S. Prt. 110-20
EXECUTIVE SESSIONS OF THE
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
TOGETHER WITH JOINT SESSIONS WITH THE
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
(HISTORICAL SERIES)
=======================================================================
VOLUME XIX
__________
NINETIETH CONGRESS
first session
1967
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
90th Congress, First Session
J.W. FULBRIGHT, Arkansas, Chairman
JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island
MIKE MANSFIELD, Montana EUGENE J. McCARTHY, Minnesota
WAYNE MORSE, Oregon BOURKE HICKENLOOPER, Iowa
ALBERT GORE, Tennessee GEORGE D. AIKEN, Vermont
FRANK J. LAUSCHE, Ohio FRANK CARLSON, Kansas
FRANK CHURCH, Idaho JOHN J. WILLIAMS, Delaware
STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota
THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey
JOSEPH S. CLARK, Pennsylvania JOHN SHERMAN COOPER, Kentucky
Carl Marcy, Chief of Staff
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
110th Congress, First Session
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BILL NELSON, Florida GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Meyers, Jr., Minority Staff Director
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
90th Congress, First Session
RICHARD B. RUSSELL, Georgia, Chairman
JOHN STENNIS, Mississippi MARGARET CHASE SMITH, Maine
STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington JACK MILLER, Iowa
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina JOHN G. TOWER, Texas
HOWARD W. CANNON, Nevada PETER H. DOMINICK, Colorado
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
STEPHEN M. YOUNG, Ohio
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
THOMAS J. McINTYRE, New Hampshire
DANIEL B. BREWSTER, Maryland
HARRY F. BYRD, Jr., Virginia
Charles B. Kirbow, Chief Clerk
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
110th Congress, First Session
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
BILL NELSON, Florida SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
EVAN BAYH, Indiana SAXBY M. CHAMBLISS, Georgia
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
MARK J. PRYOR, Arkansas ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
JIM WEBB, Virginia JOHN CORNYN, Texas
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Mike Kostiw, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Pages
Preface.......................................................... IX
Future Hearings, January 11...................................... 1
The World Situation, January 16.................................. 39
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Subcommittees and Hearings Procedures, January 24................ 113
Minutes, January 24.............................................. 129
Minutes, January 25.............................................. 130
Minutes, January 26.............................................. 131
The Situation in Indonesia, January 30........................... 133
Testimony of Marshall Green, U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia
Background Briefing on Disarmament Problems, February 3.......... 159
Testimony of Richard Helms, Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency
Status of Development of Ballistic and Anti-Ballistic Systems in
U.S., and Briefing on Non-Proliferation Treaty, February 6..... 193
Testimony of Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., Director of Defense
Research and Engineering; and Hon. William C. Foster,
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Military Assistance to Latin America, February 6................. 217
Testimony of Gen. Robert Porter, Southern Military Command
Strategic Implications of Antiballistic Missile Defense
Deployment/Limitations on Use of Chemical and Bacteriological
Agents in Warfare/Sales of Military Equipment by the United
States, February 7............................................. 245
Testimony of Cyrus R. Vance, Deputy Secretary of Defense; and
John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs
Minutes, February 27............................................. 274
Minutes, February 28............................................. 275
Minutes, February 28............................................. 276
Minutes, March 1................................................. 277
Sales of Military Equipment by United States, March 2............ 279
Testimony of John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs
Policy Implications of Armament and Disarmament Problems, March 3 289
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; and Adrian S.
Fisher, Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency
Minutes, March 6................................................. 311
Minutes, March 13................................................ 312
Arms Sales to Iran, March 14..................................... 313
Testimony of Henry J. Kuss, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Logistics Negotiations
Minutes, March 16................................................ 330
Minutes, March 20................................................ 331
Briefing on Africa, March 28..................................... 333
Testimony of John Palmer II, Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs
Minutes, March 30................................................ 366
Minutes, April 3................................................. 367
Additional Military Assistance to Pakistan, April 5.............. 369
Testimony of William J. Handley, Acting Assistant Secretary
of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Minutes, April 6................................................. 391
Minutes, April 13................................................ 392
Minutes, April 13................................................ 393
Minutes, April 14................................................ 394
Minutes, April 18................................................ 395
Minutes, April 19................................................ 396
Minutes, April 20................................................ 397
Minutes, April 21................................................ 398
Minutes, April 24................................................ 399
Minutes, April 25................................................ 400
United States Troops in Europe, April 26......................... 401
Testimony of Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense; and
Nicholas DeB. Katzenbach, Acting Secretary of State
Minutes, April 26................................................ 414
Briefing on Yemen and Greek Situations, April 28................. 415
Testimony of Lucious D. Battle, Assistant Secretary of State
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Minutes, May 2................................................... 442
Minutes, May 2................................................... 443
United States Troops in Europe, May 3............................ 445
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; and Eugene V.
Rostow, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Minutes, May 4................................................... 457
Discussion of Military Assistance to India and Pakistan, May 5... 459
Testimony of Lt. General Joseph F. Carroll, Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency
The Situation in Poland, May 15.................................. 471
Testimony of John A. Gronouski, U.S. Ambassador to Poland
Discussion Regarding the Secretary of State's Testimony, May 16.. 505
Minutes, May 16.................................................. 520
Minutes, May 16.................................................. 521
Briefing on Deployment of Antiballistic Missiles and Non-
Proliferation Treaty, May 18................................... 523
Testimony of Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director, Arms Control
and Disar- mament Agency
United States Foreign Policy With Respect to the Middle East and
Vietnam, May 23................................................ 539
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Briefing on the Middle East Situation, June 1.................... 587
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; and Robert S.
McNamara, Secretary of Defense
Minutes, June 5.................................................. 624
Minutes, June 5.................................................. 625
Briefing on the Middle East Situation, June 7.................... 627
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Minutes, June 8.................................................. 657
Briefing on Vietnam, June 8...................................... 659
Testimony of William J. Porter, U.S. Ambassador to Korea
Briefing on the Middle East Situation, June 8.................... 697
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Briefing on the Middle East Situation, June 9.................... 705
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Minutes, June 20................................................. 729
Military Assistance to India and Pakistan, June 22............... 731
Testimony of Jeffrey C. Kitchen, Deputy Secretary of State
for Politico- Military Affairs
Minutes, June 22................................................. 738
Minutes, June 27................................................. 739
Briefing on Glassboro Talks, June 28............................. 741
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Minutes, June 29................................................. 775
Minutes, July 10................................................. 776
Minutes, July 11................................................. 777
Briefing on the Congo Situation, July 11......................... 779
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Minutes, July 12................................................. 825
Minutes, July 13................................................. 826
Minutes, July 25................................................. 827
Foreign Assistance Act of 1967, July 26.......................... 829
Testimony of Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense
Minutes, July 27................................................. 854
Minutes, August 1................................................ 855
Minutes, August 22............................................... 856
Minutes, September 12............................................ 857
Minutes, September 22............................................ 858
Minutes, October 2............................................... 859
Minutes, October 6............................................... 860
Minutes, October 10.............................................. 861
Minutes, October 11.............................................. 862
Minutes, October 23.............................................. 863
Minutes, October 23.............................................. 864
Minutes, October 31.............................................. 865
Minutes, October 31.............................................. 866
Minutes, November 1.............................................. 867
Minutes, November 2.............................................. 868
Need for Open Hearing with Secretary Rusk on U.S. Policy Toward
Southeast Asia, November 7..................................... 869
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Minutes, November 16............................................. 926
Briefing on the Vietnam Situation, November 16................... 927
Testimony of Elsworth Bunker, U.S. Ambassador to South
Vietnam
Minutes, November 17............................................. 972
Motions Regarding Testimony by the Secretary of State, November
30............................................................. 973
Minutes, December 7.............................................. 991
Minutes, December 8.............................................. 992
Minutes, December 12............................................. 993
Briefing on Greece and the Middle East, December 14.............. 995
Testimony of Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary of State
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Briefing on News Stories on the NLF in Saigon and the U.N.,
December 14.................................................... 1027
Testimony of Nicholas DeB. Katzenbach, Acting Secretary of
State
Minutes, December 15............................................. 1065
APPENDICES
A. Committee on Foreign Relations Publication for 1967: Hearings,
Committee Prints, Senate Documents and Reports................. 1067
B. Volumes Published to Date in the Historical Series............ 1071
PREFACE
----------
``You certainly are getting more than your share of
crises,'' one senator commiserated with Secretary of State Dean
Rusk during an executive session of the Foreign Relations
Committee in 1967. Although national attention necessarily
focused on the war in Vietnam, where the United States had sent
a half million troops and spent billions of dollars to fight a
war that had come to seem endless, foreign policy crises were
erupting around the world that year at an alarming rate.
Members of the Foreign Relations Committee displayed
mounting skepticism about Vietnam, discounting the overly
optimistic reports they received from the State Department and
from U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Elsworth Bunker.
Increasingly, committee members looked toward a negotiated
settlement as more likely than a military victory in Vietnam.
Because of such attitudes, the administration of President
Lyndon B. Johnson kept the committee at arm's length on
anything related to the war. Secretary Rusk cancelled scheduled
appearances to testify so often during the year that Senator
Albert Gore, Sr., complained of seriously impaired
communications between the committee and the State Department.
Instead of Vietnam, therefore, the committee devoted its
hearings to the state of the world, from a coup in Greece to a
war in the Middle East and a rebellion in the Congo. However,
members always kept in mind the potential connections between
the Vietnam war and events occurring elsewhere.
Committee members worried that America's preoccupation with
Vietnam could serve as an invitation to troublemaking in Asia,
Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. Committee chairman J.
William Fulbright cited involvement in Southeast Asia as having
hindered the United States' response to the ``Six-Day War''
between Israel and its Arab neighbors. ``I do not hesitate to
make a decision that the Middle East is far more important to
the security of this country than Vietnam,'' Senator Fulbright
lectured Secretary Rusk--who earlier that year had assured the
committee he did not foresee a war in the Middle East. In his
own explanation of the world situation, Secretary Rusk insisted
that the United States was fighting communist aggression where
it existed, not communism as an ideology in the abstract. He
wanted to assure the committee that despite the war, the
Johnson administration sought detente with the Soviet Union,
but committee members remained dubious. By the year's end,
Senator Claiborne Pell chided an assistant secretary of state
that the administration seemed to see everything that happened
anywhere as ``one vast Communist plot, and that what went on in
any part of the world had its effect in any other part of the
world because the strings are all being pulled from one
place.''
Through its hearings, the committee also demonstrated
concern over the ``militarization'' of U.S. foreign policy.
Subcommittees devoted a great deal of time to examining arms
sales in the Middle East and in the Indian-Pakistani
territorial disputes, and followed closely the development of
anti-ballistic missile systems and the negotiations for nuclear
non-proliferation. Senator Eugene McCarthy complained that the
Johnson administration had embraced an arms sales philosophy
that unless the United States sold arms to other countries it
would lose its influence over the policies of those countries.
Vietnam and its larger implications caused committee
members to ponder the Senate's constitutional responsibilities
over foreign policy. When President Johnson sent planes to the
Congo, Senator Fulbright raised the possibility of the
president sending as many troops as he wanted without
congressional authorization. ``I do not see that it would be
entirely inconsistent with Vietnam or any other place,'' the
chairman said to Secretary Rusk. ``How many did you send to the
Dominican Republic? You sent 22,000. You could have sent
100,000 if you wanted. I do not know why you could not sent
100,000 or 200,000 into the Congo if you thought it
desirable.'' He added, ``I do not know where you draw the line
here.'' During another closed committee meeting, Senator
Fulbright complained to his colleagues: ``I get fed up with
being told we are committed to something all the time,'' simply
because the president said the nation is committed. That was
not what he meant by commitment, Fulbright asserted: ``I think
the commitment is something that is taken by the Congress and
the Executive, not just a unilateral action.''
Committee members of both parties agreed that a Republican
Policy Committee report had asked the single pertinent question
of the year: what is our national interest in Southeast Asia?
For all their efforts, the committee could never get a
satisfactory response from the Johnson administration.
Admitting his mistake in supporting the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution and his assumption that President Johnson had not
intended to widen the war, Fulbright lamented that the war had
``grown so gradually that we never have been able quite to get
the full impact of where we are going.'' That sense of drift
and helplessness pervades these hearings.
The selection of transcripts for these volumes represents
the editor's choice of the material possessing the most
usefulness and interest for the widest audience. Subheads,
editorial notes, and some documents discussed in the hearings,
are added to bring the events into perspective. Any material
deleted (other than ``off the record'' references for which no
transcripts were made) has been noted in the appropriate
places, and transcripts not included are represented by minutes
of those sessions, in chronological sequences. Unpublished
transcripts and other records of the committee for 1967 are
deposited at the National Archives, where they are available to
researchers under the access rules of that agency. Some
transcripts may require further declassification procedures.
In accordance with the general policy of the series,
portions of the volumes were submitted to the Departments of
State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency for
review and comment.
The Foreign Relations Committee extends its appreciation to
the Senate Committee on Armed Services for its cooperation in
approving the release of those sessions in which its members
participated.
This volume was prepared for publication by Donald A.
Ritchie of the Senate Historical Office.
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr.
FUTURE HEARINGS
----------
Wednesday, January 11, 1967
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:20 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Morse,
Gore, Church, Symington, Dodd, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper,
Aiken, Carlson, and Mundt.
Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Holt, and Mr.
Henderson of the committee staff.
The Chairman. I think the committee will come to order. We
have a quorum here.
Congratulations to everybody and the committee in
particular. We have a quorum the first morning.
reduction of u.s. forces in europe
Well, gentlemen, the main purpose of this is just to
discuss a variety of things. One of the letters I suppose we
ought to take up first is Senator Mansfield's. I have a letter
here signed yesterday addressed to me about Senate Resolution
300 which was introduced last summer regarding how a
substantial reduction in U.S. forces permanently stationed in
Europe can be made without adversely affecting either our
resolve or agreement to meet our commitments under the North
Atlantic Treaty.
This letter was addressed to me personally, asking if I
wished to join in its sponsorship, but the reason I bring it up
here----
Senator Mundt. Who wrote the letter?
The Chairman. Mike Mansfield. He introduced the resolution
last summer.
The reason I am bringing it up here is not whether I should
sign it or not but is about its procedure. He proposes, I
think, to take this up on the floor without any committee
dealing.
Now, when this matter was considered before on increasing
from two to six, we had extensive hearings. This committee and
Armed Services.
As a procedural matter it seems to me very bad not to send
this kind of resolution to some committee because, well from
your point of view, no Republicans participated. This came out
of the Democratic Policy Committee. If we start the precedent
of resolutions going direct to the floor from the Policy
Committee, it seems to me it is very objectionable.
What I thought, if the committee thought well of it, was
for the committee to authorize me to write a letter requesting
that it be submitted to this committee.
Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a very
brief comment that I have prepared on this matter. It is my
hope that we can confirm the Mansfield resolution relative to
troop assignment to NATO----
The Chairman. Speak a little louder. I cannot hear you.
Senator Morse. It is my hope that we can confirm the
Mansfield resolution relative to troop assignments to NATO and
that it will be referred to this committee. Since the committee
held extensive hearings last year on NATO, additional hearings
may not be necessary although there have been rather dramatic
changes in Germany and in German attitudes toward Eastern
Europe since our hearings. In any case, I think the resolution
should be referred to this committee and reported out before it
goes before the Senate.
role of the policy committee
The Party Policy Committee should not become a substitute
for a standing legislative committee, and I agree with the
Chairman that I think that a resolution of this importance
should be submitted to the committee first and not go to the
floor of the Senate.
As you know, that has been my position for many years in
the Senate, that committees should not be by-passed. You always
have the protection, if it becomes necessary, of sending a
legislative matter to a committee under instructions and you
always have the protection of discharging a committee if the
committee seeks to bury the legislation.
But I speak respectfully, I think if this is still the
position of the majority leader, and I am surprised it is,
because I thought I read in the paper some time ago a statement
attributed to him that he was not insisting on the matter going
directly to the floor.
The Chairman. I make it clear this letter does not insist
on it. But I thought it was his idea before that it do that,
and I was anticipating this question and that is why I brought
it here. He did expect it to be taken up, I think, last summer
without going to the committee.
Senator Morse. He did. He made this argument, but I only
want to say, and I close, that I would support the suggestion
of the chairman that the letter be sent to the majority leader
advising that it go to the Foreign Relations Committee to hear
it.
In fairness to the Armed Services Committee, I want to say
it may very well be that it should go to the Foreign Relations
Committee and then to the Armed Services Committee or possibly
that we have joint hearings on it, but I do not think that the
Foreign Relations Committee should give up what I think is its
right to pass on this resolution because of its clear foreign
policy import.
Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, I fully agree with what has
been said, with what you say and what Senator Morse says.
problems with joint hearings
Personally, I would just like to see it referred to this
committee with the idea that we could act on it and then refer
it to the Armed Services Committee, if we felt proper, rather
than having joint hearings. Those hearings were pretty painful
proceedings.
The Chairman. There are too many people.
Senator Sparkman. Yes, and if it is authorized I will make
a motion to the effect that the chairman be instructed to
follow that course.
The Chairman. Yes, that is in order.
Is there any further discussion?
Senator Hickenlooper?
military v. foreign policy
Senator Hickenlooper. I have some reservations on this.
First, I thoroughly agree that under no circumstances should
this--if we can prevent it--resolution go directly to the floor
from a strictly party committee such as the Republican Policy
Committee or the Democrat Policy Committee, or anything else. I
think it is a terrible practice.
Number two, I would like to hear a little bit more
justification why it should go to this committee rather than
the Armed Services Committee. I think maybe it should, at least
we should have something to say about it, but it seems to me
that the question of the reduction in force in Europe under an
alliance agreement, and that is what it is over there, that is
primarily either a professional area or a top executive area
discussion on national defense.
Senator Morse. Would you yield, Bourke, on that point?
Senator Hickenlooper. Yes, I just want to have some
discussion, I am not committed.
Senator Morse. I only make a one sentence comment. The
original commitment came from this committee. The original NATO
commitment was a Foreign Relations Committee matter.
Senator Hickenlooper. We do not handle the military conduct
of the war; we may sign a treaty.
Senator Morse. But there is no question of military under
this treaty because it is the relationship to foreign policy.
Senator Sparkman. I think this is wrapped up in foreign
policy implications.
a political matter
The Chairman. I think so, too. To me this is not a war.
This is political judgment as to the relationship between
Western Europe, ourselves, and Russia. The reason for NATO
really was fear of invasion of Western Europe by Russia and
this entails, in my view, essentially a political judgment as
to what those relations are now and whether or not there is
justification for the continuation of, well, NATO as such, and
certainly how much you do in pursuance of NATO.
I would think as between the two this is far more a
political matter at this stage than it is military.
Frank was the NATO man last year. What do you say?
Senator Church. Well, I would agree with that, Mr.
Chairman, particularly inasmuch as the level of troops to be
maintained there turns on political considerations fully as
much as military considerations. In fact, the major arguments
for retaining so large a force had been based in recent years
not upon a military assessment, but rather upon the political
consequences of reductions, particularly West Germany, and of
course the whole Gaullist attitude toward the disposition of
American forces is a political one.
It seems to me that it is all inextricably bound into
foreign policy considerations.
Senator Clark. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
INTERNAL SENATE POLITICS
Senator Clark. I would certainly support this motion, but I
am a little bit concerned about the internal Senate politics of
this and wondering whether we cannot get off on perhaps a
little better foot in this session than we have sometimes in
the past. Whether it would be desirable for the chairman before
he writes a letter to sit down with Dick Russell and Senator
Mansfield and see if some amicable arrangement agreeable to all
three could be worked out.
Now, Stuart is not here; he wants to come. Maybe I am not
as good a mind reader as I think I am, but he is on both Armed
Services and this committee, and I suspect that he would be a
little bit upset if we were to assert sole jurisdiction.
John Sparkman will remember that at that meeting of the
NATO Parliamentarians in Paris in November, which he and I both
attended, there were a couple of pretty belligerent fellows
from the House of Representatives who really kind of took the
point of view that NATO is primarily a military alliance. They
were not much in favor of any efforts to get a better
relationship either with de Gaulle--you remember at that
briefing, John, those fellows gave Chip Bohlen and Cleveland
such a bad time, and I know that the NATO Parliamentarian group
is kind of split on the political committee which would rather
switch than fight and the military committee which wanted to
relieve tensions. I believe it might be worthwhile to see if we
cannot work out an arrangement with the Armed Services.
I agree that joint hearings are kind of rough. There are
too many people. But maybe some sort of genius can come along
which would work out a friendly relationship, either refer it
here first and there second, or get some kind of an agreement
that a committee of the two committees should sit, just in the
interests of hoping that the 90th Congress will not get off on
yackety yack between the Armed Services and the Foreign
Relations Committees which we are going to have on Vietnam
anyway.
The Chairman. That is a good suggestion. I would like to
work it out, and I do not think you meant to be exclusive.
Senator Morse. Not at all. I made the point maybe we ought
to have joint meetings.
The Chairman. I would object because they are unwieldy and
difficult to conduct when you have got that many people. And I
would think it would be better to have it here and then Armed
Services.
What do you think about that? I think Joe has a point.
Senator Sparkman. I think it is a good idea.
The Chairman. I do not want to have a row and have a
contest right off the bat. Do you think it would just be better
I talk to Mike Mansfield about it? But I would like to be able
to say the committee feels it ought to come here.
Is there anybody who does not feel that way?
ADVISE THE LEADERSHIP
Senator Morse. I think, Mr. Chairman, that you ought to
talk to Mike and also talk to Everett Dirksen and probably the
two of them together. I am sure they do not agree but
nevertheless I think that it is important that the minority
leader be advised, too.
Senator Clark. Do you not think you ought to talk to Dick,
too?
Senator Morse. I think that was agreed.
The Chairman. How do you feel about that? I do not want to
say. Do you feel they ought to come here?
USURPATION OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES
Senator Hickenlooper. I feel we have an interest in it, but
I feel that probably 60 percent of the interest is in the Armed
Services Committee or should be, and I go a step further. We
have noticed in the last year or two or three the usurpation of
certain fields of activity that ought to be in the Foreign
Relations Committee taken up by other committees, and we get
our tail over the dashboard a little bit on that. I guess there
is not much we can do about that. But we can, of course--this
may be the committee's area of responsibility, but we are
getting into other fields, I suppose. I just feel that 40
percent of it is probably here and 60 percent belongs to Armed
Services Committee. I think both committees ought to take a
look at it, but not with a joint meeting. I agree it is almost
impossible to get any satisfactory results.
CREATE TWO SUBCOMMITTEES
Senator Morse. It is possible, Mr. Chairman, to have one of
Joe's suggestions where you can have two subcommittees or a
subcommittee of each of the two committees hold the hearings
and report to their full committee.
The Chairman. That is a possibility. What does the
committee think about that?
Senator Clark. Why do you not explore it with Mike and
Dick?
The Chairman. I will be glad to explore it. I wanted an
expression of how you feel about it. Do you all, Karl, do you
think we have an interest?
Senator Mundt. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I think in this
particular instance we have a better claim to jurisdiction than
the Armed Services Committee.
The Chairman. That is what I wondered.
Senator Mundt. What Frank says is exactly right. It is the
political implications we are going to listen to mostly. They
are not going to talk about the fear of an immediate invasion
from Russia. If there have been any military affairs
implications it must be connected with the war in Vietnam in
some way, about the deployment of troops. But I do not want to
get into a quarrel with the other group either.
I would think we could pass some kind of a resolution
saying that the Foreign Relations Committee feels that there
should be hearings, whether we want to have participation or
something, and I do not know how far we have to go in
nursemaiding the Armed Services Committee on these matters.
It is perfectly all right to consult, but I think you would
be fortified if you went there and said, ``We are going to have
them. We didn't want to have a quarrel. Do you want to have
subcommittees, joint committees?''
Do you want them to come in tandem or how, but I definitely
feel we ought to have a hearing.
Senator Carlson. I agree with the chairman on it.
Senator Aiken. We ought to look it over. The military
aspect, as Karl says, will probably relate to deployment of
troops that might be taken out there.
The Chairman. It is just more what you do with the troops,
whether or not you go here or over to Vietnam. That is a matter
which is military.
Senator Aiken. We have a political and economic situation
involved.
Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, I think this idea of having
two subcommittees could work, but I think it would be
preferable to have it before the full Foreign Relations
Committee, although that could be explored.
The Chairman. Well, then, if I understand it correctly I
will take it up and talk to the majority leader about it, and I
assume we will probably then talk either with him or separately
with Dick Russell and the Republican leader.
Well, that disposes of that.
TESTIMONY OF SECRETARY RUSK
I think you have already had notice that the Secretary,
Secretary Rusk, has agreed to come in executive session on
January 16 and in open session on January 23. He called me and
asked, requested, that our hearings not go longer than a full
morning, that is when it is in open, because of the strain and
the lights and so on. He is assuming there will be television--
I do not know whether there will or not. I guess there will;
there usually is when he appears. And I said that I thought
that was a reasonable request. He said he would rather, because
of the strain and the lights. So I said we would agree to have
it run one day up until 1 o'clock, say.
Mr. Marcy brings up a question that is always a difficult
one. He says that Senator Symington cannot come on the 16th. He
wishes it to go on the 17th, and this creates a problem that if
we wanted to run over in executive session--what I said about
going in the afternoon applies only to open session with lights
and all that. It does not apply to executive session. He would
not be free on the afternoon of the 17th.
Senator Pell. Excuse me, I would like to bring up a point
here, too, if I can.
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Pell. And that is I realize it is a good idea for a
few people questioning because it goes through with greater
ease, but when meetings are scheduled for Monday morning at 10,
it is very difficult sometimes for those of us who, if we have
a speaking engagement--I may be in the minority on this, I do
not know if anybody else shares the same view, and as a matter
of routine when we have the choice and initiative, could not
meetings be scheduled for Tuesday mornings and not Monday
mornings?
The Chairman. Well, Tuesdays are our regular meetings for
the conduct of our regular business such as I have got--I have
got several other items I am coming to; for example, the
consular agreement mentioned last night. Katzenbach came and
said he wanted us to take it up, and we have hearings. If you
mean we will not just utilize Monday, it is going to make it
very difficult. That means Friday, too.
Senator Pell. Fridays it does not mean because people do
shove off, they shove off in the afternoon but maybe I am the
only one, in which case I withdraw my point, but----
The Chairman. I would like to accommodate the members. How
do you members, all of you, feel about Monday? We are going to
have an awful heavy schedule because there are a number of
things I am going to mention in a minute.
Senator Mundt. I would rather have Monday than Friday.
Senator Hickenlooper. We have other meetings and it could
be Tuesday.
Senator Aiken. Get it over with.
Senator Pell. I am in a minority so I withdraw.
The Chairman. You do not live far away so you cannot get
back on Monday.
Senator Pell. I made two speaking engagements that day.
The Chairman. You do not speak on Sunday, do you?
[Discussion off the record.]
Senator Pell. So I am in the same condition on the 23rd
where I probably will not be able to be here.
The Chairman. Well, you know, as big a committee as this
is, there is going to be somebody, I think, nearly every day,
and we just almost have to proceed in some way.
Senator Pell. Yes.
The Chairman. With that understanding, the executive is on
the 16th and open on the 23rd.
SIZE OF THE COMMITTEE
By the way, did the Steering Committee take action on the
size of the committee?
Senator Clark. Yes; this has to still be off the record.
[Discussion off the record.]
APPEARANCE BY SECRETARY MCNAMARA
The Chairman. McNamara, we have contacted McNamara. His
position is simply that he would like to appear before Armed
Services before this committee, and I wrote to Russell and he
feels that way. So he will appear there first and the date has
not been set, has it, Marcy, you have not heard any further
about it?
Mr. Marcy. No, sir.
The Chairman. It is not that he does not want to come, but
simply he would like to appear in public before that committee
and then we will have him as it is agreeable after that.
I mentioned the consular agreement. The President, as you
know, mentioned it last night. Katzenbach has already----
Senator Hickenlooper. He mentioned so much last night I
must have missed that.
The Chairman. It was buried down----
Senator Sparkman. With east and west trade.
The Chairman. But Katzenbach came up and said they are
anxious to proceed with it.
The question is what do you think about hearings? We have
had some hearings. It is my understanding that--in fact, I have
some letters here, limited to official use, from Douglas
MacArthur referring to Mr. Hoover's attitude toward this, and I
understand Mr. Hoover feels that his former testimony may have
been--I do not know whether you would say distorted a bit. He
is not adamant against this at all. If I understand it
correctly he simply made the observation that it would entail
additional surveillance, I guess you would say. But he is not
of the view that it should not be done is the way I understand
it. You can look at it if you like.
MISINFORMATION ON CONSULAR TREATY
Senator Carlson. I want to say on this consular treaty, our
people may be getting misinformed. I am getting a lot of mail
and we ought to have some additional hearings.
The Chairman. The Liberty Lobby has mounted a strong
campaign against it, relying I think primarily on the former
testimony of Mr. J. Edgar Hoover.
Senator Carlson. If we have a hearing, it may clear up some
of this.
The Chairman. I think we should, too. Does everybody
believe that?
Senator Sparkman. I do.
The Chairman. Any objection?
Senator Clark. If I may make one very brief comment, when I
was in Russia in November and before I went, when I talked with
Dobrynin\1\ in a briefing, the Russians really could not care
less about this consular treaty because they think it is so
much more to our advantage than it is to theirs, with which I
agree, that they are not pushing particularly hard. I think it
is very much to our advantage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Soviet Ambassador to the U.S. Anatoly Dobrynin.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Chairman. I do, too. I think it is to our advantage.
Senator Sparkman. I think it would ease a lot of pain if
you could get a modification of Hoover's statement because it
has been----
Senator Dodd. Is this on the troop commitment to Western
Europe?
The Chairman. We have discussed that. We wanted to bring it
up after you got here. We discussed that at some length.
SENSE OF THE POLICY COMMITTEE
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I almost mentioned in the
caucus yesterday but I did not, the Democratic caucus, that I
am fairly certain that it was the sense of the majority, if not
all of the members of the Policy Committee, that this should be
referred to a joint committee of the Armed Services and Foreign
Relations Committee, and when the majority leader did not bring
it up, I mentioned it to somebody who was sitting there, who
was on the Policy Committee, and he said he understood
Mansfield was going to take it up with you as to what would be
the preference. But I know that my feeling, as the only member
of both committees, was that it should go before a joint
committee of Armed Services and Foreign Relations.
It is clear that it involves both committees very
fundamentally and very definitely, and in their mission, you
might say, so I hope it would be agreeable to this committee.
The Chairman. We have just discussed it. It is agreeable, I
mean in the sense of jurisdiction. There was quite a strong
sentiment if you got both full committees together it is
unwieldy. We suggested that it either go to the committees
successively, one and then the other, or a joint subcommittee
so you do not have so many people at one time where it is
unsatisfactory.
Senator Symington. I only wanted to report to you the way
it was left in the Policy Committee.
The Chairman. What would you think of it going to this
committee first and then that committee?
Senator Symington. I think that would be wrong. I would
rather see a joint subcommittee.
The Chairman. You would rather have a joint subcommittee.
Senator Symington. Yes, because there is so much work
involved.
The Chairman. Take eight or ten of this committee and join
with them together.
Senator Symington. That is right; this committee has a
tremendous amount of work and we have this draft law, as well
as appropriations and authorizations. There was some
resistance, I think it is fair to say, to doing it at all
because of the amount of work involved. This time I think we
ought to either fish or cut bait, because of these tremendous
expenses abroad. They are absolutely incredible under the
circumstances in the amount of money they are asking for in the
Far East and the amount of bodies they are asking for.
A PSYCHOLOGICAL BARRIER
Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, may I say--Tom and Stu were
not here--I would much prefer the joint subcommittee to going
to one committee or the other first because, let us face it,
there is a psychological barrier there, people being what they
are, and if it comes here first, people on the Armed Services
Committee, some, will psychologically be disturbed. If it is
the other way, there will be some here. I think a joint
subcommittee would be much better than going to one committee
first and then the other. I agree with you, Mr. Chairman, that
having a joint hearing of the two full committees is very
unwieldy. I do not think it is necessary
After all, each full committee will take it up on the basis
of the report of their subcommittee.
Senator Clark. Mr. Chairman, can I put in a plug, in
passing, for a more frequent use of subcommittees, either ad
hoc or the standing subcommittees, in order to expedite our
work?
The Chairman. Mr. Marcy and I have been talking about that
and we will talk about it further, I mean with the committee. I
think you are right, we ought to use that more. If I understand
it and everybody is agreeable to the Senator from Missouri's
suggestion preferring the joint subcommittee meeting.
Senator Morse. On Joe's subcommittee comment, I would like
to say that later in the morning I have on my agenda to raise
with the committee a subcommittee matter. I will cover it then,
and I quite agree with Joe.
RESCHEDULING SECRETARY RUSK'S TESTIMONY
Senator Symington. Can I bring up something you passed on?
I have a very important engagement next Sunday, almost as
important as the U.N. organization in 1945, when the Kansas
City Chiefs are going to show the National Football League they
have got the thing sewed up as much as they think they have.
With that premise, I was hoping that perhaps Secretary Rusk
could come on Tuesday. I talked to Carl about it and I talked
to the Secretary about it, because it is impossible for me to
get back here in time in the morning. I just thought, I would
hope, that you could because there is no way I can get back at
10 o'clock on Monday morning. I could get back in the
afternoon, but I would hope--the Secretary said it would be all
right with him if it would be all right with you. He did on the
17th. I spoke to him and he spoke to Carl, and I asked Carl to
speak to you.
Senator Pell. I subscribe, for the reason I already said,
to what Stuart said. Monday morning at 10 is very difficult.
Friday mornings at 10 we are around. But Monday morning is very
difficult.
Senator Symington. I am going to try to hold all my
engagements to weekends the way this thing happened last year,
but this makes Monday morning difficult.
Senator Aiken. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me any member of
this committee who cannot be here Monday morning can afford to
buy a Sunday paper and learn everything that we will be told
Monday morning.
Senator Sparkman. Did you see Bart Starr's picture, you
know, big color?
Senator Symington. I would like to ask this question. If it
is going to be a question that he could come back in the
afternoon on Monday but he could not do it on Tuesday, then if
I can get here in time for Monday afternoon, could we have an
agreement that he will be back Monday afternoon?
