the national intelligence director control,
which means accountability and real reform.
As we have debated this issue, I have heard many Members cite the
words and reported opinions of the 9/11 Commission. The 9/11 Commission
has done a great service to this country, but the Commissioners
themselves have made it clear they do not have all the answers.
The 9/11 Commission did produce an excellent study of the failures
leading
[[Page S9877]]
up to the attacks of September 11. The Governmental Affairs Committee
bill is faithful to the lessons the Commission drew from its work. It
is an excellent report. But I remind my colleagues that the
Commission's report was based on a single case study--the period
leading up to the attacks of September 11. However, a broader
historical examination of our intelligence community leads many--
including this Senator--to the important conclusion that over the last
50 years, the intelligence community has drifted due to the lack of or
absence of a clear chain of command and the lack of accountability that
a clear chain of command can bring. That clear chain of command
requires giving the national intelligence director the authority to
direct, to control, and to supervise our national collection agencies.
Our job is not to take the work of the 9/11 Commission as a sacred
text which is not to be questioned or altered; our job is to take their
work and integrate it with the lessons learned over the 50-plus years
of history of our intelligence community and nearly 30 years of
congressional oversight by the Intelligence Committee. As the Senator
from Pennsylvania has pointed out, his amendment incorporates many of
those lessons.
Yesterday, I also heard Members argue that the Specter amendment
would create confusing chains of command for the National Security
Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence collection elements of the
Defense Intelligence Agency. I respectfully disagree.
In addition to providing the national intelligence director with the
authority to direct, supervise, and control these agencies, the Specter
amendment clarifies other provisions of law to specifically address
this concern. It amends title 10 and title 50, adds two new provisions
to the law to specifically clarify that the Directors, again, of the
National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence
collection elements of the Defense Intelligence Agency report directly
to the national intelligence director.
While this amendment gives the national intelligence director direct
control over these agencies, they remain ``combat support agencies''--
nobody quarrels with that--and the Secretary of Defense will still have
influence over them. That is by design. No one is trying to change
that. I think it is much better than the bill's current language in
which the Secretary of Defense has direct control of these agencies,
and the NID only has influence and persuasion. I can tell you from past
history, influence and persuasion do not get you very far at the
Pentagon.
Some have argued that only the Secretary of Defense can manage the
combat support agencies. Some argue that only if the Secretary of
Defense manages the Pentagon's national intelligence collection
agencies will the warfighter receive adequate support. This is a
fallacy. As I said earlier, there is no reason to believe the Defense
Department will not receive the support it needs if the Pentagon's
national intelligence collection agencies report to the national
intelligence director.
The amendment provides the Secretary of Defense with important
feedback mechanisms to make sure the Department is getting the national
intelligence support it needs.
First, the Secretary of Defense is required to provide the national
intelligence director with some performance appraisals for the
directors of the national intelligence collection agencies. Second, the
national intelligence director will receive recommendations from the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff based upon a biannual review of
the combat support plans for the National Security Agency; again, the
National Reconnaissance Office; again, the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency; and the DIA, again, the Defense Intelligence
Agency.
Working with the Secretary of Defense through these feedback
mechanisms, the national intelligence director will ensure that the
Defense Department's intelligence needs are met. Clearly, this
amendment recognizes the important support role these agencies play to
the Department of Defense in its role as an intelligence consumer.
Now, I also heard the argument yesterday that giving the national
intelligence director direction, supervision, and control of the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency is a bad idea because that
agency is responsible for making maps. I point out that this agency
used to be named the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, but they
changed its name to signal a change in the manner in which it would
perform its mission.
The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, or the NGA, uses
intelligence data acquired by satellites and other means and melds that
data into the maps that our entire Government uses. This is what is now
called geospatial intelligence. The maps we use have the full benefit
of the intelligence data we gather all around the world. Mapmaking is
not inconsistent with the national intelligence director's mission.
Another argument heard yesterday against the Specter amendment was
that the 9/11 Commission had considered granting the NID direction,
supervision, and control authorities but rejected the idea on the
grounds that the duties of managing these agencies would overload the
national intelligence director. However, I note that the Secretary of
Defense controls the military services, the Reserves, the unified
commands, the defense agencies, field activities, literally millions of
uniformed and civilian personnel, and those who mow the yard outside
the Pentagon.
So if I understand correctly, in order not to overburden the national
intelligence director, we will leave the national intelligence
collection agencies under the control of an already extremely busy and,
I might add, effective Secretary of Defense. This logic escapes me.
I also heard an argument that the
9/11 Commission had rejected granting the national intelligence
director greater authorities because the Commissioners preferred what
was described on the Senate floor as a ``lean, mean modern corporate
structure.''
I ask my colleagues, What successful modern corporation would not
give its chairman and CEO the authority to direct, supervise, and
control every component of the organization for which he or she was
held accountable by the shareholders? We should not confuse direction,
supervision, and control with micromanagement.
I also heard the argument that the Specter amendment would promote
group-think within the intelligence community. Well, I can tell you
that the Senate Intelligence Committee wrote the book on the occurrence
of group-think in its report on the prewar assessments on Iraq's WMD
programs.
It is a problem that we on the committee watch very carefully every
week, almost every day. I do not believe the Specter amendment will
promote any kind of group-think. I would be concerned about the risk of
group-think if we were proposing to grant the national intelligence
director the authority to direct, supervise, and control the analytical
content of our national analytical agencies. That is not what Senator
Specter's amendment proposes. It proposes direction, supervision, and
control over the Department of Defense's national intelligence
collection agencies.
Additionally, as was seen in the committee's examination of the
prewar assessments--as I say, it took us over a year, 22 professional
staff members; we interviewed over 220 analysts--the creation of a
strong national intelligence director will prevent group-think in the
intelligence community. A strong director will ensure a level playing
field in which the analysis of all agencies will be given full
consideration and equal consideration based upon the quality of the
analysis when intelligence community assessments are being developed.
If anyone has studied the committee's Iraq report--and I encourage
Senators to read it, 511 pages--they know that the lack of a level
playing field was a major problem.
Mr. President, with that I am going to conclude my remarks. I urge
Members to support the Specter amendment.
The Specter amendment has been described as a ``bridge too far.''
This well-known term is a product of the tragic Battle of Arnhem,
Holland, in 1944.
Many historians see the tragedy of Arnhem as a combination of errors,
i.e., the undertaking, for some political
[[Page S9878]]
reasons, of an ill-advised military campaign opposed by American
commanders; i.e., and a massive intelligence gap that failed to detect
a large concentration of German armor in the area.
Mr. President, the ``bridge too far'' analogy is apt, but it cuts in
favor of the Specter amendment. We must not, for political reasons,
fail to make the hard decisions that are necessary to ensure a strong,
in-charge national intelligence director.
These decisions are difficult. They are hard. But these decisions are
critically needed. The changes we make today have one overarching goal:
to prevent another intelligence failure on the order of Arnhem and
September 11. Because of those failures, the allies suffered 17,000
casualties and, obviously, on September 11, 3,000 died.
Failure to approve the Specter amendment may be seen by historians as
a tragic half-measure that led to another Arnhem or another September
11.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Utah.
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Bond
immediately follow me in order.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I associate myself with the remarks of the
distinguished chairman of the Intelligence Committee.
I rise today to support the amendment offered by Senator Specter.
This amendment has the support of Senators Specter, Shelby, and
Roberts--two former chairmen of the Intelligence Committee, as well as
the current chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. I
have had the pleasure to work closely with these colleagues, and I
respect their experience and their independent thinking on intelligence
matters.
This amendment is also cosponsored by a bipartisan group of Senators
from the Intelligence Committee. This amendment establishes the goals
set forth by 14 Senators who addressed a letter to Chairman Collins and
Senator Lieberman on September 20, 2004, in which they sought to ensure
that the national intelligence director has the ability to control the
day-to-day operations of all of our national intelligence assets.
I consider myself privileged to serve as a member of the Intelligence
Committee during these difficult and historic times. Yet I can also say
that during these years I have heard too many excuses for intelligence
failures. I have seen firsthand the damage that comes when the head of
the intelligence community lacks the ability to effectively lead our
national intelligence agencies.
The chairman and the ranking minority member of the Governmental
Affairs Committee have taken on a monumental task, for which I am
grateful. They have been charged with writing a bill that modifies the
National Security Act of 1947, to give the national intelligence
director greater budget control and stronger authority to manage the
intelligence community. This task, as we all know, has been extremely
complicated.
It is particularly difficult when one considers the broad authorities
that the National Security Act of 1947 already granted to the Director
of Central Intelligence, as head of the intelligence community.
