DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY INTELLIGENCE AND BORDER SECURITY:
DELIVERING OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
INFORMATION SHARING, AND
TERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 28, 2006
__________
Serial No. 109-89
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Loretta Sanchez, California
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Norman D. Dicks, Washington
John Linder, Georgia Jane Harman, California
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Tom Davis, Virginia Nita M. Lowey, New York
Daniel E. Lungren, California Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Columbia
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Zoe Lofgren, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Katherine Harris, Florida Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Islands
Dave G. Reichert, Washington Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Michael T. McCaul, Texas James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION SHARING, AND TERRORISM RISK
ASSESSMENT
Rob Simmons, Connecticut, Chairman
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Zoe Lofgren, California
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Loretta Sanchez, California
Daniel E. Lungren, California Jane Harman, California
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Nita M. Lowey, New York
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
(II)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENT
The Honorable Rob Simmons, a Representative in Congress For the
State of Connecticut, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk
Assessment..................................................... 1
The Honorable Zoe Lofgren, a Representative in Congress For the
State of California and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Intelligence, Informaton Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment 2
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
For the State of Mississippi, (ex officio)..................... 4
The Honorable Mark E. Souder, a Representative in Congress For
the State of Indiana........................................... 12
The Honorable Jim Gibbons, a Representative in Congress For the
State of Nevada................................................ 16
The Honorable Jane Harman, a Representative in Congress For the
State of California............................................ 20
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey, a Representative in Congress For the
State of New York.............................................. 38
WITNESSES
Panel I
Mr. Charles E. Allen, Chief Intelligence Officer, Office of
Intelligence and Analysis, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Panel II
Mr. L. Thomas Bortmes, Director, Office of Intelligence, Customs
and Border Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 31
Prepared Statement............................................. 33
Ms. Cynthia O'Connell, Acting Director, Office of Intelligence,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 27
Prepared Statement............................................. 29
Mr. James Sloan, Assistant Commandant for Intelligence, U.S.
Coast Guard, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 22
Prepared Statement............................................. 23
Panel III
Mr. Michael W. Cutler, Fellow Center for Immigration Studies:
Oral Staement.................................................. 44
Prepared Statement............................................. 46
Mr. Michael O'Hanlon, Senior in Foreign Policy Studies, Brookings
Institution:
Oral Statement................................................. 48
Prepared Statement............................................. 49
Questions for the Record
Questions from Representative Rob Simmons for Assistant Secretary
Charles Allen.................................................. 60
DHS INTELLIGENCE AND BORDER SECURITY: DELIVERING OPERATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
----------
Wednesday, June 28, 2006
House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information .
Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Rob Simmons
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Simmons, Souder, Gibbons, Dent,
Lofgren, Harman, Lowey and Thompson (ex officio).
Mr. Simmons. A quorum being present, the Committee on
Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information
Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment will come to order.
Today the subcommittee meets to hear testimony on the
Department of Homeland Security's border security intelligence
operations. One of the Department's primary jobs is to secure
the homeland against the illegal entry of people, goods and
illicit materials. The 9/11 Commission wrote in their
comprehensive study, and I quote, targeting travel is at least
as powerful a weapon against terrorists as targeting their
money. The United States should combine terrorist travel
intelligence, operations and law enforcement in a strategy to
intercept terrorists, fine terrorist travel facilitators and
constrain terrorist mobility.
DHS works to do this through the hard work of people,
through U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement and the United States Coast Guard, among
others in the intelligence and law enforcement communities. But
as we all know, thousands of people illegally stream across our
international borders.
The 9/11 Commission estimated that annually approximately
500,000 people enter this country illegally, without
inspection, and overstay their legal welcome. Many come for
opportunities that America provides, and we understand that,
but others have a more sinister intent. In order to better
protect our borders, we need to know who is attempting to
cross, and what are they bringing into this country, and why.
Our border immigration and Coast Guard officials protect
more than 5,000 miles of the border with Canada, 1,900 miles of
border with Mexico, and approximately 12,400 miles of shoreline
east and west. To protect this vast international border,
intelligence-driven operations will be the key to targeting and
interdicting these threats before their arrival.
On a typical day Federal officials will apprehend over
3,000 people trying to cross between ports of entry, and on a
typical day will intercept one person for terrorism or national
security-related reasons. These apprehensions net fraudulent
documents and seemingly innocuous pocket litter, both of which
can have tremendous intelligence value. Therefore, DES
frontline operators must have the tools, the training,
capability and processes in place to weave the information from
these everyday encounters into a comprehensive intelligence
picture.
In addition to those who try to cross our borders
illegally, on a typical day approximately 1,200,000 people and
passengers arrive at our ports of entry, and approximately
80,000 shipments of goods arrive for approved entry. Nothing
wrong with this, we want to encourage this. And we must make
sure that this lawful travel and lawful commercial activity
proceeds efficiently, without undue delay, while focusing again
on those who deserve additional scrutiny. It is a daunting but
necessary task.
Today we will hear from Charlie Allen, the Chief
Intelligence Officer of the Department of Homeland Security,
who will give an overall perspective of the Department's
strategic intelligence efforts and his support to DHS
operational components. Again, welcome, Mr. Allen. This task is
a huge task and a new task for United States as Americans.
Next we will hear from the Coast Guard, the Customs and
Border Patrol and the ICE on how they incorporate intelligence
into their operations, and on how the Office of Intelligence
and Analysis is supporting their efforts.
And then finally, our third panel will consistent of Mr.
Michael W. Cutler from the Center for Immigration Studies, and
Mr. Michael O'Hanlon from the Brookings Institute, who will
provide the subcommittee with their perspective on how
intelligence can best be used to secure and control America's
borders.
Mr. Simmons. The Chair is now happy to recognize the
Ranking Member of the subcommittee, the gentlelady from
California, Ms. Lofgren for her opening statement.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
While I am pleased that we are finally turning our
attention today to the question of intelligence and border
security, I must say, Mr. Chairman, this hearing and other
hearings the Republican leadership has scheduled in the next
few months are a day late and dollar short--correction, we are
6 years late and millions of dollars short.
President Bush took office in 2001, and this Congress has
been controlled by Republicans since 1995. The Senate, with one
exception, has had a majority of Republicans since 1995. The
Federal Government, charged with making and enforcing the laws
of this Nation, have been under the sole control of Republicans
for the last 6 years.
With complete control of legislation and enforcement of the
law for 6 years, you would think that a party that now calls so
vigor
[[Page 3]]
ously for border security and enforcement of immigration law
could have solved the problem of illegal immigration by now,
but, Mr. Chairman, the Republican Party seems to be all talk on
this subject.
Here is just a partial list of the failures presided over
by the Republican majority on illegal immigration.
Since 1996, when the Senate and the House were taken over
by the Republican Party, 5.3 million undocumented immigrants
came to the United States. Since 2003, when President Bush came
to power, over 2 million undocumented immigrants have entered
the United States.
In 2004, Congress enacted the Intelligence Reform Act, or
the 9/11 Act, which mandated an additional 2,000 Border Patrol
agents being hired over each of the next 5 years. But the
President's subsequent budgets and Congress have failed to
include adequate resources to implement the act. Indeed, the
President's fiscal year 2006 budget called for only 210
additional Border Patrol agents. In fiscal year 2006, the
Congress, with both House and Senate controlled by Republicans,
eventually funded only 1,000 additional agents.
The 9/11 Act also mandated an additional 800 immigration
enforcement agents over each of the next 5 years, and yet for
fiscal year 2006, the Congress funded only 350 additional
agents. The act also mandated an additional 8,000 detention
beds, but for fiscal year 2006, the Congress funded only 1,800
additional detention beds.
President Bush and the House Republicans continue to
underfund the Border Patrol. The President's fiscal year 2007
budget does not fully fund the authorized levels for the Border
Patrol.
During the Bush administration, Catch and Release has been
rampant, a program under which 12,000 undocumented immigrants
each month are apprehended from countries other than Mexico and
are released and allowed to live in the United States while
awaiting a deportation hearing, yet the Federal Government,
which is completely controlled by Republicans, 70 percent of
the OTMs are released into the interior with notices to appear
at a later date and are never heard from again.
According to the Washington Post, between 1999 and 2003,
work-site enforcement operations were scaled back 95 percent by
the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The number of
employers prosecuted for unlawfully employing immigrants
dropped from 182 in 1999 to only 4 in 2003. And fines collected
declined from $3.6 million to 212,000. In 1999, the United
States initiated fines against 417 companies; in 2004, it
issued fine notices to only three.
Next to nothing has been done to secure our northern border
at a time when 17 suspected terrorists were arrested in
Toronto, and there are reportedly 50 terrorist groups in
Canada. The millennium bomber was arrested as he attempted to
cross the northern border with explosives, and the
Congressional Research Service says that Canada is, quote, ``a
favored destination for terrorist groups as a safe haven,
transit point and place to raise funds.''
While the Republican leadership in Congress focuses on the
southern border, with 10,000 Border Patrol agents stationed
along a 2,000-mile border with Mexico, only one-tenth of that
amount is on the Canadian border, a border that is 2.5 times as
long as the Mexican border. Recent news stories state that
people drive, walk, sail, ski and sled across the northern
border all the time.
On December 16, 2005, all 219 House Republicans voting that
day opposed a proposal, the Democratic motion to approve border
security and immigration enforcement by fulfilling the 9/11
Commission's border security recommendations. The proposal
would have hired more border guards; ended the Catch and
Release practice by authorizing 100,000 additional detention
beds; and incorporated state-of-the art technology, including
cameras, sensors, radar satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles
in order to ensure 100 percent border coverage.
In 2005, all but one Republican voted against a
comprehensive Homeland Security proposal that would commit 41
billion to securing the Nation from terrorists, 6.9 million
more than the President's budget. In 2005, all but two
Republicans voted against an effort to add $284 million to an
emergency spending bill for securing the Nation's borders.
Mr. Chairman, there has been a lot of talk about
immigration these days, tough talk, but the pattern is talk and
not action. And I say this because I have been made aware that
there is a schedule--and this hearing, I think, is on that
schedule, and I was on a hearing last week that was part of
this schedule--to raise the issue of immigration, and I think
the Republican leadership has made it a political issue. There
was the hearing in the House Administration Committee last
week; this hearing today; on July 5th, the hearing from the
House International Relations subcommittee in San Diego, the
Senate Majority is on it; July-h, another hearing in Laredo,
Texas; mid-July a hearing, House Education and Workforce;
August 14th, Government Reform and the like.
So I am quite skeptical that this hearing on border
intelligence is more than talk. It seems to me this is just
another long list of the hearings held and planned by the
Republican-led Congress that does not lead to solutions to a
problem that the American public cares about, and I thank the
gentleman for recognizing me.
Mr. Simmons. Yes. And I think some of the items that you
have listed in your opening statement are just the reason why
we are having this hearing today, so that we can hear from our
Chief Intelligence Officer how he is working to incorporate the
various components of the Department of Homeland Security
intelligence to better address this important issue. And I
think we understand it is an important issue, and we look
forward to their testimony, and hopefully their statement of
progress in these difficult issues.
And now the Chair would like to recognize the distinguished
Ranking Member of the full committee Mr. Thompson of
Mississippi for any statement he would like to make.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Ranking
Member. I appreciate the opportunity to participate in this
hearing.
[[Page 5]]
Always nice to see my friend Charlie Allen. First day of
work he came by, and it has been a good relationship so far. I
appreciate you, Mr. Allen.
But for the sake of this hearing today, Mr. Chairman, we
really should have been talking about border intelligence 5
years ago after 9/11. If we had conducted oversight and border
intelligence during that time, we could focus legislation more
adequately on what our problems are now. More importantly, it
would have given us some meaningful starting point when taking
up border security legislation.
