S. Hrg. 109-724
CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 2, 2006
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas, Chairman
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Vice Chairman
ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah CARL LEVIN, Michigan
MIKE DeWINE, Ohio DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri RON WYDEN, Oregon
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi EVAN BAYH, Indiana
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
BILL FRIST, Tennessee, Ex Officio
HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio
JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia, Ex Officio
----------
Bill Duhnke, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Andrew W. Johnson, Minority Staff Director
Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
FEBRUARY 2, 2006
OPENING STATEMENTS
Roberts, Hon. Pat, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from the State of
Kansas..................................................... 1
Rockefeller, Hon. John D. IV, Vice Chairman, a U.S. from the
State of West Virginia..................................... 5
WITNESSES
Negroponte, Hon. John D., Director of National Intelligence...... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 26
HEARING ON CURRENT AND PROJECTED
NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES
----------
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 2006
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Pat
Roberts (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Roberts, Hatch, DeWine, Bond, Lott,
Snowe, Hagel, Chambliss, Warner, Rockefeller, Levin, Feinstein,
Wyden, Bayh, Mikulski, and Feingold.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PAT ROBERTS, CHAIRMAN,
A U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS
Chairman Roberts. The Committee will come to order. The
first order of business is to welcome Senator Feingold as a new
Member of the Committee. Senator Feingold is a very
conscientious Member, very hard-working Member, and we're very
pleased to have him. And I would yield to him at this time, if
he would like to make a very short statement.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll just say
what an honor it is to be on this Committee at any time, but
particularly in this time in our history with the challenges
that we face. And I thank you and everybody for their
courtesies in getting me used to the practices of the
Committee.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Roberts. I thank the Senator.
Today the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence meets in
open session to conduct its annual worldwide threat hearing.
The Committee always begins the legislative year with an open
hearing--it's a tradition--so that the public will have the
benefit of knowing the intelligence community's best
assessments of the current and projected national security
threats to the United States.
Our witness is Mr. John Negroponte, the director of
national intelligence. Mr. Director, thank you for taking your
valuable time to come here today. It's a pleasure to have you
here.
To assist in fielding the Committee's questions, the
director is joined at the witness table by: General Michael
Hayden, the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence;
Mr. Robert Mueller, the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation; Mr. Porter Goss, the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency; and Lieutenant General Michael Maples, the
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency; Mr. Charles
Allen--no stranger to the Committee--the Chief Intelligence
Officer for the Department of Homeland Security; and Ms. Carol
Rodley, the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for
Intelligence and Research.
And on behalf of the Committee, we thank all of you for
being here today. Thank you for your perseverance and thank you
for the job that you're doing.
Mr. Director, this is your first appearance at the
Committee's worldwide threat hearing as the head of the U.S.
intelligence community. I look forward, as do the rest of the
Members, to your presentation on the community's views
concerning the many threats our Nation must confront. The
threat of terrorism is my most immediate concern, as I know it
is yours.
The Nation does remain at war with Islamic terrorists who,
as we all know, on September 11, 2001, murdered 3,000 innocent
people here on American soil. We must never forget that fact.
Thankfully, since that day, we have not suffered another
major attack on our soil. That is due at least in some part--I
think large part--to the brave and very dedicated men and women
of our intelligence community, the armed forces and our law
enforcement agencies who are executing an aggressive and
forward-leaning counterterrorism policy.
We should not, however, be lulled in to a false sense of
security. The terrorists are a patient and determined enemy. As
Usama bin Ladin's recent audiotape demonstrates, he and his
terrorist network, while damaged, are still a very real threat
to America. So when Usama bin Ladin or his No. 2, Zawahiri, or
Zarqawi in Iraq, does issue a threat, I take it seriously, as
should we all.
These are terrorists who have a track record for following
through on threats no matter how long it takes. Remember, the
first attack on the World Trade Center was 1993. Eight years
later came 9/11. Had the terrorists put the bombs that were put
in the World Trade Center back in 1993 where the grid was,
6,000 people wouldn't have come out suffering from smoke
inhalation; they would have not actually have come out.
So, they do have patience. Our enemies are continually
probing our defenses and adjusting their tactics in an attempt
to launch a successful mass casualty attack. We continually see
the evidence of the training and the commitment and the sheer
brutality of al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups. Every
American should understand our terrorist adversaries. They
think of us--everybody in this room, all of the people who are
going to testify, all of the Committee Members--as dust. Now,
think about that. In their extremist absolutism, our lives and
the lives of those we hold dear have no value.
Ladies and gentlemen, to counter this evil, we must remain
vigilant and forward leaning as we prosecute this war. That
means we must not only use every lawful means at our disposal
to protect the American people from another attack, we must
support the men and women sitting before us here today as they
lead their respective agencies in a conflict which is often
fought in the shadows of some of the most dangerous places on
Earth.
Along with terrorism, our Nation faces a variety of other
threats. Last year, I identified North Korea and Iran and
Communist China and proliferation as primary threats worthy of
Committee attention. The threat of proliferation and the
threats posed by Iran and North Korea really go hand in hand.
The intelligence community assesses that North Korea already
has nuclear weapons, and Iran, if it continues on its current
path--and we hope we could see some action by the Security
Council and others working on this, but they will likely have
the capability to produce a nuclear weapon within the next
decade. In addition, there are indications that both Iran and
North Korea are continuing work on numerous weapon programs,
including long--range ballistic missiles and advanced
conventional weapon systems.
On our side of the world, Latin America continues to
present a number of challenges, including a trend toward
socialist anti-American governments, including, most notably,
Venezuela.
I'm going to deviate from my remarks, and I apologize to my
membership, but there are 360 million people in 31 nations that
comprise the Southern Command, and I must say it is not
neglect, but maybe benign neglect and in terms of the fact that
we're stretched so thin. Other than energy, other than
immigration, other than trade, other than drugs, that part of
the world really has no affect on the United States, and so
consequently, I think we must refocus, at least to some degree,
on the threats that are really threats in the Southern Command.
For our part, the Committee will continue to examine the
intelligence community's capabilities against Iran, North Korea
and other areas of interest. We try to challenge the community
to think of new ways to penetrate those hard collection
targets, and they try as well.
I do not believe the intelligence community is where it
needs to be. I think most of the people at the table will agree
with that, but we have made impressive strides in the past few
years. The threat from communist China is also one which we
must closely monitor. China has not so quietly emerged as a
regional power both militarily and also economically. China's
not the next big thing. They are the big thing.
While the United States, in general, enjoys good relations
with China--and we must do that; we must endeavor to do that--
we and our regional allies are given pause by China's often-
aggressive statements in regards to Taiwan, its very dramatic
investment in offensive military capabilities in a blue-water
Navy and its questionable counterproliferation record.
Additionally, China maintains a determined espionage effort
within the United States, which is aimed at stealing our most
sensitive weapons' secrets. Harsh words, I intend them to be.
China's increasing influence in our global affairs is
undeniable. It is my hope that Beijing will use this increasing
influence to actually promote stability, curb the nuclear
ambitions of North Korea and provide greater support to
counterproliferation and counterterrorism initiatives.
Now, Mr. Director, I look forward to hearing from you about
these and the many other threats which face us across the
globe. I also look forward to the input of the Intelligence
Agency directors during the question and answer period.
Once again, it is important to remember that the Nation is
at war. It is a war which requires aggressive intelligence
collection and close combat with the enemy. The success of the
latter often depends entirely on the success of the former.
Our witnesses today and the men and women whom they lead
are on the front lines of that war. Unlike us, they are doing
the fighting and the dying, and they do so to keep us and our
families safe.
Although we will never be able to repay them the debt we
owe, it seems to me that we must provide them with every
possible advantage, which includes not only adequate resources,
but also the capabilities and the authorities that they
require.
It is also our responsibility to conduct oversight, and the
Committee meets that responsibility in a number of different
ways. We receive briefings, we conduct hearings at a rate far
exceeding any other previous Congress. As a Member of this
Committee, we will tell you we are very demanding of their
time. We read and review intelligence reporting and analysis.
We interview intelligence officials. We travel around the
world. We meet with people on the front lines in what is truly
a global conflict. We also, when the Committee so decides,
conduct investigations and inquiries into specific matters.
For example, we are presently engaged in the final stages--
let me repeat, the final stages--of our examination of issues
that are related to prewar intelligence on Iraq. And I hope we
have that concluded at the earliest possible date. My hope is
to complete that effort as soon as practical.
There has also been a great deal of discussion in regard to
the issue of terrorist surveillance. Senator Rockefeller and I
have been intimately involved with this issue since we assumed
our respective positions. We have been conducting oversight
over this critical capability for almost 3 years now.
Nonetheless, the minority Members and some in the majority of
this Committee have requested an opportunity to meet and
discuss whether the Vice Chairman and my efforts on their
behalf have been sufficient. I have scheduled such a business
meeting for February 16. I have assured the Vice Chairman twice
that the Committee will have an opportunity to express its will
on this matter, and we will.
Yesterday, Members had the opportunity to meet with various
officials of the Justice Department to discuss the legal issues
associated with terrorist surveillance. I've also scheduled a
hearing for February 9--I want all Members to note that--when
we will meet in executive session to hear from Attorney General
Gonzales and also General Hayden. I hope my actions and my
words are sufficient to assuage any lingering concerns about
what we may or may not be doing.
If any Member wishes to discuss further the Committee
activities, I'm happy to make arrangements to do so at an
appropriate time. For now, the Committee turns its attention to
our annual worldwide threat hearing. Our witnesses are some of
the Nation's premiere experts on national security matters.
During this open hearing, I am hopeful that Members will take
the opportunity to engage this uniquely qualified panel in a
manner which will educate the American people to the maximum
extent possible on the global threats faced by our Nation.
I ask that Members do reserve questions for the closed
session that will require a discussion of classified or
sensitive material.
Before I turn to our Director, I recognize the
distinguished Vice Chairman for any remarks that he may wish to
make.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKELLER IV,
VICE CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Director Negroponte. This is not just your first
visit at a world threat meeting, but it's your first visit with
the Committee, and we're happy to see you here, and everybody
else.
Americans are presented with sobering information about the
threats facing our country on a daily basis. They are
continually reminded that the passage of time since the attacks
of 9/11 has done little to lower the security threat both here
and abroad. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, America moved
swiftly and decisively against al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan and the
surrounding region.
However, at the same time, we were destroying the terrorist
safe haven in Afghanistan. Our military invasion of Iraq, in
turn, created a dangerous terrorist environment that did not
exist prior to the war--a place where Islam's jihadists can
train on the front line and carry out attacks against American
and allied troops.
Our military action in Afghanistan forced bin Ladin and the
al- Qa'ida leadership to run and hide. We isolated them and
disrupted their terrorist networks and plots. By invading Iraq,
however, we gave them not only a target-rich terrorist
environment, but an effective propaganda tool for fostering
anti-American, anti-Western sentiment throughout the Muslim
world. As a result, we are now faced with the disturbing trend
of autonomous terrorist organizations and groups with little or
no operational or organizational link to al-Qa'ida carrying out
murderous attacks against civilians in Spain, Britain,
Southeast Asia and elsewhere.
I'm afraid that the gains in Afghanistan have been offset
by the unintended consequences of our actions in Iraq. We now
face a more decentralized, but equally lethal terrorist threat
which cannot be decapitated by the capture of a single
individual or any specific target. This metastasized threat
presents a number of operational and political challenges to
our counterterrorist program, and I'd like to take a moment
just to speak about one of them.
The 2004 intelligence reform bill creating the Director of
National Intelligence position requires the Director to be
responsible for providing national intelligence to the
Congress. That's the law. The law requires that the
intelligence provided by the Director should be timely, should
be objective and independent of political consideration.
