Congressional Record: September 7, 2004 (Senate)
Page S8864-S8915
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS
Mr. McCAIN (for himself, Mr. Lieberman, Mr. Specter, Mr. Bayh,
Mr. Graham of South Carolina, Mr. Daschle, Mrs. Clinton, Mr.
Nelson of Florida, Mr. Corzine, and Ms. Mikulski):
S. 2774. A bill to implement the recommendations of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, and for other
purposes; read the first time.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, this week marks the third anniversary of
that terrible day in 2001 when terrorists attacked America's commercial
and governmental capitals. On that occasion, in the largest attack ever
on American soil, 2,973 innocent individuals lost their lives. The
victimization of America went beyond this astounding number, with
physical injuries to many, damage to our Nation's economy, and
psychological trauma among millions who witnessed these shocking
events.
While nothing we do can erase this pain, we can honor and pay tribute
to those who have suffered by ensuring that terrorists never again
attack our land. We have come a long way since 2001 in enhancing this
country's ability to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks, but, as
the 9/11 Commission said in its final report, we are not yet safe.
Increasing our safety against terrorist attack requires new strategies,
new ways of thinking, and new ways of organizing our government.
Today I am pleased to be joined by Senators Lieberman, Specter, Bayh,
Graham of South Carolina, Daschle, and Clinton in introducing
legislation designed to implement the 9/11 Commission recommendations,
which were issued just prior to the August recess. Governor Tom Kean
and Representative Lee Hamilton have endorsed this bill, and assured us
that it accurately reflects the Commission's intent.
With the introduction of this bill, the Senate now has before it
legislation that addresses each of the Commission's 41 recommendations,
which together are designed to build unity of effort across the U.S.
Government--all in an effort to prevent future terrorist attacks. The
provisions of this bill outline the shape and objectives of a global
counterterrorism strategy, and suggest a reconfiguration of our
national security and homeland security apparatus within the U.S.
Government. As anyone who reads the legislation will quickly see, it
also cuts across jurisdictional lines with respect to the Senate
committee prerogatives. There are portions of this bill that deal with
intelligence, foreign affairs, defense, border security and commerce,
transportation security, and more. In normal times, naysayers would
caution that this fact alone could paralyze this body. But these are
not normal times. International terrorism poses a real and present
danger to the United States, and it is our responsibility as elected
officials to take action on the Commission's recommendations.
I would like to highlight some of the major aspects of the bill, and
I know that the other sponsors also will provide details on the bill's
structure.
The largest section of this bill concerns the reorganization of our
intelligence community. This legislation establishes a National
Intelligence Authority to unify the efforts of the community, and this
new entity would be headed by a National Intelligence Director, NID.
The NID also would act as the principal intelligence advisor to the
President, taking over this function from the Director of Central
Intelligence. The NID would have direct budgetary authority and
significant personnel authority over all of the intelligence agencies,
except those that generate intelligence that falls under the purview of
one department alone, such as tactical military intelligence. The NID
would have influence over the budgets for these other entities that do
provide this very specific intelligence. Assisting the NID would be
four deputies, including a principal deputy, another that serves
currently as the CIA Director and would handle foreign intelligence, a
deputy that also serves as the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence, and a fourth that handles domestic intelligence.
Also established in this bill is a National Counterterrorism Center
to oversee all of the U.S. Government counterterrorism operations,
including analysis, net assessments, and guidance for joint
counterterrorism operations. The center would be headed by a deputy-
level official who can adjudicate policy disagreements among the
agencies and, if need be, bump them up to the National Security Council
for a decision. In addition to the National Counterterrorism Center,
the bill authorizes the NID to establish ``National Intelligence
Centers'' that will address particular geographic or functional areas.
These centers will, like the NCTC, bring together the full range of
reporting and analysis on particular topics so that no one with a need
to know is cut out of the loop. There are also provisions designed to
ensure that increased centralization of the intelligence community does
not lead to a reduction in the range of analytical views available to
policymakers.
Finally in the intelligence title, the bill codifies the critical
reforms that Director Mueller has begun at the FBI, including his
efforts to improve the FBI's intelligence capabilities and develop a
personnel cadre that specializes in national security issues.
In its report, the 9/11 Commission found that the biggest impediment
to ``connecting the dots'' among diverse sources of homeland security
information is the widespread resistance to sharing. To address this
problem, the Commission recommended that the President create a new
``trusted information network'' modeled on a framework developed by a
Markle Foundation task force. This bill directs the President to create
an information network among all Federal departments and agencies with
responsibilities for homeland security, among State and local
authorities, and among relevant private sector entities. The
legislation describes key attributes that should be incorporated into
the network and sets forth an ambitious schedule for development and
implementation.
The Commission report stated that, ``Of all our recommendations,
strengthening congressional oversight may be among the most difficult
and important. So long as oversight is governed by current
congressional rules and resolutions, we believe the American people
will not get the security they want and need. The United States needs a
strong, stable, and capable congressional committee structure to give
America's national intelligence agencies oversight, support, and
leadership.''
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The Commission offered several options for how Congress should be
restructured to best provide for strong oversight over both
intelligence and homeland security. With respect to intelligence, it
recommended that Congress create either a joint committee modeled after
the Joint Atomic Energy Committee or House and Senate Committees with
combined authorizing and appropriating powers. With respect to homeland
security, it recommended that Congress create a single, principal point
of oversight and review, noting that DHS officials now appear before 88
different committees and subcommittees.
Late last month, the Senate leadership tasked a bipartisan working
group with examining how best to implement these recommendations and
asked it to report back to the leadership as soon as possible. In
recognition of this ongoing review, our bill does not propose the
committee structures we believe should be adopted, but instead includes
a Sense of the Congress that both houses of the 108th Congress adopt
all necessary rule changes so that the committee structures for the
109th Congress are revised in accordance with one of the options
recommended by the Commission.
It is incumbent on each member to put aside jurisdictional power
struggles and take action that is in the interest of securing our
homeland. We should strive to never again read a report that calls
Congressional oversight ``dysfunctional.'' We simply must heed the
Commissions call to action and fundamentally overhaul Congressional
oversight for intelligence and homeland security. As the Commission
stated, ``tinkering with the existing structure is not sufficient.''
As recommended by the Commission, we have included provisions to help
ensure that an incoming President-elect can start putting together his
national security team during a transition between administrations. Our
legislation would establish procedures for expediting security
clearances and Senate consideration of top national security
appointees, as well as any necessary clearances for presidential
transition team members. In addition, it directs the President to
consolidate security clearance responsibilities in a single Federal
agency, and to work with the new NID to set uniform standards for
granting security clearances so that they are accepted by all Federal
agencies.
One lesson from the Commissions report is that no one set of
strategies is sufficient to prevent future terrorist attacks. The
United States must use all of the instruments at our disposal to
counter the short and long-term threats posed by international
terrorism. For this reason, we have devoted an entire title of the bill
to the role of diplomacy, foreign aid, and the military. The
legislation would renew the U.S. commitment to Pakistan's future, in
light of the critical role that country plays in the war on terror, and
authorizes a substantial increase in aid to Afghanistan. It addresses
our relations with Saudi Arabia and suggests establishing an
international contact group to develop a multilateral counterterrorism
strategy. Other provisions in our bill will enhance America's ability
to fight the war of ideas by promoting universal values of democracy,
tolerance, and openness. It authorizes increased funding for U.S.
broadcasts to Muslim countries and would ramp up the scale of education
and exchange programs.
This bill notes that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
is a grave and gathering threat to this country, and suggests ways to
strengthen our nonproliferation programs. And, since portrayals of
mistreatment of captured terrorists hinders our ability to engage in
the wider struggle against them, this legislation both reiterates
standards for their humane treatment once captured, and calls on the
U.S. Government to develop a common approach to detainee treatment,
along with its coalition partners.
One significant way to prevent future terrorist attacks on American
soil is to stop terrorists from entering the country in the first
place. This bill contains a number of provisions that would enhance the
security of our borders, transportation systems and critical
infrastructure. For example, our legislation requires the Secretary of
Homeland Security to work with multiple government agencies to develop
a unified strategy to intercept terrorists, find terrorist
facilitators, and constrain terrorist mobility both domestically and
internationally. In addition, to efficiently screen persons entering
the United States, we must integrate the multiple terrorist screening
systems already in place. This bill would require the Secretary of
Homeland Security to develop a comprehensive screening system that
brings together an integrated network of screening points, and to work
to fully implement the entry and exit functions of the U.S. VISIT
system at all ports of entry as quickly as possible.
The Commission also pointed out what appears to be a gaping hole in
our border security. I am referring to the ability of people who claim
to be United States citizens to orally attest to their citizenship when
passing from Canada or Mexico into the United States. Numerous reports,
including a recent GAO study, point to our porous borders as potential
terrorist entryways into this country. Our legislation would require
everyone entering the U.S. to present a passport, at a minimum.
Of course, travel documents only work insofar as they are authentic
and can be authenticated by our officials. Our bill requires the
Secretary of Homeland Security to establish uniform Federal standards
for driver's licenses and birth certificates. It is long past time that
we take action to protect these documents from being used to commit
identity theft, terrorism, and other criminal acts.
Although there has been considerable progress in tightening
transportation security since September 11, the Commission made several
recommendations to further improve the system. For example, the
computer systems and protocols used to vet passengers before they board
a plane are not substantially different than the systems that failed to
prevent the 9/11 hijackers from boarding their flights. Therefore in
this legislation we require the Transportation Security Administration
to take over and improve the no-fly list process, and to improve the
screening of air passengers for explosives and the screening of air
cargo. In addition, we require DHS to set risk-based priorities for
defending various transportation assets, and then figure out a plan and
budget to get the job done.
Mr. President, I am in full agreement with the Commission that we
need to broadly address transportation security vulnerabilities. In
fact, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation has
already reported several legislative measures designed to improve the
security of other transportation modes. A maritime security bill was
signed into law in 2002, and we reported a subsequent maritime security
measure earlier this year. We also reported, and the Senate has passed,
a bus security bill, and our rail security legislation is pending on
the Senate Calendar. These measures must be enacted before we adjourn.
The Commission made a number of recommendations to further our
national preparedness and emergency response efforts. Its report states
that ``homeland security assistance should be based strictly on an
assessment of risks and vulnerabilities,'' and implores that ``Congress
should not use this money as a pork barrel.'' I heartily agree. In
following this recommendation, the legislation directs the Secretary of
Homeland Security to allocate assistance based on the threats, risks,
and vulnerabilities facing a community, along with its population and
other specific criteria. It also establishes an expert advisory panel
to develop benchmarks for assessing the homeland security needs and
capabilities of various communities, and rescinds the current formula
for homeland security grants.