Essentially we have a bill pending now that is not informed
by what is known at the border. This Republican Congress passes
bill after bill--and I have five different bills that we have
passed on border security, Mr. Chairman--and nothing has
happened with them. If we are going to do top-notch border
intelligence, it is essential that we develop a risk-based
approach to border security.
The United States has 216 airports, 143 seaports, and 115
land border crossings that are official ports of entry.
Screening all the people and goods coming through these busy
ports is already an enormous resource challenge for the men and
women of the Department of Homeland Security. I have serious
concerns that they lack the resources necessary to obtain true
situational awareness at these locations, not to mention among
the many hundreds of miles of unguarded rural and remote border
locations.
As we know, the threat to our northern border was thrown
into sharp relief with the arrest of an apparent terrorist
sailor in Toronto. This administration has failed to adequately
secure our northern border by the fact that the northern border
is more than twice the length of the southern border, with only
one-tenth of the agents.
State, local and tribal law enforcement is uniquely
situated to help out with border intelligence where resources
are stretched thin. What I am hearing from police and sheriffs'
offices, however, worries me. When it comes to border security,
the Department should have an all-hands-on-deck attitude.
Instead, I hear CBP holds back information from local law
enforcement because they view locals as competitors. Some local
officers tell me that if they arrest someone coming over the
border illegally, CBP headquarters sees it as a black eye for
them.
Making matters worse, officers in northern border
communities have told me that they often receive more specific
and actionable information from their Canadian colleagues than
they do from the Department. Add to this the fact that border
security is a Federal responsibility, Mr. Chairman, and yet
this administration has passed the buck to State and local
authorities in some areas, relying on them to do its job,
without providing adequate support.
Whether it is a turf issue, a resource issue or something
else, this is unacceptable. CBP, ICE and the Coast Guard need
to adopt common and consistent practices to share information
with all their border security partners. While I had high hopes
for the Homeland Security information network as a key way to
communicate with State and locals, moreover, I am troubled
about a Department report yesterday that found that most
officers either don't trust it or don't think it contains much
useful information.
[[Page 6]]
This hearing, therefore, is both important and timely, Mr.
Chairman. This administration has dropped the ball on border
security by underfunding critical programs for recruiting
Border Patrol agents, leaving large planks of our border
vulnerable in not procuring sufficient detention beds.
Constructive and thoughtful Democratic amendments that seek to
fill these critical gaps have been rejected time and again, and
now we face a possible intelligence breakdown on our borders.
How we proceed from here will have a big impact both on how we
go about securing our border, and ensuring that our immigration
laws are fully enforced.
I welcome all the witnesses and look forward to your
thoughts on these critical issues. I yield back.
Mr. Simmons. I thank the Ranking Member for his comments,
and I agree with him completely. I think this hearing is
important, and I think it is timely. Other Members who are
present know that they can submit opening statements for the
record.
Mr. Simmons. We will move now to the first panel. The
Chairman calls the first panel, which is assembled; recognizes
Mr.Allen as our Chief Intelligence Officer of the Department--
of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, who reports
directly to Secretary Chertoff. In this role, he is responsible
for coordinating with the Intelligence Community and providing
guidance on Homeland Security intelligence issues.
Mr. Allen has a long and distinguished career in the U.S.
Intelligence Community, beginning in 1958, when he joined the
Central Intelligence Agency. He has subsequently held
assignments of increasing responsibility within that
organization, within the Office of Secretary of Defense, and he
has served his country in a variety of other capacities.
Mr. Allen, welcome. It is good to see you again. We look
forward to your testimony.
STATEMENT OF CHARLES E. ALLEN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, CHIEF INTELLIGENCE OFFICER,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Lofgren
and members of the committee. I am very grateful for the
invitation to speak to you today. I am also gratified to appear
alongside my colleagues from the United States Coast Guard;
Customs and Border Protection; and Immigration and Customs
Enforcement. As members of the Homeland Security Intelligence
Council, which I chair, they have been invaluable partners in
realizing the Secretary's vision of an integrated Department of
Homeland Security intelligence enterprise.
I have a very brief statement, and I would request that my
full statement be submitted for the record.
Providing intelligence support to border security is a
subject that I have devoted considerable time and energy during
my relatively short time as Chief Intelligence Officer of the
Department. One of my first actions was to launch an
intelligence campaign
[[Page 7]]
plan for border security. We began this process last October by
holding a border security intelligence conference that enabled
us to gain inputs from a wide range of Department of Homeland
Security and Intelligence Community partners.
Since then we have worked on two tracks. On one track, we
have taken concrete measures to deliver discrete, actionable
intelligence to the men and women securing our borders. And
although the need to protect sensitive sources and methods
precludes my discussing these measures in detail today, I can
tell you that members of my office have drawn on the extensive
experience in the Intelligence Community to help the Department
get full benefit from national collection assets, and that is a
process that was not evident before I came. We have changed
that substantially.
On the other track, we have been developing a phased
framework for sustainable intelligence support to border
security. Our overall approach is to bring national
intelligence to bear on the border, while at the same time
fusing intelligence from border and immigration activities into
an integrated threat picture, at first within individual
sectors, but eventually across the length of the borders. The
approach is consistent with ongoing operational efforts to push
the border outward and to build a layered defense extending
into the U.S. Interior.
As befits an office with department-wide responsibilities,
my office has focused its own staff resources on strategic
efforts, including the development of a department-wide
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance architecture;
establishing a border security analysis branch; and working
with interagency partners to coordinate and streamline Federal
intelligence efforts on the border.
Some of our efforts have had an indirect but strong effect
on the delivery of operational intelligence in support of
border security. Our plan for supporting State and local fusion
centers envisions deploying DHS personnel, including
intelligence officers, in a way that is most responsive to each
center's particular need, including augmenting border security
intelligence capabilities, if required.
Our work on enhancing the Homeland Security Information
Network, which will invigorate an important channel for sending
intelligence to and receiving information from the State and
local authorities.
Finally, my office's development of an information
architecture for the Department's intelligence enterprise will
promote faster information sharing and greater
interoperability, improving the delivery of operational
intelligence in support of border security.
In summary, my office has been an active and effective
advocate of intelligence support to border security, deploying
our department-wide perspective and authorities and the
particular skills of our officers on behalf of the entire DHS
intelligence enterprise.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Simmons. Thank you for that testimony.
[The statement of Mr. Allen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Charles E. Allen
Chairman Simmons, Ranking Member Lofgren, Members of the
Subcommittee,
Thank you for inviting me to speak with you about my role in
providing intelligence support to border security. The subject of
today's hearing is one to which I have devoted considerable time and
energy during my tenure as Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and
Analysis and Chief Intelligence Officer of the Department. I am
gratified to appear alongside my esteemed colleagues from the Coast
Guard, Customs and Border Protection, and Immigration and Customs
Enforcement. As members of the Homeland Security Intelligence Council,
which I chair, they have been invaluable partners in realizing the
Secretary's vision of an integrated DHS intelligence enterprise.
When I arrived last September, the Office of Intelligence and
Analysis already was leading a working group on intelligence
initiatives in support of the Secretary's Secure Borders Initiative, or
SBI. One of my first acts was to launch an Intelligence Campaign Plan
for Border Security, or ICP, which Deputy Secretary Jackson introduced
to General Michael Hayden, then the Deputy Director for National
Intelligence, on Sept. 27, 2005. We kicked off our planning efforts by
holding a DHS Border Security Intelligence Conference on 24-25 October,
2005. This conference, held in a secure facility, enabled us to gather
inputs from a wide range of DHS and Intelligence Community partners. It
proved highly valuable to our subsequent planning.
Among the needed improvements we identified as a result of the
conference were greater focus on strategic analysis; coordination and
integration of analytic efforts at both the tactical and strategic
levels; inclusion of DHS agent and inspector insight in collection and
exploitation activities; better-defined areas of responsibility for
information sharing; and dissemination of-and identified repositories
for-relevant information.
Since then, we have worked on two tracks. On one track, we have
taken concrete measures to deliver discrete, actionable intelligence to
the men and women securing our borders. I would be pleased to describe
some of these measures in a closed hearing, but the need to protect
sensitive sources and methods precludes my discussing them in detail in
this setting. What I can tell you is that my officers have drawn on
their extensive experience in the Intelligence Community to help ensure
that DHS gets full benefit from national collection assets.
On the other track, we have been developing a phased framework for
sustainable intelligence support to border security. Our overall
approach is to bring national intelligence resources to bear on the
border while at the same time fusing intelligence from DHS border and
immigration activities into an integrated threat picture-at first
within individual sectors, but eventually across the length of the
border. This approach is consistent with ongoing operational efforts to
push the border outward and build a layered defense extending into the
US interior. In addition we are maintaining focus on all of our borders
to include the Northern Border and maritime domain.
In the first phase of the ICP, covering fiscal years 2006 and 2007,
we will develop and implement a comprehensive strategy for collection
and analysis of border security intelligence. During this phase, we
will apply our intelligence resources and analytic focus in areas of
immediate need. Our research will be comprehensive covering a broad
range of topics associated with cross border violence with
subcategories of human, drug, weapons, contraband smuggling and
trafficking, transnational gangs, documentation fraud, and the violence
these topics spawn on the border. The research and assessments we
produce will include all agencies with responsibilities in these areas
of interest. We will start with the southwest border, progressing to
all borders based on threat assessments. We will review lessons learned
from the first phase and make any programmatic investments and
structural changes that flow from these findings. Finally, we will be
on a sustainable footing, allowing us to push the borders outward while
supporting interior enforcement.
I should point out that even though our planning efforts pre-date
the President's decision to deploy the National Guard to the border, we
are taking this deployment into account. We plan to collaborate with
the National Guard to ensure its intelligence capabilities are
integrated with the overall intelligence enterprise at the border,
filling in shortfalls and laying the foundation for the post-deployment
period.
As befits an office with Department-wide responsibilities, my
office has focused its own staff resources on strategic efforts. In the
area of collection and requirements, we are leading the development of
a Department-wide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
architecture that will serve as the central nervous system of DHS
intelligence. In the area of analysis and production, we have created a
border security branch that is focusing research and analysis on a
number of topics relevant to the border, including alien smuggling,
counter-narcotics, money laundering, transnational criminal gangs, and
identity theft and benefit fraud using travel documents. Finally, we
are deeply deeply engaged in efforts to coordinate and streamline
interagency intelligence efforts on the border, notably in El Paso,
where three valuable intelligence centers, run by elements of three
different Cabinet agencies, are exploring new ways to work together on
their common mission of securing the border.
I wish to highlight several efforts of the Office of Intelligence
and Analysis that will have an indirect, but powerful, effect on the
delivery of operational intelligence in support of border security.
First, my office has led the Department's development of a plan to
support state and local fusion centers across the country. Our plan
envisions deploying DHS personnel, including intelligence officers, in
a way that is most responsive to each center's particular need. If the
fusion centers in states along the border tell us they want particular
support in partnering with the federal government on border security,
we stand ready to deliver. Second, we have taken on the responsibility
for enhancing the Homeland Security Information Network, an important
channel for sending intelligence to, and receiving information from,
state and local authorities. Third, we are developing an information
architecture for the DHS intelligence enterprise in order to promote
faster information sharing and greater interoperability-characteristics
that undoubtedly will improve the delivery of operational intelligence
in support of border security.
In conclusion, I believe we have been an active and effective
advocate of intelligence support to border security, deploying our
Department-wide perspective and authorities and the particular skills
of our officers on behalf of the entire DHS intelligence enterprise. I
look forward to answering your questions.
Mr. Simmons. And in my opening statement I made reference
to the fact that we have a 5,000-mile border with Canada, an
undefended or demilitarized border with Canada; 1,900 miles of
border with Mexico, again, a demilitarized or undefended, in
some
[[Page 8]]
respects, border with Mexico; 12,400 miles of shoreline. This
geography presents a vast challenge.