Now, many of us on this Committee fought hard for the
inclusion of that phrase ``independent of political
consideration,'' to have that in the law, because we were
troubled by what we had found in the Committee's investigation
into the handling of intelligence on Iraq prior to the war. Of
specific concern to me was the disturbing pattern by the
Administration of selectively releasing or declassifying
intelligence that supported the case to go to war, while
dismissing or downplaying or simply not acknowledging
intelligence that undercut claims that Iraq had an active
nuclear weapons program, that Iraq was assisting al-Qa'ida with
chemical and biological weapons, or, as the Vice President
continued publicly assert, that Iraq had a role in the 9/11
attacks against America.
To be blunt, Director Negroponte, I have these same
concerns today.
I am deeply troubled by what I see as the Administration's
continued effort to selectively release intelligence
information that supports its policy or political agenda while
withholding equally pertinent information that does not do
that. The question I am wrestling with is whether the very
independence of the U.S. Intelligence Community has been co-
opted, to be quite honest about it, by the strong, controlling
hand of the White House.
Now, let me be specific. The recent revelation that the
National Security Agency, at the direction of the President,
has been intercepting phone calls and e-mails within the United
States without a warrant and in contravention of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act for the past 4 years has led
Members of this Committee to ask some difficult but, frankly,
necessary questions about the program.
As you know, this Committee, as the body that oversees and
annually authorizes our nation's intelligence programs, is
entrusted with the most sensitive secrets. There are statutory
requirements placed on you and the heads of the intelligence
agencies to keep our Committee Members fully informed on these
matters and activities, including efforts taken to counter the
terrorist threat facing our nation.
And yet the White House has laid down the edict to you and
your principal deputy, Director Negroponte and former NSA
Director General Hayden, that no one on this Committee other
than the Chairman and myself can be briefed on the NSA domestic
spying program. The reasons, we are told, is that the 13 other
Members of this Committee cannot be trusted to know the details
of the program.
This rationale for withholding information from Congress is
flat-out unacceptable and nothing more than political smoke, in
this Senator's view. As you, sir, and General Hayden know well,
every Member of this Committee is given access to operational
details about each and every signals intelligence collection
program carried out by the NSA against targets overseas. We're
all getting it. Much of the staff gets it. We are briefed in
closed session about ultra-sensitive NSA programs that produce
unique and invaluable intelligence and, if divulged, literally
could get people killed. The NSA briefs the Committee on these
programs not just because the law requires them to do so, but
because we, as the authorizers of the intelligence budget, need
to understand the value and risk of what we do to keep America
safe.
How can this Committee reconcile this ongoing intimate
understanding and evaluation of the NSA's overseas activities
with the wall that the White House has constructed around the
NSA's warrantless collection of phone calls and e-mails inside
of the United States? What is unique about this one particular
program among all the other sensitive NSA programs that
justifies keeping Congress in the dark?
It certainly is not that the program is cloaked in heavy
secrecy. On the contrary, it's become one of the more public
programs. Since the existence of this program was leaked to the
press in a most unfortunate fashion in mid-December, the
President has not only confirmed the existence of the program,
but has spoken at length about it, repeatedly, characterizing
not only the target of the intelligence collection, but the
method employed to collect that information.
In recent weeks, every senior Administration official, from
the Vice President to the White House press secretary, has
voluntarily approached the cameras and microphones to talk
about this NSA domestic surveillance program. I assume that
they were not only authorized to discuss the details of this
classified program, but were in fact directed to do so.
Last week, the White House carried out a 4-day press
strategy to saturate the media with speeches and events
designed to sway public opinions, in my judgment, in support of
the spying program.
The second act of this 4-day White House push was a speech
given by General Hayden before the National Press Club on
January 23rd, so that he could, in his own words, ``Tell the
American people what NSA has done and why, and perhaps more
importantly, what it has not been doing.''
The General's unusual appearance before the press corps and
other related public statements give the disturbing impression
to some that the intelligence community has become a public
relations arm of the White House in recent weeks on this
matter.
Even more troubling are the actions of the intelligence
community to sidestep our Committee--this is something about
which we feel very strongly on--with the matter of the NSA
program. To paraphrase General Hayden's statement before the
National Press Club, why he has not been before our Committee
to tell all Members what NSA has been doing and why, I just
can't justify, balance, or even understand this rationale.
The NSA's domestic surveillance program is the most openly
discussed program in the agency's history. Administration
officials have publicly described in unprecedented fashion and
detail the scope of the program, who is targeted by the
program, what type of communications are intercepted, and how
the information collected has allegedly been used to foil
plots.
Director Negroponte, consider this fact. The only NSA
program the White House has authorized senior intelligence
officials to discuss publicly is the only NSA program all
Members of the congressional Intelligence Committees are
prohibited from knowing about.
I hope you are struck by this paradox and troubled by its
implication. You in the intelligence community serve the
President, to be sure, but Congress, according to the law, is
an important customer of the intelligence community as well.
The expectation is that you and all officials of the
intelligence community are to carry out your duties in a manner
that is independent of political influences from either end of
Pennsylvania Avenue. The selective declassification of
intelligence reform, which has undeniably occurred in recent
weeks in support of the Administration's defense of the NSA
programs, hark in fact to the troubling runup to the war in
Iraq.
A decision has been made by the White House to overly
restrict congressional access to key information about the NSA
program, while at the same time it opens the floodgates of this
public relations campaign to the American people in support of
the program.
I have heard that hundreds, if not thousands, of people at
NSA, the White House, the Department of Justice and the CIA
have a working knowledge of the NSA domestic surveillance
program. And yet the White House position is that if sharing
the details about the program is carried out with 40 Members of
the Senate and the House Intelligence Committees, that that's
an unacceptable risk. I'm sorry, I can't buy into that.
So, Mr. Director, you don't need to answer now, but do you
believe that this is so? Do you, General Hayden? A White House
P.R. campaign is not a substitute for the legal requirement--
legal requirement--to keep the Members of our Committee fully
informed of intelligence activities.
Director Negroponte, during the question and answer period
of this hearing, I want to pursue this matter further with you.
I will ask for the record who specifically has prohibited you,
General Hayden, and the NSA Director, General Keith Alexander,
from appearing before our Committee in closed session and
providing testimony on the factual aspects of the NSA domestic
surveillance program, and whether you agree with the basis for
withholding this information from Congress. I also want to find
out which person or office describes what aspects of the NSA
domestic surveillance that can be declassified and released to
the public.
In closing, it may be that some Members of Congress, of
this Committee would indeed support the program if they were
apprised of its scope and its operational successes. Others
might oppose it. Either way, Committee Members cannot be put in
the untenable position of passing judgment on a program that
they are prevented from understanding. As both a customer of
intelligence and the body that annually authorizes the
important programs carried out by you gentlemen and ladies, we
have a solemn responsibility to make sure that the activities
that we fund are not only justified but lawful.
As of today, we cannot make such a determination about the
NSA domestic surveillance program authorized by the President.
So, in conclusion, Director Negroponte, we will be
addressing the threats facing America in your testimony--you
will be doing that. What is being done to combat these threats
is a concern shared by all of us. I hope you appreciate why it
is important for Members of this Committee to fully understand
the efforts being brought to bear to combat the terrorist
threat to our Nation, including, but not limited to, action
taken within our borders.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Roberts. Mr. Director, I am now going to turn to
you. But let me say that, as I said in my opening statement,
the Committee will have ample opportunity to discuss this issue
in full at two business meetings and obviously will conclude
with the wishes of the Committee.
And let me say also that my primary concern in this regard,
this particular issue, is not losing this capability and going
blind and not being able to continue to prevent attacks on the
United States and guarantee the safety of the American people.
Mr. Director.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. NEGROPONTE, DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, ACCOMPANIED BY GENERAL
MICHAEL V. HAYDEN, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; HON. ROBERT S. MUELLER, III,
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; HON.
PORTER GOSS, DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; LIEUTENANT
GENERAL MICHAEL D. MAPLES (USA),
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; DR. CHARLES
ALLEN, CHIEF INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY; AND HON. CAROL RODLEY, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
Director Negroponte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Vice Chairman
Rockefeller, members of the Committee. Thank you for the
invitation to offer my assessment of the threats, challenges
and opportunities for the United States in today's world. I am
honored to be the first Director of National Intelligence to
offer you such an assessment. And I am pleased to note that
following my oral testimony, I will answer your questions with
the assistance of those who accompany me here at the witness
table.
Let me begin with a straightforward statement of
preoccupation shared by all of us sitting here before you.
Terrorism is the preeminent threat to our citizens, to our
homeland and to our interests abroad. The war on terror is our
first priority and driving concern as we press ahead with a
major transformation of the intelligence community that we
represent.
We live in a world that is full of conflict, contradictions
and accelerating change. Viewed from the perspective of the
Director of National Intelligence, the most dramatic change of
all is the exponential increase in the number of targets we
must identify, track and analyze. Today, in addition to hostile
nation-states, we are focusing on terrorist groups,
proliferation networks, alienated communities, charismatic
individuals, narcotraffickers and microscopic influenza.
The 21st century is less dangerous than the 20th century in
certain respects, but more dangerous in others. Globalization,
particularly of technologies that can be used to produce
weapons of mass destruction, political instability around the
world, the rise of emerging powers like China, the spread of
the jihadist movement, and, of course, the horrific events of
September 11, 2001, demand heightened vigilance from our
intelligence community.
This morning, I will discuss, first, global jihadists,
their fanatical ideology, and the civilized world's efforts to
disrupt, dismantle and destroy their networks; next, the
struggle of the Iraqi and Afghan people to assert their
sovereignty over insurgency, terror, and extremism; next, WMD-
related proliferation and two States of particular concern,
Iran and North Korea. Then I will discuss issues of political
instability and governance in all regions of the world that
affect our ability to protect and advance our interests; and
last, globalization, emerging powers, and such transnational
challenges as the geopolitics of energy, narcotrafficking, and
possible pandemics.
In assessing these themes, we must all be mindful of the
old dictum, ``forewarned is forearmed.'' Our policymakers,
warfighters and law enforcement officers need the best
intelligence and analytic insight humanly and technically
possible to help them peer into the onrushing shadow of the
future and make decisions that will protect American lives and
interests.
This has never been more true than now, with United States
and coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, the citizens and
fledgling governments they help to protect under attack.
Addressing threats to their safety and providing the critical
intelligence of a myriad of tactical and strategic issues must
be--and is--a top priority for our intelligence community.
But in discussing all the many dangers the 21st century
poses, it should be emphasized that they do not befall America
alone. The issues we consider today confront responsible
leaders everywhere. That is the true nature of the 21st
century--accelerating change affecting and challenging us all.
Now I turn to the global jihadist threat. Collaboration
with our friends and allies around the world has helped us
achieve some notable successes against the global jihadist
threat.
In fact, most of al-Qa'ida's setbacks last year were the
results of our allies' efforts, either independently or with
our assistance. And since 9/11, examples of the high level of
counterterrorism efforts around the world are many. Pakistan's
commitment has enabled some of the most important captures to
date. Saudi Arabia's resolve to counter the spread of terrorism
has increased. Our relationship with Spain has strengthened
since the March 2004 Madrid train bombings. The British have
long been our closest counterterrorism partners--the seamless
cooperation in the aftermath of the July attacks in London
reflect that commitment--while Australia, Canada, France and
many other nations remain stout allies.
Nonetheless, much remains to be done; the battle is far
from over. Jihadists seek to overthrow regimes they regard as
``apostate'' and to eliminate United States influence in the
Muslim world. They attack Americans when they can, but most of
their targets and victims are fellow Muslims.
Nonetheless, the slow pace of economic, social, and
political change in most Muslim-majority nations continues to
fuel a global jihadist movement. The movement is diffuse and
subsumes three quite different types of groups and individuals:
First and foremost, al-Qa'ida, a battered but resourceful
organization; second, other Sunni jihadist groups, some
affiliated with al-Qa'ida, some not; third, networks and cells
that are the self-generating progeny of al-Qa'ida.