Under that act, the DCI was given substantial authority to develop a
budget for national intelligence activities, to set election
requirements and priorities, and to direct intelligence analysis. The
Intelligence Committee has observed over time, however, that the DCIs
cannot exercise their authorities because they do not have actual
control over the operations of the national intelligence agencies. This
is because the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance
Office, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency report
operationally to the Secretary of Defense, and DCIs have had to
negotiate and cajole to ensure that their operational initiatives were
met. As a result, to keep from hindering this day-in/day-out
negotiation, DCIs were unable to effectively exercise their broad
budget authorities.
There is no greater example in my eyes--or at least modern example--
than in 1998, when former DCI George Tenet recognized that we needed to
direct all of our intelligence resources to defeating al-Qaida. This
was his famous ``declaration of war'' against al-Qaida, and he declared
that no resource of intelligence would be spared to defeat al-Qaida. He
was ignored by the intelligence community that he was in charge of
leading.
For example, the National Security Agency retooled for a different
signals intelligence mission, not for the war on al-Qaida. We simply
cannot ignore this example of unused DCI authorities. We cannot forget
the lessons of past intelligence failures. I am concerned that the best
intentions of the Governmental Affairs legislation will never be
fulfilled and that the good authorities granted to the national
intelligence director under the legislation will never be effectively
exercised.
The debate we are having today about the authorities of the national
intelligence director versus the Secretary of Defense has occurred in
this town over and over again since the National Security Act was first
passed back in 1947. As the intelligence community grew, the
authorities of the Director of Central Intelligence were diluted as the
Secretary of Defense gained a greater share of control over our
intelligence agencies.
We have a unique opportunity in the next few weeks to establish a
structure that puts someone truly in charge of our national
intelligence mission. I think we have to take this opportunity to
clarify the confused chains of command that have handcuffed past
Directors of Central Intelligence.
With a national intelligence director empowered to ``supervise,
direct and control'' our national collection assets, we will implement
real reform, not just establish another bureaucratic level and finally
have one person who is actually accountable to the President and to
Congress. Only with the Specter amendment's clear chains of command
will we give the national intelligence director the authorities
necessary to meet his vast responsibilities.
Some will argue that the Specter amendment goes too far; that it is
just too hard to separate the NSA, NRO, and NGA from the Department of
Defense; that it will hinder intelligence support for the warfighters.
The argument made has not been compelling. Why are clear chains of
command a bridge too far, as some have suggested? That is a clear
image, but it does not illuminate the argument. Why should we rely on a
mishmash of budget and personnel controls to put a national
intelligence director nominally in charge when we know that real
control and accountability will only come with a clear chain of command
to the director? We have all been saying that for months and so has the
9/11 Commission. Why are we talking about current provisions of law to
show that these combat support agencies can't be separated from the
Defense Department?
Let's not let arguments about current law confuse the issue. We are
talking about putting a national intelligence director in charge. We
are debating a bill that would change current law. If the Specter
amendment requires, we can accommodate other necessary provisions.
Finally, no one believes that the NSA, NRO, NGA, and DIA would stop
supporting the warfighter if this amendment is enacted. Really, does
anybody? The answer to that is no. If I believed that, I would not
support this amendment. Why would a national intelligence director turn
off the intelligence support upon which our warfighters rely so much? I
have never known a DCI to do such a thing. No national intelligence
director would ever shortchange the warfighter. No President or
Congress would ever permit that. In fact, the Specter amendment
recognizes the unique position of the Department of Defense as an
intelligence consumer--giving the Secretary of Defense the right to
prepare annual performance evaluations for the Directors of the Central
Intelligence Agency, the NRO, NSA, NGA, and DIA, and maintaining the
Joint Chiefs biannual review of the combat support plans of the NRO,
NSA, NGA, and DIA.
What the Specter amendment does not do is maintain the current
confused chains of command for the national intelligence collectors
within the Department of Defense. The Specter amendment recognizes that
accountability and effective management are only possible with clear
chains of
[[Page S9879]]
command. The blunt tool of budget control is not an effective mechanism
for flexible midcourse corrections in intelligence collection that a
national intelligence director must be able to make, without having to
negotiate or consult for his or her priorities.
If the confused chains of command of the status quo are an effective
mechanism for control, we should ask the Secretary of Defense if budget
control would be sufficient for him to ``coordinate'' a war. If the
Secretary of Defense only controlled the Army's budget, would that be
sufficient command of the Third Infantry Division? If he only
controlled the Navy's budget, could he order an aircraft carrier from
one ocean to another and expect it to move? If the answers to those
questions are no, then why should we settle for anything less than full
direction, supervision, and control of national intelligence collection
for the national intelligence director?
I support the Specter amendment. I know everybody on this floor is
sincerely trying to resolve these problems as best they can. I commend
the distinguished committee for the work it has done in bringing this
bill to the floor and the two leaders on the floor. But I think we
should support the Specter amendment. I urge all my colleagues to do
the same.
I thank the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri.
Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I thank the Chair and appreciate the words
of my colleagues.
In spite of years of recognition that intelligence was in dire need
of reform, the catalyst of this year's reform initiative was the
tragedy of September 11, 2001. The intelligence failure of Iraq's WMD
programs only underscores this point.
I applaud many of the provisions of the Collins-Lieberman bill.
However, I stand in support of the Specter amendment as a means to
provide absolutely essential powers to the national intelligence
director. For those who may just happen to be listening for the first
time, the national intelligence director is now known as the NID. But
this NID must have powers to bring together fully and effectively our
national collection efforts.
In spite of my respect and admiration for the efforts of my
colleagues, I remind the Senate that now is the time for bold action.
This deliberative body must be prepared to stare down very powerful
executive branch bureaucracies--and a few of our own--that are
instinctively protecting their turf. Three thousand dead Americans
should be a message to all of us that we must make significant changes.
A witness before the Senate Intelligence Committee put it well. She
said:
History's lesson is to make the most of reform
opportunities when they arise because they do not arise often
and they do not last long. We have one of those rare windows
of opportunity now. And if the past is any guide, there will
not be another chance for a generation. These realities mean
that reforms should be sweeping because they will be lasting.
The choices we make will be with us for decades to come.
I fear we are not being as bold in the underlying bill as
circumstances demand. We all agree that the 9/11 Commission published a
great report outlining in detail the events of September 11, 2001.
We could not and we should not detract from their efforts. However,
one fundamental concern I have in this is that it is now 3 years after
9/11, and we are only now taking action, largely based on the
recommendation of a panel not specifically chartered to focus on the
intelligence failures leading to 9/11.
I am concerned that a commission directed by law to investigate the
``facts and circumstances relating to the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001,'' has become the only basis for intelligence
reform.
Well, there is a lot of work that has been going on in this body and
in the other body about intelligence reform that is not covered in the
9/11 report.
Just since the end of the Cold War, there have been many major
studies of intelligence reform, staffed by intelligence professionals.
They include the joint Senate/House inquiry into 9/11, the Aspin-Brown
Commission, IC21 study, the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence study, the Scowcroft review, and many others.
As I listen to the debate on this Collins-Lieberman bill, I am
concerned that the truly meritorious recommendations and thoughts from
these other commissions have been largely disregarded. Rather, I seem
to hear--behind most of the key provisions in the bill--the rationale
that ``the 9/11 Commission said so.'' Well, we do respect and take
seriously the work of the 9/11 Commission, but we must be sure that we
consider the other recommendations of studies specifically examining
the intelligence process. I happen to think that many of those are more
accurately reflective of the needs of the intelligence community.
Recommendation No. 1, from the joint Senate/House inquiry into the 9/
11 intelligence failure was:
Congress should amend the National Security Act of 1947 to
create and sufficiently staff a statutory director of
national intelligence who shall be the President's principal
advisor on intelligence and shall have the full range of
management, budgetary, and personnel responsibilities needed
to make the entire U.S. intelligence community operate as a
coherent whole.
The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence's staff study
entitled, ``IC21,'' or ``Intelligence Community in the 21st Century,''
stated:
The [intelligence community] would benefit greatly from a
more corporate approach to its basic functions. Central
management should be strengthened, core competencies
(collection, analysis, and operations) should be reinforced
and infrastructure should be consolidated wherever possible.
The 9/11 Commission's Vice Chairman, Lee Hamilton, for whom I have a
great deal of respect, admitted to our committee in open session that
they really had not even considered more bold reform. He said the
Commission simply looked at things they thought they could accomplish.
I believe the word he may have used was ``pragmatic.'' They simply did
not consider more bold reforms, so maybe we ought not to consider their
recommendations as final. It is up to us. We have the ultimate
responsibility of passing this bill. Are we going to pass what is
pragmatic, what seems to be the least upsetting to the bureaucracies or
do we want to be bold and pass something that will make
the intelligence community work? Count me in the latter category.