I think back to my experience, my service in Asia, working
on the Great Wall of China, thinking about the logistics and
expense of creating such a great wall and then reflecting on
the fact for all that effort, it actually did not work; it did
not keep, if you will, the barbarian hordes from penetrating
that country.
So my point of view has always been very simply stated. We
need to be intelligent about how we control our border. We need
to focus and target our intelligence assets so we are at the
right place at the right time, doing the right things against
the right people.
Some of my colleagues, as you have heard from their opening
statements, give the impression that nothing has been done. Of
course, in the Intelligence Community it is often best not to
be on the front pages of the New York Times; I think we
understand that. But from your perspective, how have we been
focusing our intelligence assets to this problem, and what
successes do you feel that we have had over the last several
years--or at least since you have been in office, which is a
relatively short time?
Mr. Allen. Yes, Mr. Chairman. That is an excellent question
because this is a very difficult, multifaceted,
multidimensional threat, and trying to secure all those lengthy
borders is a very large challenge. But I think we have to do it
in a couple of ways. And my colleagues, who will speak later,
will speak on specific operational successes and programs on
which they are engaged.
What I see has been lacking is a good intelligence analytic
baseline to understand the threat thoroughly, to look at the
border holistically. We cannot break it into simply the legal
movement of goods and people, narcotics, human smuggling,
trafficking, contraband, potential of WMD being smuggled across
the border, terrorism, and illegal immigration. We have to look
at a secure border process.
Under the Homeland Security Act, the Secretary of Homeland
Security is charged with developing secure borders, and I think
we have to look at it in a way that we have not looked before.
One of the things that I have done since we have arrived is
establish a border security branch that is going to be quite
substantial in order to understand the threat, the drug
smuggling, the alien smuggling, and the financial transactions,
including money laundering. So we are going to have to take a
very strategic look at this problem that we have not done
previously.
The other issues that we have to bring to bear is all of
the capabilities of the national Intelligence Community on to
this problem. And there is a lot that can be done through the
various intelligence collection capabilities. I don't have the
power to collect intelligence, as the Chief Intelligence
Officer, although the DHS operating components can collect
information as part of their operational and law enforcement
duties. But I do have the right to develop the collection
requirements and priorities, which we are doing, and for the
first time we have a set of priorities which we would be happy
to talk about in a closed session.
We also are developing new capabilities within the GEOINT.
General Clapper, who just left NGA; there are things we have
done that are totally unprecedented within the area of other
intelligence collection capabilities. As I said in my opening
comments, we are developing an intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance plan to deal with border security, and working
very closely with General Maples over in the Department of
Defense, and General Cartwright at the Strategic Air Command.
All of these things we have done in the last 3 or 4 months. And
as I said, when I came in, we did not have an intelligence
campaign plan against the border. The Secretary and Deputy
Secretary of Homeland Security directed me to do so. And I
think we are in the opening stages of developing that overall
strategic picture and landscape. My colleagues will talk to you
in specific terms of successful operations.
I agree with you that we should have done more earlier, but
we are not at this vigorously. I have a weekly stand-up, and
believe me, those are rough stand-ups. Of all of my people--
Mr. Simmons. Mr. Allen, before my time runs out, in all of
these activities are you preserving and protecting civil
liberties and rights of people across our borders?
Mr. Allen. Absolutely. This is something of which we are
very concerned. Civil liberties and civil rights, privacies are
all taken carefully into account. Everything we are doing were
done under the careful scrutiny of my legal staff as well as--
and my colleagues can talk about their lawful activities. But
everything we do is absolutely lawful. And we certainly are
looking at special interest aliens from certain countries that
could have not only just alien smuggling, but perhaps terrorism
connections.
Mr. Simmons. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And it is good to see you, Mr. Allen. Certainly your
reputation in the Intelligence Community is a sterling one, and
I am glad that you are in the job that you have. However, as
you have only been there a short period of time, as we all
know, so would it be accurate to say that you have--obviously
no plan is ever completely done. Even when the plan is done, it
must be continuously updated, but would it be accurate to say
that you have completed the comprehensive DHS border
intelligence plan, including CBP, ICE and the Coast Guard, or
is that in progress still?
Mr. Allen. Congresswoman, that is still in progress. We are
still--in my view, we are only in midstream in getting that
overall plan together. I have seen a lot of vigor on the part
of the individual operating components, but we have to work
this as an integrated process. As you know, there are a number
of initiatives. There is a Southwest Counternarcotics Border
Strategy in which we are participating. It is a very layered
approach.
One of the things we are looking at is the information
flows and trying to ensure that as we acquire information, we
provide the information to the border--to the Customs and
Border Protection. And we obviously have to improve those
connectivities and the flow of information. We have a good deal
to do, but I have some good ideas on how to get this done.
Ms. Lofgren. I am sure that you do. Can you tell us, if you
know, why this wasn't done before you got here?
Mr. Allen. Well, I think the real issue is bringing the
Department together, bringing all these various agencies and
operating components together, many of which have somewhat
overlapping roles, but never ensuring there is a close
collaboration, integration.
[[Page 10]]
I meet every week with the gentlemen and ladies who will be
speaking later from the operating components, and we have 2
hours of just talking about how we can integrate our efforts
toward the borders and towards training together, developing
our analytic expertise together. And these are very tough
sessions, but we are getting things done.
Ms. Lofgren. As you know, 17 suspected terrorists were
recently arrested in Toronto, and there are reported--I don't
know if it is accurate--at least 50 terrorist groups in Canada.
And we know that the only reported terrorist caught at the
border was the millennium bomber arrested at the northern
border as he was--with explosives, and a Congressional Research
Service says that Canada is the favored destination for
terrorist groups as a safe haven, transit point and place to
raise funds.
Now, we have gone over that there are 10,000 Border Patrol
agents stationed along the 2,000-mile border with Mexico, and
we still have problems with illegal immigration with that level
of patrol, but only one-tenth of that amount is on the Canadian
border. That border is 2.5 times as long as the Mexican border.
And I know it would be incorrect to assume that those 1,000
agents are really on the job because it is a post position. If
you look at 24 hours a day, at any given time you have got
between 200 and 300 people on that whole border. And we have
had reports that people drive, walk, sail, ski, sled, crawl--
and probably a few other things--across the border with
impunity.
Does the comprehensive border plan that you are putting
together address that gaping hole in border and national
security?
Mr. Allen. Yes. Our intelligence campaign plan would also
include our northern border. We are very much concerned about
our northern border. I believe that Ambassador Negroponte spoke
indirectly to it in his hearing in front of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence when he did his worldwide threat. I
just met with Ambassador Negroponte and Stockwell Day, the
Minister of Public Safety up in Canada. We certainly have some
common interests. We are very impressed with what the Canadians
have done in dealing with extremism. But this is an issue, and
any nexus with the United States is of great concern to us. We
obviously need to ensure that we work at this much harder.
I just met with the head of the Border Patrol of Canada. We
and--the head of the Border Patrol is a woman. We have agreed
that we will work harder to look at issues where we should do
common cause to better secure our border.
The northern border is very different from the southern
border, and we need new tools, techniques and methods to help
make the border more secure.
Ms. Lofgren. Just before my time is up, do you think 200
Border Patrol agents on a 5,000-mile-long border is sufficient?
Mr. Allen. I think we need substantial resources on all our
land borders. And I am very impressed with what our U.S. Coast
Guards have done with our maritime borders. We obviously have
to spend a great deal of time and attention with our northern
border as well as our southern border.
I have spent time with our southern borders. I have just
made a very good trip to Mexico City where we had some very
strong dis
[[Page 11]]
cussions on how to work harder on particularly special-interest
aliens, people who might be involved in terrorism, and we are
getting good cooperation in the south.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up.
Mr. Simmons. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Indiana Mr. Souder.
Mr. Souder. First I would like to make a couple of brief
comments on the northern border. Clearly, coming from the
Midwest, I am concerned about the northern border, but it is a
little bit different than the southern border. One thing is we
work with the Canadians on harmonization of immigrationwise. I
have met teams along the border. They are taking down groups in
Canada, the millennium bomber himself, and working with the
RCMP.
We have had open testimony in this committee from Mr.
Garcia about the 10- to 12,000 that it usually takes to smuggle
a Hispanic across the southern border, and that there are areas
along the southern border where it is 30--to 35,000 to smuggle
a Middle Easterner. But since we have no real knowledge of what
is coming into Mexico, east, west or from the south, and they
don't have functional control of their country, and we don't
have functional control of our south border, that is partly why
we focus so much on the south border. We do need attention in
the north border, in fact, because so many Middle Eastern
natives in Canada and citizens of the U.S. live in Detroit and
Buffalo, Toronto and Montreal. That is clearly a pressure zone,
but it is not exactly the same as the south border.
I had a couple of questions. One is kind of simplistic, but
it has been an increasing frustration of mine. It seems like
often our agencies are spending more time meeting with each
other to try to coordinate their intelligence than trying to
figure out who the bad guys are.
I have a very simple question: Given that we will probably
never eliminate all stovepiping, and given the fact that so
many of the different intelligence subgroups have somewhat
different goals, in addition to terrorism they have a
multiplicity of goals and focusing on different things, what I
am wondering is if you are a border agent at any of the
official border crossings, and you have an ID and the name
comes up, is there a pop-up, just a signal? If the Department
of Defense doesn't want to share certain intelligence, if the
CIA doesn't want to share certain intelligence, if different
parts of DHS have different intelligence in all this that pops
up and says this is a person of interest, do we have enough
harmonization of our intelligence agencies that even if they
don't want to share the information, that if a name hits the
border system, a pop-up occurs?
Mr. Allen. I think--and I will let Customs and Border
Protection, Captain Bortmes, speak to that later, but I, having
visited the Border Patrol and spent time with it in two sectors
and traveled with Congressman Reyes to El Paso, I am convinced
that databases, as names are checked, those are done very
quickly and very efficiently. And believe me, having come from
the Central Intelligence Agency, there is no information if it
involves the security of the United States that can be withheld
by CIA or anyone else in getting that information. If it needs
to be sanitized and declas
[[Page 12]]
sified, that can be done if it deals with personalities of
interest to the Border Patrol.
Mr. Souder. So you are saying that you are confident that--
because I ran into a case in my area that we have. It was a new
category of people we are watching as opposed to our watch
list; in other words, they haven't done anything wrong, they
are not even a suspect, but they are doing certain behaviors.
You are confident that each branch of the government, that if
they have someone that they have some interest in, they may not
have an arrest warrant out, they may just be trying to trap
them, that all those names are in a system, in a computer
system, that if that person crosses a border entry, that some
warning will come up to say hold this person, here is the
agency you contact.
Mr. Allen. I am not confident that every database that has
a potential person of interest would be immediately available
to the Border Patrol. But the Border Patrol does have an
ability to check to see if there is a potential record that
would indicate that individual has engaged in something
nefarious or has connections with terrorism.
I think they do a good job. There are people turned away
every day at our borders. I am sure Mr. Bortmes can speak more
directly about this, but I do believe that this is improving.
Database management is a very hard problem for the U.S.
Government, and particularly for the U.S. Intelligence
Community.
Mr. Souder. Because this isn't a question of whether the
Border Patrol is doing their job, or CBP, this is a question
about is the information getting to them with which to do this
job, which I know we are pushing towards, but it is really hard
to get all these agencies to share complete information, and if
they won't share it, if they would at least share the name so
that people can get back to them.
I have one other question. How do you see AMO fitting in
Riverside? The maritime center.
Mr. Allen. Out in California?
Mr. Souder. Yes.