The Chairman. Oh, sure.
Senator Symington. I withdraw my objections.
The Chairman. That was one of the main reasons we preferred
Monday was the fact he could be here in the afternoon because
it is likely we would not get through with him in any case.
Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, could I be the devil's
advocate for just a moment?
The Chairman. Yes.
SENATORS ACCOMMODATING THEMSELVES TO COMMITTEE SCHEDULE
Senator Morse. I am very fond of the Senator from Missouri,
as he knows. I am talking now of any relationships to any
requests that have been made. It is my opinion that the
efficiency of this committee was greatly interfered with last
year because of the generosity of our chairman in trying to
accommodate the personal requests of members of the committee.
I think this is the time for us to adopt a procedure policy at
the beginning of the session as follows: Namely, that although
we would like to have people at our meetings that cannot be
there, we have just got to accommodate ourselves to the
committee schedule, and, if we cannot be there, we cannot be
there. But I do not see, Mr. Chairman, how you can run this
committee if you never knew whether or not a date you have set
is one that you are going to be able to carry out.
I would like to suggest that as a matter of policy, we
decide this morning that if we cannot be at the meetings, that
if just too bad, but we are going to have to accommodate
ourselves to the schedule.
Senator Symington. There is one point about that if the
Senator will bear with me, because a great many of this
committee are members of the Finance Committee on both sides of
the aisle, which I am not, and I find there is a great deal of
adjustment of the dates on the Finance and Foreign Relations
Committees. Inasmuch as I am the sole member on Armed Services,
I hope my beloved friend from the State of Oregon will not
object to working it out. Even when I am here, I get badly
stuck between two----
Senator Morse. You missed my point. My point is that the
chairman has got to work out what should be our schedule of
hearings. He has to do it with other committees and find out
what our membership and conflict is with other committees. But
my point is he has to work out a schedule and we have to follow
the schedule.
Every time you get an exception, may I say, for X or Y on
this committee, you inconvenience A and B. They may not say
anything, but every time you change it A and B are discommoded
and I think we have to have a schedule to follow.
CONFLICTS WITH OTHER COMMITTEES
The Chairman. May I say I talked to Marcy at length about
this. One reason for Monday is that it is one of the days where
practically no other committees meet and we thought--Tuesday is
a favorite day for all committees, and you run these conflicts
you are talking about, membership in other meetings.
Take Senator Gore. He is a very high ranking man on
Finance. He likes to be there, and I like to have him there
because I cannot go to it. They always meet on Tuesday, is that
not correct, practically always, on other days. Mondays was one
of the reasons why it looks inconvenient from your point of
view. It is free from those other conflicts more than most days
of the week.
Senator Pell. The only question that comes to my mind is
the planning ahead. Sometimes you want to make one day in your
home area; should it be a weekday, should it be a Monday, or
should it be a Friday? We have to weigh these things. As a rule
I thought--I have always got the feeling that Monday was
probably the better day to choose as opposed to Friday. Monday
morning, as happens in Senator Symington's case, is the
earliest to get back.
The Chairman. He is only going to be out there once. He
will be very disillusioned about that.
Senator Pell. Friday, on the other hand, people may leave
but they always leave in the afternoon.
Senator Morse. We have to cancel some meetings. I canceled
a meeting up in George Aiken's state. I was supposed to lecture
up there in the university. I notified them I could not do it
and I canceled it.
The Chairman. I would like to do the best I can with the
committee. I need guidance. We thought this was an idea. I will
do anything that the consensus believes in.
Senator Carlson. I just want to say this. I want the
chairman to set the meetings. I am going to have to miss some.
But I do not want anything to interfere with this meeting next
Sunday in San Francisco. I want the Senator from Missouri to be
there and bring back the bacon.
PROBLEMS TRAVELING TO THE WEST
Senator Mundt. I think what Wayne said makes a lot of
sense. I would like to add one little codicil. If you will
follow the practice of what you have done here of giving us a
little advance notice, like a week, we can adjust to your
schedule. I agree you cannot change your schedule for an
individual member without interfering with some other member.
We have an altogether different problem out West from what Clay
has. He cannot be back Monday morning. I cannot get back home
unless I leave Friday morning, so it varies. Set it and give us
a week or so notice and we will adjust, like Wayne canceled a
meeting.
The Chairman. I am certainly open to suggestions, and Mr.
Marcy has been around here a long time. He sort of thought
Mondays and Tuesdays--Tuesdays are our regular days and Monday
would fit in as well as any day with anybody. But I do not want
to be arbitrary about it. As far as I am concerned, it is about
half dozen of one and six of the other.
Senator Symington. One more point I have following Karl's
point, too. If we do try to go out on weekends, which is what I
am going to do this year, then I respectfully say because of
the problem of getting back from your state and my state that
Tuesday and Wednesday would be better than Monday and Tuesday.
If you come back Sunday, you fly all day Sunday night which
cripples you a little bit and you can get back sometime Monday,
and then Tuesday and Wednesday it gives you a chance to get out
Friday. It takes you a little longer than it does me.
Senator Hickenlooper. Are you establishing a Tuesday to
Thursday club?
Senator Symington. Thursday is Armed Services.
[Discussion off the record.]
The Chairman. I will talk to Mr. Marcy further. Personally,
it does not make much difference to me. I am perfectly
agreeable to any way. I would just like to accommodate as many
as possible and get as many people here. We did pretty well
last year.
THE SPACE TREATY
Let me go over a few other things. The space treaty is one
which we anticipate will be signed this month and they will, I
know, they have already mentioned it, want it acted on quickly
because of their--they think it is psychologically important.
Katzenbach has mentioned it, and so that is another matter
which I am sure we will have hearings on. This is what I meant
a moment ago. We are going to have to utilize more than Monday
and Tuesday. This is just starting with Rusk. I think we are
going to be Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday very likely when you
get into these other matters that I mentioned.
[Discussion off the record.]
HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES
The Chairman. Then we have a few other things. These things
bother me, no end. I wonder what you all think or should we
just forget about them. I get these letters all the time. They
come here you know, there are--I mean on the human rights
things, what do you all think about those? Should we forget
them or should we act on them? You have been to the U.N.--by
the way, I think we ought to have a time set aside--I want to
hear what the Senator from Idaho has to say about his
experience in the U.N. But this is a matter particularly
relating to the U.N. What do you think about it?
Senator Church. Of course there is a good deal of feeling
up there that is adverse to the United States on this matter
because although we have voted finally for the approval of
these conventions, we have never ratified any of them. As time
has passed, more and more comment, adverse comment, has
developed against us on the ground that we are not really for
these conventions and the proof of it is that, although we go
through the motions in the U.N. where they have been approved
by very large majorities, we have failed to ratify these
conventions and make them a part--make them binding treaties.
I have not studied the conventions very carefully, but I
think with the possibility of certain reservations that may be
necessary, we could proceed with hearings, obviously secure the
ratification of some of the conventions without any difficulty.
Senator Dodd. Is the Genocide Convention one of those?
Senator Church. Yes, it is one of those. But I think if we
were to move on any one, perhaps the one that would encounter
the least difficulty, it would be helpful to us with the U.N.
We really do not care about these and we know the African and
Asian countries are quite--they put a lot of store in these
conventions.
Senator Sparkman. When you refer to the human rights
convention, is that an old one or was it passed in the U.N.
either this or last year?
Senator Church. This relates, it relates back several
years.
The Chairman. It is an old one, the one I had in mind.
Mr. Marcy. There are three of those that have been up here
since, in the Kennedy regime--yes, they came July of '63. There
is one on the convention of political rights for women. There
is another one, the convention concerning the abolition of
forced labor. There is a third, a supplementary convention on
the abolition of slavery, the slave trade, an institution of
practices similar to slavery, and then there is the genocide
convention, which has been with us since 1949.
Senator Sparkman. Those three that you mentioned
specifically though, they are relatively new.
Mr. Marcy. They are, yes.
Senator Sparkman. I think they were adopted in that
preceding session of the General Assembly. The genocide is old,
and I think there is a human rights with it also, adopted way
back in '57.
DIFFICULT FOR OTHER NATIONS TO UNDERSTAND U.S. POSITION
Senator Church. Just a reading of these, particularly
reference to slavery and women's rights and that kind of thing,
it is very difficult for many of these countries to understand
why the United States with all our talk of democratic rights
and individual liberties and equality and so forth cannot find
it possible to ratify conventions against slavery.
Senator Hickenlooper. One reason they do not understand
some of those things, they do not understand the American
system of government. They do not understand these treaties can
abrogate or replace under certain conditions some of the
provisions of our Constitution.
Senator Church. I know.
Senator Hickenlooper. For one I am not for letting the
African countries run this country through emotion or
otherwise. They have been doing it for a little while, and I
think it is time we stopped letting them be influential on
these things.
May I say most of these conventions, I think, can be worked
out, as Frank said, and made satisfactory.
Senator Sparkman. I was going to ask if we should act
favorably on these last three, and I understand or from what I
have heard about them, they are more or less--they are more or
less unobjectionable. Would that ease your situation?
Senator Church. John, I think anything that would break the
ice to show that we are prepared to follow through, and we will
hold hearings, and I think ratification of one or two of these
would be extremely helpful to the United States.
Senator Sparkman. I think a couple of them could be done,
maybe three of them if I heard correctly about them. But so far
as the old human rights and the genocide, those old ones, there
are about three of them are there not, two or three, I just do
not believe there is any chance.
Senator Church. Forget the old ones and take the three most
recent ones.
Senator Church. We have some constitutional problems, as
Bourke said, and we have to look at them. But there is a
possibility of ratification of some of them.
THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
Senator Pell. I would like to also, Mr. Chairman, having
had some contact with the U.N., put in a strong plug of support
for Frank's view, and I would like to particularly hope we
would not put out a hand on considering the genocide convention
because I think it is the most important one in the whole
crowd. I think the genocide convention is as important as it
was when it was considered in the late forties, and I would
hope very much indeed we would consider it.
Senator Hickenlooper. Have you studied what it will do to
the Federal Constitution?
Senator Pell. I studied it, I read it, and I realize the
problems.
Senator Hickenlooper. That is what has been holding it up
all these years.
Senator Pell. I am well aware of it.
SUBCOMMITTEE SITUATION
Senator Morse. I think here is the place where you could
assign to a subcommittee the consideration of this matter to
report to the full committee, for example, under the direction
of Senator Church. Let us face it, you cannot begin to handle
all the things that are going to come before this full
committee, if the full committee retains jurisdiction over all
of them. I think this is as good a place as any for me to renew
my proposal of last year that the full committee should approve
and authorize a program of activity for its subcommittees. The
Mansfield resolution, the Vietnam hearings, the outer space
treaty are items that will occupy the full committee, along
with others. The final report of the Committee on the
Reorganization of Congress shows this committee held far more
full committee hearings in the 88th Congress than any other
Senate committee. We held 196. The next high number was the
Commerce Committee with 127. But Foreign Relations had only 33
subcommittee meetings in the 88th Congress whereas Commerce had
116.
The full committee will have a heavy schedule of major
business in 1967. But I do not think our activity should be
limited to what the full committee can handle.
The arms races in Latin America and the Middle East are
possibilities for such a subcommittee. So is a full review of
the Alliance for Progress and many other items that could be
handled either under existing subcommittees, or special ad hoc
committees.
Mr. Chairman, let us face it with the kind of a setup we
have in this committee for your subcommittees, they are going
to be appendages, in my judgment, with very little
effectiveness. I speak most respectfully because of my high
regard for our staff, but this staff cannot handle full
committee business and subcommittee business.
This committee has, in my judgment, unlike most committees
in the Senate, never sought to get the financial support, the
staff support, that a Foreign Relations Committee ought to
have. I renew my suggestion that you take these subcommittees,
you recognize that their staffs be enlarged, that they be given
staff, under the supervision of the chairman and the
professional director of the staff, Mr. Marcy.
LATIN AMERICAN SUBCOMMITTEE
But let me as a special pleader tell you about my problem
in the Latin American subcommittee. I cannot possibly carry on
what needs to be done on the Latin American subcommittee if I
am going to have to rely on the existing staff. Carl Marcy and
Pat Holt and Lowenstein and the rest of them cannot possibly
give to me the professional assistance that I need to conduct
the kind of hearings that ought to be conducted on Latin
America. Alliance for Progress ought to be gone into.
I want to say that I have already had two conferences with
Assistant Secretary Sol Linowitz, who by the way, has made a
tremendously favorable impression on me. He talked to me before
the President sent him to Latin America. He talked to me after
he came back. I want to have an early meeting of the
subcommittee in the late afternoon in which I would invite the
full committee, to which I would always invite the full
committee if I am given jurisdiction to conduct some of these
things, and have him brief us. I think he is terrific in his
understanding already of Latin American policy.
But I want to say, Mr. Chairman, we are just kidding
ourselves if you think that these subcommittees of this
committee are more than facades. We have no real jurisdiction.
We have no staff, we have no financial resources, and I would
propose a complete reorganization of the subcommittee setup,
under the control of the Chairman, but with authority for us to
go ahead and conduct the studies that the full committee will
never get around to conducting.
I think what is needed, Mr. Chairman, we cannot do it this
morning, but you ought to get Carl Marcy and his staff to work
with some of us on various plans for a reorganization of
subcommittees. I would like to see not only my committee, but I
would like to see the NATO committee, I would like to see the
other subcommittees, start subcommittee hearings this year that
amount to something.
Senator Clark. Would you yield for just a second?
Senator Morse. I am all through. I yield.
COMPARISON TO LABOR COMMITTEE
Senator Clark. I would like you to comment to the chairman
about the experience you and I both had with the Labor
Committee where we could not possibly get through the workload.
Senator Morse. That is probably why it makes me a biased
witness. We have on the Labor Committee real jurisdiction given
to the subcommittees. We have our staff, and I think, for
example, you check them for security, you approve of them on
this committee, but you give these subcommittees the needed
staff they need to do this job.
Let us face it. Marcy and his associates just cannot be of
service to these subcommittees and be of service to the full
committee to the degree that we are going to need their service
unless you are willing to make the fight to enlarge the
subcommittee staffs with some jurisdiction given to the
chairman of each subcommittee under your direction, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Sparkman asked to comment. He has to
go. Did you want to comment on it?
Senator Sparkman. Well, I merely say this. I have always
inclined toward as many meetings by the full committee as
possible for the consideration of matters. But I realize there
is a lot of truth in what the senator says, particularly with
reference to the time element and also with this problem that
we have of getting a quorum present because of conflict with
other committees.
But any way we go at it we are going to have our hands
full.
Senator Morse. Sure.
Senator Sparkman. That is all I care to say.
The Chairman. Senator Gore?
THE DISARMAMENT SUBCOMMITTEE
Senator Gore. I wanted to raise a question about a
subcommittee, the Disarmament Subcommittee, of which I happen
to be the chairman. The most interesting and entreating
paragraph in the president's speech last night was the one
which seemed to me to be addressed directly to the Soviet Union
rather than to us, and that is on the antimissile program. Here
is a disarmament question per se, and if it would be agreeable
with the subcommittee, with the full committee, I would propose
to have some hearings on this. However, it is matter of such
overweening importance, I would not wish to go into it if the
full committee wishes to do so. If the full committee can find
time to do so, fine. But it seems to me here is something of
mutual interest to the United States and to the Soviet Union,
the two countries being the only ones with the technological
competency to create such systems, and yet this has been a
decision that has been procrastinating now for many, many
months. How long it can safely be postponed without reaching
some agreement is a matter, I think, of urgency.
Of course in my view it would be far preferable that the
United States and the Soviet Union mutually agree to abstain
from such a costly and wasteful expenditure, but it is very
dangerous to this country, in my view, to procrastinate until
the Soviet Union may suddenly have a fait accompli and we are
left second.
So it seems to me this is a subject which either the full
committee or the subcommittee should examine. I am willing to
see either done, and I want to submit it to you.
Senator Clark. Mr. Chairman, I would like to support Albert
as a member of this subcommittee. I think this is probably the
most important single foreign policy matter that confronts us
today, a good deal more important than things that are
considered to be vital.
ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS
If we get ourselves into another escalation of this arms
race by the placement of antiballistic missiles around Moscow,
Leningrad, and Washington, and New York, the total cost is
going to be well over 20 billions of dollars.
Senator Symington. Eight months of the Vietnamese war.
Senator Clark. It is absolutely and fully for either
country to do it, and I think a skillful agreement pushed by
this committee could get us off the hook because it is not
outside of the Soviet's interests either.
The Chairman. That is one thing that pleased me last night
because he decided two things. From the intelligence community
it is my best information they do not believe that the Soviets
are very far along on this ABM at all. The only one that is
being currently pushed is around Moscow. It has very limited
possibilities and it is the only one, and I think he is quite
right in taking a further look. It is my impression that is
what he has in mind in the meantime, to do the best he can
diplomatically to try to----
Senator Gore. I raise no critical comment. I say this is
just a matter of such overweening importance that either this
committee or the subcommittee should go into it.
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, may I say a word?
THE AMOUNT OF WORK
First I agree without any reservation of any kind with the
position taken by the Senator from Oregon. In fact, the Chair
will remember I presented this to him sometime back.
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Symington. Because in my opinion this is the most
important committee, so long as it does not get subordinated to
the executive branch, in the Congress of the United States.
Now knowing Senator Gore, I think it would be a wonderful
thing if he could really get his teeth into this disarmament
thing.
You can do it as well as anybody around, but you have so
doggone much else to do.
The Armed Services Committee is a very important committee,
especially because it authorizes well over 60 percent, I think,
now of the budget, the United States budget. We could not do
anything that really meant anything if we did not have some
major subcommittee like Stennis's Military Preparedness
Subcommittee and Jackson's Military Construction Committee. The
Military Preparedness Subcommittee has a complete staff, with a
great many members, and they are all excellent people.
Now, everything is done just like when we testified. I used
to testify from the executive branch to committees. The
chairman of the committee is always the chairman of any
subcommittee, if he wants to be there. At times the chairman
would come in. If Mahon has a meeting and Cannon would come in,
he immediately would chair the meeting.
But from your standpoint, your health, the amount of work,
the way the world is today, I just do not think you can take it
and at the same time do a good job without impairment to your
health. I just could not be more serious about this.
One other point; just before I left, Doug MacArthur came
down to see me, and he was very upset about the Middle East.
That is the little subcommittee I happen to be the chairman of,
and he told me all about it and he said he felt that the
Israelis made a very serious mistake.
VISIT TO THE MIDDLE EAST
Well, I came back from the Far East last week through the
Middle East, and putting it mildly, in my opinion, they sure
did make a serious mistake. I spent a couple of days with Luke
Battle in Cairo, who is a very bright fellow and seemed to be
fully up on it, and has an excellent staff and then I went up
and had a long talk with Hussein in Jordan, who in my opinion
fully expects to be assassinated. He is our one great friend we
have out there.
I talked to Levi Eshkol and I did not pull any punches, and
I said, ``This is going to hurt you a lot more than anything
you have done since the state was formed in 1948.''
I talked to Abba Eban, I talked to General Moshe Dayan who
is out, the military hero.
I then stopped to talk in Athens--I spent a good many hours
with Walworth Barbour, the ambassador to Israel.
I went to Athens, and I had another break. In Athens is an
ambassador, a seasoned fellow who was formerly an assistant
secretary of state. Phil Talbot, our ambassador, and I spent a
good many hours with him, and he said, ``You see, the story
going around the Middle East and based on my experience is just
plain murder,'' he said. ``The Israelis attacked Jordan because
they knew Jordan was a friend of the U.S., but they did not
attack Syria or UAR, especially Syria, because they felt they
were friends of the Soviets,'' and also my impression was very
definitely that the UAR is moving quietly but definitely into,
further into, the Soviet bloc.
Well, these things are the kind of things, just thinking
out loud, if you could have some hearings on and just to get
information, because I noticed since I have got back that
everything that I did in Israel was very well covered by the
press, pictures in my own home town paper and that kind of
stuff, whereas there was none of it, you might say, on the Arab
side.
I am not choosing up sides. I do think they made a bad
mistake on this and their arguments are very specious as to why
they did it. I do think if we have any friend in the Arab
world, it is Hussein, and I do think he is in very serious
trouble.
So these are the kinds of things that if you held some
hearings, I think you could bring out and get a better grasp
of.
Just like I would sure like to see Albert get into this
disarmament thing and have some hearings about this situation,
because actually, without violating any security or anything,
the hearing that you, Bourke, and I went to the other day, I
was impressed with the fact that the information we got was not
coordinated or was not the same as the information released
recently by the Secretary of Defense to the American people on
that particular subject.
So you just have a lot of information floating around, and
if you do not fragment this committee into subcommittees with
some authority and some staff, always subject to the approval
of you and the full committee, I just do not think you can do
the job the way the world is today. End of statement.
COMMITTEE'S USE OF SUBCOMMITTEES
Senator Morse. I would like to have further discussion of
it at our meetings after the evidence is brought in. I want to
stress what Stu said in his last statement. My proposal does
not involve any independence of the subcommittees. My proposal
involves your approval in your capacity as chairman, and it
involves the approval of the full committee with regard to the
subject matters taken up. But once assigned to the
subcommittee, then the subcommittee will do what it does in
other committees, it acts for the full committee and reports
back to the full committee.
You know I never have hearings without sending each one of
you a letter inviting you to come to the hearings. I have not
talked to the staff. I have my information from other sources,
so I do not think it would be proper for me to involve the
staff in the inquiries that I have made. But I would like to
get all sides of it and all the facts.
I think you will find that of the major committees of the
Senate, the Foreign Relations Committee is the most
understaffed. The Foreign Relations Committee in a sense has
sort of a closed staff, a very small number of people, highly
qualified. There is no reason why a subcommittee should not be
authorized to select a subcommittee staff of two or three
people representing--serving both the majority and the minority
of the subcommittee as qualified as the people on the full
committee staff, with an expertise on the work of that
subcommittee, in the jurisdiction of that subcommittee.
SIZE OF THE COMMITTEE STAFF
My question to you is: Why is it that the Foreign Relations
Committee maintains as small a staff as we maintain when we are
up against the State Department and the Pentagon building with
almost unlimited staff to draw on? Why have we kept this staff
as small as we have kept it in comparison with other staffs?
Take the Labor Committee. We far exceed this committee, Armed
Services Committee, Stu has already stated.
I just want to say part of our problem is we do not have
the assistance that we need as members of this committee to do
our job, and I think we ought to change the staff policy of the
committee.
The Chairman. Well, I am very glad to hear this discussion.
What do you think over here on this side about it, Bourke and
George?
Senator Hickenlooper. I think you run a tremendous danger
just like other committees have run. I think a lot of these
committees have run just clear out of the reservation on their
subcommittees, vast staffs that they have set up, and they
become autonomous subcommittees practically. I think it is hard
to justify it except to give a lot of jobs to a lot of people
and a lot of autonomy to a lot of folks.
That is just the practical answer. You have asked me and I
tell you.
The Chairman. I want to know----
Senator Symington. Would you feel that way about it if you
had a Republican President and were chairman of this committee?
Senator Hickenlooper. I had thought about it during eight
years of the Eisenhower Administration.
The Chairman. George, what do you think?
Senator Aiken. Mr. Chairman, I try to practice what I
preach. I find in my own office that if they pushed up a little
bit to get their work done, they do a whale of a lot better
work than they do if there are too many people in the office.
Nobody wants to do it if they have one too many. But if they
are pushed up they take it and go and do it.
REPORTS OF THE LATIN AMERICAN SUBCOMMITTEE
Senator Hickenlooper. What Senator Morse said about his
Latin American Subcommittee, I have been on that subcommittee.
I have been on it ever since it was set up. I read every report
Pat Holt has put in about the investigations of these countries
in Latin America. I think they are more profound and more
penetrating than any subcommittee hearing that we could have
here on that subject.
Now, I don't mean to say we should not----
Senator Morse. But those very reports ought to be the basis
for a thorough and intensive study and investigation of the
subcommittee.
Senator Hickenlooper. He is very thorough and his
observations over the years have been very accurate.
Senator Morse. With all due respect to Pat Holt, he is no
substitute for the Senatorial responsibilities of the members.
Senator Hickenlooper. No.
Senator Morse. That is what you are going to make it if you
are going to turn the investigation over to the staff members.
Senator Hickenlooper. Not until there is reason to think
the staff member is inaccurate.
Senator Morse. But the point is he doesn't begin, his
reports don't begin to cover the type of study I am talking
about.
BACKGROUND ON STAFF AND SUBCOMMITTEES
Mr. Marcy. Senator, I might just remind the committee on a
little background on this.
In 1958, a subcommittee was created, of which Senator
Sparkman was chairman, to look into the whole staff problem. At
that time the committee, that is the subcommittee, recommended
to the full committee, that the present structure continue to
exist. At that time, it pointed out that the staff had six
professionals and eight clerical employees. The final
conclusion, except insofar as the subcommittee recommended the
addition of one employee to assist in the coordinating
functions in connection with the visits of distinguished
foreign visitors, that is Miss [Milrae] Jensen, it did not
believe that there should be any additions to the staff at the
present time.
Now, that was in 1958.
Senator Clark. Nine years ago. The world has sure changed
since then.
The Chairman. May I say, last year we utilized, I thought
very effectively, five ad hoc subcommittees, assigning certain
jobs to them, and they did a lot of work and reported a lot of
bills. The tax conventions, in particular, and claims
convention, legislation under Senator Sparkman.
I think we have got to move in some degree in this
connection. It is a question of how much, in my opinion, and
also it is not easy to get good qualified staff people. You
look around here and it is hard to get them, the ones that are
really qualified for this kind of work like our professional
staff.
Senator Pell?
BRINGING STAFF TO COMMITTEE MEETINGS
Senator Pell. There is another problem here along the line
of what Wayne said, which is that this is the only--it maybe a
very good idea, I haven't made up my own mind--but this is the
only committee, I believe, in the Congress where you can't
bring your own staff people in with you, and so when you have a
continuing responsibility on a specific subject that you are
following it leaves you a little scattered, because there is no
staff man you can talk to.
The Chairman. Harry Byrd never allowed one of my staff to
go to the Finance Committee. I don't think they do under any
circumstances.
Isn't that right?
Senator Dodd. We don't in Judiciary.
The Chairman. It is the custom.
Senator Dodd. We don't do it in Judiciary.
The Chairman You do not?
Senator Dodd. No.
The Chairman. I don't think it is peculiar at all.
Senator Pell. I am sorry.
The Chairman. Senator Dodd?
FOCUS ON BIG PROBLEMS AS A TOTALITY
Senator Dodd. I don't know whether it is improper or not
but I would like to hear from the staff, what they think about
this.
The Chairman. Sure, it is not improper. We have talked
about this before.
Go ahead.
Mr. Marcy. Well, Senator, this, as the members know, comes
up about every two or three years and it seems always to boil
itself down to a very fundamental question as to whether the
committee wants to focus on fairly big kinds of problems as a
totality, which is the way the committee has generally done, or
whether it wants to break up into sort of a series of
subcommittees, each going in sort of a different direction.
Senator Symington. That is not so.
Mr. Marcy. I might say that the staff has for some time
thought that it might be advisable to set up one or two, we
thought mostly in terms of one, one subcommittee which would be
kind of a continuing thing with a separate staff. It would be
assigned to specific kinds of things.
I think, for example, the problem would be illustrated if
we tried to hold hearings during the next two months on, say,
the subject of the Middle East, disarmament and the Alliance
for Progress. I think they need to be approached in sort of
separate way.
AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEES HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL
Senator Church. Mr. Chairman, I am generally in sympathy
with the position of the Senator form Oregon and the Senator
from Missouri. I think the experiment of the ad hoc committees
has been a rather successful one.
Furthermore, I don't think this committee is getting its
work done functioning as it has been functioning over the
years. I think that is quite evident in terms of the things we
haven't taken up, and in terms of the extravagant amount of
time we have had to spend on foreign aid and that sort of
thing.
So that we are not really penetrating many of these
questions as thoroughly as we should.
I think that in light, and this is no reflection on the
staff, I think this is the finest professional staff that I
know anything about, but in light of our experience with the ad
hoc committees, I don't see why we couldn't retain for the full
committee the most important things that we want to look at as
a whole committee, and give some of these subcommittees
assignments of a substantive character. Let them conduct
hearings; let them bring in their recommendations, and print
hearings for the full committee to review.
Senator Morse. Certainly.
Senator Church. And the full committee has the final say.
Set it up in such a way that we won't proliferate all over the
place. Establish the limits and give the chairman of the full
committee the final say concerning the work of the
subcommittees which they would take up.
Senator Morse. That is all I have asked for.
Senator Church. I mean this is a perfectly reasonable
request.
Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, may I make a comment?
The Chairman. Yes.
COMMITTEE HAS GAINED IMPORTANCE
Senator Gore. I think we are picking ourselves to pieces
here. I think introspection is good, but I would like to call
attention to one thing. We had a quorum this morning. Two years
ago the Chairman was complaining nobody ever attended meetings.
This committee has attained an importance in the last year that
it hasn't had in a long time. I think hearings before the
American people not only rehabilitated this committee in its
importance, but did more than anyone thing has done in a decade
to restore the co-equal status of the Legislative Branch with
the Executive. The public hearings we had, whether you agree
with what was said here or there or disagree, had an impact on
the American people no other committee of either house of
Congress has done since I have been a member of the body, which
has been 28 years now.
So I think that while we are finding fault with ourselves,
let us recall that what the committee as a whole did last year
was the single most important thing that this or any other
committee, in my opinion, has done in a long time.
So let us improve through ad hoc, through subcommittees,
through staff, but let us not forget that the most important
thing is this committee as a whole, playing its constitutional
function in the open before the American people.
Senator Church. I agree with that.
HAVE A SUBCOMMITTEE HANDLE NATO MATTERS
The Chairman. Let me say one thing. Last year I was more
than willing to have a subcommittee handle NATO and we got to
talking about it and it looked like we were downgrading NATO if
we don't have a full committee.
Remember that?
Should it be a full or subcommittee? I was for it and I
intended it for it. You went over there and when we got down
there they put it up to me, ``If you do that, it will look as
though you are not really interested in NATO,'' so they put the
pressure on me. I had to do it. That is what happened. I was
all for it.
Senator Church. That may have been a subject----
The Chairman. I mean this is what you often run into. On
these other things, the things I mentioned, there were five
subcommittees. No one thought those were so important that it
had to be full, and they went off very well and you did the
work well.
We can do that more. I am perfectly willing to do it. We
have already talked about this morning a subcommittee to meet
with Armed Services on these troops in Europe. I am all for it.
I think it would be a good idea.
Senator Church. I just wanted to say one thing. I should
think some of these U.N. conventions, for example, could be
taken up by a subcommittee.
The Chairman. I do, too.
Senator Church. And hearings held and printed hearings
distributed.
The Chairman. I do, too. I am all for this.
I do think if we move in this direction--last year I said
we will try these ad hoc and see how they work and if they work
well, we will do more of it.
I am all for it. I think we do have a couple of more staff
men, but they are hard to get. The committee did look over a
lot of them and you would be surprised how difficult it is to
get good ones.
Senator Clark. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make two
points.
EXERCISE OVERSIGHT FUNCTION
First, I would thoroughly agree the committee is not
getting its work done as expeditiously as it could and I think
the ad hoc device is an excellent thing, two or three members
well-informed and then report to the full committee for action.
So, as Senator Mansfield pointed out to all committee chairmen
including you, he believes this is a session where we ought to
exercise our oversight function, and a large part of this
committee is not legislative but oversight--Vietnam. NATO
hearings are an example.
The Chairman. That is an example.
Senator Clark. You cannot carry on more than one or two of
those things a year if you are going to have the full committee
do it, if you, Mr. Chairman, have to be the fellow out there in
the front all the time.
Now, it is true, the argument is made and to some extent it
is downgraded. But I call on my colleague from Oregon to point
out whenever they have a problem involving education they go to
the Senator from Oregon and not to the chairman of the
committee, Senator Hill, who is a wonderful magnificent
committee chairman I serve under. When they went to go to the
man on manpower problems, they come to me. But in the course of
a not too long period of time, you get the press oriented to
the fact the committee is organized so that most of the
committee work is done at a subcommittee level.
When you come to the full committee you have the most
gracious and able man in the Senate, of course present company
excepted, but we have to break down so the subcommittees can
have more status than they have now. It won't be done
overnight.
INACTIVE SUBCOMMITTEES
I have one more point. I serve on three subcommittees--
Disarmament, Economic Institutions and Tom Dodd's economic aid
problem. Those subcommittees have been pretty darned inactive
during the last two years I have been on the committees and why
have they been inactive--to some extent because the chairmen
have been too busy, but to a very large extent they have no
staff to organize witnesses, to handle it.
I think if you take those three subcommittees,
International Institutions, Disarmament, and Financial and
Economic Interests Overseas, one good staff man could start off
serving those three subcommittees as a start.
Now, Mr. William Bader has competence in that particular
area, and if we find that he can't do it by himself with those
three subcommittees maybe we ought to get more staff.
I don't have a shadow of a doubt that Wayne Morse has got
to have at least one man and maybe more to handle this Latin
American problem because Pat Holt can't do it.
GIVE FOREIGN AID BILL TO A SUBCOMMITTEE
The Chairman. Let me make one observation. You know the
Foreign Aid bill is long with this committee. What percentage
of those hearings were on foreign aid, you mentioned a great
number. About 30 or 40 percent. And it has disrupted this
committee for years. You know how much time it takes.
Senator Dodd. Couldn't you give that to a subcommittee?
The Chairman. Well, it has always been considered so
controversial and so difficult that the full committee handles
it. I would be perfectly willing to try a subcommittee.
Does everybody think that could be done with a
subcommittee?
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say,
first, my remark to Bourke was pretty fresh and I didn't mean
it that way and I regret saying it that way. I think he knows
how I feel.
I want to apologize for that crack. It really wasn't a
crack.
Senator Hickenlooper. Then there is no need to apologize
for it.
Senator Symington. Well, bless your heart.
The thing that worries me is, I am not a lawyer and nearly
everybody else here is, but I used to have a lot of experience
in management. For a good many years of my life, I went into
sick businesses and tried to work them out and they are still
going, if I may make that immodest remark.
