S. HRG. 108-777
NOMINATION OF THE HONORABLE
PORTER J. GOSS TO BE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
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HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
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SEPTEMBER 14 AND 20, 2004
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Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
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PAT ROBERTS, Kansas, Chairman
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Vice Chairman
ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah CARL LEVIN, Michigan
MIKE DEWINE, Ohio DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri RON WYDEN, Oregon
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine EVAN BAYH, Indiana
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland
JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia
BILL FRIST, Tennessee, Ex Officio
THOMAS A. DASCHLE, South Dakota, Ex Officio
BILL DUHNKE, Staff Director
ANDREW W. JOHNSON, Minority Staff Director
KATHLEEN P. MCGHEE, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
Page
Hearing held in Washington, DC, Sept. 14, 2004
Statement of:
Durbin, Hon. Richard J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Illinois....... 45
Goss, Hon. Porter J., Nominee to be Director of Central Intelligence ..... 7
Graham, Hon. Bob, a U.S. Senator from the State of Florida................ 6
Nelson, Hon. Bill, a U.S. Senator from the State of Florida................5
Roberts, Hon. Pat, Chairman............................................... 1
Rockefeller, Hon. John D. IV, Vice Chairman................................3
Supplemental Material:
79
53
15
82
Chart presented by Senator John D. Rockefeller IV........................ 15
Washington Times Op-Ed by Senator Saxby Chambliss........................ 53
Letter from Cynthia Thomas, President, TriDimension Strategies .......... 79
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Questionnaire for Completion
by Presidential Nominees..................................................................82
Glynn, Marilyn, Acting Director, Office of Government Ethics, letter to
the Honorable Pat Roberts................................................................. 108
Goss, Hon. Porter J., letter to John Rizzo dated September 1, 2004 ..... 109
Financial Disclosure Report of Hon. Porter J. Goss...................... 108
Responses to QFRs from Hon. Porter J. Goss to Senator Robert J. Durbin ..148
Hearing held in Washington, DC, Sept. 20, 2004
Statement of:
Goss, Hon. Porter J., Nominee to be Director of Central Intelligence ... 173
NOMINATION OF THE HONORABLE
PORTER J. GOSS TO BE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 2004
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, DC.
The Select Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in
Room SH-219, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Pat
Roberts, (Chairman of the Committee), presiding.
Committee Members Present: Senators Roberts, Hatch, DeWine,
Bond, Lott, Snowe, Hagel, Chambliss, Warner, Rockefeller, Levin,
Feinstein, Wyden, Durbin, Bayh and Mikulski.
OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PAT ROBERTS,
CHAIRMAN
Chairman ROBERTS: The Select Committee will come to order.
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence meets today to consider
the nomination of the Honorable Porter J. Goss to be the Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Congressman Goss, on behalf of the Committee, I would like to
congratulate you on your nomination and I thank you for appearing
today.
The Committee would also like to welcome the Senior Senator
from Florida, when he arrives, and the Junior Senator from the
State, my predecessor as Chairman of this Committee, Senator Bob
Graham, and my colleague on the Armed Services Committee, Senator
Bill Nelson. So gentlemen, thank you for being here today in
support of Congressman Goss.
The role of Director of Central Intelligence is of paramount importance
to the security of this Nation. It is also one of the most
challenging jobs, if not the most challenging job, in the Executive
Branch as of today.
This Nation, as everybody knows, is currently engaged in a war
where intelligence defines the front line. We are not fighting
against nation-states but against a network of desperate terrorist
groups, who operate not only in the shadows, but at times right in
our midst. Whether in Afghanistan, Iraq or here at home, defeating
this enemy depends largely upon the ability of our intelligence
services to locate, to penetrate and to destroy these terrorist cells.
In short, we are involved in a world war which requires timely and
actionable intelligence to assure victory and the safety of the American
people.
The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency is responsible for
producing this intelligence. As we fight the threat posed by Islamic
terror, there remains unabated numerous other worldwide threats
against which our Nation must also guard. Among them are these:
the development of nuclear programs by adversary regimes such as
exist in Iran, also in North Korea; the steady growth of communist
China into an Asiatic power and its greater influence over Taiwan
and the region; and the continued worldwide expansion of WMD
technology.
The Director of Central Intelligence is also responsible for producing
intelligence to keep policymakers, both in the Administration
and in Congress, informed about many other threats.
If that isn't daunting enough, Congressman Goss has been nominated
for a position which is not likely to exist for much longer.
The President and many in the Congress now support the creation
of a new national intelligence director. There is now a great deal
of discussion among my colleagues on how best to ensure that the
creation of a national intelligence director is something more than
just a name change.
Most of the debate outside this Committee has centered on how
to grant increased authority to the new national intelligence director
while leaving undisturbed the structural status quo. Many on
this Committee simply believe you can't really get there from here.
In other words, it will take significant structural change to effect
real reform.
I believe strongly that we must create a new structure that accommodates
the diverse activities of the various intelligence agencies
by giving direct responsibility and control of the primary intelligence
disciplines--the collection and the analysis and the research
and the acquisition and the tactical support--and the corresponding
agencies who are in charge of those disciplines to a
truly empowered national intelligence director and his assistants.
True empowerment includes both budget authority and the authority
to direct and control the activities of the intelligence agencies
--to direct and control. One without the other will once again
leave us, in my opinion, with an intelligence head who can neither
succeed nor be held accountable. This would be an unacceptable
outcome.
We don't know how or when reform will be enacted. Until then,
we need a strong Director of the Central Intelligence Agency with
the necessary skills to manage a community which is in dire need
of a leader. The unique background of Congressman Goss will serve
him well as he meets these and many other challenges while directing
our intelligence community.
For over 40 years, Porter Goss has been serving his Nation, his
State and his local community of Sanibel, Florida. Whether as an
Army intelligence officer, a clandestine CIA case officer, a newspaperman,
a county commissioner, U.S. Representative, or Chairman
of the House Intelligence Committee, he has done his duty
with skill, with honor and with integrity.
His experience, I think, makes him uniquely suited to serve as
the Director of Central Intelligence. The President, in my view, has
selected an outstanding public servant to be his principal adviser
on intelligence and we look forward to working with him as the
next Director of Central Intelligence.
At this time, I would like to recognize the distinguished Vice
Chairman of the Intelligence Committee for his remarks.
Senator Rockefeller.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV,
VICE CHAIRMAN
Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, Congressman Goss. Good morning, Senator
Graham and Senator Nelson. Welcome all.
You are very well known to this Committee in your role as
Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee. Now we have to
deal with you as a Congressman and as a potential future CIA Director
and perhaps beyond that.
You have a long and distinguished career as a public servant. I
applaud your willingness to undertake the possibility of this extremely
difficult and complicated job of Director of Central Intelligence.
And, as you know better than most, the United States intelligence
community is at a crossroads.
The documented intelligence failures prior to the terrorist attacks
of September 11th and leading up to the war in Iraq have
left the intelligence community's credibility bruised--not bloodied,
but bruised--and its reputation tarnished. The community's objectivity,
independence and competency have been called into question.
As a result, a bipartisan call for reform has steadily grown to the
point where I believe that the Congress can and should, if allowed
by the Senate and House leadership, pass landmark legislation to
create a stronger and more effectively-managed intelligence community
before we adjourn. It can be done. If you give Congress
enough time to do something, we'll do nothing. If you don't give us
enough time, we can sometimes get some things done.
The work of the intelligence community, however, of course, does
not stop during this period. We're at war in Afghanistan. We're at
war in Iraq. We're in a global war against terrorists around the
world. The men and women of the Central Intelligence Agency and
other intelligence agencies are a central part of the America's ability
to prevail on the battlefield in various places and to stop terrorists
before they carry out their murderous plots either abroad or
here.
The next Director of the Central Intelligence Agency will be the
most important ever confirmed by the United States Senate. Never
before in the 57-year history of the intelligence community has
there been a need for a Director of Central Intelligence with unimpeachable
character, proven leadership and management experience,
and a strong national security set of credentials.
The new Director will face no fewer than four simultaneous
changes, in my judgment--waging an unrelenting offensive clandestine
campaign against al-Qa'ida and other terrorist organizations
around the world; supporting the ongoing military operations
in Afghanistan and Iraq; managing an intelligence community in
a state of transition; restoring the intelligence community's lost or
tarnished credibility. The next Director of Intelligence must be ex-
traordinarily qualified in order to carry out these and other national
security tasks. The stakes are simply enormous.
Perhaps most importantly, in this Senator's view, the next Director
of Central Intelligence must be nonpartisan, independent and
objective. The standard is not mine, although it is; it's what the
law requires.
The very first responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence
under the National Security Act requires the Director to
provide national intelligence to the President, to the Congress, to
the Executive Branch of the military that is ``timely, objective,
independent of political considerations and based upon all sources
available to the intelligence community.''
Congressman Goss, having reviewed your record closely, I do
have a number of concerns about whether your past partisan actions
or statements will allow you to be that type of nonpartisan,
independent and objective national intelligence director that our
country needs. That's what this discussion will be about--tough,
but fair. And these questions need to be put.
You have made a number of statements relative to intelligence
matters, many in the past year, that are highly, in my judgment,
partisan and display a willingness on your part to use intelligence
issues as a political broad sword against members of the Democratic
Party. Now, at the appropriate time, I will ask you to explain
the purpose of some of these statements and to substantiate the
claims that you make in them. As I say, my questions will be
tough, but I hope, pray and believe that they will be fair.
During the course of this hearing, I will also have a number of
questions about your views on reforming the intelligence community,
how it is to be done, and the bill that your proposed earlier
this year.
As I noted earlier, I believe intelligence reform should be the top
priority of the Congress. It remains a question whether it will be
allowed to be in these remaining few days or weeks that we have.
And I need to be assured that you appreciate the need for the reform
necessary, and that you are prepared to embrace it, if confirmed.
I will want to spend some time discussing your views on a number
of recent and ongoing investigations, as well, some of which we
discussed in our very productive meeting yesterday, including both
the joint congressional and the independent 9/11 Commission investigations,
this Committee's inquiry into prewar intelligence into
Iraq, and the criminal investigation in the outing of CIA employee
Valerie Plame.
Your record as a Member and then also Chairman of the House
Intelligence Committee is another area I want to explore with you,
including your involvement with the Cox Commission's dealing
with the People's Republic of China and espionage at the Department
of Energy's national laboratories.
In short, we have a lot to talk about. Again I want to say that
I think my questions are going to be thorough and at times tough.
The importance of this position for which you are nominated, in my
judgment, requires no less. And I'm proud that you're here and I
look forward to hearing what you have to say.
Chairman ROBERTS: Thank you, Senator Rockefeller.
I now recognize the distinguished Senior Senator from Florida,
the past Chairman of the Committee, for any remarks he would
like to make in regard to the nominee. And while I have the opportunity,
I would like to thank Senator Graham for his years of service
in the Senate. He has earned the admiration and respect of all
of our colleagues.
Senator Graham.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BOB GRAHAM,
UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Senator GRAHAM: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for those
very generous remarks.
I am delighted to be here again with colleagues for whom I have
a special affection. I am also here in order to introduce you to a
man that you already know, but hopefully provide some additional
perspective.
Let me state at the beginning that I am not unbiased. I believe
that Porter Goss is an exceptional human being and will be an exceptional
head of our Central Intelligence Agency. I want to first,
however, introduce an important part of why Porter Goss is the
man that he is. He is joined today by his wife Mariel and their son
Chauncey. And I would like to ask if they would stand and be recognized.
[Applause.]
Senator GRAHAM: Adele and I, who also joins me, are very fond
of Porter and Mariel, and we recognize the sacrifices which the
family has made in order for Porter to be able to spend so much
of his adult life in public service.