Mr. Allen. Well, we are working closely with AMOC, that is
a center there. We are providing them with strategic
information. Through our initiatives and building requirements,
we have provided them with data that they have never received
in the last 2 months. In fact, they say they are inundated with
some of the information that using national NTM systems that
they never had access before. So we are starting to make
progress. We are not where we should be, sir, but I am pushing
it every week.
Mr. Souder. Thank you. Because it is clear that the area
you are working in is the underpinnings of everything else we
do, because good intelligence and actionable intelligence is
how we are going to prevent things. Thank you for your work.
Mr. Simmons. I believe I just got a call for a vote, but we
have time for an additional--a couple of sets of questions, I
believe.
The Chair recognizes the Ranking Member Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Allen, are you aware of CBP being accused of holding
back information to local law enforcement agencies?
[[Page 13]]
Mr. Allen. No, sir, I am not. And I would--I will let Mr.
Bortmes answer that question when he appears on the second
panel. Unless it is for some reason sensitive law enforcement
case--investigative case information, one would think that
information would not necessarily be held back in ways that
would not be effective.
Mr. Thompson. So you would agree that the sharing of
information between agencies is a must, from an intelligence
standpoint.
Mr. Allen. It absolutely is. That is where I am--as you
know, Congressman Thompson, that is where I am spending a lot
of my time. We are putting people--Secretary Chertoff has just
approved my implementation plan for putting my officers out
with State fusion centers--and, in fact, I want to put them out
in every fusion center--in order to help both the sharing of
information from the national Intelligence Community down at
the lowest possible level to the local level.
Mr. Thompson. Can you give me our analysis of where CBP,
ICE and the Coast Guard is with regard to the common sharing of
intelligence with other State and local partners?
Mr. Allen. Well, I would defer to them, but we have
become--for State and local fusion centers, we have become--my
own office has become sort of the centerpiece, the executive
agent for the Department for the flow of information down to
State and local level. I am sure there is information shared at
the local level by all the operating components, and I should
let them speak directly to that.
Mr. Thompson. So your job will be to manage the fusion
center?
Mr. Allen. To ensure that there is a flow of information
down to the State fusion centers and to the major city fusion
centers. We are in the process of doing that and in the process
of deploying officers to those centers. We have deployed them
to Los Angeles, New York, Louisiana, Maryland, and we are
sending an officer to Georgia and to Virginia in the near
future.
Mr. Thompson. And the goal of those centers is to have some
common thread of intelligence available to all parties?
Mr. Allen. Yes, sir. Those are under State or city control.
And our job is to coordinate the flow of Federal information
down to those centers and to ensure that they have all the
information that they need in case there is some risk or danger
to that particular State or that particular city.
Mr. Thompson. Well, with respect to border intelligence,
will we have CBP and ICE agents in those fusion centers also?
Mr. Allen. That is a decision I think that the head of the
operating component must make. We certainly will have officers
from DHS there. They obviously, and JTTS, the Joint Terrorism
Task Force, that is managed by the FBI, and they are there in
many places, and they do a tremendous job in working and
sharing of information.
Mr. Thompson. If it was left up to you, would you have one
there?
Mr. Allen. I am not sure. I think that if we have the right
small number of officers there--and certainly officers from ICE
or CBP could come down to a fusion center working for the Chief
Intelligence Officers as part of his outreach to State and
local governments. I would like that very much. The Secretary
has designated
[[Page 14]]
me and my office as executive agent for the Department in the
flow of information to State and local governments.
Mr. Thompson. Well, since we are talking about border
intelligence--I will have some other questions, Mr. Chairman, I
will submit for the record.
Mr. Thompson. But, Mr. Allen, the only other question I
have for you is, are you aware of the IG report that came out
yesterday with respect to the Homeland Security Information
Network?
Mr. Allen. Yes, sir, I am aware of it. I have not read it.
I have asked my information management officer to send it to
me. The Homeland Security security network is run by the
operations director at the Department.
Mr. Thompson. But you also--there was some--well, you have
not seen it, but there are some weaknesses.
Mr. Allen. Yes. And one of the things that we have been
doing--and let me just say on the classified side we are doing
three things. One, on the Homeland Security Information Network
I have put in an intelligence portal for sensitive but
unclassified information to go to State and local governments.
We have run some experiments, and we have gotten good reception
on that.
Two, I took over a very broken Homeland Security
Information Network system. We have fixed that to almost every
State and fusion center.
And three, we are forming a Homeland Security data network,
which will be a more robust--a more robust classified network.
We are in the early stages of doing a pilot test on that. We
have every intention of doing that.
Very candidly, Mr. Thompson, we have been behind in our
information management, and I am not happy with it, and I know
that the Secretary isn't either.
Mr. Thompson. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Simmons. I thank the gentleman.
For the record, we have a motion to adjourn on the floor. I
will keep the hearing going. Ms. Harman is going to go vote and
return. I think there is adequate time for the gentlelady from
New York to ask her questions of Mr. Allen, and we will try to
keep this moving along.
Mrs. Lowey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And I thank you, sir, for your presentation. And I
particularly appreciate your focus on fusion centers.
I met with the head of the New York State Department of
Homeland Security just last week, and one of the points he
unfortunately shared with me is that the communication between
the Federal Government and the local officials in New York is
mediocre at best. So, number one, I would appreciate if you
would comment on that and what is being done to improve upon
it.
And secondly, there are three fusion centers, as you know,
in New York. There is one in Albany, there is New York City
Police Department, and there is one in Rockland County. I know
Westchester is in the process of putting one together, but
there isn't one now.
[[Page 15]]
I am very pleased that you talked about placing your people
in these fusion centers. Perhaps you can continue to expand on
that. How fast is this moving? Are you getting support for
doing that? Perhaps you can focus specifically on New York. I
happen to have an interest in it; it happens to be my district.
What is happening there? And if the New York State Department
of Homeland Security said there is inadequate communication,
what are you doing; what can you do; what will you do to
improve upon it?
Mr. Allen. Well, I thank you for the question because New
York City--New York State, and New York City in particular, has
been a focus right from the moment I arrived. I will soon have
three officers in New York City working with the Intelligence
Division and with the Counterterrorism Division. I have a
general liaison officer there now full time. We are going to
send up two very experienced all-sourc intelligence officers to
help in mentoring and teaching in New York City. Mr. David
Cohen and Larry Sanchez are very strong on this.
Mrs. Lowey. Didn't David originally come from New York?
Mr. Allen. Well, his wife is from Brooklyn. He came from
Boston. He still has a Bostonian accent. But he is a New
Yorker, he truly is. And up in Albany we have a UNYRIC where we
work very closely. And I have a team in UNYRIC this week. I
intend to put a full-time officer in UNYRIC, there is no
question about that. My principal deputy, I have an outsider,
Jack DiMaggio, who spends his full time working to get our
officers out to the various fusion centers.
Albany--at this stage we do not have plans to put anyone in
Rockland County, but we do have--we will put people in Albany.
And I respect that Homeland Security advisor. We are going to
improve our communications flows. When we have a threat into
New York, we always call the Homeland Security advisor. We call
him on the unclassified line if it is an open issue, but if it
is classified, we have secure communications. And Homeland
Security has made certain that the UNYRIC as well as New York
City has classified capabilities.
I have substantially augmented cryptographic capabilities
for New York City so that they can communicate with the Federal
Government. And on top of that, I am going to put in a secure
video for Commissioner Kelly up in New York City so that he can
dial in if he has a problem or a worry about something, we can
just sit and secure a video conference and discuss the threat.
Mrs. Lowey. Well, I personally, before I go and vote, want
to thank you for that, because Chairman King and I--I am not
sure, Chairman Simmons, whether you were with us at the time,
it was shortly after 9/11, and we went down there and met with
Commissioner Kelly, and it was clearly, good luck from the
Federal Government, he was on his own. And as you know, he has
established a counterterrorism network around the world. And I
have been with David Cohen and others visiting their system and
their various offices, and it really is impressive. They really
follow up on every single lead.
I just wonder, how many leads do you get from the Federal--
just on average, from the Federal Government coming down to
them, or
[[Page 16]]
are they really picking them up themselves through their own
networks?
Mr. Allen. Well, I think we get quite a number of threats
that relate to this country that flow in from overseas, and
obviously from the extraordinary capabilities of the FBI. Many
of these are not valid; we have to look at their credibility.
And this is something that goes on every day. New York City
also picks up suspicious activity, and they are very good at
informing us.
New York City is a model for doing counterterrorism, and we
learn from working with New York City it is a two-way street. I
have learned a great deal from working with Dave Cohen, a man
with whom I worked with at the CIA, as well as Mr. Sanchez. So
I think it is a mutual sharing of information. And Commissioner
Kelly has made it clear that he wants to work very closely with
the Department and with the operations that I direct.
Mrs. Lowey. I gather I have to vote, but let me just say
thank you very much. You have been on the job for how long now?
Mr. Allen. I have just arrived 9 months ago.
Mrs. Lowey. Well, I appreciate it. I remember on our other
committee it took 2-1/2 years out of 9/11 for an inspector
general to set up a computer system. So all these questions
that we have, why hasn't it been done, that is past, and I hope
that you can move as expeditiously as possible. And I know that
New York City will be grateful for your efforts.
One thing really impressed me as I visited these centers.
They follow up on every single lead, no matter how minor,
because you never know how minor it really is. So I thank you
very much for your important work, and I guess I had better
vote.
Mr. Allen. Thank you, Congresswoman. Believe me, New York
City is on my thoughts all the time. They ask me what worries
me always, and I am always worried about New York City. And I
am always sure to tell David Cohen I worry about it before I go
to sleep.
Mrs. Lowey. You keep worrying about it, because I have five
of my seven grandchildren living in New York City, plus two of
my three kids. So I worry about it morning, noon and night. And
hopefully we will continue to put all the appropriate
procedures in place. Continue to worry because that is the only
way we can make sure we are covered. And I thank you very much.
Mr. Allen. Thank you, ma'am.
Mr. Souder. [Presiding.] I assume this is done--and I am
not trying to get into specifics that would be classified, but
I assume that on a daily basis there is attempts to see where
our vulnerabilities are, where we are testing our border
crossings, where we are testing our ports, where we are testing
our airports, and you are checking to see where our holes are.
Is that a correct assumption?
Mr. Allen. That is correct. Whether it is terrorism from
abroad, al-Qa'ida, whether it is sort of global--inspired
homegrown terrorists that are looking for weaknesses. We see
alien smuggling networks and narcotraffickers always trying to
find new ways of getting across our borders, yes.
Mr. Souder. One of the concerns that I have is
historically--I chair the narcotics oversight committee
directly and have spent
[[Page 17]]
most of my career working with narcotics as well as the
Speaker's Drug Task Force, and came on here because, having
worked narcotics issues, it was a logical thing to move to
Homeland Security and border because they are so
interconnected, and their functions are interconnected--is that
often we are better at figuring out after some things happened
in explaining patterns rather than being able to prevent. And
it is much more difficult to try to put the little pieces of
the alphabet in the connection until you have actually had the
action. And yet the risk is so much higher even in Homeland
Security on one big tragic thing than kind of the daily
pounding we take on narcotics and other types of illegal
activity.
My question is, how much of the focus in the intelligence
gathering--is it the National Targeting Center? Who is
primarily trying to figure out when we do this, this is how
they may change? In other words, let's say we put a fence over
parts of the border. Where are they going to move next? Are we
going to squeeze them into the Caribbean, are we going to move
into the--if we control the Florida area, are they going to
move in where we don't have as much air surveillance between,
say, Galveston and the center of Florida? What if we do this
will move them more to the Canadian border? What will move them
to North Dakota as opposed to through the main border
crossings? Is that type of discussion occurring? Is it
interagency? How does it interrelate with the NORTHCOM and
SOUTHCOM and the JATFs?
Mr. Allen. And it is a very good question because--and I
will let my colleagues--again, Mr. Bortmes, Mr. Sloan and Ms.