The bill would also require certain broadcasters to vacate their
television channels in a crisis so that their airwaves are available to
first responders, and ensure that public safety organizations have
access to this spectrum no later than January 1, 2007. In addition, it
directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to work with other officials
in developing effective communications capabilities, including back-up
support. These steps are vital for closing the existing gaps in
interoperability of emergency communications systems.
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The Commissioners pointed out that the private sector controls 85
percent of the critical infrastructure in the Nation. Our bill directs
the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish a program to promote
private sector preparedness for terrorism and other emergencies. It
also directs the Secretary to report to Congress regularly on the
adequacy of the government's plans to protect our Nation's critical
infrastructure.
All of us who are concerned with threats to this Nation's security
also wish to ensure that our efforts to protect Americans do not
infringe on our civil liberties. After all, giving up the way of life
we have fought so hard to defend is not an acceptable price for greater
security. We must find a way to balance the two, and that is what this
bill proposes to do. It creates a Privacy and Civil Liberties Board, as
well as designated privacy and civil liberties officers within relevant
Federal agencies, to analyze actions the enhanced security measures
taken by our government and to ensure that civil liberties are
appropriately considered as these policies are developed. The Board,
which would reside within the Executive Office of the President, would
advise the President and Federal agencies on the privacy and civil
liberties implications of proposed and extant laws, as well as
authority to oversee Federal agencies to ensure that civil liberties
are being protected.
In addition, the legislation requires certain agency heads to
designate senior officers to serve as privacy and civil liberties
resources and watchdogs. Among these officers' responsibilities is
ensuring that their agency has a process in place to receive,
investigate, and respond to complaints from people who report privacy
or civil liberties violations.
Having described the bill we are introducing today, I'd like to
reiterate that it addresses each of the Commission's recommendations--
not more, not less. The sponsors all recognize that other legislative
proposals will be offered that address the security of our Nation in
the face of terrorist threats. In particular, I want to acknowledge the
efforts by Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman, the Chairman and
Ranking Member of the Senate Government Affairs Committee. That
Committee has a key leadership role in this area, and it is one that I
greatly respect. I know that they are working to report a bipartisan
reform proposal to reform the Intelligence community in the days ahead
and look forward to Senate debate on their proposal.
The sponsors of today's legislation remain open to all proposals, and
in fact, will have additional suggestions of our own. But the
introduction of our legislation today ensures that the commendable work
of the 9/11 Commission has a real opportunity to be debated, amended,
and adopted. Despite the short and crowded legislative calendar, we
urge the leadership to allow for debate on this and other proposals to
address the 9/11 Commission's recommendations. Even in an election
year, there is no higher priority than defending the American people
against threats to their security.
Mr. President, there has been much talk over recent months about the
importance of firm resolve in the face of threats to America's security
and its integrity. This legislation presents the Congress with an
opportunity this year to exhibit some resolve of our own. While we will
act in the shadow of the dark hours of September 11, we can show the
American people--and the world--that this government is committed to
facing down the worst threats that face us today. We can move forward--
yes, in an election year, yes, by actually finding agreement regardless
of party or committee assignment--to better protect and preserve the
security of this Nation. With the Senate's serious and thorough
consideration of the Commission's recommendations, we will honor those
who have been patient enough to afford us this opportunity to change.
I will make two additional comments. One, we need to reform the
institutions of government. This blueprint which outlines in
legislative form the recommendations of the September 11 Commission are
exactly that, a blueprint. I am confident that the Committee on
Governmental Affairs, under the outstanding leadership of the Senator
from Maine, Ms. Collins, working with Senator Lieberman, Senator
Specter, and other members of the committee, will produce a legislative
product of which everyone can be very proud. They have already begun a
series of hearings, and I have complete confidence in their
deliberations and their results.
Let me also say that one of the most difficult aspects of reform will
be reform of the institutions here and in the other body. There is no
doubt that either one of the two committee recommendations--that there
be a joint committee along the lines of the now defunct Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy or two separate permanent committees. Those committees
have to have budgetary authority. They must be able to appropriate. If
not, those committees will be debating societies and they will not have
the influence or power necessary or authority necessary to supervise
America's intelligence operations.
There are many other areas and many other ideas, including those of
the White House and the executive branch that need to be taken into
consideration. But I think this is a good start because if there is one
thing all of us can agree on it is that the recommendations of the 9/11
Commission have been embraced by virtually one and all, clearly, with
some reservations because it is not a perfect document. But overall,
the overwhelming majority of Americans expect that we should act on
this blueprint as a blueprint, but, second of all, that we should act--
that we should act.
There is no disagreement that our intelligence agencies and our
ability to obtain the vital information that is necessary to maintain
our national security and prevent another terrorist attack require us
to act in an expeditious fashion.
I understand the majority leader, in consultations with Senator
Daschle, has laid out a schedule for the Governmental Affairs Committee
to report out the last week in September. I think that is a very
worthwhile cause.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, it is good to see you after the recess.
I thank my colleague and dear friend from Arizona, Senator McCain, for
his comments. I support him in substance and in spirit, which is to say
the urgency of Congress reacting to the report of the 9/11 Commission.
It was shortly after September 11 that Senator McCain and I
introduced legislation, with Senators Specter, Bayh, and others,
creating the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States. We believed--and we know so many others agreed--that the Nation
needed to know as clearly and definitively as possible what had
happened, why it had happened, and what could be done to prevent such a
heinous attack from ever happening again.
In particular, most understandably and movingly, the families of the
9/11 victims rightly demanded that we learn all we could from the
tragedy that took their loved ones from them. In its 20-month
existence, the Commission, headed by Governor Thomas Kean and
Congressman Lee Hamilton, brought a laser focus to its task. The
Commission insisted on talking to the people and seeing the documents
that could help them understand and tell the full story. The result is
not only a definitive account of what happened on September 11, but
also a very thoughtful and compelling analysis of why it happened and
where we must go from here. And I take it to be a sign of not only
tribute to the Commission but of the public concern and interest in
what the Commission had to say, that the published volume of its
report, unlike any I have known of in a long time, remains a bestseller
throughout our country.
So today, Senator McCain, Senator Specter, Senator Bayh, and I join
together again to introduce the 9/11 Commission Report Implementation
Act of 2004. This legislation embraces and expresses in legislative
language all 41 of the recommendations in the Commission's final
report. Some of those, involving calls to restructure the intelligence
community, have already been the focus of extensive debate. Others,
such as the proposals to crack down on fraudulent identification
documents or to build new bridges to the Muslim world, have gotten less
discussion. But
[[Page S8867]]
they are all--each and every one of them--the product of the
outstanding and diligent work of the Commission and therefore deserve,
indeed command, our attention. We did not attempt to pick and choose
which of the 41 recommendations should be considered or legislated, or
to edit the Commission's policy conclusions. Indeed, there are one or
two areas where I might take a different approach to the concerns the
Commission has raised. But the Commission's recommendations should be
our starting point. And I believe in many cases, probably most, they
should be our ending point as well.
Introducing this legislation is the fulfillment of the promise we
made on the day the Commission issued its report: that we would express
its proposals in legislation. At that time we had no idea whether
anything would happen on the Commission report in August or September
or October. It was that night that Senators Frist and Daschle, our
bipartisan leadership, asked our Governmental Affairs Committee to
assume responsibility for considering the Commission's report and
making a set of proposals to the Senate no later than October 1.
This proposal we now introduce today will go to the Governmental
Affairs Committee, formally or informally, to inform the work it is
doing. The Governmental Affairs Committee now has the ball and will
report to Congress, and is on a schedule, I am pleased to say, to
report in advance of the deadline set by Senators Frist and Daschle, in
advance of October 1.
So what does the Commission and therefore this legislation call for?
The Commission's final report depicts a nation that was woefully
unprepared for the attacks of September 11. As the Commission
concludes: We need a new strategic vision to confront terrorism and a
new unified effort to carry out that strategy. Such unity can only be
achieved through a dramatic transformation of the status quo of our key
organizations and policies. That is the first order of business.
The Commission has described how, in the course of its investigation,
it repeatedly asked this question: Who was in charge prior to September
11, and who is in charge today? And it never received a satisfactory
answer. In fact, Governor Kean and Congressman Hamilton testified to us
before our Governmental Affairs Committee that they still cannot point
to some one individual in charge of the American intelligence effort,
its enormous human and technological assets, and, therefore, no one who
is personally accountable.
This is unacceptable. This legislation rightly creates a national
intelligence director to serve as head of the intelligence community
and principal adviser to the President for national intelligence
matters. The director will have strong budget, resource, and personnel
authority to shape priorities and break down the kinds of turf barriers
and stovepipes that stood in the way of our Government pulling together
in one place all the information we knew prior to September 11--
information that might well have prevented the attacks of September 11
from occurring.
These powers are far stronger than the current authorities exercised
by the Director of Central Intelligence. This will create the
capability and the accountability for someone to truly lead a unified
intelligence effort that will, in turn, greatly benefit the specific
fight against terrorism. This intelligence director will operate
through a new agency, to be called the National Intelligence Authority.
This is not a large new bureaucracy, but rather a command, control and
coordination center to achieve a unified intelligence effort. Although
the Commission originally called for this office to be created within
the White House, numerous experts counseled against this and the
Commissioners themselves now agree with that counsel. As a result, this
legislation creates the National Intelligence Authority as an
independent entity.
To help guarantee the government-wide antiterrorism cooperation that
did not exist pre-9/11, the legislation also creates a National
Counterterrorism Center, patterned on the joint commands of the
Department of Defense, drawing on expertise from throughout the
intelligence community. This center will serve as an analytic fusion
center on terrorism, and will also have responsibility to develop
operational plans for counterterrorism initiatives, and then to track
and monitor the operations' implementation. As such, the center will
build on the promise of the new multi-agency Terrorist Threat
Integration Center it would replace, but go beyond that model to create
an even more robust center that combines analytical and operational
capabilities.
As recommended by the Commission, the legislation also provides for
the creation by the National Intelligence Director of a number of
national intelligence centers focused on either specific topics like
weapons of mass destruction or specific geographic areas such as the
Middle East. These centers will bring together the most experienced
intelligence experts from across the intelligence community on a given
issue or region, and can be created or eliminated as needed, giving us
the flexibility to hone in on evolving priorities.
I am pleased these intelligence reform proposals have already been
the focus of numerous hearings, and these issues, as I have said, will
be under active consideration in the Governmental Affairs Committee in
the coming days.
The work on this legislation and the work that the Governmental
Affairs Committee is doing has proceeded distinctly, separately, but
collaboratively, and work on each has informed and, I believe,
strengthened the other.
I hope--I know the cosponsors of this legislation share that hope--
the package we are introducing today will be of real help to the
Governmental Affairs Committee as it frames the legislation it--we--
will report out to the Senate. I am confident the Senate can actually
begin to consider it well before the end of September.