Mr. Chairman, I've known Porter Goss for well over two decades,
and I can tell you from personal experience that he is uniquely
qualified to be here today as the President's nominee to serve as
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
First, he is a man of great character, unusual intelligence, a tremendous
work ethic and an outstanding personal and professional
standard of integrity. As Governor of Florida, I came to know Porter
when he served first as Mayor of Sanibel, Florida. In the early
1980s, the county of which Sanibel is a city, Lee County--Fort
Myers is the county seat--decided to undertake the construction of
a new airport. It was probably the largest public works project in
the history of that county.
Unfortunately, shortly into that project, three of the five members
of the county commission were indicted for corruption. In that
circumstance, as Governor, I first had the responsibility of suspending
them from office, and then the second responsibility of
finding three good people who could step into those vacancies and
complete this important project and restore the integrity of local
government in the eyes and souls of the people of Lee County.
Porter Goss was one of those three people. Not unexpectedly, he
soon rose to be the Chairman of the Lee County Commission. And
over the course of his service, he did both; he completed the airport,
which is now a great asset for his community and our State
and Nation, and second, he rebuilt the public confidence in their
local government.
Party affiliation did not matter then. What was necessary was
good men and women who could carry out a difficult task. And my
colleagues, I believe party affiliation does not matter today.
The challenge that Porter Goss, on a much magnified scale, will
face as the Director of Central Intelligence is very analogous to the
challenge that he faced 20 years ago in restoring integrity to his
local community and completing a very complex project.
Second, in addition to those personal qualities, when it comes to
the intelligence community, Congressman Goss has, in my judgment,
a balanced perspective, a perspective gained both as an insider
and then as an outsider. For a decade, early in his career,
Congressman Goss served our Nation in both Army and the CIA.
He knows firsthand the value and the risk of clandestine operations.
Since he's been in Congress, and especially as a Member of and
Chair of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
he came to know the agencies from an oversight capacity.
Some have said that he's too close to the intelligence agencies,
that he will be too protective of the status quo. Most of you served
with Porter and myself on the Joint Inquiry into the events of
9/11. I believe you would join me in saying that, from that experience,
Porter is a man who will be independent in his judgments
and unflinching in his criticisms where he believes they are necessary.
Mr. Chairman, I have been critical of the intelligence failures
that led to 9/11 and the war in Iraq. I have also been critical of
the Administration for its lack of leadership toward reform in the
three years since September the 11th.
But at this occasion, I want to commend President Bush for the
nomination of Congressman Porter Goss. I am confident that he
will not be part of the problem, but a leader in taking us toward
principled, thoughtful solutions when it comes to reforming the intelligence
community.
I strongly recommend your recommendation of confirmation of
Porter Goss.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman ROBERTS: We thank you, Senator Graham.
It's my privilege now to recognize the distinguished Junior Senator
from Florida for any remarks that he might wish to make.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BILL NELSON,
UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Senator Nelson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman,
Members of the Committee.
I think we need intelligence reform. I think we need it now. And
I think Porter Goss is the man to lead the effort.
This is a uniquely gifted individual and I think the Vice Chairman
of the Committee has pointed out very rightfully that this is
a position that all of us have to feel is nonpartisan and is independent
and critical in their judgment.
I can tell you this Member of the Senate certainly believes that
by virtue of the lack of information and misinformation that this
Senator received with regard to the intelligence leading up to the
Iraq war, but a most recent example that Porter is going to have
to deal with is to get the sufficient assets on the ground that can
penetrate hostile regimes such as North Korea, so that we are not
in this Never-Never Land of not knowing what an adversary will
do, particularly an adversary that may possess the nuclear weapon
and all of that implication to the security interests of the United
States.
So I'm here to echo all the reasons that Senator Graham has
given you, but I'm here to give you my own personal observations
of Congressman Goss as someone whose public life has been illustrative
of being nonpartisan, fair and independent. Those characteristics,
in this town that is so highly charged partisan, not for the
good of this country, especially at this time, are sorely needed in
a Director of Central Intelligence. And that's why I wanted to come
to you and tell you why I support Porter Goss.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman ROBERTS: Senator Graham and Senator Nelson, thank
you very much for your testimony on behalf of your colleague and
for your very strong statements. They certainly show significant bipartisan
support.
While my colleagues from Florida are welcome to stay, you may
wish to simply get out of the line of fire while you have the chance.
I thank you very much for your participation and I hope that Ivan
the Terrible turns into Ivan the Meek. You've already had enough
of that in Florida and we share your concern.
I now recognize the nominee for his opening statement.
TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE PORTER J. GOSS, NOMINEE
TO BE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Mr. GOSS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for your
comments.
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, Senators, ladies
and gentlemen. I am obviously very honored to be appearing
before this Committee as the President's nominee to be the next
Director of Central Intelligence. I'm humbled by the confidence the
President has expressed in me and my ability to carry out the obligations
of the office to which I have been nominated.
I wish to thank exceedingly Senator Graham and Senator Nelson,
my home-state Senators, for their very gracious introductions.
I appreciate their support and their very kind words.
I look forward to today's hearing and the opportunity it presents
to discuss with you the very important issues facing our Nation,
particularly the intelligence community.
As much as I look forward to this opportunity, I have to say, honestly,
that I never expected to be in this seat before you. Of course,
I never planned to be a Congressman or a Lee County Commissioner
or the Mayor of Sanibel, for that matter.
As for my representation of my constituents from the 14th District
in Florida, I've given my best to them for the past 15-plus
years, and at times, perhaps, I've engaged in debate with a little
too much vigor or enthusiasm. I've tried, however, to the best of my
ability to engage my colleagues on both sides of the aisle fairly and
with the utmost respect for their position and their perspective.
Rest assured, however, that I do understand completely the difference
in obligations the position of DCI carries with it and that
which the role of Congressman carries. These are two completely
distinct jobs in our form of government. I understand those distinctions
and, if confirmed, I commit myself to a nonpartisan approach
to the job of DCI.
As noted, I've been a Congressman from Florida. This is my
eighth term in Congress. During the last seven-and-a-half years,
I've been privileged to serve as the Chairman of the sister Committee
in the House of Representatives, the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence in the House.
I've served with several very distinguished Ranking Democrats
well-known to this Committee--Norm Dicks of Washington, the
late Julian Dixon of California, Nancy Pelosi, who has risen to the
position of House Minority Leader, and most recently with Jane
Harman of California--each of them, able, committed and valuable
Members of Congress.
I'm proud of my record of service to the Nation in that capacity
and the record of cooperation, objectivity and the nonpartisan approach
taken together with them on the serious issues facing the
Nation and the intelligence community.
I have served as a Mayor and County Commissioner. I worked
in the Directorate of Operations at the CIA in the 1960s as a clandestine
services officer. And while in the Army, I was trained and
worked as a photo interpreter. Each of these opportunities has
challenged me and enabled me to serve my country in unique ways.
If confirmed, I will be given another unique opportunity to serve
my country.
The challenges facing the intelligence community today are varied
and extremely complex, as well described in the opening statements
of the Chairman and Vice Chairman. Most important among
them is countering the terrorist threat to our Nation.
In addition, the intelligence community cannot lose sight of its
other responsibilities; it must work tirelessly and continuously to
provide our diplomats and our policymakers, both in the Executive
Branch and Congress, with information that informs the development
of public policies across a very broad range of topics.
With regard to terrorism, the intelligence community's task is
most urgent. It must strive to detect, deter and disrupt future terrorist
attacks on the United States.
As Americans, we are confronted by a brutal enemy who prefers
to murder innocents, who continues to strike our military men and
women, who bombs our embassies and who is committed to the destruction
of not only our economy, but our way of life. In this battle,
good intelligence is crucial. We must deliver a solid, reliable
product for our decisionmakers.
When I look back at my time as clandestine services case officer
with the CIA during the Cold War, I can say that the mission of
the intelligence community was very clear--to obtain the plans and
intentions of our enemies, our adversaries and their associates before
they could attack the United States. We knew our enemy then.
The mission for the intelligence community has not changed. We
must determine our enemies' plans and intentions before they attack
the United States; that is the core business.
Our human intelligence capability must improve if we are to continue
to exercise our responsibilities in this challenging time. Our
analytical depth and our scope of coverage must increase if we're
to provide context and texture to the information that is collected.
Our national technical means must be protected and reinvigorated.
Investment in these areas will be required.
Intelligence needs to be shared with those who need to know.
This includes our State and local law enforcement authorities for
homeland security purposes and our Federal law enforcement officials
as well. Information sharing must improve if we are to improve
our capabilities against our most imminent threats.
We must also improve our intelligence capabilities in the proliferation
arena. We need to develop sufficient language skills and
a depth to be able to accomplish all of our mission objectives in a
timely fashion. I agree wholeheartedly with the 9/11 commissioners
that the intelligence community management must foster and nurture
imagination throughout the intelligence community and not
stifle it.
And there are no easy fixes to these complex challenges. If confirmed,
I look forward to working together with this Committee to
find ways to improve our capabilities to carry out our mission in
the defense of liberty and freedom.
The job to which I've been nominated, the DCI, is a capabilities
job. It is not a policy job, and I know that. The DCI must provide
precise intelligence and it must provide objective intelligence.
In order to do this, the DCI must have the capabilities and resources
available to gather that intelligence. Objective and precise
intelligence is only possible if the intelligence community's leadership
is itself objective, independent and clear in its commitment to
these ideals.
I am committed to these principles. If confirmed, I pledge to be
forthright and objective in the presentation of intelligence information
to you and to the policymakers of the Executive Branch.
And, finally, I want to say a few words about the dedicated men
and women in the intelligence community. During my years as
Chairman of HPSCI, I've come to know the successes that they've
achieved and the extraordinary efforts that they have performed in
the service of this Nation. They serve quietly, with integrity and
with the utmost dedication to our Nation, its security, its people.
The people of this great Nation are indebted to their sacrifice, their
commitment and their work.
And most importantly, my role as husband and father defines
me. I have a wife, who has been introduced, who has sacrificed
much to allow me to serve. Mariel and I were looking forward to
a quiet retirement, but we both understand the call of public service
and duty to our country. In this time of war, when duty calls,
we find ways to serve. This is my way. I'm eternally grateful to
Mariel for her steadfast support and continued strength.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, Members of the Committee,
again, thank you very much for this opportunity. I'm now prepared
to take your questions.
Chairman ROBERTS: The Committee will now proceed to questions.
Each Member will be recognized by the order of their arrival.
Each Member will be granted 10 minutes. And, if necessary, we
will have a second round.
Now, Congressman Goss, there's been considerable concern
raised about the CIA's alleged involvement in the interrogation of
detainees in Afghanistan and Iraq. Now, I'm not going to ask you
to discuss in an open hearing the specifics of the CIA's possible involvement
in any of the interrogations, but can you commit to us
that as the DCI you will ensure that the CIA's activities do comply
with all applicable law, and that the CIA will cooperate with the
relevant investigations, including by the Department of Defense,
the Department of Justice and the Congressional Committees?
Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir, I can strongly commit to both of those in affirmative
``yes'' answers.
Chairman ROBERTS: Do you agree to appear before the Committee
here or in other venues when invited?
Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir.
Chairman ROBERTS: Do you agree to send intelligence community
officials to appear before the Committee and designated staff when
invited?
Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir.
Chairman ROBERTS: Do you agree to provide documents or any
materials requested by the Committee in order to carry out its
oversight and its legislative responsibilities?
Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir.
Chairman ROBERTS: Will you ensure that all intelligence community
entities do provide such material to the Committee when requested?
Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir.
Chairman ROBERTS: Do you agree to provide such other information
that the Committee may require in order to carry out its oversight
and its legislative responsibilities?
Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir.
Chairman ROBERTS: Mr. Goss, will you be a nonpartisan DCI?
Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir. You have my word on that, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman ROBERTS: Mr. Goss, your intelligence reform proposal,
H.R. 4584, has been criticized by some as a threat to civil liberties.
That criticism is based on a provision in the bill modifying the prohibition
on CIA exercise of any, ``police subpoena or law enforcement
powers or internal security functions'' by opening up the possibility
of such activity if ``permitted by law or as directed by the
President.''
Has your proposal been characterized accurately in this regard?