ORGANIZATIONAL GROWTH
There comes a time when anything you do grows to a point
where you have to make major basic changes in organization, and
I say organizational structure along with it, functional
structure. You have to have an organization, reorganization of
your chart, and then you have to have a functional
reorganization. I know that they put a book out, the
Metropolitan Club had its 100th Anniversary and it said all the
members of the State Department were founders of it, and I
think 37 was the total members of the State Department in
Washington.
When my wife's grandfather was Secretary of State, John
Hay, at the turn of the century, there were just over a hundred
people in the State Department at that time.
The Chairman. The whole department?
Senator Symington. The whole department.
Senator Hickenlooper. They did pretty well.
Senator Aiken. That is good.
Senator Symington. We had the two greatest allies the world
has known, the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, too.
But to me it just seems as we watch the growth by hundreds
and hundreds of thousands, I think millions would be fair, of
the administrative branch and nobody has more respect for this
staff than I do and I always get a good rapid answer from Carl
Marcy or anybody else on the staff. It isn't that at all to me.
It is just a case of getting organized to handle the workload
which is infinitely more today, plus what Albert said about the
interests of the people.
THE COMMITTEE GOT PEOPLE INTERESTED IN FOREIGN POLICY
The one great thing that this committee did last year, it
got the people interested in the foreign policy of the United
States to an extent that they never even dreamed about, in my
opinion, that is when I get back to the hustings. It is going
to be much more, it is not going to be less, because now the
people are really interested in it and there is a lot of doubt
about this tremendous ground war in Asia, and a lot of
nervousness about this situation in the Middle East, and a lot
of work which has been done incidental to our occupation in
Europe and so on.
I know it is hard to get staff people, but I would say it
is a lot easier to get staff people into this problem today
than three or four years ago because there is a lot of interest
in it and good people follow where the interest goes. And I
hope this could be considered not as a criticism of the staff
and not as a criticism of the committee and, above all, not
criticism of you because you are the one more than anyone else
in the United States who has gotten the American people
interested in foreign policy.
A MANAGEMENT PROBLEM
I would hope it would be recognized on a management basis.
There is nobody I respect more than Bourke. He is your ranking
member, people like George Aiken next to him, nearly all over
there feel the way you do about most of these problems, the
senior members of the committee. We just have a management
problem on our hands and it was the kind of thing I was deep
in, it was my life's work 20 years ago, and I think we have got
to face up to the management problem.
The staff situation, a lot of things that could be done,
you could approve, have people, final approval, you could have
the top of your own staff consulted with your own final
decision on members of the subcommittee staff. Just thinking
off the top of my head it might be an excellent idea not to put
the subcommittees on television. God knows I wouldn't like to
try to get some real facts and dig in on the Arab-Israeli
problem on television and so forth and so on.
The Chairman. That would be explosive.
Senator Symington. There are a lot of ways that you could
bind this thing and the way the thing ran. This isn't the
committee with the least staff by any means, with all due
respect to my friend from Oregon.
The Agriculture Committee is a committee that has got for
my money much the least staff as against the money involved and
so forth and so on.
The Chairman. Finance has had no staff until this year.
Senator Symington. My experience on the Agriculture
Committee, I mean on the steering committee, and I know, Joe,
they spend their time up there, instead of fighting to get on
the committee, they spend their time fighting not to get on the
Agriculture Committee.
The Chairman. George wanted to say something. He has been
waiting here.
Senator Symington. I am all through now. But I think it is
a management problem here we are discussing today at least as
much as anything else.
The Chairman. George?
AD HOC VERSUS AD INFINITUM
Senator Aiken. I have been listening very attentively to
the discussion relative to ad hoc committees and the staffing
of ad hoc committees, and I am sure if they were well staffed
they would have some very interesting staff meetings.
But I also have a great regard for the intelligence and
education of my chairman and I wanted to ask him what is the
distance between ad hoc and ad infinitum.
Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, getting back to the overall
thing----
The Chairman. I don't know.
Senator Gore. I guess you assigned me more ad hoc duties
last year than anyone.
The Chairman. I think more individual bills you handled
than any of them.
Senator Gore. Well, some of them we reported and the
committee acted upon in the Senate and some of them we reported
on unfavorably, and I think events have sustained us. I am
willing to do whatever you want me to do in that regard.
PROVOKING PUBLIC DISCUSSION
But, again, I repeat, the overall function of this
committee, as Stu Symington said, touched the American people.
It stimulated an awareness and a study. It provoked study and
discussion groups all over the United States.
I would like to see us conduct another hearing of a level
that would challenge the intelligent and public spirited people
of the country.
For instance, what are the valid indices of the great
decisions today of a preeminent world power. Are we stuck with
shibboleths, are there abstractions that have emotional and
political appeal on which we should not base decisions? Where
are we? What is our position in the world, and why?
It seems to me if you could get some of the eminent
scholars of the country once again, not to examine whether we
should or should not be in Vietnam, that is past, but to
examine the position of this country in the world of today's
technology, that we could once again play an important role in
public education and once again assert the constitutional
importance of the Senate.
STATE DEPARTMENT OPPOSITION TO AN EFFECTIVE COMMITTEE
Senator Morse. I want to say the Senator from Oregon is not
going to take the rap that he gets from certain quarters
because the subcommittee on Latin America is not conducting the
hearings it ought to be conducting. They should be conducted
and conducted under your jurisdiction. I am not asking the
subcommittee appoint staff but asking that you and the full
committee appoint them. I am pointing out that nothing I have
heard this morning justifies keeping the staff at its small
number. We can get people. Sure it is hard to get them. Sure we
can enlarge the staff by getting qualified people and we should
do it.
I want to say no member of this staff in my judgment can
serve as a substitute for the responsibilities of the
committee. Pat Holt makes very fine reports, but those reports
ought to be conducted under the direction of the subcommittee
and they ought to be subject to review by the subcommittee, and
we ought to be able to call people in and determine whether or
not they stand up.
I think they will stand up. But the State Department would
love to have some of these subcommittees continue to be
ineffective.
The last thing Rusk and Rostow and Gordon want is a vital
working effective subcommittee on Latin America, but you had
better keep your eyes on Latin America, may I say to this
committee, because you have got great problems and trouble
stirring themselves up in Latin America, and the subcommittee
should do the job on the subject and not Pat Holt, in effect
operating somewhat independent of the subcommittee. All I am
asking for is that you enlarge your staff, that you can take
complete jurisdiction over the subjects that will be taken up
by your subcommittee and that we get on with the job of doing
what--let's face it, this full committee is never going to do
in regard to the Latin American problem because you haven't got
time to do it, but the subcommittee can.
You would know when we would have our meeting, we wouldn't
be interfering with your jurisdiction. I would have them at
night, if necessary, but we would do the work.
But I only want to say as chairman of this subcommittee
that the full committee is letting down the subcommittee, in my
judgment, speaking as its chairman. I don't care how many
members on the subcommittee want to let the present
arrangements continue. It is not a good arrangement, and you
are not going to do the job on Latin America and you either get
a new subcommittee, if you want to get a new chairman, go ahead
and get him, but I want to say I am going to continue to
express why this subcommittee is not doing its job. It is not
doing the job because it isn't properly staffed.
AMERICAN RESPONSIBILITIES AS A GREAT POWER
The Chairman. Well, I certainly am glad to have this
discussion, and I will talk with the staff and see if we can
come up with some concrete suggestion and maybe look into the
matter of getting some more.
I don't want to go too far, but I certainly think we ought
to move in this direction and we will do it better.
I want to make a comment here, Senator Gore brought up a
question which was the last item on my agenda and the time is
almost running out.
The staff and I have been discussing this during this
interim and I think you are quite right. We had a general
subject that we are talking about called American
responsibilities as a great power, a general subject to survey
in some open hearings--of course we expect to start out in the
usual way with whatever the administration wishes to say on
this with Secretary Rusk and McNamara and others, that is the
foreign policy prospects for '67. In that anything may be
discussed, and this subject, general subject would be involved.
I wanted to raise this question with you, a subject, for
example, of this which we kicked around here at some length,
the nature of our commitments, this nature of our being
committed all the time.
A number of these treaties, the President last night
referred to them, and he is going to live up to all of them. We
made a great many treaties during the 50's, a review of this as
a part of this overall review of our relations as the greatest
power in the world today and what that means.
Another one was this man Edwin Reischauer is back. I have
been thinking about, I would certainly personally like very
much to have him. He ought to be as well qualified as anybody,
for example, to discuss our relations with the whole Pacific
area, not just Vietnam but he is especially qualified, it seems
to me, to testify about our relations with Japan, China, the
whole area of which Vietnam is simply one part.
Senator Symington. I couldn't agree with you more.
AN EXAMINATION FOR OUR OWN EDUCATION
The Chairman. This is the way we have been thinking about
it and it is what I wanted to bring up.
What does the committee think about it?
I think it is on all fours with what the Senator from
Tennessee stated. I completely agree with that. This is an area
in which the full committee----
Senator Gore. But an examination----
The Chairman. That is correct. My own view is not at all we
are attacking anybody. This is an examination for our own
education, our own benefit as well as the public as to what
kind of a role should the United States play under these
present circumstances, and this is a complicated matter. It
sounds vague but it is very real.
Senator Clark. Mr. Chairman, could I make one brief
comment?
The Chairman. Does this appeal to you?
Senator Symington. Yes.
Senator Clark. It appeals to me very much.
I would like to make one brief comment to my very good
friend Carl Marcy for whom I have the most profound admiration
as a magnificent chief of this committee, but I hope when he
starts to look around for a new staff man, Carl, we won't have
as one of the criteria a timid little Ph.D. who is prepared to
wipe the dandruff off the shoulders of members of this
committee. I think that is what you mean.
The Chairman. I don't know what you mean. Maybe Mr. Marcy
does.
[Discussion off the record.]
A COMBINATION OF ACTUAL EXPERIENCES
Senator Symington. I think it would be a wonderful thing to
get Reischauer. I stayed twice with him in Tokyo.
The Chairman. He is an example. I hope we can get other
people.
You necessarily, when you get outside of the government,
are going to be confronted with the difficulty of getting
people who have a combination of actual experiences, as he has,
plus a sufficient historical, political, social background and
so on, and that he can relate it to us. This is difficult to
get those people.
Senator Clark. We have no finer fellow on the staff than
Jim Lowenstein, with whom I spent a month with in Europe who is
absolutely terrific. He came to this committee from a good spot
in the State Department because he thought he could be more
useful here.
The Chairman. We have a new one we haven't used much who
will turn out the same way, and he is Bader. He was in the
State Department and it was partly because of Jim Lowenstein
and everyone seemed to agree.
Senator Pell. I came in and became a Senator. [Laughter.]
TESTIMONY FROM LOWER LEVEL OFFICIALS
Senator Morse. Bill, I don't know whether you can get--
whether protocol stops you or other restrictions do, but I wish
we could get in Edward E. Rice, who is our consul general in
Hong Kong, if our State Department will come and let him
testify in executive session.
The Chairman. It is a great problem.
I would like to have some of these lower level people. The
State Department seems to take the view the Secretary ought to
talk for them. They don't want their underlings to testify. I
hate to embarrass the underlings because they might fire them.
I would like to do it, personally. I agree with you.
Senator Morse. Carl Marcy can tell you if you get a
briefing that we got in Hong Kong from Rice, it is far
different from what the Secretary tells you when he comes in
here.
The Chairman. Well, I have the same feeling.
What can we do about it, as a practical matter?
Senator Symington. I can tell you what we can do about it.
We ran into exactly the same thing in the Armed Services
Committee, and I think I was the one who suggested first that
we put the witnesses under oath. Then we had the Preparedness
Subcommittee, under John Stennis, an able, fair, efficient
fellow, and these fellows come in and we tell him who we want
as witnesses. We don't let them tell us who we want as
witnesses, and we pull in two or three fliers in Vietnam and
they are under oath so they can go right back and say, ``You
don't want me to perjure myself, do you?'' And they come up
there and they give us more information in less time as against
all this stuff that we get from the Joint Chiefs, you see.
We really begin to cut the mustard as to what the facts
are.
DOVES AND HAWKS
One thing I don't know and that worries me a very great
deal, based on my relationship with this government, is whether
there is any accuracy in the fact that essentially McNamara is
a dove and essentially Rusk is a hawk and the degree of it. I
do know that when I talk to Walt Rostow who is now in a
protective position as part of the Executive Branch that he was
pretty darned hawkish, you see.
Well, I think it might be, I certainly would subscribe to
what Neil Sheehan wrote in the New York Times the other day
after this last trip of mine, not a dove but no longer a hawk.
When these fellows come down like the JCS they can't cross
a ``t'' or dot an ``i'' that isn't approved by higher
authority.
So it seems to me if we had a subcommittee operating on the
theory of getting the facts from less important people, and you
come in and run the committee any time you want to handle it
and call the people in here, I think to call in some of these
ambassadors from outside this country and if necessary put them
under oath.
TESTIMONY FROM JOURNALISTS
The Chairman. Let me ask you--I am glad to have this angle.
The other angle that bothers me--I would like to have
newspapermen. We went over this in the Dominican thing.
Does the committee feel that this is unfeasible?
Some of these people have more experience.
Senator Symington. I don't know, but I know one thing. You
have the right as chairman of this committee to ask anybody in
this government because we put the money up.
Senator Pell. I think you have the right to ask foreigners,
too.
The Chairman. We have never done it. These are the
precedents which this committee has had long before I came
here. It seems to me that we ought to have a little greater
freedom to ask anybody who appeals to us.
Senator Symington. I couldn't agree with you more.
The Chairman. These have been traditions, and I thought it
ought to be the decision of the committee.
Do you think we ought to contemplate, I will certainly
submit any of these changes to the committee, but shall we
investigate it, for purposes of discussion?
Senator Morse. I think so because we are entitled to give
the American people the facts they are entitled to receive from
any source.
JEOPARDIZING SUBORDINATE OFFICIALS
Senator Hickenlooper. This is the old story with this
committee and other committees to try to get in subordinate
officials to try to get them to testify when their own necks
are out eight feet. If they offend their superiors, they will
get their heads chopped off and you just put them there and put
them under the guillotine.
Look at [Otto] Otepka, sitting there in the State
Department being there for two years because he told the truth
to the [Thomas] Dodd committee and they just, they have got him
sitting over there, nothing to do and they are trying to get
rid of him, but they don't have a case against him.
You have got----
Senator Symington. In 1948, I bucked the Secretary of
Defense as Secretary of the Air Force. In 1949, Mr. Truman had
a meeting in the cabinet room and he said, ``I want everybody
here to support this budget whether they like it or not and if
they don't want to support it I want them to say so now.''
A lot of people in the room, but he looked at me the whole
time he was saying it, and I said, ``I just want to ask you one
question and then I will make up my mind. Are you asking me to
go up on the Hill and perjure myself?''
And he looked at me for about 15 seconds and he said,
``Will you give me your word of honor you didn't instigate the
question?''
And I said, ``I will,'' and he said, ``Go up there and tell
them what you believe.''
If you get these fellows and put them under oath and put
them--it is pretty tough if anybody above them, and we will
know about it soon enough if they are castigated for perjuring
themselves before this committee in order to follow a party
line.
Senator Hickenlooper. Stu, nobody knows better than you do
it doesn't happen the next week after they do it. It happens
two years later when they find themselves going down the hall
and pretty soon the door opens and they fall off and you can't
go back and prove it.
[Discussion off the record.]
Senator Gore. That has been a helpful session.
[Discussion off the record.]
PROSPECTIVE WITNESSES
The Chairman. I am going to ask Mr. Marcy to try to contact
these people along these lines, if you have any suggestion
about it. Some of them I mentioned, if this meets with your
approval, the Communist world in '67, some hearing on this
subject. I would like to have men like George Kennan and
Schulman who are the recognized authorities on that subject.
Does that suit you?
Senator Gore. Yes.
The Chairman. And Asia, the Pacific.
Senator Gore. We not only need to examine ourselves in this
world, but we need to examine our adversaries in this world.
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Gore. In order to determine our place.
The Chairman. And our relations to them, what they are like
and our relations.
Senator Gore. What are our dangers, prospects and
limitations.
The Chairman. For example, this subject has been suggested,
Asia, the Pacific, and the United States, that type of thing
may have a man like Reischauer, he is the best type of man I
can think of to best describe what is presently the situation
in Japan, the Far East. He is a long time scholar of China. If
anybody could interpret that situation, it seems to me he would
be as good as anybody.
But that is the type of hearing.
This is strictly educational, not intended to attack
anybody at all, simply the information of what it is like out
there, what these people think and what our relations to them
ought to be.
Does that make sense to you?
Senator Gore. Yes.
CHANGING AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD FOREIGN POLICY
The Chairman. And on down, the changing American attitudes
towards foreign policy. I mean what is going to here, our
attitude, what we are afflicted with, what limitations and so
on, and the nature of U.S. commitments.
We talked about this last year. It seems to me we ought to
clarify this matter.
I get so fed up with being told we are committed to
something all the time, which I don't think is so. What makes
the commitment is having the President say we are committed,
and I don't think that is what I mean by commitment. I think
the commitment is something that is taken by the Congress and
the Executive, not just a unilateral action.
Senator Gore. SEATO committed us to confer.
The Chairman. I think they absolutely misrepresent what
SEATO is. He repeated it again. Of course that is what Rusk has
been saying over the past couple of years. He didn't say it in
the beginning, but he is saying it now.
When you read what Dulles said SEATO meant it isn't what
they now say it means.
Senator Gore. It isn't what Rusk said at the beginning.
The Chairman. Well, if I understand it, that is the way we
will proceed. Who can we get on some of these? I would like to
have James Gavin again on that----
Senator Pell. Matthew Ridgway maybe.
The Chairman. And Ridgway. Who we can get.
Senator Pell. I think Ridgway is more coherent in his
arguments.
SCHOLARS AND GENERALS
The Chairman. Gavin we had, and I thought he did a very
good job. It is perfectly all right to have them both. The
reason I do is we naturally have to have so many scholars
because they are available and I would like to use whatever
generals we can to offset the attitude we are stacking these
hearings and not having generals.
Whatever generals that are called at all reasonably I would
like to have them not because I have such respect personally,
they are wiser than others, but to offset the emotional
prejudice in some quarters against the scholars.
Does that make sense to you?
Senator Pell. Perfectly.
The Chairman. The same with this fellow Griffith. He is a
scholar. He was as good as you can find among the generals, and
lived in China and he has a reasonable attitude. It offsets the
criticism they offered toward people like Fairbank and Bartlett
and others.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ John K. Fairbank, Professor of Asian History at Harvard, and
Ruhl J. Bartlett, Professor of Diplomatic History at The Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Marcy. Do you want to mention----
The Chairman. Did either one of you see Alf Landon's speech
that he made in Kansas three months ago?
Well, it is a remarkable speech. I couldn't believe it, and
I am all for having him. I never dreamed of having a fellow
like that but he made a speech I think you would thoroughly
approve of, and I think it would be very good politically to
have him sandwiched in among these scholars. The speech is
available if either one of you have time to read it. I am sure
you would approve it, and coming from that quarter it
absolutely knocked me out of my chair.
It is amazing, he is quite a fellow, at least from this
speech.
INVITE SUGGESTIONS FOR WITNESSES
Senator Gore. Why don't you invite all members of the
committee to suggest possible witnesses. We would not be
obligated to invite all, but out of the suggestions might come
a very helpful suggestion?
The Chairman. I have no objection other than the personal
relations. They have a feeling if they submit some, we have 19
members and if you don't take them they will be offended.
Senator Pell. I think you are right.
The Chairman. If they put in a friend or a fellow----
Senator Gore. I withdraw it.
In other words, I am asked to submit a man and then you
didn't invite him. I withdraw the suggestion.
The Chairman. You can get into awful serious trouble.
Last year the way we did it was this way, Albert, after
thinking about it. The way that was done--I didn't know a lot
of the people--I asked Carl and the fellow Robertson who is the
China expert in the Library, Far East, and Barnett of Columbia
who is a recognized authority. I didn't have anything really to
do with it. I didn't know most of those people. They got
together, surveyed the situation and tried to fit the man to
the subject and that is the way they were selected until the
very end when Bourke said to me, ``I think we ought to have
somebody on our side,'' and I said, ``These aren't on my side,
they are supposed to be the best there are.''
Well, anyway, that is the way we got the other three. It
didn't work too bad in this sense, Albert, because after we got
through these, then Bourke, we satisfied--he submitted those
three names and he was satisfied.
If we started out, I imagine we would have had 15 names,
Mundt's and various ones, all of them had submitted them and we
hadn't got them, I am afraid they would be mad.
But those three satisfied him.
What we want is not quantity but quality if we can get it,
the very best that we can get. I don't want to get just one
point of view. I would like to get people who have had
experiences who can give both points of view or whatever points
of view there are.
A NEW POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE
Senator Gore. Well, just as last year, as more or less of a
tangential effect of our Vietnam hearing, the hearing created a
new political atmosphere in which the administration had some
maneuverability with respect to China, it seems to me if we
could get the proper erudition on the subject many of the World
War II dogmas could be examined and I have an idea many of them
are not very valid any more.
The Chairman. I agree with you, I am sure.
Senator Gore. And yet we need the study ourselves, but
perhaps even more importantly for the American people.
The Chairman. That is right. That is what I meant. We ought
to be the forum for, the sounding board for these scholars and
thoughtful people who have no other way of reaching the
American people. I mean these people we had, Fairbank, nobody
ever heard of him. He could write a book or article or write a
speech and he wouldn't get beyond the 200 people who read him
but with this forum, in a way he reached millions of people,
and that is what I think we can do. It is a question of getting
people who really know this subject. I thought we did pretty
well: we had darned good people.
BUSINESSMEN AS WITNESSES
Senator Pell. In this connection, most of the witnesses we
had were scholars. I was able to get a passport validated for
an American businessman from Textron, a friend of mine, a
businessman. If he succeeds in getting in, somebody who can
speak firsthand as a man with considerable intellectual
curiosity, a lawyer, and he believes in opening up contacts
there, that would have even more of an impact.
The Chairman. You remember this man Blackie who was head of
Caterpillar? We had him on East-West Trade. He was smart and he
made a good witness. That is a top businessman in this country.
Senator Pell. Even better than a general.
The Chairman. He is one of the most successful businessmen
in the country with worldwide business and he made a good
witness on East-West trade. That is a thing which I think could
well be involved.
EDUCATING THE ADMINISTRATION
Senator Gore. Not only do we educate the American people
and ourselves but again referring, adverting to the China
hearings, I think the Administration got a little light on it
as much as we did.
The Chairman. The Administration needs it as much as we do.
Senator Gore. I believe they welcomed the effect and
reacted to it.
The Chairman. They do on China. They got miffed on Vietnam
because they thought it challenged their policy.
Senator Gore. I mean China.
The Chairman. I think that is correct.
TRIP TO CAMBODIA
Senator Pell. Speaking on firsthand knowledge, too, is
there any more on the trip to Cambodia? I talked to Carl about
it. I don't think there was. As I understand it, we are waiting
now a little bit on our dignity. Shouldn't we reactivate it?
Mr. Marcy. The latest on that was that the Cambodians
advised that we not press it, not respond affirmatively to
their invitation to come until Prince Sihanouk was back from
some medical treatment in Paris.
The Chairman. That is right.
He went to France.
Mr. Marcy. He is still in Paris. They expect him back some
time in February.
Senator Pell. Late January.
Mr. Marcy. I am sure we really can't get a reply from them
until he really does get back, but in late January or early
February it would be appropriate either for us or for them, I
think, to open the question again. We can do it simply by
telephoning New York.
Senator Pell. The reason I wanted to raise it is just
simply to get three senators to make plans to go two or three
weeks. The best time would be in January during a slack period,
and I didn't know.
The Chairman. Can I try out another idea?
Senator Pell. Couldn't we agree on this before leaving
this? Would it seem agreeable about making a phone call before
the end of the month?
The Chairman. Yes, inquire as to when.
Mr. Marcy. I think we ought to wait until the Prince is
back, because what they will do is to fire off an inquiry to
Cambodia.
Senator Pell. Let's find out from the State Department so
we will know when he is back.
The Chairman. State Department when he is back, and then
put the inquiry. Sure, that is right.
HAVE A HISTORIAN TESTIFY
We had a subject here, changing American attitude toward
foreign policy. This is kind of a historical thing, what do you
think about a man like [Henry Steele] Commager or [Arthur]
Schlesinger?
Senator Gore. Change and the need for change.
The Chairman. In connection with it. If it is not changing
enough, how it ought to change. This is more or less a
historical review type of thing in which I think is the process
of self-analysis along the line you are thinking that in order
to change, in order to see we have to analyze what we have
thought as to how relative it is to present conditions and how
it originated, the kind of a forum of self-analysis.
Senator Gore. May I make a suggestion? Does this appeal to
you----
[Discussion off the record.]
JUSTIFICATION OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM
The Chairman. Let me try another thing on you.
I say this if we have these hearings you can't keep from
appealing our involvements, and I think the issue for the
justification about our involvement is still the crucial one.
What bothers me and a lot of the people who don't like this is
I don't feel there is valid justification for our ever having
become involved and, therefore, the way they pursue it and so
on just doesn't go down with me. I think we are in a false
position, and the quicker we liquidate it in a reasonably
dignified manner the better. I don't think it is a matter
purely of manners, you might say, and dignity of a great
country. You just drop it and get out. You have to have an
acceptable form of negotiation to get yourself out, to
extricate yourself. As far as the hearings, Albert, I don't
want to announce them and don't want to say this is just
another Vietnam hearing. I want that to be developed as a part
of an overall examination of our relations and our
responsibilities as the most powerful country in the world to
the rest of humanity, is more or less the way I want it to come
up.
Does that make sense?
Senator Gore. Yes, you can't ignore it. It is a part.
The Chairman. It is a part but I don't wish to have it said
we are just again attacking this problem because the
administration will get its back up and the people will say I
am trying to pursue an old vendetta.
A LITTLE SELF-CRITICISM
Senator Pell. Couldn't we do it with a little bit of
modesty and criticism and self-criticism by suggesting we are
doing now what we should have done five years ago as far as
Thailand goes by doing that saying we should have done this in
Vietnam in '61 and didn't but we are going to do it, by God
now?
The Chairman. I have tried to be as contrite as I can in
the Tonkin Gulf and others. I didn't realize what we are
getting into, and I am quite willing to say I was shortsighted.
I had no idea that we were going to go this way.
Senator Pell. This would be a good opening.
The Chairman. That is honest with me. I had no idea. I
thought when I was on this and with this President, I thought
he was just as determined as I was to keep out of a major war
out there. That is what I believed in 1964.
Senator Gore. I assume that what the President said last
night--since we decided to send troops to Vietnam he was using
an editorial ``we.''
The Chairman. I think so. [Laughter.]
Does that meet with your general idea of how we should
proceed on this, on the people? I have got some others here.
Hutchins is very outspoken on this. These are people. Bob
Hutchins. This Eric Fromm has written a lot on this. Some
people think he is a Communist, I don't think he is, but I
don't know whether it would be safe to have him or not. He
lives in Mexico.
Senator Pell. Hutchins.
The Chairman. We will try to see what we can do.
[Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the committee recessed, subject
to call of the chair.]
THE WORLD SITUATION
----------
January 16, 1967
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman,
Mansfield, Morse, Lausche, Dodd, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper,
Aiken, Carlson, Williams, Mundt, Case, and Cooper.
Also present: Senator McGee, Assistant Secretary Douglas
MacArthur III, Deputy Assistant Secretary H.G. Torbert, Jr.,
Mr. Ernest Lindley, Special Assistant to the Secretary of
State, Major A.B. Outlaw, Department of Defense.
Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Holt, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Tillman,
Mr. Jones, and Mr. Lowenstein of the committee staff.
Mr. Chairman. Well, we will come to order.
We are very pleased this morning to have the Secretary of
State, but before we proceed, I want to welcome the new member,
Senator Cooper, from Kentucky.
We are very pleased, indeed, to have you on the committee,
and we are sure you will make a great contribution to the
deliberation of the committee.
Senator Carlson. We are delighted.
The Chairman. After seeing the new Republicans yesterday, I
am bound to congratulate them on the quality of their new crop.
Senator Aiken. We accept the congratulations.
Senator Cooper. I am glad to be on the committee.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, we are very glad to have you
and assume you would like to give us a kind of a rundown of the
general situation before we have questions, if that is
agreeable.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE
Secretary Rusk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen. I
would like to start by paying my personal compliments to
Senator Cooper. Not only has he had a very distinguished
service as a Senator, but he was one of our great ambassadors
in an earlier day, and I am proud to be associated with him on
this committee.
If it is agreeable, Mr. Chairman, I might comment fairly
briefly on certain important developments that have occurred
since the Congress adjourned and then go as promptly as
possible into comments and discussions and questions.
TURMOIL IN CHINA
First, I think perhaps the most important single thing that
is happening in the world today is happening in mainland China.
We believe that it is very important even though we do not know
exactly what is happening there. It is the kind of ignorance
which does not embarrass us too much because it seems fairly
obvious that the leadership in China is not exactly clear on
what is happening.
But the combination of a struggle among individuals with
regard to the succession to Mao and some ideological debates
within the top leadership that occurred last summer that we are
gradually becoming aware of, and perhaps some revival of
regional difference and regional influences in China have
created a situation of considerable turmoil.
I would caution members of the committee about drawing too
many conclusions too rapidly about the news, that is, the
normal press dispatches, particularly those that are based upon
posters in Peking, but we do know that there seems to be a
considerable struggle between the apparatus of the Communist
Party in China, or considerable elements of the apparatus of
the party, and the so called Red Guards under the leadership of
Mao Tse-tung, with the army playing a somewhat equivocal role,
perhaps in between.
SHIFTS IN CHINESE LEADERSHIP
Just to indicate the confusion that exists there reflected
in our own lack of understanding of exactly what is happening,
Lin Piao has not been heard from for about two months, since
November, even though Mao had nominated him to be his successor
and had highlighted his role up to this point. He has dropped
out of the picture temporarily. I can be incorrect by the end
of the day because he may reappear.
There was a report this morning that Liu Shao-chi, who was
demoted in the party, the chief of state, so-called, is out in
western China. If this is so, this could be of some importance
because we have had some indication that the regional armies
are playing something of an independent role here. We are
keeping this point in mind because Lin Piao has his army around
Peking and presumably he would have had a considerable
advantage in the Peking area. But Chen Yi, who was under attack
by the Red Guards, has long connections with an army which is
in the southwest of China, and the supposition is that he has
at least some independence of position because he has the
support of his own former army in another part of the country.
We do know that Chou En-lai seems to be trying to play a
mediating role among the different elements, and he is a fairly
key figure to keep your eyes on in this situation. If he is
able to bring Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi and some of these
different elements in some standdown on hostilities, then it
may be that the regime could be reconstituted, perhaps somewhat
weakened, on the basis that it existed say two weeks ago. But
the leadership, undoubtedly they are eyeing each other among
themselves.
We do know that there have been considerable acts of
violence in different parts of the country, that railways have
been interrupted, that factories have been shut down because of
strikes, that very large numbers of workers seem now to be
moving into Peking itself with divided loyalties, and almost
anything can happen.
POSTPONEMENT OF WARSAW TALKS
The most immediate impact upon us is that they have asked
us to postpone our next talk in Warsaw for two weeks for what
they call administrative reasons. It may be that the ambassador
there is going back to Peking or has gone back for a visit. It
may be there is some difficulty about what line he is to take
in issuing his instructions.
It is interesting to note that Peking's diplomats in about
25 countries have been going home in considerable numbers in
the last two weeks, indicating that they expected to be back in
their post in about 60 days. We, of course, are watching this
very carefully to see whether it might in any way be connected
with some foreign adventure somewhere. But the pattern does not
seem to indicate that, and it looks more like something
connected with the cultural revolution, perhaps indoctrination
of the diplomatic corps or purge of the diplomatic corps. We
just cannot yet say. But we would expect to have our next talk
with Peking in Warsaw in February. If that is postponed again,
I think that perhaps will be a reflection of the disturbances
going on in China.
Senator Aiken. When was the last talk?
Secretary Rusk. The last talk was, I think, in September.
NO ROLE FOR NATIONALIST FORCES
There is one point that has come into public attention I
would just mention in order to discount completely. That is,
any suggestion that the Nationalist forces on Taiwan have any
role to play here, or intend to play any role here, or have any
capability of moving onto the mainland to interfere in this
situation. This talk out of Taiwan is talk, and they have now
said publicly in the last few days that they acknowledge the
requirement of an agreement with us before they make any move
under the security and arrangements we had with them in the
middle of the fifties. They know we are not going to give them
that commitment, and I think that that situation is more talk
than anything else.
We have not yet seen any direct connection between the
events in China and in moves outward from China. There is
always the possibility that people who are in that kind of
trouble at home might try to unify themselves or try to divert
attention from their own problems through some international
adventure, but we do not see the displacement of military
forces or other indications suggesting that they plan to
intervene in South Vietnam.
RISK OF CHINESE INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM WAR
I noticed over the weekend a report from a French editor
that there was some sort of an agreement between Peking and the
United States on the basis of which they would stay out of
Vietnam, that is, if we would not attack China, that we would
not ourselves invade North Vietnam and we would not bomb the
dikes. I do not know of any such agreement. There has never
been any exchange on that between ourselves and Peking.
We have assumed that, of course, if we attack China we
would be at war with China. We have assumed if we were to move
land forces north of the 17th Parallel that that would raise
very substantially the risks of a Chinese intervention, but for
reasons of our own, including humanitarian reasons, we have not
had the intention of bombing those dikes in the Red River
Valley. They could cause very, very heavy flooding and ruin a
great many civilians up there.
But we have had the impression from time to time through
third parties that Peking's basic attitude was if we leave them
alone, they will leave us alone, and that certainly is all
right with us, but we do not know to what extent we can rely on
that.
All I am saying on the merits is there is something in
those three points mentioned by the French editor, but we are
not aware of any agreement or any communication from Peking to
that effect.
The closest thing to it was a comment passed along by a
third-country diplomat shortly after a press conference in
which I had said that the idea of a sanctuary is dead. I was
referring there to North Vietnam, but Peking said--told a
third-country diplomat, in essence, that if the United States
leaves Peking alone, they would leave us alone, but that was
about a year and a half ago, and coincides somewhat in time
with the events allegedly spoken about by the French editor.