The intense debate over the Commission's recommendations on
intelligence reform may have obscured the sweeping proposals the
Commission made in other areas--very strong and important proposals on
border and transportation security, on information sharing, on national
preparedness and congressional oversight.
Those proposals are included in this legislation as well. As a
result, we hope its introduction will jump-start debate and
consideration of those other vital reforms.
First, the Commission stressed we must do all we can to stop this
problem at the source--that is, to alter the conditions and dynamics
that give rise to terrorism in the first place. This legislation
includes the recommendations to strengthen our efforts to fight
international terrorism using such tools as diplomacy and foreign aid.
For instance, the legislation would increase U.S. foreign assistance to
Afghanistan and renew our commitment to Pakistan. It would enhance our
outreach to the Muslim world through U.S. broadcasts to the region,
educational exchange programs and a fund to boost educational
opportunities for Muslim youth.
This will be a long and difficult challenge, however, and we must
assume international terrorism will be with us for years to come and
prepare accordingly. In addition to the intelligence community reforms
I have already mentioned, the Commission calls for a range of new
programs and policies to combat terror.
Information sharing is one such critical step. Terrorism has made the
homeland part of the frontlines, but too many government officials
still believe information related to terrorist threats must be
carefully hoarded among a select group. Even colleagues within the
intelligence community are often not trusted with vital information,
much less officials outside the national security elites or in state
and local government. We must break down these information barriers and
engage a far broader community in the task of fighting terrorism. This
will would create an urgently needed information sharing network to
break down the information stovepipes that currently hamper our efforts
to stay one step ahead of the terrorists. The network, which is modeled
on a proposal by a task force of the Markle Foundation, would consist
of policies and information technology designed to facilitate and
promote sharing of terrorism information throughout the Federal
government, with state and local agencies and, as appropriate, the
private sector.
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The President will be required to submit an implementation plan to
Congress, including clear deadlines, assignment of responsibilities and
budget requirements. The proposal includes safeguards for privacy and
civil liberties.
The bill includes critical provisions to restrict terrorist travel--
the strategies and methods by which terrorists can, and did, come to
this country and position themselves for attacks. It would expand our
efforts to collect and utilize intelligence regarding terrorist travel
strategies and methods. The legislation also requires an integrated
screening system to ensure adequate screening at the nation's entry
points and to access transportation systems and critical
infrastructure. Complementary provisions in the bill require stronger
document requirements for all travelers, including citizens, to enter
the United States; acceleration of the automated biometric entry and
exit system known as U.S.-Visit; and improved security for
identification documents such as driver licenses and birth
certificates.
In the area of transportation security, the 9/11 Commission warned
against the government's heavy focus on passenger aviation to the near
exclusion of other modes of transportation. As its Final Report states,
``[o]ver 90 percent of the nation's $5.3 billion annual investment in
the [Transportation Security Administration] goes to aviation--to fight
the last war.'' Yet we are investing little in protecting the 14
million Americans who use transit systems each weekday, or safeguarding
our port systems that handle millions of shipping containers each year.
What is lacking, the Commission states, is ``a forward-looking
strategic plan systematically analyzing assets, risks, costs and
benefits.'' Following its recommendations, this legislation calls for a
comprehensive transportation security strategy to assess risks and set
priorities across all modes of transportation. It also seeks to close
ongoing gaps in aviation security by requiring the Transportation
Security Administration, rather than the airlines, to screen passenger
names against a consolidated terrorist watchlist. Additional aviation-
related measures include explosives screening for all passengers and
their carry-on bags, accelerated research and deployment of explosives
detection technologies, and measures to improve the security of cargo
traveling on passenger aircraft.
To help deter terrorist attacks and minimize the effect of any
attacks that do occur, we must improve our preparedness capabilities
and this legislation includes the Commission's recommended steps to do
so. The bill would require that homeland security preparedness grants
be distributed solely on the basis of criteria related to threat and
risk, eliminating the per state minimum in current law. It would
facilitate first responder communications by assigning certain radio
spectrum to public safety agencies for their use--an important step
toward solving the critical challenge of enabling first responders to
talk to one another during an emergency. Fighting terrorism is a
challenge for our entire national community and the Commission also
stressed the importance of preparedness within the private sector. This
legislation requires the Department of Homeland Security to promote a
voluntary preparedness standard for the private sector. It also presses
the Secretary of DHS to complete efforts to inventory the nation's
critical infrastructure, assess the threats and vulnerabilities
regarding these critical assets, and ensure there are measures to
protect them.
The Commission recognized that these new policies and programs will
raise important issues regarding privacy and civil liberties and called
for a new Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board to ensure the
protection of these liberties as laws and policies are developed and
implemented to protect the nation from terrorism. This legislation
creates such a board, which will consist of five individuals appointed
by the President and confirmed by the Senate. In addition to advising
the President and federal agencies, the board will have strong
authority to conduct investigations and oversight of government actions
in the war on terror.
Finally, as we look to the changes the Commission has urged for
executive branch structures and programs, we cannot neglect the
Commission's call to reform our own structures and its indictment of
the status quo of congressional oversight of intelligence. We have to
clean and reshape not only the executive branch, but we have to clean
out and reshape our own house.
The Commission concluded that the Intelligence Committees of the
House and Senate are not organized currently to provide the necessary
leadership and oversight for intelligence and counterterrorism, and
that jurisdiction over the Department of Homeland Security is also too
broadly dispersed.
The legislation we are introducing today incorporates the mandate of
the Commission that each Chamber reform its rules to create a more
powerful Intelligence Committee and to consolidate oversight of the
Department of Homeland Security in a single committee in each Chamber.
Clearly, we have our work cut out for us. But nothing is more
important than to respond not just in a timely but in an urgent way to
the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, and to do so, as the
Commission itself did, in a way that puts partisanship aside and our
national security first. The group of us introducing this legislation--
Senators McCain, Specter, Bayh, and I--stand shoulder to shoulder
across party lines to achieve a safer nation, to protect the American
people at home.
We are confident, as we go forward, that our colleagues on both sides
of the aisle will join us. There will be differences of opinion. It
would be shocking if there were not. Because the recommendations of the
Commission represent bold change and dramatically alter the status quo,
differences of opinion will naturally occur. They ought to occur. But I
am confident in the end they will not be partisan. In the end, we will
act and act quickly to implement much of the 9/11 Commission's report
so that we can say to the American people, particularly those who lost
loved ones on September 11, that we have taken action, done whatever we
possibly could to prevent a terrorist attack such as the one that
occurred on September 11, 2001, from ever happening again.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I am pleased to join my colleagues--
Senators McCain, Lieberman, and Bayh--in introducing this legislation
today which codifies the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. The 9/
11 Commission has accomplished a very important mission in stimulating
the demand of the American people that action be taken to put all of
our intelligence agencies under one command authority. Had this been
done prior to 9/11, it is my judgment that 9/11 could have been
prevented.
There was the famous FBI report from Phoenix about the suspicious
character who wanted to learn to fly an airplane but wasn't interested
in learning to take off or land. There were the suspicious people in
Kuala Lumpur who turned out to be two of the terrorists known by the
CIA to be al-Qaida, but it was not told to the INS to keep them out of
the country. There was the information on Zacarias Moussaoui and the
work of the FBI field office in Minneapolis with the 13-page, single-
spaced report filed by Agent Coleen Rowley. Those factors and others
gave clear-cut clues to what was happening or about to happen. Had they
been pursued and investigated, the chances are good that 9/11 could
have been prevented.
The Commission, in focusing public attention on the absolute
necessity to have one commander, has accomplished something which had
not been accomplished up until the present time. I served on the
Intelligence Committee back in 1987, when we had the investigation of
the Iran Contra affair. At that time I introduced legislation for a
national intelligence director looking more to oversight at that time.
In 1996, when I was chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, I
introduced legislation which would have provided budget and hiring
authority under the CIA Director. Technically, the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency has for some time--I believe going back to
1947--the overall direction of the intelligence community. But without
budget authority and without hiring and firing, it has been virtually
meaningless. But in 1996, I proposed that legislation.
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In 2002, we moved for the creation of an Office of Homeland Security.
Senator Lieberman and I introduced, 30 days after 9/11, legislation to
create the Department of Homeland Security. But there were various
objections to it, and the issue was not taken up seriously until mid-
2002. There was a real effort made in that legislation to have all of
the intelligence agencies under one command authority. The House of
Representatives passed a bill in October and left town, which they do
from time to time, leaving us with the option of either taking their
bill or not having a bill until the following spring.
At that time I had an amendment prepared to give the Secretary of
Homeland Security the authority to direct all of the other intelligence
agencies. As I have said on the record before, and it is worth
repeating briefly, I had a conversation that afternoon with Secretary
Ridge who urged me not to offer the amendment. I told him I thought it
had to be done. And when I declined to accept his recommendations, I
got a call from Vice President Cheney who urged the same course. When I
again declined, I later talked to the President that afternoon and
decided that I would await a later date to press for having that
authority to direct. But this has been a gaping hole in
the intelligence apparatus forever.
The Scowcroft Commission filed a report, still in confidential form
but widely reputed to create an individual in charge of the overall
intelligence agency. So, finally, we are coming to the point where we
are thinking very seriously about having one person in charge, a
national director of intelligence, thanks to the focus of the 9/11
Commission.
The Government Affairs Committee on which I serve, with the
leadership of Senator Collins, the chairman of the committee, and
Senator Lieberman, the ranking member, did something very unusual. We
returned in the first week of the recess on July 30 and held additional
hearings. In reviewing the work of the 9/11 Commission at that time, I
expressed for the record and would repeat now briefly the concerns I
have about the so-called double hatting. The 9/11 Commission has
recommended that the counterintelligence unit, for example, of the FBI
stay under the direction of the Director of the FBI but report also to
the national intelligence director so that the Director of the FBI
counterintelligence unit would be so-called double hatted.
Well, I do not think that can work under the very basic principle
that no one can serve two masters.
The same kind of concept is present on double hatting with the CIA
Director for the Department of Defense intelligence agencies. During
the course of the Governmental Affairs hearings, I asked Congressman
Lee Hamilton, cochairman of the 9/11 Commission, about the possibility
of creating the director with a 10-year term, modeled after the FBI
Director, to be able to have someone who would outlast the tenure of
Presidents. I think that is also a concept which ought to be
incorporated.
When the Governmental Affairs Committee was considering this issue
and legislation, I prepared a draft bill which I submitted to the
members of the Governmental Affairs Committee back on August 3 of this
year.
I think it would be useful to put it into the Record. I ask unanimous
consent that the text of that draft proposal be printed in the
Congressional Record following my statement.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. SPECTER. There are other proposals that have been made. The
chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Senator Roberts, has
proposed legislation. So we have a great many ideas to choose from. As
I sat at the Governmental Affairs hearing in early August, it was my
hope that we would report out a bill early. I am pleased to say
Chairman Collins has listed a markup for the week of September 20th, so
that we should have a bill to present to the Senate early on. Then it
is my hope we will act on this matter and act expeditiously. We have to
get it right.