Yesterday, my good friend, the chairman of the committee writing this
bill, alluded to some of the concerns I have. When responding to
concerns about DOD being shortchanged by the NID's budget authority,
she reminded us all that ultimately the President determines the
budget. That will always be the case. Let us not also forget that the
bureaucracies of the OMB and many committees of the Senate and the
House also determine the budget. There is simply too many ways to water
down the limited real authority that budgetary powers provide. More
real day-to-day authorities are needed, especially if we are to hold a
NID accountable for our intelligence efforts. As bothersome as the OMB
is in the effective operation of Government--I say that only half
facetiously--does anybody think the OMB runs the agencies of
Government? They mess them up sometimes. There are a lot of areas I can
tell you where the OMB has shortchanged vitally important activities.
But run them? I don't think so. Budgetary authority is not the same
thing as running an agency.
The way I read the bill, it seems as though any agency or department
that didn't want to chafe under a powerful NID has found a way out.
This bill leaves the door open for several key agencies, such as the
State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, INR; major
portions of the FBI'S intelligence operations capabilities; the
Department of Energy's Office of Intelligence; the Treasury
Department's Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, and
others, to avoid the authority of a NID. So under the Governmental
Affairs bill, a NID who declares war on al-Qaida--as referenced by
Chairman Roberts of the Intelligence Committee a few minutes ago--will
have even fewer troops to try to muster for this war, and little
additional power that doesn't already exist today.
Let us recall that every knowledgeable voice on this issue is
adamant: If you create a NID, he must be given power; otherwise, you
create an intelligence czar and have made the problem worse. We have
created a drug czar
[[Page S9880]]
and all kinds of czars, but they are not able to get the job done. As I
continue to listen to DOD proponents, I am concerned that insufficient
authorities are granted in the GAC bill, and they will be even further
eroded, putting us one step closer to creating an intelligence czar
with a great title and very little authority.
One of the recurring themes we always hear on the Intelligence
Committee--on which I have had the pleasure to serve for only a year
and three-quarters--is the reluctance of the agencies to share
information with those who need to know. We know all too well there are
many legitimate reasons not to share intelligence. We understand the
need to protect sources and methods. We also understand that decisions
not to disseminate some information may rightly involve protecting U.S.
civil liberties. But parochialism, poor information architectures, and
bureaucratic confusion should not be included amongst the reasons to
squirrel away intelligence that we need by cognizant analysts
throughout the community.
Three years after 9/11, and after dozens of hearings in which
intelligence community management describes ``seamless'' intelligence
sharing, we end up prying a little deeper to find out that it simply is
not the case. While there have been improvements in some areas of
intelligence sharing, they are often done under duress. As soon as the
``heat'' is off, you can bet that those parochial agencies will return
to intelligence hoarding, not intelligence sharing. We must empower a
NID to force appropriate intelligence sharing even in times when the
congressional and executive spotlights are not on the issue.
I believe it has already been referred to on the Senate floor that at
a recent hearing, the intelligence committee was truly dumbfounded as
we listened to different agencies talk about a specific threat. Two
agencies had a very different view of the severity of that threat when
they started talking to each other at the witness table.
One of the agencies said: We have information that you don't have.
They were supposed to be working on the same threat. I asked a dumb
question. I said: Why didn't you share it? They said it was sensitive
information. Well, wait a minute. They were trying to give us a
recommendation on a very serious matter, and the two agencies that were
supposed to work together on this serious matter didn't want to share
information with each other? I used to think when we worked on a need-
to-know basis, if you have a sensitive collection system, you need to
keep the name and identity very closely guarded. They were happy to
tell us in the Intelligence Committee the reason they were keeping a
particular source on another matter in confidence was because it was so
sensitive. I will tell you one thing. If you have ever seen a sieve, it
looks too much like the Intelligence Committee. We don't need to know
the names or even the identifying features of an intelligence source in
the committee. But if that is the essential element on which the
analysts are going to determine whether this particular source is
reliable, they ought to be sharing it on a very limited basis with all
of the people involved in the task.
I understand that the information that was gathered by the Iraqi
Survey Group after the war was very effective because they brought in
collectors and analysts from different agencies who were working on the
same problem and they put their heads together. What a wonderful thing.
They must have had a table. They laid out the information on the table.
They did what informally is called ``red teaming'' and they came up
with better estimates.
The NID, the national intelligence director, needs to be able to take
care of this himself, not to negotiate with the positions with other
departments or go to the White House and Congress and say, will you get
these guys together to talk?
This reluctance to share information appears to be so deeply
ingrained that only direct orders to do so are adequate, not budgetary
influences.
Let me be candid. As a member of the Intelligence Committee I am
convinced that the worst offenders of not sharing intelligence are the
CIA and the NSA, but there are others. Arm twisting that is largely
limited to budgetary problems and powers will not solve the problem. We
know getting the information shared among agencies, red teaming, as
they say, is very important. In other words, if the players are at the
table, they are going to get their best result when everybody turns
over their cards and shows what they are holding, but right now some of
the agencies are going to the table and keeping their cards face down,
saying, boy, we know some stuff, it is in our hand, and we are not
going to show you.
Budget authority alone is not going to get them to turn over the
cards. Red teaming cannot be successful unless the cards are turned
over and the red team knows what cards the CIA is holding, for example.
Full deference should be given to civil liberties concerns, and I
hope that the Collins-Lieberman provisions for improving information
architectures within the intelligence community will allow for getting
the right intelligence to the right people, and in the case of very
sensitive intelligence or any other critical, possibly damaging
intelligence, only to the right people. But it has to be gotten to the
people who need it.
Some have argued that the Specter amendment will lead to too much
centralized control, therefore group-think. Not likely. Let's be clear.
The Specter amendment deals with national collection, entities of the
NSA, NGA, portions of the DIA and CIA. This will help streamline
collection and reduce inefficiencies. It will allow the NID truly to
harness the collection capabilities against our Nation's primary
threat: The terrorists.
This leaves capabilities organic to the DOD currently funded under
the Joint Military Intelligence Program, JMIP, and the Tactical
Intelligence and Related Activities, somewhat glamorously acronymed the
TIARA, still firmly under DOD control, as they should be. DOD will not
be shortchanged and our Nation will have a more effective collection
effort.
Today, the DOD is the most voracious consumer of intelligence. That
is why they have the lion's share of the intelligence budget and
significant organic collection assets whose sole function is support to
the warfighter. However, national collectors must be unified in an
effort to meet national needs which include those of the
key intelligence entities in our war or terror: DOD, CIA, FBI, and the
Department of Homeland Security, where the appetite for terrorism-
related intelligence collection will only continue to grow.
I heard debate yesterday on the combat support agencies. Nobody
denies that these agencies, the NRO, the NSA, and the NGA, are still
combat support agencies, but as their name suggests, they also serve
national interests. When we examine this in a larger light, we realize
that having these agencies report directly to the Secretary of Defense
solely made sense during the Cold War. However, as I mentioned earlier
in this statement, the decisions we make today will be with us for
decades to come.
The world has changed. The war on terror is not going to go away
soon. While DOD is still a voracious consumer of intelligence, it is
now a partner with the CIA, FBI, the Department of Homeland Security,
and others in the war on terrorism. As other agencies continue to join
CIA and DOD as coequals, it makes sense to have a national intelligence
director who can see to the needs of all of these agencies and best
harness all national collection capabilities to meet our national
needs.
Again, we need to look decades down the road. We must recognize the
need to empower a NID to meet these needs. I believe Chairman Roberts
has already mentioned this several times, but let me state that the
Directors of the National Security Agency and the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency stated that having their agencies transferred to
the control of a NID would not degrade their level of support to the
military. Considering their testimony, as well as other commentary and
the maintenance of DOD's military intelligence collections, the
Pentagon need not fear the Specter amendment in any way.
It so happens I have a personal interest in this. As many of my
colleagues know, my son is a young ground intelligence second
lieutenant in the Marine Corps. I certainly do not want to
[[Page S9881]]
do anything that would interfere with his or his comrades' ability to
get the information, the intelligence, the estimates, and the tactical
intelligence they need to leave them hanging out without adequate
cover. My colleagues can bet I would never do that.
I conclude by giving some thoughts from Dr. David Kay, the interim
head of the Iraqi Survey Group, who testified before us many times and
who was a real bright light in gathering intelligence. He is certainly
not afraid to speak the truth in spite of whom he may offend. He told
the Intelligence Committee:
I am concerned, however, that simply creating a national
intelligence director, even one that seems to have--and we
think has--real powers . . . and we think budget and
personnel authority is real power, we will not end up
addressing the real problems . . .
Well, budget and personnel authority is some power but, as Dr. Kay
indicated, it is not real power.
Dr. Kay further stated:
I think you need to place the national intelligence
director in charge, charged by you, Congress, with ensuring
that all of the collection assets of this government work to
support the national intelligence strategies and priorities.
Dr. Kay recognizes the need for a unified collection effort. We
cannot afford to waste or misuse scarce collection assets. I think Dr.