EFFECT OF CHINESE EVENTS ON HANOI
Now, on Vietnam, Mr. Chairman, we do not see that the
events in mainland China have significantly affected the
Vietnam situation with possibly two exceptions. One is that
there seems to be some reaction in Hanoi against the events in
China. The speculation is to the point as to whether events in
China are giving Hanoi any larger freedom of action in this
situation, whether that might open up possibilities for
contacts that did not exist before.
Secondly, we do have contacts and----
[Discussion off the record.]
Secretary Rusk. I cannot report----
HANOI'S READINESS TO TALK
Senator Hickenlooper. May I ask the Secretary, has it not
been characteristic of wars in the past when one side is losing
and feels it is on the verge of collapse, then it wants to talk
and is willing to talk? Is there anything significant in the
fact that the rumblings out of Hanoi seem to be a little more
conversational than they were in the past?
Secretary Rusk. I would not want to leave the impression,
Senator, that the contacts that have existed lately really are
pointed toward a readiness or desire to talk. There are a good
many things that have been put to the other side from our
direction that have had no response. That might change at
almost any time.
There are those who think they may be somewhat more willing
to talk, but we have not been able to dig that out in any fully
satisfactory way, and, in general, the answer to your question
is yes.
WHETHER THE UNITED STATES REFUSED TO TALK
The Chairman. How about our situation, we were told two
years ago that you--we refused to talk because we were losing.
It was just the opposite.
Secretary Rusk. That is not correct, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Which is not correct, that we were told it or
it was not true?
Secretary Rusk. I mean what you were told was not correct.
The full story of that is not on the record, and one of the key
witnesses there is now dead, Adlai Stevenson. There were
contacts before, during, and after that particular episode with
the other side. We were misled as to the channels that were
being used during that period.
I was told, for example, that the Soviet Foreign Office
knew nothing about this, that this was not known to the Soviet
ambassadors and Mr. Gromyko and so forth. Then a year or so
later I was told this had been actively discussed with Mr.
Andrei Gromyko during a period when I was regularly in touch
with him and the matter did not come up, and I was told under
no circumstances should we raise it. Further, we did tell the
Secretary General if he had a channel to go back and explore it
and try to develop it further and see more about the situation
with whom one talks and what about. Insofar as I know, he never
did that.
Adlai Stevenson, the week before he died, on the BBC in
London said that he was never very clear about with whom the
talks were supposed to be held and on what subject.
Now the problem about surfacing that whole business is that
it would get in the way of contacts through the Soviet Union.
Hanoi has flatly and categorically denied it. The possibilities
of channels of the sort that were discussed at that time have
been further explored without results, and we prefer to deal
with this kind of a question with regard to the future rather
than trying to just rehash the past.
But the story, as I knew it, is not the one that is
generally talked about in regard to that episode.
CESSATION OF THE BOMBING
The principal point that is being raised now in contacts is
the question of a--is an unconditional and permanent cessation
of the bombing. I point out those two words because this is
rather different from what was said last autumn. Last autumn
the suggestion was made in a number of quarters, including
Communist quarters, that a suspension of the bombing for a
period of time might make it possible to develop the basis of
discussion of some more toward negotiations, and we suspended
the bombing for twice as long as had been suggested to us by
key elements on the other side, and without result.
Now, the price has gone up very considerably. They are
saying unconditional and permanent or they say unconditional
and definitive or, in that Harrison Salisbury view,
unconditional and for good. That is a rather different problem
than a temporary suspension.
The other side has told us that the temporary suspension is
nothing but an ultimatum; that this matter has to be taken up
on the basis of a complete and permanent stoppage.
At the same time we are not able to get anything from the
other side at all about what they would do if the bombing
stopped, and we have been probing on that point, continue to
probe it, are doing so now, as to what the effect would be.
U THANT'S THREE POINTS
Secretary General U Thant has his three points. The first
that we stop the bombing. The second, there be a mutual de-
escalation, and the third, there be negotiations with the Viet
Cong.
We have said so far as the first point is concerned, okay,
what about the second point? On that there has been nothing,
Hanoi has rejected U Thant's second point, mutual de-escalation
of the violence, and has said with regard to U Thant's third
point that the Viet Cong, the National Liberation Front, is the
sole spokesman for the South Vietnamese people.
Those who call upon us to accept U Thant's three points
usually do not take into account the fact that Hanoi has
already categorically rejected points two and three. We
continue to try to find some sort of an indication or
suggestion, informal or otherwise, private or public, as to
what the result will be if we stop the bombing and no one yet
has been able or willing to tell us what that could be.
FIVE YEARS SUSPENSION
The fact that they are calling for a permanent stoppage of
the bombing makes it a very serious problem, because we have
had now, experiences with three periods in which there was no
bombing, five years, five weeks, five days, and we know that
the infiltration simply continued.
Senator Mansfield. Mr. Secretary--Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rusk. Yes.
Senator Mansfield. What do you mean five years suspension?
Secretary Rusk. Well, there was no bombing for five years
from 1960 when they announced publicly they were going to seize
South Vietnam. They moved the entire 325th Division of the
North Vietnamese Regular Army into South Vietnam before we
started the bombing. During that five-year period when there
was no bombing of North Vietnam, we went to the Laos
Conference, we made major concessions, as some persons saw it,
took the Soviet nominee to be prime minister of Laos and
accepted the coalition government worked out among the three
elements there. We got no exchange for that, no performance
whatever on the other side with respect to North Vietnamese
troops in Laos or the use of Laos as an infiltration route to
the south, or ability of the coalition government to function
in Laos or the ability of the ICC to function in Laos. During
all that period there were literally hundreds of contacts with
the--in South Vietnam and there we did not see any peace in
South Vietnam.
Senator Mansfield. Mr. Secretary, I think you are going
back a long way and stretching it pretty thin when you use the
five years, five weeks, and five days analogy, because in 1960
how many troops did we have in Vietnam?
Secretary Rusk. We had----
Senator Mansfield. Very few.
Secretary Rusk. We had about 600 and a military aid mission
there.
Senator Mansfield. We had no air forces of any kind, and I
am not at all sure we were even instructing the South
Vietnamese air force. If my information is correct, and it is
from the Defense Department, the organized cadres did not come
down from the north until 1964. At that time they were
identifiable, and I think I can reinforce those figures and
that fact.
Secretary Rusk. You mean organized units of the North
Vietnamese Regular Army?
Senator Mansfield. Yes.
Secretary Rusk. Well, that is different than cadres, I
think, Senator, because they were infiltrating cadres including
North Vietnamese long before 1964. Organized elements of the
North Vietnamese Army, I think I would agree with you.
Senator Mansfield. Cadres and organized units and, if my
memory is correct, the figure was 400 at the end of 1964, and
that figure was supplied to me by the Department of Defense.
U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF SOUVANNA PHOUMA
I note that you call Souvanna Phouma the Soviet nominee for
prime minister of Laos who we decided to accept after we had
rejected and kicked him out two years previously, which was a
serious mistake on our part, as a result of the Geneva Accord
on Laos.
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Mansfield. Was Souvanna Phouma not our nominee,
too?
Secretary Rusk. He came to be when we accepted him, but
there was another prime minister that the Eisenhower
Administration had recognized in 1960.
Senator Mansfield. That is true, and during that time I
think we had a very large part to play in ousting Souvanna
Phouma, undermining his position, and helping to create the
situation which developed in Laos in those years, is that
correct? I think your ambassador had something to do with it at
the State Department.
Secretary Rusk. I think there is something in that, yes.
Senator Mansfield. That is all, Mr. Chairman. I will have
something else later.
The Chairman. Proceed, Mr. Secretary.
STEPS TOWARDS NEGOTIATIONS
Secretary Rusk. Well, the key question in Vietnam at the
present time is the question of whether we can get steps taken
by both sides to move this matter towards a peaceful solution
either at the conference table or through negotiations or de
facto. And at the present time I cannot report to the committee
we have had any indication from the other side what any
reciprocal step might be, although there are many
opportunities, many ways, many channels by which that could be
taken up.
FRANCE AND NATO
As far as that is concerned, there is a pretty clear
understanding now between the 14 on the one side and France on
the other as to where the dividing line is and those NATO
matters in which France will participate and will not
participate. The 14 have constituted themselves into a defense
planning committee. France does not attempt to interfere in the
activities of the 14, or to veto or obstruct what the 14 feel
that they must do.
France, on the other hand, does take part in the political
discussions that go on in the council of the 15, and there
seems to be a pretty clear understanding now as to just where
one starts and the other leaves off.
At our last NATO meeting it was a good business-like
meeting, and I think we transacted our business more
efficiently than we have for some time, the 14 dealing with the
military and the 15 taking up the political matters.
I think the most interesting thing is the full exploration
which is being made by practically all of its members on
relations with the east.
We had before us at our last NATO meeting a report, I
think, that has been made available to the committee, a report
of contacts between members of NATO and Eastern European
countries of a period of about six months, and there were about
185 of those contacts in terms of exchanging visits or exchange
of visits or exchange of delegations and things of that sort.
GERMANY AND EASTERN EUROPE
It is quite interesting to see that the new government in
the Federal Republic apparently has decided it is going to
explore the possibilities of improved relations with Eastern
Europe. There are delegations in Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and
Poland to look at that situation. They apparently have come to
the conclusion that 20 years of harsh confrontation has not
moved them any nearer reunification or settlement of the German
question, and they are prepared now to explore the possibility
of improved relations to see whether that might not reduce the
fear of the Germans among some of the small Eastern European
countries, open up better contacts between West and East
Germans and perhaps bring about a political situation
atmosphere in which some movement can be made in the direction
of reunification.
SOVIET ROLE IN VIETNAM
Let me say as far as we are concerned, we were interested
that when Gromyko came to the United Nations Assembly last year
and visited Washington briefly, as well as from contacts we
have had with him since then, is that the Soviet Union has not
taken the view that because of Vietnam there is nothing to
discuss. They have been prepared to sit down and talk about
particular issues with us despite Vietnam.
[Discussion off the record.]
Secretary Rusk. If you want to refer to this problem on the
public record, you can go back to the Bucharest communique of
the Warsaw Pact countries in July in which the Eastern European
countries called upon the U.S. to comply with the 1954 and 1962
agreements. Our answer to them was, ``all right, we agree to
that, let's get going.''
The difficulty is that Moscow does not feel that it is in a
position to take a public political initiative with Hanoi in
such things as calling a conference or authorizing the ICC to
take up some of the chores that we would hope it would take up,
because it seems to be immobilized by the problem with China
and also somewhat handicapped by its relative lack of influence
in Hanoi itself.
So we have felt that we ought to go ahead and try to
discuss other subjects with the Soviet Union, to see whether we
find other points of agreement.
CONSULAR AGREEMENT
As you know, we did conclude a civil area agreement, We
hope very much that the Senate will find it possible to approve
the consular agreement during the present session. In passing,
Mr. Chairman, let me repeat here, from our point of view at the
present time what is important about that treaty is not the
possibility that we might open up consulates. That we could do
today under existing legislation, one consulate in one place
and one consulate in another. Ninety-five percent of our
interest in this treaty is in those provisions providing
consular access and protection for American citizens traveling
and living in the Soviet Union. I told the committee when we
were discussing that earlier that as far as consulates are
concerned, we would be prepared to consult further with the
committee before moving to establish the consulates, but we do
have need for consular access to American citizens. They are
traveling in the Soviet Union in larger and larger numbers.
Many of our tourists, despite certain education we try to give
them before they go, do some of the things in the Soviet Union
that tourists do in many countries such as manipulating
currency and picking up souvenirs and things of that sort, and
it makes it very difficult for us to give them reasonable
protection without the formal agreements of a consular
convention.
Senator Hickenlooper. At that point, Mr. Secretary, if you
would care to comment----
Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir?
GIVING RUSSIA MOST FAVORED NATION STATUS
Senator Hickenlooper. With me, the one hurt under the
saddle of this consular treaty is why do we have to give the
Russians under the Most Favored Nations clause extend to all
other countries, 20 or whatever it is, immunity from
prosecution for crime by the employee nationals of a country. I
could go as far as the consular official, something of that
kind, although we do not do it to any other country. We will
have to extend it under the Most Favored Nations clause, as I
understand it. Why do we have to do it with the Russians?
Secretary Rusk. I think the point on which a judgment will
have to be made, Senator, is whether our interest in the
reciprocal privilege is not stronger than their interest on
this point. You see, our problem with our own employees in the
Soviet Union is a far more severe one than problems we would
have here, but this is one of those questions on which----
Senator Hickenlooper. That is the thing that is unclear to
me.
I cannot rationalize that in my own mind nor can I quite
understand the reason for it. Go ahead.
Secretary Rusk. That is right. Let me get some material
down on that in the terms of numbers and in terms of our
interest on----
Senator Hickenlooper. I think we have numbers on it. I
think I have numbers in my files on the thing and that is what
mystifies me. The more information I get, the more I am
confused, so I do not know, maybe I had better just stay as I
am.
Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, I do think he ought to provide
the rest of us, however, with the memorandum, because I do not
have the figures.
Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. We had some figures, but maybe we ought to be
brought up to date. We had some.
Senator Morse. In the committee file?
The Chairman. Yes, about the number of Americans going
there and Russians here, showing in my view we had much more to
gain than they did by giving this protection.
Senator Hickenlooper. Also the number of immunities we
grant. It is my understanding that there would be 400 and some.
I do not mean to get into an extended discussion of it, but
there would be 400 and some other employees.
The Chairman. That could be mutually controlled.
Senator Hickenlooper. By other countries which we would
have to extend to consulate officials and employees who are
nationals of the sending country.
Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, the point--I realize you do
not want to go into that in great detail, but on the matter of
Most Favored Nations treatment for other countries, that would
only occur where they would be prepared to give us reciprocal
arrangements. We know some of these other countries are not
interested in giving us that privilege. Therefore, this would
not come into operation. So, we will have to try to find out
informally if we can----
Senator Hickenlooper. Perhaps some of them would not ask
for it.
GERMAN RELATIONS WITH FRANCE
The Chairman. Were you going to say something more about
the Germans?
Secretary Rusk. Yes.
The Chairman. I thought you were going into this recent
meeting of Kurt Kiesinger and Charles de Gaulle. What is your
interpretation?
Secretary Rusk. Our interpretation of that is that the new
German government wants to find out whether it can get a more
relaxed relationship with President de Gaulle. They felt that
they were caught up--the Germans felt they were caught up in
some sort of special bilateral issue between Paris and
Washington. There probably were some feelings on President de
Gaulle's part about the role of the United States in Europe as
well as in other world affairs, but basically the issue was
between President de Gaulle and the other 14.
It is our impression that the new German government will
try to move on those points where it can move with France, but
within the limits of a basic commitment to NATO, and without
creating a big gap between Bonn and the United States and some
of the largest issues.
We ourselves have told the Germans and the French that the
United States has a basic interest in good relations between
Germany and France. After all, two world wars came about
because these two countries started fighting each other.
We do believe that it is important that Germany improve her
relations without going down the same route as President de
Gaulle in certain subjects, particularly, for example, NATO,
but we will have to see.
I think the atmosphere at this last meeting was good, but I
do not have the impression that the Germans changed underlying
basic policy toward NATO.
What was important, I think, Mr. Chairman, is that de
Gaulle, as well as we, have encouraged the new German
government to explore the possibilities of improved relations
with the East on the ground that we have tried over a period of
20 years another approach, the Adenauer approach in effect. Now
another approach might be more promising for the longer range
future, depending a good deal, of course, on what the reaction
of Eastern Europe would be.
I would like to come back to that from two or three
different points of view, if I may, and I am going to try not
to take too much of your time, but I think the committee would
be interested in the present state of play of the
nonproliferation treaty.
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY
The parliamentary situation is that there is no agreement
between the United States and the Soviet Union as yet on
particular language for a nonproliferation treaty. However,
there is some language which we think the Soviet Union would
probably accept which might be acceptable to us, depending upon
the consensus we might reach among allies. It is very important
that you understand that we have not agreed with the Soviet
Union, but that we are discussing this language with our
allies.
The language itself, and I will pass this around the table
for anyone to see, the language itself stems right out of our
own national legislation in this field. Each nuclear weapons
state, party to this treaty, undertakes not to transmit to any
recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other explosive devices
or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or
indirectly.
As I say, that is what our national legislation at present
says.
I think it is quite important that if this language becomes
acceptable to note that a good deal of underbrush has been
worked out and cast aside. For example, the Soviets agree that
we are talking about warheads and we are not talking about
delivery vehicles and that is a very important advance.
Secondly, they agree that they are not talking about what
happens in case of war, in which event a treaty of this sort
disappears. The Soviet allies in Eastern Europe have delivery
vehicles and, in the event of war, presumably warheads would be
made available to them. The same thing would happen in NATO if
that terrible situation ever came about. Third, they are not
talking about how an alliance makes the overriding political
decision to go to war, which seemed at one point to be part of
the problem.
A METAPHYSICAL POINT
We have discussed centering around an almost metaphysical
point. Mr. Gromyko illustrated it with a little diagram in
which he said that a nuclear power should not transfer nuclear
weapons to a non-nuclear power.
All right, no difficulty about that.
Secondly, that a nuclear power should not transfer nuclear
weapons to non-nuclear powers through an alliance.
No problem on that.
Then we got into difficulty when he said and cannot
transfer weapons or control over them to an alliance itself,
that is stopping there. And this got into all sorts of
metaphysical problems about just what is the alliance apart
from its members, and got confused with the question of the
political decisions of an alliance, about whether to go to war
or not and matters of that sort.
This language here that I just mentioned seems to cut
through that and concentrate on the hardware, the actual
nuclear warheads.
Now, we have discussed this and I would appreciate it very
much if members of the committee would make no reference to
this outside because we have discussed this with the four
members of NATO who are members of the Geneva Conference, that
is, the other three, Britain, Italy and Canada.
We are also discussing it with the Germans, and we are also
discussing it in a preliminary way with the Japanese.
We will shortly be discussing it with the rest of the NATO
members.
ACCEPTABLE TO GERMANY
I am encouraged to believe that at least as far as the NATO
countries are concerned, including Germany, this is probably
going to prove acceptable and, therefore, I think we can
assume----
Senator Lausche. Did you say it will be acceptable to
Germany?
Secretary Rusk. That is the present indication. They have
had some problems about such things as the European Clause,
reserving a right for a unified Europe to have its own nuclear
force. But it now seems clear to them that if a unified Europe
comes about through the political consolidation of the present
European members that it would be a nuclear power through
direct succession from France and, say, Great Britain. That if
there are other arrangements which may come 10, 20 years in the
future that they could invoke the review clauses that would be
in such a treaty or if necessary, actually withdraw from the
treaty.
Let me say, that we will be in consultation with the
appropriate committees of the Congress on this before any
agreement is given to any language that might be developed
here.
But I just wanted to let the committee know we think there
has been some movement.
PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES
But there are two other problems that are of major
importance in the nonproliferation matter that you should know
about. One is that the non-nuclear countries, such as India and
Japan, are going to raise or likely to raise some very, very
difficult problems. For example, both of them say, ``Well, now,
it is all very well to get rid of nuclear weapons or for us to
foreswear nuclear weapons, but we need to reserve the right to
have nuclear explosives available for peaceful purposes.''
Nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes is a bomb for all
practical purposes. We hope to be able to work out among the
nuclear powers, at least some of the nuclear powers, a
procedure by which we can make peaceful uses of explosives
available to non-nuclear countries, under some arrangements by
which you make a judgment on its feasibility and desirability
and so forth. So, if Mauritania wants a harbor and applies to
the nuclear powers to explode a device there and dig them a
harbor, there will be some way in which this can be done.
Otherwise, some of the non-nuclear countries are likely to use
this at least as a pretext for not coming into this treaty.
Secondly, there is a very difficult question about
safeguards. We feel ourselves that this non-proliferation
treaty would be a very important instrument which to deal with
the safeguards problem. When you look ahead over the next
several years, with the rapid developments of nuclear power,
there is going to be enough fuel lying around to make a
considerable number of bombs a day within the next decade or
so, or by 1980, and so a general application of a safeguard
system is extremely important.
The Soviets are more or less disinterested in safeguards in
this situation. But they, I think, would take it, provided we
could all take the IAEA safeguard, the Vienna safeguards.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ International Atomic Energy Agency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE EURATOM PROBLEM
Then we run into the Euratom problem because the five
members who are members of Euratom are unwilling to accept IAEA
rather than their own safeguard, worked out among them. In that
matter France has a veto. So, I want to alert you to the fact
even though we got agreement on Article I, there are tough
problems remaining. We need to do something about.
Senator Clark. Mr. Secretary, are all five of those
countries strongly opposed to IAEA?
Secretary Rusk. No, Senator, you are quite right. I think
four out of the five would probably accept IAEA safeguards.
Senator Clark. Are you sure France would not?
Secretary Rusk. This is being tested, now. But the trouble
is their attitude toward a non-proliferation treaty is frigid.
[Discussion off the record.]
Secretary Rusk. The present indication is they would not
now sign a non-proliferation treaty although they might do it
at a later stage. They tell us they won't get in the way of a
non-proliferation treaty, but that is about as far as we can go
along this line.
Mr. Chairman. I talked a little longer that I had planned
to.
SITUATION IN ISRAEL
The Chairman. Just one other subject before you go on. I
wonder about Israel. There seems to be, from this morning's
press, a very dangerous situation there. Could you say a word
about it?
Secretary Rusk. The issue at the present time centers along
the Israeli-Syrian border. There are three elements in the
problem in terms of repose in the area. One is the activities
of a Fatah organization of terrorists, who we think are not
directly and actively supported by any of the governments
concerned. Particularly not by Jordan, who has been trying to
operate against them but who use Syrian and Jordanian territory
for acts of sabotage and terror over the Israeli border.
On that particular point, Jordan and Israel have greatly
increased their police action on their respective sides of the
border to try to deal with that activity as a police matter.
There is a more complicated matter between Israel and
Syria. At the time of the armistice, Syrian forces were
occupying a strip within the historical boundaries of the
mandate. Under the armistice, Syrian forces withdrew from that
strip under demilitarized regulations. Israel claims since this
was territory within the mandate and is Israeli territory, and
they claim to exercise sovereignty over the subject as to
demilitarized regulations.
The Syrians claim this has never been legally established,
and so you have both Israeli and Syrian farmers in this strip.
Arms are fired into the area from the Syrian side typically,
with response from the Israeli side. Israelis patrol on
occasion in this area with their own armored vehicles, so you
have a continuation of this particular kind of struggle.
DO NOT EXPECT A MAJOR WAR
I don't myself, think, sir, that this is likely to lead to
a major war.
The Chairman. You do not?
Secretary Rusk. Athough--because I don't think, for
example, the Syrians are particularly interested in it. We know
the Israelis are not interested in a major war in this
situation, but it is a very troublesome problem as to how you
handle these repeated acts of terror back and forth across the
border, particularly in that area.
General Bull, the head of the U.N. force out there, is
trying to make some arrangement--the Arabs would say, ``Let the
U.N. forces take charge in this demilitarized area and provide
the police forces,'' while the Israeli and Syrian farmers go
ahead with their agricultural work. As a matter of fact,
farmers on both sides apparently get along pretty well until
somebody from outside the demilitarized zone starts shooting in
from outside the area.
But that is about the situation, Mr. Chairman. It is tense,
but we don't----
The Chairman. You don't expect a major war?
Secretary Rusk. We don't expect a major war.
U.S. OBJECTIVES REGARDING CHINA
The Chairman. I wonder, you started out on China and you
said you thought it was probably the most important matter at
the moment, I wonder if you could briefly say what our attitude
or policy is toward China. What is our objective with regard to
China at the moment or to put it another way, is our policy to
continue nonintervention and to continue all possible means to
exclude them from the U.N. and so on? Would you say just very
briefly what our attitude is?
Secretary Rusk. I think our principal problem we have with
China is the one which a foreign minister of an eastern
European country described as moving Peking to peaceful
coexistence and the issue we have in trying to organize a
durable peace in the Pacific Ocean basin.
But as far as Peking is concerned, the key question turns
out to be always the attitude toward Formosa. In our bilateral
talks with them, as I have indicated to the committee, before
they start and end with a statement by the Peking
representative that ``There is nothing to discuss unless you
are prepared to surrender Formosa,'' and when we say we can't
surrender these 13 or 14 million people contrary to their will,
then nothing else happens. That is, we have tried to talk about
disarmament, tried to talk about Southeast Asia, exchanges,
exchange of plant material, for example, relevant to the food
problem and things of that sort, scientists, scholars, newsmen,
and so forth.
The same issue remains in the United Nations. The question
of what to do about Peking is coupled with the question of what
to do with the Republic of China. If we are not prepared to
surrender Formosa, then Peking is not going to talk to us
bilaterally about serious matters in any responsible sense. If
the United Nations is not prepared to expel the Republic of
China, then the problem remains about where it is.
We are continuing our contacts with Peking, but it comes
back to that question as to what you do about the 13 or 14
million people there, as well as in the longer run, what their
attitude is going to be toward what the Soviets call peaceful
coexistence.
The Chairman. You sum up there is no change in that
situation, no movement?
Secretary Rusk. No present change indicated.
The Chairman. No present change.
Secretary Rusk. For the reasons I stated.
U.S. OBJECTIVES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
The Chairman. Could you restate for the record the
objectives of our policy in Southeast Asia? What is it we are
seeking now to achieve there?
Secretary Rusk. We should like to see an accord with our
treaty commitments there through a situation in which in the
first place our allies are safe and secure, in which the
smaller countries of Southeast Asia are free to live their own
national existence under what policies they wish, but living in
peace with their neighbors across their frontiers. We have said
many times we consider that as far as what used to be Indo-
China is concerned, we consider the 1954 and 1962 agreements to
be an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia. That if the
movement of men and arms from North Vietnam to South Vietnam
would stop, we could work out the peace very quickly, and we do
believe those '54 and '62 agreements do provide such a basis.
But that the countries with whom we are allied in Southeast
Asia, that means the Philippines and Thailand, ought to be free
from molestation.
We have no objection to their being non-aligned if that is
their wish. We supported the non-alignments of Laos and of
Cambodia, of Burma, any of those countries that want to be non-
aligned, but we are concerned about the stability of peace in
the area.
THE FOURTEEN POINTS
I have, Mr. Chairman, made a few notes on the so-called 14
points that were used last year as they have developed during
the course of the year, and I will be glad to pass those around
for anyone who wishes to have a look at them.
We have not released these to the press in their present
form, although I think everything that is on these three pages
has been said publicly at one time or another, but Mr. Marcy
might want to have these.
SEATO OBLIGATIONS
The Chairman. One reason I asked you that was because I
heard a part of your appearance on that early morning show, I
think a week or maybe ten days ago.
Secretary Rusk. Today Show.
The Chairman. Perhaps, and you correct me if I misstate
this, you said one of the reasons we are there is in accordance
with obligations in the SEATO Treaty. But beyond and above that
is the necessity for stopping the, I think, tendency or
inclination to aggression. Was that a correct statement or not?
Do you remember how you put it?
Secretary Rusk. I don't recall that I put it just that way.
I did point out----
The Chairman. You put it correctly.
Secretary Rusk. I did point out that we ourselves have a
very important stake in the organization of a durable peace in
the Pacific. We have alliances with Korea and Japan and the
Republic of China, Philippines, Thailand, Australia, and New
Zealand. And our interest in a stable peace in the Pacific
compares to our interest in such a peace in the Atlantic.
I would be glad to get--I don't happen to have a transcript
with me, Mr. Chairman, but we have not set ourselves up to play
the role of general policeman in the world. I think the last
time we gave an account of various crises there were about
seventy, and we took an interest in about six of them over the
various years, but we do have specific commitments and we do
feel these specific commitments are very important to the
possibility of organizing peace.
The Chairman. I thought perhaps I misunderstood you, that
there was something beyond those specific commitments in the
way of aggression that was, I thought you gave in detail. I
could be wrong about that.
SECRET REPORT ON BOMBING POLICY
Mr. Chalmers Roberts recently had a story from which I
quote:
There is a top secret report by the Central Intelligence
Agency and Pentagon Defense Intelligence Agency casting doubt
on the military efficacy of bombing.
Is there such a report?
Secretary Rusk. Well, that--there are many examinations of
that question. I don't think there is a report that is looked
at frequently.
The Chairman. A recent report.
Secretary Rusk. I think the key points that are made in
these examinations is that the bombing has not stopped the
infiltration, that it has not brought the other side to the
conference table, but that from an operational point of view in
terms of lines of communication and the capacity of the other
side to sustain his effort, the expense to him of sustaining
his effort, shows that the bombing does impose upon him a very
substantial additional burden.
The Chairman. Is that the principal reason for maintaining
the bombing, the burden it imposes on the North?
Secretary Rusk. Well, that is an important reason. I think,
also, Mr. Chairman, that if you look at a situation where North
Vietnam could be safe and comfortable, and undisturbed while it
sends its armed forces and arms into South Vietnam, that the
prospect that this war would last a long time is greatly
strengthened.
I don't know what the incentive would be for North Vietnam
to stop doing what it is doing if it could be completely
comfortable.
The Chairman. It is an ideal situation for it to occupy,
sit there safe without being afraid of any damage being done to
them while our men and South Vietnamese men are being killed.
NOT FIGHTING COMMUNISM AS AN IDEOLOGY
This question has been asked me on one or two occasions
along this line: In the State of the Union Message the
President used the word ``Communist'' six times in discussing
the situation in Vietnam. But in talking about the Soviet
Union, Eastern Europe, and China he did not use the word once.
If it is United States policy to fight communism as an ideology
in Vietnam, what is the position with regard to building
bridges with Communists in Eastern Europe?
Secretary Rusk. Senator, I think the point is that we are
not fighting communism as an ideology. We are not undertaking a
world crusade to do that. What we are doing, as we have done
before, is resist aggression by these Communist countries
against those with whom we have commitments and/or in whom we
have a vital stake. I said that because we did go to the aid of
Greece without a treaty obligation. We went to the aid of Korea
without a treaty obligation.
But this point arises, for example, in connection with the
question as to whether we are at the front edges of a detente
with the Soviet Union and eastern Europe. We think we well
might be, we hope we are, and we will explore every possibility
of contributing to that detente.
But we didn't get there, we didn't get to this present
position by giving away Azerbaijan or Greece to the guerrillas
or the eastern provinces of Turkey or Berlin or Korea or the
Congo and some of these other situations. It has been a long
and difficult path to the point where there is considerable
prudence on both sides.
What we would hope to see is a corresponding prudence of
the eastern wing, the Asian wing; of the Communist Party, which
has isolated itself even within the Communist world, largely
because of its excessive militancy, and there is some
possibility of that when we see the shape of the second
generation of leadership in Peking, and this may come sooner
than sometimes we think, there may be a little more prudence
there.
NEW GENERATION OF SOVIET LEADERS
We do have a second generation now present in the Soviet
Union. There is no longer an old Bolshevik in the government of
the Soviet Union. Mr. Mikoyan was the last one.
There seems to be some prudence there.
I don't want to exaggerate that because when we look at
what the Soviets are doing in Egypt, Syria, Algeria, and
Somalia, we still have some problems, but we are prepared to
contribute to that possibility of detente if we can manage it.
So, this is not a general question of ideology. These are
specific acts taken against countries with whom we have treaty
commitments.
COMMUNIST AGGRESSION
The Chairman. Is it fair to say if the North Vietnamese
were not Communists that we would have intervened in this case?
Do you think we would or would not?
Secretary Rusk. Well, I think when you gentlemen approved
the Southeast Asia Treaty, when it was signed, it was made
clear by the government at that time that treaty referred only
to Communist aggression. I think the thinking behind that was
that neighborhood quarrels across frontiers are not the
problems that are going to inflame the entire world. We didn't
get involved when Algeria and Morocco were shooting each other,
and we haven't gotten involved in a lot of these neighborhood
disputes, but where you have pressures outward from a regime
which proclaims that it is going after the world revolution and
supported by militant minds, then you have the possibilities of
a momentum of aggression that deeply threatens the
possibilities of the peace of the world.
The Chairman. Do you think that this is realistic to apply
to a country of 14 million people that were about to take over
the world or even planning to?
Secretary Rusk. It is not just these people. Their big
brothers to the North have also announced they are going after
some of these other countries, like Thailand.
The Chairman. Then it is the Communists--what I am trying
to clarify is, is this the overshadowing reason because they
are Communists or not? Is this in your opinion, and the
Department, or the government's opinion, the principal reason
we are there because they are Communists and part of an
international conspiracy?
Secretary Rusk. That is what the SEATO Treaty----
The Chairman. What do you think? I was trying to pick your
brains.
Secretary Rusk. Well, I think, sir, there is a difference
between those quarrels which have a built-in insatiable
appetite on one side, and there is a world revolution----
The Chairman. Is that characteristic of North Vietnam in
your opinion?
Secretary Rusk. And Peking, yes. I mean----
The Chairman. Then, if you change it a little, then it is
Peking, is this Peking's aggression we are dealing with? I am
just trying to take one step at a time.
Secretary Rusk. Well, we haven't made a special point that
this is Peking's aggression, but Peking's support of Hanoi in
this matter is crucial to Hanoi's position, and if Peking
showed the slightest interest in peace in this situation my
guess is that peace could be arranged rather quickly.
CONFUSION OVER U.S. INTERVENTION
The Chairman. But this is the point that I think is behind
much of the confusion and perhaps the dissent that you--I
think, the government objects to. If we can clarify it, I think
it would be very useful to those of us who are called upon to
clarify it nearly every day. To our constituents and otherwise,
as to just why it is we are there, what makes this quarrel so
important.
You have already said you didn't intervene in these other
areas, Tunisia, Algeria. You didn't intervene in other places,
but you did here.
Now, why is it that this is so peculiar?
First, let me, let's eliminate it, it isn't because North
Vietnam is so powerful that it threatens the peace of the world
in itself as a country, is it?
Secretary Rusk. It threatens the peace of Southeast Asia,
Vietnam, Laos and Thailand.
The Chairman. But if it wasn't Communist, what in your
opinion would we have done, would we have intervened?
Secretary Rusk. My guess is if it were not Communist it
would not be doing what it is doing. If you look at the
actions----
The Chairman. Why would you guess that? I don't follow that
at all. I mean, the Germans haven't resorted to force, but they
certainly are eager for reunification of their country, and
there are very substantial reasons. But here I think it would
be natural that these people would want to reunify their
country. Every country seems to want to do that.