These are complicated matters. We have been studying them for a very
long time. We have been studying them, to my personal knowledge, going
back to 1987 in legislation I introduced, and again in 1996, and with
the very extensive consideration of the legislation on homeland
security in 2002. So I think we are ready to move ahead and make the
kinds of judgments that are tough decisions, but that is the pay grade
around here. I think the time has come to act.
It may not be a perfect bill. I have been in the Senate for 24 years
now and I have not seen a perfect bill. The risks of inaction, in my
view, are much greater than the risks of action. We know enough to make
a sound judgment as to how to put the entire intelligence community
under one umbrella.
I see my colleague Senator Bayh on the floor. I yield the floor.
Exhibit 1
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the
``Intelligence Reformation Act of 2004'' or ``9-11 Act''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Findings; purposes.
Sec. 3. Definitions.
TITLE I--DEPARTMENT OF INTELLIGENCE
Subtitle A--Executive Department
Sec. 101. Executive department.
Sec. 102. Director of Intelligence.
Subtitle B--Office of the Director of Intelligence
Sec. 111. Office of the Director of Intelligence.
Sec. 112. Deputy Director of Intelligence.
Sec. 113. National Counterterrorism Center.
Sec. 114. Other national intelligence centers.
Sec. 115. Assistant Director of Intelligence for Research, Development,
and Procurement.
Sec. 116. Assistant Director of Intelligence for Civil Liberties and
Privacy.
Sec. 117. National Intelligence Council.
Sec. 118. General Counsel of the Department of Intelligence.
Sec. 119. Inspector General of the Department of Intelligence.
Sec. 120. Intelligence Comptroller.
Sec. 121. Chief Information Officer of the Department of Intelligence.
Sec. 122. Chief Financial Officer of the Department of Intelligence.
Sec. 123. Military status of Director of Intelligence and Deputy
Director of Intelligence.
Subtitle C--Mission, Responsibilities, and Authorities
Sec. 131. Provision of national intelligence.
Sec. 132. Responsibilities of Director of Intelligence.
Sec. 133. Authorities of Director of Intelligence.
TITLE II--ELEMENTS OF DEPARTMENT OF INTELLIGENCE
Subtitle A--Central Intelligence Agency
Sec. 201. Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 202. Mission; power and authorities.
Subtitle B--National Security Agency
Sec. 211. National Security Agency.
Sec. 212. Mission; power and authorities.
Subtitle C--National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
Sec. 221. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 222. Mission; power and authorities.
Subtitle D--National Reconnaissance Office
Sec. 231. National Reconnaissance Office.
Sec. 232. Mission; power and authorities.
Subtitle E--Other Offices
Sec. 241. Intelligence, counterterrorism, and counterintelligence
offices.
Sec. 242. Office of Civil Liberties and Privacy.
TITLE III--OTHER INTELLIGENCE MATTERS
Subtitle A--Modifications and Improvements of Intelligence Authorities
Sec. 301. Sense of Congress on availability to public of certain
intelligence funding information.
Sec. 302. Coordination between Director of Intelligence and Secretary
of Defense in performance of specific functions
pertaining to National Foreign Intelligence Program.
Sec. 303. Role of Director of Intelligence in certain recommendations
to the President on appointments to intelligence
community.
Sec. 304. Collection tasking authority.
Sec. 305. Oversight of combat support agencies of the intelligence
community.
Sec. 306. Improvement of intelligence capabilities of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.
Subtitle B--Restatement of Authorities on National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency
Part I--Missions
Sec. 311. Missions.
Sec. 312. Support for foreign countries on imagery intelligence and
geospatial information.
Part II--Maps, Charts, and Geodetic Products
Sec. 321. Maps, charts, and books.
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Sec. 322. Pilot charts.
Sec. 323. Sale of maps, charts, and navigational publications.
Sec. 324. Exchange of mapping, charting, and geodetic data with foreign
countries and international organizations.
Sec. 325. Public availability of maps, charts, and geodetic data.
Sec. 326. Civil actions barred.
Sec. 327. Treatment of certain operational files.
Part III--Personnel Management
Sec. 331. Management rights.
Sec. 332. Financial assistance to certain employees in acquisition of
critical skills.
Part IV--Definitions
Sec. 341. Definitions.
TITLE IV--TRANSITION MATTERS
Subtitle A--Modification of Authorities on Elements of Intelligence
Community
Sec. 401. Conforming modification of authorities on Central
Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 402. Other conforming modifications of law relating to missions,
responsibilities, and authorities of Director of
Intelligence and Director of Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 403. Conforming modification of authorities on certain Central
Intelligence Agency officers.
Sec. 404. Conforming modification of authorities on National Security
Agency.
Sec. 405. Inclusion of Department of Intelligence in intelligence
community.
Sec. 406. Repeal of superseded authorities on National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 407. Other conforming amendment.
Subtitle B--Other Transition Matters Relating to Intelligence
Sec. 411. Preservation of intelligence capabilities.
Sec. 412. General references to intelligence officials.
Subtitle C--Transfer of Elements
Sec. 421. Transfer of Terrorist Threat Integration Center.
Sec. 422. Transfer of Community Management Staff.
Sec. 423. Transfer of certain elements of Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
Subtitle D--Transfer of Functions
Sec. 431. Transfer of functions.
Sec. 432. Transitional authorities.
Sec. 433. Savings provisions.
Subtitle E--Other Matters
Sec. 441. Treatment of Department of Intelligence as executive
department.
Sec. 442. Executive Schedule matters.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS; PURPOSES.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Timely and accurate information about the activities,
capabilities, plans, and intentions of foreign powers,
organizations, and persons, and their agents, is essential to
the national security of the United States. All reasonable
and lawful means must be used to ensure that the United
States receives the best intelligence available.
(2) The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et
seq.) created a formal structure under an official who would
lead the Central Intelligence Agency and, in a separate role
as Director of Central Intelligence, the intelligence
community of the United States Government, and serve as the
principal adviser to the President on intelligence.
(3) Executive Order 12333 (December 4, 1981; 46 F.R. 59941)
states that ``the United States intelligence effort shall
provide the President and the National Security Council with
the necessary information on which to base decisions
concerning the conduct and development of foreign, defense
and economic policy and the protection of United States
national interests from foreign security threats. All
departments and agencies shall cooperate fully to fulfill
this goal''.
(4) The intelligence community of the United States is
supposed to function as a single corporate enterprise,
supporting those who manage the strategic interests of the
United States, whether political, economic, or military.
(5) The United States has suffered through an escalating
cycle of intelligence failures, especially since the end of
the Cold War, while witnessing the onset of new and emerging
global threats such as terrorism and proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction.
(6) The Director of Central Intelligence has no genuine
influence over elements of the intelligence community other
than the Central Intelligence Agency because, among other
things, the Director controls only a small portion of the
funds, personnel, and related assets of the intelligence
community. There is no structural mechanism to enforce the
mandate of Executive Order 12333 that all elements of the
intelligence community must fully cooperate with one another.
(7) As such, the existing intelligence structure is
dysfunctional, and not organized to effectively respond to
new and emerging threats. In fact, the intelligence apparatus
of the United States has for decades grown more cumbersome
and unaccountable and may now properly be characterized as a
Cold War model in an era of terrorism.
(8) The existing dysfunctional structure of the
intelligence community has severe consequences, as the
Director of Central Intelligence--or those ostensibly under
the Director's control--missed, ignored, or failed to connect
numerous warnings which could have averted the terrorist plot
of September 11, 2001. Similar errors may have caused the
Director to mislead the President on the nature of weapons of
mass destruction threats as the Administration weighed
military action against Iraq.
(9) Despite the best efforts of the Administration of
President George W. Bush, Congress, and the American people,
much of the dysfunction in the intelligence community--
including the lack of common terrorist watchlists and the
inability to detect and apprehend terrorists traveling in the
United States--has not been remedied in the three years since
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
(10) The final report of the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, while making
certain recommendations on the restructuring of the
intelligence community to meet new and emerging terrorist
threats, leaves much discretion to Congress in determining
the scope and nature of the restructuring of the intelligence
community.
(11) President George W. Bush on August 2, 2004,
specifically requested that Congress create a national
intelligence director in a ``free-standing entity similar to
a cabinet agency or an agency'' and ``who will have a great
deal of budget authority'' and will have ``the same
relationship to the White House and the President that the
Secretary of Defense would have, the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, [or]
the Secretary of the Treasury would have.'' The Executive
Orders issued on August 27, 2004, while properly focusing on
strengthened management of the intelligence community,
strengthening information sharing, and the creation of a
National Counterterrorism Center, also leaves a great deal of
discretion to Congress to codify these matters in law and
determine the scope and nature of the restructuring of the
intelligence community.
(12) To effectively counter the grave threat of
transnational terrorism, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
recently conceded, as he must, that ``strong, entrenched
agencies must be willing to give up some of their turf and
authority in exchange for a stronger, faster, more efficient,
government-wide effort''.
(b) Purposes.--The purposes of this Act are as follows:
(1) To provide for fundamental reform of the intelligence
community of the United States Government involving a robust
Department of Intelligence and Director of Intelligence with
control over the budgets, personnel, and related assets of
the intelligence community.
(2) To compel the elements of the intelligence community to
work together to accomplish their common mission, much as the
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of
1986 (Public Law 99-433) fostered ``jointness'' among the
various Armed Forces, in conformance with the requirements of
law and Executive orders.
(3) To facilitate the provision to the President and the
National Security Council of the necessary information on
which to base decisions concerning the development and
conduct of foreign policy, defense policy, and economic
policy, and the protection of United States national
interests from security threats, including threats related to
transnational terrorism.
(4) To ensure that all means, consistent with United States
laws, Executive orders, and regulations and with full
consideration of the rights of United States persons, are
used to develop intelligence for the President and the
National Security Council.
(5) To create a structure for the intelligence community
that will better serve the President in his duty under the
Constitution of the United States to protect the security of
the United States.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Department.--The term ``Department'' means the
Department of Intelligence.
(2) Director.--The term ``Director'' means the Director of
Intelligence.
(3) Intelligence.--The term ``intelligence'' includes
foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.
(4) Foreign intelligence.--The term ``foreign
intelligence'' means information relating to the
capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign
governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or
foreign persons, or international terrorist activities.
(5) Counterintelligence.--The term ``counterintelligence''
means information gathered, and activities conducted, to
protect against espionage, other intelligence activities,
sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of
foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign
organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist
activities.