Al-Qa'ida remains our top concern. We have eliminated much
of the leadership that presided over al-Qa'ida in 2001, and
U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts in 2005 continue to disrupt
its operation, take out its leaders and deplete its cadre.
But the organization's core elements still plot and make
preparations for terrorist strikes against the homeland and
other targets from bases in Pakistan-Afghanistan border area.
They also have gained added reach through their merger with the
Iraq-based network of Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi, which has
broadened al-Qa'ida's appeal within the jihadist community and
potentially put new resources at its disposal.
Thanks to effective intelligence operations, we know a
great deal about al-Qa'ida's vision. Zawahiri, al-Qa'ida's No.
2, is candid in his July 2005 letter to Zarqawi. He portrays
the jihad in Iraq as a stepping-stone in the march toward a
global caliphate, with the focus on Egypt, Syria, Jordan,
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and Israel. Zawahiri
stresses the importance of having a secure base in Iraq from
which to launch attacks elsewhere, including the United States
homeland.
In bin Ladin's recent audiotape, al-Qa'ida's top leader
reaffirms the group's commitment to attack our homeland and
attempts to reassure supporters by claiming that the reason
there has been no attack on the United States since 2001 is
that he chose not to do so.
This week's statement by Zawahiri is another indication
that the group's leadership is not completely cutoff and can
continue to get its message out to followers. The quick
turnaround time and the frequency of Zawahiri statements in the
past year underscore the high priority al-Qa'ida places on
propaganda from its most senior leaders.
Attacking the U.S. homeland, U.S. interests overseas, and
U.S. allies--in that order--are al-Qa'ida's top operational
priorities. The group will attempt high-impact attacks for as
long as its central command structure is functioning and
affiliated groups are capable of furthering its interests,
because even modest operational capabilities can yield a deadly
and damaging attack. Although an attack using conventional
explosives continues to be the most probable scenario, al-
Qa'ida remains interested in acquiring chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear materials or weapons to attack the
United States, U.S. troops and U.S. interests worldwide.
Indeed, today we are more likely to see an attack from
terrorists using weapons or agents of mass destruction than
States, although terrorists' capabilities would be much more
limited. In fact, intelligence reporting indicates that nearly
40 terrorist organizations, insurgencies or cults have used,
possessed, or expressed an interest in chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear agents or weapons. Many are capable of
conducting simple, small-scale attacks, such as poisonings or
using improvised chemical devices.
Al-Qa'ida inspires other Sunni jihadists. The global
jihadist movement also subsumes other Sunni extremist
organizations allied with or inspired by al-Qa'ida's global
anti-Western agenda. These groups pose less danger to the U.S.
homeland than does al-Qa'ida, but they increasingly threaten
our allies and interests abroad and are working to expand their
reach and capabilities to conduct multiple and/or mass-
casualty attacks outside their traditional areas of operation.
Jemaah Islamiyah is a well-organized group responsible for
dozens of attacks killing hundreds of people in Southeast Asia.
The threat of a JI attack against U.S. interests is greatest in
Southeast Asia, but we assess that the group is committed to
helping al- Qa'ida with attacks outside the region.
The Islamic Jihad Union, the IJU, which has allied itself
with al-Qa'ida, operates in Central Asia and was responsible
for the July 2004 attacks against the United States and Israeli
embassies in Uzbekistan.
The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, LIFG, was formed to
establish an Islamic State in Libya, but since the late 1990s
it has expanded its goal to include anti-Western jihad
alongside al-Qa'ida. LIFG has called on Muslims everywhere to
fight the United States in Iraq.
Pakistani militant groups, primarily focused on the Kashmir
conflict, represent a persistent threat to regional stability
and U.S. interests in South Asia and the Near East. They also
pose a potential threat to our interests worldwide. Extremists
convicted in Virginia in 2003 of providing material support to
terrorism trained with a Pakistani group, Lashkar-i-Tayyiba,
before 9/11.
New jihadist networks and cells. An important part of al-
Qa'ida's strategy is to encourage a grassroots uprising of
Muslims against the West. Emerging new networks and cells, the
third element of the global jihadist threat, reflect aggressive
jihadist efforts to exploit feelings of frustration and
powerlessness in some Muslim communities and to fuel the
perception that the United States is anti-Islamic. Their
rationale for using terrorism against the United States and
establishing strict Islamic practices resonates with a small
subset of Muslims.
This has led to the emergence of a decentralized and
diffused movement with minimal centralized guidance or control
and numerous individuals and small cells--like those who
conducted the May 2003 bombing in Morocco, the March 2004
bombings in Spain, and the July 2005 bombings in the United
Kingdom. Members of these groups have drawn inspiration from
al-Qa'ida, but appear to operate on their own.
Such unaffiliated individuals, groups and cells represent a
different threat than that of a defined organization. They are
harder to spot, and represent a serious intelligence challenge.
Regrettably, we are not immune from the threat of such
homegrown jihadist cells. A network of Islamic extremists in
Lodi, California, for example, maintained connections with
Pakistani militant groups, recruited U.S. citizens for training
at radical Karachi madrassas, sponsored Pakistani citizens for
travel to the United States to work at mosques and madrassas,
and, according to FBI information, allegedly raised funds for
international jihadist groups.
In addition, prisons continue to be fertile recruitment
ground for extremists who try to exploit converts to Islam.
Now, I wish to turn to the impact of Iraq on the global
jihad. Should the Iraqi people prevail in establishing a stable
political and security environment, the jihadists will be
perceived to have failed and fewer jihadists will leave Iraq
determined to carry on the fight elsewhere. But we assess that
should the jihadists thwart the Iraqi efforts to establish a
stable political and security environment, they could secure an
operational base in Iraq and inspire sympathizers elsewhere to
move beyond rhetoric to attempt attacks against neighboring
Middle Eastern nations, against Europe, and even the United
States.
The same dynamic pertains to al-Zarqawi. His capture would
deprive the movement of a notorious leader, whereas his
continued acts of terror could enable him to expand his
following beyond his organization in Iraq much as bin Ladin
expanded al-Qa'ida in the 1990s.
The debate between Muslim extremists and moderates also
will influence the future terrorist environment, the domestic
stability of key U.S. partners, and the foreign policies of
governments throughout the Muslim world. The violent actions of
global jihadists are adding urgency to the debate within Islam
over how religion should shape government. Growing internal
demands for reform in many Muslim countries further stimulate
this debate.
In general, Muslims are becoming more aware of their
Islamic identity, leading to growing political activism; but
this does not necessarily signal a trend toward radicalization.
Most Muslims reject the extremist message and violent agendas
of the global jihadists. Indeed, as Muslims endorse democratic
principles of freedom, equality, and the rule of law and a role
for their religious beliefs in building better futures for
their communities, there will be growing opportunities for
countering a jihadist movement that authoritarianism, isolation
and economic stagnation.
Let me turn to the issue of extremism and challenges to
effective governance and legitimacy in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The threat from extremism and anti-Western militancy is
especially acute in Iraq and Afghanistan. In discussing Iraq,
I'd like to offer, if you will, a balance sheet to give a sense
of where I see things today and what I see as the trends in
2006.
Bold, inclusive leadership will be the critical factor in
establishing an Iraqi constitutional democracy that is both
viable as a nation-state and responsive to the diversity of
Iraq's regions and people.
Let me begin with some of these encouraging developments
before turning to the challenges.
The insurgents have not been able to establish any lasting
territorial control. They were unable to disrupt either of the
two national elections held this year or the constitutional
referendum. They have not developed a political strategy to
attract popular support beyond their Sunni Arab base. And they
have not shown the ability to coordinate nationwide operations.
Iraqi security forces are taking on more demanding
missions, making incremental progress toward operational
independence, and becoming more capable of providing the kind
of stability Iraqis deserve and the economy needs in order to
grow.
Signs of open conflict between extreme Sunni jihadists and
Sunni nationalist elements of the insurgency, while thus far
still localized, are encouraging and exploitable. The
jihadists' heavy-handed activities in Sunni areas in western
Iraq have caused tribal and nationalist elements in the
insurgency to reach out to the Baghdad government for support.
Large-scale Sunni participation in the last elections has
provided a first step toward diminishing Sunni support for the
insurgency. There appears to be a strong desire among Sunnis to
explore the potential benefits of political participation.
But numerous challenges remain. Iraqi Sunni Arab
disaffection is the primary enabler of the insurgency and is
likely to remain high in 2006. Even if a broad, inclusive
national government emerges, there almost certainly will be a
lag time before we see a dampening effect on the insurgency.
Insurgents continue to demonstrate the ability to recruit,
supply, and attack coalition and security forces, and their
leaders continue to exploit Islamic themes, nationalism, and
personal grievances to fuel opposition to the government and to
recruit more fighters.
The most extreme Sunni jihadists, such as those fighting
with Zarqawi, will remain unreconciled and continue to attack
Iraqis and coalition forces. These extreme Sunni jihadist
elements, a subset of which are foreign fighters, constitute a
small minority of the overall insurgency, but their use of
high-profile suicide attacks gives them a disproportionate
impact. The insurgents' use of increasingly lethal improvised
explosive devices, and the IED-makers' adaptiveness to
coalition countermeasures, remain the most significant day-to-
day threat to coalition forces and a complex challenge for the
intelligence community.
Iraqi security forces require better command and control
mechanisms to improve their effectiveness, and are experiencing
difficulty in managing ethnic and sectarian divides among their
units and personnel.
A key to establishing effective governance and security
over the next 3 to 5 years is enhanced Sunni Arab political
participation and a growing perception among Sunnis that the
political process is addressing their interests.
Sunnis will be focused on obtaining what they consider
their demographically appropriate share of leadership positions
in the new government, especially on the Constitutional Review
Commission. Debates over federalism, central versus local
control, and division of resources are likely to be complex.
Success in satisfactorily resolving them will be key to
advancing stability and prospects for a unified country.
Although the Kurds and Shi'a have been accommodating to the
under-represented Sunnis in 2005, their desire to protect core
interests, such as regional autonomy and de-Ba'athification,
could make further compromise more difficult.
In the aftermath of the December elections, virtually all
of the Iraq parties are seeking to create a broad-based
government, but all want it to be formed on their terms. The
Shi'a and the Kurds will be the foundation of any governing
coalition, but it is not yet clear to us whether they will
include the main Sunni factions, particularly the Iraqi
Consensus Front, or other smaller and politically weaker
secular groups, such as former Prime Minister Allawi's Iraqi
National List.
The Sunni parties have significant expectations for
concessions from the Shi'a and Kurds in order to justify their
participation and avoid provoking more insurgent violence
directed against Sunni political leaders.
During the coming year, Iraq's newly elected leadership
will face a daunting set of governance tasks. The creation of a
new, permanent government and the review of the constitution by
early summer will offer opportunities to find common ground and
improve the effectiveness and legitimacy of the central
government. There is a danger, however, that political
negotiations and deal-making will prove divisive. This could
obstruct efforts to improve government performance, extend
Baghdad's reach throughout the country and build confidence in
the democratic political process.
Let me focus on one of those tasks--the economy.
Restoration of basic services and the creation of jobs are
critical to the well-being of Iraqi citizens, the legitimacy of
the new government, and, indirectly, to eroding support for the
insurgency. At this point, prospects for economic development
in 2006 are constrained by the unstable security situation,
insufficient commitment to economic reform, and to corruption.
Iraq is dependent on oil revenues to fund the government, so
insurgents continue to disrupt oil infrastructure, despite the
fielding of new Iraqi forces to protect it. Insurgents also are
targeting trade and transportation. Intelligence has a key role
to play in combating threats to pipelines, to electric power
grids, and personal safety.
Turning now to Afghanistan, like Iraq, Afghanistan is a
fragile new democracy struggling to overcome deep-seated social
divisions, decades of repression, and acts of terrorism
directed against ordinary citizens, officials, foreign aid
workers, and coalition forces. These and other threats to the
Karzai government also threaten important American interests
ranging from the defeat of terrorists who find haven along the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border to the suppression of opium
production.