Mr. GOSS: No, sir, Mr. Chairman. I don't think that it's accurately
characterized that way.
If you'll permit, the purpose of that particular piece of legislation
language was to open the door on a debate that must happen. This
was done at a time, of course, when I was a Member of Congress
and Chairman of the Committee and confronting the recommendations
of the 9/11 Commission Report, which call for a blurring of
the line between foreign intelligence and domestic intelligence collection
for the first time.
That deserves, in my view, a full, rigorous debate and full attention
in the Congress of the United States. It is a very huge departure
from what we've done in the past and the question is before
us, how do we do domestic intelligence? How do we safeguard lib-
erties, but how do we protect people? And I think Congress must
be in that debate.
Chairman ROBERTS: Do you support CIA performance of domestic
law enforcement powers?
Mr. GOSS: I do not believe that the foreign intelligence apparatus
should be used domestically. I do believe law enforcement must be
properly prepared with the adequate safeguards to protect us in
this country and to protect our civil liberties.
Chairman ROBERTS: You have already touched on this, but if you
could briefly summarize, what did you hope to accomplish with this
legislative proposal, other than to simply begin the debate?
Mr. GOSS: At the time, it was to begin the debate, because it's
a debate we had avoided, in my view, in Congress. We've raised
this before in the Committee.
At this time, my reason for emphasizing it and being very glad
to receive this question is because I believe the DCI, whoever it
will be--and certainly if I am nominated, I will be coming to you
for guidance and clarity on how we proceed with dealing with that
business with our intelligence and law enforcement capabilities.
Chairman ROBERTS: In Steve Coll's book ``Ghost Wars,'' there is
a quote that is attributed to the former DCI, Bob Gates, who said
this: ``Bill Casey had not come to the CIA with the purpose of making
it better, managing it more effectively, reforming it or improving
the quality of intelligence. Bill Casey came to the CIA primarily
to wage war against the Soviet Union.''
Mr. Goss, why, primarily, do you want to be the DCI?
Mr. GOSS: Mr. Chairman, the reason is simply because I believe
I can improve our capabilities.
We need better product for our policymakers, we all know that.
I believe the answer to getting that better product is rebuilding our
eyes and ears, our capabilities in HUMINT, and reviewing the way
we do business in our analytical areas. There obviously are some
shortfalls there you yourself have pointed out in a very excellent
product by this Committee, with the group-think issue on the
WMD report. We have fragility in our national technical means
which needs attention.
These are all matters which must not wait. They must happen
now. Intelligence is our first and best defense, especially in a preemptive
global war that we are in. And I believe that we have the
obligation to make the investment, which is actually a modest investment
compared to some of the other investments our country
makes.
Chairman ROBERTS: This Committee has longstanding concerns
about the National Reconnaissance Office's inaccurate cost estimates
for satellite acquisition. Routinely, the National Reconnaissance
Office's cost group sends Congress cost estimates that are far
below any actual cost to procure intelligence satellites. Cost estimates
that are prepared by independent groups outside the National
Reconnaissance Office are much more accurate.
To solve this problem, last year, Congress enacted and the President
signed a law requiring that independent cost estimates be performed
by either the Community Management Staff or the Department
of Defense for all intelligence community programs costing
over $500 million. It also required that the President's budget not
exceed the projected levels in the independent cost estimate.
Now, the National Reconnaissance Office is evading compliance
with the law by insisting that its cost group estimates meet that
law's requirements. I believe that the NRO is wrong.
Will you assure the Committee that if confirmed you will budget
to independent cost estimates produced by the Community Management
Staff or the Department of Defense in accordance with the
independent cost estimate law reported by this Committee and enacted
in 2003?
Mr. GOSS: Mr. Chairman, I shared your frustration with the
problems that the ICE was used to resolve, is intended to resolve.
I supported ICE. It is the law. I intend to comply with the law if
I'm confirmed.
Chairman ROBERTS: Mr. Goss, there's a saying attributed to John
Paul Jones: ``Men mean more than guns in the raiding of a ship.''
Let's talk about the men and women in the intelligence community
workforce, as you did in your opening statement.
During your chairmanship, the House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence has been adamantly opposed to a compensation
reform pilot program enacted two years ago for the Central Intelligence
Agency. Just as adamantly, the former Director, George
Tenet, supported the pilot program and, in fact, had taken steps to
make the program permanent.
Where do you stand on CIA compensation reform? And I'll just
leave it at that. And then I have one final question.
Mr. GOSS: I believe that it must happen. My concern with the
package as it was being handled was that we didn't have an opportunity
to review the pilot program. I think the results of the pilot
program on comp reform are extremely important, because it's such
a unique workforce. You're absolutely correct, sir. The people are
what intelligence is about.
And they are unique the way they do their work. And I think
we've got to get it right. I stand for a comp reform, but I want to
make sure it's the right comp reform.
Chairman ROBERTS: Let's talk about OPTEMPO in the remaining
time that I have. What will you do to ensure that the men and
women in the CIA's workforce receive the best training possible
even during this time of very high tempo operations?
Mr. GOSS: Mr. Chairman, thank you.
There's no question that we have got good training facilities that
are in further need of expansion and modernization. Further, we
have programs--one would be the Roberts scholarship program, as
a matter of fact--that provides in-training capabilities for some of
our good men and women to enhance their capabilities and get
them more focused on the needs we have today.
There are a number of programs out there. We are requiring
now, as a result of the work, I think, of the Oversight Committees,
the NRO Commission, a lot of review that is going on. I found that
in the past few weeks as I've introduced myself around the community.
And I believe that we are going to have to invest more in some
training programs. The will is there. The people want the opportunity.
They would like to have things like competitive analysis--
those opportunities. There just aren't enough resources. There
aren't enough analysts.
So I think it's a combination of getting resources on the target
that are the most important priority targets, and then making sure
that we've got the right mix of people, the right diversification, to
deal with the threats as they exist today and then providing them
encouragement, career path and training to go do their job. And it's
certainly a doable program.
Chairman ROBERTS: I apologize to the Members of the Committee
for going overtime.
Senator Rockefeller.
Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Representative Goss, as I noted in my opening statement, I feel
very strongly, as in our discussion last night, that the next Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency has to be a person who has attributes.
Attributes are not always changeable from one year to another.
Attributes are, sort of, part of the make-up of how a person is or
can be--it doesn't necessarily have to be, but can be. Those attributes
have to be nonpartisan, independent and objective.
On March 8th of this year, you co-authored an intelligence oped
piece called ``Need Intelligence? Don't Ask John Kerry.'' In it,
you made a number of highly charged partisan, in my judgment,
allegations, and here are a few. ``When Democrats controlled the
Congress, the cuts were deep, far-reaching and devastating to the
ability of the CIA to do its job to keep America safe.''
During the Clinton years, ``the intelligence community was given
a clear message that if they failed in politically risky operations,
which presumably could yield the best information, there would be
no backing from the Clinton White House or the Democratic-controlled
Congress.''
And then you targeted Senator John Kerry, who you claim ``was
leading the way to make deep and devastating cuts in the intelligence
community's budget, and was leading efforts in Congress to
dismantle the intelligence capabilities of the Nation.''
A few months later, in a June 23, 2004, statement on the floor
of the House, you claimed the Democratic Party did not support the
intelligence community. In the same floor debate, in June, you said,
``My comment is that when there was opposition to intelligence and
year after year efforts to cut the intelligence budget, they did come
from the Democratic side through the period of the 1990s.''
I have a number of questions about these statements and claims.
As you know, it's very difficult to talk publicly about budget
issues. They are classified. But I want to present some facts to the
extent that I can do so and ask how these fit into your statements
and whether you stand by these statements.
First, let's look at whether the Democrats under President Clinton
were guilty of not supporting the intelligence community as you
claim. During the first two years of the Clinton Administration, the
intelligence budgets declined. This was a period of deep cuts in almost
all areas of government as we tried to grapple with the legacy
of the previous 12 years of, frankly, uncontrolled deficits.
Over the next six years, however, the Clinton Administration
budget requests increased every single year. During that six-year
period, 1996 fiscal to 2001 fiscal, Republicans controlled both
houses of Congress and the Congress cut the President's request in
1996, 1997, 1998 and 2001. In 1999, the Republican-controlled Congress
initially cut the intelligence budget, but then passed a large
one-time supplemental appropriation.
In fiscal year 2001, the Republican-controlled Congress returned
to its pattern of cutting intelligence funding. After the 9/11 attacks,
the Congress once again passed an emergency supplemental funding
bill. By that point, the Democrats had a majority in the Senate.
Now, you voted for every intelligence authorization bill and every
defense appropriations bill during this period. So you must've
thought that underfunding President Clinton's request was at least
within some acceptable range.
Now let's look at exactly what Senator Kerry proposed in 1994
and contrast that with the bill, H.R. 1923, introduced by Representative
Solomon with you listed as the primary co-sponsor.
In 1994, Senator Kerry introduced a bill to cut the deficit by $45
billion over five years.
I'm having charts put up. In my 20 years in the Senate, I've
never used a chart before. That's a rather boring chart because
that was all the CIA said I could do. But we can discuss this.
[Laughter.]
Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: I'm not gifted artistically.
Chairman ROBERTS: Are you sure it's not a Mondrian painting?
Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: That was a good line, Pat.
[The chart referred to follows:]
Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: Now, let's look at exactly what
Senator Kerry proposed. He introduced a bill to cut the deficit, as
I said, by $45 billion over five years. Again, you will recall the Congress
at that time was searching for ways to undo the 12 years of
uncontrolled deficits. Senator Kerry's proposal would have rescinded
$1 billion from the 1994 intelligence appropriations and
then increased intelligence spending over the next four years by
the inflation rate.
Your proposal in 1995 would have cut not less than 4 percent of
the personnel from all intelligence agencies in each of the next five
years.
I have a chart that shows what each of these proposals would
have done to intelligence spending in the aggregate had they been
enacted. The top left line--and I hope this has been distributed to
the Members--is what would have been spent had Senator Kerry's
legislation been enacted. And I can make it no more complicated
than that, can't put any numbers, because, again, of the CIA classification,
which you understand very well.
The lower line, which is red, is what would have happened to intelligence
spending had your proposal become law. I intended to
show how these two proposals compared to the actual spending,
but, again, the CIA told me that I couldn't do that. And I will attempt
to do that if we have a classified session.
Now, after the initial cut in 1994, Senator Kerry's proposal would
have provided significantly more funding for intelligence than was
appropriated by the Congress, controlled by the Republicans that
Congress, beginning with the fiscal year 1996 budget.
Your proposal, on the other hand, after the initial year where it
would have been higher than the actual spending, but still lower
than Senator Kerry's suggested level of spending, would have resulted
in dramatically lower intelligence funding.
In fact, John Kerry's proposal would have resulted in $8.8 billion
over that period of time in more spending for intelligence than your
bill. And worse, all of the cuts you proposed in 1995 would have
been achieved by firing 20 percent of America's intelligence officers.
In fact, had we followed your plan, sir, the intelligence community
would have had tens of thousands of fewer intelligence officers
in 2000, fewer intelligence collectors in the CIA, the NSA and elsewhere,
fewer intelligence analysts across the community, fewer intelligence
officers in the military services, fewer counterterrorism
officers in the FBI.
The Goss plan would have made, using your own words, ``deep
and devastating cuts in the intelligence community budget,'' I'm
forced to conclude. But this year, an election year, you chose to
level that charge against the Democratic Party as a whole and
John Kerry by name on the floor of the House.
So my questions simply are, how do you reconcile these facts
with your charge that it was the Democrats that did not support
intelligence? Do you stand by your claims? And why did you feel
it necessary, in terms of this question of being nonpartisan and all
the rest of it, did you feel it necessary to do that?
Mr. GOSS: Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman.
Your opening question I think was the question of if a person has
attributes, are they so intense that they can't be changed, or so
much of the foundation?
I think my colleague from Florida, Senator Graham, made it very
clear that I have had times in my life when I have been very nonpartisan.