O'Connell--talk particularly about the daily looking at
changing patterns.
My job--and I have here my Chief Threat Assessment
Officer--is to look at how these patterns change, working with
all sources of information from the traditional Intelligence
Community as well as from the operational components of
Homeland Security to try to focus very clearly on where things
have shifted because--and I am sure Mr. Sloan can tell you
about maritime patterns and how, as the Coast Guard increases
pressure in one area, the roots move to another.
I think we have to do this very, very systemically. I have
talked to Mr. John Walters, who heads their Office of Drug
Enforcement Policy, and he believes that we have to look at
this very holistically, and we have to stand back and get
strategic intelligence. If we simply follow the latest lead,
the latest tip, and just do tactical intelligence, we won't
understand it.
And your question is very much on target. We have to do
both; we have to do tactical operations, and we have to do
strategical analysis, otherwise we will never win this--and I
don't know if win is the right word--otherwise we will never be
successful in this struggle to secure our borders.
Mr. Souder. One of the challenges, when there was a lot of
focus on the Arizona border, we took resources from California
and Texas and moved them over. It is not clear that the groups
who are moving any kind of illegal traffic, whether it be
human, narcotics, terrorists or anything else, behave in zones
like we behave. While they may have certain syndicates that
control certain parts of those zones, they don't match up to
our sectors. And what clearly hap
[[Page 18]]
pened is we had an increase in activity in areas where we had
pulled out, and so the net reduction wasn't anything like
consolidating in one zone.
If we put the Guard on the border, if we fence certain
sections, I presume that as we are making those decisions, much
like--I mean, anybody knows who goes to San Ysidro, you can see
all the watchers. You can see the watchers on their side and
our side going back and forth, and the lane movements, and both
sides are watching that. And I would like to think that we are
increasingly doing that anticipation of what, if we do this,
the next move is going to be. And a lot of that is
intelligence-driven: Are we doing preventative intelligence as
well as reactive intelligence? And that is kind of the biggest
challenge that you have in the services.
One other question on NORTHCOM. They have been talking
about standing up more intelligence and coordination, whether
it is down at El Paso or up in Colorado. Do you know what the
status of that is? And do you have an opinion as far as how--
whether the Defense Department needs to get into more
aggressive intelligence on the border?
Mr. Allen. Well, let's just go back to proactive
intelligence activities and ways to do prevention. I think Mr.
Bortmes may talk about intelligence-driven activities or
operations on how we have tried to anticipate, if there is a
threat, to preempt people from entering and crossing our
borders who could have very nefarious plans.
The one thing that we are working on right now broadly
within the Intelligence Community as well as the Department of
Homeland Security is the issue of radicalization. We are also
working with State and local governments because we are finding
that the States are studying radicalization. What causes a
person to move from, say, a fundamentalist view of the world to
one of extreme, say, solipsism and where violence might be
created? How can you prevent that deterrence? How can you
engage in a policy of deterrence or a policy of preemption? So
we are working at that.
And my deputy for intelligence, who is not here, has formed
a Radicalization Working Group, and we work across the
community and across the Department.
On the NORTHCOM issue, that is very important. I'm getting
a NORTHCOM officer assigned directly to my office so we can
coordinate more. I met with Admiral Keating. I have met with
retired Captain Mike Knoll, who is a J-2 out there. It is clear
that they do wish to expand their energies and efforts to work
secure borders. They have had some issues getting all the
activities in which they want to undertake, but we are working
very closely with them, and they are expanding their energy on
border security.
Ms. Lofgren. Just real quickly. All of the terrorists who
attacked the World Trade Tower, the first attack and the
second, actually came in with visas through airports, not
across the land borders. Does your plan that you are working on
address that element?
Mr. Allen. The intelligence campaign plan is more focused
on securing the land borders in particular, both north and
south. We have come leaps and bounds since September 11th in
being able to control particularly the movement through the air
and our airports of entry. I believe the kind of programs that
are in place now and which are being improved is much greater.
I know that Mr. Sloan could talk about security at ports as
well as maritime and border intrusions. But what we have since
September 11 is a much harder country to enter illegally.
However, I am very concerned about the potential for "clean
skins" getting breeder documents, getting genuine documents,
say, in Western Europe and being able--as Director Mueller
might say--to be only an e-ticket away from entering the United
States. So we do worry about that.
Ms. Lofgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would yield
back so that my colleague from California can begin her
questions.
Mr. Simmons. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from
California, the distinguished Ranking Member of the
Intelligence Committee. Thank you.
Ms. Harman. Thank you for holding this hearing.
Welcome, Charlie. I just voted not to adjourn Congress. I
actually think there are some important things to do, and one
of them is to enact a comprehensive immigration reform
strategy. I realize you are not here testifying on that, but I
thought I would, until I collect myself, make a point, which is
that we do need stronger border enforcement at all of our
borders and not just our southern border. We surely need an
intelligence strategy to fit with border enforcement, because
most folks coming here are just looking for a better way of
life, they are not potential terrorists or criminals. But we
also need the rest of it, which is some fair and reasonable
suggestion for how to deal with 11--or 12 million people who
are already here. And I hope we will do both, and I think it
would be a huge mistake if some folks in this Congress prevent
us from doing both. So that is my rant. Now I have collected
myself.
And I know you have been asked that question about fusion
centers and some of the other issues that I care about, too. I
sort of want to approach this more philosophically, if I can,
and that is to get your sense, and I know you can give us your
sense because this is your background in what you do for a
living, of how critical the intelligence piece is to border
enforcement. If you get this right, and if the intelligence--if
the fusion centers work, and if information sharing actually
happens, what could we begin to see? And if you get it wrong
and there isn't information sharing, and the fusion centers
implode, and the intelligence products are bad, what could we
see?
Mr. Allen. I think a strong intelligence integrated
capability with law enforcement along with good policies and
good cooperation with our neighboring countries will make a
world of difference. I think intelligence can and should be a
major driver because, to me, to be able to understand the
threat, to focus in on those threats that are most worrisome to
us--and, as you said, it is not just the illegal workers. What
really worries us are the narcotraffickers, the alien smugglers
and, above all, special interest aliens, some of whom may be
coming here from Asia, the Middle East, South Asia, or Africa
as part of an extremist group.
If we get this right--and this is something that we are
working with Ambassador Negroponte. As you know, Ambassador
Negroponte served in Honduras, he served in Mexico City, he
knows some of the border issues very well, and we discussed it.
He looks to the intelligence-driven efforts that we are
conducting as very much part and parcel of the overall national
intelligence effort. Ambassador Negroponte, and I saw him last
night, is very determined to work with us on this issue.
Ms. Harman. Well, I agree with that. We call him Director
Negroponte, by the way, in the Intelligence Committee because
we think he has got to lead this endeavor and not just be an
ambassador. But that is a comment for the winds.
At any rate, I agree. And if we get it wrong, conversely,
the highest fences in the world, 3 million Border Patrol folks
I doubt will prevent us from being harmed by either the
criminal element or terrorist element because there is no such
thing--and I am asking a rhetorical question, but I assume you
agree with me, Charlie. But there is no such thing as 100
percent security anyway; is that correct?
Mr. Allen. That is absolutely correct. I talk about
stabilizing our borders. The term ``seal our borders'' is not a
phrase I use. I want stability on the borders so we can then be
able to focus on those real threats. And they are real threats,
and some that I see every day that give us great concern.
Ms. Harman. Well, I thank you for that. And, Mr. Chairman,
let me conclude by saying if we don't get the intelligence
piece right, we will never get border enforcement right,
period. And border enforcement obviously is more than the
Mexican and the Canadian borders. It is port security; it is
airport security; it is those folks who come in on cruise ships
to Catalina off the coast of California where there are no
border controls, and then take the ferry boat into San Pedro or
Long Beach, or pick another island in another location. None of
this will work if Charlie Allen doesn't succeed. So, no
pressure, Charlie, but please succeed.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Simmons. I thank the gentlelady for her questions and
her comments. And I share with her that I could not agree with
her more, that what we do intelligencewise on the border, how
we focus our intelligence assets is going to determine whether
or not we succeed; that we simply cannot put a policeman or a
soldier in every place for 12,000 miles. It simply won't work.
And in excusing our first panel, I would like to comment
again where he says ongoing operational efforts to push the
border outward and build a layered defense extending within the
United States. We talk about the border as a line in the sand,
but from an intelligence standpoint we are talking about
someone who may appear on the radar in Afghanistan, transit
Europe, show up on a ship or in Canada or in Mexico, and at
some point in that process we try to get a line on them so when
they hit the border, we can grab them, or when they cross the
border, they set off a trigger mechanism and ring a bell so
that subsequently we can get them within the United States.
So it is not a question of intelligence just at that point;
it is a question of intelligence in depth overseas and
intelligence follow-up within the continental United States,
again, within the framework of our civil liberties and our
rights.
[[Page 21]]
Thank you, Mr. Allen, for your testimony. And I would ask
the second panel to quickly gather. I know our Coast Guard
friends have some time constraints, but we want to pick their
brains. Thank you very much.
The second panel will be made up of what you might call the
operational components of intelligence at the border. We have
Mr. James Sloan, Assistant Commandant For Intelligence of the
U.S. Coast Guard, charged primarily with port security and
offshore security activities; Ms. Cynthia O'Connell, Acting
Director, Office of Intelligence, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement. And I think we all have an understanding of what
our Immigration and Customs folks are doing intelligencewise at
the border. And then lastly Mr. L. Thomas Bortmes, Director,
Office of Intelligence, Customs and Border Protection.
I welcome the three witnesses. I know they all have
prepared statements. We would appreciate it if they could
summarize the high points of their statements for no more than
5 minutes, allowing the Members to ask questions.
And why don't we start with the Coast Guard. Mr. Sloan, the
motto is Semper Paratus. Are you prepared?
STATEMENTS OF JAMES SLOAN, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT FOR
INTELLIGENCE, U.S. COAST GUARD, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY.
Mr. Sloan. Yes, I am, Mr. Chairman. And thank you. And
thanks also to Ranking Member Lofgren.
I am Jim Sloan. I am the Coast Guard's Assistant Commandant
For Intelligence and Criminal Investigations. And I do have a
prepared statement that I would ask be inserted into the
record.
Mr. Simmons. Without objection.
Mr. Sloan. Thank you, sir.
I would like to thank each of the members of the committee
for the opportunity to discuss the Coast Guard's intelligence
and criminal investigations program and its role in support to
Coast Guard missions regarding border security.
Bounded by the oceans, America always has been a maritime
Nation. The oceans are a resource that we have to protect, a
path for global commerce, and, unfortunately in today's world,
a route for potential terrorists and other threats to our
national security.
Mr. Chairman, you commented on the 12,500-mile border that
is the maritime border, but in addition to that, the Coast
Guard is responsible for 95,000 miles of coastline when you
consider the laws that the Coast Guard has to enforce within
3.4 million square miles of Exclusive Economic Zones extending
200 miles from the United States and its territories and
possessions. This places us in a position to push our borders
out and react to the threats far at sea.
[[Page 22]]
It is through the Coast Guard's Intelligence and Criminal
Investigation Program, that includes not only those personnel
serving in Coast Guard headquarters, but those serving as
liaison officers at various agencies, the intelligence
analysts, the COASTWATCH personnel at the Intelligence
Coordination Center, as part of and partnered with the Office
of Naval Intelligence at the National Maritime Intelligence
Center, the intelligence specialists at the Area Maritime
Intelligence Fusion Centers, the field intelligence support
teams at U.S. ports, and our criminal investigators are all
involved in accomplishing the objectives to provide immediate
actionable warning intelligence on terrorists and other threats
to the Coast Guard's operational commanders, the Commandant,
the Department of Homeland Security, and our other consumers.