Afghan leaders face four critical challenges: Containing
the insurgency, building central government capacity and
extending its authority, further containing warlordism, and
confronting pervasive drug criminality. Intelligence is needed
to assist, monitor, and protect Afghan, coalition, and NATO
efforts in all four endeavors. The volume and geographic scope
of attacks increased last year, but the Taliban and other
militants have not been able to stop the democratic process or
expand their support base beyond Pashtun areas of the South and
East. Nevertheless, the insurgent threat will impede the
expansion of Kabul's writ, it will slow economic development,
and limit progress in counternarcotics efforts.
Ultimately, defeating the insurgency will depend heavily on
continued international aid; on effective coalition, NATO, and
Afghan government security operations to prevent the insurgency
from gaining a stronger foothold in some Pashtun areas; and on
the success of the government's reconciliation initiatives.
I would like now to turn to the issue of weapons of mass
destruction and States of key concern, Iran and North Korea.
The ongoing development of dangerous weapons and delivery
systems constitutes the second major threat to the safety of
our Nation, our deployed troops, and to our allies. We are most
concerned about the threat and destabilizing effect of nuclear
proliferation. We are also concerned about the threat from
biological agents or even chemical agents, which would have
psychological and possibly political effects far greater than
their actual magnitude. Use by nation-states can still be
constrained by the logic of deterrence and international
control regimes, but these constraints may be of little utility
in preventing the use of mass effect weapons by rogue regimes
or terrorist groups.
The time when a few states had monopolies over the most
dangerous technologies has been over for many years. Moreover,
our adversaries have more access to acquire and more
opportunities to deliver such weapons than in the past.
Technologies, often dual-use, move freely in our globalized
economy, as do the scientific personnel who design them. So it
is more difficult for us to track efforts to acquire those
components and production technologies that are so widely
available.
The potential dangers of proliferation are so grave that we
must do everything possible to discover and disrupt attempts by
those who seek to acquire materials and weapons.
We assess that some of the countries that are still
pursuing WMD programs will continue to try to improve their
capabilities and level of self-sufficiency over the next
decade. We also are focused on the potential acquisition of
such nuclear, chemical and/or biological weapons, or the
production technologies and materials necessary to produce them
by states that do not now have such programs, terrorist
organizations like al-Qa'ida and by criminal organizations,
either alone or through middlemen.
We are working with other elements of the U.S. Government
regarding the safety and security of nuclear weapons and
fissile material, pathogens, and chemical weapons in select
countries.
Our concerns about Iran are shared by many nations, by the
International Atomic Energy Agency and, of course, Iran's
neighbors. Iran conducted a clandestine uranium enrichment
program for nearly two decades in violation of its IAEA
safeguards agreement and, despite its claim to the contrary, we
assess that Iran seeks nuclear weapons. We judge that Tehran
probably does not yet have a nuclear weapon and probably has
not yet produced or acquired the necessary fissile material.
Nevertheless, the danger that it will acquire a nuclear
weapon and the ability to integrate it with ballistic missiles
Iran already possesses is a reason for immediate concern. Iran
already has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the
Middle East, and Tehran views its ballistic missiles as an
integral part of its strategy to deter--and if necessary
retaliate against--forces in the region, including U.S. forces.
As you are aware, Iran is located at the center of a vital
and volatile region. It has strained relations with its
neighbors and is hostile to the United States, to our friends,
and to our values. President Ahmadinejad has made numerous
unacceptable statements since his election, hard-liners have
control of all the major branches and institutions of
government, and the government has become more effective and
efficient at repressing the nascent shoots of personal freedom
that had emerged in the late 1990s and earlier in the decade.
Indeed, the regime today is more confident and assertive than
it has been since the early days of the Islamic Republic.
Several factors work in favor of the clerical regime's
continued hold on power. Record oil and other revenue is
permitting generous public spending, fueling strong economic
growth and swelling financial reserves. At the same time, Iran
is diversifying its foreign trading partners. Asia's share of
Iran's trade has jumped to nearly match Europe's 40 percent
share. Tehran sees diversification as a buffer against external
efforts to isolate it.
Although regime-threatening instability is unlikely,
ingredients for political volatility remain, and Iran is wary
of the political progress occurring in neighboring Iraq and
Afghanistan. Ahmadinejad's rhetorical recklessness and his
inexperience on the national and international stage also
increase the risk of a misstep that could spur popular
opposition, especially if more experienced conservatives cannot
rein in his excesses. Over time, Ahmadinejad's populist
economic policies could, if enacted, deplete the government's
financial resources and weaken a structurally flawed economy.
For now, however, Supreme Leader Khamenei is keeping
conservative fissures in check by balancing the various
factions in government.
Iranian policy toward Iraq and its activities there
represent a particular concern. Iran seeks a Shi'a-dominated
and unified Iraq, but also wants the United States to
experience continued setbacks in our efforts to promote
democracy and stability. Accordingly, Iran provides guidance
and training to select Iraqi Shi'a political groups, and
weapons and training to Shi'a militant groups to enable anti-
coalition attacks. Tehran has been responsible for at least
some of the increasing lethality of anti-coalition attacks by
providing Shi'a militants with the capability to build
improvised explosive devices with explosively formed
projectiles similar to those developed by Iran and Lebanese
Hezbollah.
Tehran's intentions to inflict pain on the United States in
Iraq has been constrained by its caution to avoid giving
Washington an excuse to attack it, also the clerical
leadership's general satisfaction with trends in Iraq, and
Iran's desire to avoid chaos on its border.
Iranian conventional military power constitutes the
greatest potential threat to Persian Gulf States and a
challenge to U.S. interests. Iran is enhancing its ability to
project its military power in order to threaten to disrupt the
operations and reinforcement of U.S. forces based in the
region, potentially intimidating regional allies into
withholding support for U.S. policy toward Iran and raising the
costs of our regional presence for the United States--for us
and our allies.
Tehran also continues to support a number of terrorist
groups, viewing this capability as a critical regime safeguard
by deterring U.S. and Israeli attacks, by distracting and
weakening Israel, and enhancing Iran's regional influence
through intimidation. Lebanese Hezbollah is Iran's main
terrorist ally, which, although focused on its agenda in
Lebanon and supporting anti-Israeli Palestinian terrorists, has
a worldwide support network and is capable of attacks against
U.S. interests if it feels its Iranian patron is threatened.
Tehran also supports Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other
groups in the Persian Gulf, Central and South Asia, and
elsewhere.
Now, turning to North Korea, North Korea claims to have
nuclear weapons, a claim that we assess is probably true, and
it has threatened to proliferate these weapons abroad. Thus,
like Iran, North Korea threatens international security and is
located in a historically volatile region. Its aggressive
deployment posture threatens our allies in South Korea and U.S.
troops on the peninsula.
Pyongyang sells conventional weapons to Africa, Asia and
the Middle East, and has sold ballistic missiles to several
Middle Eastern countries, further destabilizing regions already
embroiled in conflict. And it produces and smuggles abroad
counterfeit U.S. currency, as well as narcotics and other
contraband.
Pyongyang sees nuclear weapons as the best way to deter
superior U.S. and South Korean forces, to ensure regime
security, as a lever for economic gain and as a source of
prestige. Accordingly, the North remains a major challenge to
the global nuclear nonproliferation regimes.
We do not know the conditions under which North Korea might
be willing to fully relinquish its nuclear weapons and its
weapons program. Nor do we see signs of organized opposition to
the regime among North Korea's political or military elite.
Now let me turn to the issue of governance, political
instability and democratization. Good governance and, over the
long term, progress toward democratization are crucial factors
in navigating through the period of international turmoil and
transition that commenced with the end of the cold war and that
will continue well into the future. In the absence of effective
governance and reform, political instability often compromises
our security interests while threatening new democracies and
pushing flailing states into failure.
I will now review those States of greatest concern to the
United States, framing my discussion within the context of
trends and developments in their respective regions.
First the Middle East. The tensions between autocratic
regimes, extremism, and democratic forces extends well beyond
our earlier discussion about Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan to
other countries in the Middle East. Emerging political
competition and the energizing of public debate on the role of
democracy and Islam in the region could lead to the opening of
political systems and development of civic institutions,
providing a possible bulwark against extremism. But the path to
change is far from assured. Forces for change are vulnerable to
fragmentation and long-standing regimes are increasingly adept
at using both repression and limited reforms to moderate
political pressures to assure their survival.
We continue to watch closely events in Syria, a pivotal--
but generally unhelpful--player in a troubled region. Despite
the Syrian military withdrawal from Lebanon last year, Damascus
still meddles in its internal affairs, seeks to undercut
prospects for Arab-Israeli peace, and has failed to crackdown
consistently on militant infiltration into Iraq. By aligning
itself with Iran, the Bashar al-Asad regime is signaling its
rejection of the Western world. Over the coming year, the
Syrian regime could face internal challenges as various
pressures--especially the fallout of the United Nation
investigation into the assassination of the former Lebanese
prime minister--raise questions about President Bashar al-
Asad's judgment and leadership capacity.
Syria's exit from Lebanon has created political
opportunities in Beirut, but sectarian tensions--especially the
sense among Shi'a that they are underrepresented in the
government--and Damascus's meddling persist. Bombings since
March targeting anti-Syria politicians and journalists have
fueled sectarian animosities.
Egypt held Presidential and legislative elections for the
first time with multiple Presidential candidates in response to
internal and external pressures for democratization. The
Egyptian public, however, remains discontented by economic
conditions, the Arab-Israeli problem, the U.S. presence in
Iraq, and insufficient political freedoms.
Saudi Arabia's crackdown on al-Qa'ida has prevented major
terrorist attacks in the Kingdom for more than a year and
degraded the remnants of the terror network's Saudi-based
leadership, manpower, access to weapons and operational
capability. These developments, the Kingdom's smooth leadership
transition, and high oil prices have eased, but not eliminated,
concerns about stability.
Hamas' performance in last week's election ushered in a
period of great uncertainty as President Abbas, the Israelis,
and the rest of the world determine how to deal with a majority
party in the Palestinian Legislative Council that conducts and
supports terrorism and refuses to recognize or negotiate with
Israel. The election, however, does not necessarily mean that
the search for peace between Israel and the Palestinians is
halted irrevocably. The vote garnered by Hamas may have been
cast more against the Fatah than for the Hamas program of
rejecting Israel. In any case, Hamas must now contend with the
Palestinian public opinion that has over the years has
supported the two-state solution.
Let me turn now to South Asia.
Many of our most important interests intersect in Pakistan.
The nation is a frontline partner in the war on terror, having
captured several al-Qa'ida leaders, but also remains a major
source of extremism that poses a threat to Musharraf, to the
United States, and to neighboring India and Afghanistan.
Musharraf faces few political challenges in his dual role
as President and chief of the Army Staff, but has made only
limited progress moving his country toward democracy. Pakistan
retains a nuclear force outside the Treaty on the
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and not subject to full-
scope IAEA safeguards, and has been both recipient and source--
via A.Q. Khan's proliferation activities--of nuclear weapons-
related technologies. Pakistan's national elections scheduled
for 2007 will be a key benchmark to determine whether the
country is continuing to make progress in its democratic
transition.
Since India and Pakistan approached the brink of war in
2002, their peace process has lessened tensions, and both
appear committed to improving the bilateral relationship. A
number of confidence-building measures, including new
transportation links, have helped sustain the momentum. Still,
the fact that both have nuclear weapons and missiles to deliver
them entails obvious and dangerous risks of escalation.
Turning now to Eurasia, in Russia, President Putin's drive
to centralize power and assert control over civil society,
growing state control over strategic sectors of the economy,
and the persistence of widespread corruption raise questions
about the country's direction. Russia could become a more
inward-looking and difficult interlocutor for the United States
over the next several years. High profits from exports of oil
and gas and perceived policy successes at home and abroad have
bolstered Moscow's confidence.