I prefer nonpartisanship. And frankly, what comes more
naturally to me is nonpartisanship. I don't mean bipartisanship, I
mean nonpartisanship. And certainly in national security that
would be very, very critical. That's the way I've tried to run the
Committee.
My public record is my public record. Today I am before you as
a candidate for a nomination to a job where it would be entirely
inappropriate to make anything that looks like a partisan comment.
So my answer to your question, sir, respectfully, would be the
record is the record. It is true there is a record and anybody is welcome
to look at it. I have made a commitment to nonpartisanship
if nominated to the DCI job. Thank you, sir.
Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: Mr. Chairman, my time has expired.
Thank you, sir.
Chairman ROBERTS: With apologies to Senator DeWine, I want
to make a point of clarification to answer a question in my own
mind.
Is this the same 1995 bill that Jerry Solomon, who was a very
unique Member of Congress, born about 10 yards offside in regards
to fiscal discipline, every year would introduce his balanced budget
amendment? And as a Member of the Rules Committee, he was
Chairman and you were on the Rules Committee, and this was not
your bill, but you did co-sponsor it, and that this bill never even
came to a vote because Chairmen like myself, then the Chairman
of the sometimes powerful House Ag Committee, became very disturbed
when I learned about this budget.
And so, at least it was proposed, but it never came to a vote. Is
that correct?
Mr. GOSS: Mr. Chairman, the record speaks for the record, as I
said to the Vice Chairman. I think you've read it properly.
Chairman ROBERTS: Senator DeWine.
Senator DEWINE: Congressman Goss, thank you very much for
being with us.
You have been, throughout your career, a strong proponent of
human intelligence. You and I have had discussions in the past
about our concern about human intelligence. I wonder if you could
tell us where you think the Agency is and the community is today
in regard to the building back up of human intelligence and where
we are today.
I wonder if you could also comment--the former DCI, Tenet, estimated
that it would take at least five years to get where we should
be in regard to HUMINT. I wonder if you could comment about his
perspective on that.
And in doing so, I wonder if you could also talk about the issue
of the use of NOCs. This is something that I've been concerned
about. If you'll recall, when we had our joint investigation into September
11th, I actually filed supplemental comments where I
talked about the use of NOCs and I thought that we should be
using them more in the community. I wonder if you could talk
about that as well.
Mr. GOSS: Senator, yes, on a scale of 10, we're about three on
build-back. In terms of years, I don't believe five is enough, but I
can report some good news, that in my estimation that we have
some that we will be able to bring on before five years is up. But
the great bulk of what we need is more than five years out there,
in terms of global eyes and ears coverage on the core mission,
which is close-in access to the plans and intentions of the enemy,
the mischief-makers, and other things we need to know in this
country for our national security.
It's a long build-out, a long haul. It's been started. It needs continuous
monitoring, attention, pushing and help. And it's certainly
going to take the help of this Oversight Committee, as well as all
the management on the Executive side.
On the question of how we do our business overseas, I want to
be very careful what I say in an open session.
Senator DEWINE: I understand that.
Mr. GOSS: But I do agree with your observation that different
types of platforms and different ways of doing business are entirely
not only relevant, but necessary. And I believe that that is now understood
in the community. It is certainly my position, very close
to yours, that that's the type of business we're going to have to do.
I am looking for innovation. And I believe that the type of the
target and what I call the adjustment of the capability requires
dealing in different ways with the enemy.
Senator DEWINE: One follow-up question in regard to human intelligence.
So what you're telling us is that you believe that it's
going to take more than five years to get where we need to be in
regard to that.
Mr. GOSS: That's my estimate, sir. I will admit that I've only
been doing homework for a couple of weeks, but in my previous position,
combined with that homework, that would be my estimate.
Senator DEWINE: That's a rather frightening answer, but I appreciate
your candor.
Mr. GOSS: Candor's important, sir, especially with an Oversight
Committee.
Senator DEWINE: Absolutely.
Let me ask another question in regard to a general policy issue.
And I understand this is a policy issue, and I understand the job
that you're up for. But use of supplementals is something that is
very bothersome to me, and I believe it inhibits us from doing our
job. But in the job that you will be, we hope, heading into, I believe
it will also pose some problems for you in doing your job.
I wonder if you can comment about that in general, understanding
that you would be part of a budget team and that you
won't be making all of those decisions.
Mr. GOSS: Senator, I won't make a policy comment, but I will
make a manager's comment. If confirmed, I assure you that my
management style would not be based on supplementals. I like to
do more comprehensive planning. I like to have a better idea of
what the tooth-to-tail ratios are on some of these activities. Very
hard to do that with supplementals.
Understanding what the OPSTEMPOs are going to be, the kinds
of things we're going to be engaged in is, obviously, predictive. But
I think that you have a better chance of getting your efficiencies
and your resources in the right place, in the right time, in the right
amount if you have a plan rather than if you're just ad hocing it
with sups.
Senator DEWINE: I think there's a general consensus among at
least the Senate Intelligence Committee that we have not historically
done as good a job in oversight as we should have. I think
there's some institutional problems connected with that. I wonder
if you could possibly comment on what as the future CIA Director
you could do to help us do our job in oversight.
Mr. GOSS: Senator, a lot of recommendations about oversight--
I believe this Committee labeled the oversight dysfunctional. I paid
a lot of attention to that in my former position, of course.
I don't think it's appropriate for me today to talk about how the
Congress of the United States ought to solve its oversight problem.
Senator DEWINE: That was not my question.
Mr. GOSS: I agree. And I wanted you to understand why I was
not going to go there.
I do think oversight is a critical, complementary part of the arrangement.
I think it takes candor with the DCI or whoever is
leading the intelligence community, the elements of the community.
It takes understanding.
This is complex business, as you well know. Just learning the
jargon of this business takes a degree of education and getting used
to. And I worry a lot that we always have a supply of knowledgeable
Members of Congress on the Oversight Committees who can
participate in the constructive and innovative, creative solutions
we're needing to have to deal not only with the management, but
with the policy questions of how we apply the capabilities. Because
I don't ever want to be put in the position, if I'm confirmed, of
building capabilities for the wrong policies.
Senator DEWINE: If I could follow up, you sat where we are sitting
and you sat there for quite a while.
Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir.
Senator DEWINE: And you, I'm sure, have some of the frustration
that at least this Member has felt in trying to get answers from
the Agency, at least from some of the witnesses in the Agency.
What can you do to alleviate some of that problem?
Quite candidly, not all of the witnesses that come before this
Committee are as forthcoming as you are today, Mr. Goss. What
are you going to do as the leader of that team to make sure that
the people who come up here have as their mission to be not only
as open to answer the questions that are specifically narrowly
asked, but trying to be as forthcoming as possible? Sometimes we
get the impression that you've got to ask just precisely the right
question, and if you don't ask it the exact right way, you're not
going to get the right answer.
You set the culture. You're going to set the culture for this team.
How are you going to do that?
Mr. GOSS: Senator, I share your frustration from my past position.
If you confirm me as DCI, you are going to get just as candid
presentations from every member of the community that are before
your Committee as you get from me.
Senator DEWINE: And your commitment to us is that that will
be part of your mission, to drive that culture down through your
team and to hold people accountable to do that?
Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir, that will be the standard. And if there are
complaints about it, there will be ways to deal with it.
Senator DEWINE: We have also been very frustrated, of course,
with the National Intelligence Estimate in regard to Iraq and the
weapons of mass destruction.
A very general question, but I think important question, is you've
looked at this, you've studied it. What were the lessons that you
learned from this failure and what are you going to do to ensure
that the next major NIE that is produced by the community does
not have that kind of problem? What have we learned?
Mr. GOSS: I think the two major things we learned is we didn't
have enough collection. Obviously, we all know we didn't have that
close-in access for plans and intentions. Therefore, we didn't have
enough for the analysts to work with. And what they did work with
they did not work with in a creative enough way. I believe that the
WMD report that your Committee has put out has basically hit just
about every possible point you could hit on that.
I know that the community, even before your report came out,
on the analytical side has started to go back and talk about why
they have not had the necessary remedies to group-think, as your
Committee expressed it, why they've not had more competitive
analysis, why they have abandoned some of the tradecraft, why
they have been not doing some of the things that should have been
done.
So I know that there is a bit of energy and a bit of vision already
being expended. That needs to be reinforced.
I don't think there's any question now in hindsight that it wasn't
our best possible job by any means. I think people did it honorably,
sincerely, but the way I characterized it in my letter to the Committee
was they didn't test conventional--excuse me, to the community,
my letter to the community back last September, I think
it was, co-signed with Ms. Harman--was they didn't test conventional
wisdom enough.
There are questions in the caveating, all of those kinds of questions,
so that the reader, the consumer of the product, clearly
knows what is known, what is not known and what is predictive.
I think those things help the product consumer very much as well.
So I think those are the areas of understanding there, now it's
the question of employing it. And we need some more analysts, I've
got to tell you that, too.
Senator DEWINE: Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman ROBERTS: Senator Wyden.
Senator WYDEN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Goss, I have always enjoyed working with you. We go back
to our House days, and I always try to be bipartisan in this field.
Senator Lott and Senator Snowe and I are, for example, trying to
overhaul the way government documents are classified.
But I will tell you this morning, I am very troubled and have serious
reservations about your commitment to intelligence reform.
And I want to be very specific about why that's the case.
As eight-year Chairman of the Committee, you essentially had a
front-row seat to terrorist attack after terrorist attack--the embassies
in Africa, the USS COLE, 9/11. You served on several commissions,
the Joint Inquiry into 9/11 during 2001 and 2002, the Brown
Commission. You saw all of these terrorist attacks. You were part
of these various commissions advocating change.
You were in the Congress for 16 years, introduced scores of bills,
but it wasn't until a few months ago that you introduced any legislation
at all to reform the intelligence community. Why wouldn't
you have acted earlier if you were serious about intelligence reform?
I mean, for example, when we were dealing with the Homeland
Security bill, why wouldn't you have said, ``We'd better be dealing
with intelligence reform right now too, because the system is broken''?
Why did you wait until just a few months ago to introduce
legislation on intelligence reform?
Mr. GOSS: Senator, as I've said, the record is the record and
there is no question that I am in the public record as a Member
of Congress appropriately trying to espouse what I thought were
the right views about intelligence, which indeed include reform.
I don't think there's any question about my commitment to reform.
I'm totally committed. I wouldn't be sitting here if I didn't
think we were going to have reform in the intelligence community
and the opportunity.
The questions that frustrated me the most, honestly, looking
back, are the questions of audience. It was hard to get attention
and, if I failed, it was perhaps in getting attention. And I think
there was a lot of frustration on the Committee that we weren't
able to get the attention for some of the things we thought needed
to be done.
In fact, I think if you look at Chairman Roberts' bill that he has
put in and go back to, I think it was, 2002, you would find in the
HPSCI authorization bill, which is where we did put all our legislation,
as you know, you would find in that legislation a recommendation
that the intelligence community consider a reform
that actually looks sort of similar to the bill that Senator Roberts,
I understand, put out.
Senator WYDEN: I would only say to you, Mr. Goss, you were
Chairman of the Committee. You were in a position to get attention
to this issue, and yet you didn't do it. And your answer today is,
``Well, I'm committed to reform.'' And we're supposed to accept you
at your word, and essentially look at this record of eight years and
literally 16 years in a favorable way.
I'm not there yet. And I'm going to be here through this entire
hearing, but you're going to have to show me in the course of these
hearings a commitment to reform specific instances, because you
didn't give me an example, a concrete example, of how you were
committed to intelligence reform just now.
And the second area I'd like to get into deals with this bill in
June. And I want to know specifically whether you favor today
what is in your June 16th bill, which is giving the CIA the power
to arrest American citizens in the United States. Do you favor that
provision that was in your bill? And I just would like a yes-or-no
answer.
Mr. GOSS: No.
Senator WYDEN: You do not favor that provision?
Mr. GOSS: No, sir, I've already answered that question for Chairman
Roberts.
Senator WYDEN: You did not answer that question specifically.