Kay also knows the frustration of fragmented control quite well. He was
a DCI special adviser on Iraq and then, as I have noted, headed the
intelligence efforts of the Iraq Survey Group, or ISG. He wrestled with
authorities quite frequently. In large part, this was due to the
limited powers of the DCI vis-a-vis other department heads, but when
they made progress is when they coordinated and cooperated and the
agencies worked together.
I urge my colleagues to support the Specter amendment. This is a key
fix to give the NID some of the powers he or she will need if we are to
ask the NID to be accountable for our national intelligence effort.
I yield the floor.
Mr. SHELBY. Mr. President, I rise to express my strong support for
the Specter amendment currently pending before the Senate. However, I
want to first take a moment to commend Senator Collins and Senator
Lieberman for their hard work and dedication to this important
legislation. These are difficult issues and I believe that we all
strive to reach the same goal--a safer, more secure America. The
question before us now is how we best accomplish that goal.
I have long advocated for significant overhaul of the intelligence
community in order to change the way it operates and specifically who
controls the community and its assets. For too long, the intelligence
community has lacked a strong leader with the ability to command and
control the multitude of agencies that operate as independent parts
without a focused direction.
I do not believe that Congress's action in 1947 intended to create
the intelligence framework we currently have--a framework where no one
has the ability to direct the actions of the community as a whole. I
believe that Congress intended to create a Director of Central
Intelligence with clear lines of authority and accountability within
the intelligence community--one that is much like what we are
attempting to create now with a national intelligence director.
The underlying bill does take some important steps toward the
creation of a national intelligence director with the power and
authority to chart a path for real reform within the intelligence
community. Unfortunately, I believe that the underlying bill fails to
provide the national intelligence director with all of the authorities
required to provide the unity of leadership and accountability
necessary for real reform.
I believe that clear lines of authority between the national
intelligence director and our national intelligence collection
agencies, extending beyond budgetary control, are critical to our
success in countering national security threats of the 21st century.
The national intelligence director must have the ability to direct,
supervise and control the elements of the intelligence community.
There must be no doubt in anyone's mind that the national
intelligence director is in charge. Without the additional authorities
that are provided in the Specter amendment, there will be doubt.
The Specter amendment seeks to eliminate any question about who is
ultimately in charge of the intelligence community. With the additional
authority included in this amendment, there will no longer be an
opportunity for finger pointing and excuse making.
Ultimately, the national intelligence director will either be
congratulated for the success of the intelligence community or held
accountable for their failures.
I believe that budgetary authority is an important part of the
overall structure of a strong national intelligence director. But
beyond that, he or she must have day-to-day operational control of all
elements of the intelligence community performing national intelligence
collection missions, including the Central Intelligence Agency, the
National Reconnaissance Office, the National Security Agency, and the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the humint parts of the
Defense Intelligence Agency.
Giving the national intelligence director budget authority but not
day-to-day operational control will leave the intelligence agencies
serving two masters and will inevitably maintain the status quo that
has continuously failed us. Fundamental change is a must if we are
going to work to prevent any further attacks.
I believe this amendment serves as a perfect complement to the
actions taken in the National Intelligence Reform bill. This amendment
simply enhances the authority of the national intelligence director.
I continue to believe that change for the sake of change will do
nothing to accomplish our goal. A powerful national intelligence
director is a vital part of our future fight against the terrorists
that have dedicated their lives for the purpose of destroying America
and its citizens. If we truly want to create a strong national
intelligence director who has the authorities necessary to command and
control our intelligence community and its assets, we must pass the
Specter amendment.
I urge my colleagues to take advantage of this opportunity and
support this amendment to ensure that true change is possible through
the enabling of a powerful national intelligence director.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I oppose the Specter amendment and I will
take a few minutes to explain my opposition. I think all of us are in
favor of bold moves, of having a powerful new national intelligence
director and having analysis that is independent and objective, much
more so than has been the case in the last few decades and recently, to
have that analysis done by a group which can bring together all of the
information and come up with a coordinated position which is
independent and objective, and the NCTC is able to do that.
This amendment would place the National Security Agency and the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the NSA and the NGA, and the
National Reconnaissance Office, the NRO, under the direction,
supervision, and control of the national intelligence director and
would do the same for the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency
regarding the national intelligence collection mission of the DIA.
In doing so, this amendment would have the national intelligence
director basically be substituted for the Secretary of Defense in the
military chain of command. There are thousands of uniformed members of
our military who are currently in those agencies.
To break the chain of command and to say for the first time we are
going to take thousands of uniformed personnel and put them under the
supervision, direction, and control of a civilian agency head would
create havoc inside of the military, would create a very unfortunate
precedent, and would in the process be creating a new agency, a new
agency that would require a supervisory staff similar to the
supervisory staff that now exists in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense for the agencies which would be transferred.
Those are the two major reasons I have problems. There is a third I
want to talk about in a moment. But the two major reasons I have are
that it would require the creation of a whole new supervisory
bureaucracy for these
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agencies in the national intelligence director's office. You cannot
supervise these agencies, from the national intelligence director's
perspective, without having people to engage in that supervision the
way the Office of the Secretary of Defense now supervises and overseas
these agencies. So we would be creating a new bureaucracy.
We should be breaking down walls between bureaucracies, not building
up a new bureaucracy.
When the 9/11 Commission reached its conclusion and when they
testified in front of us, they told us they decided not to create a
department. They thought that would be overcentralization. They were
bold. I don't think anybody can successfully argue here that the 9/11
Commission was not bold. They were bold. They made some major shifts,
in terms of budget execution authority and in terms of personnel
authority. In shifting those authorities over the agencies which we are
debating here to the NID, they made a major decision relative to power,
relative to control. But they decided they would not go toward a more
centralized new agency; that they would rather coordinate with the
budgeting personnel power in a new powerful NID but not create a new
bureaucracy in the process.
There are many reasons why their decision--and I focus on the 9/11
Commission recommendation at our hearing--was a wise one. Their
approach was not just bold in terms of recommending the transfer of
budget and personnel authority, but it was wise in not creating a new
bureaucracy in the process.
The chain of command is such that we now do not put large numbers of
our uniformed military people outside of the chain of command and under
the command and control of civilian supervisors. We do not do that.
There is a purpose for having a chain of command from your commander
inside the military, which is clear, which you must abide by. That is
what you sign up for when you join the military and that is what is so
essential to military effectiveness, that the chain of command be solid
and that it not be broken in the way this amendment would break a chain
of command.
These agencies we are talking about today are integral parts of the
Defense Department. They are recognized for the support they provide to
combat operations. Indeed, when the Congress adopted the Goldwater-
Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986, we created the concept of ``command
support agencies.'' Pursuant to that legislation, the DIA and the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency have been designated by law as
command support agencies. We hear that designation will continue. But
it is pretty hard to square that with what this amendment proposes,
which is that they would not be inside the military chain of command.
They would still have the label but not the reality. They would be
called combat support agencies, but they would not be in the chain of
command of the Department of Defense.
The combat support functions of the DIA and the NSA and the NGA have
been recognized in law. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is
required by law to evaluate periodically, and not less often than every
2 years, the responsiveness and readiness of these agencies to support
operating forces in the event of war or threats to national security.
The pending amendment would preserve the form of the periodic review.
That periodic review by the JCS Chairman of the combat support agencies
of the intelligence community would be retained, but it would be a
report which is in form only because it is the Secretary of Defense who
is charged with being responsible for the combat capabilities of the
Armed Forces.
The NID, the national intelligence director, does not have the
responsibility that the Secretary of Defense has for the combat
capabilities of our Armed Forces. So to simply say, well, there will
still be a periodic review by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of the
combat support agencies of this community, but then to say that report
goes to the NID, the national intelligence director, instead of going
to the person who we make responsible for the combat abilities of the
Armed Forces, is a hollow gesture. It says that one thing will continue
to be true, we will still call them a combat support agency, but when
it comes to the real world of where that review goes, it will go to the
person, the national intelligence director, who is not the person
responsible for the combat capabilities of the Armed Forces. So we have
a break in the chain of command, which is unprecedented, which creates
all kinds of problems inside the military in terms of military
effectiveness, which weakens not only the power of the Secretary of
Defense but which undermines his responsibility to make sure we have
full combat capability inside of the Department of Defense.
For these reasons, that we should not be creating a new bureaucracy,
we should be breaking down walls of old bureaucracies; that this
amendment would require new supervisory staff over these entities if
they are going to be transferred to the national intelligence director
in order to help him perform the supervision of these agencies, which
is now performed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense; and because
this would represent an unprecedented break in the chain of command
that now exists, and which is so critical to our military
effectiveness, I believe the 9/11 Commission reached the right balance.
Their balance was one which was conscious and conscientious; it was
bold but it was wise.
I have one other thought which I want to share and then I will yield.