Russia probably will work with the United States on shared
interests such as counterterrorism, counternarcotics and
counterproliferation; however, growing suspicions about Western
intentions and Moscow's desire to demonstrate its independence
and defend its own interests may make it harder to cooperate
with Russia on areas of concern to the United States.
Now, let me briefly examine the rest of post-Soviet
Eurasia, where the results in the past year have been mixed.
Many of the former Soviet republics are led by autocratic,
corrupt, clan-based regimes whose political stability is based
on different levels of repression; yet, at the same time, we
have seen in Georgia, in Ukraine, and in Kyrgyzstan the
emergence of grassroots forces for change.
Central Asia remains plagued by political stagnation and
repression, rampant corruption, widespread poverty and widening
socio- economic inequalities, and other problems that nurture
nascent radical sentiment and terrorism. In the worst, but not
implausible case, central authority in one or more of these
States could evaporate as rival clans or regions vie for power,
opening the door to an expansion of terrorist and criminal
activity on the model of failed states like Somalia and, when
it was under Taliban rule, Afghanistan.
Turning now to Latin America, a gradual consolidation and
improvement of democratic institutions is the dominant trend in
much of Latin America. By the year's end, 10 countries will
have held Presidential elections and none is more important to
U.S. interests than the contest in Mexico in July. Mexico has
taken advantage of the NAFTA and its economy has become
increasingly integrated with the United States and Canada.
Committed democrats in countries like Brazil and Chile are
promoting economic growth and poverty alleviation. And, despite
battling persistent insurgent and paramilitary forces with
considerable success, Colombia remains committed to keeping on
a democratic path. Nonetheless, radical populist figures in
some countries advocate statist economic policies and show
little respect for democratic institutions.
In Venezuela, President Chavez, if he wins reelection later
this year, appears ready to use his control of the legislature
and other institutions to continue to stifle the opposition, to
reduce press freedom, and entrench himself through measures
that are technically legal, but which nonetheless constrict
democracy. We expect Chavez to deepen his relationship with
Castro. He also is seeking closer economic, military, and
diplomatic ties with Iran and North Korea. Chavez has scaled
back counternarcotics cooperation with the United States.
Increased oil revenues have allowed Chavez to embark on an
activist foreign policy in Latin America that includes
providing oil at favorable repayment rates to gain allies,
using newly created media outlets to generate support for his
Bolivarian goals, and meddling in the internal affairs of his
neighbors by backing particular candidates for elective office.
In Bolivia, South America's poorest country with the
hemisphere's highest proportion of indigenous people, the
victory of Evo Morales reflects the public's lack of faith in
traditional political parties and institutions. Since his
election, he appears to have moderated his earlier promises to
nationalize the hydrocarbons industry and cease coca
eradication. But his Administration continues to send mixed
signals regarding its intentions.
Haiti's interim government is the weakest in the
hemisphere, and the security climate could continue to
deteriorate due to slum gang violence. A failure to renew the
United Nations mandate would greatly increase the risk of a
complete nationwide breakdown of public order, intensifying
migration pressures. The perception among would-be migrants
that the U.S. immigration policy is tough is the most important
factor in deterring Haitians from fleeing their country.
Turning now to Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia includes
vibrant, diverse, and emerging democracies looking to the
United States as a source of stability, wealth and leadership.
But it is also home to terrorism, separatist aspirations,
crushing poverty, ethnic violence, and religious divisions.
Burma remains a dictatorship, and Cambodia is retreating from
progress on democracy and human rights that it made in the
1990s. The region is particularly at risk from avian flu, which
I will discuss at greater length in a moment. Al-Qa'ida-
affiliated and other extremist groups are present in many
countries, although effective government policies have limited
their growth and input.
The prospects for democratic consolidation are relatively
bright in Indonesia, the country with the world's largest
Muslim population. President Yudhoyono is moving forward to
crack down on corruption, professionalize the military, bring
peace to the long-troubled province of Aceh, and to implement
economic reforms. On the counterterrorism side, Indonesian
authorities have detained or killed significant elements of
Jemaah Islamiyah, the al-Qa'ida-linked terrorist group, but
Jemaah Islamiyah remains a tough foe.
The Philippines remain committed to democracy despite
political turbulence over alleged cheating in the 2004
elections and repeated rumors of coup plots. Meanwhile, Manila
continues to struggle with the 35-year-old Islamic and
communist rebellions, and faces growing concerns over the
presence of JI terrorists in the South.
Thailand is searching for a formula to contain violence
instigated by ethnic Malay Muslims separatist groups in the far
Southern provinces. In 2005, the separatists showed signs of
stronger organization and more lethal and brutal tactics
targeting the government and the Buddhist population in the
South.
Some good news is coming out of Africa. The continent is
enjoying real economic growth after a decade of declining per
capita income. The past decade has also witnessed a definite,
albeit gradual, trend toward greater democracy, openness and
multi-party elections.
In Liberia, the inauguration of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf as
President, following a hotly contested multi-party election,
was a positive harbinger of a return to democratic rule in a
battered nation.
Yet in much of the continent, humanitarian crises,
instability and conflict persist. Overlaying these enduring
threats are the potential spread of jihadist ideology amongst
disaffected Muslim populations and the region's growing
importance as a source of energy. We are most concerned about
Sudan and Nigeria.
The signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan
last year was a major achievement, but the new Government of
National Unity is being tested by the continuing conflict in
Darfur, and the instability in Chad is spilling over into
western Sudan, further endangering humanitarian workers and
assistance supply lines. Gains in stabilizing and improving the
conditions in Darfur could be reversed if the new instability
goes unchecked.
The most important election on the African horizon will be
held in spring of 2007 in Nigeria, the continent's most
populous country and largest oil producer. The vote has the
potential to reinforce a democratic trend away from military
rule, or it could lead to major disruption in a nation
suffering frequent ethno-religious violence, criminal activity
and rampant corruption.
Speculation that President Obasanjo will try to change the
constitution so he can seek a third term in office is raising
political tension and, if proven true, threatens to unleash
major turmoil and conflict. Such chaos in Nigeria could lead to
disruption of oil supply, secessionist moves by regional
governments, major refugee flows and instability elsewhere in
Africa.
To one degree or another, all nations are affected by the
phenomenon known as globalization. I'm turning now to the issue
of globalization and rising actors. Many see the United States
as globalization's primary beneficiary, but the developments
subsumed under its rubric operate largely beyond the control of
all countries. Small, medium and large States are both gaining
and losing through technological and economic developments at a
rate of speed unheard of in human history.
Such recalibrations in regional and global standing usually
emerge in the wake of war. But globalization is not a war, even
though its underside--fierce competition for global energy
reserves, discrepancies between rich and poor, criminal
networks that create and feed black markets in drugs and even
human beings and the rapid transmission of disease--has the
look of a silent, but titanic global struggle.
One major recalibration of the global order enabled by
globalization is the shift of world economic momentum and
energy to greater Asia, led principally by the explosive
economic growth in China and the growing concentration of world
manufacturing activity in and around it. India, too, is
emerging as a new pole of greater Asia's surging economic and
political power. These two Asian giants comprise fully a third
of the world's population--a huge labor force eager for modern
work, supported by significant scientific and technological
capabilities, and an army of new claimants on the world's
natural resources and capital.
China is a rapidly rising power with steadily expanding
global reach that may become a peer competitor to the United
States at some point. Consistent high rates of economic growth,
driven by exploding foreign trade, have increased Beijing's
political influence abroad and fueled a military modernization
program that has steadily increased Beijing's force projection
capabilities.
China's foreign policy is currently focused on the
country's immediate periphery, including Southeast and Central
Asia, where Beijing hopes to make economic inroads, to increase
political influence and to prevent a backlash against its rise.
Its rhetoric toward Taiwan has been less inflammatory since
Beijing passed its ``anti-secession'' law last spring. China
has been reaching out to the opposition parties on Taiwan and
making economic overtures designed to win favor with the Taiwan
public, although Beijing still refuses to deal with the elected
leader in Taipei.
Beijing has also expanded diplomatic and economic
interaction with other major powers--especially Russia and the
European Union--and begun to increase its presence in Africa
and Latin America.
China's military is vigorously pursuing a modernization
program--a full suite of modern weapons and hardware for a
large proportion of its overall force structure; designs for a
more effective operational doctrine at tactical and theater
level; training reforms; and wide-ranging improvements in
logistics, administration, financial management, mobilization,
and other critical support functions.
Beijing's greatest challenge is to sustain growth
sufficient to keep unemployment and rural discontent from
rising to destabilizing levels and to maintain increases in
living standards.
To do this, China must solve a number of difficult economic
and legal problems. It must improve the education system,
reduce environmental degradation, and improve governance by
combating corruption. Indeed, China's rise may be hobbled by
systemic problems and the Communist Party's resistance to the
demands for political participation that economic growth
generates. Beijing's determination to repress real or perceived
challenges--from dispossessed peasants to religious
organizations--could lead to serious instability at home and
less effective policies abroad.
Turning now to India, rapid economic growth and increasing
technological competence are securing India's leading role in
South Asia, while helping India to realize its long-standing
ambition to become a global power. India's growing confidence
on the world stage as a result of its increasingly globalized
business activity will make New Delhi a more effective partner
for the United States, but also a more formidable player on
issues such as those before the World Trade Organization.
New Delhi seeks to play a key role in fostering democracy
in the region, especially in Nepal and Bangladesh, and will
continue to be a reliable ally against global terrorism, in
part because India has been a frequent target for Islamic
terrorists, mainly in Kashmir. India seeks better relations
with its two main rivals--Pakistan and China--recognizing that
its regional disputes with them are hampering its larger goals
on the world stage. Nevertheless, like China, India is using
its newfound wealth and technical capabilities to extend its
military reach.
On the economic front, as Indian multinational corporations
become more prevalent, they will offer competition and
cooperation with the United States in fields such as energy,
steel, and pharmaceuticals. New Delhi's pursuit of energy to
fuel its rapidly growing economy adds to pressures on world
prices and increases the likelihood that it will seek to
augment its programs in nuclear power, coal technologies, and
petroleum exploration. Like Pakistan, India is outside the
nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
Let me turn to the issue of threats to global energy
security.
World energy markets seem certain to remain tight for the
foreseeable future. Robust global economic expansion is pushing
strong energy demand growth and, combined with instability in
several oil- producing regions, is increasing the geopolitical
leverage of key producer states such as Iran, Saudi Arabia,
Russia and Venezuela. At the same time, the pursuit of secure
energy supplies has become a much more significant driver of
foreign policy in countries where energy demand growth is
surging--particularly China and India.
The changing global oil and gas market has encouraged
Russia's assertiveness with Ukraine and Georgia, Iran's nuclear
brinksmanship, and the populist ``petro-diplomacy'' of
Venezuela's Hugo Chavez. Russia's recent but short-lived
curtailment of natural gas deliveries to the Ukraine
temporarily reduced gas supplies to much of Europe and is an
example of how energy can be used as both a political and
economic tool. The gas disruption alarmed Europeans, reminding
them of their dependence on Russian gas, and refocused debate
on alternative energy sources.
Foreign policy frictions, driven by energy security
concerns, are likely to be fed by continued global efforts of
Chinese and Indian firms to reach new oil field development
deals and to purchase stakes in foreign oil and gas properties.
Although some of these moves may incrementally increase oil-
sector investment and global supplies, others may bolster
countries, such as Iran, Syria and Sudan, that pose significant
U.S. national security risks or foreign policy challenges. For
example, in Venezuela, Chavez is attempting to diversify oil
exports away from the United States.
Let me turn now to the security threat from narcotics
trafficking.
In addition to the central U.S. national security interest
in stemming the flow of drugs to this country, there are two
international threats related to narcotics: First, the
potential threat from an intersection of narcotics and
extremism; and second, the threat from the impact of drugs on
those ineffective and unreliable nation states about which we
are so concerned.
