S. Hrg. 109-61
CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 16, 2005
__________
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas, Chairman
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Vice Chairman
ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah CARL LEVIN, Michigan
MIKE DeWINE, Ohio DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri RON WYDEN, Oregon
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi EVAN BAYH, Indiana
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
BILL FRIST, Tennessee, Ex Officio
HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio
JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Ex Officio
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Bill Duhnke, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Andrew W. Johnson, Minority Staff Director
Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk
CONTENTS
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Page
Hearing held in Washington, DC:
February 16, 2005............................................ 1
Witness Statements:
Goss, Hon. Porter J., Director of Central Intelligence....... 7
Prepared statement....................................... 14
Jacoby, Vice Admiral Lowell, USN, Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency........................................ 45
Prepared statement....................................... 46
Loy, Admiral James, Deputy Secretary, Department of Homeland
Security................................................... 36
Prepared statement....................................... 39
Mueller, Hon. Robert S. III, Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation.............................................. 18
Prepared statement....................................... 23
Rodley, Carol, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for
Intelligence and Research.................................. 59
Supplemental Materials:
Prepared Statement for the Record from Hon. Thomas Fingar,
Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research. 59
Prepared Statement for the Record from Senator Olympia J.
Snowe...................................................... 69
CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES
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WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 2005
United States Senate,
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Pat
Roberts, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Committee Members Present: Senators Roberts, Hatch, Bond,
Lot, Snowe, Chambliss, Warner, Rockefeller, Levin, Feinstein,
Wyden, Bayh, and Mikulski.
OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PAT ROBERTS,
CHAIRMAN
Chairman Roberts. The hearing will come to order.
Today, the Senate Committee on Intelligence meets in open
session to conduct its annual worldwide threat hearing. I would
like to inform Members that traditionally we have a closed
hearing in the afternoon, but Secretary of State Rice is coming
to the Senate to brief all Members this afternoon.
We will follow up with individuals at our weekly
intelligence hearings, and then, obviously, a hearing or
briefing at any Member's request. So we will see all of these
people back again in a classified session at another time.
The Committee traditionally begins its annual oversight of
the U.S. intelligence community with an open hearing, so that
the public will have the benefit of the intelligence
community's best assessment of the current and projected
national security threats to the United States.
Our witnesses today are Mr. Porter Goss, the Director of
Central Intelligence. Welcome back, Mr. Director.
Director Goss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Roberts. Mr. Robert Mueller, the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation; Admiral James Loy, the Deputy
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security; Vice Admiral
Lowell Jacoby, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency;
and Ms. Carol Rodley, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for Intelligence and Research. The acronym for that,
by the way, is INR.
The Committee thanks all of our distinguished witnesses for
being here today. We thank you for your commitment, for your
perseverance on your job, and for helping to keep America safe.
Before we begin the testimony, I would like to take this
opportunity to discuss an issue that has concerned and
frustrated me since I joined this Committee over 8 year ago,
and all Members of this Committee from time to time.
While we meet today in open session, the Members of this
Committee and our witnesses will be limited in what they can
say because the vast majority of the information with which
this Committee and our witnesses deal is classified. The issues
which we cover are not necessarily secret, but the details that
surround them generally are.
Our goal today is to have as open a discussion as possible,
recognizing that there are simply some things that we cannot
and must not discuss publicly. The dynamics surrounding what we
can and cannot say represents one of the most frustrating
aspects of membership on this Committee, especially when secret
intelligence activities find their way into public discourse.
How do we as a Committee assure the American people that we
are even aware of something when we cannot discuss it publicly?
How, without confirming or denying a particular story, do we
explain that concerns are misplaced, on point or off point?
Where do we draw the line between the public's right to know
and our Nation's security interests in keeping something
secret? These remain very difficult questions.
In 1976, the U.S. Senate established this Committee to
conduct vigorous oversight of the intelligence activities of
the United States government. And that is exactly what we do,
day in and day out--with, I might add--what the Vice Chairman
and I consider to be an outstanding and most capable staff.
Unfortunately, but necessarily, the Members of this
Committee are rarely at liberty to respond to public stories or
to inquiries. This does not mean, however, that we are not
aware of or deeply involved in the issue that is being
discussed.
Much of this Committee's work gets done behind closed doors
with little fanfare. And open public discussion about all of
the issues on which our Committee works is just not possible.
If we were to discuss some of the ingenious ways this Nation
does collect intelligence and protects our citizens, our
adversaries would and could develop simple countermeasures that
would eliminate these advantages, which were developed at great
cost or high risk. This secrecy does protect lives and helps us
to keep safe.
The Vice Chairman and I will, however, continue to work
together to keep the American people as informed as possible.
And when we can, we will do our best to clarify any
misconceptions that may exist. With that in mind, I will now
briefly discuss some of our plans for this Committee's
oversight in the coming months.
First, we look forward to the naming of a Director of
National Intelligence. As soon as the President nominates this
individual, we will schedule a confirmation hearing as soon as
practicable.
Second, we will monitor closely the implementation of the
Intelligence reform bill. We will focus a great deal of
attention on how this Committee can support the new DNI in the
exercise of his or her authorities. And, because no legislation
is perfect, we will also look at whether any legislative fixes
are necessary.
Third, in the area of oversight, we will focus on the
intelligence community's collection and analytical
capabilities, especially in regard to our capabilities. Do we
have the adequate collection? Do we have the adequate analysis?
Do we have the information access to make a consensus threat
analysis that is both credible and helpful to the policymakers
and the Congress?
This Committee learned from our Iraq WMD inquiry that we
cannot and should not always take the intelligence community's
assessments at face value. The Vice Chairman and I have
therefore decided to change the way the Senate Intelligence
Committee does our work.
We haven't launched anything. We haven't really begun an
investigation or an inquiry. Nor have we ruled them out. We
have simply adjusted our approach based on the lessons we
learned while reviewing the assessment by the community on
Iraq's WMD programs.
Applying the methodologies that we used in that review, we
will now look deeper into the intelligence community's work on
the very critical threats that face our Nation. Instead of
examining these issues after the fact, as we did on the Iraq
WMD question and many other matters in the past, we are going
to be more proactive, to try to identify our strengths and our
weaknesses ahead of time. We have already begun to examine our
intelligence capabilities with respect to nuclear terrorism and
also the country of Iran.
In closing, I want to say something about the limitations
of intelligence. Even the best intelligence will not be
absolutely precise and tell us what to do. However,
intelligence is a necessary and crucial tool used by
policymakers to make very difficult decisions that do directly
affect those who defend our freedoms and our national security.
With that said, I look forward to the testimony of our
witnesses, and also the questions by our Members. I now turn to
the distinguished Vice Chairman for any comment he may wish to
make.
Senator Rockefeller.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV,
VICE CHAIRMAN
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It's customary at the beginning of our hearings to welcome
everybody, and I certainly do so, and very much look forward to
your testimony. I have to say, though, I think there is a
significant absence or an empty spot at the table, at the
witness table. And I want to talk about that.
There should be another chair before us. And the little
sign in front of it should read Director of National
Intelligence, DNI. Last summer, the Congress made reforming the
intelligence community its top legislative priority. We worked
through our August recess. We came back in a lame duck session
after the election.
And we eventually passed landmark legislation fundamentally
reforming the intelligence community for the first time in 50
years. The Congress made this extraordinary effort because it
believed that our Nation was at risk, and we take that
seriously.
More specifically, the Congress--eventually joined by the
President--understood that without one individual in charge of
the 15-agency intelligence community, America's war on
terrorism would continue to be hampered by bureaucratic
infighting and by budgetary tug-of-wars, that in turn inhibit
the sharing of information--or, as we like to say, the access
to information--and limit our ability to bring all of our
resources to bear on what is a fairly ghastly threat on a
worldwide basis.
When the President signed the intelligence reform bill in
December, I really expected that when this hearing came the new
Director of National Intelligence would be here to talk about
threats.
It took 3 months for the Senate and the House to pass
separate intelligence bills--that's not really very much time--
and then resolve a multitude of differences in conference and
all kinds of back-and-forth in a way which was agreeable to the
Administration.
Two months have now passed since the bill-signing ceremony.
And the position of Director of National Intelligence remains
vacant--not even a person nominated. To me, this is
unacceptable. It's unacceptable that the Administration has not
shown the same urgency in dealing with that question that the
Congress took the trouble to create. Some agree, some don't
agree with the decision, but it was not a particularly close
vote in either house.
With absolutely no disrespect--and, in fact, a great deal
of respect to Director Goss--or any of our other witnesses, it
is unacceptable that we cannot hear from and question the one
person under the new law that is supposed to be responsible for
the overall management of how the intelligence community is
responding to the national security threats that we will be
discussing this morning.
There are other troubling consequences to the
Administration's lack of action. In recent weeks, I visited
most of the principal agencies that comprise our intelligence
community. The message I heard over and over, through words or
body language, was that the senior leadership at these agencies
was--that action on how best to carry out some key provisions
on the intelligence reform bill was being held up pending the
arrival of the new Director of National Intelligence. The delay
in appointing a DNI has kept implementation of the reform bill,
therefore, in my judgment, in idle.
So, what are the practical consequences of this delay, in
the context of today's threat hearing? I'll highlight three.
The first and most obvious is that delaying the appointment
of the DNI places that individual at a growing disadvantage in
establishing his or her team--the new directorate--and
selecting his or her supporting team of deputies within the 6
months prescribed by law, 2 months already having gone by, or
more. It's prescribed by law, has to have it done.
The second consequence of delay pertains to the
intelligence community's counterterrorism program. In addition
to establishing the position of DNI, the intelligence reform
bill mandated the creation of the National Counterterrorism
Center, or NCTC. Initially created by Executive Order, the NCTC
is chartered to be the primary organization in the U.S.
Government responsible for analyzing and integrating all
intelligence pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism.
As is the case with the DNI, the head of the NCTC is a
Senate-confirmed position and the Administration has yet to
nominate a person to carry out those crucial tasks. One could
say one has to do the DNI before the NCTC, but let's get going.
One of the primary missions of the NCTC--and I'm reading
the law now--is to conduct strategic operational planning for
counterterrorism activities, integrating all instruments of
national power, including diplomatic, financial, military,
intelligence activities, as well as homeland security and law
enforcement activities, and to assign roles and
responsibilities as part of its strategic operational planning.
My understanding is that the operational planning mission
at NCTC is not being undertaken, pending confirmation of the
new DNI. We can discuss that. So when we talk about going after
terrorists, after their organizations, where they plot and
where they train and where they keep their money, the question
is, who is carrying out this strategic operational planning
mission on this day?
In the wake of our war against the al-Qa'ida terrorist
network and its operational bases in Afghanistan and Pakistan,
the fundamentalist Islamic terrorist threat has splintered and
decentralized its operations. We need a person in charge, we
need an organization in place, that can coordinate
counterterrorist operations across agencies against this
multiplying terrorist threat.
The third immediate consequence of not having a DNI in
place is the area of proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. The proliferation activity of North Korea and
Iran, along with the damage done by Pakistani scientist A.Q.
Khan, has reduced any confidence that the nuclear genie is
contained.
The combination of these two threats--a decentralized, but
determined terrorist threat and growing proliferation
activity--present the intelligence community with a sobering
challenge, now and for the foreseeable future.
The Congress recognized the importance of this challenge in
crafting the intelligence reform bill, by authorizing the
establishment of a National Counterproliferation Center. The
new intelligence center would generally follow the blueprint of
the National Counterterrorism Center. Again, I am told and
troubled by the fact that the decision on whether or not to
establish the National Counterproliferation Center and, if so,
in what form, is being held up pending the DNI's appointment.
The proliferation activities of North Korea are a threat to
our security and the security of our allies today, as well as
down the road. And the same, of course, is true with Iran, and
we discover others as we go along. Iran, as a nuclear aspirant
and supporter of terrorism, is also center stage and very much
needs to be pursued in this manner.
Policymakers and, most importantly, the President, but also
the Congress, need the best intelligence possible on North
Korea, Iran and other hotspots around the world--Africa being
one which I may ask a question about.