You, in my view, talked generally about it, but I appreciate your
answer, so we're clear that that 57-year-old ban--that's what's on
the books now with respect to the prohibition on the CIA arresting
Americans in the United States--you will not favor changing that
as CIA Director?
Mr. GOSS: The CIA should have no arrest powers in the United
States of America.
Senator WYDEN: A question dealing with the commitment, again,
to take on the tough issues and challenge the Agency is the focus
of this question.
The Senate has cooperated with an ongoing Department of Justice
inquiry into the shooting down of an American missionary
plane in Peru. This was a matter, as you'll recall, that in a program
that the CIA was involved in, an American missionary and
a baby were killed. The Senate is cooperating fully in that inquiry.
Has your Committee fully cooperated in that inquiry and shared
documents on the investigation?
Mr. GOSS: To the best of my knowledge.
Senator WYDEN: I think you'd better check again. It is our understanding
that the Committee has not cooperated, is not sharing
documents. And the reason that I feel this is important is it goes
to your willingness, looking at the past, to take the Agency on.
The Senate has been willing to do it. The Senate has been willing
to say that we're going to cooperate with the matter. And my understanding
is that the House is not fully sharing documents in
this matter. And I consider it important.
The next area I'd like to ask you about involves political accountability.
You have said in the past that the Agency is risk-averse.
And I think that's an important statement, and one that I largely
share. The reason that I think that may be the case is that when
things go wrong, the Agency takes the hit and political officials,
particularly in the Executive Branch, get off the hook.
I'd like to know what you would do to support political accountability
so as to give your agents more confidence in terms of being
willing to take risks.
Mr. GOSS: Risk-aversion is a very important part of this, and rebuilding
the morale and giving people the latitude to do the jobs
and standing behind them is just plain good leadership and good
management. And that, surely, is something that I have in mind
and, if confirmed, will practice.
My attitude toward the intelligence community and, I guess, my
alma mater, the CIA, is one of tough love. I very much want to see
our men and women in the intelligence community succeed in their
work for not only their own sake, but for the safety of all Americans.
That is our first defense, in my view, of our national security.
So I think all the motivation and all the forward lean on this that
could be out there is very, very important.
I will stand up for what is fair and just on behalf of the people
of the intelligence community. And I will hold accountable those
people who are out of bounds. I believe that accountability works
both ways. Those should be celebrated who do good work and those
who don't need to be corrected.
Senator WYDEN: Why did you vote against the 9/11 Commission,
the creation of it?
Mr. GOSS: Sir, the record will speak for the record. I believe that
I did support the composition of the 9/11 Commission.
Senator WYDEN: But you were opposed to it originally.
Mr. GOSS: Senator, my reason for opposing it was the same as
some of my colleagues in this chamber. I did not believe that a simultaneous
investigation would be in the best interest of getting
all the facts out in a very straightforward way and getting an efficient
investigation done.
I did very much support the idea of a sequential investigation,
very much understanding that we would never, in our Joint Inquiry,
get it all done, and said so many times in the Joint Inquiry.
The record will be clear on that.
But actually I am very proud--I'll accept some paternity for the
setting up of the 9/11 Commission and the fact of the way we set
it up so that they came up with a bipartisan, good-quality book
which I would recommend to every American, at least the first 338
pages which deal with what happened. I believe that it is a fine
product. And I, frankly, think there will be more of the mosaic in
the future filled in.
Senator WYDEN: I think it's an excellent product.
I'm concerned that if you had had your way, at least originally,
we wouldn't have had the product, and that's what troubles me.
Let me ask you, if I might, about Ahmed Chalabi, because you
led a party-line vote to reject an amendment that would have authorized
an inquiry into dealings with Ahmed Chalabi. Now, this
was even after allegations that Chalabi had leaked U.S. military
secrets to Iran. You said, ``I would say that the oversight has
worked well in matters relating to Mr. Chalabi.'' I find that very
hard to believe.
Do you still feel that oversight has worked well with respect to
Ahmed Chalabi?
Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir, I do.
Senator WYDEN: As Director of the CIA, would you initiate an investigation
into whether an assumed American ally provided intelligence
information to an adversary?
Mr. GOSS: Of course, if it were credible.
Senator WYDEN: And why do you believe that the system worked
well with respect to Mr. Chalabi?
Mr. GOSS: I believe the issues about Mr. Chalabi, which are extensive,
have been generally well understood. I think that all of the
questions have been raised and I think the appropriate investigations
that follow on are taking place. I don't think oversight gets
much better than that.
Senator WYDEN: Mr. Chairman, my time has expired.
I would just say to Mr. Goss that, despite my affection for you,
the answers you're giving me today suggest that it's going to be
business as usual at the Agency if you're confirmed. Now, I intend
to be here throughout the day. I hope we'll actually have a second
hearing. I hope you can convince me otherwise.
My time has expired, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman ROBERTS: Senator Levin.
Senator LEVIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me add my welcome to Mr. Goss.
This nomination is being considered in a context, as a number
of colleagues have pointed out, of proposed reforms following failures
of intelligence before 9/11 and following massive pre-Iraq failures
of intelligence. To my mind, at least as important is the structural
reforms which are under consideration and even arguably
more so in terms of importance, is the need to assure the independence
and objectivity of intelligence analysis.
A more powerful national intelligence director with greater authority
over intelligence budgets and personnel could be appropriate,
with a big ``if''--if that increased power is used to help ensure
the independence and the objectivity of intelligence analysis
and if it's not used--as it must not be used--to promote policy. Intelligence
is not supposed to be promoting policy. It's supposed to
be informing policymakers and I just don't want a more powerful
national intelligence director to be a more powerful yes man, for
whatever Administration is in power.
I don't want someone who says that something is a slam dunk
when it isn't to the President of the United States. I don't want
someone who says publicly something that is different from what
the classified material says, thereby supporting policy of an Administration
with those kind of public statements.
And that's what I have to become comfortable with relative to
your nomination--not to you personally, but to the nomination that
we're talking about to this job and whether you are the right person
for this job, given the statements which you have made, the positions
which you have taken relative to a number of intelligence
matters.
You were quoted yesterday in The Washington Post as saying
that you would not use the term ``failure'' to describe the intelligence
lapses before 9/11. Was that accurate?
Mr. GOSS: I think it's partially, in context. I think I added some
other words.
Senator DEWINE: Were there significant intelligence failures
prior to 9/11?
Mr. GOSS: In the sense that the intelligence did not prevent the
attack, yes. In that sense that the intelligence was not the full
problem, no.
Senator LEVIN: But would you use the term ``failure'' relative to
the 9/11 intelligence?
Mr. GOSS: In the contemporary sense that our intelligence failed
us, I would.
Senator LEVIN: As a matter of fact, the report that we all issued,
the two Committees issued, uses the word ``failure'' over and over
and over again. But you seem to have some reluctance, or you did
relative to that interview, to use the term. I'm glad you're willing
to use the term.
Now, what about prior to Iraq? Would you say that there were
massive intelligence failures prior to the Iraq war?
Mr. GOSS: Are you referring to the WMD, the material that was
given to our----
Senator LEVIN: The 500-page report of this Committee. Would
you say that there were massive intelligence failures prior to Iraq?
Mr. GOSS: I would say there were intelligence failures. The degree
question is probably going to be in the eye of the beholder.
They were certainly significant, and they were not up to standard.
Senator LEVIN: In your eye, were there significant failures?
Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir. In my eye, there were significant failures in
our intelligence, in the product that was delivered, and that's why
the product has to be better.
Senator LEVIN: All right. The product that the CIA delivered?
Mr. GOSS: The product that the intelligence community delivered,
sir.
Senator LEVIN: And would that include the CIA?
Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir, of course.
Senator LEVIN: And were there significant failures in the public
comments of the Director of the CIA, in terms of his statements
about what the intelligence showed? Would you say there were inaccuracies,
omissions, distortions and failures on the part of CIA
Director Tenet in his public statements, many of which were analyzed
in that 500-page report, by the way?
Mr. GOSS: I believe that Director Tenet spoke forthrightly with
what he truly believed at the time.
Senator LEVIN: You think that he distorted?
Mr. GOSS: I don't think he had the full--I don't think he distorted
intentionally, no.
Senator LEVIN: Do you think he omitted?
Mr. GOSS: I don't know that, sir.
Senator LEVIN: Do you think he exaggerated?
Mr. GOSS: I don't know that.
Senator LEVIN: And did you read our report?
Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir.
Senator LEVIN: Do you agree with our report?
Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir. Generally, I've read obviously a huge report.
It has a lot of blackout in it, as you very well know, redaction. Too
much probably. And I've read all 117 of your conclusions. I'm sorry
there weren't some recommendations to follow. Perhaps there will
be.
Senator LEVIN: Well, hopefully there will be. That's phase two,
apparently.
Chairman ROBERTS: It's the Roberts bill, by the way. I just
thought I'd, you know, toss that in.
Senator LEVIN: This is one of the conclusions in that report, that
most of the major key judgments in the intelligence community's
October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate called ``Iraq's Continuing
Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction'' either overstated
or were not supported by the underlying intelligence reporting.
Mr. GOSS: I think I agree with that.
Senator LEVIN: Now, you were also quoted in yesterday's Post as
saying that--after saying that you would use the word ``failure'' to
describe the intelligence lapses before 9/11--that's what The Washington
Post said you said--you then are quoted as saying the following:
``I don't like to see the left wingers splattering mud on an
agency that's done some very fine work.'' You allegedly said that
in 2002. Was that an accurate quote?
Mr. GOSS: I have no idea if it's an accurate quote or not in 2002.
I don't know what the context was. I do believe that we need a
forthright, nonpartisan look at our intelligence weaknesses, failures
and needs.
Senator LEVIN: Does that reflect your views, however?
Mr. GOSS: Which?
Senator LEVIN: That quote.
Mr. GOSS: That what?
Senator LEVIN: You don't like to see the ``left wingers splattering
mud on an agency''?
Mr. GOSS: Let me put it this way, Senator. I don't believe that
anybody should be unfairly criticizing men and women who are
working in our intelligence community, particularly when we're at
a time at war, unless there is real justification for it.
Senator LEVIN: And do you think that that 500-page indictment,
in effect, of the failures of the CIA represents splattering mud on
the CIA?
Mr. GOSS: No, sir. And that certainly was not the context of that
quote.
Senator LEVIN: But you don't remember making that quote?
Mr. GOSS: No.
Senator LEVIN: Your statement to Senator Rockefeller, on the
numbers that he gave to you, is that the record is the record.
That's an unacceptable answer, because if the record's inaccurate,
it seems to me you ought to correct it. As a matter of fact, you said
to the Chairman when the Chairman quoted from something in
your record, you said that--and this is just a couple of minutes
ago--''Mr. Chairman, the record is the record. You read the record
properly.''
Did Senator Rockefeller read the record properly?
Mr. GOSS: I think Senator Rockefeller read the record properly,
and came to the conclusions he came to.
Senator LEVIN: And do you disagree with any of the numbers--
there's no numbers there, but do you disagree with the statements
that he made? These are very factual statements about what you
supported as a Member of the House, and with intelligence cuts,
comparing the bill that you co-sponsored to the proposal of Senator
Kerry. Is that inaccurate in any way?
Mr. GOSS: The record is accurate to the best of my knowledge,
Senator.
Senator LEVIN: Are his statements accurate?
Mr. GOSS: Senator Rockefeller's statements?
Senator LEVIN: Yes. Comparing the bill that you co-sponsored
with the proposal of Senator Kerry, is that statement of Senator
Rockefeller accurate?
Mr. GOSS: Senator Rockefeller's statements are what he believes.
Senator LEVIN: I want to know what you believe, not what he believes.
I know what he believes, he just stated it very forthrightly.
I need to know what you believe forthrightly.
My question is, do you believe that those statements comparing
Senator----
Mr. GOSS: Senator, I believe----
Senator LEVIN: I want to finish my question.
Mr. GOSS: Sorry.