These agencies now do analysis on their own. We got some very important
analysis before the Iraq war, in fact, from the Defense Intelligence
Agency, analysis which was different from the analysis produced by the
Central Intelligence Agency. If we are serious about wanting
alternative views relative to intelligence; if we are serious, as the
9/11 Commission urges us to be and as I hope we are, about ending the
politicization and misuse of intelligence to support policy positions;
if we are serious about promoting objectivity and independence of
analysis, we would want these agencies not to be shifted because their
analysis should not be under the control of the national intelligence
director. Their analysis should be independent and objective. For these
agencies to be shifted outside of where they now are, separate from the
national intelligence director, and put underneath his umbrella, is
going to make us weaker when it comes to the most critically important
reform we should be producing, which is to have objective, independent
analysis of intelligence which can be provided to the policymakers and
not shaped to support policies of the policymakers.
To remove these agencies that now are in a position to provide
alternative analysis and to put them under the aegis of the national
intelligence director will make that many fewer sources of independent,
objective intelligence that will be available to our policymakers. That
is a real loss.
There are other provisions in this bill and other provisions I hope
will be added during the amendment process to promote the objectivity
and independence of intelligence analysis.
We have had too much abuse in this area. We have had too much shaping
and exaggeration, going back at least as far as the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution, when intelligence was misused, to the Iran-Contra years
when intelligence was misused, shaped, and exaggerated in order to
support particular policy positions, and the same thing happened before
the Iraq war. We have to find ways to break down any kind of group-
think, any kind of a monolithic approach to intelligence, and we have
to make it more difficult for a national intelligence director to be
doing the shaping, to be in total control of the analysis of
intelligence.
That is why having an NCTC office separate from NID is so important.
Having an NCTC director who is subject to the confirmation of the
Senate is so important. That is why some of the other provisions which
we were able to add in committee to promote the independence and
objectivity of the intelligence analysis are so important.
We should not be reducing the numbers of sources of independent
analysis of intelligence, as this amendment would do, by putting these
agencies that now produce intelligence analysis under the aegis,
supervision, and operational control of the national intelligence
director. It is too much concentration of that critically important
analysis power under one person. We
[[Page S9883]]
should be wary of doing that. We should be moving in a very different
direction.
We should be finding ways to plot independence and objectivity of
intelligence so we don't have a repeat of the fiasco we just saw where
we had 500 pages, according to a bipartisan Intelligence Committee
report, of instances where intelligence was shaped, stretched, and
exaggerated, and they all moved in one direction. All those
intelligence changes and all the shaping was moved in the direction of
supporting a particular policy of the administration. That is a great
danger.
This amendment, because it concentrates or would concentrate agencies
that are currently involved in intelligence analysis under the NID,
increases the danger rather than reduces the danger of having
intelligence which is shaped to support policy rather than provide
support for objective information and objective estimates to the
policymakers.
I oppose this amendment. I hope it will be defeated.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator
DeWine be added as cosponsor of the pending amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I am advised that Senator Shelby would
like to speak to the bill. He is now chairing the Banking Committee,
which is hearing from the 9/11 Commission. I have talked to the manager
of the bill. I ask unanimous consent that the pending amendment be set
aside so we might start utilizing the time of the floor on another
amendment which I intend to offer.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
Amendment No. 3761
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. Specter], for himself
and Mrs. Feinstein, proposes an amendment numbered 3761.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
(Purpose: To specify a term of service for the National Intelligence
Director)
On page 10, between lines 16 and 17, insert the following:
(d) Term of Office; Removal.--(1) The term of service of
the National Intelligence Director shall be ten years.
(2) An individual may not serve more than one term of
service as National Intelligence Director.
(3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) shall apply with respect to any
individual appointed as National Intelligence Director after
the date of the enactment of this Act.
(4) If the individual serving as Director of Central
Intelligence on the date of the enactment of this Act is the
first person appointed as National Intelligence Director
under this section, the date of appointment of such
individual as National Intelligence Director shall be deemed
to be the date of the commencement of the term of service of
such individual as National Intelligence Director.
On page 10, line 17, strike ``(d)'' and insert ``(e)''.
On page 11, line 3, strike ``(e)'' and insert ``(f)''.
On page 11, line 5, strike ``subsection (c)'' and insert
``subsection (e)''.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, this amendment would give the national
intelligence director a 10-year term, the same kind of a term the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation now has. The debate on
this bill generally has stressed--and appropriately so--the need for a
strong, independent national intelligence director.
The interest of having policy determinations guide our new
intelligence estimates has been stressed repeatedly. There is a very
broad, historical precedent of the desirability of taking steps to
guarantee to the maximum extent possible that the intelligence
estimates will be independent and will not be in line to try to promote
some specific policy objective.
The 10-year term, as I say, is modeled after the term of the Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
When I offered this amendment in committee, I had a provision for
removal only for cause. After considering the matter, I have stricken
that provision because I believe it is unnecessary. I believe by
analogy to the FBI Director, the inference is plain that the removal
can be only for cause.
I will refer very briefly to comments by Senator Byrd on July 26 of
1976 when the FBI Director was given the 10-year term. Senator Byrd
said, ``The setting of a 10-year term of office by Congress would as a
practical matter preclude or at least inhibit a President from
arbitrarily dismissing an FBI director for political reasons.''
Senator Byrd goes on to note that obviously a successor would have to
be confirmed by the Senate. But there could not be the removal of the
FBI Director for political reasons. The implication is pretty clear
that removal can only be for cause.
The additional views of Senator Levin on the national intelligence
reform bill which he submitted on September 27 contain a very good
summary of authorities on this proposition generally. I am going to
cite a number of the authorities which Senator Levin referred to in
those additional views. I complimented Senator Levin a few moments ago
on the floor of the Senate for the quality of his views which he
submitted and said I was going to quote him. He said it was
unnecessary, but I believe in the interest of full disclosure that it
is good to give Senator Levin that credit.
The references to what happened with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
where that intelligence reports were used--and inappropriately used--
for representations about intelligence to support the administration's
position are well known historically. The Secretary of Defense at that
time, McNamara, cited classified information to support the passage of
the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution which President Lyndon Johnson wanted.
Those citations were made to support the conclusion that the Gulf of
Tonkin Resolution ought to be adopted.
The analyst for the National Security Archive, John Prados, said that
Secretary McNamara used the intercepts as a ``trump card'' during the
1964 hearings to ``silence doubters.'' According to the views of Mr.
Prados, Secretary McNamara asserted that ``intelligence reports from a
highly classified and unimpeachable source reported that North Vietnam
was making preparations to attack our destroyers, and ``the attack was
underway.'' Finally, ``The North Vietnamese lost two ships in the
engagement.'' Those materials turned out to be unsubstantiated, as a
matter of fact.
It was notorious that Central Intelligence Director William Casey
misrepresented intelligence during the Iran-Contra period. The
bipartisan Iran-Contra report specified that Director Casey
``misrepresented or selectively used available intelligence to support
the policy that he was promoting.''
In former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Robert Gates'
memoirs entitled ``From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of
Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War,'' former CIA Director
Gates said or referred to Bill Casey as a DCI who had his own foreign
policy agenda and had the estimating program as a powerful instrument
in forcing the pace of the policy area.
Former Secretary of State George Shultz, in his memoir ``Turmoil and
Triumph, My Years as Secretary of State,'' published in 1993, referred
to former Director of the CIA Bill Casey, who had very strong policy
positions and was so ideological that they inevitably colored his
selection and assessment of materials, once again, using the position
of intelligence director to have a determination of policy.
Former Director of the CIA and also former Director of the FBI
William Webster testified before the Senate Governmental Affairs
Committee on August 16 of this year and said:
With respect to relations with the President, while the
leader of the intelligence community must be the principal
adviser on intelligence to the President, he must work hard,
very hard, to avoid either the reality or the perception that
intelligence is being framed or that is read, spun, to
support a foreign policy of the administration.
The 10-year term, so it does not coincide with the term of the
President, is designed to give the national intelligence director the
reality of independence and certainly to avoid the
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perception that the intelligence is being spun for the interests of the
chief executive.
Two days after Judge Webster testified, the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence heard from former chief weapons inspector David Kay,
who said:
Intelligence must serve the Nation and speak truth to power
even if in some cases elected leaders choose, as is their
right, to disagree with the intelligence with which they are
presented. This means that intelligence should not be part of
the political apparatus or process.
A 10-year term would seek to ensure, guarantee, that the national
intelligence director was independent, and was not a part of the
political process or apparatus.
Mr. Kay went on to say:
This is, I think, if you move forward on a national
intelligence director legislation, is going to be the hardest
thing to communicate, that the national intelligence director
must serve the national security objectives of the Nation,
and he serves whoever is the President best by giving him
unvarnished truth, which will often not be welcome.
Again, a 10-year term would guarantee that kind of independence to
the national intelligence director.