The faulty intelligence used by the Administration to
invade Iraq has harmed our credibility with our allies and has
given Islamic jihadists a powerful recruiting tool around the
world that is not to anybody's advantage. We must learn from
these mistakes, as the Chairman has indicated, and get better
in how we produce timely, objective and accurate intelligence
for U.S. policymakers.
The Chairman and I have directed that the Intelligence
Committee undertake review of how intelligence on Iran is
collected, analyzed and produced. The review will be similar to
what we did before with weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.
But it's going to be very proactive. The same sort of rigorous
oversight ought to apply to North Korea also, and there are
some other countries that come to mind.
I am hopeful that the Committee can also focus the efforts
of its very talented staff on the growing controversy
surrounding the collection of intelligence through the
interrogation and rendition of detainees. We need to probe the
fundamental legal, jurisdictional and operational questions,
both retrospectively and prospectively, in my mind, at the
heart of how the intelligence community collects such
intelligence.
It's undeniable that the intelligence community has made
enormous strides in the past 3 years and that some reform has
occurred. The tireless efforts of hardworking men and women at
the CIA, FBI and other intelligence agencies, like the work of
those in uniform, have been a linchpin in the effort to protect
every American against the murderous intentions of terrorists.
But there is an acknowledgement among the people I have
spoken with that we can do better and that we must get better.
The intelligence reform bill addressed that issue of
authorities, resources and organization. But the promise of
reform will not be realized without strong leadership and
management acumen--the sort of skills the DNI must bring to the
table.
Challenges abound, as the Chairman knows, for the current
and future leadership of the intelligence community. There's a
lot of work to be done on how we collect intelligence,
particularly in the arena of human intelligence, analytical
workforce problems, language problems. Our intelligence
community needs to establish a global presence that is not only
capable, but lithe, for our adversaries are increasingly mobile
and use much more sophisticated technology as they do their
work.
I know we're limited as to what we can discuss in an open
hearing, but I hope to the extent possible that our witnesses
will address some of the questions that I have raised.
I thank the witnesses and I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Roberts. Before I recognize Director Goss, I would
like to speak to the Vice Chairman's comments in regard to the
appointment of a DNI. I think this is what we used to hear on
``Perry Mason,'' with extenuating circumstances.
The intelligence reform bill was passed on December 17. The
bill says that a DNI will be appointed no later than 6 months--
that is, June 17. I think, or at least it is my opinion, that
the Administration is also awaiting the report of the
independent WMD commission, part of whose job or task is to
take a look at the intelligence reform bill and make some
recommendations.
In addition, while I share the Vice Chairman's frustration
that we wish we had here the Director of National Intelligence
and that he or she was well down the road to implementing the
reform bill, it is, I think, crucially important, not only in
terms of timing, but to get the right person. And that person
should have managerial experience, obviously, expertise in
intelligence, obviously, expertise and experience perhaps in
the military. As the Vice Chairman has pointed out, we have
certainly people in the Washington area or, for that matter,
within the United States, that certainly fit that description.
So, I hope that the Administration will move in an
expeditious fashion, but in a fashion that gets the right
person for the job.
Director Goss, you may proceed, sir.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PORTER J. GOSS,
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Director Goss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Good
morning, Mr. Vice Chairman and Members of the Committee, and
thank you for the hospitable welcome here.
The challenges that you've mentioned in your opening
remarks that face the United States of America and its citizens
and our interests literally do span the globe. My intention
today is to tell you what I believe are those challenges in
terms of the most threatening and identify briefly where we
think our service as intelligence professionals is needed most
on behalf of the United States taxpayers.
We need to make some tough decisions about which haystacks
deserve to be scrutinized for the needles that can hurt us
most. And we know in this information age that there are
literally endless haystacks everywhere. There's an awful lot of
material out there.
I do want to make several things clear. Our officers are
taking risks, and I will be asking them to take more risks--
justifiable risks--because I would be much happier here
explaining why we did something than why we did nothing.
I'm asking for more competitive analysis, more co-location
of analysts and collectors--in fact, that's underway--and
deeper collaboration with agencies throughout the intelligence
community.
Above all, our analysts must be objective. Our credibility
rests there, as you pointed out well in this Committee's report
to the community issued on the WMD.
We do not make policy. We do not wage war. I am emphatic
about that. I testified to that during my confirmation, and it
is still true and it will always be. We do collect and analyze
information. With respect to the CIA, I want to tell you that
my first few months as Director have served only to confirm
what I and, I think, Members of Congress have known about CIA
for years. It is a special place. It's an organization of
dedicated, patriotic people who are doing their best.
In addition to taking a thorough, hard look at our own
capabilities, we're working to define CIA's place in the
restructured intelligence community--a community that will be
led by a new DNI, as we've heard--to make the maximum possible
contribution to American security at home and abroad that
uniquely the CIA can make.
The CIA is and will remain the flagship agency, in my view,
and each of the other 14 elements of the community will
continue to make their unique contributions, as well. I say
that as the DCI, not as the Director of Central Intelligence
Agency.
I turn to threats. I will not attempt, obviously, to cover
everything that could go wrong in the year ahead. We must and
do concentrate our efforts, experience and expertise on the
challenges that are most pressing. And they are, of course,
defeating terrorism, protecting the homeland, stopping
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and drugs,
fostering stability, freedom and peace in the most troubled
regions of the world.
My comments today will focus on these duties. I know well
from my 30 years in public service that you and your colleagues
have an important responsibility with these open sessions to
get information to the American people, as the Chairman has
stated.
I also know too well, as the Chairman has stated, that as
we are broadcasting to America, enemies are also tuning in. In
open session, I feel that I will and must be very prudent in my
remarks as DCI.
Mr. Chairman, on the subject of terrorism, defeating
terrorism must remain one of our intelligence community's core
objectives, and it will, as widely dispersed terrorist networks
will present one of the most serious challenges to the U.S.
national security interests at home and abroad in the coming
year. That's not startling news, but it's important.
In the past year, aggressive measures by our intelligence,
law enforcement, defense and homeland security communities,
along with our key international partners, have, in fact, dealt
serious blows to al-Qa'ida and other terrorist organizations
and individuals.
Despite these successes, however, the terrorist threat to
the U.S. in the homeland and abroad endures. I'd make four
points.
Al-Qa'ida is intent on finding ways to circumvent U.S.
security enhancements to strike Americans in the homeland, one.
Number two, it may be only a matter of time before al-
Qa'ida or another group attempts to use chemical, biological,
radiological or nuclear weapons. We must focus on that.
Three, al-Qa'ida is only one facet of the threat from a
broader Sunni jihadist movement.
And four, the Iraq conflict, while not a cause of
extremism, has become a cause for extremists.
We know from experience that al-Qa'ida is a patient,
persistent, imaginative, adaptive and dangerous opponent. But
it is vulnerable and displaced. We and other allies have hit it
hard. Jihadist religious leaders preach millennial,
aberrational visions of some kind of a fight for Islam's
survival. Sometimes they argue that the struggle justifies the
indiscriminate killing of civilians, even with chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. And, fortunately,
they have a small audience.
Our pursuit of al-Qa'ida and its most senior leaders,
including bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, is
intense. However, their capture alone would not be enough to
eliminate the terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland or
interests overseas. Often influenced by al-Qa'ida's ideology,
members of a broader movement have an ability to plan and
conduct operations. We saw this last March in the railway
attacks in Madrid, conducted by local Sunni extremists.
Other regional groups connected to al-Qa'ida or acting on
their own also continue to pose a significant threat. In
Pakistan, terrorist elements remain committed to attacking U.S.
targets. In Saudi Arabia, remnants of the Saudi al-Qa'ida
network continue to attack U.S. interests in the region.
In Central Asia, the Islamic Jihad Group, a splinter group
of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, has become a more
virulent threat to U.S. interests and local governments there.
Last spring, the group used female operatives in a series of
bombings in Uzbekistan, as you know.
In Southeast Asia, the Jemaah Islamiyah continues to pose a
threat to U.S. and Western interests in Indonesia and the
Philippines, where JI is colluding with the Abu Sayyaf Group
and possibly the MILF group, as well.
In Europe, Islamic extremists continue to plan and cause
attacks against U.S. and local interests. Some of them may
cause significant casualties. In 2004, British authorities
dismantled an al-Qa'ida cell--much reported. And in the
Netherlands, an extremist brutally killed a prominent Dutch
citizen--not as widely reported.
Islamic extremists are exploiting the Iraqi conflict to
recruit new, anti-U.S. jihadists. Those jihadists who survive
will leave Iraq experienced and focused on acts of urban
terrorism. They represent a potential pool of contacts to build
transnational terrorist cells, groups and networks in Saudi
Arabia, Jordan and other countries.
Zarqawi has sought to bring about the final victory of
Islam over the West, in his version of it. And he hopes to
establish a safe haven in Iraq from which his group could
operate against the ``infidel Western nations, the apostate
Muslim governments.''
Other groups spanning the globe also pose persistent and
serious threats to U.S. and Western interests. Hizbollah's main
focus remains Israel. But it could conduct lethal attacks
against U.S. interests quickly upon a decision to do so. It has
that capability, we estimate.
Palestinian terrorist organizations have apparently
refrained from directly targeting U.S. or Western interests in
their opposition to Middle East peace initiatives, but they do
pose an ongoing risk to U.S. citizens that could be killed or
wounded in attacks intended to strike Israeli interests.
Extremist groups in Latin America are still concerned with
the FARC--the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia--
possessing capability and clear intent to threaten U.S.
interests in that region.
The Horn of Africa, the Sahel, the Mahgreb, the Levant and
the Gulf States are all areas where pop-up terrorist activity
can be expected and needs to be monitored and dealt with.
Afghanistan, Mr. Chairman, once the safe haven for Usama
bin Ladin, has started on the road to recovery after decades of
instability and civil war. Hamid Karzai's election to the
presidency was a major milestone. Elections for a new national
assembly and local district councils, tentatively scheduled for
this spring--though that's an ambitious schedule--will complete
the process of electing representatives this year, hopefully.
President Karzai still faces a low-level insurgency, aimed at
destabilizing his country and raising the cost of
reconstruction, and ultimately forcing coalition forces to
leave before the job is done. The development of the Afghan
national army and the national police force is going well,
although neither can yet stand on its own.
In Iraq, low voter turnout in some Sunni areas and the
post-election resumption of insurgent attacks--most against
Iraqi civilian and security forces--indicate that the
insurgency achieved at least some of its election day goals and
remains a serious threat to creating a stable, representative
government in Iraq.
Self-determination for the Iraqi people will largely depend
on the ability of the Iraq forces to provide their own
security. Iraq's most capable security units have become more
effective in recent months, contributing to several major
operations, and helping to put an Iraqi face on security
operations. Insurgents are determined and still trying to
discourage new recruits and undermine the effectiveness of
existing Iraqi security forces by grotesque intimidation
tactics.
The prolonged lack of security would hurt Iraq's
reconstruction efforts and economic development, causing
overall economic growth to proceed at a slower pace than many
analysts expected and, certainly that the Iraqi people deserve.
Alternatively, the larger, uncommitted moderate Sunni
population and the Sunni political elite may seize the post-
electoral moment to take part in creating Iraq's new political
institutions, if victorious Shia and Kurdish parties include
Sunnis in the new government and the drafting of the
constitution. That is a hopeful opportunity.
On the subject of proliferation, Mr. Chairman, I will now
turn to the worldwide challenge. Last year started with
promise, as Libya had just renounced its WMD programs, North
Korea was engaged in negotiations with regional states on its
nuclear weapons program, and Iran was showing greater signs of
openness regarding its nuclear program after concealing
activity for nearly a decade.
Let me start with Libya, which is a bit of a good news
story and one that reflects the patient perseverance with which
the intelligence community--writ large--can tackle a tough
intelligence problem.
In 2004, Tripoli followed through with a range of steps to
disarm itself of WMD and ballistic missiles. Libya gave up key
elements of its nuclear weapons program and opened itself to
the IAEA. Libya gave up some key CW assets, and opened its
former CW program to international scrutiny.