Secretary Rusk. And if the people themselves deciding these
questions freely on their own in the two parts of the countries
involved were to agree on reunification, we would not object to
that.
It is the attempt to impose reunification by force that we
objected to, we would in Germany and we would in Korea.
U.S. OPPOSITION TO VIETNAMESE ELECTION
The Chairman. We did object to an election in '56, didn't
we? We objected to an election being held at that time, and I
understood from what people have written about it because we
thought if you had an election it would be reunified under Ho
Chi Minh.
Secretary Rusk. Incidentally, I have not been able to find
in the record instructions to our embassy saying that we
opposed elections out there. I have been trying to find what
the instructions were during that period. But at that time, Mr.
Chairman, it seemed to be obvious to everybody that there was
no possibility of a free election in the North and, therefore,
the question was do you have free elections in the South only
with everything rigged in the North?
General Vo Nguyen Giap in 1956, I think it is in your
committee report, I have brought up at a public hearing last
year, General Giap in 1956 described what was happening in the
North during that period and the mistakes they made in terms of
terror and intimidation and torture and things of that sort. He
was very frank about it. And it was the judgment at that time
in Saigon that under those circumstances a free election was
simply not possible, apart from the problems they might have
had in South Vietnam about free elections.
The Chairman. That makes free elections, I guess--I don't
know any other way, however, to bring this to issue.
GRADUAL NATURE OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT
Senator Lausche. Will the chairman point out to me so that
I will be able to better understand what he is aiming to prove,
is it your position that we should pull out?
The Chairman. No, I don't think that is feasible. I wish we
never had been involved.
Mr. Max Frankel said the other day, he is one of the people
more or less sympathetic with our position there. He says if
the matter was up today for our sending five hundred thousand
troops from ab initio--from the beginning--to save Saigon, we
wouldn't do it. The reason we are there is because of the very
gradual nature of the involvement, a little at a time, a little
more and a little more and finally we find ourselves there.
This is his theory, and I was trying to really see if the
Secretary could give me information that is better able to
answer questions as to why we are involved here.
Is it fear of Vietnam? No. Is it because of China, and if
so, is there evidence China is a very aggressive nation, and
should we be fearful of China and try to destroy her now? I
don't know what we want to do with her. I just wondered.
A LARGER CONTEXT
Secretary Rusk. I don't want to take up an undue amount of
time, but I would just like to pull back a step or two and take
a look at this in a somewhat larger context.
The Chairman. I think that is good.
Secretary Rusk. President Kennedy, President Johnson and
their Secretary of State have not come to the Senate with
additional alliances. President Kennedy came down here with a
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. President Johnson has concluded the
Civil Air Agreement. He presented you the consular agreement,
and he hopes we can present you with an East-West Trade
Agreement. He presented you with a space treaty, and we hope we
can present you with a nonproliferation treaty.
But after the war during the 50's at a time when the
Communist world was pressing almost on all fronts, and
resorting to armed force and a number of circumstances, we made
some alliances in the interest of building a stable peace in
the world.
Now, in the case of the SEATO Treaty, the administration at
that time, and the Senate said that each party recognizes that
aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area would
endanger its own peace and safety and agrees it will in that
event act to meet the common danger and so forth.
Now, if this matter were presented afresh today, I mean if,
say, yesterday there was the kind of an invasion of South
Vietnam that occurred in Korea by organized divisions publicly
and formally coming across the demarcation line, I am not at
all clear that Mr. Frankel is right in saying that we couldn't
do it. I think that is something that the President and the
leadership would have to look at and look at in terms of what
happens in the world if we fail to meet one of these solemn
treaty commitments in the organization of peace.
WORKING TOWARD DETENTE
I point out since 1947, we have spent something on the
order of $900 billion in defense budgets and fantastic
resources. And we have only barely by the skin of our teeth
been able to come to a position where there may be some
possibility of enough prudence on both sides to work toward
some sort of a detente, say, between ourselves and eastern
Europe. We are only four or five years away from a major crisis
over Berlin and only five years ago from a most horrible crisis
over Cuban missiles. It only has been a very narrow thing that
we begin to see the possibility of something like peaceful
coexistence with some sort of real content in the expression
opening up here.
I think the overriding question is how do you organize a
durable peace. And it is not for me to be presumptuous, Mr.
Chairman, but I think it is worth your committee's considering
whether it might wish to address itself to that problem, taking
into account such changes as might have occurred since 1945,
since the United Nations Charter was signed, to see what the
changes are, if any, what they mean and how these changes bear
upon the general problem of organizing a durable peace in the
world.
APPREHENSIONS ABOUT ESCALATION OF THE WAR
The Chairman. Well, of course, what bothers me is I think
we are more apprehensive, I am today, than at any other time. I
am more apprehensive than 20 years ago. I am apprehensive about
this war and its escalation. I don't want to prolong this.
I want to call on Mr. Mansfield. I want to again recall for
the record in your own Department of State memorandum of March
8, 1965 which was entitled ``Legal basis for U.S. action in
Vietnam,'' that your own statement refers to the U.N. Charter
and the Geneva Accords and didn't even mention the SEATO
Treaty. This is what causes so much trouble with us, trying to
understand it.
It wasn't until recently that the SEATO Treaty has been
given in justification for this involvement, and I am still
very puzzled about it.
Mr. Mansfield?
THE SEATO TREATY
Senator Lausche. Will you re-read that SEATO Treaty
declaring why these nations have joined in the compact? That is
considered as a challenge to their own security.
Secretary Rusk. In the preamble they said, among other
things:
Desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace and freedom and
to uphold the principles of democracy and individual liberty
and the rule of law, and to promote the economic well being and
development of all peoples in the Treaty area, intending to
declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that any
potential aggressor will appreciate that the parties standing
together in the area, and desiring further to coordinate their
efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace
and security.
But there was added by the United States the understanding
in the treaty, that the United States, in executing the present
treaty, does so with the understanding that its recognition of
the effect of aggression and armed attack and its agreement
with reference thereto in Article IV, paragraph 1, apply only
to communist aggression.
The reason for that was that it was not the desire to
become involved in other kinds of neighborhood disputes,
particularly, for example, the Pakistan-India dispute and I
gather Senator Mansfield may recall this better than I. And I
gather when Mr. Dulles made it clear that this was the
interpretation of the United States, that there was a period of
24 hours or more when the Pakistan representative was very
uncertain about whether Pakistan would sign it or not. That is
my recollection of what the record shows.
The Chairman. I don't think it was contemplated that we
would intervene in a civil war on account of this, either.
Senator Sparkman?
Senator Sparkman. Well, Mr. Chairman, I have been in and
out.
I noticed some other items we have on this suggested agenda
here,\2\ I don't know whether you have seen them or not.
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\2\ MEMORANDUM
Suggested Areas of Questioning for Secretary Rusk, January 16, 1967
1. Vietnam
a. Effectiveness of bombing in North Vietnam;
b. Indications of willingness to negotiate on part of North Vietnam
and National Liberation Front;
c. Progress of pacification;
d. Political developments in South Vietnam;
e. United States military activity in the Mekong Delta;
f. Basis for statistics on incidents, casualties, desertions, etc.
2. Thailand
a. Scale and targets of counterinsurgency efforts;
b. United States role in counterinsurgency;
c. United States military buildup on Thailand;
d. Are Thai troops being sent to Vietnam?
3. Significance of Current Uproar in China
4. Prospects for a Non-Proliferation Agreement
5. Soviet Deployment of a Limited Anti-Ballistic Missile System
6. Prelimary Findings of the Tripartite Working Group on NATO Force
Levels in Europe
7. Reasons for Delaying Food Shipments to India and Estimate of
Future Indian Requirements
8. Situation in Rhodesia and Southern Africa Generally
9. Implications of Military Aid and Sales in Latin America.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Secretary Rusk. I haven't seen it.
Senator Sparkman. That I might ask you rather briefly
about.
First, have you asked questions about Thailand?
The Chairman. No, I did not.
Go ahead.
THE SITUATION IN THAILAND
Senator Sparkman. I wonder if you can give us something
about the Thailand situation, first of all. Just what are we up
against there and what are the prospects?
Secretary Rusk. At the present time, there are several
hundred, rather than several thousand trained guerrillas
operating in the northeastern part of the country. This is a
rather remote area, and has been difficult for the government
to organize its police and security forces on as tight a basis
as would be necessary to deal with such small numbers of
guerrillas.
We also know in North Vietnam there is a training camp for
Thais who have been trained in North Vietnam to enter Thailand.
We know that Thailand is under pressure from its north and
northeast, but we feel unless there is a major increase in the
effort made by the North Vietnamese or the Chinese coming
directly down from China that the Thais seem to have the
capability of dealing with this. They have been very careful
themselves not to have U.S. soldiers involved in their
activities in the villages. We have helped them with
transportation into the general areas on occasion through
helicopter lifts. But beyond that, Thailand is a member of the
SEATO Treaty, is supporting the effort in Vietnam, has made
certain of its facilities available to us and to our armed
forces, and is contributing certain forces to South Vietnam.
On the internal side, they are doing reasonably well on the
economic side. They are now working on a constitution
acquisition that is led by Prince Huan, who served here once as
ambassador. In the months ahead, it is possible they will
promulgate that constitution and move toward a more elected
government than they have at the present time.
HANOI'S OPPOSITION TO U.S BASES IN THAILAND
Senator Sparkman. I notice the New York Times had quite an
article in a recent issue, as did the Washington Evening Star.
The New York Times article is entitled ``Hanoi Demands Thai Ban
on U.S. Use of Bases.'' Just how strong is their demand and do
they threaten action in the event that----
Secretary Rusk. Well, they are taking action at the present
time within the limits of these guerrilla operations that I
mentioned.
Senator Sparkman. Are they under the direction of Hanoi?
Secretary Rusk. Well they are being trained in North
Vietnam.
There is a Thai training camp there. We have taken pictures
of it. We have prisoners who tell us where it is and what goes
on there.
They then apparently infiltrate through the northern part
of Laos into the northeastern part of Thailand.
THE MEKONG VALLEY
Senator Sparkman. Just as a matter of curiosity, I saw
somewhere reference to that northeast section of Thailand along
the Mekong River saying it was the poorest section of the
country. I thought that was a very fertile valley.
Secretary Rusk. The Mekong Valley itself is reasonably
fertile. They were damaged by the heavy floods that occurred
along that part of the Mekong this past year, both in Laos and
in northeast Thailand. But I think one of the principal reasons
for the backwardness of northeast Thailand when you look at it,
is more generally, rather than just in the river valley where
there is communication by river, is lack of communications and
mountain jungle, undeveloped in the usual sense. I think it's
the lack of communications that is the principal problem in
terms of both development and security. It is somewhat like the
northeast corridor of Cambodia in that respect where we know
the Viet Cong are using Cambodian territory. We don't think
with the approval or the permission of Prince Sihanouk but yet
it is remote and rugged terrain into which his own security
forces can't go to monitor the situation in any way.
PRESS COVERAGE OF A HUSH-HUSH OPERATION
Senator Sparkman. In that same issue of the The Star there
was a headline ``14 million dollars annual savings possible by
the B-52 use of those bases,'' Is that a pretty reasonable
evaluation?
Secretary Rusk. Well, there are some operations advantages
in the short run compared with the several hours from Guam. The
bases there are not at the present time fitted for B-52
operations. This is a question for the future. No decision has
been made. The Thais apparently would be agreeable but we
ourselves have not made a final decision on that point.
Senator Sparkman. Why have we had such little discussion
publicly of what we are doing in Thailand? Is it a hush-hush
operation? The papers seem to get hold of it somehow.
Secretary Rusk. Well, there are two or three reasons. One
is that we do not wish officially to talk about which
particular operations go from which bases, but more importantly
the Thais themselves feel that the settlement of the situation
in Southeast Asia would be facilitated if these matters are not
made major matters of public prestige and things of that sort.
We are in Thailand. The Thai Government has a veto on that. We
think they themselves will say more about this fairly shortly.
But they have been very insistent upon not going into details
because they say that in the Southeast Asian situation it is
better to try to keep the Vietnam situation from a political
point of view in as narrow channels as possible in order not be
get the problems of a settlement too complicated.
These are open secrets. The only problem is how far we go
in confirming officially what goes on.
Senator Sparkman. Yes.
Secretary Rusk. In order to avoid the Thai sensibilities.
Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, I have lots of questions
but everybody around the table wants a chance to ask, so I will
pass.
The Chairman. Senator Hickenlooper?
RESTRAINTS ON BOMBING
Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Secretary, with reference to the
question which Senator Fulbright asked you and which was
discussed with respect to the bombing, whether or not that had
any effect of lessening or diminishing the activities of the
North Vietnamese, does the fact that we don't bomb a lot of
military targets up there lessen the probability of quieting
them down? In other words, the stories we get here are that
Russian MIGs sit on the airfield up there and our pilots are
forbidden to bomb those airfields or destroy those Russian MIGs
sitting there.
Then we get the argument which doesn't appeal to me very
much, if we bomb these they will just move into the air bases
in China and if we bomb those then the fat will be in the fire.
Is it not a fact we are not bombing many targets in North
Vietnam which would really hurt their military efforts?
Secretary Rusk. Well, the list of important targets that
could be called military targets that have not been bombed is
really relatively small, Senator.
Senator Hickenlooper. Quite important, though, aren't they?
Secretary Rusk. Well, I suppose in one sense the most
important of these would be the Haiphong harbor and there are
one or two plants inside the perimeter of Hanoi. For example,
there is a steel plant, a cement plant which would have some
direct relationship to their operations.
We have kept the airfields outside of the immediate Hanoi
area out of our operation because it takes a great deal of
striking to do it, and the repair of an airfield is not too
complicated a matter.
Senator Hickenlooper. But the destruction of MIGs would be.
Secretary Rusk. Yes. Actually, the MIGs have not been all
that much of a problem in terms of our own forces. We have felt
that, and I don't want to preclude what the future might hold
in this in either direction, but we have felt we ought to try
to keep the situation within certain limits, if we can find
some possibility that the other side is prepared to talk sense
about peace in this situation.
You know we have had some recent MIG 21 engagements in
which I think some nine MIGs were shot down. Which were at
least about half of what they had there. The MIGs have not
given us much trouble nor indeed have the SAM sites in the
main. The principal problem has come from the conventional
anti-aircraft scattered all over the place. There are other
factors to be taken into account about the airfields. They are
very, very heavily protected by anti-aircraft. The prospects of
substantial losses on our side are pretty good, and the
question is as to whether the losses would be larger if we held
our hand and took on these follows in the air. But, again,
these are tactical decisions the Commander in Chief would have
to make at the end of the day, and I wouldn't want to foreclose
the future.
TARGETS ARE AUTHORIZED FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Hickenlooper. Are those decisions made in South
Vietnam or are they made over here at the pentagon?
Secretary Rusk. The principal fixed targets are authorized
from Washington.
Now, there are certain areas in what is called route
reconnaissance authorized for the purpose of hitting trucks and
barges and other things that are moving supplies to the south.
But the principal fixed targets are authorized from here in
light of the recommendation from the field and from the Joint
Chiefs.
One of the factors, I might add that are taken into account
in regard to those fixed targets is the prospect of civilian
casualties and one of the columns in which you take up these
questions shows the probable civilian casualties, and there
have been some targets which have been taken off the list
because of the prospect of significance of civilian casualties.
IMPACT OF VIETNAM WAR ON INDONESIA
Senator Hickenlooper. Let me ask you this question. I want
to hurry on because I have a good many questions to ask here:
Would you care to venture an opinion as to what would have
happened by now in Indonesia under Sukarno's leadership if we
had not stood fast in South Vietnam?
Secretary Rusk. It is very hard to be precise about that--
--
Senator Hickenlooper. I know you can't----
Secretary Rusk. I am inclined myself, Senator, to think
that there was a connection but not a decisive one, that in the
event of October a year ago, in Jakarta this was a PKT
operation with some Chinese help, that did not expect to rely
upon the presence of Chinese armed forces from China. They
almost succeeded and came within a gnat's eyelash of
succeeding. They got six generals and had they gotten two more
the thing would have been over.
But I think the presence of U.S. and British forces in
Southeast Asia, a combination of them there, did lead these
generals to believe they at least would not be subject to major
intervention from China. Now, saving Haidsah----
[Discussion off the record.]
Senator Hickenlooper. Would you say if we had not been in
South Vietnam, communism would have made tremendous strides in
Indonesia.
Secretary Rusk. That would be the implication of what he
said, of his remark; but I would be inclined to discount his
remarks somewhat.
I do feel, Senator, that what is--that the stand we have
taken in Vietnam has made a considerable difference to all of
those free countries in Asia, the ten, for example, who met in
Korea this past year and affirmed their support of South
Vietnam and expressed their appreciation for those giving help,
both Asian and non-Asian, and from Korea and Japan right around
through, all the way to India, there is a confidence that, I
think, would not have been there, that is making some
difference as to how they comport themselves.
THE RHODESIAN SITUATION
Senator Hickenlooper. I want to move on for just a quick
question or two here: As you know, and I have talked to you
about this, the Rhodesian situation troubles me very greatly,
and I was greatly disturbed when the President signed the
executive order of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia on
January 5th.
I fail to agree with him in my own mind. I suppose I can
rationalize it if I go way-round rationalization, as to why did
he undertake to attempt to destroy one of the most progressive
and successful governments and economies in all Africa by this
kind of action. I understand the sovereignty theory and all
that that is being advanced. I don't happen to agree with it,
but I understand it, I understand what it is. What are we
trying to do there?
Secretary Rusk. Well, first, Senator, we feel that this is,
in the first instance, a problem for the Commonwealth,
Britain----
Senator Hickenlooper. Why did we get into it?
Secretary Rusk. Well, we didn't buy into it ourselves, on
our own initiative. We didn't go around drumming up business on
this one. It was presented to us in the first instance by joint
action and joint position by some 18 members of the
Commonwealth, and a reference of this question to the Security
Council by the Commonwealth.
Now we are sitting in the Security Council, and when it
comes before the Council we have to ourselves decide what
attitude we take. The United Kingdom introduced a resolution.
We had to vote yes or no or abstain. We did help to fend off
much more extreme resolutions in the Security Council, for
example, the use of force, but we have felt that basically,
quite frankly, that the attitude of the Commonwealth is sound
in this situation, that the Rhodesian question is, in fact, a
threat to the peace in the longer run unless there is some
modification of view. What we have been hoping all along was
that discussions would lead to a peaceful settlement of the
situation. They came very close in the conversations on the
cruiser Tiger between Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Ian
Smith, but it broke down apparently on the issues as to which
side was going to trust the other during the interim period of
about three months.
Now the hope is that when the present Rhodesian leadership
looks down the longer range of the future, that they will
become convinced that further negotiations and talk are
required, and that the British would also take that view,
although both sides have become very grumpy about further talks
at the present time.
This is not a matter which has to be settled overnight, but
there surely has to be some movement toward a settlement with
which the 4 million Africans in Rhodesia can live and with
which their neighbors can live. Otherwise you are going to have
a situation in which all sorts of people would be mobilizing
themselves to try to prevent the movement into this part of
Africa of an apartheid approach.
The Communist world will seize these issues and exploit
them to a very considerable extent. So we feel that the Ian
Smith regime must make some adjustments here in order to get
this on the track of peaceful settlement that its own 4 million
majority can live with.
THE DESTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA
Senator Hickenlooper. The net result of the British
position and ours would seem to me to be--or would seem to me
to be the destruction of Southern Rhodesia, that is, in other
words, for a viable going economy to be turned over to the
natives over there, who mentally are not capable of running a
government with the same success that it is being run now.
Secretary Rusk. Excuse me----
Senator Hickenlooper. Go ahead.
Secretary Rusk. Well, please.
In the first place, Senator, I do not believe that the
Africans either in Rhodesia or outside Rhodesia would require
that the government of Rhodesia be required to be turned over
overnight all of a sudden to blacks.
Senator Hickenlooper. That has been the case in most other
countries in Africa, has it not?
Secretary Rusk. Well, that has been true--well, they have a
white member of the cabinet in Tanzania; I think they have
white members in Kenya, and Liberia, they have worked out
relations between the races in a rather constructive fashion.
One of the problems in the Rhodesian matter is that it is
the kind of an issue that could destroy the working
relationships between the whites and blacks in that government
even in those countries where the working relationships are
sound and in reasonably good order. But we do feel that--and
this is the Commonwealth view--that there needs to be some
movement in this matter. There are many interim steps to be
taken which would bring more repose in this situation.
Now, if Ian Smith were to permit some of those interim
steps, the stake could be worked out.
Again let me say that the Tiger agreement represented some
of those interim steps and apparently the key point on which
that broke down was the question of who would be responsible
for law and order in the country during an interim period when
a new constitution would be promulgated and on the basis of
which Rhodesia would become independent. That constitution
itself would itself have included interim steps rather than a
final solution and apparently the cabinet in Salisbury would
not agree to let the Governor General have control of the
security forces of the country during that brief interim period
before a new constitution might be promulgated and that is
where it broke down.
Senator Hickenlooper. I think my time is up.
LEGAL MEMORANDUM
Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, I have a brief memorandum
here on some of the legal aspects and charter aspects. I might
give this to Mr. Marcy in case any members of the committee
might wish to have a look at it.
The Chairman. Senator Morse.
Senator Lausche. Could copies be provided of that legal
memorandum?
Senator Morse. The committee can provide them.
The Chairman. The committee can make copies if you want
one.
The Senator from Oregon.
Senator Morse. Mr. Secretary, I shall confine my questions
to certain problems that I think have arisen as a result of U
Thant's proposals. I shall read this legal memorandum that you
have just referred to with great care.
DISAGREEMENT OVER SEATO
I only want to say in passing, by way of a caveat, of
course, I do not share in any degree the State Department's
position on SEATO. I think that the chairman has pointed out
here the March 8, 1965, memorandum as to the administration's
legal justification for its involvement with North Vietnam. It
does not even whisper about SEATO within the realm of sound
international law.
I think all the rationalization, in my judgment--that is my
characterization of the State Department on SEATO in recent
times--is an afterthought, and I think completely unsound in
international law, but I shall discuss that in further detail
elsewhere.
CONFIDENCE IN U THANT
But what does bother me, Mr. Secretary--and you can be very
helpful to us in what I think is a growing confusion in the
country in regard to our relations to U Thant, I do not sit
here holding any brief for him. I want your help on it,
however.
We certainly took the position that we wanted him to be
continued as Secretary General. We were one of those who urged
it upon him, some would say did more than urge, but we urged
it. He has been proposing variable formats for trying to pave
the way for negotiations and every time he does, it seems that
we get into controversy with him. It seems that we are the ones
that get into controversy with him. I do not find any other
nations that have been in controversy with him, at least it has
not been reported. Perhaps you can tell us if they do, and that
is one of the things I want to find out.
If we have the confidence that we expressed in him when we
urged his reappointment as Secretary General, why do we not
take the position that if he will set up a procedure for
triparty negotiations, we will look with great favor on it. Why
do we take the position that, as you expressed again this
morning, that we will not stop the bombing unless he can come
in and give us assurance of some kind of reciprocal action on
the part of North Vietnam? Is that a price that we should exact
until we have first found out what he can do with cessation of
bombing? I do not know whether he can deliver anything or not.
But I seriously doubt whether a continuation of our bombing is
justifiable on the basis of the argument you make this morning
when U Thant is telling the world that the United States ought
to stop bombing first.
U Thant is telling the world now that he disagrees that
Vietnam is of vital security interest to the United States. It
seems to me he has put us in a pretty bad light in the world,
and I wonder if the proper response is for us to simply reject
him or reject his ideas rather than make a plea here again
through the procedures of the United Nations for a United
Nations' manifestation backing him up and assuming their
peacekeeping obligations under the Charter.
That is broad outline. I only want to raise----
Secretary Rusk. Yes.
Senator Morse [continuing]. The question so you can talk to
this committee about why we are taking the attitude toward U
Thant that the public statements of you and our Administration
have been taking.
U THANT'S POSITION ON THE BOMBING
Secretary Rusk. Senator, first, on the question of stopping
the bombing, bear in mind that the other side is now very
specifically saying that this must be unconditional and
permanent, and this is a major step. There are three divisions
in and just north of the demilitarized zone today.
Senator Morse. Does he agree with that?
Secretary Rusk. Agree with that?
Senator Morse. Does U Thant agree with that? Is that what U
Thant means when he says we should stop the bombing?
Secretary Rusk. We have said--but U Thant is not the man
who makes this judgment. It is the other side who has to make
the judgment.
Senator Morse. He is the one who is making the proposals to
both sides, and we immediately reject his proposal about
stopping the bombing which I have not understood. If it is
true, I would like to have you tell me.
Secretary Rusk. I beg your pardon, we have not rejected his
proposal of stopping the bombing. We have said, ``Okay, that is
possible, what about point two,'' which is the mutual de-
escalation of the violence on both sides, and on that he has
not had anything whatever from the other side.
Senator Morse. I understand that.
Secretary Rusk. And the other side says, ``It is none of
your business.''
Senator Morse. I understand that. But my point is you have
to have a starting point here, and my point is when we say we
are not going to stop the bombing until U Thant delivers
reciprocity, we give the impression--I understand our points--
but we give the impression that we are the ones that right off
the bat throw in a block that makes it impossible for him to
act.
OPPOSITION TO U THANT'S PROPOSALS
Secretary Rusk. You mentioned one point about other
countries. The ambassadors of seven Asian nations, including
Japan, Malaysia, Laos, called on him the other day to take
strong exception to what he said in his press conference about
the security significance of Vietnam in this present
situtation. I might say they did that without any encouragement
from us. We did not stimulate them to do that, and I gather
that Australia and New Zealand are also doing the same thing
when they heard about the Asian move.
But Hanoi has rejected strongly U Thant's second and third
points, second point, mutual de-escalation of the violence,
and, third, on U Thant's point about the Liberation Front they
have said the Liberation Front is the sole spokesman for the
South Vietnamese.
Now, Senator, it seems to me there are two, as far as peace
is concerned, as it affects the United States. There are two
most elementary facts in this situation. One is substantial
numbers of the North Vietnamese regular forces in South Vietnam
and our bombing in North Vietnam. All right, why can we not get
rid of both of those at the same time, why can we not get rid
of both of those together? We have not been able--and I can
assure you, sir, we have scoured the earth on it--to get
anybody to give us any indication as to what would happen. They
do not even say they would come to a conference without doing
anything on the ground. They do not--let me illustrate the
point.
THE CHRISTMAS TRUCE
Very recently, during the two-day Christmas truce, when the
hour arrived, hundreds of vessels, most of them small, but
about 18 of them fairly good sized, suddenly made a dash along
the coast of North Vietnam to resupply their forces north of
the DMZ. They were all loaded and ready to go, just as Olympic
dash men at the starting point. They came down, they unloaded
several thousand tons of supplies and then scattered again
before the truce is over, you see.
Now, we need to have some indication that that is not going
to be the effect of stopping the bombing, that something is
going to happen on the ground that moves this toward peace.
Otherwise, we simply give them an unlimited and an indefinite
capability of doing it the comfortable way of sending their
people south and taking their time and being safe and secure
and not have anything to worry about at home.
This, I think, would be a very serious thing.
Now, we are trying to find out the answer to a secondary
question. If people cannot tell us what Hanoi would do if we
stopped bombing, they at least can tell us what they would do.
Moscow, Eastern Europe, U Thant and the rest of them, India,
what they would do if we stopped the bombing. There is no
response from the other side.
I would be interested in your own view as to whether this
would make any difference to your own position, Senator, if we
stopped the bombing and there was no response. Quite frankly,
we have not----
U.S. SHOULD NOT BE FIGHTING U THANT
Senator Morse. You ought to take judicial notice that would
make a difference with me. You ought to know me well enough for
this. My difference with you is we are laying down conditions
precedent that are not going to be accepted apparently even by
U Thant, and if we are going to try to work through U Thant, we
ought to give--make some attempt to see what he can deliver. If
we have made a bad bargain on U Thant, if we are now already
discovering that he cannot give us the leadership because of
the conditions he imposes, then let us face up to that.
I think we are getting a bad image created around the world
in regard to our relationships with U Thant. I think we should
not be fighting with U Thant at the present time.
Secretary Rusk. Well, when U Thant says, for example, that
he does not believe that the security of Southeast Asia is of
strategic importance to the West, there is nothing in his
present responsibility or his background of experience that
makes his judgment on that matter of very much importance. He
is not responsible for the strategic interests of the West.
Senator Morse. He certainly comes from a country that sits
on the front door of China, and Burma does not seem to be as
concerned about China as we are.
[Discussion off the record.]
THE DOMINO THEORY
Secretary Rusk. Mr. U Thant also said that he does not
believe in the domino theory. I do not believe in the domino
theory myself, and I have said that many times. The theory is
the theory of the world revolution pursued by militant means.
He mentioned countries X, Y, and Z. Hanoi, with the help of
Peking, has already named the countries X, Y, and Z. Vietnam is
X, Laos is Y, and Thailand is Z. So, I personally do not feel
when Mr. U Thant makes a statement of this sort by silence we
indicate that somehow we agree with him. We supported him for
Secretary General not because he and we would agree on every
one of the hundred or more items that might be on the agenda of
the U.N. or on an item like this which is not on the agenda of
the U.N. and he opposes putting it on the agenda of the U.N.,
but because he has on the whole done a good job as Secretary
General and the prospect was that he would be a considerably
better Secretary General than any of the alternatives that
seemed to be around.
ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
Senator Morse. I will not take more time other than to make
a comment on the last observation you made. Sure he is
Secretary General of the United Nations, but he is not
independent in his responsibilities to the organization, to
both branches of the organization, and I repeat, I would like
to bring this before the Security Council. After all, I think
the Security Council ought to sit down and go over his
proposals, because they relate to the image of the United
Nations, but I think we, on the other hand, ought to insist
that that Security Council stand up and be counted, either with
a veto or with a vote, an affirmative vote. I want to get
ourselves out of the position where we seem in many quarters to
be giving the impression that we are holding the United Nations
off. I would like to put the heat on that Security Council and
get a vote up or down, and I think the Secretary General ought
to be asked to sit down with that Security Council and go over
these proposals of his. He sits there as Secretary General and
makes these announcements that are going to affect the members
of the organization, and then a nation individually and
unilaterally, the United States in this instance, takes him on.
I do not think we should be in that position. I think the
United Nations, to whom he is responsible and of whom he is an
agent, ought to be taking him on.
Secretary Rusk. You know, I would not dispute that point
with you too much, Senator. There is pending before the
Security Council a resolution by which the Security Council
would call upon the parties to engage in negotiations for a
peace in Southeast Asia. It does not have the votes on the
Security Council for a variety of reasons. The Soviets would
veto. But there are others influenced in part by U Thant who
say----
Senator Lausche. Why not let the Soviets veto?
Secretary Rusk. But there are others who say that since
Hanoi and Peking say this is not the business of the United
Nations, that if the Security Council takes up this question,
and tried to get into it, that this would get in the way of a
use of the machinery which Hanoi and Peking say is the
appropriate machinery, namely, the Geneva machinery.
When this point was made by the Soviet delegate, Mr. Arthur
Goldberg said that is fine with us, let us use the Geneva
machinery, in which case the Soviet ambassador said, ``No, no,
we can't use that.''
This matter has been one way or another before the United
Nations at least a dozen times, and I have an up-to-date
memorandum on this point which I will be glad to furnish Mr.
Marcy for the committee.
A PERMANENT PRESENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
The Chairman. Will the Senator yield for one clarifying
thing?
You said no one would be more alarmed than Burma, unless it
be Thailand, if we pull out of Southeast Asia, which seems to
imply that you feel we have a permanent presence there.
Secretary Rusk. No.
The Chairman. That is the interpretation of it.
Secretary Rusk. No, I meant under present circumstances. I
am not saying what you would do if we have peace. Our Manila
declaration on that is quite specific on that point.
FORMAL ACTION RATHER THAN BACK SCENE NEGOTIATING
Senator Morse. You must not take more time on that, and if
you will only pardon me, I want to make this observation. I
just do not buy the argument that Hanoi and Peking should be
telling the United Nations what to do. The Charter makes
perfectly clear if there was a threat to the peace by a non-
member, the members, the signatories, have the job of enforcing
the peace. It is the primary purpose of the Charter. All the
other things that the United Nations do are ancillary to it.
The real reason for it was to enforce the peace.
I would put France and Russia, as the Senator from Ohio
said--with a veto, if they want to veto it, let them do it. But
the important thing is it would help clarify the situation.
Instead of giving the impression that the United States is
doing a lot of back scene negotiating, which isn't what the
Charter calls for--the Charter calls for formal action under
the juridical process thereof, and we ought to insist on it.
Secretary Rusk. I have some sympathy with that point.
The Chairman. Senator Aiken.
Senator Morse. The sad part of it is if we could closet
ourselves longer we might find ourselves in more agreement.
Senator Aiken. First, let me say I agree with the Secretary
that not only would Burma but every other country in Southeast
Asia be alarmed if we pulled out completely from that area.
My questions will be short and along a different line.
U.S. TRADE WITH CAMBODIA
Mr. Secretary, to what extent is our trade with Cambodia--
to what extent has it been increasing?
Secretary Rusk. I do not have the trade figures. Our
tourism has been more or less holding up. I would have to get
the figures on trade.
Senator Aiken. And we are now supplying some oil to
Cambodia?
Secretary Rusk. American companies----
Senator Aiken. Yes.
Secretary Rusk [continuing]. Provide oil in Cambodia and up
the Mekong River to South Vietnam.
CHINESE STEEL
Senator Aiken. That is right. But in that connection I read
last month the United States, through Bombay, had purchased a
very substantial amount of steel manufactured in China for use
in South Vietnam.
Then about two weeks ago there was another news item to the
effect that a freighter carrying steel from Bombay to the
United States had gotten into trouble or been sunk or
something.
Are American companies buying Chinese steel through Bombay
for use in this country?
Secretary Rusk. No. We tried to look into that. I think the
allegation was that this was a transaction through Singapore.
Senator Aiken. No question--no one questions that.
Secretary Rusk. But the information we have is that this
did not occur; that the steel was resold at Singapore to known
customers; these were not in Vietnam. I can't find any
substance to that.