(6) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence
community'' includes--
(A) the Department, which shall include the Office of the
Director of Intelligence and such other offices as the
Director may designate or are prescribed by law;
(B) the Central Intelligence Agency;
(C) the National Security Agency;
(D) the Defense Intelligence Agency;
(E) the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency;
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(F) the National Reconnaissance Office;
(G) other offices within the Department of Defense for the
collection of specialized national intelligence through
reconnaissance programs;
(H) the intelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force,
and Marine Corps, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Department of the Treasury, the Department of Energy, and the
Coast Guard;
(I) the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the
Department of State;
(J) the elements of the Department of Homeland Security
concerned with the analyses of foreign intelligence
information; and
(K) such other elements of any other department or agency
of the United States as may be designated by the President,
or designated jointly by the Director and the head of the
department or agency concerned, as an element of the
intelligence community.
(7) National intelligence; intelligence related to the
national security.--The terms ``national intelligence'' and
``intelligence related to the national security''--
(A) refer to intelligence which pertains to the interests
of more than one department or agency of the Government; and
(B) do not refer to counterintelligence or law enforcement
activities conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
except to the extent provided for in procedures agreed to by
the Director and the Attorney General, or otherwise as
expressly provided for in this Act or otherwise provided by
law.
(8) National foreign intelligence program.--The term
``National Foreign Intelligence Program'' refers to all
programs, projects, and activities of the intelligence
community, as well as any other programs of the intelligence
community designated jointly by the Director and the head of
a department or agency of the United States Government or by
the President. Such term does not include programs, projects,
or activities of the military departments to acquire
intelligence solely for the planning and conduct of tactical
military operations by United States Armed Forces.
(9) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term
``congressional intelligence committees'' means--
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives.
(10) Terrorism information.--The term ``terrorism
information'' means any information, whether collected,
produced, or distributed by intelligence, law enforcement,
military, homeland security, or other United States
Government activities, relating to--
(A) the existence, organization, capabilities, plans,
intentions, vulnerabilities, means of finance or material
support, or activities of foreign or international terrorist
groups or individuals, or of domestic groups or individuals
involved in transnational terrorism;
(B) threats posed by such groups or individuals to the
United States, United States persons, or United States
interests, or to other nations or the persons or interests of
other nations;
(C) communications of or by such groups or individuals; or
(D) groups or individuals reasonably believed to be
assisting or associated with such groups or individuals.
TITLE I--DEPARTMENT OF INTELLIGENCE
Subtitle A--Executive Department
SEC. 101. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT.
(a) Executive Department.--The Department of Intelligence
is an executive department of the United States.
(b) Composition.--The Department is composed of the
following:
(1) The Office of the Director of Intelligence.
(2) The elements specified in title II.
(3) Such other offices, agencies, and activities as may be
established by law or by the President.
(c) Seal.--The Director shall have a seal for the
Department. The design of the seal is subject to approval by
the President. Judicial notice shall be taken of the seal.
SEC. 102. DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE.
(a) Director of Intelligence.--There is a Director of
Intelligence, who is the head of the Department of
Intelligence, appointed by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate.
(b) Individuals Eligible for Nomination.--Any individual
nominated for appointment as Director shall have extensive
national security expertise.
(c) Term of Office.--(1) The term of service of the
Director shall be 10 years.
(2) Paragraph (1) shall apply with respect to any
individual appointed as Director after the date of the
enactment of this Act.
(3) If the individual serving as the Director of Central
Intelligence on the date of the enactment of this Act is the
first person appointed as Director of Intelligence under this
section, the date of appointment of such individual as
Director of Intelligence shall be treated as the date of the
commencement of the term of service of the individual as
Director of Intelligence for purposes of this subsection.
(d) Duties and Responsibilities.--The Director shall--
(1) serve as head of the intelligence community in
accordance with the provisions of this Act, the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.), and other
applicable provisions of law;
(2) act as a principal adviser to the President for
intelligence related to the national security; and
(3) determine the annual budget for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the United States
Government in accordance with section 133.
Subtitle B--Office of the Director of Intelligence
SEC. 111. OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE.
(a) Office of Director of Intelligence.--There is within
the Department an Office of the Director of Intelligence.
(b) Function.--The function of the Office of the Director
of Intelligence is to assist the Director in carrying out the
duties and responsibilities of the Director under this Act,
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.),
and other applicable provisions of law and to carry out such
other duties as may be prescribed by law.
(c) Composition.--The Office of the Director of
Intelligence is composed of the following:
(1) The Deputy Director of Intelligence.
(2) The National Counterterrorism Center.
(3) Other national intelligence centers established under
section 114.
(4) The Assistant Director of Intelligence for Research,
Development, and Procurement.
(5) The Assistant Director of Intelligence for Civil
Liberties and Privacy.
(6) The National Intelligence Council.
(7) The General Counsel of the Department of Intelligence.
(8) The Inspector General of the Department of
Intelligence.
(9) The Intelligence Comptroller.
(10) The Chief Information Officer of the Department of
Intelligence.
(11) The Chief Financial Officer of the Department of
Intelligence.
(12) Such other offices and officials as may be established
by law or the Director may establish or designate in the
Office.
(d) Staff.--(1) To assist the Director in fulfilling the
responsibilities of the Director as head of the intelligence
community, the Director shall employ and utilize in the
Office of the Director of Intelligence a professional staff
having an expertise in matters relating to such
responsibilities, and may establish permanent positions and
appropriate rates of pay with respect to that staff.
(2) The staff of the Office under paragraph (1) shall
include the elements of the Community Management Staff that
are transferred to the Office under title IV.
(3) To the maximum extent practicable, the Director shall
utilize existing personnel, resources, and expertise in
organizing the staff of the Office under paragraph (1).
SEC. 112. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE.
(a) Deputy Director of Intelligence.--There is a Deputy
Director of Intelligence who shall be appointed by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
(b) Individuals Eligible for Nomination.--Any individual
nominated for appointment as Deputy Director of Intelligence
shall have extensive national security expertise.
(c) Duties and Responsibilities.--The Deputy Director of
Intelligence shall, subject to the direction of the Director,
be responsible for assisting the Director in carrying out the
responsibilities of the Director, including--
(1) assisting the Director in the development and execution
of budgets under section 133, evaluating programs, and
exercising authority under section 133(f) with respect to
reprogramming and reallocation of funds and transfers of
personnel;
(2) assisting the Director in the transition of elements of
the intelligence community to the Department under this Act;
(3) assisting the Director in the development,
implementation, and management of a personnel system for
intelligence community personnel;
(4) collecting data and preparing separate quarterly
reports on the obligation and expenditures of funds from the
elements of the intelligence community under the National
Foreign Intelligence Program;
(5) assisting the Director in the establishment of the
National Counterterrorism Center and the national
intelligence centers;
(6) assisting the Director in the management and
administration of the staff of the Office of the Director of
Intelligence;
(7) assisting the Director in performing management
functions across the intelligence community, including the
management of personnel and resources;
(8) assisting the Director in ensuring that the elements of
the intelligence community make better use of open source
intelligence analysis;
(9) assisting the Director in directing the efficient and
effective tasking of national intelligence collection using
technical means and human sources;
(10) assisting the Director with the establishment of
standards, requirements, and priorities for the analysis and
production of intelligence by all elements of the
intelligence community;
(11) assisting the Director in overseeing the collection,
analysis, production, and dissemination of intelligence by
all elements of the intelligence community;
(12) assisting the Director in monitoring the allocation of
resources for the collection, analysis, and production of
intelligence in order to identify any unnecessary duplication
in the collection, analysis and production of intelligence;
(13) assisting the Director in directing the competitive
analysis of analytical products having national importance;
[[Page S8872]]
(14) assisting the Director with the establishment of
priorities and requirements for daily tasking of collection,
analysis, and dissemination of information;
(15) assisting the Director in conducting daily tasking of
collection, analysis, and dissemination of information;
(16) assisting the Director in providing advisory guidance
on the tasking of collection, analysis, and dissemination of
information to elements of the departments and agencies of
the United States Government that collect intelligence and
are not within the National Foreign Intelligence Program;
(17) assisting the Director with the establishment of
procedures and mechanisms to provide for real-time automated
tasking across multiple intelligence disciplines, such as
signals intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence,
human intelligence, imagery intelligence, and electronic
intelligence;
(18) assisting the Director in assessing the performance of
the elements of the intelligence community with respect to
tasking requests and priorities; and
(19) making recommendations to the Director regarding the
assignment within the Department of officers or employees of
the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the
National Reconnaissance Office, and other elements of the
Department to assist in the tasking of collection, analysis,
and dissemination of information to all elements of the
intelligence community under the National Foreign
Intelligence Program.
(d) Power To Act as Director of Intelligence.--The Deputy
Director of Intelligence shall act for, and exercise the
powers of, the Director during the Director's absence or
disability or during a vacancy in the position of Director of
Intelligence.
(e) Precedence in Office of Director of Intelligence.--The
Deputy Director of Intelligence takes precedence in the
Office of the Director of Intelligence immediately after the
Director.
SEC. 113. NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER.
(a) National Counterterrorism Center.--There is a National
Counterterrorism Center.
(b) Missions.--(1) The missions of the National
Counterterrorism Center shall be as follows:
(A) To serve as the primary organization within the United
States Government for analyzing and integrating all
intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States
Government pertaining to terrorism or counterterrorism (other
than purely domestic counterterrorism information) and, in
furtherance of such mission--
(i) to receive, retain, and disseminate information from
any department, agency, or other element of the Federal
Government, any State or local government, or any other
source to the extent consistent with applicable law; and
(ii) to respond to inquiries from any department, agency,
or other element of the Federal Government, or any State or
local government agency, that is discharging counterterrorism
responsibilities in order to assist such department, agency,
or element in discharging such responsibilities.
(B) To conduct strategic planning for operations for
counterterrorism activities that integrate all instruments of
National power, including diplomacy, finance, military force,
intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement.
(C) Consistent with applicable law, to assign general
responsibilities for counterterrorism in support of strategic
plans under paragraph (2) to departments, agencies, and
elements of the United States Government having
counterterrorism responsibilities, and provide such
departments, agencies, and elements with access to
intelligence necessary to accomplish the responsibilities so
assigned, without undertaking the direction of such
operations.
(D) To serve as the central and shared information
repository within the United States Government on terrorism
information.
(E) To ensure that appropriate departments, agencies, and
elements of the United States Government have access to and
receive all-source intelligence support necessary to
executive their counterterrorism plans or perform
alternative, independent analysis.
(F) To unify the strategic intelligence and planning of
operations against transnational terrorist threats across the
foreign-domestic divide.
(G) To foster joint action among the department, agencies,
and elements of the United States Government involved in
counterterrorism.
(H) To oversee the counterterrorism operations of the
United States Government.
(I) To ensure that an accountable official has authority to
guide the Government-wide counterterrorism efforts of the
United States Government.