Although the worldwide trafficking-terrorist relationship
is limited, the scope of these ties has grown modestly in
recent years. A small number of terrorist groups engage the
services of or accept donations from criminals, including
narcotics traffickers, to help raise operational funds. While
the revenue realized by extremists appears small when compared
to that of dedicated trafficking organizations, even small
amounts of income can finance destructive acts of terror.
The tie between drug trafficking and extremism is strongest
in Colombia and Afghanistan. Both of Colombia's insurgencies
and most of its paramilitary groups reap substantial benefits
from cocaine transactions. In Afghanistan, the Taliban and the
Hizb group gain at least some of their financial support from
their ties to local opiate traffickers. Ties between
trafficking and extremists elsewhere are less robust and
profitable. North African extremists involved in the 2004
Madrid bombings reportedly used drug income to buy their
explosives.
Most major international organized crime groups have kept
terrorists at arm's length, although some regional criminal
gangs have supplied fraudulent or altered travel documents,
moved illicit earnings, or provided other criminal services to
members of insurgent or terrorist groups for a fee.
Narcotics traffickers and other organized criminals
typically do not want to see governments toppled, but thrive in
States where governments are weak, vulnerable to or seeking out
corruption and unable or unwilling to consistently enforce the
rule of law. Nonetheless, a vicious cycle can develop in which
a weakened government enables criminals to dangerously undercut
the state's credibility and authority, with the consequence
that the investment climate suffers, economic growth withers,
black market activity rises, and fewer resources are available
for civil infrastructure and governance.
We are particularly concerned about this cycle in countries
on the other side of the world, such as Afghanistan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Burma, and those close to home, such as in
Haiti, Jamaica, and Mexico. About 90 percent of detected
cocaine destined for the United States was smuggled through the
Mexico-Central America corridor, nearly all Mexican heroin is
for the U.S. market, and Mexico is the primary foreign supplier
of marijuana and methamphetamine to the United States.
Let me turn now briefly to the threat from pandemics and
epidemics.
In the 21st century, our intelligence community has
expanded the definition of bio-threats to the United States
beyond weapons to naturally occurring pandemics.
The most pressing infectious disease challenge facing the
United States is the potential emergence of a new and deadly
avian influenza strain, which could cause a worldwide outbreak
or pandemic. International health experts worry that avian
influenza could become transmissible among humans, threatening
the health and lives of millions of people around the globe.
There are many unknowns about avian flu, but even the
specter of an outbreak could have significant effects on the
international community, on whole societies, military
operations, critical infrastructure and diplomatic relations.
Avian flu is not something we can fight alone. An effective
response to it is highly dependent on the openness of affected
nations in reporting outbreaks where and when they occur. But
for internal political reasons, a lack of response capability
or disinclination to regard avian influenza as a significant
threat, some countries are not forthcoming.
In close coordination with the Department of Health and
Human Services, the intelligence community therefore is
tracking a number of key countries that are or could be
especially prone to avian influenza outbreaks and where we
cannot be confident that adequate information will be available
through open sources.
The intelligence community also coordinates closely with
the Department of Homeland Security and provides input to the
National Biosurveillance Integration System at the Department
of Homeland Security.
In conclusion, each of the major intelligence challenges
that I have discussed today is affected by the accelerating
change and transnational interplay that are the hallmarks of
21st century globalization. As a direct result, collecting,
analyzing and acting on solid intelligence have become
increasingly difficult.
To meet these new and reconfigured challenges, we need to
work hand-in-hand with other responsible nations. Fortunately,
the vast majority of governments in the world are responsible
and responsive, but those that are not are neither few in
numbers nor lacking in material resources and geopolitical
influence.
The powerful critiques of this Committee, the 9/11
Commission, and the WMD Commission, framed by statute in the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, and
taken to heart by the dedicated professionals of our
intelligence community, have helped make us better prepared and
more vigilant than we were on that terrible day in September
2001. But from an intelligence perspective, we cannot rest. We
must transform our intelligence capabilities and cultures by
fully integrating them from law enforcement through national
authorities in Washington to combatant commanders overseas. The
more thoroughly we do that, the more clearly we will be able to
see the threats lurking in the shadow of the future and ward
them off.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And now I'd be pleased
to try and answer any questions which the Committee might have.
Chairman Roberts. Mr. Director, I asked you to make a very
comprehensive statement covering all the threats that you think
endanger our country, not only for the Committee, but for those
listening, all the citizens of the United States. You have done
that in a very comprehensive report.
It is under my understanding under the Geneva Convention,
under the heading of ``cruel and inhumane punishment'' for
congressional hearings that last for more than 2 hours, and
prior to questioning, that it would be the thing to do to
declare a 5-minute break, which we will do. And we will resume
immediately at the 5-minute mark to start our questions.
[The prepared statement of Director Negroponte follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John D. Negroponte, Director of Intelligence
Chairman Roberts, Vice-Chairman Rockefeller, Members of the
Committee, thank you for the invitation to offer my assessment of the
threats, challenges, and opportunities for the United States in today's
world.
I am honored to be the first Director of National Intelligence to
offer you such an assessment, and am pleased to note that following my
oral testimony, I will answer your questions with the assistance of Mr.
Porter Goss, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; Lieutenant
General Michael D. Maples, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency;
Mr. Robert Mueller, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
Ms. Carol Rodley, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence
and Research; Mr. Charles E. Allen, Chief Intelligence Officer,
Department of Homeland Security; and General Michael Hayden, Principal
Deputy Director of National Intelligence.
Let me begin with a straightforward statement of preoccupation
shared by all of us sitting here before you: terrorism is the
preeminent threat to our citizens, Homeland, interests, and friends.
The War on Terror is our first priority and driving concern as we press
ahead with a major transformation of the Intelligence Community we
represent.
We live in a world that is full of conflict, contradictions, and
accelerating change. Viewed from the perspective of the Director of
National Intelligence, the most dramatic change of all is the
exponential increase in the number of targets we must identify, track,
and analyze. Today, in addition to hostile nation-states, we are
focusing on terrorist groups, proliferation networks, alienated
communities, charismatic individuals, narcotraffickers, and microscopic
influenza.
The 21st century is less dangerous than the 20th century in certain
respects, but more dangerous in others. Globalization, particularly of
technologies that can be used to produce WMD, political instability
around the world, the rise of emerging powers like China, the spread of
the jihadist movement, and of course, the horrific events of September
11, 2001, demand heightened vigilance from our Intelligence Community.
This morning, then, I will discuss:
Global jihadists, their fanatical ideology, and the
civilized world's efforts to disrupt, dismantle and destroy their
networks;
The struggle of the Iraqi and Afghan people to assert
their sovereignty over insurgency, terror, and extremism;
WMD-related proliferation and two states of particular
concern, Iran and North Korea;
Issues of political instability and governance in all
regions of the world that affect our ability to protect and advance our
interests; and
Globalization, emerging powers, and such transnational
challenges as the geopolitics of energy, narcotrafficking, and possible
pandemics.
In assessing these themes, we all must be mindful of the old
dictum: forewarned is forearmed. Our policymakers, warfighters, and law
enforcement officers need the best intelligence and analytic insight
humanly and technically possible to help them peer into the onrushing
shadow of the future and make the decisions that will protect American
lives and interests. This has never been more true than now with US and
Coalition forces in Iraq and Afhanistan--and the citizens and fledgling
governments they help to protect under attack. Addressing threats to
their safety and providing the critical intelligence on a myriad of
tactical and strategic issues must be--and is--a top priority for our
Intelligence Community.
But in discussing all the many dangers the 21st century poses, it
should be emphasized that they do not befall America alone. The issues
we consider today confront responsible leaders everywhere. That is the
true nature of the 21st century: accelerating change affecting and
challenging us all.
THE GLOBAL JIHADIST THREAT
Collaboration with our friends and allies around the world has
helped us achieve some notable successes against the global jihadist
threat. In fact, most of al-Qa'ida's setbacks last year were the result
of our allies' efforts, either independently or with our assistance.
And since 9/11, examples of the high level of counterterrorism efforts
around the world are many. Pakistan's commitment has enabled some of
the most important captures to date. Saudi Arabia's resolve to counter
the spread of terrorism has increased. Our relationship with Spain has
strengthened since the March 2004 Madrid train bombings. The British
have long been our closest counterterrorism partners the seamless
cooperation in the aftermath of the July attacks in London reflected
that commitment while Australia, Canada, France and many other nations
remain stout allies. Nonetheless, much remains to be done; the battle
is far from over.
Jihadists seek to overthrow regimes they regard as ``apostate'' and
to eliminate US influence in the Muslim world. They attack Americans
when they can, but most of their targets and victims are fellow
Muslims. Nonetheless, the slow pace of economic, social, and political
change in most Muslim majority nations continues to fuel a global
jihadist movement. The movement is diffuse and subsumes three quite
different types of groups and individuals:
First and foremost, al-Qa'ida, a battered but resourceful
organization;
Second, other Sunni jihadist groups, some affiliated with
al-Qa'ida, some not;
Third, networks and cells that are the self-generating
progeny of al-Qa'ida.
Al-Qa'ida Remains Our Top Concern. We have eliminated much of the
leadership that presided over al-Qa'ida in 2001, and US-led
counterterrorism efforts in 2005 continue to disrupt its operations,
take out its leaders and deplete its cadre. But the organization's core
elements still plot and make preparations for terrorist strikes against
the Homeland and other targets from bases in the Pakistan-Afghanistan
border area; they also have gained added reach through their merger
with the Iraq-based network of Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, which has
broadened al-Qa'ida's appeal within the jihadist community and
potentially put new resources at its disposal.
Thanks to effective intelligence operations, we know a great deal
about al-Qa'ida's vision. Zawahiri, al-Qa'ida's No. 2, is candid in his
July 2005 letter to Zarqawi. He portrays the jihad in Iraq as a
stepping-stone in the march toward a global caliphate, with the focus
on Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, and
Israel. Zawahiri stresses the importance of having a secure base in
Iraq from which to launch attacks elsewhere, including in the US
Homeland.
In Bin Ladin's recent audio tape, al-Qa'ida's top leader reaffirms
the group's commitment to attack our Homeland and attempts to reassure
supporters by claiming that the reason there has been no attack on the
US since 2001 is that he chose not to do so. This week's statement by
Zawahiri is another indication that the group's leadership is not
completely cutoff and can continue to get its message out to followers.
The quick turnaround time and the frequency of Zawahiri statements in
the past year underscore the high priority al-Qa'ida places on
propaganda from its most senior leaders.
Attacking the US Homeland, US interests overseas, and US allies--in
that order--are al-Qa'ida's top operational priorities. The group will
attempt high-impact attacks for as long as its central command
structure is functioning and affiliated groups are capable of
furthering its interests, because even modest operational capabilities
can yield a deadly and damaging attack. Although an attack using
conventional explosives continues to be the most probable scenario, al-
Qa'ida remains interested in acquiring chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear materials or weapons to attack the United
States, US troops, and US interests worldwide.
Indeed, today, we are more likely to see an attack from terrorists
using weapons or agents of mass destruction than states, although
terrorists' capabilities would be much more limited. In fact,
intelligence reporting indicates that nearly 40 terrorist
organizations, insurgencies, or cults have used, possessed, or
expressed an interest in chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
agents or weapons. Many are capable of conducting simple, small-scale
attacks, such as poisonings, or using improvised chemical devices.
Al-Qa'ida Inspires Other Sunni Jihadists. The global jihadist
movement also subsumes other Sunni extremist organizations, allied with
or inspired by al-Qa'ida's global anti-Western agenda. These groups
pose less danger to the US Homeland than does al-Qa'ida, but they
increasingly threaten our allies and interests abroad and are working
to expand their reach and capabilities to conduct multiple and/or mass-
casualty attacks outside their traditional areas of operation.
Jemaah Islamiya (JI) is a well organized group responsible for
dozens of attacks killing hundreds of people in Southeast Asia. The
threat of a JI attack against US interests is greatest in Southeast
Asia, but we assess that the group is committed to helping al-Qa'ida
with attacks outside the region.
The Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), which has allied itself with al-
Qa'ida, operates in Central Asia and was responsible for the July 2004
attacks against the US and Israeli Embassies in Uzbekistan.
The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) was formed to establish an
Islamic state in Libya, but since the late 1990s it has expanded its
goals to include anti-Western jihad alongside al-Qa'ida. LIFG has
called on Muslims everywhere to fight the US In Iraq.
Pakistani militant groups--primarily focused on the Kashmir
conflict represent a persistent threat to regional stability and US
interests in South Asia and the Near East. They also pose a potential
threat to our interests worldwide. Extremists convicted in Virginia in
2003 of providing material support to terrorism trained with a
Pakistani group, Lashkar-i-Tayyiba, before 9/11.
New Jihadist Networks and Cells. An important part of al-Qa'ida's
strategy is to encourage a grassroots uprising of Muslims against the
West. Emerging new networks and cells--the third element of the global
jihadist threat reflect aggressive jihadist efforts to exploit feelings
of frustration and powerlessness in some Muslim communities, and to
fuel the perception that the US is anti-Islamic . Their rationale for
using terrorism against the US and establishing strict Islamic
practices resonates with a small subset of Muslims. This has led to the
emergence of a decentralized and diffused movement, with minimal
centralized guidance or control and numerous individuals and small
cells--like those who conducted the May 2003 bombing in Morocco, the
March 2004 bombings in Spain, and the July 2005 bombings in the UK.
Members of these groups have drawn inspiration from al-Qa'ida but
appear to operate on their own.
Such unaffiliated individuals, groups and cells represent a
different threat than that of a defined organization. They are harder
to spot and represent a serious intelligence challenge.
Regrettably, we are not immune from the threat of such
``homegrown'' jihadist cells. A network of Islamic extremists in Lodi,
California, for example, maintained connections with Pakistani militant
groups, recruited US citizens for training at radical Karachi
madrassas, sponsored Pakistani citizens for travel to the US to work at
mosques and madrassas, and according to FBI information, allegedly
raised funds for international jihadist groups. In addition, prisons
continue to be fertile recruitment ground for extremists who try to
exploit converts to Islam.
Impact of Iraq on Global Jihad. Should the Iraqi people prevail in
establishing a stable political and security environment, the jihadists
will be perceived to have failed and fewer jihadists will leave Iraq
determined to carry on the fight elsewhere. But, we assess that should
the jihadists thwart the Iraqis' efforts to establish a stable
political and security environment, they could secure an operational
base in Iraq and inspire sympathizers elsewhere to move beyond rhetoric
to attempt attacks against neighboring Middle Eastern nations, Europe,
and even the United States. The same dynamic pertains to al-Zarqawi.
His capture would deprive the movement of a notorious leader, whereas
his continued acts of terror could enable him to expand his following
beyond his organization in Iraq much as Bin Ladin expanded al-Qa'ida in
the 1990s.
Impact of the Islamic Debate. The debate between Muslim extremists
and moderates also will influence the future terrorist environment, the
domestic stability of key US partners, and the foreign policies of
governments throughout the Muslim world. The violent actions of global
jihadists are adding urgency to the debate within Islam over how
religion should shape government. Growing internal demands for reform
in many Muslim countries further stimulate this debate. In general,
Muslims are becoming more aware of their Islamic identity, leading to
growing political activism; but this does not necessarily signal a
trend toward radicalization. Most Muslims reject the extremist message
and violent agendas of the global jihadists. Indeed, as Muslims endorse
democratic principles of freedom, equality, and the rule of law and a
role for their religious beliefs in building better futures for their
communities, there will be growing opportunities for countering a
jihadist movement that only promises more authoritarianism, isolation,
and economic stagnation.
EXTREMISM AND CHALLENGES TO EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE AND LEGITIMACY IN IRAQ
AND AFGHANISTAN
The threat from extremism and anti-Western militancy is especially
acute in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In discussing Iraq, I'd like to offer a ``balance sheet'' to give a
sense of where I see things today and what I see as the trends in 2006.
Bold, inclusive leadership will be the critical factor in establishing
an Iraqi constitutional democracy that is both viable as a nation-state
and responsive to the diversity of Iraq's regions and people.
Let me begin with some of these encouraging developments before
turning to the challenges:
The insurgents have not been able to establish any lasting
territorial control; were unable to disrupt either of the two national
elections held this year or the Constitutional referendum; have not
developed a political strategy to attract popular support beyond their
Sunni Arab base; and have not shown the ability to coordinate
nationwide operations.
Iraqi security forces are taking on more demanding
missions, making incremental progress toward operational independence,
and becoming more capable of providing the kind of stability Iraqis
deserve and the economy needs in order to grow.
Signs of open conflict between extreme Sunni jihadists and
Sunni nationalist elements of the insurgency, while so far still
localized, are encouraging and exploitable. The jihadists' heavy-handed
activities in Sunni areas in western Iraq have caused tribal and
nationalist elements in the insurgency to reach out to the Baghdad
government for support.
Large-scale Sunni participation in the last elections has
provided a first step toward diminishing Sunni support for the
insurgency. There appears to be a strong desire among Sunnis to explore
the potential benefits of political participation.
But numerous challenges remain.
The Insurgency and Iraqi Security Forces
Iraqi Sunni Arab disaffection is the primary enabler of the
insurgency and is likely to remain high in 2006. Even if a broad,
inclusive national government emerges, there almost certainly will be a
lag time before we see a dampening effect on the insurgency. Insurgents
continue to demonstrate the ability to recruit, supply, and attack
Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces, and their leaders continue to
exploit Islamic themes, nationalism, and personal grievances to fuel
opposition to the government and to recruit more fighters.
The most extreme Sunni jihadists, such as those fighting with
Zarqawi, will remain unreconciled and continue to attack Iraqis and
Coalition forces. These extreme Sunni jihadist elements, a subset of
which are foreign fighters, constitute a small minority of the overall
insurgency, but their use of high-profile suicide attacks gives them a
disproportionate impact. The insurgents' use of increasingly lethal
improvised explosive devices (LEDs), and the IED makers' adaptiveness
to Coalition countermeasures, remain the most significant day-to-day
threat to Coalition forces, and a complex challenge for the
Intelligence Community.
Iraqi Security Forces require better command and control mechanisms
to improve their effectiveness and are experiencing difficulty in
managing ethnic and sectarian divides among their units and personnel.
Sunni Political Participation
A key to establishing effective governance and security over the
next 3 to 5 years is enhanced Sunni Arab political participation and a
growing perception among Sunnis that the political process is
addressing their interests. Sunnis will be focused on obtaining what
they consider their demographically appropriate share of leadership
positions in the new government--especially on the Constitutional
Review Commission. Debates over federalism, central versus local
control, and division of resources are likely to be complex. Success in
satisfactorily resolving them will be key to advancing stability and
prospects for a unified country. Although the Kurds and Shia have been
accommodating to the underrepresented Sunnis in 2005, their desire to
protect core interests--such as regional autonomy and de-
Ba'thification--could make further compromise more difficult.
In the aftermath of the December elections, virtually all of the
Iraq parties are seeking to create a broad-based government, but all
want it to be formed on their terms. The Shia and the Kurds will be the
foundation of any governing coalition, but it is not yet clear to us
whether they will include the main Sunni factions, particularly the
Iraqi Consensus Front, or other smaller and politically weaker secular
groups, such as Ayad Allawi's Iraqi National List. The Sunni parties
have significant expectations for concessions from the Shia and Kurds
in order to justify their participation and avoid provoking more
insurgent violence directed against Sunni political leaders.
Governance and Reconstruction
During the coming year, Iraq's newly elected leadership will face a
daunting set of governance tasks. The creation of a new, permanent
government and the review of the Constitution by early summer will
offer opportunities to find common ground and improve the effectiveness
and legitimacy of the central government. There is a danger, however,
that political negotiations and dealmaking will prove divisive. This
could obstruct efforts to improve government performance, extend
Baghdad's reach throughout the country, and build confidence in the
democratic political process.
Let me focus on one of those tasks--the economy. Restoration of
basic services and the creation of jobs are critical to the well-being
of Iraqi citizens, the legitimacy of the new government, and,
indirectly, to eroding support for the insurgency. At this point,
prospects for economic development in 2006 are constrained by the
unstable security situation, insufficient commitment to economic
reform, and corruption. Iraq is dependent on oil revenues to fund the
government, so insurgents continue to disrupt oil infrastructure,
despite the fielding of new Iraqi forces to protect it. Insurgents also
are targeting trade and transportation. Intelligence has a key role to
play in combating threats to pipelines, electric power grids, and
personal safety.
Afghanistan
Like Iraq, Afghanistan is a fragile new democracy struggling to
overcome deep-seated social divisions, decades of repression, and acts
of terrorism directed against ordinary citizens, officials, foreign aid
workers, and Coalition forces. These and other threats to the Karzai
government also threaten important American interests--ranging from the
defeat of terrorists who find haven along the Afghanistan-Pakistan
border to the suppression of opium production.
Afghan leaders face four critical challenges: containing the
insurgency, building central government capacity and extending its
authority, further containing warlordism, and confronting pervasive
drug criminality.
Intelligence is needed to assist, monitor, and protect Afghan,
Coalition, and NATO efforts in all four endeavors.
The volume and geographic scope of attacks increased last year, but
the Taliban and other militants have not been able to stop the
democratic process or expand their support base beyond Pashtun areas of
the south and east. Nevertheless, the insurgent threat will impede the
expansion of Kabul's writ, slow economic development, and limit
progress in counternarcotics efforts.
Ultimately, defeating the insurgency will depend heavily on
continued international aid; effective Coalition, NATO, and Afghan
government security operations to prevent the insurgency from gaining a
stronger foothold in some Pashtun areas; and the success of the
government's reconciliation initiatives.
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND STATES OF KEY CONCERN:
IRAN AND NORTH KOREA
The ongoing development of dangerous weapons and delivery systems
constitutes the second major threat to the safety of our nation, our
deployed troops, and our allies. We are most concerned about the threat
and destabilizing effect of nuclear proliferation. We are also
concerned about the threat from biological agents--or even chemical
agents, which would have psychological and possibly political effects
far greater than their actual magnitude. Use by nation-states can still
be constrained by the logic of deterrence and international control
regimes, but these constraints may be of little utility in preventing
the use of mass effect weapons by rogue regimes or terrorist groups.
The time when a few states had monopolies over the most dangerous
technologies has been over for many years. Moreover, our adversaries
have more access to acquire and more opportunities to deliver such
weapons than in the past. Technologies, often dual-use, move freely in
our globalized economy, as do the scientific personnel who design them.
So it is more difficult for us to track efforts to acquire those
components and production technologies that are so widely available.
The potential dangers of proliferation are so grave that we must do
everything possible to discover and disrupt attempts by those who seek
to acquire materials and weapons.
We assess that some of the countries that are still pursuing WMD
programs will continue to try to improve their capabilities and level
of self-sufficiency over the next decade. We also are focused on the
potential acquisition of such nuclear, chemical, and/or biological
weapons--or the production technologies and materials necessary to
produce them by states that do not now have such programs, terrorist
organizations like al-Qa'ida and by criminal organizations, alone or
via middlemen.
We are working with other elements of the US Government regarding
the safety and security of nuclear weapons and fissile material,
pathogens, and chemical weapons in select countries.
Iran and North Korea: States of Highest Concern
Our concerns about Iran are shared by many nations, by the IAEA,
and of course, Iran's neighbors.
Iran conducted a clandestine uranium enrichment program for nearly
two decades in violation of its IAEA safeguards agreement, and despite
its claims to the contrary, we assess that Iran seeks nuclear weapons.