Senator LEVIN: Do you believe that the statements of Senator
Rockefeller comparing what was in your bill to what Senator Kerry
proposed are accurate? Do you believe it was accurate?
Mr. GOSS: The record is the record, Senator. And I don't believe
that it is appropriate in any way, shape or form for me to get involved
in anything that could be considered a debate about partisan
matters.
Senator LEVIN: I couldn't agree with you more. Let's talk about
facts and numbers. That's what the two charts were. They were
comparing numbers, without having the specific numbers, comparing
the level of expenditures for intelligence.
It's a very factual question, it's a very objective question. We're
looking for objectivity, we're looking for independence. It's not going
to be good enough for you to say, ``The record's the record,'' when
you don't want to deal with the record, but when you do want to
deal with the record, then comment on it. That isn't going to be
good enough, at least for this one Senator.
And this is not something, again, which is personal between us.
It is something which is very essential to me, that we have confidence
that whoever that director is in whatever Administration is
going to be objective and independent and is going to call it as he
sees it.
And now the question that Senator Rockefeller asked, and I'm
going to try to get you to answer, is whether or not that comparison
of levels of spending that compared your bill, the bill that you
co-sponsored, with what Senator Kerry proposed was an accurate
representation. That is my question. And it's essential we get an
answer to that question.
Mr. GOSS: Senator, I believe that Senator Rockefeller believes
what he said, and the record is clear on what my record is. The
facts speak, the record, they're no different in the record. They
speak for themselves.
Senator LEVIN: They don't speak. You're speaking for them is
much more significant at this moment for this Senator than just
simply saying, ``The record speaks for itself.'' And I don't understand
the reluctance in some cases to say ``Yes, that is an accurate,
factual statement,'' where in other cases you are perfectly willing
to say, ``No, I did say that,'' or, ``I didn't say that.''
For instance, you gave an answer to Senator Wyden saying you
don't support something, even though the way the bill reads it
might be interpreted the other way. It's just a direct question. And
the reluctance troubles me to give a direct answer to a factual
question--what your belief is, whether that is an accurate representation
of the facts.
Mr. GOSS: Senator, you've asked me what my belief is.
Senator LEVIN: Do you believe it's an accurate representation?
Mr. GOSS: I believe that the chart that Senator Rockefeller put
up, as vague as it is, which has no facts on it, is put up there in
good faith by Senator Rockefeller to make a point of the way he
sees it. I believe people can interpret the record in different ways.
That's why I'm not going to try to interpret the record.
I made a very firm commitment that I would be nonpartisan and
objective and straightforward and candid, and if nominated and if
confirmed that I would take this job and deal with it and step away
totally from my former job and let the record speak for itself.
Senator LEVIN: Thank you.
Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: Mr. Chairman, I just need simply
to interrupt to say that I have all of the figures, and would be
happy to sit down and go over those with you, if that's appropriate.
But I have all of the figures about those bills. I just could not bring
them before this open forum.
Mr. GOSS: I understand that.
Senator LEVIN: Perhaps we can then get an answer after you've
reviewed those figures. We haven't gotten it now, and I don't believe
that therefore meets the test you've just given, which is being
candid and being open and forthright. Your answer does not meet
that test.
Chairman ROBERTS: Senator Warner.
Senator WARNER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Congressman Goss, I welcome you and your lovely wife and join
those in commending both of you for the willingness to take on
what appears to be a very arduous and extraordinarily challenging
new post.
I want to be up front with you and tell you exactly where I'm
coming from as we propose here in the Congress the legislative
changes with regard to our intelligence structure. I want to be respectful
of our President. I think he's taken some strong initiatives
through Executive Orders and other ways.
But I come back to my own personal convictions about the Central
Intelligence Agency. I was privileged 35 years ago to enter government
service as the Under Secretary and Secretary of the Navy,
and I have continuously, except for a brief hiatus when I was running
for the Senate, worked with that Agency. I think it is one of
the most extraordinary institutions in our overall government.
It is composed of individuals unlike those found in many other
agencies of government. And you, having been in the ranks there
in your career--distinguished career--I believe you share that and
that's one of the strongest reasons I want to be a supporter for you
in this post.
I feel that if we go through this legislative change, whatever it
may be at the moment, I personally am going to do everything I
can to strengthen the integrity and the professionalism and the effectiveness
of the CIA, and let no one try to crack it and break its
morale, which could cause a disaffection of this extraordinary group
of professionals that are serving all over the world, in many places,
as you well know, taking personal risks equal in every respect to
those of the men and women of our armed forces.
So, having said that, I listened carefully as our distinguished
Chairman and Ranking Member and others talk to you about your
background and your ability to be bipartisan or nonpartisan or
however it is--we use those phrases interchangeably rather loosely
up here.
But the fact that you're an elected official and perhaps the second
only in history to take the post to which you've been assigned
I think is a great credit, because you bring an extraordinary knowledge
of government and the dynamics which make government
work.
And I think if you look back over many of your predecessors, a
number of whom I had the privilege of knowing personally and
working with, while they may not have been elected officials, they
were no fools when it came to politics. And I'm confident that you
can fulfill this post without ever suffering any accusations of being
political.
The Chairman opened the discussion with reference to the ghost
detainee issue. I had extensive briefings on Friday from the Agency
and I participated with the Chairman and other Members of this
Committee yesterday on the subject of the ghost detainees. And
you gave very clear answers.
But I want to clarify something in the record. I want to go back
to an Associated Press story of September 3 this year.
``Washington: Porter Goss, tapped as the next CIA Director, says
the Senate lacked, quote, 'balance in its public hearings in investigating
the Iraq prison scandal and should not have plucked military
commanders from the field to question them about the
abuse.' ''
Now departing from this momentarily, as Chairman of that Committee,
I indicated to the Secretary of Defense in a letter a number
of witnesses who we felt should come before the Committee at
times convenient and in no way to interfere with their military duties.
The Secretary called me personally and said General Abizaid and
Sanchez are in Washington. They're available and we had them as
witnesses. They were not plucked from their duties. They came at
the direction of the Secretary in connection with their appearances
here in Washington on other matters.
But I continue: ``During one interview in May, the eight-term
House Republican and Floridian said he couldn't count the number
of ongoing prison abuse investigations, but, 'We've got the circus in
the Senate, which is always the likely place to look for the circus.'
``Even though I say that lightheartedly, I do honestly question
whether or not they have balance over there on this issue.' '' I continue
your quote: ``It seems to me pulling the general in charge of
the troops in a hostile combat situation back to explain something
that they don't need him for and he doesn't have the answers to,
and he could get the information through subordinates anyway, it
seems to me to be some very stylish interpretation of oversight,'
Goss said, 'and probably unnecessary, and perhaps not helpful to
the war effort. I am not comfortable with what the Senate is doing,'
he added.''
I think this is an appropriate time, in light of the questions by
the Chairman with regard to this ghost detainee issue, which I consider
a very serious one, along with the whole subject, that I believe
that the Senate has treated very conscientiously. And it's interesting
that the House Armed Services Committee was somewhat
dismissive of the issue in the beginning, but subsequently that
Committee has conducted just about every single hearing that the
Senate has had on the subject in a very thorough and professional
way.
So I don't mean to dwell on that, but if you want to say a word.
Mr. GOSS: Senator, thank you for the opportunity.
In the first place, I did not know of your conversation, in your
capacity as Chairman, with the Pentagon. Had I known that, I
probably would not have made that statement. In fact, I certainly
would not have.
My statement was based on dealing with members of the military
who were witnesses who had appeared before our House Committee,
and they were concerned that we were getting in the way
of their first jobs. That was why the statement was made with regard
to do we need our people here or there. And I think that your
clarification of that illuminates it for me, and I think you are right.
With regard to the question of needing to investigate, obviously
we needed to investigate. My issue then was the question of how.
Back then, in May, there was quite a feeding frenzy going on in
the media over the very sensational photographs that were out
there, which, unfortunately, our Committees had the responsibility
of overseeing, and they were--disgusting is not a strong enough
word.
But putting the perversion aside and going to the issue of our
Committee, my worry about balance was the question of the balance
between getting it right on interrogation, which is a critically
important tool for intelligence, having professional interrogators
able to do their work--professional interrogators. Torture is never
tolerable, and it's not anything that a professional interrogator
uses.
Senator WARNER: I think I accept your answer.
Mr. GOSS: Thank you, sir.
Senator WARNER: In terms of the role of the CIA Director in this
coming legislative environment, again, I want to work on a provision
along these lines. And that is, I'm a firm believe that competitive
analysis and differing views are some of the pillars of strength
in our intelligence system. I want to preserve that, at the same
time supporting the President's initiative for a NID.
But on the assumption there will be instances where the CIA Director
could have a strong, personal, differing view than that held
by the NID, I'd like to have it written in law, if necessary, that
that individual, be it yourself or successors, has the opportunity to
go directly to the President and provide those views.
Let me give you an example. When I and many others worked
on the Goldwater-Nichols Act--and yesterday in that seat sat Colin
Powell, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs--we wrote in that
while the Chairman is the principal military adviser to the President,
if one or more of the other uniformed service chiefs have differing
views, they can have access to the President to express those
views in the presence of the Chairman or however it was done.
Something along those lines, I think, is needed for your post. And
I wonder if you share that view. I might say Colin Powell said that
he was intrigued with it, and he felt it was worthy of careful examination.
Mr. GOSS: Senator, I think it's a very important observation you
have made. How the reorganization comes out, and how the network
is stitched together, and how the intelligence community is
stitched together and what are the positions is unclear to me, and
it will be the job of the Congress. It will not be my job.
But you asked me specifically do I think there should be the opportunity
of the person who is in charge of dealing with our clandestine
services and our intelligence product that makes up, basically,
the most important briefings the President and his national
security people get--do I think that that person should have the
ability to talk to the President of the United States? Yes, sir, I do.
Senator WARNER: Thank you very much. Well, I hope that we
will provide that in a way, if necessary, in law.
Mr. GOSS: Thank you, sir.
Senator WARNER: The President, 24 hours a day, seven days a
week, needs intelligence. You know that full well. The military, certainly
in the tactical level, likewise needs it 24 hours a day.
Now, assuming we enact a new law, I'm concerned about how we
implement and transform the present system in such a way, at a
time when this Nation is at war, we don't lose a single heartbeat
and it is not perceived by any adversary now is the time to strike
America because they're reshuffling this intelligence system.
What guidance could you give the Congress with regard to how
we may incorporate that in law, or certainly report language, so an
orderly transformation does not leave a single heartbeat, a weakness,
in our system?
Mr. GOSS: Sir, that will be your job. And it would be probably
inappropriate for me to tell you how I would like my job description
carved out.
But I will be very candid and say I totally agree that there can
be no slippage, and we must not lose sight of the fact that the
warfighter, to support our military operations when we are at war,
must have every possible priority and consideration. We know
there's frictions between the national consumer and the military.
Those are an area which I hope that the Senate and the House
would take a very close look at and provide provision when we are
at war, whether it's a conventional war or a SOLIC-type war, lowintensity
conflicts.
I think those are distinctions that need to be looked at in clarity
of how we proceed and deal with our organization so that it is flexible
and can get the capabilities on the target to enhance our national
security.
Senator WARNER: I thank the witness.
Chairman ROBERTS: Senator Feinstein.
Senator FEINSTEIN: Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, Mr. Goss.
I would like to go back to Senator Warner's question about your
comment that, ``We've got the circus in the Senate, which is always
the likely place to look for the circus.'' And this is still the oversight
body for the intelligence community, and as such I think there
needs to be some mutual respect between this Committee and whoever
is DCI. What you're saying by that comment is certainly a
lack of respect not only for this Committee, but this body.
How can there be mutual respect, how can we carry out our oversight
responsibility with you as a DCI that believes we are a circus?
Mr. GOSS: Senator, I certainly do not believe that the Senate is
a circus or this Oversight Committee is.
The comment that I made to the reporter over the media frenzy
that was going on over the sensationalism of the pictures at the
time was very simple. It was not made as a serious comment. It
was not meant as a serious comment. And it was not reported as
a serious comment. It was light-hearted jesting about our rivalries
that go back and forth on the Hill.