Senator Aiken. The ship that got into trouble was
reportedly headed toward the United States. I did not know that
India had a surplus of steel.
Secretary Rusk. This sounds--I had not put my attention on
this shipping from Bombay to the United States.
Senator Aiken. But isn't it true that Communist countries
and Western countries do conduct considerable business with
each other through third parties?
Secretary Rusk. I think that is true.
Senator Aiken. There is no question about that, and that--
--
Secretary Rusk. Let us leave this off the tape.
[Discussion off the record.]
ESTABLISHING A BASE IN THE DELTA
Senator Aiken. I notice there was quite a lot made in the
news lately about establishing a base in the Delta. Is that
being constructed as a permanent base?
Secretary Rusk. I saw a report this morning that one of the
amphibious operations was off-loading to go back to its main
base. I think there may be some U.S. forces at some point in
the Delta.
Part of the Delta is in the immediate Saigon area. For
example, Long An Province, we have had some forces there for
some time. But I think the major effort at the present time is
in the Saigon area and particularly northwest of Saigon to try
to break the flow of men and supplies that might be coming from
the Delta up into the Third, Second and First Corps.
I just do not know what the future will hold on this. There
is no policy problem in my mind about doing in the Fourth Corps
what we are doing in the First, Second and Third. But there are
practical problems of how you best use your forces, under what
circumstances.
GUANTANAMOS IN VIETNAM
Senator Aiken. Isn't it quite likely when the situation
over there quiets down--I do not mean comes to an end, but
quiets down--or phases out, fades out somewhat, that we will
have one or two Guantanamos along the Coast of Vietnam?
Secretary Rusk. Oh, no. On that, sir, we have no interest
in maintaining a permanent position in South Vietnam.
This Cam Ranh Bay facility is a very substantial facility,
but David Lilienthal is on his way over there now to help work
out plans for conversion to civilian use in case of peace.
We have no desire, and we publicly have committed ourselves
to this many times, to maintain neither bases or troop presence
in South Vietnam if there is peace there.
Sentor Aiken. We have presence in Cuba. The difference is
we do not try to run the Cuban government from Guantanamo.
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Aiken. But why isn't a permanent base at Cam Ranh
Bay or some other place just as logical as Guantanamo?
Secretary Rusk. Well, we have bases in the Philippines and
in Okinawa, and we thought this might be a contribution towards
the possibilities of peaceful settlement to make it clear we
were not looking for a permanent position, a permanent
presence, military presence, in South Vietnam.
RUSSIAN ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS IN NORTH VIETNAM
Sentor Aiken. Another thing that puzzles me somewhat is the
fact that while the President is trying to get on friendlier
terms with Russia, that we are furnishing the Russians with the
most beautiful target practice they ever had in perfecting
their new antiaircraft weapons, as I understand it. We have had
nearly 600 planes shot down over North Vietnam. Don't we ever
talk to the Russians about that?
Secretary Rusk. Not very much about that precise point. The
SAM missiles have been fired over 1,000 times, and I think that
only 30 of them have effected a hit.
Purely in military terms, I am not drawing any political
implication from this at all. I think that technical or the
tactical advantages, perhaps, are on our side in terms of
learning how to handle surface-to-air missiles.
Senator Aiken. Of course, if they only get a missile out of
a thousand shots----
Secretary Rusk. They have sent their top missile men out of
Vietnam to find out what is the matter, and we know this is a
major discovery they have made, and that is that their SAM
missiles are not very effective.
Senator Aiken. They must have fired 600,000 shots to get
those 600 planes.
Secretary Rusk. No. Most of the planes that have been lost
have been lost to conventional anti-aircraft fire as the plane
goes in for particular targets.
Senator Aiken. Have the Russians been furnishing anti-
aircraft guns to them?
Secretary Rusk. Some of it, and some come from China.
Senator Aiken. And they have been perfecting their anti-
aircraft weapons without any risk themselves.
Secretary Rusk. Possibly.
Senator Aiken. I thought it might be well to speak to them
about it quietly, in a soft tone of voice, maybe of what they
will be doing wrong.
Secretary Rusk. If they could translate their position
there into influence on Hanoi, to get going on the 1954 and
1962 agreements, there would be very substantial advantages to
us.
INCREASE IN NATIONALISM
Senator Aiken. There really is an increase in political
nationalism throughout the world, is there not? Aren't the
countries really more nationalistic than they have been for
some time?
Secretary Rusk. If you would look at the world as a whole,
perhaps slightly, but I do not think it has changed too much
over the decades.
Senator Aiken. In most cases where it puts up barriers,
international economics have a tendency to knock them flat, do
they not?
Secretary Rusk. That is right, sir.
Senator Aiken. In other words, trade is important, and the
greatest potential wealth of the world, the trading area of the
world, is Southeast Asia, assuming that their purchasing power
can be developed.
Secretary Rusk. There has been a pretty steady growth in
regional economic arrangements, not just in the Common Market,
but in Central America particularly. Now they are talking very
actively about a broader Latin American free trade. You get
that same movement now among the free countries of Asia, so
that you have that over against the national feelings.
Senator Aiken. I have no more questions, but I have an idea
it is going to take a while to get out of Southeast Asia as it
did in the Philippines, and that was some time. We were there
50 years officially.
The Chairman. Senator Lausche.
THE THINKING BEHIND SEATO
Senator Lausche. Mr. Secretary, I want to explore through
questions and your answers what the predominating thinking in
the fifties when we signed the various treaties related to
Southeast Asia in inducing us to sign those treaties.
Secretary Rusk. I think the most succinct statement--pardon
me, excuse me.
Senator Lausche. I begin with the Southeast Asia Collective
Defense Treaty signed September 8, 1954. I understand, of
course, my colleagues understand, that the President of that
year, Eisenhower, sent that treaty to the Senate to be
approved; is that correct?
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Lausche. And that treaty contained Article IV which
reads:
Each party recognizes that aggression by means of armed
attack in the treaty area against any of the parties or against
any State or Territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement
may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and
safety, and agree that it will in that event act to meet the
common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.
Senator Dodd. Is that the SEATO Treaty?
Senator Lausche. That is the Treaty.
Secretary Rusk. Article IV, paragraph 1.
Senator Lausche. Yes. In other words, when that treaty was
signed, the President of the United States, the Secretary of
State, and the Senate declared to the world that our security
was involved whenever armed attack was made upon any one of the
nations that subscribed to that treaty, is that correct?
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Lausche. And the nations that signed the treaty
were the United States, Australia, France, New Zealand,
Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom, Cambodia,
Laos.
Secretary Rusk. Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam were
protocol states. They did not sign the treaty but were covered
by the special protocol.
Senator Lausche. I see, there is a note there.
ANZUS TREATY
Now then, I go to the next treaty, and that is ANZUS, that
is a treaty made with Australia, I suppose, New Zealand, and
the United States?
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Lausche. That treaty was signed in September 1951,
and at that time Truman was President?
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Lausche. Do you recall who was Secretary of State?
Secretary Rusk. Mr. Dean Acheson.
Senator Lausche. And that treaty came up to the Senate for
confirmation.
Now, I read from Article IV of that treaty:
Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific
area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace
and safety, and declares that it would act to meet the common
danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.
In order words, in 1951 on September 1, it was the firm
thinking of the Senate, President Truman and Secretary Acheson
and, I suppose, the government in general, that our security
was involved if any one of the signatories to that treaty were
attacked. Am I correct in that?
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
MUTUAL COOPERATION TREATY WITH JAPAN
Senator Lausche. I now go to the Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan
signed January 19, 1960, at which time Eisenhower was
President. Who was Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles?
Secretary Rusk. Mr. Christian Herter.
Senator Lausche. Herter.
Secretary Rusk. In 1960.
Senator Lausche. Article V of that treaty reads:
Each party recognizes that an armed attack against either
party in the territories under administration of Japan would be
dangerous to its own peace and safety, and declares that it
would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its
constitutional provisions and processes.
That was again a declaration of our interest in Southeast
Asia and the relationship that it had to our own security.
Secretary Rusk. Senator, pardon me just a moment. I think
in the Japan treaty, that was limited to attack on Japan. I do
not think that treaty got into Southeast Asia, did it?
Senator Lausche. Well, whatever it is----
Secretary Rusk. I think so.
Senator Lausche. That is the language. You are familiar
with it.
MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY WITH TAIWAN
Now then, here is the next treaty, the Mutual Defense
Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China.
Article V reads:
Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the West
Pacific area directed against the territories of either of the
Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety, and
declares that it would act to meet the common danger in
accordance with its constitutional processes.
That was signed December 2, 1954; Eisenhower President,
Dulles Secretary of State.
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Lausche. I suppose the Senate, made up of members
who are at this table today--and I will want the staff to put
in the record how the votes were cast at that time----
Senator Morse. I voted against it.
Senator Lausche. Then you are consistent.
Senator Morse. I did not want to put the staff to work.
MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY WITH KOREA
Senator Lausche. I now go to the Mutual Defense Treaty
between the United States and the Republic of Korea, October
1953, Article III:
Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific
area on either of the Parties in territories now under their
respective administrative control or hereafter recognized by
one of the Parties is lawfully brought under the administrative
control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and
safety, and declares that it would act to meet the common
danger.
THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES
Now, I ask you, has there been a single treaty entered into
with Asian nations and Southeast Asia that did not declare that
our security was involved and that, therefore, we entered into
those agreements?
Secretary Rusk. That underlying concept is in each of the
treaties we have in the Pacific Ocean area, in Asia.
Senator Lausche. Now, Eisenhower was President under most
of them. When Truman went into Korea, what was the motivation
for going into Korea at that time? Did it have underlying it
this same principle about the security of the United States
being involved?
Secretary Rusk. The basic view as to where the security
interests of the United States lay was the same. It had not
been put in treaty form at the time of the North Korean attack
on South Korea.
Senator Lausche. It was put into the treaty, in treaty
form, after Eisenhower took office.
Secretary Rusk. In 1953, yes, sir.
KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION AND VIETNAM
Senator Lausche. Now we have Truman and Eisenhower, and I
now come to Kennedy.
When Kennedy became President, how many troops were in
South Vietnam?
Secretary Rusk. There were about 650 U.S. military there as
a part of the military assistance mission.
Senator Lausche. How many were there when he tragically
lost his life?
Secretary Rusk. Approximately 20,000, sir.
Senator Lausche. Did he, by expanding the number of troops
that were there, give indication of his judgment that we could
not allow South Vietnam to be taken over by the Communists
through aggression?
Secretary Rusk. He did, sir. The first thing he tried to
do, if I might take a moment, is to explore fully the
possibilities of a peaceful settlement. He talked about this
with Mr. Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961. It appeared that
the two of them had reached agreement on Laos on the basis that
everybody get out of Laos and leave this small land-locked
country to take care of themselves.
He was unable to get agreement on South Vietnam at the
Vienna meeting, and you remember he sent some special missions
out there, among them General Maxwell Taylor, to take a look at
the situation to see what needed to be done in the light of the
situation, and so when he examined it fully and he had on the
one side no prospect that there was agreement with the
Communist world on Vietnam, and on the other side our
commitment, and the situation, he moved substantially to
strengthen our participation there.
Senator Lausche. So you have Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy,
and Johnson of the belief that our security and safety is
involved in what happens in Southeast Asia.
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Lausche. And you have Acheson, Dulles, Herter--was
there any other Secretary of State----
Secretary Rusk. No, sir.
Senator Lausche. And yourself.
THE POSSIBILITY OF DETENTE
Now then, that goes back 15, 20 years ago, what has changed
since that time that should induce us to believe that our
nation's security and safety have no relationship to what
happens in Southeast Asia?
Secretary Rusk. I think the principal changes in this
regard have not yet been fully developed. But I would say there
are the beginnings of the possibility of a detente and peaceful
co-existence with the countries of Eastern Europe. That is one
element of the situation which affects the problem.
Secondly, the authorities in Peking are coming to the
watershed of the transfer of power to the next generation, and
have found that a policy of extreme militancy has isolated them
within the Communist world, and that has had its repercussions
inside China.
Third is the development of nuclear weapons by Peking and,
therefore, the increasing importance of stabilizing the
situation and trying to organize a peace in the Pacific and to
induce there some of the same prudence that we begin to see
with our relations toward Eastern Europe. Those are the
principal changes since that period.
UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES UNCHANGED
Senator Lausche. All right. But with those changes can you
take those changes as the basis of saying that all that was
declared in these treaties by the Senate and by the President
and the Secretaries of State was erroneous and that those
reasons no longer exist for our being in Southeast Asia?
Secretary Rusk. No, I do not think so. I think the
underlying principles remain the same. They would, over time,
Senator, be reduced in importance if there were some peace. In
other words, the way not to have an alliance to come into
operation is for nations to leave each other alone in
situations of this sort.
Senator Lausche. All right.
CHINA'S POLICY ON VIETNAM
Now I go to just one more question and then I will close. I
have the four points that have been submitted by Mao. Point
number four:
The internal affairs of South Vietnam should be settled by
the South Vietnamese people themselves in accordance with the
program of the NFLSV.
I suppose that is the National Liberation Front of South
Vietnam.
Secretary Rusk. Yes.
Senator Lausche. Has there been any yielding on that point
four by Mao?
Secretary Rusk. Senator, I think it might be avoiding
confusion if we referred to that as Ho Chi Minh's point three,
however it might have appeared there in what you have.
Senator Lausche. All right.
Secretary Rusk. We have not seen a revision of that, and if
I could say this off the tape----
[Discussion off the record.]
Senator Lausche. This final question.
Senator Mundt. Will you yield? What has happened?
Secretary Rusk. We have not had a reply on that particular
point. We have offered them alternative language, and we have
had no reply.
THE LAOTIAN AGREEMENT
Senator Lausche. Now, the Laos Treaty or protocol, whatever
you call it, was signed in 1962?
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Lausche. The agreement provided for the withdrawal
of all troops of all foreign nations?
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Lausche. Specific points were designated where the
departure was to be made so that the three countries, I assume
Canada----
Secretary Rusk. India and Poland.
Senator Lausche [continuing]. Poland and India would be
able to tell whether they had left.
Have United States troops left Laos?
Secretary Rusk. They left as soon as that agreement was
concluded, sir.
Senator Lausche. Have the Communists complied with that
agreement?
Secretary Rusk. No, sir. Our estimate is that the level of
North Vietnamese forces in Laos never dropped below 6,000.
Senator Lausche. That is all.
Senator Pell. May I just interpolate to clarify the record.
Aren't there still elements of American activity in Laos that
are not of a formal military nature, that would balance that
6,000?
Secretary Rusk. As a matter of fact, we now carry out
certain military operations in Laos, but the point is that we
complied with that agreement and would be prepared today to
comply with it 1,000 percent if we can get anybody else to.
The Chairman. Did you give the alternative language to
point three that the Senator asked you about?
Secretary Rusk. No, sir; I did not, and I would prefer not
to, Senator, if I may. As a matter of fact, what we suggested
was very much like----
[Discussion off the record.]
Secretary Rusk. I call your attention, Mr. Chairman, to
point six at the bottom of the first page where we have added
to the original point, ``We will be prepared to accept
preliminary discussions to reach agreement on a set of points
as a basis for negotiations.''
I think that is all we should say about that at the present
time in order to keep open the possibilities they just might
come back.
The Chairman. Senator Carlson?
WHEN THIS WAR IS OVER
Senator Carlson. Mr. Secretary, I shall be brief. I was
interested in your comments in response to Senator Aiken's
question about at the end of hostilities this war is over and
our boys are coming home; we are moving out of Southeast Asia.
Based on the past in Korea and Cuba, and our great investment
in this area where we have now probably the finest docking
facilities of any place in the Southeast Asia area except
Japan--we have great airfields; great air bases, do you think
the surrounding countries would permit us to move out any more
than they would permit us to move out now?
Secretary Rusk. The seven nations, Senator Carlson, which
have forces in South Vietnam, said in the Manila communique
that allied forces shall be withdrawn, after close
consultation, as the other side withdraws its forces to the
North, ceases infiltration, and the level of violence thus
subsides; that those forces will be withdrawn as soon as
possible and not later than six months after the above
conditions have been fulfilled.
We have since World War II, or including World War II, had
very large and important military facilities in connection with
various enterprises that we have gone into, and we have
demonstrated a capability of withdrawing from those facilities
at the end of the period when they were needed.
Our hope is that Cam Ranh Bay, for example, which is a
spectacularly effective and beautiful natural harbor, could
become a major port for the service of the upper two-thirds of
South Vietnam, and it should be converted to civilian,
industrial and trading purposes.
Mr. David Lilienthal is going to be helping us on
developing those plans. I think the seven nations who are most
directly involved in this situation have agreed among
themselves on this point.
Now, if at some time in the future the assault on South
Vietnam were renewed, then the governments at that time would
have to decide what to do about it. But we want to make it
clear that we are not after any special military position in
Southeast Asia as far as we are concerned.
MAINTAINING U.S. FORCES IN VIETNAM
Senator Carlson. With that last statement I fully agree,
and I can see that we are not. But also I can see, looking
further into the future, if we do not maintain substantial
forces in that area, what is there to prevent the Red Chinese
from going down and taking over the greatest facilities ever
constructed in that area, and they could do it very easily?
Secretary Rusk. The prospect that the United States would
once again meet its treaty commitments and would join with
others to prevent that occurring.
Senator Carlson. That is the point I am making. We do not
want to get committed to a position here where after a few
years, after terrific loss of life and great expenditures of
funds, we have to get back, and some day soon I trust we will
reach agreement when that war will end, and whenever it does
end, that decision is going to have to be made despite your
Manila agreement.
I think we have to look that one over because we have
invested men and material in this operation, and it just looks
to me, I think we are making a big mistake if we go out and
tell the people of the United States--I know it was made, I
read your Manila declaration--that we will soon move out of
there. I do not think we should do that.
Secretary Rusk. Under certain conditions.
Senator Carlson. Well, those conditions, I think, will
develop very rapidly after the conclusion of this war. I hope
they do not, but I think we have again assumed the
responsibility in Southeast Asia, I don't say whether we should
or should not, but I think we are going to have to meet that
issue, and I hope the administration and the government itself
does not lead our people to believe on the day this war is
over, six months after, the declaration says we are coming
home. I hope we do, but I can see another issue.
You know, I have been interested in the tone of the Hearst
publications on this war, and they have been in thorough
support of the President and in its operation. But in this last
issue--and I assume you may have read it--they said they were
fearful that world opinion is having too much influence on the
operation of this war.
U.S. INTERESTS IN AFRICA
I think there is some danger of world opinion, NATO--we
have discussed all these projects, NATO, Rhodesia--I think we
are in Rhodesia because of the African opinion, not because of
Great Britain. I do not think we are obligated. I think we made
a mistake, and I think if world opinion enters into this
Vietnam situation we will be caught in a bind. I hope we are
not.
I cannot help but bring it up this morning because I am
fearful of the future.
Secretary Rusk. Senator, perhaps what I said earlier was
too broad on the Rhodesian matter. I believe that in the U.S.
national interests and our own interests in the entire
continent of Africa, as to what happens in that country, I
think it was necessary for us to take a stand as we did on
Rhodesia. I did not want to----
Senator Carlson. I appreciate your position, Mr. Secretary,
but you and I and the Commerce Department have had about 14,
16, 18 months of discussion on some of our problems in South
Africa when it comes to selling airplanes. I know you are
familiar with it, selling planes for dollars to the Republic of
South Africa, and it was finally resolved in favor of the
United States, but only after, I would say, 18 months of
bickering and discussions, and it was resolved because Great
Britain was going to sell those planes and use U.S. engines.
I appreciate the Secretary's action in this. I think it was
right, but I know this situation, if we get involved and too
carried away by pressure from other countries and forget our
own nation, I do not like to say that, but we get carried away
in this world opinion matter. I shall conclude, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
NORTH VIETNAMESE CONDITIONS
I have two questions, Mr. Secretary. I thought I heard you
say that North Vietnamese had proposed three different sets of
conditions, unconditional with respect to the bombing,
unconditional and for good, unconditional and definitive, but
the third one escaped me.
Secretary Rusk. These were three different ways of what
appear to us to be saying the same thing, permanent,
definitively, and for good. Whether these are differences in
different translations of the same Vietnamese words I am not
quite sure. Harrison Salisbury said in an interview
unconditionally and for good. Another statement put in
definitively. But the word ``permanently'' is the most frequent
word they use in that regard. At all times they say
unconditional.
Senator Dodd. I see.
THE INDONESIAN SITUATION
The second question I would like to ask is with respect to
the Indonesian situation. I am not clear what your position is.
I understood you to say that you would not go so far as to say
our presence in Vietnam was decisive.
Secretary Rusk. Senator, I would quite frankly be very
comfortable about saying to you that what we are doing in
Vietnam was the decisive influence on the events in Indonesia.
I cannot in candor say that.
Senator Dodd. Would you say----
Secretary Rusk. But what I said was that I thought it had
some influence. How much I am not quite sure. I did say that
prominent officials of Indonesia said to us that it did have a
decisive influence, but it is hard to answer that question
accurately and specifically.
I did not want to be in a position of exaggerating that
particular point as far as we look at the situation. I have no
doubt that it had some influence, and it might have had even
more influence if the Chinese had attempted to send their own
armed forces by sea to reinforce the PKI during that period,
you see.
The fact that the Seventh Fleet was there and the British
Fleet was there, and so forth, this could have made quite a
difference, of course.
Senator Dodd. Would you say that a long term effort to help
Indonesia in our aid program, in, I assume, other respects
certainly helped those or, Ices in Indonesia to compel the
efforts to overturn the government?
Secretary Rusk. I think it proved in hindsight to have been
very useful for the United States over the years to keep some
sort of contact going and alive even though there were times
when it was painful to do so.
Senator Dodd. Yes, I was critical of it, so I am giving you
an opportunity to get even. But I take it that it did pay off
and that with our presence in South Vietnam.
Secretary Rusk. I think it is just not on the military
side, although that turned out to be useful, but our labor
unions have had very important and constructive relationships
with some of the labor unions in Indonesia, and our university
people in the same way. There were times when it was very
difficult to keep those going for reasons on both sides, some
of which you will remember.
But I think, on the whole, it has demonstrated that in that
instance certainly patience and a little persistence turned out
to be a good thing.
INFLUENCE OF VIETNAM WAR ON INDONESIA
Senator Dodd. I put it essentially that it seems to me our
policy with respect to Indonesia, and in continuing to try to
give them assistance in all of the respects you have mentioned
and others, and our presence in South Vietnam, did have a very
strong influence on the outcome of the struggle in Indonesia
between the Communist forces or pro-Communist forces, and those
other forces more friendly to the West, is that right?
Secretary Rusk. I think it has an important influence,
Senator.
I think it had an important influence.
Senator Dodd. It certainly did appear to the people in that
respect.
Secretary Rusk. I think I ought to say when the moment of
truth came in Indonesia, as it did, between these opposing
troops, we were not involved in that in any way. Maybe these
people would ask the question, ``If you were not, why weren't
you?'' But there was a wholly Indonesian problem here, and we
were not involved in it surreptitiously or otherwise, except
for these overt reasons, the public reasons, we were in Vietnam
and had maintained the contacts, and everybody would know we
would be sympathetic if the Indonesians found a way to fend off
the attempt of the PKI to seize power.
Senator Dodd. It certainly would be fair to say, would it
not, that all of the things we did do and tried to do in
Indonesia itself, and our presence in South Vietnam, certainly
influenced the thinking of the Indonesian people in this
critical hour.
Secretary Rusk. I think that is fair, sir.
Senator Dodd. That is all I have.
The Chairman. Senator Williams.
U.S. AND BRITISH POLICIES TOWARD RHODESIA
Senator Williams. Mr. Secretary, in general, I have been
supporting your positions that you have taken in South Vietnam.
It is a little hard for me to understand why we have just
joined Great Britain in imposing economic sanctions on
Rhodesia, but I noticed in the press the other day that Great
Britain is selling fertilizer and chemicals to Castro, going to
finance a plant, and also continuing to trade, as we
understand, with both North Vietnam and China. How can we
reconcile those two positions, particularly when Great Britain
itself is one of the members of SEATO?
Secretary Rusk. First, sir, on the Rhodesian matter, this
is not a matter which was purely bilateral between us and
Britain, a commitment by the United States in support of
Britain because it was Britain. We have, in fact, at times had
some margins of difference with Britain over the Rhodesian
question, both in the direction of pursuing the talks more and
in the direction of being careful about the general attitude of
the African countries.
We were acting in the Rhodesian thing as a matter of
national interest in respect of the total continent there, as a
factor over and above different from the attitude of Britain.
FLAGSHIPS OUT OF HONG KONG
Secondly, Britain is not itself trading with North Vietnam,
with the exception of an occasional flagship out of Hong Kong
controlled by a company in Hong Kong.
Senator Williams. Isn't that to a certain extent like some
of our American companies owning under a Panamanian flag?
Secretary Rusk. Yes, it is possible, sir. But they do not
feel they have the kind of control in that situation in the
colony there and, Senator, one reason, since this trade is
almost minuscule, one reason that I personally feel somewhat
relaxed about it, is I do not want to have the question put to
us if we do those things to Hong Kong which causes the people
on the mainland to go after Hong Kong, is the U.S. going to
help them in Hong Kong, and I do not want to have anything to
do with that problem.
Senator Williams. To the extent we understand, and I have
seen this excuse before, but Great Britain has control over the
ships going into Hong Kong.
Do I understand these same ships, using the flag from Hong
Kong, British-owned ships, can continue to trade with Rhodesia
and not be subject to this blockage and Great Britain has no
control over those companies and cannot stop them?
Secretary Rusk. No, I do not think so.
Senator Williams. It has stopped them in Rhodesia.
Secretary Rusk. That is correct.
Senator Williams. And they would stop them in North Vietnam
on the same basis if they wanted to, couldn't they?
Secretary Rusk. It would require legislation, I believe.
Senator Williams. It did not require legislation in
Rhodesia.
Secretary Rusk. I think, sir, it was an Order in Council
with respect to Rhodesia.
Senator Williams. Now, the fertilizer plant which she is
financing for Mr. Castro.
Secretary Rusk. We do not like that and other countries in
this hemisphere do not like it and have expressed our views
very strongly in London. Britain has a different policy than we
do on this, and we haven't been able to prevail. That is the
way it is. Here is a point in which we and they simply disagree
on.
CHINESE STEEL SHIPMENTS
Senator Williams. One final question. I notice it was first
reported in the London Observer, in which these steel shipments
to which another member referred----
Secretary Rusk. Right.
Senator Williams. I read that story and, as I read the
story, we gave the official explanation that this steel was in
short supply and that it had been purchased and we were going
to stop it. Did we----
Secretary Rusk. No.
Senator Williams. Did we completely deny there was any such
transaction at all and that story was false?
Secretary Rusk. When something like that comes in we first
try to find out what the facts are. We investigated this. The
Singapore Government has denied it and has accounted to us for
the steel shipments that they got out of China through Hong
Kong, and where that steel went, and the record shows that the
steel went to places other than Vietnam. So that my answer to
you today is, to the best of our ability to proceed to find
out, there was nothing in that story.
Senator Williams. And it did not ultimately end up in South
Vietnam at all?
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir. I am not suggesting
that all the trading that goes on there may not be some things
brought out of China through Hong Kong that may not turn up
anywhere, including this country, through a third or fourth
country trading. But we did look into the steel matter, and we
have been able to locate where that steel went. It did not go
to Vietnam.
Senator Williams. Thank you.
Secretary Rusk. I will get the committee the details.
Senator Aiken. It did not go to Wilmington.
Secretary Rusk. Not to Wilmington. [Laughter.]
The Chairman. Senator Clark.
THE ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE SITUATION
Senator Clark. Mr. Secretary, I would like to get your
comments on the antiballistic missile situation with respect to
the policy of the Department. Also, how much can you tell us
about what Ambassador Thompson is up to, what you and Mr.
Dobrynin have been able to achieve, and generally speaking
whether you have read Roswell Gilpatric's article in the New
York Times of yesterday, and whether you are generally in
sympathy with the point of view he expressed, which is we ought
to do everything feasible to prevent an escalation of the arms
race by either Russia or ourselves of the ballistic missiles.
Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, could we, perhaps, leave this
part of it off the tape?
[Discussion off the record.]
TAKING OVER THE WAR FROM THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE
Senator Clark. I would like to move into one more question.
What is the rationale, Mr. Secretary, behind or, perhaps, are
the press reports true, that we are committed to moving in
force into the Mekong Delta in order to take over the
responsibilities in that area that South Vietnam has hitherto
attempted to carry on? What is the rationale behind the search
and destroy massive maneuvers in the Iron Triangle? Are we
still committed to an increasing policy of taking over from the
South Vietnamese the conduct of the war in Vietnam, and what is
our own view as to whether this will not result in casualties
far beyond any productive results?
Secretary Rusk. First, on the Iron Triangle, this has been
an area near Saigon which has been a major Viet Cong
headquarters and supply center for a long time, and out of that
come raids and operations against communications as well as
against the city itself.
It is a relatively lightly populated area. As you know, we
are moving the civilians out as the operation proceeds. But as
far as the U.S. taking over the main battle is concerned, I
just noticed in the daily military report this morning that I
see every day, that the operations of battalion size or larger
going on yesterday, I have the figure here exactly, I think
there were 11 U.S., 2 allied, other allies, and something like
18 or 20 South Vietnamese.
The South Vietnamese are engaging in full operations. We
are trying to get them moved toward pacification, which is
something of a misleading term in this sense, that does not
mean the South Vietnamese are going to take fewer casualties.
This pacification effort is a very mean part of the war, but it
is something the South Vietnamese may be better able and fitted
to do than we in working in the villages and rooting out the
Viet Cong from the rest of the population.
The Mekong Delta, part of this is immediately adjacent to
Saigon. We are interested very much in securing the Saigon
area. The Delta is a source of rice and men for the Viet Cong
in Corps One, Two and Three. I think it is a tactical matter as
to which of the 43 provinces our forces operate in primarily,
and which are primarily for the South Vietnamese forces.
A 100 PERCENT AMERICAN WAR
Senator Clark. I would suggest, Mr. Secretary, it is much
more strategic than tactical, and it is another obvious
indication, if it is true we are moving in for the first time
in force in the Mekong Delta, that we are slowly but surely
making this a 100 percent American war, and I would like your
comments on that.
Secretary Rusk. Well, the record of operations, the record
of casualties, the missions performed just do not show it,
Senator. As I say, I have the figure here----
Senator Clark. Well, they certainly did a few months ago,
Mr. Secretary, when American casualties increased, and they
have drastically increased all through 1966, and the South
Vietnamese casualties for several weeks were less than ours.
I would find it a little surprising if you would deny that
we have been more and more involved in search and destroy
operations in South Vietnam with an ever-increasing list of
American casualties--that is true, is it not?
Secretary Rusk. I did not say that. I was saying yesterday
in operations of battalion size or larger there were 11 U.S.
and 22 South Vietnamese. They were carrying on twice as many
operations in numbers.
U.S. SUFFERING MORE CASUALTIES
Senator Clark. I do not want to get into an argument with
you. I have this map here. You remember the fuss I made about
this matter a year ago. It looks like we have not any more
ground, and we have suffered many casualties. The casualties
are what bother me. We talk an awful lot about the strategic
value. What gets me down is we are not really paying enough
attention to how many American boys are getting killed.
Secretary Rusk. Senator, you are not more concerned with
casualties than I am. I belong to that generation of young men
who were betrayed into World War II because the governments
refused to face the problem of organizing a peace in the world.
I hate these casualties just as much----
Senator Clark. Would you mind if I give my entire attention
to you, and let your staff assistant postpone his comments?
Secretary Rusk. I say you are not more concerned with
casualties than I am. I belong to that generation of young
people that was betrayed into World War II with tens of
millions of casualties all over the world because the
governments of that day, including the Government of the United
States, refused to face the problem of organizing a peace in
the world.
Now, we have taken 190,000 casualties since 1945 all over
the world, and it is bloody and difficult and burdensome, but
the effort has been, and is beginning to show some signs of
paying off that we can organize a peace before we let this go
down the chute-the-chute to World War III. This is what it is
all about, and these casualties being undertaken out there are
highly relevant to the question of whether we are going to
organize some peace, or whether most of the world is going to
go up in flames one of these days.
Senator Clark. Well, I think that is where you and I find
ourselves in disagreement, and I do not think it desirable, Mr.
Chairman, to pursue it any further at this point. I think we
can organize the peace without getting all these Americans
killed.
The Chairman. Is that all?
Senator Clark. Yes.
The Chairman. Senator Mundt.
NUCLEAR WARHEAD DELIVERY SYSTEMS
Senator Mundt. Did I understand you to say in this proposed
proliferation or non-proliferation treaty, it would not include
the delivery systems?
Secretary Rusk. It concentrates on the nuclear warheads and
does not try to deal with the question of delivery systems.
Sentor Mundt. Why not?
Secretary Rusk. Because the effect is to prevent the spread
of warheads, whereas delivery systems can be everything from
ordinary aircraft to artillery, to anything else, and it would
be awfully hard to combine a delivery system into a non-
proliferation treaty.
Senator Mundt. From our standpoint vis-a-vis, China isn't
there a problem of getting a delivery system? They have got the
bomb.
Secretary Rusk. Well, we would be interested in finding a
way to keep them out of the ICBM business or IRBM business. But
they have got delivery systems now, ordinary aircraft or the
most shortranged missiles or presumably they will eventually
develop atomic capability with artillery. So the delivery
problem is a different problem from that of the warhead.
Senator Mundt. The problem is they do not have a delivery
system from their standpoint, but they are going to get one.
Secretary Rusk. That is right.
Senator Mundt. And I think a non-proliferation treaty that
ignores that is good for others but no good for us.
Secretary Rusk. Well, I think the problem of delivery
systems is a special and, in some respects, a more complicated
question. For example, if you get into the delivery system
business, should we go back to the Baruch proposals or not?
This sounds these days like a rather wild idea, but would the
security of the United States be enhanced if the world went
completely conventional again? Now, if we say, no, we have got
to have missile deterrence ourselves, then getting some control
of these on the part of other countries is going to be
extremely difficult.
Senator Mundt. Don't you think we have to say yes to that
question?