We judge that Tehran probably does not yet have a nuclear weapon and
probably has not yet produced or acquired the necessary fissile
material. Nevertheless, the danger that it will acquire a nuclear
weapon and the ability to integrate it with the ballistic missiles Iran
already possesses is a reason for immediate concern. Iran already has
the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East, and
Tehran views its ballistic missiles as an integral part of its strategy
to deter--and if necessary retaliate against forces in the region,
including US forces.
As you are aware, Iran is located at the center of a vital--and
volatile--region, has strained relations with its neighbors, and is
hostile to the United States, our friends, and our values. President
Ahmadi-Nejad has made numerous unacceptable statements since his
election, hard-liners have control of all the major branches and
institutions of government, and the government has become more
effective and efficient at repressing the nascent shoots of personal
freedom that had emerged in the late 1990s and earlier in the decade.
Indeed, the regime today is more confident and assertive than it
has been since the early days of the Islamic Republic. Several factors
work in favor of the clerical regime's continued hold on power. Record
oil and other revenue is permitting generous public spending, fueling
strong economic growth, and swelling financial reserves. At the same
time, Iran is diversifying its foreign trading partners. Asia's share
of Iran's trade has jumped to nearly match Europe's 40-percent share.
Tehran sees diversification as a buffer against external efforts to
isolate it.
Although regime-threatening instability is unlikely, ingredients
for political volatility remain, and Iran is wary of the political
progress occurring in neighboring Iraq and Afghanistan. Ahmadi-Nejad's
rhetorical recklessness and his inexperience on the national and
international stage also increase the risk of a misstep that could spur
popular opposition, especially if more experienced conservatives cannot
rein in his excesses. Over time, Ahmadi-Nejad's populist economic
policies could--if enacted--deplete the government's financial
resources and weaken a structurally flawed economy. For now, however,
Supreme Leader Khamenei is keeping conservative fissures in check by
balancing the various factions in government.
Iranian policy toward Iraq and its activities there represent a
particular concern. Iran seeks a Shia-dominated and unified Iraq but
also wants the US to experience continued setbacks in our efforts to
promote democracy and stability. Accordingly, Iran provides guidance
and training to select Iraqi Shia political groups and weapons and
training to Shia militant groups to enable anti-Coalition attacks.
Tehran has been responsible for at least some of the increasing
lethality of anti-Coalition attacks by providing Shia militants with
the capability to build IEDs with explosively formed projectiles
similar to those developed by Iran and Lebanese Hizballah.
Tehran's intentions to inflict pain on the United States in Iraq
has been constrained by its caution to avoid giving Washington an
excuse to attack it, the clerical leadership's general satisfaction
with trends in Iraq, and Iran's desire to avoid chaos on its borders.
Iranian conventional military power constitutes the greatest
potential threat to Persian Gulf states and a challenge to US
interests. Iran is enhancing its ability to project its military power
in order to threaten to disrupt the operations and reinforcement of US
forces based in the region--potentially intimidating regional allies
into withholding support for US policy toward Iran--and raising the
costs of our regional presence for us and our allies.
Tehran also continues to support a number of terrorist groups,
viewing this capability as a critical regime safeguard by deterring US
and Israeli attacks, distracting and weakening Israel, and enhancing
Iran's regional influence through intimidation. Lebanese Hizballah is
Iran's main terrorist ally, which--although focused on its agenda in
Lebanon and supporting anti-Israeli Palestinian terrorists has a
worldwide support network and is capable of attacks against US
interests if it feels its Iranian patron is threatened. Tehran also
supports Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other groups in the Persian
Gulf, Central and South Asia, and elsewhere.
NORTH KOREA
North Korea claims to have nuclear weapons--a claim that we assess
is probably true--and has threatened to proliferate these weapons
abroad. Thus, like Iran, North Korea threatens international security
and is located in a historically volatile region. Its aggressive
deployment posture threatens our allies in South Korea and US troops on
the peninsula. Pyongyang sells conventional weapons to Africa, Asia,
and the Middle East, and has sold ballistic missiles to several Middle
Eastern countries, further destabilizing regions already embroiled in
conflict And it produces and smuggles abroad counterfeit US currency,
as well as narcotics, and other contraband.
Pyongyang sees nuclear weapons as the best way to deter superior US
and South Korean forces, to ensure regime security, as a lever for
economic gain, and as a source of prestige. Accordingly, the North
remains a major challenge to the global nuclear nonproliferation
regimes. We do not know the conditions under which the North would be
willing to fully relinquish its nuclear weapons and its weapons
program. Nor do we see signs of organized opposition to the regime
among North Korea's political or military elite.
GOVERNANCE, POLITICAL INSTABILITY, AND DEMOCRATIZATION
Good governance and, over the long term, progress toward
democratization are crucial factors in navigating through the period of
international turmoil and transition that commenced with the end of the
cold war and that will continue well into the future. In the absence of
effective governance and reform, political instability often
compromises our security interests while threatening new democracies
and pushing flailing states into failure.
I will now review those states of greatest concern to the United
States, framing my discussion within the context of trends and
developments in their respective regions.
MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
Middle East. The tensions between autocratic regimes, extremism,
and democratic forces extend well beyond our earlier discussion about
Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan to other countries in the Middle East.
Emerging political competition and the energizing of public debate on
the role of democracy and Islam in the region could lead to the opening
of political systems and development of civic institutions, providing a
possible bulwark against extremism. But the path to change is far from
assured. Forces for change are vulnerable to fragmentation and
longstanding regimes are increasingly adept at using both repression
and limited reforms to moderate political pressures to assure their
survival.
We continue to watch closely events in Syria, a pivotal--but
generally unhelpful--player in a troubled region. Despite the Syrian
military withdrawal from Lebanon last year, Damascus still meddles in
its internal affairs, seeks to undercut prospects for an Arab-Israeli
peace, and has failed to crackdown consistently on militant
infiltration into Iraq. By aligning itself with Iran, the Bashar al-
Asad regime is signaling its rejection of the Western world. Over the
coming year, the Syrian regime could face internal challenges as
various pressures--especially the fallout of the U.N. investigation
into the assassination of the former Lebanese Prime Minister--raise
questions about President Bashar al-Asad's judgment and leadership
capacity.
Syria's exit from Lebanon has created political opportunities in
Beirut, but sectarian tensions--especially the sense among Shia that
they are underrepresented in the govenunent--and Damascus's meddling
persist. Bombings since March targeting anti-Syria politicians and
journalists have fueled sectarian animosities.
Egypt held Presidential and legislative elections for the first
time with multiple Presidential candidates in response to internal and
external pressures for democratization. The Egyptian public, however,
remains discontented by economic conditions, the Arab-Israeli problem,
the US presence in Iraq, and insufficient political freedoms.
Saudi Arabia's crackdown on al-Qa'ida has prevented major terrorist
attacks in the Kingdom for more than a year and degraded the remnants
of the terror network's Saudi-based leadership, manpower, access to
weapons, and operational capability. These developments, the Kingdom's
smooth leadership transition and high oil prices have eased, but not
eliminated, concerns about stability.
HAMAS' performance in last week's election ushered in a period of
great uncertainty as President Abbas, the Israelis, and the rest of the
world determine how to deal with a majority party in the Palestinian
Legislative Council that conducts and supports terrorism and refuses to
recognize or negotiate with Israel. The election, however, does not
necessarily mean that the search for peace between Israel and the
Palestinians is halted irrevocably. The vote garnered by HAMAS may have
been cast more against the Fatah government than for the HAMAS program
of rejecting Israel. In any case, HAMAS now must contend with
Palestinian public opinion that has over the years has supported the
two-state solution.
SOUTH ASIA
Many of our most important interests intersect in Pakistan. The
nation is a frontline partner in the war on terror, having captured
several al-Qa'ida leaders, but also remains a major source of extremism
that poses a threat to Musharraf, to the US, and to neighboring India
and Afghanistan. Musharraf faces few political challenges in his dual
role as President and Chief of Army Staff, but has made only limited
progress moving his country toward democracy. Pakistan retains a
nuclear force outside the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons and not subject to full-scope IAEA safeguards and has been both
recipient and source--via A.Q. Khan's proliferation activities--of
nuclear weapons-related technologies. Pakistan's national elections
scheduled for 2007 will be a key benchmark to determine whether the
country is continuing to make progress in its democratic transition.
Since India and Pakistan approached the brink of war in 2002, their
peace process has lessened tensions and both appear committed to
improving the bilateral relationship. A number of confidence-building
measures, including new transportation links, have helped sustain the
momentum. Still, the fact that both have nuclear weapons and missiles
to deliver them entails obvious and dangerous risks of escalation.
EURASIA
In Russia, President Putin's drive to centralize power and assert
control over civil society, growing state control over strategic
sectors of the economy, and the persistence of widespread corruption
raise questions about the country's direction. Russia could become a
more inward-looking and difficult interlocutor for the United States
over the next several years. High profits from exports of oil and gas
and perceived policy successes at home and abroad have bolstered
Moscow's confidence.
Russia probably will work with the United States on shared
interests such as counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and
counterproliferation. However, growing suspicions about Western
intentions and Moscow's desire to demonstrate its independence and
defend its own interests may make it harder to cooperate with Russia on
areas of concern to the United States.
Now, let me briefly examine the rest of post Soviet Eurasia where
the results in the past year have been mixed.
Many of the former Soviet republics are led by autocratic, corrupt,
clan-based regimes whose political stability is based on different
levels of repression; yet, at the same time, we have seen in Georgia,
Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan the emergence of grassroots forces for change.
Central Asia remains plagued by political stagnation and
repression, rampant corruption, widespread poverty and widening socio-
economic inequalities, and other problems that nurture nascent radical
sentiment and terrorism. In the worst, but not implausible case,
central authority in one or more of these states could evaporate as
rival clans or regions vie for power--opening the door to an expansion
of terrorist and criminal activity on the model of failed states like
Somalia and, when it was under Taliban rule, Afghanistan.
LATIN AMERICA
A gradual consolidation and improvement of democratic institutions
is the dominant trend in much of Latin America. By the year's end, ten
countries will have held Presidential elections and none is more
important to US interests than the contest in Mexico in July. Mexico
has taken advantage of NAFTA and its economy has become increasingly
integrated with the US and Canada. Committed democrats in countries
like Brazil and Chile are promoting economic growth and poverty
alleviation. And despite battling persistent insurgent and paramilitary
forces with considerable success, Colombia remains committed to keeping
on a democratic path. Nonetheless, radical populist figures in some
countries advocate statist economic policies and show little respect
for democratic institutions.
In Venezuela, President Chavez, if he wins reelection later this
year, appears ready to use his control of the legislature and other
institutions to continue to stifle the opposition, reduce press
freedom, and entrench himself through measures that are technically
legal, but which nonetheless constrict democracy. We expect Chavez to
deepen his relationship with Castro (Venezuela provides roughly two-
thirds of that island's oil needs on preferential credit terms). He
also is seeking closer economic, military, an d diplomatic ties with
Iran and North Korea. Chavez has scaled back counternarcotics
cooperation with the US.
Increased oil revenues have allowed Chavez to embark on an activist
foreign policy in Latin America that includes providing oil at
favorable repayment rates to gain allies, using newly created media
outlets to generate support for his Bolivarian goals, and meddling in
the internal affairs of his neighbors by backing particular candidates
for elective office.
In Bolivia, South America's poorest country with the hemisphere's
highest proportion of indigenous people, the victory of Evo Morales
reflects the public's lack of faith in traditional political parties
and institutions. Since his election he appears to have moderated his
earlier promises to nationalize the hydrocarbons industry and cease
coca eradication. But his administration continues to send mixed
signals regarding its intentions.
Haiti's interim government is the weakest in the hemisphere and the
security climate could continue to deteriorate due to slum gang
violence. A failure to renew the U.N. mandate would greatly increase
the risk of a complete nationwide breakdown of public order,
intensifying migration pressures. The perception among would-be
migrants that the US migration policy is tough is the most important
factor in deterring Haitians from fleeing their country.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
Southeast Asia includes vibrant, diverse, and emerging democracies
looking to the Unit