After disclosing its Scud stockpile and extensive ballistic
and cruise missile R&D efforts in 2003, Libya took the
important step to abide by its commitment to limit its missiles
to the 300-kilometer range threshold of the Missile Technology
Control Regime.
Today, the U.S. continues to work with Libya to make sure
that any discrepancies in the declarations they have made are
clarified.
In North Korea, on the other hand, on 10 February 2005--not
long ago--Pyongyang announced it was suspending participation
in 6-party talks under way since 2003, declared it had nuclear
weapons and affirmed it would seek to increase its nuclear
arsenal. The North had been pushing for a freeze on its
plutonium program in exchange for significant benefits rather
than committing to the full dismantlement that we and our
partners seek.
In 2003, the North claimed it had reprocessed the 8,000
fuel rods from the Yongbyon reactor, originally stored under
the agreed framework, with the IAEA monitoring in 1994. The
North claims to have made new weapons from its reprocessing
effort.
We believe North Korea continues to pursue a uranium
enrichment capability, drawing on the assistance it received
from A.Q. Khan before his network was shut down.
North Korea continues to develop, produce, deploy and sell
ballistic missiles of increasing range and sophistication,
augmenting Pyongyang's large operational force of Scud and
Nodong-class missiles. North Korea could resume flight testing
at any time, including longer range missiles, such as the Taepo
Dong-2 system. We assess the TD-2 is capable of reaching the
United States with a nuclear weapon-size payload.
North Korea continues to market its ballistic missile
technology, trying to find new clients now that some
traditional customers--read Libya--have halted such trade.
We believe North Korea has active CW and BW programs, and
probably has chemical and possibly biological weapons ready for
use.
Iran. In early February, the spokesman of Iran's Supreme
Council for National Security publicly announced that Iran
would never scrap its nuclear program. This came in the midst
of negotiations with EU-3 members--that would be Britain,
Germany and France--seeking objective guarantees from Tehran
that it would not use nuclear technology for nuclear weapons.
Previous comments by Iranian officials, including Iran's
supreme leader and its foreign minister, indicated that Iran
would not give up its ability to enrich uranium. Certainly, it
would be right for Iran to have the capability to produce fuel
for power reactors. But, we're more concerned about the dual-
use nature of the technology that could also be used to achieve
a nuclear weapon. We do not have transparency.
In parallel, Iran continues its pursuit of long-range
ballistic missiles, such as an improved version of a 1,300-
kilometer range Shahab-3 MRBM, to add to the hundreds of short-
range Scud missiles it already has.
Even since 9/11, Tehran continues to support terrorist
groups in the region, such as Hizbollah--it is a state
sponsor--and could encourage increased attacks in Israel and
the Palestinian territories to derail progress toward peace
there. Iran reportedly is supporting some anti-coalition
activities in Iraq and seeking to influence the future
character of the Iraqi state.
Conservatives are likely to consolidate their power in
Iran's June 2005 presidential elections, further marginalizing
the reform movement of last year. Iran continues to retain, in
secret, important members of al-Qa'ida, causing further
uncertainty about Iran's commitment to bring them to justice
one way or another.
Moving to China, Beijing's military modernization and
military buildup could tilt the balance of power in the Taiwan
Strait. Improved Chinese capabilities threaten U.S. forces in
the region. In 2004, China increased its ballistic missile
forces deployed across from Taiwan and rolled out several new
submarines. China continues to develop more robust, survivable,
nuclear-armed missiles, as well as conventional capability for
use in regional conflict.
Taiwan continues to promote constitutional reform and other
attempts to strengthen local identity. Beijing judges these
moves to be a ``timeline for independence.'' If Beijing decides
that Taiwan is taking steps toward permanent separation that
exceed Beijing's tolerance, we assess China is prepared to
respond with varying levels of force.
China is increasingly confident and active on the
international stage, trying to ensure it has a voice on major
international issues, to secure access to natural resources,
and to counter what it sees as United States efforts to contain
or encircle it.
New leadership, under President Hu Jintao, is facing an
array of domestic challenges in 2005, including the potential
for a resurgence in inflation, increased dependence on exports,
growing economic inequalities in the country, increased
awareness of individual rights, and popular expectations for
his new leadership.
In Russia, the attitudes and actions of the so-called
``siloviki''--the ex-KGB men that Putin has placed in positions
of authority throughout the Russian government--may be critical
determinates of the course Putin will pursue in the year ahead.
Perceived setbacks in Ukraine are likely to lead Putin to
redouble his efforts to defend Russian interests abroad, while
balancing cooperation with the West.
Russia's most immediate security threat is terrorism. And
counterterrorism cooperation undoubtedly will continue.
Putin publicly acknowledges a role for outside powers to
play in the confederate states, but we believe he is
nevertheless concerned about further encroachment by the U.S.
and NATO into that region.
Moscow worries that separatism inside Russia and radical
Islamic movements beyond their borders might threaten stability
in southern Russia. Chechen extremists have increasingly turned
to terrorist operations in response to Moscow's successes in
Chechnya, and it's reasonable to predict they will carry out
attacks against civilian or military targets elsewhere in
Russia in 2005.
Budget increases will help Russia create a professional
military by replacing conscript with volunteer servicemen and
focus on maintaining, modernizing and extending the operational
life of strategic weapons systems, including the nuclear
missile force.
Russia remains an important source of weapons technology,
material and components for other nations. The vulnerability of
Russian WMD materials and technology to theft or diversion is a
continuing concern.
On other areas of potential instability, Mr. Chairman, I
would briefly go to the Middle East.
The election of the Palestinian President, Mahmoud Abbas,
marks an important step, and Abbas has made it clear that
negotiating a peace deal with Israel is a very high priority.
That's extraordinarily good news. Nevertheless, there are
hurdles ahead.
Redlines must be resolved while the Palestinian leaders try
to rebuild damaged PA infrastructure and governing
institutions, especially the security forces, the legislature
and the judiciary--those things that will help stability.
Terrorist groups, some of whom benefit from funding from
outside sources, could step up attacks to derail peace and
progress and need close monitoring.
In Africa, chronic instability will continue to hamper
counterterrorism efforts and impose heavy humanitarian and
peacekeeping burdens on us.
In Nigeria, the military is struggling to contain militia
groups in the oil-producing south and ethnic violence that
frequently erupts throughout the country. Extremist groups are
emerging from the country's Muslim population of about 65
million. Nigeria is a big oil producer for us.
In Sudan, the peace deal signed in January will result in
de facto southern autonomy and may inspire rebels in provinces
such as Darfur to press harder for a greater share of resource
and power. Opportunities exist for Islamic extremists to
reassert themselves in the north, unless the central government
stays unified.
Unresolved disputes in the Horn of Africa--Africa's gateway
to the Middle East--create vulnerability to foreign terrorists
and extremist groups. Ethiopia and Eritrea still have a
contested border. And armed factions in Somalia indicate they
will fight the authority of a new transitional government.
In Latin America, the region is entering a major electoral
cycle in 2006. Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Peru and Venezuela hold presidential elections.
Several key countries in the hemisphere are potential
flashpoints in 2005. In Venezuela, Chavez is consolidating his
power by using technically legal tactics to target his
opponents and meddling in the region, supported by Castro.
In Colombia, progress against counternarcotics and
terrorism under President Uribe's successful leadership may be
affected by an election.
The outlook is very cloudy for legitimate, timely elections
in November 2005 in Haiti, even with substantial international
support.
Campaigning for the 2006 presidential election in Mexico is
likely to stall progress on fiscal, labor and energy reform.
And in Cuba, Castro's hold on power remains firm. But a bad
fall last October has rekindled speculation about his declining
health and the succession scenarios.
In Southeast Asia, three countries bear close watching. In
Indonesia, President Yudhoyono has moved swiftly to crack down
on corruption. But reinvigorating the economy, burned by the
cost of recovery in the tsunami-damaged area, will likely be
affected by continuing, deep-seated ethnic and political
turmoil exploitable by terrorists.
In the Philippines, Manila is struggling with prolonged
Islamic and Communist rebellion. The presence of Jemaah
Islamiyah, terrorists seeking safe haven and training bases in
the south, adds volatility and capability to terrorist groups
already in place.
And finally, Mr. Chairman, Thailand is plagued with an
increasingly volatile Muslim separatist threat in the
southeastern provinces and the risk of escalation remains very
high.
I thank you very much for that opportunity to give a brief
overview.
[The prepared statement of Director Goss follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Porter Goss,
Director of Central Intelligence
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, Members of the
Committee.
It is my honor to meet with you today to discuss the challenges I
see facing America and its interests in the months ahead. These
challenges literally span the globe. My intention is to tell you what I
believe are the greatest challenges we face today and those where our
service as intelligence professionals is needed most on behalf of the
U.S. taxpayer.
We need to make tough decisions about which haystacks deserve to be
scrutinized for the needles that can hurt us most. And we know in this
information age that there are endless haystacks everywhere. I do want
to make several things clear:
Our officers are taking risks, and I will be asking them
to take more risks--justifiable risks--because I would much rather
explain why we did something than why we did nothing,
I am asking for more competitive analysis, more
collocation of analysts and collectors, and deeper collaboration with
agencies throughout the Intelligence Community. Above all, our analysis
must be objective. Our credibility rests there.
We do not make policy. We do not wage war. I am emphatic
about that and always have been. We do collect and analyze information.
With respect to the CIA, I want to tell you that my first few
months as Director have served only to confirm what I and Members of
Congress have known about CIA for years. It is a special place--an
organization of dedicated, patriotic people. In addition to taking a
thorough, hard look at our own capabilities, we are working to define
CIA's place in the restructured Intelligence Community--a community
that will be led by a new Director of National Intelligence--to make
the maximum possible contribution to American security at home and
abroad. The CIA is and will remain the flagship agency, in my view. And
each of the other 14 elements in the community will continue to make
their unique contributions as well.
Now, I turn to threats. I will not attempt to cover everything that
could go wrong in the year ahead. We must, and do, concentrate our
efforts, experience and expertise on the challenges that are most
pressing: defeating terrorism; protecting the homeland; stopping
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and drugs; and fostering
stability, freedom and peace in the most troubled regions of the world.
Accordingly, my comments today will focus on these duties. I know well
from my 30 years in public service that you and your colleagues have an
important responsibility with these open sessions to get information to
the American people. But I also know all too well that as we are
broadcasting to America, enemies are also tuning in. In open session I
feel I must be very prudent in my remarks as DCI.
TERRORISM
Mr. Chairman, defeating terrorism must remain one of our
intelligence community's core objectives, as widely dispersed terrorist
networks will present one of the most serious challenges to U.S.
national security interests at home and abroad in the coming year. In
the past year, aggressive measures by our intelligence, law
enforcement, defense and homeland security communities, along with our
key international partners have dealt serious blows to al-Qa'ida and
others. Despite these successes, however, the terrorist threat to the
U.S. in the Homeland and abroad endures.
Al-Qa'ida is intent on finding ways to circumvent U.S.
security enhancements to strike Americans and the Homeland.
It may be only a matter of time before al-Qa'ida or
another group attempts to use chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear weapons (CBRN).
Al-Qa'ida is only one facet of the threat from a broader
Sunni jihadist movement.
The Iraq conflict, while not a cause of extremism, has
become a cause for extremists.
We know from experience that al-Qa'ida is a patient, persistent,
imaginative, adaptive and dangerous opponent. But it is vulnerable and
we and other allies have hit it hard.
Jihadist religious leaders preach millennial aberrational
visions of a fight for Islam's survival. Sometimes they argue that the
struggle justifies the indiscriminate killing of civilians, even with
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons.
Our pursuit of Al-Qa'ida and its most senior leaders, including Bin
Ladin and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri is intense. However, their
capture alone would not be enough to eliminate the terrorist threat to
the U.S. Homeland or U.S. interests overseas. Often influenced by al-
Qa'ida's ideology, members of a broader movement have an ability to
plan and conduct operations. We saw this last March in the railway
attacks in Madrid conducted by local Sunni extremists. Other regional
groups--connected to al-Qa'ida or acting on their own--also continue to
pose a significant threat.