(2) A department, agency, or element of the United States
Government that objects to the assignment of general
operational authority to such department, agency, or element
under paragraph (1)(C) shall notify the National Security
Council and the Homeland Security Council under title IX of
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 491 et seq.) of
such objection.
(c) Administrator of National Counterterrorism Center.--(1)
There is an Administrator of the National Counterterrorism
Center, who shall be the head of the National
Counterterrorism Center, who shall be appointed from civilian
life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate.
(2) Any individual nominated for appointment as
Administrator of the National Counterterrorism Center shall
have significant expertise in matters relating to the
national security of the United States and matters relating
to terrorism that threatens the national security of the
United States.
(d) Duties and Responsibilities of Administrator.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, at the policy
direction of the President and the National Security Council,
the Administrator of the National Counterterrorism Center
shall, through the Director, be responsible for the following
insofar as it relates to counterterrorism:
(1) Serving as the principal advisor to the President on
counterterrorism matters.
(2) Directing the efficient and effective tasking of
national intelligence collection using technical means and
human sources.
(3) Establishing standards and priorities relating to the
analysis and production of intelligence by the elements of
the intelligence community.
(4) Directing the tasking of analysis and production of
intelligence by the elements of the intelligence community.
(5) Directing competitive analysis of analytical products
having national importance.
(6) Identifying intelligence requirements.
(e) Authorities of Administrator.--In carrying out the
duties and responsibilities specified in subsection (d), the
Administrator of the National Counterterrorism Center shall--
(1) monitor the implementation of counterterrorism
operations and coordinate the updating of plans for such
operations as needed;
(2) oversee interagency task forces on counterterrorism
(including task forces of the Central Intelligence Agency,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other departments,
agencies, and elements of the United States Government), and,
as the Administrator determines necessary, incorporate the
coordinating activities of such task forces into the Center;
(3) incorporate into the Center any interagency planning of
operations on counterterrorism that is being conducted by the
staff of the National Security Council as of the date of the
enactment of this Act;
(4) establish priorities and requirements for, and
coordinate the efficient and effective tasking of, national
intelligence collection on counterterrorism, whether inside
or outside the United States, using technical means and human
sources, including the establishment of mechanisms and
procedures to provide for automated tasking across multiple
intelligence disciplines in real time;
(5) develop assessments comparing terrorist capabilities
and intentions with United States defenses against such
threats (commonly referred to as ``net-assessments'');
(6) provide warnings of terrorist threats as directed by
the President;
(7) incorporate, as necessary, the perspectives and needs
of State and local counterterrorism officials in implementing
the mission of the Center; and
(8) access, as considered necessary by the Administrator
for the performance of the functions of the Center,
information to which the Administrator is granted access by
subsection (i).
(f) Deputy Administrators of National Counterterrorism
Center.--(1) There is in the National Counterterrorism Center
a Deputy Administrator of the National Counterterrorism
Center for Intelligence who shall be appointed by the
Administrator of the National Counterterrorism Center.
(2) There is in the National Counterterrorism Center a
Deputy Administrator of the National Counterterrorism Center
for Operations who shall be appointed by the Administrator of
the National Counterterrorism Center.
(3) The Deputy Administrators shall have the
responsibilities set forth in subsection (g).
(g) Duties and Responsibilities of Deputy Administrators.--
(1) The Deputy Administrator of the National Counterterrorism
Center for Intelligence shall have responsibilities for
matters as follows:
(A) Strategic analysis of terrorist threats.
(B) The pooling of all-source intelligence (whether
domestic or foreign) about transnational terrorist
organizations with worldwide reach.
(C) The development of assessment comparing terrorist
capabilities and intentions with United States defenses
against such threats (commonly referred to as ``net
assessments'').
(D) The provision of warnings on terrorist threats.
(E) The discharge of the tasking of national intelligence
under subsection (d) and (e).
(F) The duties of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center
(TTIC) transferred to the Department under title IV.
(2) The Deputy Administrator of the National
Counterterrorism Center for Operations shall have
responsibilities as follows:
(A) Joint planning for the assignment of responsibilities
for operations to lead agencies.
(B) The tracking of operations so assigned.
(C) The overall coordination of operations of the
intelligence community.
[[Page S8873]]
(h) Staff.--(1) To assist the Administrator of the National
Counterterrorism Center in fulfilling the responsibilities of
the Administrator under this section, the Administrator shall
employ and utilize in the Center a professional staff having
an expertise in matters relating to such responsibilities.
(2) The head of any element of the intelligence community
may, upon the request of the Director, assign or detail to
the Center any officer or employee of such element to assist
the Administrator in carrying out the responsibilities of the
Administrator under this section.
(i) Access to Terrorism Information.--The head of each
department, agency, or other element of the United States
Government that possesses or acquires terrorism information
shall--
(1) give prompt access to such information to the
Administrator of the National Counterterrorism Center, unless
otherwise expressly prohibited by law or otherwise directed
by the President;
(2) cooperate in, and facilitate the production of, reports
based on terrorism information with contents and formats that
permit dissemination of such information in a manner that
maximizes the utility of such information in protecting the
territory, people, and interests of the United States; and
(3) if such department, agency, or other element conducts
diplomatic, financial, military, homeland security,
intelligence, or law enforcement activities relating to
counterterrorism, keep the Administrator fully and currently
informed of such activities, unless expressly prohibited by
law or otherwise directed by the President.
SEC. 114. OTHER NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CENTERS.
(a) National Intelligence Centers.--(1) The Director shall
establish within the Department one or more centers (to be
known as ``national intelligence centers'') to address
intelligence priorities established by the National Security
Council.
(2) Each national intelligence center shall be assigned an
area of intelligence responsibility, whether expressed in
terms of a geographic region (including the Middle East), in
terms of function (including counterterrorism, proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, and international crime and
narcotics), or in other terms.
(b) Requirements Relating to Establishment of Centers.--(1)
In establishing a national intelligence center, the Director
shall assign lead responsibility for such center to an
element of the intelligence community selected by the
Director for that purpose.
(2) The Director shall determine the structure and size of
each national intelligence center.
(3) The Director shall notify the congressional
intelligence committees of the establishment of a national
intelligence center not later than 60 days before the date of
the establishment of the center.
(c) Mission of Centers.--(1) Each national intelligence
center shall provide joint all source intelligence analysis
and planning of intelligence operations in the area of
intelligence responsibility assigned the center by the
Director pursuant to intelligence priorities established by
the National Security Council.
(2) As part of its intelligence analysis mission, a
national intelligence center shall--
(A) undertake primary responsibility for strategic and
tactical intelligence analysis, fusing all-source
intelligence, whether foreign or domestic, on the area of
intelligence responsibility of the center;
(B) develop intelligence net assessments;
(C) provide threat warnings to the Director and to
appropriate departments, agencies, and elements of the United
States Government for further dissemination at the State and
local level; and
(D) direct foreign and domestic intelligence collection and
analysis to address threats and to support implementation of
operations.
(3) As part of its mission to plan intelligence operations,
a national intelligence center shall--
(A) develop, based on policy objectives and priorities
established by the National Security Council, plans for
operations for intelligence collection for its area of
intelligence responsibility;
(B) assign responsibilities for operations for intelligence
collection for its area of intelligence responsibility to the
elements of the intelligence community, which operations
shall be directed and conducted by the elements of the
intelligence community concerned; and
(C) oversee implementation of such plans and operations,
and update such plans, as the administrator of the center
considers appropriate.
(d) Supervision.--The administrator of each national
intelligence center shall report directly to the Director in
order to ensure adequate sharing of intelligence analysis and
adequate planning of intelligence operations in the area of
intelligence responsibility assigned to such center.
(e) Staff of Centers.--(1) The head of an element of the
intelligence community shall, upon the request of the
administrator of a national intelligence center and with the
approval of the Director, assign or detail to the center any
personnel, including intelligence analysts and intelligence
operations specialists, of such element as the administrator
of the center considers appropriate to carry out the mission
of the center.
(2) Personnel assigned or detailed to a national
intelligence center under paragraph (1) shall be under the
authority, direction, and control of the administrator of the
center on all matters for which the center has been assigned
responsibility and for all matters related to the
accomplishment of the mission of the center.
(3) Performance evaluations of personnel assigned or
detailed to a national intelligence center under this
subsection shall be undertaken by the supervisors of such
personnel at the center.
(4) The supervisors of the staff of a national center may,
with the approval of the Director, reward the staff of the
center for meritorious performance by the provision of such
performance awards as the Director shall prescribe.
(5) The administrator of a national intelligence center may
recommend to the head of the element of the intelligence
community concerned the reassignment to such element of any
personnel of such element previously assigned or detailed to
the center.
(f) Modification or Termination of Centers.--(1) The
Director may terminate a national intelligence center if the
Director determines that the center is no longer required to
meet an intelligence priority established by the National
Security Council.
(2) The Director may from time to time recommend to the
National Security Council a modification of the mission or
responsibilities of a national intelligence center, and may,
with the approval of the National Security Council, modify
the mission or responsibilities of a national intelligence
center.
(g) Support.--The element of the intelligence community
assigned lead responsibility for a national intelligence
center under subsection (b)(1) shall be responsible for the
provision of administrative support for the center, including
the provision of funds to the center necessary for the
administration of the center, until such time as the center
is included in the National Foreign Intelligence Program
Budget.
SEC. 115. ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE FOR RESEARCH,
DEVELOPMENT, AND PROCUREMENT.
(a) Assistant Director of Intelligence for Research,
Development, and Procurement.--There is an Assistant Director
of Intelligence for Research, Development, and Procurement
who shall be appointed by the Director.
(b) Direction.--The Assistant Director of Intelligence for
Research, Development, and Procurement shall report to the
Director regarding the activities of the Assistant Director.
(c) Principal Responsibilities.--The Assistant Director of
Intelligence for Research, Development, and Procurement
shall--
(1) manage and oversee the research and development
activities of the intelligence community with respect to the
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the
United States Government;
(2) ensure that research and development projects are
consistent with national intelligence requirements;
(3) establish priorities among such projects in order to
address deficiencies in the collection, analysis, and
dissemination of national intelligence;
(4) account for funding constraints in program development
and acquisition;
(5) address system requirements from collection to final
dissemination (also known as ``end-to-end architecture'');
and
(6) in consultation with the Director, the Chief
Information Officer of the Department of Intelligence, and
the Intelligence Comptroller, ensure that tactical military
intelligence systems, military systems, and national
intelligence systems are sufficiently interoperable.
(e) Responsibility for Performance of Specific Function.--
In carrying out responsibilities under this section, the
Assistant Director of Intelligence for Research, Development,
and Procurement shall ensure through the National
Reconnaissance Office the continued operation of an effective
unified organization for the research, development, and
acquisition of overhead reconnaissance systems necessary to
satisfy--
(1) the requirements of all elements of the intelligence
community; and
(2) the needs of the Department of Defense, including the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of
the unified and specified commands.