Many Coast Guard missions are cued by intelligence such as
counterdrug initiatives, alien smuggling, migration, fisheries
enforcement, and other law enforcement functions. It is the
personnel at the Department's Office of Intelligence and
Analysis that Charlie Allen represents, the Area Maritime
Intelligence Fusion Centers, and the Intelligence Coordination
Center that blends the information and places it into the
appropriate channels.
As part of the Department of Homeland Security's
intelligence architecture, I am committed to integrating the
Coast Guard intelligence capabilities with other components in
the Department to support a unified DHS intelligence
enterprise. Significant challenges remain, and many of them
have been discussed in the last hour, and more work needs to be
done, but the Coast Guard and the organizations represented
here today are dedicated to ensuring the safety and security of
the American people.
Thanks for this opportunity, and I am prepared to answer
any questions.
Mr. Simmons. I thank you very much.
[The statement of Mr. Sloan follows:]
Prepared Statement of James Sloan
Good morning Mr. Chairman and distinguished members. It is my
pleasure to be here today, alongside Ms. Cynthia O'Connell,
Intelligence Director of ICE and Mr. Tom Bortmes, the Intelligence
Director of CBP, appearing before you today to discuss the Coast Guard
Intelligence Program's role in border security.
The security of the U.S. borders is a top priority for the Coast
Guard and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This hearing is a
testament to the continued importance placed on border security and
recognition of the Coast Guard's vital role in port and border
security. Border security conveys the thought of land masses converging
together. The reality is our maritime borders are the longest front in
this battle. The Coast Guard's authority focuses not on land-to-land
borders but land-to-water borders that include the Pacific and Atlantic
Oceans as well as the Gulf of Mexico and the Great Lakes. These shores
involve key border security issues that must be included in any border
security discussions and decisions.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4854.001
As the Nation's primary maritime law enforcement agency, an armed
force, and lead Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agency for
maritime security, the Coast Guard has significant authorities and
capabilities with regard to maritime security. Still, success in
achieving maritime border security requires the full and complete
cooperation of our interagency, state, local, tribal and private sector
partners.
The maritime domain is an avenue for those wishing to smuggle
people and illicit drugs into our communities - and an avenue that
could be exploited as a means to smuggle weapons of mass destruction
and/or terrorists into our country. In 2005 alone, the Coast Guard
pted 9,500 undocumented migrants attempting to enter the United
States illegally by sea, a 100 percent increase over 2001; and
Prevented more than 338,000 pounds of cocaine (an all-time maritime
record) and more than 10,000 pounds of marijuana from reaching the
United States.
While the 9/11 Commission noted the continuing threat against our
aviation system, it also stated that "opportunities to do harm are as a
great, or greater, in maritime or surface transportation." There has
been a great deal of focus on container security, which is appropriate;
however, a container is only as secure as the ship and crew that
carries it. In fact, the most often observed U.S. maritime threat
remains smuggling. As on land, we know that there are numerous
professional migrant smuggling rings that operate in the maritime
realm. The proximity of U.S. population centers to the maritime domain
and the diversity of maritime users present significant and wide
ranging vulnerabilities. Effective intelligence support can address
these vulnerabilities to detect and defeat threats along our maritime
borders.
Many of the Coast Guard's mission successes are cued by
intelligence. In addition to supporting our focus on preventing
terrorist attacks, timely intelligence is critical in our efforts to
stop international maritime drug trafficking, maritime alien smuggling,
illegal high-seas driftnet fishing encroachment of U.S. natural
resources in the Exclusive Economic Zone, and damage to the marine
environment. Intelligence is a needed force multiplier given our
limited assets and expanding mission requirements, it is the value
added to enhancing maritime domain awareness.
Leveraging our longstanding partnerships and unique maritime
authorities, access and capabilities the Coast Guard has significantly
enhanced nationwide maritime security. The role of intelligence is to
provide timely, accurate and actionable information so that decisions
can be made and actions taken that support the operational commanders.
Significant challenges remain and much more work needs to be done, but
we are focused on the right priorities.
The Coast Guard Intelligence and Criminal Investigations Program
has established and actively participates in several partnerships to
enhance border security and other Homeland Security initiatives, such
as:
The Coast Guard works in close partnership with DHS Office of
Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) and other elements of the Department to
provide intelligence support to homeland security. We are providing
strong support for the standup of the intelligence functions within
OI&A by detailing intelligence analysts and assisting in building
relationships with other Intelligence Community partners.
The Coast Guard Intelligence Program and the Office of Naval
Intelligence continue to build an effective joint intelligence
partnership to enhance maritime domain awareness. The Coast Guard's
Intelligence Coordination Center is co-located with the Office of Naval
Intelligence, which comprises the National Maritime Intelligence Center
(NMIC);
The NMIC has been designated as the core element for the Global
Maritime Intelligence Integration (GMII) Plan. The GMII Plan is one of
the eight support plans that make up the National Strategy for Maritime
Security (NSMS). The Coast Guard's Intelligence Coordination Center
(ICC) and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) have been the foci of
the GMII effort thus far. Achieving Final Operating Capability (FOC) is
dependent upon strong representation from the other core elements,
including: DHS - CBP and ICE, DOJ - FBI and DEA, Treasury - OFAC and
FINCEN, NSA, and NGA. The overarching GMII requirement is to identify,
locate, and track potential threats to U.S. maritime interests and
subsequently transfer accurate, relevant, and collaborated information
to those operational entities.
Within the Coast Guard's Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC),
the Coast Guard and CBP have exchanged personnel to enhance data
sharing between the ICC's COASTWATCH program (which gathers and
analyzes information based on the ship's 96-Hour Notice of Arrival
(NOA) report on vessels and people approaching U.S. ports) and CBP's
National Targeting Center (cargo tracking) process. COASTWATCH has
improved processing of NOAs by more than 600 percent since FY05. This
COASTWATCH mission has detected and provided advance warning about
numerous arriving individuals identified in federal law enforcement and
immigration databases as criminal or security concerns, including
active warrants and "deny entry" orders for previous border crossing
violations. In addition, several individuals wanted for questioning by
federal agencies about possible extremist associations have been
identified in advance of arrival and referred to the relevant agency
for investigation.
The Coast Guard provides access, where authorized and appropriate,
to its intelligence and criminal investigations databases, as well as
advice to others developing intelligence sharing architectures. The
Service has also provided intelligence analysts, exchange personnel,
and liaison officers to other agencies active in the maritime arena;
The Coast Guard's Intelligence and Criminal Investigations Program
provides a permanent presence on the FBI's National Joint Terrorism
Task Force (JTTF) and select regional JTTFs;
"Operation Drydock", which began in December 2002, is a joint Coast
Guard and FBI criminal and counterterrorism investigation into national
security threats and document fraud associated with U.S. merchant
mariner credentials. Currently, the databases compiled are managed by
the Coast Guard Investigative Services (CGIS) and are used by El Paso
Intelligence Center (EPIC), Coast Guard ICC, and Coast Guard Sector
Commands nationwide. The "Operation Drydock" databases are also used by
Coast Guard Regional Examination Centers (REC) to vet applicants
seeking merchant mariner documents and licenses; and
"Operation Panama Express" is a multi-agency Organized Crime Drug
Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) investigation that began in the mid
1990s to help stem the flow of illegal narcotics flowing from Central
and South America via maritime means. The Coast Guard Investigative
Service is a partner in Panama Express. The CGIS agents assigned to
Panama Express speak fluent Spanish and have a wealth of practical
hands-on experience in Coast Guard maritime law enforcement operations
and CGIS narcotics investigations.
The Coast Guard has also increased its efforts to share law
enforcement and intelligence information collected by the Coast Guard
with other DHS components and other federal government agencies. In
addition, the Coast Guard's Intelligence Program activities have been
enhanced to assist in countering potential maritime threats there
Establishment of Field Intelligence Support Teams (FIST) in various
key U.S. ports. FISTs gather local law enforcement information,
establishes contacts, interviews masters and crewmembers to better
understand maritime threats;
Enhanced intelligence capability at the theater-level with the
standup of the Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers (MIFCs) Atlantic
and Pacific. The MIFCs increase collection and analytical capabilities,
enhance all-source intelligence and information fusion, improve the
timeliness and quality of intelligence support to Coast Guard
operational forces. The MIFCs also ensure the rapid reporting of
information gathered by Coast Guard forces into the Department of
Homeland Security and Intelligence Community at the national level;
Conducting Port Threat Assessments as a complement to the MTSA-mandated
Port Security Assessment, to provide analyses of threats for specific
ports, inclusive of both terrorism and crime - foreign and domestic -
using law enforcement and intelligence information; Fielding of Sector
Intelligence Officers put intelligence support at the tactical level;
and, the Coast Guard's membership in the Intelligence Community; our
wide-range of missions, and our expertise in the maritime domain allows
us to interface in numerous and diverse forums at various levels within
the DoD components, law enforcement agencies, intelligence community,
state and local stakeholders, and private industry.
Analysis of the maritime threat to U.S. ports is challenging.
Characterization of incidents and trend analysis is complicated by the
convergence of large volumes of cargo, alien smuggling networks, the
narcotics trade, terrorism, regional conflict, maritime criminal
enterprises, and some activities that fall into multiple categories but
fall short of being a direct security threat to U.S. ports. It is the
Coast Guard's overarching strategy, through layered security
architecture, to "push out our borders." Our unambiguous goal is to
meet threats far offshore in order to prevent hostile persons, vessels,
or cargoes from entering our ports or coastal regions. Our ability to
push the borders out is an essential element in protecting our
homeland.The Coast Guard faces challenges in the maritime domain
similar to those of our colleagues in securing the land border - with a
limited set of resources, located amid vast geographic areas and huge
amounts of legitimate activity - stop those seeking to do us harm. The
foundation of the Coast Guard's maritime strategy relies on three key
priorities:
Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness;
Establish and Lead a Maritime Security Regime; and
Deploy effective and integrated Operational Capability.
These are not stand-alone goals, but rather part of an active
system of layered maritime security. For example, the Maritime
Transportation Security Act (MTSA) led to the establishment of domestic
and international AIS carriage requirements for certain commercial
vessels. But without investment in systems to collect, analyze and
disseminate the AIS signals we lose the opportunity to assess threats
early. Similarly, the detection, identification and interdiction of
small vessels (that certainly do not advertise their position) used by
smugglers throughout the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific requires
persistent surveillance capabilities. In the end, Coast Guard assets
must be capable of mounting a dependable response to identified threats
lest we have information but not the capability to act.
Coast Guard assets and systems are required to operate across a
diverse operating area including within our ports, in the littoral
region, and far offshore. Thanks to the strong support of the
administration and Congress, a number of initiatives are underway to
transform Coast Guard capabilities. I would like to highlight a few of
these initiatives as each will have a broad and substantial influence
on our intelligence capabilities to mitigate current and future
maritime risks.
Integrated Deepwater System. The centerpiece of the Coast Guard's
future capability is the Integrated Deepwater System, recently revised
to reflect post-9/11 mission requirements such as enhanced intelligence
gathering and handling capabilities. The Integrated Deepwater System
was designed to secure the nation's maritime borders.
The vessels delivered by the Deepwater program will serve as the
Coast Guard's "eyes and ears" and allow the nation to see, hear and
communicate activity occurring within the maritime domain. The Coast
Guard's sustained presence along our maritime borders is unique. More
capable Deepwater assets, linked to each other and multiple agencies
through Deepwater's net-centric command-and-control system will
significantly improve information sharing, collaboration, and
interoperability in the maritime domain.