I then amplified that to say, but I am concerned about balance,
because I am so concerned about our interrogation as a weapon we
must have. As you very well know in your position, you have seen
the value of good professional interrogation and what it has meant
to the safety of Americans at home and abroad in recent months
and years.
To lose that because of the extraordinary abuses that were going
on and the failure in the media to understand the distinction between
prison guards who may have gotten out of control, or allegedly
have gotten out of control and some of who clearly did get out
of control and have been properly convicted and there are investigations
ongoing, and our professional interrogators who we need
to do the job was the point I was trying to make.
I was worried that that balance would swing over and that sensationalism
would cause a stop in our interrogation, which was my
main problem.
Senator FEINSTEIN: Let me ask you about another light-hearted
comment and this has to do with the outing of a clandestine agent,
namely Valerie Plame. And you said, ``I would never take lightly
a serious allegation backed up by evidence that there was a willful
--and I emphasize 'willful'; inadvertent is something else--willful
disclosure and I haven't seen any evidence. Somebody sends me
a blue dress and some DNA, I'll have an investigation.''
Do you believe that's an appropriate comment as the Chairman
of the House Intelligence Committee?
Mr. GOSS: I don't think it was my best comment ever, for sure.
I think it was made to a provocative remark to me about the difference
between evidence and allegation. It's not something I'm
proud I said at all. But I think the point I was trying to make is
that evidence is different than allegations.
Senator FEINSTEIN: Okay. The question is what kind of a message
that sends to the clandestine community when you're going to
be their number one authority figure?
Mr. GOSS: If you're referring to do I take seriously the investigation
about the leak, the answer is indeed I do. And when I was the
Chairman of the Committee, I assure you we had numerous of the
right people from the Administration come up and explain to us exactly
what was going on.
I did exactly what I have done in every investigation, I think
without exception, as the Chairman and as a Member of the Committee
over the 10 years that I've been there, which was have a
quiet, closed hearing to get the facts; learn that the proper investigation
was being taken by the proper people; demand that a re-
port be given back to the Committee for the Committee's deliberation
when the report was concluded.
That was the record. Some of that is closed, obviously, and I cannot
go any further in it. But we await that report.
Senator FEINSTEIN: Thank you very much. I'd like to move on.
Mr. GOSS: Yes, ma'am.
Senator FEINSTEIN: This morning every Member of the Committee
received a letter from a 22-year veteran of the Agency. He
is a serving CIA officer. He made 10 points. I'd like to read one of
the points and ask you to tell me what you will do about it.
``In the CIA's core U.S.-based bin-Laden operational unit today,
there are fewer Directorate of Operations officers with substantive
expertise on Al-Qa'ida than there were on 11 September. There's
been no systematic effort to groom al-Qa'ida expertise among Directorate
of Operations officers since 11 September.
``Today the unit is greatly understaffed because of a hiring freeze
and the rotation of large numbers of officers in and out of the unit
every 60 to 90 days, a process in which experienced officers do less
substantive work and become trainers for officers who leave before
they're qualified to support the mission.
``The excellent management team now running operations
against al-Qa'ida has made repeated, detailed and on-paper pleas
for more officers to work against the al-Qa'ida and have done so for
years, not weeks or months, but have been ignored.''
What would you do? Because I'm one that believes the capture
of Bin Ladin, the removal of al-Qa'ida from the face of the Earth,
really should be a number one mission of this Agency and this says
that there is the al-Qa'ida unit, which is not really functioning as
it should be.
Mr. GOSS: Senator, I don't know whether that reference is to the
CTC or to an area division or to some other component.
Senator FEINSTEIN: The CIA.
Mr. GOSS: Yes, ma'am. I'm going to take that to mean it is part
of the CIA Directorate of Operations and answer it that way.
I largely agree with that. I don't know whether it's factually accurate,
but it is similar to the conclusions that our Committee,
which I'm no longer on, and, obviously, I'm not speaking on behalf
of that Committee.
But that did lead us to write our authorization bill this year with
some very sharp language that went very much to those points
that caused some considerable uproar at the time. Frankly, it was
very similar to language that your Committee reported in your
WMD as well. So I think there is agreement there's a problem.
One of the reasons that I sit here before you today seeking your
confirmation is so we can continue to rebuild the HUMINT services
properly. They are our best bet for dealing with the war on terrorism.
It is very hard to use some of our national technical means
effectively against terrorists. HUMINT is our best capability.
It needs to redesigned. We need to have people who can speak
the language, blend into the culture, spot the people, understand
what motivates people in those cultures. All of those things need
to happen. That takes training, that takes time, it takes resources.
It takes different platforms, different ways of doing business.
That is very much why I am looking forward to this job if I am
confirmed. I believe I can make that happen.
Senator FEINSTEIN: Let me follow up on that.
I'm one that believes the NIE was deeply flawed, and virtually
every time there was a difference of view--whether it was on the
aluminum tubes, whether it was on the UAVs, whether it was on
mobile biological weapons labs--the CIA view prevailed and the
CIA view was wrong.
One of the things that bothers me very much is that the Secretary
of State was put out before the world at the United Nations
with deeply flawed data. And he used that data, and particularly
on the mobile labs, when our investigation showed that it was a
flawed operation to gather those sources from the beginning and
never should have happened that way.
What will you do to specifically change the collection and analysis
methodology in the preparation for an NIE?
Mr. GOSS: Thank you. Part of the answer to that is the management
of the integration and the fusion of information. It is a question
of co-locating people from different agencies into the different
disciplines to try and make sure that they have people talking to
each other. That's a big part of it.
The second part of it is the tradecraft, testing the conventional
wisdom, competitive analysis, those kinds of things that are properly
pointed out--avoiding group-think if you will. And some of
that is ongoing, and I would submit to you that there is a paper
from the DO which I would like to provide for you if you're interested
on some of the steps that are being taken.
But it goes much further than just dealing with the management.
It goes to the question of how many analysts do we actually
have who speak the language, who know the cultures to do the jobs
and these things. And the answer is, frankly, not enough.
I don't want to give aid and comfort to our enemy today by telling
you how bad I think this problem is, but I can tell you right
now we're borrowing analysts from places we shouldn't be borrowing
analysts from to do jobs. They're probably not as good at
what they're being borrowed for, and they're leaving a gap for what
they're good at.
That's not smart. And that worries me. And that's happening
both at our DO and our analytic divisions, and that's got to stop.
Senator FEINSTEIN: Do you believe that analysts should have
more of the source data?
Mr. GOSS: Yes, ma'am.
Senator FEINSTEIN: Which is a real problem. And do you also believe
that perhaps they should have station experience?
Mr. GOSS: I believe it's very helpful. The question is that they
haven't had the time or the people or the slots; there's a lot of logistics
reasons why they haven't.
In a better world, absolutely they should have that, and certainly
there needs to be better working relationships, understanding, I
will say cross-talking between the DO, the DI.
And, obviously, analysis should drive collection. It shouldn't be
we have a collector somewhere say this is what we're interested in.
It should be, we have an analyst who wants this, this is what I
want a collector to get. That's the right formula.
And you're right. I mean, your Committee's paper did an excellent
job pointing this stuff out.
Senator FEINSTEIN: Thank you, my time is up.
Chairman ROBERTS: Thank you, Senator.
Senator Hagel.
Senator HAGEL: Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Goss, welcome. We are grateful to you and Mariel for offering
yourselves once again at an important time in the history of
our country.
I have no questions regarding circuses or any references to circus
or county fairs, but I do want to talk a little bit about some things
that you have discussed here this morning.
Each of us, and certainly you, Mr. Goss, understand that we are
living at a very transformational time in the history of the world.
That is requiring essential United States Government agencies to
be radically transformed. We are in the midst of that today and
have been and will continue to be working on this over the next
few weeks in the intelligence community, reforming our intelligence
community, restructuring our intelligence community. This
transformation in the world today has presented new challenges,
new threats, new possibilities.
And with that as the context, I would be very interested in getting
your sense of the larger view. And you referenced it a couple
of times in your statement when you said, ``Intelligence needs to be
shared with those who need to know. This includes our State, local
law enforcement authorities for homeland security purposes, and
our Federal law enforcement officials. Information-sharing must
improve if we are to improve our capabilities against our most imminent
threats.''
Within that context, how do you break out information sharing,
as you have noted here, within the domestic structure of our government
today? You talk specifically about local law enforcement.
We're not doing that very well. In fact, I don't know how much of
it we are doing.
How do we integrate into the overall intelligence community fabric
domestic and foreign intelligence? How does that work? We're
talking about intelligence-sharing this morning, we talked about it
yesterday, you have dealt with it for seven years as Chairman of
the House Intelligence Committee.
Then, in addition to that, how then do we integrate the tacticalstrategic
intelligence dynamic into this overall new 21st Century
agency intelligence community that you are going to have an awful
lot to do with, and you will play a very significant role if you're confirmed,
in helping shape and mold that?
Mr. GOSS: That is going to be primarily the most critical task of
the community management aspect of the job of DCI or national
intelligence director or whatever the job finally is.
The question of the horizontal coordination, collaboration and exchange
of both tactical and strategic information and the vertical,
down through the State and local, down the working level, is what
this is all about. Blending in, getting over that line that we have
always had, this is different than the wall between intelligence and
law enforcement, but it's like it.
Our whole intelligence apparatus is set up as the National Foreign
Intelligence Program. It's all overseas. Now we have a domestic
Homeland Security Department. They do law enforcement and
they stop terrorism from happening. But the information may come
from overseas, or the information may come from local people.
What we have to have is a place to deal with that information.
But we have it. It's called TTIC. It's being set up--the Terrorist
Threat Integration Center. It's a fusion place. It's a house of exchange
of information. It doesn't have capability to go do something.
That's why we have a national counterterrorism center that
is being considered.
And that's why we have a very thorny question which is raised
both by the 9/11 Commission--and as some of the Senators asked,
alluding to some of my legislation--how do you join that piece together
where you have actual information being used by law enforcement
or surveillance people in the United States of America
against Americans? That's a policy question that you all are going
to have to answer, and I hope that your answer is very clear for
the people in the Executive Branch. It has to be clear. I don't know
the answer to that.
There are a number of proposals out there to deal with it. The
issue has been raised by virtually everybody, and it has to be dealt
with. I think it's critical to the success. And everybody has to understand
what that is.
Then comes the technical problem, sir. And there is some good
news here. We are beginning to understand ways to share information.
We're using tearsheets. We're beginning to talk about ways to
get information down to the local level, training people to receive
information at the local level, ways to sanitize or partially sanitize
information so that it can be shared with more people. DIA has
done a good job using taggants on some of the information so people
can go back and see what levels of access are available for a
given nugget of information. Those kinds of tools and modernization
techniques are beginning to happen. They're not in place.
We desperately need an enterprise architecture that has an assured,
secure mechanism for the intelligence community and its
customers to talk together in a way that you can do all of the business
you need to do on behalf of the intelligence community--and
that is classified information, quite often, the exchange between--
and then have a customer be able to reach in there to a safeguarded
level where there's no threat to sources, methods, ongoing
investigations, liaison relationships or things like that.
That is a long way away, but it is so necessary.
And one of the requests, if I am confirmed, that I am going to
be continuously making of the Oversight Committees is continued
support for enterprise architecture. Because we've got some agencies
now that can't even do their work inside themselves on a secure
basis, as you very well know.
Then they have to be able to find interoperability with other
agencies. Then you have to be able to stitch that network together.
And then you have to be able to deal with your customers, not all
of whom can have access to all of the sources and methods, obviously.
You've put your finger on probably the toughest management
question we've got, and it's going to take some time and the cooperation
of all of us to get that fixed. And we've got to do it.
Senator HAGEL: I would hope, Mr. Goss, that you will be very active
in this and take significant initiative. Because we play a role--
and you have been through this--but we don't understand it as
well as you understand it, and your colleagues. And we are, to
some extent, guided, as is your Agency, by the end-user's needs, by
what you have to say about this.