In Pakistan, terrorist elements remain committed to
attacking U.S. targets. In Saudi Arabia, remnants of the Saudi al-
Qa'ida network continue to attack U.S. interests in the region.
In Central Asia, the Islamic Jihad Group (IJG), a splinter
group of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, has become a more virulent
threat to U.S. interests and local governments. Last spring the group
used female operatives in a series of bombings in Uzbekistan.
In Southeast Asia, the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) continues to
pose a threat to U.S. and Western interests in Indonesia and the
Philippines, where JI is colluding with the Abu Sayyaf Group and
possibly the Mff.F.
In Europe, Islamic extremists continue to plan and cause
attacks against U.S. and local interests, some that may cause
significant casualties. In 2004 British authorities dismantled an al-
Qa'ida cell and an extremist brutally killed a prominent Dutch citizen
in the Netherlands.
Islamic extremists are exploiting the Iraqi conflict to recruit new
anti-U.S. jihadists.
These jihadists who survive will leave Iraq experienced in
and focused on acts of urban terrorism. They represent a potential pool
of contacts to build transnational terrorist cells, groups, and
networks in Saudi Arabia, Jordan and other countries.
Zarqawi has sought to bring about the final victory of
Islam over the West, and he hopes to establish a safe haven in Iraq
from which his group could operate against ``infidel'' Western nations
and ``apostate'' Muslim governments.
Other terrorist groups spanning the globe also pose persistent and
serious threats to U.S. and Western interests.
Hizballah's main focus remains Israel, but it could
conduct lethal attacks against U.S. interests quickly upon a decision
to do so.
Palestinian terrorist organizations have apparently
refrained from directly targeting U.S. or Western interests in their
opposition to Middle East peace initiatives, but pose an ongoing risk
to U.S. citizens that could be killed or wounded in attacks intended to
strike Israeli interests.
Extremist groups in Latin America are still a concern,
with the FARC--the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia--possessing
the greatest capability and the clearest intent to threaten U.S.
interests in the region.
Horn of Africa, the Sahel, the Mahgreb, the Levant, and
the Gulf States are all areas where ``pop up'' terrorist activity can
be expected.
AFGHANISTAN
Mr. Chairman, Afghanistan, once the safe haven for Usama bin Ladin,
has started on the road to recovery after decades of instability and
civil war. Hamid Karzai's election to the presidency was a major
milestone. Elections for a new National Assembly and local district
councils--tentatively scheduled for this spring--will complete the
process of electing representatives.
President Karzai still faces a low-level insurgency aimed at
destabilizing the country, raising the cost of reconstruction and
ultimately forcing Coalition forces to leave.
The development of the Afghan National Army and a national
police force is going well, although neither can yet stand on its own.
IRAQ
Low voter turnout in some Sunni areas and the post-election
resumption of insurgent attacks--most against Iraqi civilian and
security forces--indicate that the insurgency achieved at least some of
its election-day goals and remains a serious threat to creating a
stable representative government in Iraq.
Self-determination for the Iraqi people will largely depend on the
ability of Iraqi forces to provide security. Iraq's most capable
security units have become more effective in recent months,
contributing to several major operations and helping to put an Iraqi
face on security operations. Insurgents are determined to discourage
new recruits and undermine the effectiveness of existing Iraqi security
forces.
The lack of security is hurting Iraq's reconstruction efforts and
economic development, causing overall economic growth to proceed at a
much slower pace than many analysts expected a year ago.
Alternatively, the larger uncommitted moderate Sunni
population and the Sunni political elite may seize the post electoral
moment to take part in creating Iraq's new political institutions if
victorious Shia and Kurdish parties include Sunnis in the new
government and the drafting of the constitution.
PROLIFERATION
Mr. Chairman, I will now turn to the worldwide challenge of
proliferation. Last year started with promise as Libya had just
renounced its WMD programs, North Korea was engaged in negotiations
with regional states on its nuclear weapons program, and Iran was
showing greater signs of openness regarding its nuclear program after
concealing activity for nearly a decade. Let me start with Libya, a
good news story, and one that reflects the patient perseverance with
which the Intelligence Community can tackle a tough intelligence
problem.
LIBYA
In 2004, Tripoli followed through with a range of steps to disarm
itself of WMD and ballistic missiles.
Libya gave up key elements of its nuclear weapons program,
opened itself to the IAEA.
Libya gave up some key CW assets and opened its former CW
program to international scrutiny.
After disclosing its SCUD stockpile and extensive
ballistic and cruise missile R&D efforts in 2003, Libya took important
steps to abide by its commitment to limit its missiles to the 300-km
range threshold of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
The U.S. continues to work with Libya to clarify some discrepancies
in the declaration.
NORTH KOREA
On 10 February 2005, Pyongyang announced it was suspending
participation in the six-party talks underway since 2003, declared it
had nuclear weapons, and affirmed it would seek to increase its nuclear
arsenal. The North had been pushing for a freeze on its plutonium
program in exchange for significant benefits, rather than committing to
the full dismantlement that we and are our partners sought.
In 2003, the North claimed it had reprocessed the 8,000
fuel rods from the Yongbyong reactor, originally stored under the
Agreed Framework, with IAEA monitoring in 1994. The North claims to
have made new weapons from its reprocessing effort.
We believe North Korea continues to pursue a uranium
enrichment capability drawing on the assistance it received from A.Q.
Khan before his network was shutdown.
North Korea continues to develop, produce, deploy, and sell
ballistic missiles of increasing range and sophistication, augmenting
Pyongyang's large operational force of Scud and No Dong class missiles.
North Korea could resume flight-testing at any time, including of
longer-range missiles, such as the Taepo Dong-2 system. We assess the
TD 2 is capable of reaching the United States with a nuclear-weapon-
sized payload.
North Korea continues to market its ballistic missile
technology, trying to find new clients now that some traditional
customers, such as Libya, have halted such trade.
We believe North Korea has active CW and BW programs and probably
has chemical and possibly biological weapons ready for use.
IRAN
In early February, the spokesman of Iran's Supreme Council for
National Security publicly announced that Iran would never scrap its
nuclear program. This came in the midst of negotiations with EU-3
members (Britain, Germany and France) seeking objective guarantees from
Tehran that it will not use nuclear technology for nuclear weapons.
Previous comments by Iranian officials, including Iran's
Supreme Leader and its Foreign Minister, indicated that Iran would not
give up its ability to enrich uranium. Certainly they can use it to
produce fuel for power reactors. We are more concerned about the dual-
use nature of the technology that could also be used to achieve a
nuclear weapon.
In parallel, Iran continues its pursuit of long-range ballistic
missiles, such as an improved version of its 1,300 km range Shahab-3
MRBM, to add to the hundreds of short-range SCUD missiles it already
has.
Even since 9/11, Tehran continues to support terrorist groups in
the region, such as Hizballah, and could encourage increased attacks in
Israel and the Palestinian Territories to derail progress toward peace.
Iran reportedly is supporting some anti-Coalition
activities in Iraq and seeking to influence the future character of the
Iraqi state.
Conservatives are likely to consolidate their power in
Iran's June 2005 presidential elections, further marginalizing the
reform movement last year.
Iran continues to retain in secret important members of
Al-Qai'ida--the Management Council--causing further uncertainty about
Iran's commitment to bring them to justice.
CHINA
Beijing's military modernization and military buildup is tilting
the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait. Improved Chinese
capabilities to threaten U.S. forces in the region.
In 2004, China increased its ballistic missile forces
deployed across from Taiwan and rolled out several new submarines.
China continues to develop more robust, survivable
nuclear-armed missiles as well as conventional capabilities for use in
a regional conflict.
Taiwan continues to promote constitutional reform and other
attempts to strengthen local identity. Beijing judges these moves to be
a ``timeline for independence''. If Beijing decides that Taiwan is
taking steps toward permanent separation that exceed Beijing's
tolerance, we believe China is prepared to respond with various levels
of force.
China is increasingly confident and active on the international
stage, trying to ensure it has a voice on major international issues,
secure access to natural resources, and counter what it sees as U.S.
efforts to contain or encircle China.
New leadership under President Hu Jintao is facing an array of
domestic challenges in 2005, such as the potential for a resurgence in
inflation, increased dependence on exports, growing economic
inequalities, increased awareness of individual rights, and popular
expectations for the new leadership.
RUSSIA
The attitudes and actions of the so-called ``siloviki''--the ex-KGB
men that Putin has placed in positions of authority throughout the
Russian government may be critical determinants of the course Putin
will pursue in the year ahead.
Perceived setbacks in Ukraine are likely to lead Putin to
redouble his efforts to defend Russian interests abroad while balancing
cooperation with the West. Russia's most immediate security threat is
terrorism, and counterterrorism cooperation undoubtedly will continue.
Putin publicly acknowledges a role for outside powers to
play in the CIS, for example, but we believe he is nevertheless
concerned about further encroachment by the U.S. and NATO into the
region.
Moscow worries that separatism inside Russia and radical
Islamic movements beyond their borders might threaten stability in
Southern Russia. Chechen extremists have increasingly turned to
terrorist operations in response to Moscow's successes in Chechnya, and
it is reasonable to predict that they will carry out attacks against
civilian or military targets elsewhere in Russia in 2005.
Budget increases will help Russia create a professional military by
replacing conscripts with volunteer servicemen and focus on
maintaining, modernizing and extending the operational life of its
strategic weapons systems, including its nuclear missile force.
Russia remains an important source of weapons technology,
materials and components for other nations. The vulnerability of
Russian WMD materials and technology to theft or diversion is a
continuing concern.
POTENTIAL AREAS FOR INSTABILITY
Mr. Chairman, in the Middle East, the election of Palestinian
President Mahmud Abbas, nevertheless, marks an important step and Abbas
has made it clear that negotiating a peace deal with Israel is a high
priority. There nevertheless are hurdles ahead.
Redlines must be resolved while Palestinian leaders try to
rebuild damaged PA infrastructure and governing institutions,
especially the security forces, the legislature, and the judiciary.
Terrorist groups, some of who benefit from funding from
outside sources, could step up attacks to derail peace and progress.
AFRICA
In Africa, chronic instability will continue to hamper counter-
terrorism efforts and pose heavy humanitarian and peacekeeping burdens.
In Nigeria, the military is struggling to contain militia
groups in the oil-producing south and ethnic violence that frequently
erupts throughout the country. Extremist groups are emerging from the
country's Muslim population of about 65 million.
In Sudan, the peace deal signed in January will result in
de facto southern autonomy and may inspire rebels in provinces such as
Darfur to press harder for a greater share of resources and power.
Opportunities exist for Islamic extremists to reassert themselves in
the North unless the central government stays unified.
Unresolved disputes in the Horn of Africa--Africa's
gateway to the Middle East--create vulnerability to foreign terrorist
and extremist groups. Ethiopia and Eritrea still have a contested
border, and armed factions in Somalia indicate they will fight the
authority of a new transitional government.
LATIN AMERICA
In Latin America, the region is entering a major electoral cycle in
2006, when Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Peru, and Venezuela hold presidential elections. Several key countries
in the hemisphere are potential flashpoints in 2005.
In Venezuela, Chavez is consolidating his power by using
technically legal tactics to target his opponents and meddling in the
region supported by Castro.
In Colombia, progress against counternarcotics and
terrorism under President Uribe's successful leadership, may be
affected by the election.
The outlook is very cloudy for legitimate, timely
elections in November 2005 in Haiti--even with substantial
international support.
Campaigning for the 2006 presidential election in Mexico
is likely to stall progress on fiscal, labor, and energy reforms.
In Cuba, Castro's hold on power remains firm, but a bad fall last
October has rekindled speculation about his declining health and
succession scenarios.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
In Southeast Asia, three countries bear close watching.