On the same day, former GEN Charles Boyd told the Intelligence
Committee of the enormous pressures that political appointees are under
to ``give the President what he wants rather than what he doesn't want
but needs,'' and the upshot of what General Boyd had to say was that
rather than seeking a special and close relationship to the President,
General Boyd articulates a standard for an intelligence director
``ought to be his distance from the President, his independence of the
President, his professionalism and be respected as such.''
Again, a 10-year term would promote that.
A few days ago, on September 21, the very distinguished Center for
Strategic and International Studies, a group consisting of former
Senators and former Secretaries of Defense, former Directors of the
Central Intelligence Agency, and two former Secretaries of State, had
this to say:
When intelligence and policy are too closely tied the
demands of policymakers can distort intelligence and
intelligence analysis, can hijack the policy development
process. It is crucial to ensuring the separation that the
intelligence community leader have no policy role. A single
individual with a last word on intelligence and some policy
as well could be a dangerously powerful actor in the national
security arena using intelligence to advocate for particular
policy positions, budget requests, or weapon systems that
often lack the knowledge to challenge.
Here, again, the citation of authorities supports the concept that
the national intelligence director ought to be objective, ought not to
be seeking to promote any special policy of the chief executive and all
of that would be enhanced by the 10-year term.
The amendment which I offer, I do so on behalf of the Senator from
California, Senator Feinstein, and myself.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, I certainly understand the intent of the
Senator from Pennsylvania in offering this amendment. Indeed, he
offered it during the markup of the Governmental Affairs Committee. It
was debated at length.
Initially, in considering this issue, I, too, was inclined to believe
that the new national intelligence director should have some sort of
term of office. However, the testimony we heard through our eight
hearings changed my mind in this regard.
Under our legislation, S. 2845, the NID serves as the principal
adviser to the President. The individual not only manages the
intelligence community and heads up the new national intelligence
authority, but serves as the principal adviser to the President. I am
stressing that role because I believe that is key to why the director,
in fact, should not have a fixed term. It is essential that the NID
enjoy the full confidence and trust of the President of the United
States. That was a point made by the 9/11 Commission chairman, Tom
Kean, at our very first hearing on July 30. But we heard that repeated
time and again by our witnesses. All of the former DCIs who came before
the committee, representing a variety of times and administrations,
were unanimous in their view that the new NID should serve at the
pleasure of the President.
The then Acting Director of the CIA John McLaughlin made the point at
our September 8 hearing that for the NID to successfully clarify our
assignment of serving as the principal adviser to the President, he
must enjoy the President's trust and confidence.
Consider a situation where the Presidency changes parties during that
10-year-period. It would be very awkward for a new President of a
different party to inherit the national intelligence director from the
previous administration. Their world views and philosophy may have
nothing in common. Yet the President has to have a close and trusting
relationship with the national intelligence director. The President
should be able to choose his or her own person for that critical post.
Proponents of having a 10-year term have frequently compared this
proposal to the 10-year term of the Director of the FBI. I would note
that I asked Director Mueller whether he thought the new NID should
have a 10-year term similar to his. He said he did not think a 10-year
term or any fixed term was appropriate for the national intelligence
director. He said the role of the FBI Director is very different from
the role of the national intelligence director.
Over and over again during our hearings, Senator Lieberman and I
raised this question with the witnesses because we, too, were trying to
reach the right determination. Over and over again, the advice was the
same, whether it was the 9/11 Commission, the Acting Director of the
CIA, the former Directors of the CIA, or Director Mueller of the FBI.
Over and over again, they advised against setting a term.
So we need to create a position where the individual will enjoy the
full confidence and trust of the President of the United States. That
is the only way that individual can effectively carry out the role he
is assigned in this legislation to serve as the President's principal
intelligence adviser.
For these reasons, I urge my colleagues to oppose the amendment of
the Senator from Pennsylvania.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I also rise to oppose this amendment by
the Senator from Pennsylvania. This is, as Senator Collins has
indicated, a matter we discussed in what I thought was a very
thoughtful discussion in our committee deliberation on a similar
amendment.
There are good arguments on both sides. The objective here is to
balance the independence we want our national intelligence director to
have with the importance of having a trusting relationship with the
President of the United States. In the end, I concluded it would be
wrong to give a fixed term to the national intelligence director for
the reason to which I just heard Senator Collins refer.
Remember, we have given the national intelligence director two main
responsibilities. One is to administer the intelligence community. The
other is to be the principal intelligence adviser to the President of
the United States. In fact, one could argue, although the national
intelligence director as administrator has many customers, if you will,
for intelligence, the No. 1 customer is the President of the United
States as President and certainly as Commander in Chief. So that is a
relationship that must be a trusting relationship.
The danger is that an incoming President will be given someone in
whom he does not have that kind of confidence. Unfortunately, history--
recent history--gives us an example of that, without attributing blame.
President Clinton and then-Director of the FBI, Mr. Freeh, had a
relationship that was not mutually confident, and, therefore, he had
somebody in that critical position who had very little contact with the
President of the United States. He was Director of the FBI, not the
principal personal intelligence adviser in the sense of giving advice
personally to the President of the United States.
The concern about the independence of the national intelligence
adviser is an important one. I feel very strongly that in this bill
Senator Collins and I offer, and our committee offers to the Senate, we
have done a lot to protect the independence of the national
intelligence director.
[[Page S9885]]
For instance, contrary to the original proposal of the 9/11
Commission, which proposed that this office of the national
intelligence director be in the White House, we said no, that may raise
questions and in fact problems with regard to the independence of the
NID if he or she is just down the hall from the President. That ought
to be out of the Executive Office of the President and established as
an independent agency.
We went well beyond that in a title particularly that was added in
our committee, most of the work of which was done by Senator Levin,
which is all about the independence of the office, the objectivity of
the intelligence that the adviser, the director gives to the President,
to the country, to the agencies he serves, independence even to the
extent that we say the national intelligence director should be like
the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board in this sense: that he does
not need administration approval to testify before Congress, does not
need his testimony cleared, if you will, by the OMB.
So there is a lot built in here that is meant to guarantee, as best a
statute can, the independence of this office, without hamstringing--if
that is the right phrase here--a President with a national intelligence
director in whom he does not have trust or in whom he loses trust as
time goes on.
But this is that critical a position. I would not want to give a
national intelligence director a set term any more than I would want to
give a Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, Director of OMB, or
National Security Adviser fixed terms. These are positions that must
every day be filled by people who enjoy the confidence and trust of the
President of the United States.
For that reason, I oppose the amendment and urge our colleagues to do
so as well.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Murkowski). The Senator from Pennsylvania.
Mr. SPECTER. Madam President, I think Senator Lieberman has advanced
an argument in support of my amendment. If I could have the attention
of Senator Lieberman, when I quote him, I want to quote him to his
face. I want him to hear what I have to say.
I say to Senator Lieberman, we agree more often than we disagree,
although we are at odds on two of my amendments today.
But when the distinguished Senator from Connecticut cites the
relationship between President Clinton and FBI Director Freeh, I think
he is supporting my argument. He is supporting my argument about the
need for independence. There was an investigation being conducted by
the FBI on campaign finance irregularities, and the President--I would
not call him a subject, but he was a part of those who were being
looked into on the soft money issue.
Then, without unduly belaboring the point, on this floor we had the
impeachment proceeding. Issues involved were obstruction of justice and
perjury. So the kind of independence the Director of FBI had by virtue
of a 10-year term, I think, served the Nation well.
Going back to the administration of President Nixon, without going
into any detail, you had activities by the FBI Director which led to
this 10-year term to insulate the Director from the appointing
authority by the President.
When the chairwoman refers to a philosophy of having the national
intelligence director, appointed by a preceding President, serving the
President, I suggest this is not like a Cabinet officer, such as the
Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense, who is supposed to
carry out the policy of the President, who is supposed to have the same
philosophy. Here we have a national intelligence director who is
supposed to tell the President what the objective facts are on
intelligence. It is inevitable in human relations, if you know what
somebody wants to hear, an inclination to tell somebody what that
person wants to hear, especially if that person is the appointing
power.
So on the question of confidence and trust, I think the American
people would have more confidence and trust in a national intelligence
director who is independent from the President.
When the talk and the argument is made about an adviser, here again,
the national intelligence director is not an adviser like the Secretary
of State or the Secretary of the Treasury or the Secretary of Health
and Human Services, carrying out the President's policies and seeking
to give him advice to carry out those policies. Here we want somebody
who will be strong and independent and objective and tell it like it
is, even if it is not what the President wants to hear, and even if it
contradicts the policies which the President wants to carry out.
This bill does contain some elements stressing the independence of
the national intelligence director such as not requiring permission to
testify before Congress, putting affirmative obligations on the
national intelligence director to keep the Congress informed as well as
the chief executive informed.