Mr. GOSS: Thank you, sir.
Senator HAGEL: Let me ask you, in following along the same line
of questions here, you mentioned this, it's been brought up in some
exchange this morning: human intelligence. You noted the critical
essence of human intelligence.
Can you tell this Committee any specific thoughts you have
about what you would do to address this issue if confirmed? You
mentioned reaching out, obviously, for more linguistics, more new
21st Century dynamics as part of the collection process, the analysis
process, but programs--anything specific to this issue that you
are thinking about now?
Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir. Definitely, some specific things.
I believe there is too much management at headquarters, specifically.
It has gotten too patterned. I don't want to use the word ``too
bureaucratic,'' but maybe it's the right word. And I think that has
stifled some of the innovation, some of the creativity and, frankly,
some of the risk-taking in the field. I think some of the exact procedures,
which I will not go into in open session, need to be modified
about how people in the field are allowed to go about their business.
I think that's a very easy example.
But there's a more basic problem than that. That's a simple fix.
That's a stroke-of-a-pen fix. Reassurance that people will be supported
in the field, building the morale, those are more leadership
issues, that has to happen. The training has to happen.
Training costs money. We need a lot more people and I can't emphasize
enough that if you don't have case officers that can deal
with the culture and the language, you're not going to get much.
It really is important to have that. And so one of the very specific
things I'd ask you to look at is the efforts that are being made with
the national flagship language program, the National Security
Education programs to take some of our existing people and bring
them into an area where we need to employ them and give them
the skills, the background, the culture, the language that we also
deal with, the language question more head-on than we have. Because
it is a major weakness. We may have the best interrogators
in the world, but if you can't speak the language, or she can't speak
the language, it doesn't do us a whole lot of good.
Senator HAGEL: Do you favor making the aggregate intelligence
community budget public?
Mr. GOSS: Sir, what do you mean by the aggregate, the top line?
Senator HAGEL: Yes, how much we spend.
Mr. GOSS: My preference is no, sir, for a very simple reason. It
served us well not to put that top line out when we were in what
I will call a bipolar stand-off with the Soviet Union. I'm not sure
what the future holds.
One of the things that kept the Soviets off balance, we know
now, was they weren't quite sure how much we were committing,
what we really had, what we were really doing. And my view is
that if I had a preference, I think the day may come when we find
ourselves in another, sort of bipolar situation, maybe it'll be
tripolar, with other great nations that are emerging.
I don't think it's a critical question. To me it's not a deal-breaking
type question, but that would be my preference.
If it is ever revealed--and whatever your decision on that will be,
obviously, I will follow the law if I'm confirmed--but if it is revealed
I hope it would be clear what it was that we were talking
about when we say we are revealing the intelligence budget and
how it is managed, how the oversight of that works in Congress,
because I fear, if confirmed as the DCI, that I had to come back
to you with a number that was one number that was public out
there, which wasn't the real number I was dealing with, that sooner
or later there would be stories written about that.
So I think the connection of the decisions you make on how you
do your oversight with regards to the budget and intelligence
amounts is related to what you're asking me.
Senator HAGEL: Mr. Goss, thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Chairman ROBERTS: Mr. Goss, Senator Bayh is next. We have
come through eight of the Senators who are here for the hearing,
eight of the 16, and he is willing and I would suggest to you that
this would be an opportunity for a five-minute break, if you so
choose. Or if you do not choose to do that, we can press ahead.
Mr. GOSS: Sir, I would be very pleased to have a five-minute
break, maybe a three-minute break if that's sufficient for you. It's
sufficient for me, I think.
Chairman ROBERTS: In the Senate, a three-minute break turns
into a five-minute break, that turns into a seven-minute break, as
you well know, so the Committee stands in recess for five minutes.
Mr. GOSS: Thank you, sir.
[A brief recess was taken.]
Chairman ROBERTS: The Committee will come to order.
Chairman ROBERTS: Senator Bayh.
Senator BAYH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Goss. I would like to begin by echoing the sentiments
of many of my colleagues here today who have recounted
their positive personal interactions with you. That certainly has
been my experience. And I appreciate your willingness to continue
your service.
I have two lines of inquiry. The first deals with some of the questions
and concerns raised by a couple of my colleagues touching
upon the issues of independence and the possibility of undue partisanship.
As I understood your opening statement, you seem to be indicating
that there are different standards of conduct for Members of
Congress, the elected branch of government, who by necessity are
involved in the political process, and those in the Executive
Branch, particularly something as sensitive as the Director of Central
Intelligence, where a different standard of involvement would
apply. And that seems to be a reasonable position to take. Have I
characterized your opening statement correctly?
Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir.
Senator BAYH: With that in mind, I'd like to ask you about something
that was referenced I think by Senator Rockefeller. And
that's this op-ed piece that you authored with Congressman Young
on March the 8th in the Tampa Tribune entitled ``Need Intelligence?
Don't Ask John Kerry.''
That seems pretty partisan to me, almost--knowing you a little
bit--almost out of character. With that in mind, I'd like to ask you,
were you requested or was it suggested to you that you write this
by someone affiliated with the White House or the President's reelection
efforts?
Mr. GOSS: Senator, I don't remember the exact circumstances of
how that came to pass. I believe I had made some statements on
the question of sufficiency in intelligence that were quoted back to
me, and I don't remember exactly how all of that blended together,
who were the participants. I'd have to check for the record on that
and get back to you. I just simply don't recall.
Senator BAYH: I would appreciate it if you would. It raises the
question, if this was just sort of a deep-seated concern about Senator
Kerry's position on these issues and you did that on your own,
that's one thing. If you did it at the behest of someone else for political
reasons--which is not, of course, unheard of--that might
suggest a level of partisanship or lack of independence that the
Committee might find to be relevant to these proceedings.
You would certainly agree that by your own standards an article
like this would be inappropriate for the DCI.
Mr. GOSS: Absolutely. Absolutely, sir. I make that loud and clear.
Senator BAYH: With regard to the reorganization that's been suggested
of the community; there have been different proposals that
have been floated. We find ourselves in an unusual position today
where you're being nominated to serve in an office that may be
substantially altered in a period of weeks, a handful of months. So
I'd like to ask you about your views on some of the issues that have
been raised here.
And let me back up just momentarily. You had your own proposal.
As you know, Brent Scowcroft had been asked to do a study,
had come up with some recommendations. Those recommendations,
as I understand it, are still classified. I find it hard to understand
why they're still classified. One of our colleagues has suggested
that he's going to offer an amendment to declassify the Scowcroft
Report.
Would you support declassifying Brent Scowcroft's recommendations
about intelligence reform?
Mr. GOSS: Senator, I have not seen the alleged Scowcroft reform.
I don't know what the report is, whether it was ever concluded or
not. I've heard about it, of course, and I don't know that it would
be a proper----
Senator BAYH: Well, if you haven't read it, then I can't ask your
opinion about whether it should be declassified.
But suffice it to say he's obviously a nonpartisan figure, has some
interesting thoughts about intelligence reform. And as far as I
know, there's nothing in his report that couldn't be shared with the
American public.
Mr. GOSS: Senator, what I would say is the job I seek, if I am
confirmed, obviously, should be involved with the questions of the
security of our country and the capabilities for the intelligence
product that we get. The questions of how we reorganize the intelligence
community, how it is reorganized, is going to be pretty
much up to the legislators in this country to decide what they want
it to look like.
Senator BAYH: Well, let me ask you about a couple of the specifics.
As I understand, the proposal that you had suggested, which was
embraced by many members of the community, as I understand it,
would have tried to flesh out the powers, make real the powers, of
the DCI as they were envisioned in 1947. We sort of made the DCI
the head of the intelligence community, but never really empowered
the DCI to exert the kind of leadership that now appears to
be necessary.
And the other approaches that have been suggested by the 9/11
Commission, now by the Administration, by the Chairman of this
Committee, would involve the creation of a national intelligence director,
the so-called NID.
What about your approach empowering the current DCI is superior
to the recommendations for the creation of a NID?
Mr. GOSS: Senator, I think the legislation is pretty clear. The
reason that I proceeded that way with the legislation was to signify
that I understand that one of our very biggest problems in the intelligence
community is that we have a loose confederation of agencies
rather than an efficient network of agencies that's delivering
product. I believe there should be sort of a top to the pyramid instead
of 15 different tops to it, if you will.
Senator BAYH: But why the DCI model as opposed to the NID
model?
Mr. GOSS: I believe the DCI model came pretty closely right out
of the issue of the DNI recommendation that our Joint Inquiry did.
I thought it was the purest and closest way to do that.
There is obviously a difference between a DNI, a NID and a DCI.
These are very subtle nuances that get into complexities, as you
very well know, sir.
Senator BAYH: Well, can I ask you about a couple of them before
my time expires? The whole issue of budget control, and this does
get into the weeds a little bit, but it's important if we're going to
have, as you say, someone coordinating, bringing coherency to all
the different agencies, it's important we don't just, as we did in
1947, put that on a piece of paper, but we empower the individual
to actually accomplish that mission.
Let's talk about budget control. The 9/11 panel would authorize
the NID to actually create the budgets in consultation with the
agencies. The Administration's proposal would have the agencies
create the budgets and then be approved. And this sounds a little
bit like it's inside baseball but, as you would well know, the people
who are actually creating the budgets in the first instance are exercising
more control and authority than if someone's just in a position
of passing approval on it.
Do you have a thought about whether the NID or the empowered
DCI should have the ability to create the budgets for the agencies
as opposed to just approving them?
Mr. GOSS: Senator, I have a thought and I had a thought, and
they're different and I don't mean in any way to be disrespectful.
The thought I had was that I felt that the national foreign intelligence
budget program should be handled by a centralized figure.
I've called it the DCI in my bill. That was what I had. What I have
now is basically, I am going to, if I am confirmed, play the cards
that are dealt to me on this subject.
Senator BAYH: What about paramilitary operations? Some have
suggested that those be consolidated in the Pentagon. Others believe
that we need to keep a robust capability within the clandestine
services of the intelligence community. Do you have an opinion
about that?
Mr. GOSS: I do have an opinion about that. Again, that is subject
to whatever you all decide you wish to do. I think there are pluses
and minuses to virtually all of the recommendations in here, mostly
pluses. I think that is one of the area where there is a recommendation
that does have some minuses to it that I do have
some concern about.
Senator BAYH: My final question, as I see my time is about to
expire, we had an unfortunate situation where your predecessor,
before I believe--if I'm not mistaken, Mr. Chairman--before 9/11
was in a position--George Tenet called for actually a declaration of
war upon al-Qa'ida and Usama bin Ladin. I think those are words
that he used--``declaration of war.'' And yet, subsequently, in testimony
it came out that the head of the National Security Agency
was unaware of that fact. This was emblematic of the kind of lack
of coordination and communication that existed at that time.
Now, you may have touched upon this in your response to Senator
Hagel's question. How do we prevent that sort of lack of coordination
from occurring again? This is not down in the bowels of
the department some place. We have the Director of Central Intelligence
declaring war; one of the chief collectors was unaware of
this fact. How do we keep that from happening?
Mr. GOSS: I think that is the principal driving factor for most of
the energies that we see that are now being engaged at all levels
and in all branches of government in Washington to deal with the
network problem.
As I said, instead of having 15 agencies out there doing their
thing, we've got to have a different kind of management that has
something at the top that can control that. That's a solvable problem.
It just takes the direction to do it. If I am confirmed, I assure
you that I recognize that the preponderance of what is being asked
of a DCI is to get the network going.
Senator BAYH: Thank you, Mr. Goss.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman ROBERTS: It is the decision of the Chair and the Vice
Chair to proceed as we go along until we at least come to the conclusion
of the first round, and probably the second round. I would
advise Members to inquire of the chair as to where they stand in
order of appearance for questioning so they can get a quick bite to
eat.
I would say, Mr. Goss, if you have someone in the audience that
is very favorable to you that can prepare you a bite to eat, we could
take another five or 10 minutes on dow