In Indonesia, President Yudhoyono has moved swiftly to
crackdown on corruption. Reinvigorating the economy, burdened by the
costs of recovery in tsunami-damaged areas, will likely be affected by
continuing deep-seated ethnic and political turmoil exploitable by
terrorists.
In the Philippines, Manila is struggling with prolonged
Islamic and Communist rebellions. The presence of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)
terrorists seeking safe haven and training basses adds volatility and
capability to terrorist groups already in place.
Thailand is plagued with an increasingly volatile Muslim.
separatist threat in its southeastern provinces, and the risk of
escalation remains high.
Chairman Roberts. We thank you, Mr. Director, for a very
comprehensive statement.
Director Mueller.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT MUELLER,
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Director Mueller. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Rockefeller and the Members
of the Committee. I appreciate this opportunity to discuss our
current view of threats to the United States and the FBI's
efforts to address these threats.
Mr. Chairman, over the past year, through unprecedented
cooperation, particularly with our other Federal agencies, but
most particularly with State and local law enforcement, and
with enhanced intelligence capabilities, we have achieved
considerable victories against national security and criminal
threats facing the United States.
However, at the same time, I must also report that these
threats continue to evolve and to pose new challenges to the
FBI and to our partners. It remains the FBI's overriding
priority to detect and prevent terrorist attacks. And the
threat posed by international terrorism, and in particular from
al-Qa'ida and from related groups, continues to be the gravest
threat that we face.
In 2004, we learned that terrorist cell members had
conducted detailed surveillance of financial targets in New
York, Washington, DC and New Jersey. In response to this threat
and in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security,
the threat level was raised. And we mobilized a substantial
contingent of agents and analysts to review the massive amount
of information connected with the attack planning and to
uncover any additional information that would give us insight
into that plot.
Later in the year, we received information suggesting that
there would be an attack. There was an attack being planned,
possibly timed to coincide with the period before the 2004
Presidential election.
To counter that threat, the FBI created a task force in May
2004, and with thousands of FBI personnel working together with
hundreds of individuals from other agencies--Federal, State and
local--we brought to bear every possible resource in an effort
to identify the operatives and to disrupt the attack plan.
As part of the initiatives of this task force, field
offices conducted a thorough canvas of all of our
counterterrorism investigations, as well as all of our
sources--not only counterterrorism sources, but other sources--
in an effort to develop any further information that could help
us find these individuals.
During the 7 months that the task force was up and running,
we also checked every substantive lead provided in the threat
intelligence. It was indeed an extraordinary effort, and while
we may never know if an operation was indeed being planned, I
am certain that our response to the threat played an integral
role in disrupting any operational plans that may have been
under way.
Mr. Chairman, since we last spoke, the FBI has identified
various extremists located throughout the United States and is
monitoring their activities. My prepared statement sets forth a
number of instances in which we have taken legal action against
individuals engaged in terrorism-related activities in
Virginia, Minneapolis and New York. Although these efforts have
made us safer, they are also a sobering reminder of the threat
we continue to face.
There are three areas that cause us the greatest concern.
First is the threat from covert al-Qa'ida operatives inside the
United States who have the intention to facilitate or to
conduct an attack. Finding them is the top priority for the
FBI, but it is also one of our most difficult challenges. The
very nature of a covert operative, trained not to raise
suspicion and to appear benign, is what makes their detection
so difficult.
Whether we are talking about a true sleeper operative who
has been in place for years, waiting to be activated to conduct
an attack, or a recently deployed operative who has entered the
United States to facilitate or to conduct an attack, we are
continuously adapting our methods to reflect newly received
intelligence and to ensure we are as proactive and as targeted
as we can be in detecting their presence.
Second, we are also extremely concerned with the growing
body of sensitive reporting that continues to show al-Qa'ida's
clear intention to obtain, and to ultimately use, some form of
chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear material in its
attacks against the United States.
While we still assess that a mass casualty attack using
relatively low-tech methods will be their most likely approach,
we are concerned that they are seeking weapons of mass
destruction, including chemical weapons, so-called dirty bombs
or some form of biological agent such as anthrax.
Third, we remain concerned about the potential for al-
Qa'ida to leverage extremist groups with peripheral or
historical connections to al-Qa'ida, and particularly its
ability to exploit radical American converts and other
indigenous extremists. While we still believe that the most
serious threat to the homeland originates from al-Qa'ida
members located overseas, the bombings in Madrid last March
have heightened our concern regarding the possible role that
indigenous Islamic extremists already in the United States may
play in future terrorist plots.
We are also concerned about the possible role that
peripheral groups with a significant presence in the United
States may play, if called upon by members of al-Qa'ida to
assist them with attack planning or logistical support. The
potential recruitment of radicalized American Muslim converts
continues to be a concern and poses an increasingly challenging
issue. The process of recruitment can be subtle, and many times
self-initiated. And radicalization tends to occur over a long
period of time and under very many different circumstances.
Efforts by extremists to obtain training inside the United
States is also an ongoing concern. Although there are multiple
reports and ongoing investigations associated with paramilitary
training activities, I would suspect that extremists
nationwide, the majority of these cases involve small groups of
like-minded individuals who are inspired by the jihadist
rhetoric found in radical mosques or in prison proselytizing or
on the Internet.
Fortunately, the recent amendment to Title 18 adding a
provision prohibiting individuals from receiving military-type
training from a designated foreign terrorist organization makes
it possible now to prosecute individuals who participate or
assist individuals in receiving this type of training.
Mr. Chairman, al-Qa'ida and the groups that support it are
still the most lethal threat we face today. However, other
terrorist groups that have a presence in the United States
require careful monitoring.
It is the FBI's assessment at this time that there is a
limited threat of a coordinated terrorist attack in the United
States from Palestinian terrorist organizations such as Hamas
and the Palestine Islamic Jihad, and the al-Aqsa Martyrs
Brigade. These groups have maintained a longstanding policy of
focusing their attacks on Israeli targets in Israel and the
Palestinian territories. We believe that the primary interest
of Palestinian terrorist groups in the United States remains
the raising of funds to support their regional goals.
We are committed to cutting off the flow of these funds
from the United States to Palestinian terrorist organizations.
As an example of this effort, the former leadership of the Holy
Land for Relief and Development, a Hamas front organization,
was indicted this past year. And in another case, the Elashi
brothers, who owned and ran InfoCom, another Hamas front
organization, were prosecuted and convicted.
Of all the Palestinian groups, Hamas has the largest
presence in the United States, with a strong infrastructure
primarily focused on fundraising, propaganda for the
Palestinian cause and proselytizing. Although it would be a
major strategic shift for Hamas, its United States network is
theoretically capable of facilitating acts of terrorism in the
United States.
And like Hamas, but on a much smaller scale, the United
States-based Palestine Islamic Jihad members and supporters are
primarily engaged in fundraising, propaganda and proselytizing
activities. In 2003, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, or PIJ,
activities and capabilities in the United States were severely
undercut by the arrests of the PIJ leader Sami al-Arian and his
lieutenants. And there have been two additional arrests of
suspected PIJ activists on charges unrelated to terrorism,
which I believe are set forth in my accompanying statement.
Currently, the most likely threat of a terrorist attack
from Palestinian groups in the United States--in the United
States homeland--is from a lone-wolf scenario. In this
scenario, a terrorist attack would be perpetrated by one or
more individuals who may embrace the ideology of a Palestinian
terrorist group, but act without assistance or approval of any
established group.
And then, the Lebanese Hizbollah retains the capability to
strike in the United States, although we have no credible
information to indicate that United States-based Hizbollah
members have plans to attack American interests within the
United States or, for that matter, abroad.
I might add in 2004 we had successes in uncovering
individuals providing material support to Hizbollah, many of
those individuals involved in various criminal schemes to
provide the monies that could be sent to Lebanon, to the
coffers of Hizbollah.
Mr. Chairman, while the national attention is focused on
the substantial threat posed by international terrorists to the
homeland, the FBI must also dedicate resources to defeating a
number of other threats, as detailed in my prepared statement--
for example, domestic terrorists, motivated by a number of
political or social agendas, including white supremacists,
black separatists, animal rights/environmental terrorists,
anarchists, anti-abortion extremists and self-styled militia
groups; foreign intelligence activity, often using non-
traditional collectors such as students and business visitors,
targeting WMD information and technology, penetration of the
United States government and compromise of critical, national
assets.
There is the cyber threat from foreign governments, from
terrorist groups and from hackers with the ability and the
desire to utilize computers for illegal and harmful purposes.
And finally, there are the continuing threats posed to the
fabric of our society by organized crime, human smuggling and
trafficking, violent gangs, public corruption, civil rights
violations, crimes against children and corporate fraud.
Mr. Chairman, in combating all these threats, from
international terrorists to child predators, the FBI must
effectively collect, analyze and share intelligence. As a
result, over the past year we have continued to strengthen the
FBI's enterprise-wide intelligence program. It began in 2001,
with a dedicated analysis section in the Counterterrorism
Division.
In 2002, we created the Office of Intelligence in the
Counterterrorism Division. That structure has enhanced our
capability significantly for purposes of our counterterrorism
operations as well as the counterterrorism operations of our
partners.
In 2003, we extended this concept across all FBI programs--
criminal, cyber, counterterrorism and counterintelligence--and
unified intelligence authorities under a new FBI Office of
Intelligence, led by an Executive Assistant Director. The
Office of Intelligence has adopted the intelligence community's
best practices to direct all of our FBI intelligence
activities. Congress and the 9/11 Commission reviewed these
efforts, and provided recommendations to strengthen our
capabilities.
In the last years, in intelligence reform legislation,
alluded to by Senator Rockefeller, Congress directed us to
create the Directorate of Intelligence--a dedicated national
intelligence workforce within the FBI--and we are doing so.
This workforce consists of intelligence analysts, language
analysts, physical surveillance specialists and special agents
who can pursue an entire career in intelligence.
This integrated intelligence service leverages the core
strengths of the law enforcement community, such as reliability
of sources and fact-based analysis, while ensuring that no
walls exist between collectors, analysts and those who must act
upon the intelligence information.
The Directorate also benefits from the strong FBI history
of joint operations by unifying FBI intelligence professionals
and integrating all partners, but most particularly, State,
local and tribal law enforcement into our intelligence
structures.
Mr. Chairman, my prepared statement provides additional
information about the Directorate of Intelligence and the many
steps that the Bureau has taken to expand and to strengthen its
intelligence capabilities.
We continue to make progress, but there is still much work
to do. We do not underestimate the challenges we face, but we
are confident in our strategy and in our plans to protect the
American people.
I again would like to thank you and the Committee for your
support, and I look forward to working with you and the staff
in the months--and hopefully the years--ahead. And I'm happy to
answer any questions that you might have.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Director Mueller follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Robert S. Mueller, III, Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Senator Rockefeller, and Members of
the Committee. I appreciate this opportunity to discuss our current
view of threats to the United States and the FBI's efforts to address
them.
Before I begin, I would like to take a moment to thank all of our
partners in the Law Enforcement and Intelligence Communities. They have
shared their information and expertise, and in many cases worked side-
by-side with us, and together we made great progress over the past year
to protect our Nation and our communities from terrorism and crime.
I would also like to thank the men and women of the FBI for
continuing to embrace our changing mission, for working to enhance our
intelligence capabilities, for adapting to new technologies and new
ways of doing things, and for doing all of this without ever pausing in
our forward push to protect this country from active threats.
Mr. Chairman, over the past year, through unprecedented
cooperation, enhanced intelligence capabilities, and continued
unwavering commitment to protect the American people, we have achieved
considerable victories against national security and criminal threats
facing the U.S. However, I must also report that these threats continue
to evolve and to pose new challenges to the FBI and our partners.
It remains the FBI's overriding priority to predict and prevent
terrorist attacks. The threat posed by international terrorism, and in
particular from al Qa'ida and related groups, continues to be the
gravest we face.
AL-QA'IDA AND RELATED TERRORIST GROUPS
In 2004, our efforts in the War on Terrorism grew more
intelligence-driven, more coordinated, and produced many tangible
results.