I think this is an important addition, to have a strong, independent,
objective national intelligence director.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, first let me say to Senator Specter
that he is quite right, we do, much more often than not, agree on
matters. Unfortunately this amendment is not one of them,
notwithstanding the arguments he just made.
There is an interesting historical note we are familiar with that
when the 10-year term for the FBI Director came into effect, I was not
here, but I gather it was as a matter of reform as against the
effective lifetime term that the former Director, Mr. Hoover, had. So
that was in that reality.
Here is the circumstance I am worried about. We have done everything
we can in this bill to create independence in the national intelligence
director position and to set standards that say: You have to level with
the President. The worst thing that can happen is if you feel you have
to create a good personal relationship and satisfy policy desires. In
fact, we have language in here that is quite remarkable that says the
national director ``must provide intelligence to the President that is
timely, objective, independent of political consideration, and based on
all sources available to the intelligence community, information that
has not been shaped to serve policy considerations, that comes from a
variety of intelligence assessments and analytical views.''
I am quoting directly from our proposal.
We have set up the office of ombudsman, a very unusual office, and,
thanks to a combination of Senator Rockefeller and Senator Shelby,
created within it an analytical review unit which will do a kind of
quality control on the work of the intelligence director, again to try
to ensure that there is a real independence and objectivity and
willingness to speak the truth.
The situation I would worry about, if we have a director for a fixed
year term of 10 years, would be that the President simply loses
confidence in that director for one reason or another. So on critically
important questions such as we have seen in our time--do you send
American troops into combat, what foreign policy do we adopt toward
threatening nations such as Iran and North Korea--if you have a
President lacking confidence or trust, and it could be in the
competence of the individual or in his or her dispassion or
objectivity, you leave the President either without adequate
intelligence advice on matters of great national importance or you
encourage the President to end-run the national intelligence director,
go directly to the head of the CIA and other agencies. That is not a
healthy situation.
Of course, it totally undercuts exactly what we are trying do to do,
which is to create a national intelligence director who will oversee
the total intelligence community. For those reasons, in this situation,
I continue to oppose the Specter amendment.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that at 2 p.m.
today, the Senate proceed to a vote in relation to the Specter
amendment No. 3761, regarding a 10-year term, provided that no
amendment be in order to the amendment prior to that vote. I also ask
consent that following that vote, the Senate proceed to a vote in
relation to the Specter amendment No. 3706 regarding the NID
consolidation, again with no second degrees in order
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to the amendment prior to the vote on the first degree. And finally, I
ask that the order with respect to the statements of Senator Harkin and
Senator Stevens begin following those two votes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. REID. Reserving the right to object, could we change that request
to 2:15 p.m. rather than 2 o'clock?
Ms. COLLINS. I would so modify the request.
Mr. REID. The other is in the form of a question. What could happen
here is one person could get the floor and keep it until 2:15. We need
some ability to make sure there is an equitable distribution of time
during the next 2 hours. I am wondering if the chairmen have an idea
how we can divide the time. I see a couple of Senators on the floor.
Any one of them could get the floor and talk until 2:15.
Ms. COLLINS. I would say to the Senator that we would welcome people
coming to the floor with their amendments. Generally, these amendments
are not breaking down along party lines.
Mr. REID. We have two votes set at 2:15. My question, though, is, are
we going to divide the time prior to that or just let things happen as
they will? That is fine with us.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, if I may answer the question, my hope
is--and I believe it is the chairman's hope--that we will stay on the
bill and people will come over and introduce more amendments, that we
have more debate between now and 2:15.
Mr. REID. Is my friend saying the debate is basically completed on
these two amendments?
Ms. COLLINS. Senator Shelby and Senator DeWine wish to speak.
Mr. REID. If the two managers don't have a concern, I don't either.
What we would do is, if the statements are completed, there would be
nothing wrong with people setting the amendments aside and offering
other amendments.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Absolutely.
Ms. COLLINS. I believe we are very near the end of the debate.
Mr. REID. I have no objection.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Ms. COLLINS. I thank the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio.
Mr. DeWINE. Madam President, I come to the floor to support the
Specter amendment. I would first like to congratulate my colleague from
Maine for the fine job she has done. This is a very difficult bill to
put together. It has taken a lot of work. She and Senator Lieberman are
certainly to be congratulated.
I would call everyone's attention to the fact that the 9/11
Commission was not the first commission to point out the need for more
power in the person who is in charge of our intelligence. Just about
every commission that has looked at intelligence reform has come to
this conclusion.
Beginning in 1947, the period right after World War II gave birth to
the modern intelligence community. Ever since then, this has been a
problem. There was a grand compromise that was made at that time and
that compromise set us on this path. The situation, though, has gotten
worse and worse as time has gone on. And as some of my colleagues have
pointed out, we have reached the point where, when George Tenet knew
and understood, as frankly few people in this country did, about the
threat from Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida and declared war, he looked
around and frankly did not have the troops. And the reason he did not
have the troops was he did not control the budget. He did not have the
power.
He had the responsibility, but he did not have the power. So we have
a problem and everybody, I think, understands that. My concern all
along has been that we would create this new position, supposedly over
the entire intelligence community. Yet this new position would not have
the authority. I think Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman have given
that person authority, but I don't think, frankly, they have gone far
enough.
If you look at the language Senator Specter has included in his
amendment, it is a significant improvement over the language of this
bill. I ask my colleagues to read the language. If you are concerned
about giving this person authority, the Specter language is much
better. The worst thing we could do would be to create this new
position and think we have given him or her authority and not have
given them the authority.
I wonder if I may get the attention of my colleague from Maine at
this time, if I may explore with the Senator part of this bill. Again,
I thank my colleague for the great work she has done on this bill. I
believe she has done a very good job. I am trying to understand the
language. As I have told her privately and I have told her again
publicly, I prefer the Specter language. But I would like to clarify a
little bit what this new position, the NID position--whoever occupies
it--what he or she would be able to do under the Senator's bill. If I
may pose a couple of questions.
If we can start with the NGA and the whole issue of the satellites,
this has been a problem in the past. We don't have to on the floor
today go over the problem of the moving of satellites. I ask my
colleague this. Let's say that the NID did, in fact, want to move a
satellite positioned on country A, and wants to get intelligence from
country Z. What ability does that person have to do that? Can you point
to the specific language in the bill that would get this done very
quickly?
Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I will find the specific language to
show the Senator from Ohio. I have the language. The NID would
establish collection and analysis requirements for the Intelligence
Community, determine collection and analysis priorities, manage and
issue collection and analysis tasking, and resolve conflicts in the
tasking abilities of the intelligence community. So the language is
very clear that the NID would have enhanced authority to resolve the
kinds of conflicts that sometimes do occur now on the allocation of
satellite resources, for example.
Mr. DeWINE. So it is the Senator's feeling that--and everything is
very time sensitive--in a matter of hours this person could make the
decision and basically order this to be done?
Ms. COLLINS. The Senator is correct. Perhaps it will be of some
comfort to the Senator from Ohio to know that the language in this
regard was suggested to our committee by Senator Roberts and comes from
his bill. There is very strong language regarding the issue the Senator
has raised.
Mr. DeWINE. I appreciate that. If my colleague could answer this: In
a real-world situation, when we are dealing with satellites--and we
will not go into the countries on the floor--if a decision had to be
made in a matter of hours, if we need this information and we need to
move from here to there, could that be ordered? I am using the
word ``ordered.'' I am not talking about consultation or prayer
together. I am talking about ordering it. Can that be ordered? Can this
person order this to be done, saying it will be done, I don't care what
anybody else says?
Ms. COLLINS. As I indicated to the Senator from Ohio--and I thought I
was very clear in answering his question--it says the NID can issue
directions in the collection and analysis tasking. I think the language
is very clear that the answer is yes.
Mr. DeWINE. I appreciate what the language is, but I want to know,
for the history we are establishing today, if my colleague believes
that would include the term ``order.'' In other words, a direction that
this will be done.
Ms. COLLINS. The term of art is the issue. That is the correct legal
language to use. It is adopted from Senator Roberts' bill. My answer is
yes.
Mr. DeWINE. I appreciate that.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. If the chairman will yield, these are very important
questions the Senator from Ohio is raising. I want to assure him,
first, that we raised the same questions during our committee's
deliberation, including meetings with the heads of these national
intelligence agencies that are within the Department of Defense. The
Senator from Ohio is undoubtedly aware of the reality, which is that
the current Director of Central Intelligence has the authority under
law to convene a committee, an interagency committee, which every day
apparently makes, as one witness said to us, thousands of decisions
about where our signal intelligence and image intelligence assets go.
In fact, one of the heads of an agency said he didn't remember a time
when there was an inability to agree. There is also, clearly,
[[Page S9887]]
in the end, both in current law, as I understand it, and in the
proposal we are making, if the rare situation occurs, you have to have
somebody in power to make that decision. Now it is the CIA. Under our
proposal, it would be the national intelligence director.