SEC. 116. ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE FOR CIVIL
LIBERTIES AND PRIVACY.
(a) Assistant Director of Intelligence for Civil Liberties
and Privacy.--There is an Assistant Director of Intelligence
for Civil Liberties and Privacy who shall be appointed by the
Director.
(b) Direction.--The Assistant Director of Intelligence for
Civil Liberties and Privacy shall report to the Director
regarding the activities of the Assistant Director.
(c) Duties and Responsibilities.--The Assistant Director of
Intelligence for Civil Liberties and Privacy shall--
(1) serve as the head of the Office of Civil Liberties and
Privacy under section 242; and
(2) in that capacity, have the duties and responsibilities
specified in that section.
SEC. 117. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL.
(a) National Intelligence Council.--There is a National
Intelligence Council.
(b) Composition.--(1) The National Intelligence Council
shall be composed of substantive experts on matters addressed
by the Council who shall be appointed by, report to, and
serve at the pleasure of the Director.
(2) The Director shall prescribe appropriate security
requirements for service on the
[[Page S8874]]
Council to ensure the protection of intelligence sources and
methods.
(c) Duties and Responsibilities.--(1) The National
Intelligence Council shall--
(A) produce national intelligence estimates for the United
States Government, including alternative views held by
elements of the intelligence community;
(B) evaluate intelligence community-wide collection,
analysis, and production of intelligence and the requirements
and resources of the collection, analysis, and production of
such intelligence; and
(C) otherwise assist the Director in carrying out the
responsibilities described in section 131.
(2)(A) National intelligence estimates produced under
paragraph (1)(A) shall--
(i) separately state, and distinguish between, the
intelligence underlying the estimate and the assumptions and
judgment of analysts with respect to that intelligence and
estimate;
(ii) describe the quality and reliability of the
intelligence underlying the estimates; and
(iii) present and explain alternative conclusions with
respect to the intelligence and estimates.
(B) Before publication and distribution of a national
intelligence estimate, the estimate shall be certified by
both the Director and the Chairman of the Council as approved
for publication and distribution.
(d) Access to Intelligence.--To the extent approved by the
President and recommended by the Director, the National
Intelligence Council shall have access to all intelligence
related to the national security that is necessary for its
duties and responsibilities under this section.
(e) Contract Authority.--Subject to the direction and
control of the Director, the National Intelligence Council
may carry out its duties and responsibilities under this
section by contract, including contracts for substantive
experts necessary to assist the Council with particular
assessments under this section.
(f) Staff.--The Director shall make available to the
National Intelligence Council such staff as may be necessary
to permit the Council to carry out its duties and
responsibilities under this section.
(g) Availability to Policymakers.--The National
Intelligence Council shall be readily accessible to
policymaking officials of the United States.
(h) Assistance of Intelligence Community.--The heads of the
elements of the intelligence community shall, as appropriate,
furnish such support to the National Intelligence Council,
including the preparation of intelligence analyses, as may be
required by the Director.
SEC. 118. GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTELLIGENCE.
(a) General Counsel.--There is a General Counsel of the
Department of Intelligence who shall be appointed from
civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate.
(b) Prohibition on Dual Service as General Counsel of
Another Agency.--The individual serving in the position of
General Counsel of the Department of Intelligence may not,
while so serving, also serve as the General Counsel of any
other department, agency, or element of the United States
Government.
(c) Scope of Position.--The General Counsel of the
Department of Intelligence is the chief legal officer of the
Department.
(d) Functions.--The General Counsel of the Department of
Intelligence shall perform such functions as the Director may
prescribe.
SEC. 119. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
INTELLIGENCE.
(a) Inspector General.--There is an Inspector General of
the Department of Intelligence who shall be appointed as
provided in section 3 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5
U.S.C. App. 3).
(b) Supervision and Control; Removal.--(1) The Inspector
General of the Department of Intelligence shall report to and
be under the general supervision of the Director.
(2) The Inspector General may be removed from office only
by the President. The President shall immediately communicate
in writing to the congressional intelligence committees the
reasons for the removal of any individual from the position
of Inspector General.
(c) Duties and Responsibilities.--It shall be the duty and
responsibility of the Inspector General of the Department of
Intelligence--
(1) to provide policy direction for, and to plan, conduct,
supervise, and coordinate independently, the inspections,
investigations, and audits relating to the programs and
operations of the Department and the intelligence community
to ensure they are conducted efficiently and in accordance
with applicable law and regulations;
(2) to keep the Director fully and currently informed
concerning violations of law and regulations, violations of
civil liberties and privacy, and fraud and other serious
problems, abuses, and deficiencies that may occur in such
programs and operations, and to report the progress made in
implementing corrective action;
(3) to take due regard for the protection of intelligence
sources and methods in the preparation of all reports issued
by the Inspector General, and, to the extent consistent with
the purpose and objective of such reports, take such measures
as may be appropriate to minimize the disclosure of
intelligence sources and methods described in such reports;
(4) to prepare semiannual reports as provided in subsection
(d); and
(5) to perform such other duties specified for inspectors
general in the Inspector General Act of 1978 as the Director
shall prescribe.
(d) Powers and Authorities.--(1)(A) The Inspector General
of the Department of Intelligence shall have access to any
employee or any employee of a contractor of the Department or
any other element of the intelligence community whose
testimony is needed for the performance of the duties and
responsibilities of the Inspector General.
(B) The Inspector General shall have direct access to all
records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers,
recommendations, or other materials which relate to the
programs and operations with respect to which the Inspector
General has responsibilities under this section.
(C) The level of classification or compartmentation of
information shall not, in and of itself, provide a sufficient
rationale for denying the Inspector General access to any
materials under subparagraph (B).
(2) The Inspector General is authorized to receive and
investigate complaints or information from any person
concerning the existence of an activity constituting a
violation of laws, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement,
gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial
and specific danger to the public health and safety. Once
such complaint or information has been received from an
employee of the Department or any other element of the
intelligence community--
(A) the Inspector General shall not disclose the identity
of the employee without the consent of the employee, unless
the Inspector General determines that such disclosure is
unavoidable during the course of the investigation or the
disclosure is made to an official of the Department of
Justice responsible for determining whether a prosecution
should be undertaken; and
(B) no action constituting a reprisal, or threat of
reprisal, for making such complaint may be taken by any
employee of the Agency or any other element of the
intelligence community in a position to take such actions,
unless the complaint was made or the information was
disclosed with the knowledge that it was false or with
willful disregard for its truth or falsity.
(3) The Inspector General shall have authority to
administer to or take from any person an oath, affirmation,
or affidavit, whenever necessary in the performance of the
Inspector General's duties, which oath, affirmation, or
affidavit when administered or taken by or before an employee
of the Office designated by the Inspector General shall have
the same force and effect as if administered or taken by or
before an officer having a seal.
(4) The Inspector General shall have such additional powers
and authorities specified for inspectors general in the
Inspector General Act of 1978 as the Director shall
prescribe.
(e) Semiannual Reports.--(1) Not later than April 30 and
October 31 each year, the Inspector General of the Department
of Intelligence shall submit to the Director a report on the
activities of the Inspector General under this section during
the six-month period ending March 31 and September 30 of such
year, respectively.
(2) Each report shall include, for the period covered by
such report, the following:
(A) The matters specified for semiannual reports of
inspectors general in section 5 of the Inspector General Act
of 1978.
(B) An assessment of the effectiveness of all measures in
place in the Department for the protection of civil liberties
and privacy of United States persons.
(3) Not later than 30 days after receipt of a report under
paragraph (1), the Director shall transmit to the
congressional intelligence committees a complete, unabridged
copy of such report together with such comments on such
report as the Director considers appropriate.
(f) Cooperation With Other Inspectors General of
Intelligence Community.--Each inspector general of an element
of the intelligence community shall cooperate fully with the
Inspector General of the Department of Intelligence in the
performance of any duty or function by the Inspector General
of the Department of Intelligence under this section
regarding such element.
(g) Construction of Duties Regarding Elements of
Intelligence Community.--The performance by the Inspector
General of the Department of Intelligence of any duty or
function regarding an element of the intelligence community
may not be construed to modify or affect the responsibility
of any other inspector general having responsibilities
regarding the element of the intelligence community.
SEC. 120. INTELLIGENCE COMPTROLLER.
(a) Intelligence Comptroller.--There is an Intelligence
Comptroller who shall be appointed by the Director.
(b) Supervision.--The Intelligence Comptroller shall report
directly to the Director.
(c) Duties.--The Intelligence Comptroller shall--
(1) assist the Secretary of Defense in the preparation and
execution of the budget of the Department of Defense insofar
as such budget relates to the tactical intelligence programs;
[[Page S8875]]
(2) assist the Deputy Director of Intelligence in the
preparation and execution of the budget of the intelligence
community under the National Foreign Intelligence Program;
(3) provide unfettered access to the Director to financial
information under the National Foreign Intelligence Program;
and
(4) provide information to the Deputy Director of
Intelligence necessary for reports under section 112(c)(4).
(d) Staff.--The staff of the Intelligence Comptroller shall
consist of personnel of the intelligence community who are
assigned to the staff by the Director, in consultation with
the heads of the other elements of the intelligence
community.
SEC. 121. CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
INTELLIGENCE.
(a) Chief Information Officer of Department of
Intelligence.--There is a Chief Information Officer of the
Department of Intelligence who shall be appointed by the
Director.
(b) Eligibility for Appointment.--Any individual appointed
as Chief Information Officer of the Department of
Intelligence shall have extensive experience in the
management, operation, and maintenance of complex information
networks, including the use of advanced information
technology applications and products to promote the efficient
and secure exchange of information across such networks.
(c) Duties and Responsibilities.--The Chief Information
Officer of the Department of Intelligence shall--
(1) develop an integrated information technology network
that provides for the efficient and secure exchange of
intelligence information among the elements of the
intelligence community and, as directed by the President,
other departments, agencies, and elements of the United
States Government and of State and local governments;
(2) develop an enterprise architecture for the intelligence
community and ensure that elements of the intelligence
community comply with such architecture;
(3) ensure that the elements of the intelligence community
have direct and continuous electronic access to all
information (including unevaluated intelligence) necessary
for appropriately cleared analysts to conduct comprehensive
all-source analysis and for appropriately cleared
policymakers to perform their duties;
(4) review and provide recommendations to the Director on
intelligence community budget requests for information
technology and national security systems;
(5) ensure the interoperability of information technology
and national security systems throughout the intelligence
community;
(6) promulgate and enforce standards on information
technology and national security systems that apply
throughout the intelligence community;
(7) provide for the elimination of duplicate information
technology and national security systems within and between
the elements of the intelligence community; and
(8) maintain a consolidated inventory of mission critical
and mission essential information systems for the
intelligence community, identify interfaces between such
systems and other information systems, and develop and
maintain contingency plans for responding to a disruption in
the operation of any of such systems.