In 2004 we learned that operatives had conducted detailed
surveillance of financial targets in New York, Washington DC, and New
Jersey. In response to this threat, in coordination with DHS, the
threat level was raised from yellow to orange for the cities referenced
in the threat and we mobilized a large contingent of analysts and
agents to review the massive amount of information connected with the
attack planning, and to uncover any additional information that would
give us insight into the plot.
Previously, in the Spring of 2004, our allies in the United Kingdom
arrested a group of terrorists who were plotting an imminent attack
inside the UK. In response, we immediately formed a task force of
analysts and agents to determine if there was a U.S. nexus to the plot
or if any of the UK subjects had links to individuals in the U.S.
Later in the year, we received information suggesting that there
was an attack being planned--possibly timed to coincide with the 2004
Presidential Election. To counter the threat, the FBI created the 2004
Threat Task Force in May 2004. With thousands of FBI personnel,
supported by individuals from outside agencies, it was the largest task
force created since 9/11, and it brought to bear every possible
resource in an effort to identify the operatives and disrupt the attack
plan.
As part of the Task Force's initiatives, field offices conducted a
thorough canvass of all counterterrorism investigations and FBI sources
to develop any further information that could help us find these
individuals. During the 7 months the task force was up and running, we
also checked every tangible lead provided in the threat intelligence.
It was an extraordinary effort and while we may never know if an
operation was indeed being planned, I am certain that the FBI's
tremendous response to the threat played an integral role in disrupting
any operational plans that may have been underway.
Mr. Chairman, since we last spoke, the FBI has identified various
extremists located throughout the U.S. and is monitoring their
activities. Although these efforts have made us safer, they are also a
sobering reminder of the threat we continue to face.
In Virginia, Mohammed Ali al-Timimi, the spiritual leader
of the Virginia Jihad training group disrupted last year, was indicted
for his involvement in the recruitment of U.S. citizens for extremist
training and jihad preparation. Al-Timimi, the primary lecturer at a
northern Virginia Islamic center, preached jihad to a small core group
of followers, provided them paramilitary training and facilitated their
travel to Pakistan in the days after September 11th to attend Lashkar-
e-Taiba training camp in preparation to fight the United States in
Afghanistan.
In Minneapolis, we arrested Mohamad Kamal El-Zahabi, a
Lebanese citizen who admitted to serving in Afghanistan and Chechnya as
a sniper and to providing sniper training at Khalden camp in
Afghanistan and in Lebanon in the 1990s. We first learned of El-Zahabi
during our investigation of Boston-based Sunni extremists Ra'ed Hijazi,
convicted for his role in the Millennium plot in Jordan, and Bassain
Kanj, who was killed in a plot to overthrow the Lebanese government in
2000.
In New York, Yassin Muhiddin Aref was arrested on money
laundering charges connected to a possible terrorist plot to kill a
Pakistani diplomat.
Unfortunately, in spite of these accomplishments, al-Qa'ida
continues to adapt and move forward with its desire to attack the
United States using any means at its disposal. Their intent to attack
us at home remains--and their resolve to destroy America has never
faltered.
Al-Qa'ida's overall attack methodology has adapted and evolved to
address the changes to their operating environment. While we still
assess that a mass casualty attack using relatively low-tech methods
will be their most likely approach, we are concerned that they are
seeking weapons of mass destruction including chemical weapons, so-
called ``dirty bombs'' or some type of biological agent such as
anthrax.
Every day, personnel in our Counterterrorism Division and in 100
Joint Terrorism Task Forces around the country, work to determine
where, when, and how the next attack will occur. The fact remains--
America is awash in desirable targets--those that are symbolic like the
U.S. Capitol and the White House--as well as the many infrastructure
targets, like nuclear power plants, mass transit systems, bridges and
tunnels, shipping and port facilities, financial centers, and
airports--that if successfully hit, would cause both mass casualties
and a crippling effect on our economy.
We continue to be concerned that U.S. transportation systems remain
a key target. The attacks in Madrid last March show the devastation
that a simple, low-tech operation can achieve and the resulting impact
to the government and economy, which makes this type of attack in the
U.S. particularly attractive to al-Qa'ida.
Another area we consider vulnerable and target rich is the energy
sector, particularly nuclear power plants. Al-Qa'ida planner Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed had nuclear power plants as part of his target set and
we have no reason to believe that al-Qa'ida has reconsidered.
Looking ahead, there are three areas that cause us the greatest
concern.
First is the threat from covert operatives who may be inside the
U.S. who have the intention to facilitate or conduct an attack. Finding
them is a top priority for the FBI, but it is also one of the most
difficult challenges. The very nature of a covert operative--trained to
not raise suspicion and to appear benign--is what makes their detection
so difficult.
Mr. Chairman, while we are proud of our accomplishments this year
and the additional insight we have gained into al-Qa'ida's activity, I
remain very concerned about what we are not seeing.
Whether we are talking about a true sleeper operative who has been
in place for years, waiting to be activated to conduct an attack or a
recently deployed operative that has entered the U.S. to facilitate or
conduct an attack, we are continuously adapting our methods to reflect
newly-received intelligence and to ensure we are as proactive and as
targeted as we can be in detecting their presence.
Second, because of al-Qa'ida's directed efforts this year to
infiltrate covert operatives into the U.S., I am also very concerned
with the growing body of sensitive reporting that continues to show al-
Qa'ida's clear intention to obtain and ultimately use some form of
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high-energy explosives
(CBRNE) material in its attacks against America.
Third, we remain concerned about the potential for al-Qa'ida to
leverage extremist groups with peripheral or historical connections to
al-Qa'ida, particularly its ability to exploit radical American
converts and other indigenous extremists. While we still believe the
most serious threat to the Homeland originates from al-Qa'ida members
located overseas, the bombings in Madrid last March have heightened our
concern regarding the possible role that indigenous Islamic extremists,
already in the U.S., may play in future terrorist plots. Also of
concern is the possible role that peripheral groups with a significant
presence in the U.S. may play if called upon by members of al-Qa'ida to
assist them with attack planning or logistical support.
The potential recruitment of radicalized American Muslim converts
continues to be a concern and poses an increasingly challenging issue
for the FBI because the process of recruitment is subtle and many
times, self initiated and radicalization tends to occur over a long
period of time and under many different circumstances.
As part of our continued efforts to identify populations that may
be a target for extremist recruitment, the FBI has been involved in a
coordinated effort between law enforcement and corrections personnel to
combat the recruitment and radicalization of prison inmates. Prisons
continue to be fertile ground for extremists who exploit both a
prisoner's conversion to Islam while still in prison, as well as their
socio-economic status and placement in the community upon their
release.
Extremist recruitment at schools and universities inside the United
States also poses a particularly difficult problem. Because the
environment on campuses is so open and isolated, schools provide a
particularly impressionable and captive audience for extremists to
target.
Additionally, keeping in mind al-Qa'ida recruitment efforts occur
primarily overseas, we are closely monitoring any possible methods for
moving individuals to extremist-linked institutions overseas,
specifically religious schools and mosques that have overt ties to al-
Qa'ida or other terrorist organizations.
We are also concerned about the possibility that individuals who
are members of groups previously considered to be peripheral to the
current threat, could be convinced by more radical, external influences
to take on a facilitation or even worse--an operational role--with
little or no warning. Individual members of legitimate organizations,
such Jama'at Tabligh, may be targeted by al-Qa'ida in an effort to
exploit their networks and contacts here in the United States.
Efforts by extremists to obtain training inside the U.S. is also an
ongoing concern. Although there are multiple reports and ongoing
investigations associated with the paramilitary training activities of
suspected extremists nationwide, the majority of these cases involve
small groups of like-minded individuals who are inspired by the
jihadist rhetoric experienced in radical mosques or prison
proselytizing.
Fortunately, the recent amendment to Title 18 adding a provision
whereby an individual knowingly receiving military-type training from a
designated foreign terrorist organization is committing an offense,
makes it possible to now prosecute individuals who participate or
assist individuals in receiving this type of training.
Another area of concern is the recent merging of Iraqi jihadist
leader Abu Mu'sab alZargawi with al-Qa'ida. Zarqawi has a demonstrated
capability of directing external operations while maintaining his focus
on Iraq as noted with the disrupted Jordan plot in April.
Another aspect of extremist activity in the U.S. is the extensive
fundraising efforts by various terrorist groups. We continue to
identify and block funding conduits, freeze assets of terrorists and
those who support them, protect legitimate charities, and disrupt the
movement of money through peripheral financial systems such as Hawalas.
As part of this effort, the FBI has engaged in extensive
coordination with authorities of numerous foreign governments in
terrorist financing matters, leading to joint investigative efforts
throughout the world. The FBI's participation in a U.S.-Saudi Arabia
Joint Terrorism Task Force, the U.S.-Swiss Terrorism Financing Task
Force and the International Working Group on Terrorist Financing has
enhanced cooperation between these agencies and the U.S. and allowed
the FBI unprecedented access that has increased our understanding of
these complex financing networks. Since 2002, we have provided
terrorism financing training and technical assistance to liaison
partners in almost 50 countries.
THE THREAT FROM OTHER INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS
Mr. Chairman, al-Qa'ida and the groups that support it are still
the most lethal threat we face today. However, other terrorist groups
that have a presence in the U.S. require careful monitoring.
It is the FBI's assessment, at this time, that there is a limited
threat of a coordinated terrorist attack in the U.S. from Palestinian
terrorist organizations, such as HAMAS, the Palestine Islamic Jihad,
and the al-Agsa Martyr's Brigade. These groups have maintained a
longstanding policy of focusing their attacks on Israeli targets in
Israel and the Palestinian territories. We believe that the primary
interest of Palestinian terrorist groups in the U.S. remains the
raising of funds to support their regional goals.
The FBI is committed to staunching the flow of funds from the U.S.
to Palestinian terrorist organizations. As an example of this effort,
the former leadership of the Holy Land for Relief and Development, a
HAMAS front organization, was indicted this past year and convictions
were won against the Elashi brothers who owned and ran Infocom, another
HAMAS front organization.
Of all the Palestinian groups, HAMAS has the largest presence in
the U.S. with a robust infrastructure, primarily focused on
fundraising, propaganda for the Palestinian cause, and proselytizing.
Although it would be a major strategic shift for HAMAS, its U.S.
network is theoretically capable of facilitating acts of terrorism in
the U.S.
Like HAMAS, but on a much smaller scale, U.S.-based Palestine
Islamic Jihad members and supporters are primarily engaged in
fundraising, propaganda and proselytizing activities. In 2003, the
Palestine Islamic Jihad, or PIJ, activities and capabilities in the
U.S. were severely undercut by the arrests of the U.S. PIJ leader, Sami
al-Arian, and three of his top lieutenants. There have also been two
additional arrests of suspected PIJ activists on charges unrelated to
terrorism. There has been no indication of a new U.S. PIJ leadership
since the arrest of al-Axian.
Currently, the most likely threat of terrorist attacks from
Palestinian groups to the U.S. homeland is from a ``lone wolf
'scenario. In this scenario, a terrorist attack would be perpetrated by
one or more individuals who may embrace the ideology of a Palestinian
terrorist group, but act without assistance or approval of any
established group.
Lebanese Hizballah retains the capability to strike in the U.S.,
although we have no credible information to indicate that US-based
Hizballah members have plans to attack American interests within the
U.S. or abroad. In 2004, we had some success in uncovering individuals
providing material support to Hizballah.
In Detroit, Mahmoud Youssef Kourani was indicted in the
Eastern District of Michigan on one count of Conspiracy to Provide
Material Support to Hizballah. Kourani was already in custody for
entering the country illegally through Mexico and was involved in
fundraising activities on behalf of Hizballah.
Also in Detroit, Fawzi Assi was arrested in May of 2004
and was charged under the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act for providing material support to Hizballah. Assi was
initially arrested in 1998 after an outbound U.S. Customs search at the
Detroit Metro Airport discovered night vision goggles, one thermal
imaging scope and two Boeing Global Positioning System devices. Assi
later fled the country after being released by the court on bail, but
was later turned over to us in Lebanon to face U.S. criminal charges.