Mr. DeWINE. I appreciate the response. I was just saying to my
colleague that my understanding of the reading of recent history has
been that the power has not been adequate, with all due respect, and
that the history has indicated there have been times when it has not
been satisfactory, the results have not been where they should have
been, which would indicate to me that the status quo is not acceptable.
That is why I am asking whether the new language--I am trying to
understand whether the new language is a significant improvement over
the status quo. We are on the floor under the understanding that the
status quo is not acceptable. I congratulate my colleagues for trying
to improve the status quo. I know they are working to do that. That is
why I asked that question.
Let me move on to another question.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. If the Senator will yield, if I may respond. I want to
refer the Senator to page 14 of our bill in section 4, enumerating the
powers of the national intelligence director. We say ``establish
collection and analysis requirements for the intelligence community to
determine collection and analysis priorities, issue and manage
collection analysis tasking, and resolve conflicts in the tasking of
elements of the intelligence community within the national intelligence
program, except as otherwise agreed with the Secretary of Defense
pursuant to the direction of the President.''
So this is language that completely mirrors existing statute for the
Director of Central Intelligence. From testimony we heard, it is
fortunately working very well that the conflicts, by the testimony of
at least one head of one of the agencies, just do not occur; they work
it out.
Mr. DeWINE. I say to my colleague that there are Members besides
myself who can privately tell the Senator that there is a history that
would indicate this does not work, that the status quo is not
acceptable.
If what the Senator is telling me today is this is not really much
change from the status quo, then I say to my colleague that we have a
major problem.
I reference the language in the old law. I think my colleague may be
right, and let me read the old law, which is the status quo today, and
this is the power that the head of the intelligence community has
today: establish the requirements and priorities to govern the
collection of national intelligence by elements of the intelligence
community; next, approve collection requirements; determine collection
priorities and resolve conflicts in collection priorities levied on
national collection assets, except as otherwise agreed with the
Secretary of Defense pursuant to the direction of the President.
Just on its face, one would think that resolving these conflicts is
already given to the DCI today, and that is why, frankly, I prefer the
language of the Specter amendment which talks about the director
overseeing the execution of the national intelligence program and to
supervise, direct, and control the operations, which to me is the key
language.
I yield to my colleague.
Ms. COLLINS. If the Senator would yield on that point, I do not want
the Senator to mistakenly believe there are no changes in our bill with
regard to current law. There is a very critical change.
Mr. DeWINE. If I could reclaim my time, the problem is the colleague
of the Senator just told me there was not much of a change at all, and
this is the problem with the language: One of the Senators saying there
is a change and the other saying there is not much change. That is
ambiguous, which is the problem, with all due respect to both of my
colleagues, who are great friends. It is the language; it is not the
Senators.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Perhaps it was my language that was confusing. I do
not think the statutory language is.
The fact is, there is an addition of authority to the NID--there is
no question about that--that the DCI does not have, and that is to
issue and manage collection and analysis tasking.
What I was trying to say earlier, and I want to distinguish this, is
the current law enables the DCI to convene the agency representatives,
which they do every day, to resolve and decide where our national
assets go, and then to resolve a conflict, as described in the language
that I read from, which is what the current DCI has.
We have added, very importantly, and the Senator is right, the
ability of the national intelligence director additionally to issue and
manage collection and analysis tasking.
Mr. DeWINE. Reclaiming my time, so there is a change?
Ms. COLLINS. If the Senator will yield?
Mr. DeWINE. I will yield.
Ms. COLLINS. There is a very significant change, as I said to the
Senator when he first raised this very important question. We recognize
that the current Director of the CIA cannot issue tasking, cannot
require the collection of information, under this section of the law.
That is why we took language recommended by Senator Roberts, included
it in the bill that I believe the Senator from Ohio may have
cosponsored, which strengthened that authority by adding the language,
``issue and manage collection and analysis tasking.'' That is not in
current law.
Mr. DeWINE. I appreciate that. I will have to go back and study this
a little bit more.
I say to my colleague from Maine, I am happy with her answer when she
responded to my question, can this be ordered, and her response, I
believe, was yes. In other words, under her bill the NID could order
the satellite to be moved. Because I think there is a problem.
The evidence is that in the past there have been some problems--I am
not saying it is a problem that occurs all the time; it probably gets
worked out most of the time--but there have been some problems and I
think this needs to be a situation where there has been a problem or
there might be a problem, be ordered, it has to be. So I certainly
appreciate the response.
Let me ask another question, if I could. Moving to the area of signal
intelligence, NSA, let us say the NID, under the Senator's bill,
decided it was in our national interest to move the assets, move the
resources, from listening to country X to terrorist Y organization. It
is the same type of issue but again a real world issue. We are moving
our assets; we have to make this decision very quickly in the real
world. Could that person order that to be done?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Maine.
Ms. COLLINS. If the Senator would yield for a response.
Mr. DeWINE. I yield.
Ms. COLLINS. My answer would be the same. The NID has the authority,
has the power, to use the words of Senator from Ohio, to issue these
orders, to task these agencies to carry out these directives.
I note that because the NID has the authority to manage the budgets
of these agencies, he has a pretty big stick to use as enforcement.
Mr. DeWINE. If we can just talk back and forth a minute, let me
interject and then the Senator can respond. I appreciate the progress
the Senator has made in regard to the budget, and I think that is very
important, but we have seen from our work on the Intelligence
Committee, in looking at the intelligence community, a lot of these
decisions that are being dealt with in the real world, are very time
sensitive so when a budget change is made, we are talking about the
next year or 2 years. Those are very important. They are changing
directions. That is important. So I congratulate the Senator for making
that change.
I am not concerned that the Senator has not done that in her bill.
The Senator has done that. What I am concerned about is the execution.
For example, I see in the Specter language: direct, oversee, execute
the national intelligence program. Then he goes on to say: supervise,
direct, and control the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency,
the National Security Agency, et cetera.
So what I see in the Specter language that gives me a great deal of
comfort is
[[Page S9888]]
``supervise, direct, control operations.'' To me, ``operations'' is the
key language because now we are dealing with things that are very time
sensitive.
What I worry about is not the long-term planning. I am convinced that
the Senator has taken care of that and I congratulate her for that.
What I worry about is real world examples that I have now, such as we
are listening to one country, or we have assets over here that we need
to move very quickly over here and target a terrorist organization, and
say we have limited assets, can we do that. It is a hypothetical, but
could that decision be made?
Ms. COLLINS. Madam President, I think the Senator from Ohio is
raising excellent, important questions in this debate, but he is
creating a misimpression of what the bill does with regard to budget
authority.
This is not 1 year off or 2 years off. The NID has budget execution
authority, not just putting the budget together for presentation and
recommendation to the President; he executes the budget as the year
goes by. He has strong authority to reprogram funds with congressional
approval and notification, I hasten to say, and to transfer funds.
He has extensive authority to transfer personnel. He has the right
under our bill to appoint the heads of these agencies with concurrence
from the Secretary of Defense. That is a major change from current law.
If the Senator from Ohio is saying, as he is, that the NID should
have direct line authority over the day-to-day operations of these
combat support agencies, I disagree with the Senator from Ohio. I
believe it does not make sense and, in fact, the NID could not handle
running these agencies day to day. As Senator Levin indicated earlier,
you would have to create an enormous supervisory staff within the
office of the NID if you were going to transfer that authority from the
Secretary of Defense. Clearly, the NID has the authority to direct the
collection and analysis of information by the heads of these agencies,
but I do not think he should be running them day to day.
Mr. DeWINE. If I could follow that up with a question, since the
Senator raised it--and I think I know her answer, but I want to make
sure I do understand her answer--talking about moving people around,
according to the newspapers--this is what is published in the
newspapers--there is a problem with a backlog apparently in listening
to tapes of intercepts, at least that is what has been in the
newspaper. Would the NID have the authority to move linguists from one
agency to another to correct that problem? For example, if they had to,
they could move them from the DIA to the CIA?
Ms. COLLINS. Absolutely.
Mr. DeWINE. This person, he or she, could pick up the phone and say:
We are going to move 50 people, 100 people from over here to over
there?
Ms. COLLINS. Absolutely.
Mr. DeWINE. This person does not have to call the SECDEF, does not
have to do anything?
Ms. COLLINS. If the Senator will yield so I can respond to his
question.
Mr. DeWINE. Surely.
Ms. COLLINS. There is very strong authority for the NID to transfer
personnel who are working within the national intelligence program
throughout the Federal Government and, indeed, I would envision the
staffing of the National Counterterrorism Center would come from the
NID taking linguists, analysts, operatives, collectors--all sorts of
expertise--from the various intelligence agencies. And I know for a
fact we need to give the NID that power because I visited with the head
of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center who does not have that power
and finds it very difficult to get the personnel resources he needs.
Mr. DeWINE. I appreciate the answer. So the Senator is sa