SEC. 122. CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
INTELLIGENCE.
(a) Chief Financial Officer of Department of
Intelligence.--There is a Chief Financial Officer of the
Department of Intelligence who shall be appointed from
civilian life by the Director.
(b) Supervision.--The Chief Financial Officer of the
Department of Intelligence shall report directly to the
Director.
(c) Duties and Responsibilities.--The Chief Financial
Officer of the Department of Intelligence shall, in
consultation with the Intelligence Comptroller--
(1) assist the Director and the Deputy Director of
Intelligence in the preparation and execution of the budget
of the elements of the intelligence community under the
National Foreign Intelligence Program;
(2) assist the Secretary of Defense in the preparation and
execution of the budget of the Department of Defense insofar
as such budget relates to the elements of the intelligence
community within the Joint Military Intelligence Program and
the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities Program; and
(3) provide unfettered access to the Director to financial
information under the National Foreign Intelligence Program.
(d) Staff.--The staff of the Chief Financial Officer of the
Department of Intelligence shall consist of personnel of the
elements of the intelligence community who are assigned to
the staff by the Director.
SEC. 123. MILITARY STATUS OF DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE.
(a) In General.--(1) Not more than one of the individuals
serving in the positions specified in subsection (b) may be a
commissioned officer of the Armed Forces in active status.
(2) It is the sense of Congress that at least one of the
individuals serving in a position specified in subsection (b)
should be a commissioned officer of the Armed Forces, whether
in active or retired status.
(b) Covered Positions.--The positions referred to in this
subsection are the following:
(1) The Director.
(2) The Deputy Director of Intelligence.
(c) Service of Commissioned Officers.--(1) A commissioned
officer of the Armed Forces, while serving in a position
specified in subsection (b)--
(A) shall not be subject to supervision or control by the
Secretary of Defense or by any officer or employee of the
Department of Defense;
(B) shall not exercise, by reason of the officer's status
as a commissioned officer, any supervision or control with
respect to any of the military or civilian personnel of the
Department of Defense, except as otherwise authorized by law;
and
(C) shall not be counted against the numbers and
percentages of commissioned officers of the rank and grade of
such officer authorized for the military department of that
officer.
(2) Except as provided in subparagraph (A) or (B) of
paragraph (1), the appointment of an officer of the Armed
Forces to a position specified in subsection (b) shall not
affect the status, position, rank, or grade of such officer
in the Armed Forces, or any emolument, perquisite, right,
privilege, or benefit incident to or arising out of such
status, position, rank, or grade.
(3) A commissioned officer of the Armed Forces on active
duty who is appointed to a position specified in subsection
(b), while serving in such position and while remaining on
active duty, shall continue to receive military pay and
allowances and shall not receive the pay prescribed for such
position. Funds from which such pay and allowances are paid
shall be reimbursed from funds available to the Director.
Subtitle C--Mission, Responsibilities, and Authorities
SEC. 131. PROVISION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
(a) Provision of National Intelligence.--The Director shall
be responsible for providing national intelligence--
(1) to the President;
(2) to the heads of other departments and agencies of the
executive branch;
(3) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior
military commanders; and
(4) upon request, to the Senate and House of
Representatives and the committees thereof.
(b) Sense of Congress.--The national intelligence provided
under subsection (a) should be timely, objective, independent
of political considerations, and based upon all sources
available to the intelligence community.
SEC. 132. RESPONSIBILITIES OF DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE.
(a) In General.--The Director shall, in consultation with
the heads of relevant entities and taking into consideration
the intelligence requirements established by the National
Security Council for purposes of national security and
foreign policy--
(1) direct and manage the tasking of collection, analysis,
and dissemination of national intelligence by elements of the
intelligence community, including the establishment of
requirements and priorities of such tasking;
(2) approve collection and analysis requirements, determine
collection and analysis priorities, and resolve conflicts in
collection and analysis priorities levied on national
collection and analysis assets, except as otherwise agreed
with the Secretary of Defense pursuant to the direction of
the President;
(3) promote and evaluate the utility of national
intelligence to consumers within the United States
Government;
(4) eliminate waste and unnecessary duplication within the
intelligence community;
(5) establish requirements and priorities for foreign
intelligence information to be collected under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et
seq.), and provide assistance to the Attorney General to
ensure that information derived from electronic surveillance
or physical searches under that Act is disseminated so it may
be used efficiently and effectively for foreign intelligence
purposes, except that the Director shall have no authority to
direct, manage, or undertake electronic surveillance or
physical search operations pursuant to that Act unless
otherwise authorized by statute or Executive order;
(6) establish requirements and procedures for the
classification of information;
(7) establish requirements and procedures for the
dissemination of classified information by elements of the
intelligence community;
(8) establish intelligence reporting guidelines while
protecting intelligence sources and methods;
(9) oversee and ensure compliance by each element of the
intelligence community with the statutes and Executive orders
of the United States, including laws related to the
protection of civil liberties and privacy of United States
persons;
(10) protect intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure as provided in subsection (b);
(11) establish and implement policies and procedures
governing access to, and use of, specified data base
information by officers and employees of the elements of the
intelligence community and, as directed by the President
(after recommendations by the Attorney General), law
enforcement personnel of the United States Government;
[[Page S8876]]
(12) develop, in consultation with the Secretary of
Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the heads of
other appropriate departments and agencies of the United
States Government, an integrated communications network that
provides interoperable communications capabilities among all
elements of the intelligence community and such other
entities and persons as the Director considers appropriate;
(13) develop and implement, in consultation with the heads
of the other elements of the intelligence community, policies
and programs within the intelligence community for the
rotation of personnel among the elements of the intelligence
community in a manner that--
(A) makes service in more than one element of the
intelligence community pursuant to such rotation a condition
of promotion to such positions within the intelligence
community as the Director shall specify;
(B) ensures the effective management of intelligence
community personnel who are specially training in
intelligence community-wide matters; and
(C) establishes standards for education and training that
will facilitate assignments to the national intelligence
centers under section 114;
(14) consolidate and manage a common personnel security
system for the Department;
(15) develop and implement, as necessary, a common
personnel system and common retirement and disability system
for the Department;
(16) ensure that the composition of the personnel of the
intelligence community is sufficiently diverse for purposes
of the collection and analysis of intelligence by recruiting
and training for service in the intelligence community women,
minorities, and individuals with diverse ethnic, cultural,
and linguistic backgrounds;
(17) appoint officers or employees of the Department of
Homeland Security, the Central Intelligence Agency, the
National Security Agency, the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and
other elements of the Department of Intelligence to serve as
tasking directors to assist in the tasking of collection,
analysis, and dissemination of information for all elements
of the intelligence community under the National Foreign
Intelligence Program;
(18) in accordance with the provisions of section 106 of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-6), make
recommendations to the President regarding the appointment of
certain heads of elements of the intelligence community;
(19) develop such objectives and guidance for the
intelligence community as, in the judgment of the Director,
are necessary to ensure the timely and effective collection,
processing, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence, of
whatever nature and from whatever source derived, concerning
current and potential threats to the security of the United
States and its interests, and to ensure that the National
Foreign Intelligence Program is structured adequately to
achieve such objectives;
(20) work with the elements of the intelligence community
to ensure that the intelligence collection activities of the
United States Government are integrated in--
(A) collecting against enduring and emerging threats to the
national security of the United States;
(B) maximizing the value of such intelligence collection to
the national security of the United States; and
(C) ensuring that all collected data is available, to the
maximum extent practicable, for integration, analysis, and
dissemination to those who can act on, add value to, or
otherwise apply it to mission needs;
(21) ensure that appropriate departments, agencies, and
elements of the United States Government have access to, and
receive, all-source intelligence support needed to perform
independent, alternative analysis;
(22) establish policies, procedures, and mechanisms that
translate intelligence objectives and priorities approved by
the President into specific guidance for the intelligence
community;
(23) receive access to all foreign intelligence,
counterintelligence, and national intelligence, including
intelligence derived from activities of any department,
agency, or element of the United States Government, and to
all other information that is related to the national
security or is otherwise required for the performance of the
duties of the Director, except in cases in which the access
of the Director to such information is expressly prohibited
by law, by the President, or by the Attorney General acting
at the direction of the President;
(24) consistent with section 133, review, and approve or
disapprove, any proposal to--
(A) reprogram funds within an appropriation for the
National Foreign Intelligence Program;
(B) transfer funds from an appropriation for the National
Foreign Intelligence Program to an appropriation that is not
for the National Foreign Intelligence Program within the
intelligence community; or
(C) transfer funds from an appropriation that is not for
the National Foreign Intelligence Program within the
intelligence community to an appropriation for the National
Foreign Intelligence Program;
(25) ensure that any intelligence and operational systems
and architectures of the departments, agencies, and elements
of the United States Government are consistent with national
intelligence requirements set by the Director and all
applicable information sharing and security guidelines and
information privacy requirements;
(26) in consultation with the Attorney General, set forth
common standards, through written requirements, procedures,
and guidelines, for the collection and sharing of information
collected abroad and in the United States by the elements of
the intelligence community, and with State and local
governments in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland
Security, while to the maximum extent practicable, protecting
the privacy and civil liberties of United States persons and
ensuring that relevant officers of the United States
Government are provided with clear, understandable,
consistent, effective, and lawful procedures and guidelines
for the collection, handling, distribution, and retention of
information;
(27) require, at the outset of the intelligence collection
and analysis process, the creation of records and reporting,
for both raw and processed information, in such a manner that
sources and methods are protected so that the information can
be distributed at lower classification levels, and by
creating unclassified versions for distribution whenever
possible;
(28) require information to be shared free of originator
controls, including controls requiring the consent of the
originating agency prior to the dissemination of the
information outside any other agency to which it has been
made available, and otherwise minimizing the applicability of
information compartmentalization systems to information while
holding personnel accountable for increased sharing of
intelligence related to the national security;
(29) direct, supervise, and control all aspects of national
intelligence, including the programs, projects, and
activities of the national intelligence centers; and
(30) perform such other functions as the President may
direct.
(b) Protection of Intelligence Sources and Methods.--(1) In
order to protect intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure and, consistent with that protection,
to maximize the dissemination of intelligence, the Director
shall establish and implement guidelines for the following
purposes:
(A) The classification of information.
(B) Access to and dissemination of intelligence, both in
final form and in the form when initially gathered.
(C) The preparation of intelligence reports to ensure that,
to the maximum extent practicable, information contained in
such reports is also available in unclassified form.
(2) The Director may not delegate a duty or authority under
this subsection.
(c) Uniform Procedures for Sensitive Compartmented
Information.--The President, acting through the D