THE THREAT FROM DOMESTIC TERRORISM
While national attention is focused on the substantial threat posed
by international terrorists to the homeland, law enforcement officials
must also contend with an ongoing threat posed by domestic terrorists
based and operating strictly within the U.S. Domestic terrorists
motivated by a number of political or social agendas--including white
supremacists, black separatists, animal rights/environmental
terrorists, anarchists, anti-abortion extremists, and self-styled
militia--continue to employ violence and criminal activity in
furtherance of these agendas.
Animal rights and environmental extremists, operating under the
umbrella of the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and Earth Liberation
Front (ELF) utilize a variety of tactics against their targets,
including arson, sabotage/vandalism, theft of research animals, and the
occasional use of explosive devices.
Serious incidents of animal rights/eco-terrorism decreased in 2004,
a fact we attribute to a series of law enforcement successes that are
likely deterring large-scale arsons and property destruction. Following
a rash of serious incidents of animal rights/eco-terrorism, including a
$50 million arson in San Diego and two bombing incidents in the San
Francisco area, law enforcement authorities achieved several
significant successes which have likely deterred additional terrorist
activity. Despite these successes, we anticipate that animal rights
extremism and eco-terrorism will continue to threaten certain segments
of government and private industry, specifically in the areas of animal
research and residential/commercial development.
The potential for violence by anarchists and other emerging
revolutionary groups, such as the Anarchist Black Cross Federation
(ABCF), will continue to be an issue for law enforcement. The stated
goals of the ABCF are ``the abolishment of prisons, the system of laws,
and the Capitalist state.'' The ABCF believes in armed resistance to
achieve a stateless and classless society. ABCF has continued to
organize, recruit, and train anarchists in the tactical use of
firearms.
U.S.-based black separatist groups follow radical variants of
Islam, and in some cases express solidarity with al-Qa'ida and other
international terrorist groups.
Incidents of organized white supremacist group violence decreased
in 2004. This is due to several high profile law enforcement arrests
over the last several years, as well as the continued fragmentation of
white supremacist groups because of the deaths or the arrests of
leaders. We judge that violence on the part of white supremacists
remains an ongoing threat to government targets, Jewish individuals and
establishments, and non-white ethnic groups.
However, the right-wing Patriot movement--consisting of militias,
common law courts, tax protesters, and other anti-government
extremists--remains a continuing threat in America today. Sporadic
incidents resulting in direct clashes with law enforcement are possible
and will most likely involve State and local law enforcement personnel,
such as highway patrol officers and sheriff's deputies.
Potential violent anti-abortion extremists linked to terrorism
ideologies or groups pose a current threat. The admiration of violent
high-profile offenders by extremists highlight continued concerns
relating to potential or similar anti-abortion threat activity.
WMD PROLIFERATION AND OTHER FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE THREATS
Although the impact of terrorism is more immediate and highly
visible, espionage and foreign intelligence activity are no less a
threat to the U.S. national security. Many countries consider the U.S.
to be their primary intelligence target; so long as the U.S. maintains
its position in world affairs, it will continue to be targeted. As part
of its reinvigorated and refocused foreign counterintelligence (FCI)
program, the FBI has applied a more rigorous methodology to its efforts
to assess and articulate the current threat environment.
One of the key elements of the FBI's National Strategy for
Counterintelligence (adopted in August 2002) is the threat assessment.
Over the past 2 years, the FBI has produced comprehensive threat
assessments on several countries deemed to be of particular CI concern.
The National Strategy for Counterintelligence identified five
categories of foreign intelligence activity as being especially harmful
to the U.S. national security. These five categories of activity are
weighted in terms of importance, the in the following order:
Proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear, and high-energy explosives (CBRNE) information and technology:
Penetration of the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC)
Penetration of U.S. Government entities and contractors
Compromise of Critical National Assets (CNAs), defined as
any information, policies, plans, technologies, or industries that, if
stolen, modified, or manipulated by an adversary would seriously
threaten U.S. national or economic security; and
Conduct of clandestine foreign intelligence activities in
the U.S.
Several countries have traditionally considered the U.S. to be
their primary intelligence target, as well as an adversary or threat.
This prioritization is manifested through their continued large and
active intelligence presence in the U.S. and their aggressive targeting
of U.S. persons, information and technology. Other countries, while not
necessarily viewing the U.S. as an adversary or threat, seek
information to help them compete economically, militarily, and
politically in world affairs. As the current leader in all three areas,
the U.S. becomes their primary target. For still other countries,
rather than being an intelligence target, the U.S. represents an
operating environment in which to conduct intelligence-related
activities focused on their domestic security.
Some foreign countries are becoming increasingly sophisticated in
their CI awareness, training and capabilities. Also of growing concern
is the asymmetrical threat posed by certain intelligence services that
supplement their collection capabilities in the U.S. by using non-
traditional collectors. These collectors include students, delegations,
business visitors, emigres, and retired intelligence officers who are
collecting against targets of opportunity or responding to ad hoc
requests from the intelligence services. Such non-traditional
collectors pose a potential threat across the US, requiring a
coordinated response by all FBI field offices.
The FBI does not foresee any significant changes in the official
foreign intelligence presence in the U.S. over the next two to 3 years.
However, in addition to using non-traditional collectors, several
countries appear to be exploiting their military liaison officers, who
are in the U.S. on overt, legitimate intelligence-sharing missions, to
target and collect sensitive defense information that is outside the
scope of their official access. Most difficult to identify and assess
is the intelligence collection activity being directed and/or conducted
by non-intelligence organizations, such as other foreign government
agencies and/or foreign companies. The FBI sees this type of activity
most frequently in the targeting and collection of CBRNE information
and technology.
Another challenge the FBI will face is the tendency of some foreign
intelligence services to leverage liaison relationships for
intelligence collection purposes. U.S. Government representatives
participating in international conferences and exchanges, or whose
duties include routine liaison with foreign intelligence
representatives, frequently report that their contacts engage in
elicitation, sometimes to a surprisingly aggressive level.
The FBI expects to see a continued increase in the use of
technology as an enabler for intelligence operations, such as
contacting, tasking; and debriefing sources and agents in the US.
Over the near term, the priority collection targets for these
countries will be:
The effects of the recent 2004 U.S. elections on U.S.
foreign and domestic policies;
U.S. military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan;
U.S. counterterrorism policy;
U.S. dual use technologies; and
U.S. policy vis-a-vis particular countries or regions of
the world.
The FBI expects to see continued lobbying, political influence,
and/or perception management activities by countries hoping to affect
U.S. policy.
Many foreign intelligence services will also continue to exploit
their presence in the U.S. to target and collect against third
countries. Most will also engage in defensive intelligence activities,
targeting their own expatriate and ethnic communities in the US,
especially those groups deemed to be a threat to the current regime.
The FBI's National Strategy for Counterintelligence sets forth
national priorities and strategic objectives as well as changes in
management and organizational culture intended to redirect and
significantly enhance the overall performance of the FBI's FCI program.
Program objectives and outcomes include:
Identify intelligence service objectives, officers,
assets, and operations;
Disrupt the operations of intelligence services; and
Change the behavior of exploited institutions and
individuals.
To that end, the FBI has identified five program strategies: Know
the Domain; Understand the Threat; Engage in Strategic Partnerships;
Conduct Sophisticated Operations; and Inform Policymakers.
During fiscal year 2004, the FBI FCI program accomplished the
following:
Six foreign intelligence officers and/or agents were
arrested;
67 requests for persona non grata actions and visa denials
were issued;
1,667 Intelligence Information Reports were disseminated.
In addition, the Asset Validation Review process was implemented in
July 2002, and the FBI began providing mandatory asset validation
training for Asset Coordinators in the field regarding procedures and
policies. The FBI also implemented the Agents in Laboratories
Initiative (AILI) in February 2003, through which FBI agents have been
placed in Department of Energy nuclear weapons and science
laboratories.
The FBI has also developed several strategic partnerships, to
include the Regional CI Working Group (RCIWG) Initiative, which was
established in October 2003 to implement the National Strategy for
Counterintelligence, leverage the RCIWGs in tasking our USIC partners,
address intelligence gaps, identify CI trends and priorities in the
operational arena among USIC agencies at the field level, and ensure
that all CI operational initiatives and projects across agencies are
coordinated through the FBI.
Similarly, the National CI Working Group (NCIWG) was established
and is led by the FBI and consists of other CI agency head-level
representatives. The mission is to establish ongoing interagency
planning discussions to better coordinate CI operations USIC-wide.
Domain Task Forces are CI project level task forces led by the FBI, in
vulnerabilities associated with at-risk national security projects,
i.e., sensitive technologies, information, and research and
development.
FBI field offices are developing ``business alliances'' to build
executive-level relationships and foster threat and vulnerability
information sharing, with private industries and academic institutions
located within their territories having at-risk and sensitive national
security and economic technologies, research and development projects.
Finally, the FBI has reinvigorated its CI training process. For
example, field agents are trained in the key components of basic CI
operations through an intensive 4-week Basic CI Operations course.
Other advanced, highly specialized CI courses and seminars provide
training to agents and analysts through a variety of innovative
instructional methods and include inservices and conferences, the
Interactive Multimedia Instruction and Simulation (IMIS) computer-based
training program, and the FBI Intranet.
CYBER THREATS
The cyber-threat to the U.S. is serious and continues to expand
rapidly the number of actors with both the ability and the desire to
utilize computers for illegal and harmful purposes rises.
Cyber threats stems from both State actors, including foreign
governments that use their vast resources to develop cyber technologies
with which to attack our networks, and non-state actors such as
terrorist groups and hackers that act independently of foreign
governments. The increasing number of foreign governments and non-state
actors exploiting U.S. computer networks is a major concern to the FBI
and the Intelligence Community as a whole.
State actors continue to be a threat to both our national security
as well as our economic security because they have the technical and
financial resources to support advanced network exploitation and
attack. The greatest cyber threat is posed by countries that continue
to openly conduct computer network attacks and exploitations on
American systems.
Terrorists show a growing understanding of the critical role that
information technology plays in the day-to-day operations of our
economy and national security. Their recruitment efforts have expanded
to include young people studying mathematics, computer science and
engineering in an effort to move from the limited physical attacks to
attacks against our technical systems.
Fortunately, the large majority of hackers do not have the
resources or motivation to attack the U.S. critical information
infrastructures. Most targets of the hacker are viewed as
``challenges'' to break into a system. These individuals do not
introduce malicious code to the system, but usually leave their ``cyber
signature.'' Although a nuisance, the single hacker does not pose a
great threat; however, the increasing volume of hacking activity
worldwide does inadvertently disrupt networks, including that of the
U.S. information infrastructures. Hackers that plant malicious code or
upload bots that are designed to steal information are the main threats
in this group. These individuals have the ability to take down a system
or steal trade secrets, either of which can be devastating to a company
or agency.
The growing number of hackers motivated by money is a cause for
concern. If this pool of talent is utilized by terrorists, foreign
governments or criminal organizations, the potential for a successful
cyber attack on our critical infrastructures is greatly increased.
To combat these and other cyber threats, the FBI established a
national cyber program with a Cyber Division at FBI Headquarters and
dedicated cyber squads in the field offices. The program enables us to
coordinate and facilitate investigations of those Federal criminal
violations using the Internet, computer systems, or networks. It also
helps us to build and maintain public/private alliances to maximize
counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and law enforcement cyber
response capabilities. We are also working to aggregate the
technological and investigative expertise necessary to meet the
challenges that lie ahead. We are recruiting and hiring individuals who
possess degrees and experience in computer sciences, information
systems, or related disciplines. We are looking for specialists who
possess a bedrock of experience and a profound understanding of the
cyber world.
CONVERGING CRIMINAL THREATS
It is increasingly the case that counterterrorism,
counterintelligence, cyber, and criminal investigations are
interrelated. There are rarely clear dividing lines that distinguish
terrorist, counterintelligence, and criminal activity. Recognizing this
trend toward convergence, the first priority of the FBI's Criminal
Investigative Program is to leverage criminal investigative resources
to enhance the FBI's Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence and Cyber
programs.