Secretary Rusk. Well, I think we ought to think about it
more than we have thought about it in the last few years
because we sort of have taken it for granted that somehow we
have to have a nuclear force ourselves.
I think one of the great tragedies myself was--well, so
much has happened since--that the Baruch proposals were not
accepted.
Senator Mundt. I agree.
NO QUID PRO QUO WITH BRITAIN
Like most of others who have commented on Rhodesia, I am
rather completely disenchanted with the way we have been sucked
into the situation over there. Let me ask you this direct
question: Before we yielded so quickly to the persuasiveness of
Great Britain, as if we were still a colony of theirs as we
were before 1776, have we ever tried to make an agreement in
which we would obtain a quid pro quo with her relative to this
business in Cuba, with respect to the trouble in Vietnam?
Secretary Rusk. Well, we did not make a condition with
respect to a quid pro quo. We have discussed this in relation
to other questions where we would hope to get some more
cooperation from them, and one reason for it is there are
nineteen members of the Commonwealth involved in this, and the
general membership in the United Nations, so a quid pro quo by
a particular member would not be responsive to our national
interests in dealing with problems in Africa or our problems
relating to the very existence of the Commonwealth, or our
interests as expressed in the United Nations.
Senator Mundt. Except that they needed us for the sanctions
program.
Secretary Rusk. Senator, I think if we had taken the other
view on this that, perhaps, some of our friends in Britain
would have simply used that to say, ``Well, you see, we were
prepared to do this, but the Americans are not going to back us
up,'' and they would have used it to get them off the hook.
Senator Mundt. Do you really think in your own mind a
program of sanctions, short of a military blockade, can ever
bring Rhodesia to its knees?
Senator Mundt. Well, I think, sir, the problem is not so
much bringing them to their knees in that sense.
Senator Mundt. Trying to get them to do what we want.
Secretary Rusk. So much as bringing them into a discussion
where they would be willing to make more sense than they have
thus far.
ROLE OF SOUTH AFRICA
Senator Mundt. It seems to me the most you can hope for if
our sanctions proceed is bringing a consolidation of South
Africa and Rhodesia into a compact or making them one country,
and then you magnify the problems.
[Discussion off the record.]
Secretary Rusk. I do not believe South Africa is going to
substitute itself for the rest of the world in Rhodesian trade.
This is a very serious problem for South Africa. I do not think
the Portuguese will do it. The Portuguese do say, if sanctions
are applied, that they must apply them at the source and not
try to use Portugal as the policeman simply because they have
an adjacent territory.
Senator Mundt. Do I interpret your statement that you
believe South Africa is not going to send oil to Rhodesia?
Secretary Rusk. The question is whether they will send oil
in quantities additional to the normal flow, which was not
particularly large, and that is the question.
We had hoped South Africa would stay out of this so there
cannot be raised the fairly serious problems of sanctions
against South Africa. We objected to those at the United
Nations.
Senator Mundt. Do you think South Africa is going to
continue or discontinue shipping oil?
Secretary Rusk. I would be surprised if they cut off the
oil below the levels which were going in before the sanctions
were applied. I would be somewhat surprised on that. What I do
not know the answer to is whether they would increase that
supply of oil.
Senator Mundt. If they continue at the same rate this is OK
with Rhodesia. They got by before this.
Secretary Rusk. Rhodesian oil is coming in through other
channels, Mozambique as well.
SOME REDUCTION IN TENSIONS
Senator Mundt. Let me ask you a hypothetical question. Just
how do you define, let us say we have got countries A and B--I
do not have to identify them--any particular countries who have
been quarreling and are suspicious of each other, and you have
a detente. What do you have?
Secretary Rusk. I got trapped on that one in a press
conference. They asked me that, and I said I did not think we
could see a detente, but I can see some reduction of tensions,
and one of the reporters looked it up in the dictionary and
said that detente means reduction of tensions.
But I think, in the first instance, the notion of detente--
to pull away from each other on those matters--that could mean
war. That is in connection with which it was intended, and I
think we are beginning to see some more prudent attitude in
Eastern Europe, and I am speaking of the thinking of the
smaller Eastern European countries, some.
It takes a good many swallows to make a summer, and you
have to probe this pretty carefully, but we would like to keep
up with the possibilities on our own side----
Senator Mundt. Let me put it this way: Suppose country A is
at war with country C, and we are trying to get a detente with
country B. Country B is hoping that country C defeats country A
or kills country A's boys. Can we conceivably have a detente
under those circumstances?
Secretary Rusk. Well, it is applying that specifically to
the Soviet Union and to North Vietnam----
Senator Mundt. Yes.
Secretary Rusk. And the United States.
Senator Mundt. And the United States.
Secretary Rusk. Because if, as I think it would be true--I
think the Soviet Union would be satisfied to see this South
Asian matter settled on the basis of the 1954 and 1962
agreements--then we have a more complicated situation than a
more harsh all-out--I hope myself that attitude on the part of
the Soviet Union can be translated into some effective
influence or effective international action to help to bring
this matter to a peaceful conclusion.
SOVIET AID TO NORTH VIETNAM
I do not think we ourselves on our side should say that
because the Soviet Union is giving assistance to North Vietnam
and----
Senator Mundt. She is supplying every sophisticated weapon
they use in Vietnam.
Secretary Rusk. Whatever sophisticated weapons they have,
such as SAM missiles and MIG 21, radar----
Senator Mundt. Yes.
Secretary Rusk [continuing]. Those things particularly. I
think it would be to our advantage not to let this get into a
completely black and white, implacable hostility kind of
situation and thereby reduce our room for some maneuver and,
indeed, some assistance when the time comes. When the time
comes----
Senator Mundt. You have got, on the one hand, the theory,
how well-grounded and how firm you never told us, that the
Russians would really like this thing settled on the basis of
the time before it started. That is the theory. How well-
documented it is I do not know.
But the fact that they are continuing to supply every
sophisticated weapon, that needs to be stubborn to the
fulfillment of that theory. If the theory is sound, it seems to
me, the Russians have it so easily available to sort of talk to
Hanoi saying, ``We are about fed up supplying all these
sophisticated weapons, we are going to reduce the supply or cut
it off,'' and I see no support for the theory in terms of the
action. I do not know where you get your theory. Maybe it is
whispered in your ear by some diplomat, maybe he is sincere and
maybe not. But I see no overt evidence at all.
Secretary Rusk. Well, it is hard to get the overt evidence,
Senator, and in dealing with these people one has to recognize
that you can be wrong tomorrow morning at nine o'clock on a
proposition like that.
But one of the questions to which we have not got a full
answer to is this pause in the cessation of bombing. If these
people cannot deliver Hanoi and say what Hanoi can do, perhaps
they can at least tell us what they can do, so it is in this
context that your question comes up, and we have not found out
what the answer to that is yet, but this is the kind of
question we are working on all the time.
DIVIDENDS FROM THE WAR IN VIETNAM
Senator Mundt. One other point. Speaking as a supporter of
the State Department's foreign policy, I have been a little bit
disappointed in your testimony today on two points. You have
sort of shot out of the saddle two of the justifications which
I have made publicly at home, which are in my own mind reasons
for supporting the foreign policy and the war in Vietnam, and I
was a little bit disappointed when you said that you did not
believe that one of the dividends from our efforts in Vietnam
was the rather salutary developments which have been occurring
in Indonesia. I have said I thought they were connected.
You have been very careful to point out you feel if there
is any relationship it is very remote.
The other disappointment is I supported reluctantly the
plea that you made when you came into the Senate and to the
House and said that Sukarno says, ``The hell with American
aid,'' and they voted against it in the House, and you came
here and said that we have to continue some of our aid to keep
certain government functions going if we were either to prevent
a Communist takeover from China or to get a good leader who
would be more neutral from the standpoint of isms, Americanism
and communism, if something happened to Sukarno and he died or
was replaced.
Now, you have told us that you do not believe that that aid
that you induced us to give you--the Senate wrote some nice
ambiguous language--could be continued.
Now you tell us you do not think that was very important in
building up the stable elements over there enabling them to
survive and get some kind of government which is not controlled
by Sukarno.
You shot out of the saddle two of the bases of my support.
I may not be as enthusiastic----
Secretary Rusk. There may be some misunderstanding on your
second point. I did not want to diminish the second point at
all. I did add the comment that it was not in the military
channels that these relations are productive, but through the
trade unions and the universities.
Senator Mundt. All of which could have gone on without your
coming here and pleading with us to override the House of
Representatives, that we were going to save the situation, we
had better support it, and we did.
Secretary Rusk. I had not supposed I had minimized in my
discussions----
Senator Mundt. I am sure you minimized it in my mind when
you put it to what the labor unions and the cultural exchanges
had done. You certainly minimized it to me.
A QUESTION OF EMPHASIS
Secretary Rusk. On the first question, there is a question
of emphasis. My own inclination on most of these questions is
to be a little moderate about claiming direct results from
particular things, particularly when the situation in Indonesia
was very complicated.
There was a connection. I am sure there was a connection. I
am sure the present Indonesian leaders felt there was a
connection. I just did not want to say to you that because--I
do not believe that our being in Vietnam played a decisive role
at the key time in Indonesia. There were good Indonesian
explanations for much of this. I am sure that had a
constructive and helpful influence, but at least as Secretary
of State I ought to feel that I ought not myself to exaggerate
this.
Now, look at the possibilities. Sukarno is still there. We
think that he is under control. We think that the new
government will remain in power, but if that should change----
Senator Mundt. Do you think our pulling out of Vietnam
would enhance or decrease Sukarno's chances?
Secretary Rusk. I think it would greatly enhance it; it
would enhance it. Let me go back to my mood of moderation.
Senator Mundt. That is all.
The Chairman. Senator Pell?
U.N. ROLE IN RHODESIAN SANCTIONS
Senator Pell. I think I sympathize with you when I see all
the foreign policies represented around the table here.
Is not our imposition of sanctions in Rhodesia basically
the result of our membership in the United Nations?
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Pell. I think this is a point which should be on
the record. We have received many benefits, including the
avoidance of civil wars through the U.N., and it involves
certain responsibilities, too.
I understand from press reports that a new Under Secretary
of State for Administration will be appointed, and I would like
to leave with you the thought, obviously in this executive
session it can be said but not in the open session, perhaps--
that I would hope that the appointment would be a man of very
broad gauge, not a professional administrator or a man in that
line, but a man who could give to whatever changes are
necessary the internal direction rather than relying for
external direction.
I did not know that that or if that would coincide with
your views. I realize it may be a little premature to discuss
this.
Secretary Rusk. This is a matter that is under
consideration by the President, and presumably a nomination
will be coming forward in due course.
Senator Pell. I would hope a broad gauge non-professional
administrator would be chosen.
RESULTS OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT
Next, if we get to the conference table in Vietnam and
reach an agreement with the North, and follow out our present,
which I think are correct, intentions, withdrawing from
Southeast Asia, would it not be a problem of fact that in
several years Vietnam would be unified, probably under a
nationalist, technically Communist leadership, and would that
not be the probable result through peaceful means?
Secretary Rusk. I would not think so, Senator.
Over this period of time, the last twenty years, North
Vietnam has become thoroughly consolidated as a Communist
system. South Vietnam has rejected the Communist system for
itself. You have the same problems in the two parts of Korea
and the two parts of Germany.
I think North Vietnam is not going to be interested in
reunification on a non-Communist basis and, by and large, I say
that may be an oversimplification, but I think that is true,
and I think South Vietnam is not going to be interested in
reunification on a Communist basis. These Buddhists and
Catholics and Montagnards and Cambodians and northern refugees,
apparently while disagreeing among themselves on many other
things, seem to agree on that. So if this is left to the free
choices of the people in the two parts of Vietnam, I think it
is rather unlikely that there will be reunification any time
soon.
LET PEOPLE DECIDE THROUGH ELECTIONS
Senator Pell. You would not think some sort of government
like that in Yugoslavia, where each side gives in the other
direction, would probably emerge, and to my mind it would not
be a bad thing from the viewpoint of American national
interest.
Secretary Rusk. Well, time factors, I can think if there is
moderation of Communist organization and techniques and peace
coexistence coming out of Mainland China and that sort of
thing, that in the longest run you may have some drawing
together, just as we hope that somehow the West Germans and the
East Germans can find ways to draw together despite these large
ideological conflicts. But I do not see that as anything that
is going to contribute to the settlement of this present
situation other than the willingness, as we have expressed it,
to let that question be decided by the people themselves in
their own way through free elections.
THE ADVANTAGE OF NEGOTIATING
Senator Pell. Then would you believe there is any validity
to the theory that the North Vietnamese really do not wish to
come to the conference table, that they would see the
possibility to achieving the objectives becoming, but that they
consider their achieving the results of world revolution better
by continuing the military level of activities, and it is to
our advantage to get them to the conference table more than
theirs?
Secretary Rusk. Well, clearly they do not see much
advantage to them in coming to the conference table because
they have had hundreds of chances to and have consistently said
no.
Senator Pell. Excuse me, and also at least in my own view,
the possibility of attaining success in coming to a conference
table, from what their overt objectives are?
Secretary Rusk. That is right. I do not believe they make
the judgment if they came to the conference table they would
get what they said they wanted to get in 1960. I think that is
right.
DANGEROUS SITUATION IN CHINA
Senator Pell. Do you believe the situation is extra
dangerous in Vietnam now where we see in China the opposing
forces struggling with the Mao forces, of an effort being made
to divert the attention of the Chinese people from internal
difficulties and to attempt external intervention such as they
did in India several years ago?
Secretary Rusk. This is a possibility one has to watch.
Quite frankly, we do not see the situation in China developing
that way at the present time, but we are keeping a very close
eye on it. We do not see troop movements. We do not see
statements from leaders, either privately or publicly,
indicating that that is what they have in mind. But it is
theoretically a possibility, and we are watching very closely.
NORTH VIETNAMESE MANPOWER
Senator Pell. What would be the present proportions of new
increments of manpower on the opposition side in South Vietnam
of local recruitment versus infiltration? Would it be about 60-
40 ratio?
Secretary Rusk. For the most recent three or four months, I
would have to check the figures on that. I would think that
probably 60-40 is not too far off.
Senator Pell. Sixty local, forty from the North?
Secretary Rusk. Probably.
Senator Pell. And the weapons we have captured, are they
divided up what percent between West and East?
Secretary Rusk. I would have to check the latest figures on
that. Most of the weapons we are getting now are Chinese
manufactured, but I would have to check that.
Senator Pell. The substantial majority would be, you say?
Secretary Rusk. That is right. You see, the Liberation
Front Forces and the North Vietnamese Forces unified their
weaponry about a year ago, went to the same caliber. It
happened to be caliber for which our ammunition is not
suitable, so they not only brought in the weapons buy they have
to continue to bring in the ammunition to keep them supplied.
These are submachine guns, the rifles, the carbines, light
machine guns, things of that sort.
CIVILIAN CASUALTIES
Senator Pell. As you know, we have had some interest for
some time in this question of civilian casualties, and I am
well aware of the horrible tortures, murders of our friends in
South Vietnam.
Why has it proved so difficult to get anywhere near so
general an estimate now for a year and a half, where we have
been sparring on this question, as to the real extent of the
civilian casualties in South Vietnam?
Secretary Rusk. Well, one of the problems is we do not have
exact information on who might be in a particular place when it
is struck. For example, on a POL dump, there are no houses
around it, and that kind of thing, who happens to be there at
the time.
Another problem is whom would you classify as civilians for
this purpose? The truck drivers in a convoy coming down the
road toward the South, a line of coolies bringing in packs on
their backs, coming into the--toward the--South? If you hit a
railway bridge and there are people there working on the
bridge, are they Chinese construction engineer soldiers or are
they civilians? There are some very difficult questions of
classification.
But I would comment, Senator, that I do not know that there
has ever been any struggle anywhere in which such extraordinary
efforts are made, both in the field and back here, to try to
minimize or eliminate what might be called innocent civilian
casualties.
Now, they have occurred. But on the fixed targets, that is
as compared with the route reconnaissance along the routes of
infiltration, the fixed targets have produced a surprisingly
small number of civilian casualties.
Senator Pell. I would agree with everything you have said,
but I think those of us who have been pressing this question
really wanted education.
COUNTERPRODUCTIVE ACTIONS
I noticed the latent hostility in Germany, what hostility
there is to the United States, which is based on the effect of
civilian casualties from raids, and it still remains a certain
amount. It is never expressed.
I am wondering if these casualties are large, as they would
seem to be, if, perhaps, some of our actions are
counterproductive, and to arrive at that, that we press for an
estimate, merely in terms of thousands. But when we get a
figure of 100 civilian casualties in a six-month period, there
is obviously something a little off.
Secretary Rusk. The only figure of that kind I heard was
identifiable civilian casualties inflicted by operations of our
own forces.
Senator Pell. In South Vietnam.
Secretary Rusk. In South Vietnam.
Senator Pell. Even that seems modest.
Secretary Rusk. That you can be somewhat more accurate
about than what is happening in North Vietnam.
Senator Pell. Thank you.
A REFERENDUM IN TAIWAN
One final question, trying to see a way out of our present
impasse in our relations with China: In your view, and you have
much knowledge in this area in the light of your previous
responsibilities and work--what would be the result of a
referendum in Formosa or Taiwan between--an open referendum
between--the Chiang Kai-shek government and some other
government?
Secretary Rusk. Some other government in Formosa?
Senator Pell. A local Taiwanese government, Taiwan
candidates. You know, the figures are about ten percent of the
Taiwanese are represented in the Parliament, whereas they make
up about 80 percent of the people, et cetera, 90 percent or 80
percent.
Secretary Rusk. I would think at some point such a
plebiscite might indicate that the Formosans would like to have
more of a Formosan control over their own affairs.
As you know, the theory of the present government there is
based upon the theory that it is a Mainland, an all-China
government, in which the Formosan Province is one of the
provinces.
But my impression is that the purely Formosan Nationalist
feeling, on the one side, and in its relation to the
Mainlanders, on the other, is somewhat more relaxed in the ten
years certainly than it was at the very beginning when there
were some pretty harsh feelings there.
I suppose about 80 to 90 percent of the enlisted personnel
of the present armed forces, the present army, of the Republic
of China are now Formosan personnel.
Senator Pell. Might not this be one of the eventual
approaches to getting us off our present wicket when the time
comes, and there is need for a change of administration there
anyway?
Secretary Rusk. I do not think it would make the slightest
difference to Peking.
Senator Pell. It would not?
Secretary Rusk. No. They want it and they just say, ``It is
ours and we have got to have it.'' There never has been any--
and they won't even renounce the use of force in the Straits of
Formosa. You remember the Eisenhower Administration in the mid-
fifties began talking with the Chinese and tried to get a
mutual declaration of the renunciation of force in the Straits
of Formosa. We continued that ever since. Never the slightest
indication of Peking that they would be interested in that
Senator Pell. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Case.
Senator Case. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
QUESTIONING THE CONTAINMENT OF CHINA
Mr. Secretary, following Senator Pell's suggestion implicit
in one of his questions as to whether the North Vietnamese and,
presumably, the Chinese might be quite uninterested in
negotiations because they expect to get more out of continuing
their current operation than through any negotiations. It seems
to me there is a relation between that possibility and the
possibility that I have not heard our policy contemplate, that
in the end it may not be what we hoped, Russia and the U.S.
against China, but rather Russia and China against the United
States, and that we are falling into, unfortunately--I am
thinking of the broadest terms now--maybe a trap, if you will,
maybe nothing as explicit as this, but this may be the
consequence, and I am not at all sure that we are right.
Even those liberals who say the ancient antagonisms between
China and Russia are going to make everything all right for us,
I am not at all sure that they are concerned about destroying
the only obstacle to world Communism, the United States of
America, that that may not override these things, at least in
the short run or in the middle time.
I wonder if you would just talk a little about this. Maybe
we, in our own interests, including, of course, the interests
of world peace, too, are on the wrong track here in thinking
that containment of China, which I have supported, as you know,
up to now, is a desirable thing, on the analogy to the position
in Western Europe, defense against--I mean standing, creating
the bulwark against expansion of Russia, believing as you have
suggested too, with you, if we had done something about Hitler
we would not have had World War II and all the rest of it.
I wonder if I am right about this, and whether we may not
be getting bogged down and trapped into doing a thing which is
going to take more and more of our strength and render us in a
position where we will be really vulnerable to this other
combination which we do not contemplate.
RECONCILIATION BETWEEN CHINA AND RUSSIA
Secretary Rusk. One of the real possibilities is an
eventual reconciliation between China and the Soviet Union.
Senator Case. I do not mean to just be happy with each
other, I mean they would be after us.
Secretary Rusk. I understand.
The key point would be on what general basis of policy
would that reconciliation occur. There are a good many in
Eastern Europe who insist it would not be possible because of
the dynamics between the Communist world for that
reconciliation to occur on the basis of the militancy of
Peking; that the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe would not and
could not move in that direction. I am not so sure of that.
That is a possibility.
The other would be a reconciliation on the basis of what
might be called the peaceful co-existence. Now, we just have no
way of knowing these things.
I do feel, Senator Case, that if Hanoi and Peking could
demonstrate to the Communist world that the policy of militancy
is the way to get ahead successfully with the world revolution,
that we are in greater danger of having the combined Communist
world getting together directly and fundamentally opposed to
the interests of the free world. That would be a very dangerous
situation.
No, I limited my own remarks to what I believe to be the
present attitude of the Soviet Union on Vietnam, and to a
somewhat moderately optimistic view as to the possibilities of
some further improvement of relations with Eastern Europe.
But these other possibilities are very much there and very
much in our minds.
It seems to me that the possibility of a combination that
is militantly hostile to the United States would be encouraged
by a demonstration by one or another of these members of the
Communist world that an aggression in the face of a security
treaty of the United States can successfully be carried out.
Senator Case. This is an effect.
Secretary Rusk. Yes, I know.
GETTING INVOLVED IN A PERIPHERAL AREA
Senator Case. I just wonder if we are taking into account
the other possibility sufficiently as to get ourselves more and
more involved in this particular area that is rather peripheral
to them and really not at all hurting them at all, not hurting
Russia one bit. They are not much involved.
Secretary Rusk. Well, we have had some of the same
considerations to deal with in connection with the Greek
guerrillas and the Berlin blockade and other such issues where
the combined weight of the Communist world posed a threat that
we had very much in mind at that time.
Senator Case. Indeed we have. But we never have gotten
ourselves involved with a half million men or whatever the
numbers.
ANTAGONISM WITH THE TWO COMMUNIST POWERS
The Chairman. Would the Senator yield there on that
question of their policy. Wouldn't the obvious reason be their
antagonism to us? That is the policy they could get together
on, not on one of these ideological reasons.
Senator Case. Yes indeed, and I think the Secretary
understood that was the thrust of my remarks.
Senator Hickenlooper. Will the Senator yield? Isn't their
antagonism toward us generated by their political philosophy,
that is, the international Communist philosophy? I do not think
it is a personal antagonism generated from anything except
their ideology.
Senator Case. This is my belief. This is my concern, based
on their desire to destroy the only real block in their way.
Secretary Rusk. You see, if all the countries lived between
us and these two Communist powers, were genuinely secure and
were not living under fear, and some of them have not been
subjected to attack by these countries, we would not have
anything to fight these two countries about. We are not going
to fight the Soviet Union over polar bears in the Arctic, and
we are not going to set off missiles against each other merely
because there are missiles over there.
The principal issues on which we and the Soviet Union could
get into a war under present circumstances have to do with the
security of Western Europe.
There are some in Western Europe who think they are somehow
part of a third world that unfortunately has been caught up in
a great controversy between us and the Soviet Union. To me,
this is a great misunderstanding of the situation.
If Western Europe were secure--Western Europe is the
issue--if Western Europe were secure we would not have put $900
billion in the defense budgets since 1947, and the same thing
will be true of Mainland China.
If Korea and Japan and the Philippines and these other
countries had a reasonable chance of living peacefully next
door to this giant there without being subjected to the
pressures of the world revolution, and they are there, I think
we ought not to decide prematurely that they are not there,
they could live peacefully there and then we have no problems
out in that part of the world except trade and other kinds of
relationships.
WORLD REVOLUTION
The Chairman. I get lost on that phrase ``world
revolution.'' You tried to describe detente. What is the world
revolution?
Secretary Rusk. The Communist doctrine that the world
should be and is going to be reorganized on a Communist basis
under the leadership of the dictatorship of the proletariat.
Now, you see a very primitive form of this out of Mao Tse-
Tung. It is getting to be more sophisticated in Eastern Europe,
but these fellows still are pretty serious about this business.
Now, this revolutionary force has lost, perhaps, some of
its clan in Eastern Europe. They are a little more middle-aged,
and have got more of a stake in what they have been able to
build up, and they may be getting a little tired with the more
military aspect of what they have been doing.
Senator Hickenlooper. You mean they have two pigs?
Secretary Rusk. They have two pigs. [Laughter.]
But this is not true of the others, apparently these
veterans of the Long March in China, although one would have to
take into account they have been more prudent in action than
they have been in their words and doctrine.
IS WORLD REVOLUTION ACTIVELY THREATENED?
The Chairman. What have they done to support your theory
that the world revolution is actively threatened? What do you
consider the Chinese have done? I do not wish to interrupt you,
I do not know----
Senator Case. I think we are probing really the same
purpose.
The Chairman. I am just trying to probe what this world
revolution is that you have in mind. Is there any doctrine or
any actions which have been taken in support?
Senator Case. I would not want to take a chance that there
is not. Frankly, I think there is. In general, I have a
somewhat different view than you do as to the desirability of
protecting ourselves about a Russian treaty.
The Chairman. It is not what you are thinking about it, but
it is what the Secretary is thinking about it.
Secretary Rusk. You are not asking questions about the
doctrine, at the moment, I mean----
The Chairman. If I understood you, the world revolution
here is a major reason for our involvement, that is the way the
Senator put it. I was very intrigued by the way the Senator put
It. We might be falling into a trap. This has occurred to us
when we saw that article out of China some time ago in which it
was said, ``We are very obliged to the U.S. for bringing their
men and treasure. We couldn't get at them if they stayed at
home. It is the only way we can get at them, their coming here
and getting bogged down. We should be very appreciative to the
government of the United States for giving us the opportunity
to destroy it.''
That is what reminded me of what the Senator said.
Secretary Rusk. Is this Hanoi or Peking?
The Chairman. That came out of Peking. It was a very long
article which came out a couple of months ago. You saw it?
Senator Pell. No, I did not. Who wrote it?
The Chairman. It came out of People's Daily. It was picked
up in the usual way. Don't you have that, Mr. Marcy? Anyway, I
know we can find it.
Senator Pell. I would like to see it. This is exactly the
theory I was advancing.
The Chairman. It was picked up from the People's Daily and
reprinted in the New York Times. I thought that is exactly what
you had in mind.
Senator Case. I had this in mind.
AMERICAN OVERCOMMITMENT
The Chairman. It has occurred to me. Are we being drawn
into one place where we can be destroyed? This is what some of
our witnesses said last year. Are we becoming overcommitted to
where our great wealth and manpower are being bogged down in an
area which, as the Senator so well said, is not costing the
opposition any substantial manpower or money? It is a very
serious question.
Secretary Rusk. Senator, when one looks back to some of
these other crises, when the guerrillas were thirty miles from
Athens in great strength from Athens, Greece, and the winter
weather fell in on the Berlin airlift, and we were in that tiny
perimeter in Pusan or even in the first week of the Cuban
missile crisis, the situation is more manageable.
Senator Case. It was said we only won that one because
Yugoslavia took a turn.
Secretary Rusk. Well, it took a turn. Maybe this one is
going to be influenced by the presence of the problems in
Mainland China.
The Chairman. It did not take a turn by bombing but for
entirely different reasons.
Senator Case. I know. This is the only reason firmness
suggests. I must profess that I am for all this. I want to be
reassured we are not getting in so deep that we are in a bog.
The Chairman. Well, you asked a very pertinent question.
Secretary Rusk. I do not believe Peking is glad to see us
in Southeast Asia. I do not believe that for a minute.
Senator Case. In one sense, no.
NOT HAVE TREATIES DISRUPTED BY A BLUFF
The Chairman. I am sure in one sense, no. But if they must
have it out this is the way. If they are convinced we are going
to attack them any way, this is a good way.
Senator Case. I am sure what you did, Mr. Secretary, in
answering this man from South Dakota, upset this man, and it
upset me, too. I have regarded what we have done as pretty
important to our success in holding the line all over the
world, taking a stand here and making your position more
credible with the Russians and with everybody else, and also in
having some rather specific effects and giving tone to the
whole free effort in an effort to keep the world free in
Southeast Asia.
Secretary Rusk. I hope I did not detract at all from that
view. I certainly----
Senator Case. Say it again because, you know, if you did
detract.
Secretary Rusk. No. I was commenting specifically about its
relation to Indonesia.
Senator Case. You mean just cause and effect, one, two,
like that?
Secretary Rusk. No. On the larger question as to what these
great security treaties mean in terms of keeping the peace, to
me the greatest danger in the world would be to have these
treaties be interpreted by the other side as a bluff, because
we have been tested at times when had they judged we were
bluffing great catastrophe would have resulted. The Berlin
crisis of 1961-1962, the Cuban missile crisis were two recent
examples of this.
The most utter dangers are involved in that problem, and we
are all--we all have to approach them, it seems to me, on our
knees because it is awfully hard to be absolutely certain on
such questions.
Senator Case. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Cooper?
Senator Cooper. Am I allowed to ask questions?
The Chairman. Yes, sir.
NORTH VIETNAM'S TERMS ON BOMBING CESSATION
Senator Cooper. Mr. Secretary, my question goes to the
declaration of North Vietnam that there must be a cessation of
bombing of North Vietnam. I am not clear as to the exact
wording of the declaration, if it is an exact wording. Did
North Vietnam expressly state that there must be a permanent
cessation of bombing or did it just state that there must be a
cessation of bombing without the fixing of any limits upon the
cessation of bombing?
Secretary Rusk. The most--the usual phrase there is
unconditional and permanent. Now in the phraseology that you
get in different ways, public and private, the permanent part--
unconditional was always there. The permanent has been
described another way as definitively which, I suppose, is
permanent; and, as Harrison Salisbury in his interview put it,
for good, which is the same thing, I suppose, as permanent. In
other words, this framing of the issue has been put to us as
unconditional permanent, and this is coupled with the excuses
that were given to us when the thirty-seven-day pause was
finished earlier this year, when nothing happened, when we
paused for twice as long, as had been suggested to us that we
pause.
They said, ``Well, a suspension is an ultimatum. You can't
expect people to pick up the question of peace under an
ultimatum of that sort,'' and the general attitude now on the
other side seems to be that unless it is unconditional and
permanent, anything less than that as a stoppage of the bombing
would be interpreted as an ultimatum.
Now, of course, one can look at the question as to whether
you simply stop without saying, but they would either insist
upon a clarification of that point or would interpret for
themselves as unconditional and permanent, and then if we found
we had to resume the bombing for military reasons, then we
could carry the burden of having acted in breach of faith, you
see.
So we feel that these are issues of such importance that we
ought to have some indications on the other side as to what
would happen if we stopped the bombing, and thus far we have
not been able to get any.
VIETNAMESE REUNIFICATION BY ELECTION
Senator Cooper. I will be brief on this question because I
am sure you have developed it in sessions at which, of course,
I was not present. But, as I understand it, the United States
has said it would accept this basis of negotiation, the
adherence to the 1954 Geneva Accords.
As I remember, those accords called for general elections
throughout all Vietnam two years later and, I assume, with the
idea that a government would be established for all Vietnam.
Beginning with the French and then with the United States,
it seems to me, our course has been to establish a separate
government for South Vietnam, and for many reasons. But how
would the United States resolve that question when it now
states that it would not adhere to the Geneva Accords? How
would it resolve the question of the government for all of the
South Vietnamese as distinguished from what would seem to have
been our policy and the French policy before to establish a
government in South Vietnam?
Secretary Rusk. I think we have two elements there. First,
we have said the South Vietnamese ought to have a chance in
free elections to determine what their own government should
be, and that the question of reunification should be decided by
the peoples of the two parts of Vietnam through free elections
or free choice.
The 1954 agreements, by providing for elections on that
issue, presumably meant that this was to be by consent of the
peoples concerned.
The same issue arises both in Korea and in Germany, where
you have other divided countries.
I do not myself think, Senator, that in terms of settling
the problem that we now have in Vietnam that the question of
reunification by peaceful means is likely to be the great
obstacle to a possible settlement. The problem is whether we
can get the other side to hold its hand in trying to bring
about reunification by force.
Senator Cooper. That is all.
The Chairman. I have one or two questions.
THE QUAKERS IN CANADA
Do you know, Mr. Secretary, about a case that was sent to
me involving the Quakers in Canada, that the Treasury of the
United States issued a circular to all the banks in the United
States directing them not to honor a check payable to the
Quakers of Canada? Are you familiar with that?
Secretary Rusk. No sir; I am not. I had not heard of it
before.
The Chairman. Well, it came to me with a photostat of the
order, and I wondered if there is any authority for such an
order from the Treasury.
Secretary Rusk. It sounds to me as though this might be one
of the foreign assets control problems. If the Quakers were
using these funds to send assistance to North Vietnam----
The Chairman. That is correct. Is there such authority that
the Quakers--well, the Quakers state they are sending it North
and South. They do this--they are not involved in this
political thing. They are doing humanitarian work, and a friend
sent me the letter. I don't have the letter anyway. I forgot
how it went--I wrote a letter to the Treasury, but have had no
response. Is that as far as you know, within the power, the
authority of the Treasury?
Secretary Rusk. I would think so, sir, under the foreign
assets control legislation.
Sentor Hickenlooper. What kind of a check?
The Chairman. I did not send a check. Anyway this person,
an American citizen, writes a check on the First National Bank
of Washington, sends it to the Quakers in Canada, and the bank
here is directed by the Treasury not to honor a check payable
to the Quakers of Canada.
Secretary Rusk. I would have to look into the specific case
because I just am not informed about it.
The Chairman. I was a little surprised that we had that
authority. I thought you could donate money to the Quakers.
Secretary Rusk. I believe donations outside the United
States are not income tax deductible in the usual case.
Senator Pell. That is absolutely correct.
The Chairman. Well, they are to Israel, aren't they?
Secretary Rusk. That is a legal sense, that is to the
organized charities organized in this country under the laws of
this country.