Vessel tracking. Securing our vast maritime borders requires
improved awareness of the people, vessels and cargo approaching and
moving throughout U.S. ports, coasts and inland waterways. The most
pressing challenges we now face involve tracking the vast population of
vessels operating in and around the approaches to the United States. In
support of this requirement, the Coast Guard has:
Established the Automatic Identification System (AIS) to provide
continuous, real-time information on the identity, location, speed and
course of vessels in ports that are equipped with AIS receivers. AIS is
currently operational in several major U.S. ports, and the Coast
Guard's Nationwide Automatic Identification (NAIS) project will expand
AIS capabilities to ports nationwide; and
Under U.S. leadership the International Maritime Organization
recently unanimously adopted a global long Range Identification and
Tracking scheme that will provide information about all commercial
ships of 300 gross tons and above operating within a 1,000 nautical
miles of our coast whether the ship is bound for a U.S. port or is on
innocent passage. Additionally, we will have tracking information out
to 2,000 nautical miles when ships have declared its intent to arrive
in a U.S. port.
Maritime C4ISR Enhancement. Existing Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems and operational concepts must be
reoriented and integrated with current and emerging sensor capabilities
and applicable procedures. Similar to the nation's air space security
regime, the maritime security regime must integrate existing C4ISR
systems with new technologies and national command-and-control systems
and processes. For example:
The Common Operating Picture (COP) and corresponding Command
Intelligence Picture (CIP) must continue to grow and expand to federal,
state, and local agencies with maritime interests and responsibilities.
The COP provides a shared display of friendly, enemy/suspect and
neutral tracks on a map with applicable geographically referenced
overlays and data enhancements. The COP is also a central element of
the Deepwater solution tying Deepwater assets and operational
commanders together with dynamic, real-time maritime domain
information. This link is essential to ensure effective command and
control of all available Coast Guard assets responding to a myriad of
border security threats.
An expansive and interoperable communications network is critical
for maritime security operations and safety of life at sea. In the
coastal environment, the Coast Guard's Rescue 21 system will provide
the United States with an advanced maritime distress and response
communications system that bridges interoperability gaps, saves lives
and improves maritime security.There is no single solution to maritime
border security. It requires a layered system of capabilities,
established competencies, clear authorities, and strong partnerships.
The cost of allowing blind spots in our awareness, security regimes or
operational capabilities is too high.This is the mandate for the Coast
Guard Intelligence and Criminal Investigations Directorate to support
those priorities, which ultimately supports the overall strategic and
national level objectives of the Nation.Thank you for the opportunity
to testify before you today. I will be happy to answer any questions
you may have.
Mr. Simmons. And we will now go to the second witness
Ms.O'Connell. Welcome.
CYNTHIA O'CONNELL, ACTING DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE,
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. O'Connell. Good morning. Thank you, Chairman Simmons. I
will have just a few brief statements. I respectfully request
that my full statement be submitted for the record.
Mr. Simmons. Without objection.
Ms. O'Connell. Chairman Simmons, Ranking Member Lofgren,
members of the subcommittee, I am Cynthia O'Connell, Acting
Director of the Office of Intelligence for Immigration and
Customs Enforcement. I sincerely appreciate this opportunity to
share with you how the men of women of ICE Intelligence employ
our capabilities to help secure our Nation's borders.
I am also honored to testify alongside my colleagues from
Customs and Border Protection and the U.S. Coast Guard, as well
as Mr. Charles Allen from the Department of Homeland Security.
As the DHS Chief Intelligence Officer, as you know, Mr. Allen
has been instrumental in coordinating with the Intelligence
Community and providing guidance on Homeland Security-specific
issues.
The ICE Office of Intelligence supports ICE and DHS
intelligence requirements and priorities. We have made
significant progress
[[Page 23]]
and continue in expanding our responsibilities to support the
needs of ICE, DHS, and the Intelligence Community.
With the unique Immigration and Customs authorities and
intelligence tools, ICE Intelligence has also enhanced its
detection, collection, and analysis capabilities.
In addition to ICE Intelligence headquarters in Washington,
D.C., we have six field intelligence units located in New York,
Long Beach, Chicago, Houston, Tucson, and Miami; two technical
collection facilities, the Tactical Intelligence Center, and a
Special Operations Center; and intelligence assets at the El
Paso Intelligence Center.
ICE Intelligence headquarters supports ICE management and
DHS intelligence and analysis efforts and coordinates ICE
Intelligence programs and operations nationwide. The field
intelligence units provide intelligence expertise to field
investigative offices and detention facilities and to DHS
intelligence as a whole. Our technical collection facilities
act in concert for the Intelligence Community, the military,
and other Federal agencies to safeguard the border that extends
beyond our borders outward. These are powerful capabilities,
and we have moved to organize them in a coherent and effective
support system both to advance the ICE investigative mission
and to support and integrate ICE into the DHS intelligence
functions.
Our specific intent is to integrate our intelligence
capabilities with other components in the Department to support
a unified DHS intelligence enterprise. ICE Intelligence takes
advantage of currently operating effective projects and
programs, and combines them with proposed new programs and
capabilities, and unites the whole under a common strategic
purpose, the protection of our country against threats that
could arise from our borders.
Our Special Operations Center detects and locates smugglers
moving contraband and aliens across the borders by collecting
intelligence through real-time technical means. Its
methodologies not only interdict the incursion, but also helps
identify smuggling organizations for investigation and
dismantling.
We coordinate Customs and Border Protection air and marine
operations in the Office of Border Patrol and Office of Border
Patrol assets to stop illegal activity. This year they have
supported the interdiction of about 35 tons of marijuana with
the seizure of associated vehicles and weapons and the arrest
of countless smuggled aliens.
ICE is integrating its Special Operations with geospatial
intelligence capabilities sponsored by DHS and the analytical
functions of our Southwest Field Intelligence Unit. We are
working with DHS Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
to leverage available Department of Defense and DHS science and
technology resources for upgrades to this dedicated border
protection unit.
What I have just described to you is true border-focused
intelligence support. However, our protective effort is not
devoted to just the land borders; we are also heavily involved
in maritime and air transportation environments.
Operation Last Call exploits the intelligence value of
hundreds of thousands of individuals who enter the detention
system annually.
[[Page 24]]
This highly effective operation collects, evaluates, analyzes,
and disseminates information derived from detainees in ICE
custody.
Project Aegis supports the ICE visa security program which
places ICE personnel in foreign countries to work with State
Department consular officials in vetting these applicants.
The Border Enforcement Security Task Force is a DHS-
inspired initiative that responds to the increase in border
violence. It is actively supported by analytical resources from
our field intelligence units.
ICE Intelligence is also working with DHS I&A on its
intelligence campaign plan, a borderwide security effort aimed
at more efficient consolidation of relevant field intelligence
information.
Operation Capistrano is a cooperative initiative with
Department of State Consular Affairs where we train password
examiners to recognize indicators that may point to potential
narcotics and currency smugglers. This initiative has led to
over 1,300 seizures and 1,300 arrests with more than 1,700
pounds of heroin and 2,600 pounds of cocaine seized.
Operation Roswell uses similar techniques to identify alien
smugglers, immigration fraud violators, and child sex tourism
suspects. In the past 2 years, Operation Roswell resulted in 26
aliens removed, produced evidence of over 60 marriage fraud
schemes, and in one significant case yielded analysis that led
to eight arrests, ten removals, and the dismantling of an
organization that smuggled 37 foreign nationals into the United
States.
In spite of all these successful initiatives, we are not
content to rest on present production and current capabilities.
Business plans and performance metrics based on objective
customer evaluations must support all our work. From these
markers, ICE Intelligence proposes the development and
acquisition of advanced technologies, new techniques and new
processes, and additional integration into multiagency and
multinational operations. This is our future path to a safer
and more secure border and homeland.
I thank you for the opportunity to describe some of our
initiatives that support border security. I would be happy to
answer any questions at this time.
Mr. Simmons. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Ms. O'Connell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Cynthia O'Connell
Chairman Simmons, Ranking Member Lofgren, Members of the
Subcommittee,
I am Cynthia O'Connell, Acting Director of the Office of
Intelligence for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). I
sincerely appreciate this opportunity to share with you how the men and
women of ICE Intelligence employ our capabilities to help secure our
nation's borders.
The ICE Office of Intelligence supports ICE and Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) intelligence requirements and priorities. We
have made significant progress in continuing and expanding our
responsibilities to support the needs of ICE, DHS, and the Intelligence
Community (IC). With unique Immigration and Customs authorities and
intelligence tools, ICE Intelligence has also enhanced its detection,
collection and analysis capabilities.
In addition to ICE Intelligence Headquarters in Washington DC, we
have six Field Intelligence Units located in New York, Long Beach,
Chicago, Houston, Tucson, and Miami; two technical collection
facilities - the Tactical Intelligence Center (TIC) and a Special
Operations Center; and intelligence assets at the El Paso Intelligence
Center (EPIC).
ICE Intelligence Headquarters supports ICE management and DHS
Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) efforts, and coordinates ICE
intelligence programs and operations nationwide. The Field Intelligence
Units provide intelligence expertise to investigative offices and
detention facilities in the field and to the DHS Intelligence as a
whole. Our technical collection facilities act in concert with the
Intelligence Community, the military, and other Federal agencies to
safeguard the southern border and to extend coverage of our borders
outward even to the shores of South America.
In intelligence terms, these are very powerful capabilities, and we
have moved aggressively to organize them into a coherent and effective
support system, both to advance the ICE investigative and operational
missions, and to support and integrate ICE in the DHS intelligence
functions. We have accomplished this through the ICE Intelligence
Strategic Plan, which was constructed with the specific intent to
integrate our intelligence capabilities with other components in the
Department, to support a unified DHS Intelligence Enterprise.
The ICE Intelligence plan takes advantage of currently operating,
demonstrably effective projects, programs, and activities; combines
them with proposed new programs and capabilities; and unites the whole
under a common strategic purpose - the protection of our country
against threats that could arise from our borders. It is more than just
a plan. It reflects real, effective action on the front lines.
Special Operations Center
The Special Operations Center detects and locates smugglers moving
contraband and aliens across our borders by collecting intelligence
through real-time technical means, primarily signals and imagery
intelligence. It supports ICE investigations with methodologies that
not only interdict the incursion, but also helps identify smuggling
organizations for investigation and dismantling. This kind of
intelligence has real long-term benefits. The unit's emphasis to date
has been on the U.S. and Mexico border.
We coordinate with Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Air and
Marine Operations and Office of Border Patrol assets to stop illegal
activity. The information we collect is disseminated to ICE and Border
Patrol agents in affected areas along the border from California to
Texas.
ICE is currently integrating its intelligence program with the
Special Operations Center geospatial intelligence capabilities,
sponsored by DHS, and the analytical functions of our Southwest Field
Intelligence Unit. We are working with DHS Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance (ISR) to leverage available Department of Defense
and DHS Science and Technology resources for upgrades to this dedicated
border protection unit.
What I have just described to you is true, border-focused
intelligence support; however, our protective effort is not devoted to
just the land borders. We are also heavily involved in maritime and air
transportation environments. We view border security as a continuum -
it starts in various foreign countries, proceeds internationally to our
borders, seaports, and airports, and extends into the interior of the
United States, where support structures exist for criminal
organizations as well as illegal immigrants. ICE provides intelligence
at all points along this continuum.
ICE Intelligence Projects and Programs
The Port Intelligence Center (PIC) was created in response to
Secretary Michael Chertoff's directive to develop a task force that
addresses New York and New Jersey seaport vulnerabilities. The ICE
Northeast Field Intelligence Unit (NEFIU), in coordination with the ICE
Special Agent in Charge/New York (SAC/NY) and SAC/Newark, CBP, USCG,
the New York City Police Department (NYCPD), and other state and local
law enforcement groups, have established the NY/NJ Metropolitan Area
Port Intelligence Center. The PIC will develop a seaport intelligence
collection strategy aimed primarily at cultivating human intelligence
in the maritime environment. It utilizes the intelligence resources of
its members to prioritize vulnerabilities and pursue entities and
individuals for potential source cultivation.