Terrorists use criminal enterprises and criminal activities to
support and fund terrorist organizations. The FBI's criminal
investigations of these crimes and criminal enterprises, often in task
forces in conjunction with other Federal, state, and local law
enforcement, continue to develop invaluable intelligence, as well as to
initiate investigations, which further identify the United States'
vulnerability to attack and directly support the FBI's and the
Intelligence Community's counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and
cyber crime efforts.
One of the FBI's first investigations to utilize the material
support of a terrorist organization statute evolved from a criminal
investigation of Hizballah operators utilizing credit card scams,
cigarette smuggling and loan fraud to support the purchase of dual use
equipment for Hizballah procurement leaders in Lebanon. The FBI used
the criminal RICO statute to fully neutralize this terrorist cell.
In combatting converging threats, the FBI's Criminal Program is
placing greater emphasis on the collection, analysis, dissemination and
effective use of intelligence, including intelligence derived from
criminal investigations, including intelligence derived from human
sources and the use of sophisticated investigative techniques. We are
using intelligence to identify crime problems and trends, to conduct
threat assessments, and to drive investigative efforts. Currently, we
are aggressively pursuing intelligence collection and threat
assessments on Organized Crime, Human Smuggling and Trafficking,
Violent Gangs, Public Corruption, Civil Rights, and Middle Eastern
Criminal Enterprises.
After CT, CI, and Cyber, the Criminal Investigative Program's other
priorities in descending order are Criminal Intelligence, Public
Corruption, Civil Rights, Violent Gangs, Criminal Enterprises,
Corporate and Securities Fraud, Health Care Fraud, Mortgage Fraud,
Major Financial Institution Fraud, and Crimes Against Children and
other Violent Crimes.
Public Corruption
Public Corruption continues to pose the greatest threat to the
integrity of all levels of government. Recent investigative efforts
have been intensified to identify and convict Immigration, Department
of State, and DMV officials illegally selling visas or other
citizenship documents and drivers licenses to anyone with enough money.
Their illegal activities potentially conceal the identity and purpose
of terrorists and other criminals, facilitating their entry, travel,
and operation without detection in the U.S. Other investigations have
convicted numerous law enforcement officers, including those who formed
criminal organizations involved in drug trafficking. Many major
metropolitan areas in the U.S. have witnessed the indictment and
conviction of corrupt public officials who betrayed the public trust
for profit or personal gain. Over the last 2 years alone, the FBI has
convicted more than 1050 corrupt government employees, including 177
Federal officials, 158 State officials, 360 local officials, and more
than 365 police officers. In addition to pursuing criminal
investigations against corrupt law enforcement officers, the FBI has
initiated awareness and training efforts to deter corruption, such as
``Project Integrity.''
Civil Rights
During fiscal year 2004, the FBI initiated 1,744 civil rights
investigations and obtained 154 convictions, focusing its efforts on
Hate Crimes, Color of Law, and Involuntary Servitude and Slavery
matters. The FBI and the United States depend on the support,
cooperation and assistance of the Arab, Muslim and Sikh Communities in
the United States to fight terrorism and to fight crime. These
communities are entitled to the same civil rights of every citizen and
person in the United States. The FBI has worked with these communities
to ease their fears concerning the FBI's interest in securing their
help in the fight against terrorism and to address the backlash of hate
crimes directed against them following 9/11 and the war in Iraq. Since
9/11, more than 500 hate crime investigations have been initiated,
where the victims were Arab, Muslim, Sikh, or perceived to be as such,
resulting in more than 150 Federal and local prosecutions. During 2004,
the FBI initiated 53 hate crime investigations where the victims were
of Arab, Muslim, or Sikh descent or were perceived to be such. Thirteen
of those cases resulted in criminal charges being filed by either State
or Federal law enforcement authorities. Other groups also continue to
be the victims of Hate Crimes, including African American and Jewish
communities.
Human trafficking and modern day slavery are a worldwide crime and
human rights problem, due to global, economic, and political factors.
Approximately 17,000 victims each year are lured to the United States
with false promises of good jobs and better lives and then forced to
work under brutal and inhumane conditions. Many trafficking victims,
including women and children, are forced to work in the sex industry,
prison like factories, and migrant agricultural work.
Violent Gangs
Violent gangs are more organized, larger, more violent, and more
widespread than ever before, and they pose a growing threat to the
safety and security of Americans. The Department of Justice estimates
there are approximately 30,000 gangs with more than 800,000 members in
the U.S.
Our communities continue to experience devastating incidences of
murder, drive-by shootings, and assaults by gangs mainly involved in
the sale and distribution of illicit drugs. However, gang activity
extends far beyond protection of turf. It impacts innocent citizens who
have no connection or involvement with gangs, and it increasingly
transcends municipal boundaries. Gang members travel from city to city,
between states and, on occasion, between countries to commit their
crimes.
In response, the FBI is implementing a coordinated, intelligence-
driven National Gang Strategy to disrupt and dismantle gangs that pose
the greatest threats to America's communities. In the past year, we
have increased the number of Safe Street Task Forces from 78 to 107 and
we are seeking to increase the number by an additional 10 to 20 percent
in the coming year. We are also centralizing gang investigations at FBI
Headquarters with a new $10 million National Gang Intelligence Center
(NGIC). The NGIC will collect intelligence on gangs from across the
U.S., analyze this intelligence, and disseminate it to help law
enforcement authorities throughout the country plan and execute
strategies to prevent further gang activity and violence.
The FBI has reclassified gang matters from ``violent criminal
offenders'' to ``criminal organizations and enterprises''--a higher
priority area. The new classification also allows the U.S. Department
of Justice to charge gang members under Federal racketeering statues
which can result in stiffer prison sentences for convicted subjects.
This approach is similar to the successful strategy used by the FBI to
dismantle traditional organized crime groups.
Under the National Gang Strategy, priority is given to efforts to
disrupt and dismantle gangs that are national in their scope and
exhibit significant connectivity and internal alliances. Among the
first to be targeted is Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), a violent gang which
originated in Los Angeles comprised primarily of Central American
immigrants. We have created a National Gang Task Force specifically to
address MS-13.
Criminal Enterprises
Organized criminal enterprises operating in the U.S. and throughout
the world pose increasing concerns for the international law
enforcement and intelligence communities. Their skill in using
international monetary systems to conduct and conceal their criminal
activity, their use of State of the art communications encryption to
further safeguard their illegal activity, and their transnational
mobility increases the likelihood they will escape detection or
otherwise cover their illegal activities with a cloak of legitimacy.
Although the FBI prioritizes its efforts on criminal enterprises with
possible connections to terrorist and counterintelligence activities,
public corruption, human smuggling of Special Interest Aliens and women
and children, or violent and pervasive racketeering activity, the
impact from just one criminal activity alone, theft, is staggering.
Annual property losses from cargo/high tech/retail theft is estimated
at $30 billion, from vehicle theft $8 billion, from art/cultural
heritage artifact theft $500 million, and from jewelry and gem theft
$135 million. However, theft by criminal enterprises often represents a
multifaceted threat. For example, Middle Eastern Criminal Enterprises
involved in the organized theft and resale of infant formula pose not
only an economic threat, but a public health threat to infants, and a
potential source of material support to a terrorist organization.
The FBI is increasing its intelligence collection and assessment
efforts on criminal enterprises, as well as its joint efforts with the
intelligence and law enforcement services of other nations, to combat
the criminal activities of the La Cosa Nostra, Italian, Russian,
Balkan, Albanian, Asian, African, Middle Eastern, Colombian/South
American and other criminal enterprises. The FBI/Hungarian National
Bureau of Investigation Organized Crime Task Force in Budapest,
Hungary, which is investigating a Russian Criminal Enterprise engaged
in murder, extortion, prostitution, and other significant racketeering
activity, represents an unprecedented cooperative effort between the
FBI and the Hungarians.
Although new criminal enterprises continue to emerge, the LCN
remains a formidable and ever changing criminal threat. This year, in
just one criminal scheme, identified by the Federal Trade Commission as
the largest consumer fraud investigated in the history of the United
States, members of the Gambino LCN family were convicted for using
pornographic websites and adult entertainment 1 800 numbers to defraud
thousands of individuals of $750,000,000. Asian Criminal Enterprises
also pose a continued threat, as exemplified by one which was
dismantled earlier this year during a coordinated arrest operation with
Canada, which resulted in the arrest of 36 subjects in Canada and 102
subjects in the U.S. for drug trafficking and money laundering.
Millions of dollars and 21 firearms, including an AK 47 assault rifle
and a sawed off shotgun were seized during the operation.
Corporate/Securities Fraud
Corporate fraud can cost Americans their jobs and rob them of hard-
earned savings. It shakes the public's confidence in corporate America
to its foundation. Since the initiation of the FBI Corporate Fraud Task
Force in December 2001, there have been 480 indictments and 305
convictions of corporate executives and their associates. The FBI's
efforts have also resulted in over $2 billion in restitutions,
recoveries and fines, in addition to over $30 million in seizures and
forfeitures. In the Enron, HealthSouth, Cendant Corporation, Credit
Suisse First Boston, Computer Associates International, Worldcom,
Imclone, Royal Ahold, Perigrine Systems, and America Online cases the
FBI obtained 119 indictments/informations and 79 convictions. The
former Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Worldcom is on trial in New
York and the former CEO of HealthSouth is on trial in Alabama. Several
additional high profile trials are anticipated in the near future, to
include the trial of Enron's former CEOs and Chief Accounting Officer
anticipated to be scheduled for August or September 2005.
The FBI is currently pursuing 334 Corporate Fraud cases throughout
the U.S. This is more than a 100 percent increase from fiscal year
2003. Eighteen of the pending cases involve losses to public investors
which each exceed $1 billion. Unfortunately, the volume of cases has
yet to reach a plateau, and the FBI continues to open three to six new
cases each month, each case averaging a loss exceeding $100 million.
Health Care Fraud
Americans' health care expenditures continue to climb at rates
higher than inflation and will soon consume more than 17 percent of the
Gross Domestic Product. It is estimated that health care fraud costs
consumers, Medicare, Medicaid, and private insurers tens of billions of
dollars each year in blatant fraud schemes in every sector of the
industry. The FBI recently instituted the Out Patient Surgery and
Pharmaceutical Fraud Initiatives to combat blatant fraud identified in
those health care programs. During fiscal year 2004, the FBI had 2,468
pending health care fraud investigations, obtained 693 indictments and
informations, 564 convictions or pre trial diversions, $1.05 billion in
restitution, $543 million in fines, $28.8 million in seizures, $19.05
million in forfeitures and disrupted 186 and dismantled 105 criminal
organizations.
Mortgage Fraud
The number of FBI mortgage fraud investigations, including major
undercover operations, rose from 102 in fiscal year 2001 to
approximately 550 in fiscal year 2004. This rise is expected to
continue. During FYs 2001-2004 the FBI received over 17,000 mortgage
fraud related Suspicious Activity Reports from federally insured
financial institutions alone. The FBI worked with the Mortgage Bankers'
Association (MBA), the National Notary Association (NNA), as well as
FINCEN, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and major
mortgage lending institutions, to improve the reporting and detection
of potential mortgage fraud.
Crimes Against Children/Violent Incident Crime
Of all violent crime, crimes against children and child
prostitution are of particular concern. Over 300,000 children per year
are forced into prostitution. The FBI's Lost Innocence, Child
Prostitution Initiative, has opened 13 cases in 11 field offices,
emphasizing the use of sophisticated investigative techniques, to
obtain 135 arrests/locates, 3 complaints, 13 indictments/informations,
11 convictions/pre trial diversions, and 4 child locates. Major violent
crime incidents, such as sniper murders, serial killings and child
abductions can paralyze whole communities and require the cooperative
efforts of the FBI and local, State and other Federal law enforcement
agencies. The FBI also continues to address the 6,218 bank robberies,
resulting in 153 injuri