The National Security Integration Center (NSIC) is an Office of
Investigations and Office of Intelligence joint center that assesses
information, targets suspects, and supports national security
investigations conducted by ICE.
Operation Ardent Guardian targets the illicit use of legitimate
immigration channels, seeking the indicators of asylum fraud, marriage
fraud, false documents, and other fraudulent mean of entry.
Extraterritorial Criminal Travel Strike Force (ECT) is a new
cooperative initiative by the ICE Office of Investigations and the
Criminal Division of the Justice Department. Supported by ICE
Intelligence, the targeting capabilities of ECT are designed to
leverage extraterritorial investigative and prosecutorial expertise to
attack foreign-based criminal networks.
Operation Last Call exploits the intelligence value of hundreds of
thousands of individuals who enter our detention and removal system
annually. This highly effective operation collects, evaluates,
analyzes, and disseminates information derived from detainees in ICE
custody. Customers for Operation Last Call intelligence are ICE
operational units, DHS I&A, the Intelligence Community, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other Federal agencies. This program
focuses on relevant collection in the areas of force protection, anti-
terrorism, on-going criminal enterprises, human trafficking and
smuggling, contraband smuggling (weapons of mass destruction, drugs,
etc.), threats to critical infrastructure, and the movement of money
that support illicit activities.
Project Aegis (Domestic Visa Security) supports the ICE Visa
Security program, which places ICE personnel in sensitive foreign
countries to work with State Department consular officials in vetting
visa applicants. The ICE Intelligence domestic program performs
detailed research on the resident U.S. sponsors and contacts listed in
visa applications and reports on the background and potentially suspect
activities of those individuals. This program provided substantial
intelligence on the Lodi, California, Pakistani community that has
recently figured prominently in terrorist investigations and action.
Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST), the DHS-inspired
initiative that responds to the increase in border violence, is
actively supported by the analytic resources of the Houston and Tucson
Field Intelligence Units. In addition to the BEST program, ICE
Intelligence is working with DHS I&A on its Intelligence Campaign Plan
(ICP), a border-wide security effort aimed at more efficient
consolidation of relevant field-generated information.
Operation Crystal Ball, a joint operation involving ICE, the Office
of Naval Intelligence, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and CBP, tracks
suspect vessels and crewmembers and maintains historical databases to
respond to queries from investigators and officers working in the
maritime environment. ICE Crystal Ball analysts use electronic
collection techniques and perform both classified and unclassified
research to derive movement and position information. They also
populate Naval Intelligence databases with large volumes of current
vessel tracking data. Crystal Ball support has repeatedly resulted in
drug seizures from merchant vessels and crewmembers, and continually
contributes to the strategic goal of awareness in the maritime and
seaport environment.
Operation Capistrano, a cooperative initiative with the State
Department's Office of Consular Affairs, trains passport examiners to
recognize indicators that may point to potential narcotics and currency
smugglers. This initiative has led to 1,366 seizures and 1,300 arrests.
Operation Roswell, an outgrowth of Operation Capistrano, uses
similar techniques to identify alien smugglers, immigration fraud
violators and child sex tourism suspects. In the past two years,
Operation Roswell has led to the removal of 26 aliens, provided
evidence of over 60 incidences of marriage fraud schemes, and in one
significant case, yielded analysis that led to 8 arrests, 10 removals,
and the dismantling of an organization that had successfully smuggled
37 foreign nationals into the United States.
Operation Watchtower, working in coordination with USCG and CBP,
analyzes the international movements of vessels and cargoes to provide
timely intelligence and risk assessment for investigative and threat
detection support.
These examples are all actual ongoing activities, presently
producing valuable intelligence that protects our borders. Many of
these activities also directly support the Department's Secure Border
Initiative. We also maintain a full-time senior liaison officer posted
permanently to DHS I&A, which serves as an open conduit between ICE
Intelligence and I&A.
In spite of such successful initiatives, we are not content to rest
on present production and current capabilities. Business plans and
performance metrics based on objective customer evaluations must
support all our work. From these markers, the ICE Intelligence
strategic plan proposes the development and acquisition of advanced
technologies, new techniques, new processes, and additional integration
into multi-agency and multi-national operations. This is our future
path to a safer and more secure border and Homeland.
Thank you for the opportunity to describe some of our initiatives
that support border security. I would be happy to answer any questions
at this time.
Mr. Simmons. And our third witness is from U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, Mr. Bortmes. Welcome. We have your
testimony, so if you summarize in 5 minutes, that would be
great.
L. THOMAS BORTMES, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE, CUSTOMS
AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Bortmes. Will do, sir.
Thank you, Chairman Simmons, Ranking Member Lofgren,
distinguished members of the subcommittee. I thank you for the
opportunity to join my Department of Homeland Security
intelligence colleagues, Assistant Secretary Allen, Director
O'Connell, and Assistant Commandant Sloan, to discuss with you
the role intelligence plays within the United States Customs
and Border Protection to help secure our Nation's borders. I
have submitted, as you stated, sir, a formal statement, and
would request that it be accepted for the record.
I want to begin this very brief oral statement by saying
that I am privileged to serve as the Executive Director of
Customs and Border Protection's Office of Intelligence, which
is charged with three primary responsibilities. The first is to
directly support the Commissioner and Customs and Border
Protection's headquarters and field leadership with the
acquisition, analysis, and timely dissemination of intelligence
information critical to CBP's primary mission of detecting,
identifying, and preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons
from entering the United States.
The second is to efficiently manage a developing integrated
Customs and Border Protection intelligence capability that
ensures frontline CBP officers and decisionmakers have the
value-added intelligence required to sustain border situational
awareness, drive operations, and support policy. This larger
CBP intelligence enterprise consists of the intelligence
capabilities within the Office of Intelligence, the Office of
Border Patrol, CBP Air and Marine, the Office of International
Affairs, and the Office of Antiterrorism, and works very
closely with the National Targeting Center and operational
field analysis capabilities of the Office of Field Operations.
And, finally, as a member of the Department's Homeland
Security Intelligence Council, it is the responsibility of the
Office of Intelligence to represent CBP's intelligence
requirements and equities to the DHS Chief Intelligence Officer
and assist him in directing an integrated DHS intelligence
enterprise.
Customs and Border Protection intelligence exists to
support an agency that, in addition to facilitating
international trade critical to the United States economy, is
responsible for border security. As you stated earlier, Mr.
Chairman, and I won't repeat the numbers, it is responsible for
protecting more than 5,000 miles of border with Canada, 1,900
miles of border with Mexico, and operating 325 official ports
of entry.
An average day in Customs and Border Protection, from the
statements you have already made this morning, is a demanding
day. We process well over 1.1 million passengers and
pedestrians; 69,000 containers; 333,000 incoming privately
owned vehicles; $81 million, almost $82 million, in fees,
duties, and tariffs; execute 62 arrests at ports of entry; over
3,200 apprehensions between the ports for illegal entry; seized
over 5,500 pounds of narcotics; and not to forget over 1,100
prohibitive meat and plant materials, animal products at and
between the ports of entry; refuse entry to 868 noncitizens at
the ports of entry; and intercept 146 smuggled aliens, and over
200 fraudulent documents, while rescuing 7 illegal immigrants
in distress or dangerous conditions between the ports of entry.
And I remind you, again, that is every day.
As the figures demonstrate, CBP addresses a variety of
threats to U.S. borders that include illegal immigration,
illegal drugs, border violence, illegal incursions, pests and
diseases, and a host of trade violations running from smuggling
to international property rights.
While all of these threats to our borders are demanding in
their own right, everyone at Customs and Border Protection
understands that their priority mission is to prevent
terrorists and terrorist weaponry from entering the United
States.
While the Office of Intelligence and the broader CBP
intelligence enterprise directly support operations aimed at
addressing all border threat categories, they also remain
focused on supporting CBP's priority mission of preventing
terrorists and their weaponry from entering the United States.
Our first priority is to operationalize intelligence reporting
on terrorist threats.
In my formal written statement I discuss how CBP
intelligence supports border security by supporting CBP's
layered defense strategy, a strategy that, in partnership with
an array of countries, international organizations, private
businesses, trade entities, as well as State and local
governments, has developed a host of programs and initiatives
aimed at pushing our zone of defense as far outward as
responsible to identify people and cargo long before they have
the opportunity to board or enter the United States.
I look forward, sir, to answering yours and the committee's
questions and working with my colleagues here today, and
appreciate the opportunity to speak on these matters.
[The statement of Mr. Bortmes follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mr. L. Thomas Bortmes
Introduction
Chairman Simmons, Ranking Member Lofgren, distinguished Members of
the Subcommittee. I thank you for this opportunity to join my
Department of Homeland Security colleagues - Assistant Secretary for
Intelligence and Analysis, Mr. Charles Allen, Ms. Cynthia O'Connell the
Director of ICE's Office of Intelligence and Mr. Jim Sloan, the Coast
Guard's Assistant Commandant for Intelligence and Criminal
Investigations - to discuss with you the role intelligence plays within
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to help secure our Nation's
borders.
I am privileged to serve as the Executive Director of the CBP
Office of Intelligence (OINT), a critical element of the Office of the
Commissioner, charged with three primary responsibilities. The first is
to directly support the Commissioner and CBP headquarters and field
leadership with the acquisition, analysis and timely dissemination of
intelligence information critical to CBP's primary mission of
detecting, identifying and preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons
from entering the United States. The second is to efficiently manage an
integrated CBP intelligence capability that ensures front-line CBP
officers and decision makers have the value-added intelligence required
to sustain border situational awareness, drive operations and support
policy. And finally, as a member of the Department's Homeland Security
Intelligence Council (HSIC), it is the responsibility of the OINT to
represent CBP's intelligence requirements and equities to the DHS Chief
Intelligence Officer/Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis,
and assist him in directing an integrated DHS intelligence enterprise
that provides one DHS face to the National Intelligence Community. I
will address each of these responsibilities from the perspective of
intelligence support to border security.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection Overview
In addition to facilitating the international trade critical to the
United States economy, CBP is responsible for protecting more than
5,000 miles of border with Canada, 1,900 miles of border with Mexico
and operating 325 official Ports of Entry. On an average day in 2005,
CBP personnel: processed 1,181,605 passengers and pedestrians, 69,370
containers, 333,226 incoming privately owned vehicles and $81,834,298
in fees, duties and tariffs; executed 62 arrests at ports of entry and
over 3,257 apprehensions between the ports for illegal entry; seized
over 5,541 pounds of narcotics and 1,145 prohibited meat, plant
materials or animal products at and between the ports of entry; refused
entry to 868 non-citizens at the ports of entry; and intercepted 146
smuggled aliens and 206 fraudulent documents while rescuing 7 illegal
immigrants in distress or dangerous conditions between the ports of
entry. As these figures demonstrate, CBP, the nation's unified border
agency, addresses a variety of threats to U.S. borders that includes
illegal immigration, illegal drugs, border violence, illegal
incursions, pests/diseases and a host of trade violations ranging from
smuggling to intellectual property rights.
Countering Terrorists
While these threats to our borders are addressed each day, all CBP
personnel understand that their priority mission is to prevent
terrorists and their weaponry from entering the United States. While
OINT directly supports operations aimed at addressing all border threat
categories, it also remains focused on supporting CBP's priority
mission of preventing terrorists and their weaponry from entering the
United States. The first priority of CBP's Office of Intelligence is to
operationalize intelligence reporting on terrorist threats. Each day,
OINT watch standers and analysts review over 1000 intelligence
community products, engage with CBP liaison officers and analysts
embedded in DHS and the national intelligence community, and leverage
long-standing partnerships with federal, state, local and international
law enforcement and intelligence organizations to ensure early
awareness of all potential terrorist travel or movement of materials to
the United States. Working clos