DRAWING THE U.S. INTO A LAND WAR IN ASIA
The Chairman. In response to Senator Case's question--he
has disappeared--but the staff just handed me an article \2\
which I had not seen, from the War/Peace Report of October 1966
which says:
\2\ ``Peking and the U.S. Are Both Winning.''
It is frightening as well as paradoxical that almost
identical political assessments are being made in Peking and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Washington concerning the war in Vietnam.
I won't read it all. It says:
On the other side, well-informed U.N. Eastern European
diplomats report the perception of the same reality is quite
different when viewed from Peking. These observers state Maoist
Peking has had, from the beginning, a three-fold strategy based
upon the assumption of an ultimate inevitable war with American
imperialism: First to draw the U.S. into a major land
engagement in Asia, preferably not on Chinese soil (these
observers believe Korea was China's, not the Soviet's
initiative); second, to shift the American-Chinese
confrontation to an American-Soviet confrontation; third, to
use Vietnam and the underdeveloped world as a vehicle to change
Russian foreign policy, or failing that, to discredit it.
I had not seen it but it is on all fours with this other
idea that this----
Secretary Rusk. They said that Korea was on China's
initiative and not the Soviets'?
The Chairman. Just the opposite.
Secretary Rusk. These observers believe----
The Chairman. Yes, the observers believe that Korea was
China's not the Soviets' initiative. I also had thought it was
the Soviets'.
Secretary Rusk. I do not believe that at all.
The Chairman. But in any case, the first point, they feel
since a conflict is inevitable, this is the best thing for them
on the same theory as the Senator from New Jersey advanced.
DULLES ON SEATO
The Chairman. I want to come back to one thing, one very
interesting thing, you said. But before I do that I want to
read a very short statement of Mr. Dulles.
You had, and the administration, correctly I think from its
point of view, is now dwelling upon SEATO, but this is what
Secretary Dulles said to us, and it has some bearing on our
interpretation of it, and I think the way you should use it now
is saying what the Senate did. Here is a quote from Secretary
Dulles.
Secretary Rusk. Is that from your committee report?
The Chairman. That is right.
Secretary Rusk. What page?
The Chairman. Page 8.
We do not intend to dedicate any major elements of the
United States military establishment to form an arm of defense
in this area.
He is speaking about SEATO.
We rely primarily upon the deterrent of our mobile striking
power. That we made clear to our associates in the treaty and
that is our policy.
It would involve in the opinion of our military advisers an
injudicious over-extension of our military power if we were to
try to build up that kind of an organization in Southeast Asia.
We do not have the adequate forces to do it, and I believe
that if there should be open armed attack in that area the most
effective step would be to strike at the source of aggression
rather than to try to rush American manpower into the area to
try to fight a ground war.
I always put it in the record to show that some of us who
were here and voted for those treaties voted for them in view
of the interpretation given to us by the Secretary of State at
that time which, I thought, and I know others must have been
influenced by the idea, that it was not an engagement to put in
a land army in a big war on the land. This was about the same
time that some of our leading military authorities were also
saying, such as Gen. Douglas MacArthur, that the last thing we
ought to do is mount a big land war on the Continent of Asia.
So I would submit that the conditions are very different
today in what we are doing from what many of us legitimately
understood was involved in that treaty.
ALTERNATIVE TO MASSIVE RETALIATION
Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, may I comment briefly on
this?
Mr. Chairman. Yes, you may. I was just trying to put
another point of view, but go ahead. You may comment.
Secretary Rusk. Well, that discussion, it seems to me, goes
to the point as to whether, as in NATO, it was proposed in
SEATO to build up standing forces of the alliance in the area
in time of peace, and it was pointed out not.
Secondly, I would point out that at that time the
alternative defense notion was massive retaliation, and had
that been explored more fully at the time, I would suspect that
the alternative Mr. Dulles had in mind as to the kind of thing
we were doing here was massive retaliation, which we have
stayed away from in this present situation.
The Chairman. That may be, but the point is to me that
those of us who were here in voting for this, our judgment, I
feel, certainly mine, was influenced by the representations as
to what we were engaged in, what undertaking we were actually
making.
COMPARISON TO TONKIN GULF RESOLUTION
I would say the same way with the Tonkin Gulf thing. I
think the changes, as today, the circumstances are very
different from what they were then. We had a very small group.
Today we have nearly approaching, I guess, 400,000 to 500,000
men in the area. It is costing $20, $25 billion, and so forth.
I think the change in the circumstances today as of the time of
the Tonkin Gulf are very dramatic indeed, and I, for one--I
have already confessed my error--was influenced very greatly by
the political situation at the time, and I was supporting the
President, who was the then candidate for 1964, and that he was
then advocating a policy of not enlarging the war and,
therefore, I supported his recommendation on the Tonkin Bay.
You are legitimately correct in saying, yes, you supported
it. It is legitimate to respond that I certainly did not
anticipate doing what we are doing. I do not particularly like
to have this always thrown up, ``Well, look, you voted for
this.'' I do not consider we did vote for what we are doing now
at all. The circumstances were very, very different.
U.S. TROOPS TO NATO
Senator Hickenlooper. If the Senator will yield to me, I
will call his attention to the fact when we were considering
the NATO organization we were told very emphatically, and the
word ``emphatically'' was used in the testimony, that we were
not going to send any troops to Europe or anything like that.
The Chairman. I think that is correct.
Senator Hickenlooper. Within four months, we had four
divisions on the way.
The Chairman. Yes. But we did right after that, the very
question of whether we should send additional forces was
submitted to the Senate, and the Senate had a long and thorough
and acrimonious debate on the subject and specifically
authorized it. You remember that.
Senator Hickenlooper. After the troops went.
The Chairman. Well, they at least paid some attention to
the constitutional idea that we participate in these things.
Senator Hickenlooper. I am just saying these things happen
at times.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON DID THE OPPOSITE OF WHAT WAS EXPECTED
The Chairman. I do not particularly like the Tonkin Bay
being thrown up at this time that that is the authority for you
to do what you are now doing. In fact, I thought in supporting
the President as of that date in August of 1964, that I was
supporting a man who was going to do exactly the opposite. Now
he is doing precisely what his opponent said he would do, and
this is a very curious turn of fate. There is not much I can do
about it publicly, at least, but anyway that is a fact of the
matter.
Secretary Rusk. One of the key elements, of course, in that
problem is what the other side is doing all the time. These
fellows keep marching down from the North. At some point
somebody has to make a decision that ``You get out of the
way,'' or you shoot them.
A GENERATION BETRAYED BY WORLD WAR II
The Chairman. These are interesting subjects you brought
up. I think the one Senator Case brought up is very interesting
and worth further thought. Here is one you make. I think this
is what you said a moment ago. You belong to a generation that
was betrayed into World War I----
Secretary Rusk. World War II.
The Chairman. World War II, I am sorry, because the
governments refused to organize the peace of the world.
The question, however, it seems to me, is, the big
question, does this war, as we are now prosecuting it, does it
obstruct or does it promote the organizing of peace. You assume
that this war is an essential and important part that is
designed to organize the peace of the world. Well, my own
feeling is in view of developments that were beginning to take
place when this war got really hot, that it more likely would
prove in the light of history to obstruct the detente that you
mentioned, certainly with the Russians, and detente generally
in Europe as between Western Europe and the Russians, not just
between us, and the very question is, you assume it, I think
the question at issue is, does this war, as we now prosecute
it, does it help organize the peace.
You say the reason you are so interested in pursuing this
is you felt betrayed, and you do not want to do that again. I
think you are assuming the question at issue.
Secretary Rusk. I do not think it is an assumption that was
just pulled out of the air. In 1961, Chairman Khrushchev said
to President Kennedy, in effect, ``Get your troops out of
Berlin or there will be war,'' and President Kennedy had to say
to him, ``Well, Mr. Chairman, then there will be war,'' and it
was extremely important that Mr. Khrushchev believe the
President of the United States on that point, otherwise we
might well have had war.
The same thing at the time of the Cuban missile crisis
where it was necessary to say to Chairman Khrushchev, ``The
missiles will have to go, Mr. Chairman. We hope they can go by
peaceful means, but they must go.''
If the Chairman, if Chairman Khrushchev had not believed
President Kennedy in that situation, we could have had an even
greater catastrophe than in the Berlin matter.
Now, it is a very serious thing to create the impression
that our mutual security treaties are bluffs.
HOW ARE CUBA AND BERLIN RELEVANT TO VIETNAM?
The Chairman. But there are two cases that I think most of
us--I never did question your correctness in both cases because
there was a valid reason for it. Now, go ahead, here is South
Vietnam. Why is it relevant? Why is what you did in Berlin
relevant as to the case in Vietnam? I do not see the relevancy.
I believe they do not believe you because you are in there on a
false basis. They respected what you said in Cuba and in
Berlin. Why is it they do not do it in Vietnam?
Secretary Rusk. The relevance, the first instance, it seems
to me, Mr. Chairman, that if you make a commitment like the
SEATO Treaty, and then demonstrate that it is a bluff, there is
a great risk that they will consider as bluffs your attitude in
these other crises.
The Chairman. You see, you are assuming the question at
issue again. The Senator from Oregon and myself and a lot of
other people do not believe the SEATO Treaty covers this case,
and neither did you until the last two years.
Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, I beg your pardon. If you
want the full record on this----
The Chairman. Well, the State Department did not. I just
gave you the reference.
Secretary Rusk. I am talking about what was said at every
SEATO Ministers meeting since I have been Secretary of State
and the communiques of the SEATO Ministers and the statements
made by President Kennedy. I have not looked at that memorandum
that you referred to of March 1965.
The Chairman. This is a State Department memorandum, not
mine.
Secretary Rusk. I understand. There were a good many other
memoranda in which the SEATO Treaty was talked about along the
way and in public statements and in communiques, and in press
conferences of President Kennedy, and so forth, and there was
certainly no possibility of doubt that in the case----
CLIENT STATES IN SEATO
The Chairman. Isn't it odd that the other SEATO Members do
not agree with you as to its applicability here? None of them
have felt obliged because of this SEATO Treaty to come and
discharge their duties. Are we the only people who have respect
for our international----
Secretary Rusk. Five of them are there, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I admit outside of our clients, I mean the
independent countries.
Secretary Rusk. If you call the clients those that agree
with us, and non-clients those that do not agree with us----
The Chairman. I call a client the ones you put so much
money in them that you dominate their policies and they will do
anything to continue to get enormous aid from you, that you
buy. That is what I call a client.
Secretary Rusk. We have not bought Australia and New
Zealand. They are not client states.
The Chairman. They are not paid very much either. I am
talking about Korea in which you paid vast sums, and I am
speaking of the Philippines in which you not only gave them
very large commitments but I was told two days ago you are now
coming up for a new item for the Philippines in the AID program
and, of course, Thailand, in which you are simply covering them
up with gold. Those are the client states, and they are the
ones that are doing most of the burden.
Secretary Rusk. But they are also the states that live
under the gun of danger out here and have the greatest interest
in resisting what is being done there by Hanoi.
The Chairman. I suppose India and Japan are not interested.
They are not in danger, if there is a danger.
Senator Aiken. I do not understand why you call them
clients. They do not pay us for our services. We pay them. I
would say they are beneficiaries instead of clients.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. Well, it is both ways. They dominate our
policy, I guess. We are the captives of the government of the
Philippines, Thailand and Formosa.
HOW TO ORGANIZE THE PEACE
Well, I wanted to get to--I got diverted--what is your idea
of how to organize the peace today?
Secretary Rusk. Well, that is a very long subject, but in
essence I would say look at Article I of the United Nations
Charter where it talks about the necessity for suppressing acts
of aggression and breaches of the peace, settling disputes by
peaceful means. Article II, the next paragraph, goes on to talk
about self-determination. Surely, if we draw anything at all
from our experience in the last decade, it is that those who
start a process of aggression develop the momentum of
aggression if it is not checked. And no one has been able to
demonstrate to me that the things which these events have in
common are irrelevant.
Now, everyone knows that every human action has its unique
aspects. One burglar is John Doe, and another burglar is
Richard Roe, and each action is unique in some respects. But it
is what they have in common that puts them in prison.
The Chairman. I was hoping you would say the U.N., and I
would hope that we would rely on the U.N. But what we are
really doing is going on our own. These are our own programs.
It is not the U.N. The U.N. has nothing to do with it. This is
a big difference between this and Korea.
One reason, I think, there was little dissent about Korea
is that it was a collective action. It is true we furnished
most of the sinews because we had it, but we had the support
and approval of the United Nations. That is the only idea I
have about organizing the peace is the U.N. But this does not
seem to be in accord with that policy. That is one of the
things why I asked that question.
Secretary Rusk. Well, again the Korean matter was unique in
the U.N. system because of the accident that the Soviet Union
was absent from--they were absent from the Security Council
when the decisive decisions were taken there.
The Chairman. But the Soviet Union has not vetoed any
action here.
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SEATO AND NATO
Secretary Rusk. But NATO is not subject to formal action by
the United Nations. If there is an attack on a member of NATO--
--
The Chairman. But, Secretary Rusk, Mr. Dulles specifically
distinguished this from NATO. He said it is not like NATO.
Secretary Rusk. But not in every respect. It was
distinguished from NATO in the formulation that was used for
these later treaties, and I think you will find in the record
that he says that the differences are insignificant; that the
difference in the wording arose out of the issue raised, I
think, by Senator Taft and others as to whether the language of
the NATO treaty itself would, in effect, repeal the
constitutional processes here, that an attack on one is an
attack on all, and in order not to have that occur, they went
to the formulation, which Senator Lausche read in these other
treaties, which was somewhat different from the NATO language.
But Secretary Dulles in one of these hearings indicated that
the difference was insubstantial.
The Chairman. Well, I will stop with one last thing. I
wondered, because I am always asked this, and I am always asked
by the press, what is the response to the question, are you
optimistic or pessimistic about the situation? They will ask
it. They always do, nearly the first question, when they say
was the Secretary optimistic or pessimistic. How did he feel
about this?
Secretary Rusk. Usually at press conferences when that
question is put to me I usually do not answer it in those
terms.
The Chairman. What do you say?
Secretary Rusk. Because it is much too complicated a
situation altogether.
A REQUEST FOR PUBLIC INFORMATION
Senator Morse. I have one question and one request for
information and, Mr. Secretary, it may involve a matter of
policy and, as you know, if it does I follow your decision on
policy.
Before I make the request, we can certainly have it on a
secret basis, I would like to get it on a public basis, if
possible, because we cannot avoid the fact that in public
discussion among our people in this country these days great
concern is expressed over whether this is becoming
predominantly an American or an Asian war. In fact, there are
certain political points of view within the ranks of the
Republican Party that it ought to be turned over to the Asians.
I have not taken that position completely, but I do think
the American people are entitled to the information that I now
would like to have you supply for public discussion, but if you
decide after consultation with the administration that it
cannot be supplied publicly, at least I would like to have it
made a part of this record, and I would like to use it for the
public, if possible.
STATISTICS ON CASUALTIES
What were the Vietnamese casualties in 1964, 1965 and 1966,
including their fatalities and their wounded?
What were the U.S. casualties during the last three years?
Supply the number of Vietnam infiltrating in 1964, 1965,
1966.
Four, the number of Viet Cong recruited in South Vietnam in
1964, 1965, and 1966.
Five, the desertion rates from the South Vietnamese army in
1964, 1965, and 1966, compared with the Viet Cong's desertion
rates.
Now, we have some of these figures provided to the
committee by the Defense Department, but they are classified.
They show that in 1966, and this is the point Senator Clark was
talking about, that the number of Americans killed in action
quadrupled while the number of Vietnamese killed in action was
less by way of 20 percent, and that despite bombing North
Vietnam infiltration almost tripled in 1966.
Of course, these figures also have to be compared in
relationship to the number of personnel in the American forces
and the South Vietnamese forces, and what is known about the
number of personnel in the Viet Cong forces.
The thrust of my request is obvious. I would like to have
the statistical material bearing on the question of great
public concern these days as to whether or not the United
States is taking over the war and the South Vietnamese, as far
as fighting is concerned, are being let out more and more of
responsibility, because if we are going to have a drive for the
war to be taken over by Asians, an all-Asian conference, as has
been proposed by some, I think the American people ought to
have the statistical material that I asked for.
Secretary Rusk. We will see what we can do on that. I think
we have much harder information on certain of those points than
we have on the others. For example, on the defections from the
Viet Cong, we can count somewhat more than 20,000 in 1966 who
come in to get their cards in the Chiu Hoi program and go on to
get resettled and get jobs.
They tell us for every one who comes over officially, maybe
three or four others simply go off to their farms, and the
desertions are not desertions from the South Vietnamese to the
Viet Cong, but simply people who go back to their farms,
people, like people in this country during the Civil War at
frequent intervals. But we will try our best to get you the
figures and see whether we can make them public. I think a good
many of these figures can be made public. Some of them are
public, but I will try to pull them together for you.
THE U.N. AND RHODESIA
Senator Mundt. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question: If I
understand when we were talking about Rhodesia you were stating
that was not a bilateral action, that we were pulled into
Rhodesia because of our obligations under the U.N. charter; is
that right?
Secretary Rusk. I said it was not just a bilateral matter,
that we had important national interests of our own involved in
this question under the charter in relation to the United
Nations structure, in relation to our own interests in Africa,
as well as our interests in the Commonwealth.
Senator Mundt. How do you respond to Dean Acheson's
statement--I know you have read this--in which he said that
such a situation in the U.N. charter is plain. Chapter I,
Article II, paragraph 7 applies unequivocally that the United
Nations shall not intervene in matters which are within the
internal jurisdiction of any state.
Secretary Rusk. I gave--did I give you that, Mr. Marcy--
that memorandum on the legal--I think the key point here is
that Article II, paragraph 7, the charter provision does not
brand as illegal intervention. The action of the Security
Council taken at the request of a member state concerned, in
this case the United Kingdom--from a legal point of view, the
responsibilities for Rhodesia continue to rest with the United
Kingdom. No one has recognized Rhodesia. I do not think any
country in the world including South Africa has recognized
Rhodesia as an independent state, and Article II, paragraph 7--
--
Senator Mundt. It says any member state or does he say any
state?
Secretary Rusk. Article II, paragraph 7--do you have a copy
of the Charter--expressly provides that the principle of non-
intervention contained in that article shall not prejudice the
application of enforcement measures under chapter 7. So from
the Charter point of view there seems to be little doubt about
that, but I will leave this memorandum for you to study,
Senator. You may not agree with all of it.
Senator Mundt. I hate to see student and teacher disagree.
Secretary Rusk. Well, it is a matter of some pain to me,
Senator.
Senator Mundt. Probably more to you than to me. It has
raised a lot of questions in my correspondence, but I cannot
answer them.
The Chairman. Any other question?
Senator Mundt. No.
Secretary Rusk. I am talking about the last sentence.
The Chairman. I guess that is all.
INDONESIAN VIEWS ON BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM
One thing I did have, I do not know whether it is
important. Maybe you can clear it very quickly. You mentioned a
prominent official of Indonesia. Did he express himself on the
bombing in the north? What was it you said about him?
Secretary Rusk. It had to do with whether our being in
Vietnam had any bearing on the situation in Indonesia.
The Chairman. You said he did.
Secretary Rusk. He said it was a very important thing.
The Chairman. Didn't I see where he thought it would be
very wise to suspend the bombing in the North? Is that correct
or not? I thought he did.
Secretary Rusk. It is possible. I have not noted what he
said.
The Chairman. He denied that he said it. It was reported,
was it not, in the press?
Secretary Rusk. Could we check that point, Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. That is all, unless you have anything further
to say.
Secretary Rusk. No, sir.
The Chairman. All right.
I believe you are scheduled to come in open session next
week, Monday, is that right?
Secretary Rusk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen.
The Chairman. All right. The committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:35 o'clock p.m., the committee was
adjourned.]
SUBCOMMITTEES AND HEARINGS PROCEDURES
----------
Tuesday, January 24, 1967
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 12:00 noon, in
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse,
Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, Clark, Pell, McCarthy,
Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Mundt, Case, and Cooper.
Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Holt, and Mr.
Lowenstein of the committee staff.
CONFIRMATION OF NOMINATIONS
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
First, is there any motion on the people we just heard,\1\
that is----
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Committee heard in open session the following nominations:
Clarence A. Boonstra to be Ambassador to Costa Rica; John F. Henning to
be Ambassador to New Zealand; David S. King to be Ambassador to the
Malagasy Republic; Robert L. Payton to be Ambassador to the Federal
Republic of Cameroon; William B. Buffum to be Deputy Representative to
the U.N.; and Arthur E. Goldschmidt to be Representative to the
Economic and Social Council of the U.N.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, I move that from small a to
small f inclusive be recommended for confirmation.
Senator Morse. Second it.
The Chairman. You heard the motion and the second. Is there
any discussion? Any questions? All in favor of the motion say
``aye.''
[Chorus of ``aye.'']
The Chairman. Opposed, ``no.''
[No response.]
The Chairman. The ``ayes'' have it.
As I said, we will take the other two tomorrow. We have Mr.
William S. Gaud. I will announce that the committee will meet
tomorrow at 10:30. We do not think it will take too long, but
we had already agreed. Mr. Gaud has a matter to present to the
committee.
There are two or three other matters.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE STAFF AND EXPENSES
First, on the committee.
Mr. Marcy, will you present the bill. It has to be approved
and get on its way to go through the procedures.
Mr. Marcy. Yes.
Normally at this time of the year the committee approves a
sum for additional staff and expenses for the balance of this
year.
Last year, the committee approved and the Senate approved
$200,000 for committee expenses. Of that $200,000, the
committee spent $144,289, so we have a balance of $55,000 left.
This would mean that the committee could get along next
year on the same amount, $200,000, but if there is any
inclination for special kinds of activities to be undertaken,
the committee might want to request $250,000.
The Chairman. The reason for that was the discussion that
took place at the last meeting where there were several people
who desired that we try to find some extra staff members. They
do not have to spend it, but if you want to leave it, I mean
make available an amount we could use, and if we possibly can
find somebody, why, we will.
Senator Lausche. Carl, was the full appropriation for the
whole fiscal year $200,000?
Mr. Marcy. That is correct.
Senator Lausche. And we got along with $200,000?
Mr. Marcy. That is correct.
Senator Lausche. Now you say we can get along the next year
unless we expand our staff and services.
Mr. Marcy. That is correct.
Senator Mundt. Did I misunderstand your word, Carl, I
thought you said we got along with $160,000.
Mr. Marcy. That is correct. We have $55,000 unexpended at
the end of the year.
Senator Lausche. Where do you get the money for the next
six months of the fiscal year?
Mr. Marcy. We do not operate on a fiscal year.
Senator Sparkman. We are on a calendar year, January 30 to
January 30.
Senator Lausche. You have $50,000 left?
Mr. Marcy. That is correct.
MONEY TO HIRE ADDITIONAL STAFF
Senator Church. You mean by that, Carl, there is room in
the present budget to hire additional staff people without
enlarging it over the amount we spent last year?
The Chairman. It depends on the hearings and the travel. It
was lower last year than usual, but there was such vigorous
complaint the other day that I said if the committee means what
it said we would give them some leeway. We do not spend it
anyway. Mr. Marcy, I think, has been extremely careful. I do
not know of any major committee that spent as little as this
one.
Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, could I raise two questions?
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Morse. Carl stated we had some left. We do not have
any left, do we? Didn't that revert?
Mr. Marcy. That reverts.
The Chairman. That reverts. What he meant is we did not
expend it. That is correct.
Senator Lausche. Mr. Chairman, there is going to be an
effort----
The Chairman. Senator Morse. He was about to say something.
EXPANDING THE SUBCOMMITTEES
Senator Morse. I want the attention of Senator Clark and
some others who expressed to me an interest in expanding the
programs of some of our subcommittees.
I have pending--I won't have time to take it up this
morning--my first draft of a proposal for doing some work on
the Subcommittee on Latin America that I think we have got to
do or we are going to be open to two problems.
One, you have got other committees of the Congress doing
it; you have got a jurisdictional problem here. I do not want
to go into that now, but we have some other committees in the
Congress that, in my judgment, are invading the prerogatives of
the Foreign Relations Committee in Latin America; and, second,
I think we ought to do it as a matter of Senate duty.
I do not think you can let this Latin American area go
without more interest being expressed in it by the Foreign
Relations Committee, and I certainly would not favor our
spending any money that we do not need to spend.
On the other hand, whatever you ask for now is the maximum
that you are probably going to get. I do not think we ought to
come in later supplementarily, and asking for more money, and I
would suggest that to play safe we ask for $250,000.
The Chairman. It does not commit us to spend it. We have
not spent it for last year or any year previously, but if we
need it, it is there. There is no commitment that you have to
spend it.
Senator Morse. No.
A REASONABLE PRESENTATION TO THE RULES COMMITTEE
Senator Clark. Mr. Chairman, Senator Pell and I are on the
Rules Committee, and these money appropriations come up there.
Senator Pell. Senator Cooper also.
Senator Clark. Yes, Senator Cooper. I thoroughly agree with
Senator Morse, but before we go in for $250,000, which we may
not spend, Carl ought to have a reasonable presentation to the
Rules Committee as to how we spend it, otherwise there will be
criticisms.
Senator Morse. My only feeling is we can probably do it on
$200,000 in view of what we did not spend last year. We
probably could do it on $200,000.
At the same time, I would not want to ask for $200,000 and
then in the next few meetings of this committee, the committee
agrees there ought to be increased staff of the subcommittees.
Senator Clark. would like to see Mr. Marcy make up a
presentation which can be presented to the Rules Committee.
Senator Marcy. I do have such a budget here, but it will
not deal with the particular investigation. For example, last
year of the full amount of $200,000, the committee budget
showed $163,000 for salaries; employee contributions $21,000;
reimbursement payments to agencies $4,000; travel $6,000;
witnesses for hearings $6,000; office expenses $4,600; and
another amount of $3,000.
That was for the full amount of $200,000.
Now, actually, the way the amounts were expended, I will
just give you a few illustrative amounts here. While we asked
for $163,000 for salaries, we spent $118,000. While we asked
for $6,000 for travel, we actually spent $17,000. That was
because at the time that the committee appropriated the funds
or authorized the amounts last year, the committee had not
decided to hold hearings on Vietnam, NATO, and China.
AREAS FOR INVESTIGATION
Senator Clark. Of course, Mr. Chairman, we really ought to
make the basic decision as to what we want to do with the
committee this year before we prepare the bill, which is
probably going to be impossible to do in this meeting in ten
minutes.
I would certainly like to strongly endorse the position of
the Senator from Oregon that we ought to have a pretty
comprehensive look at Latin America. I believe Senator Gore,
the chairman of the Disarmament Subcommittee, and I certainly
agree with him, think we ought to take a good hard look at the
Disarmament Agency, and I have no doubt there are other areas
of countries as a result of my trip to Eastern Europe and the
Middle East. Some Senators will feel we ought to be conducting
much more effective oversight than we do at present. But my own
point is we ought to make this policy decision and then ask
Carl to make up a budget. We have the cart before the horse,
and since we have to do it this way, I would rather see us ask
for $250,000, and if we do not have to spend it, we will not
spend it.
Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, may I say just this: It may
be the cart is before the horse, but it is just something that
cannot very well be avoided because this present fund expires
January 30, and we need to get action before the end of the
month.
Senator Lausche. Mr. Chairman.
CAREFUL HANDLING OF FUNDS
Senator Sparkman. Wait a minute.
Now, the experience of this committee in the past, I think,
and Carl will bear me out on this, has been one of very good
husbanding of the funds that we have gotten. I think it will
show that some years we have turned back a very large amount.
Other years it has been a lesser amount. You cannot predict it
with any precision. But what we do not spend goes back into the
Treasury, so it seems to me that certainly we can trust the
careful handling of the funds, but that we ought to allow
ourselves elbow room so that we can do what we decide we ought
to do in this committee and, therefore, I would recommend the
larger amount. If it is in order, I would like to make a motion
to agree on that.
The Chairman. Senator Lausche.
SUBSTITUTE MOTION
Senator Lausche. I offer a substitute, and that is that the
amount be kept at $200,000. We are faced with the
responsibility of answering to the people of the United States
whether we are going to keep expenses at present levels or
reduce them, on the one hand; or extend them, on the other, and
impose new taxes.
When the time comes for imposing new taxes, the probability
is that there will be a wave of opposition to it. My belief is
that we ought to begin with the committee's indicating that we
are exerting every effort possible to escape the obligation of
imposing new taxes, or if we have to do so, impose them in the
least amounts possible.
We had $200,000 last year; we spent $150,000. That would
indicate to me that there is a latitude of $50,000 with which
to do the work that might be in excess of what was done last
year.
I make this proposal also because it has become thoroughly
apparent that if there has been neglect, and I am not saying
that it prevails in this committee, because another committee
on which I serve has increased its amount by $200,000 in the
last three years. We should begin here, and that is where I
propose to begin.
The Chairman. You heard the motion. The substitute motion
is to ask for $200,000. Is there any further discussion?
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS COMMITTEE
Senator Mundt. Mr. Chairman, I was late for this committee
because I was detained in the committee presided over by your
distinguished colleague from Arkansas, Mr. John McClellan.\2\
The staff had prepared a proposed spending program, and by
unanimous action our committee there, operating pretty much on
the philosophy that Frank Lausche has mentioned, cut it down.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Government Operations Committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Morse. How much is the total?
Senator Mundt. It is a big committee, a quarter of a
million dollars. They asked for about $1,250,000, and we cut it
down.
Senator Morse. It is the very committee, may I say most
respectfully, which, in my judgment, is planning some work in
Latin America that ought to be subordinated to the Foreign
Relations Committee.
Senator Mundt. Not that I know of. They never mentioned it.
You are thinking of Vietnam.
Senator Morse. You have the Judiciary Committee with
$2,600,000 plus, with some of the subcommittees with $500,000.
Senator Mundt. I am talking about Government Operations.
Senator Morse. I know, but I also bring in the other
Committees.
Senator Mundt. So far as I know, they are not talking about
Latin America. There is a possibility of investigating AID in
Vietnam.
WHOSE OX IS BEING GORED
Senator Cooper. Mr. Chairman, you remember--I am rather
reluctant to give my views on this--but serving on the Rules
Committee we do have this experience: when the committee
chairmen come in for additional funds, if they are supported by
a plan of what is intended to do, I think the Rules Committee
is very generous in approving their request. But I think if
some budget is not made out, there will be a tendency to cut it
out somewhat, and that has been our practice in the Rules
Committee. So I would say if you are going to ask for $250,000,
it ought to be supported by some plan.
The Chairman. May I ask you members of the Rules Committee,
are you likely to cut back? If he only asked for $200,000, are
you going to cut it back along with everybody?
Senator Cooper. Not $200,000.
The Chairman. Because this committee asked for very little.
For example, the committee he mentioned was $1,000,000.
Senator Clark. I would like to say something about the
tactics, if you do not mind. It depends on whose ox is being
gored. There are certain committees which are absolutely
sacrosanct, and they get whatever they want, and other
committees do not get what they want. This does not represent
my philosophy, but it does that of the Rules Committee. I think
this committee's requests are extremely modest.
The Chairman. I think so, too. The Judiciary Committee is
$2,670,000. And they have subcommittees: the Subcommittee on
Antitrust and Monopoly asks for $560,000; Constitutional
Rights, $205,000; Internal Security, $437,000; Juvenile
Delinquency, $260,000.
Senator Clark. Which is not within their jurisdiction.
The Chairman. They total $2,670,000. I do not want to do
anything outrageous.
CONDEMNING OTHER COMMITTEES' EXTRAVAGANCES
Senator Lausche. The weakness of our position is that in
this room we condemn this, but when we go to the floor nobody
utters a word. I think that we can justifiably and honestly
defend our position. I think that that expenditure is
completely unjustified, and it sort of corroborates the
extravagance in the committees.
Senator Pell. No one had the gumption to say so.
Senator Lausche. No one complains. We consider each
committee sacrosanct. Allen Ellender goes up on the floor and
makes the argument, and only the walls listen to him.
Senator Church. Mr. Chairman, the question here is how much
money should this committee have. I think that it is perfectly
clear that we did not have the kind of staff help we could
efficiently use in the various subcommittees, and we are not
getting the job done that we should get done. I mean there is
no reason why we should limit ourselves with a staff that is
inadequate.
The Chairman. If the committee will have order. I was sorry
to arouse such a big controversy. I did not know there would be
such a big row. We did not spend the $200,000. Obviously we
have room there. If people feel so strongly about it, I would
rather go on $200,000, and if we need it, why, we can ask for a
supplemental. I think the Rules Committee people--I am
perfectly willing to abide by what your advice is because we
can ask for more. I have asked the staff to try to follow out
what was suggested here the other day to look for some people
and see--we have already appointed two new subcommittees, and
we are going to try to staff them and get some people. We are
moving in that direction. If you think this is outrageous, I am
perfectly willing to stay with it.
Senator Clark. Mr. Chairman, let us vote.
The Chairman. All right, let us vote.
SUBCOMMITTEES NEED A COMMITMENT FROM THE FULL COMMITTEE
Senator Morse. One minute, before you vote. I would like to
have one minute.
We have started a discussion, and a very fruitful
discussion in this committee about expanding the work of the
subcommittees.
The Chairman. That is right.
Senator Morse. Because we feel they ought to be expanded.
You cannot expand the work of the subcommittees unless the
chairman of the subcommittees can get some commitment from this
full committee as to what the budget is going to allow them.
You are not going to be able to do that on the basis of the old
judgment, in my opinion, because your $153,000 expenditure last
year was low for the reason we did not undertake the type of
program in the subcommittees that ought to have been
undertaken. I certainly think that if you just ask for $200,000
you are going to encourage encroachments upon the jurisdiction
of this committee from other committees, and I think we ought
to ask for $250,000 or $225,000. You ought to go before that
committee and make the case before the Rules Committee. This is
what we intend to do that we have not been doing, and that
ought to be done. If you do not do that, you are going to be in
a position where they would be justified in cutting back on
your budget.
If you say you were going to ask for no more money, and we
are going to do a larger program, the Rules Committee would
have a basis for cutting back. I think you ought to ask for the
$250,000 and make your case before the committee.
DEFEAT OF THE SUBSTITUTE MOTION
The Chairman. All right, let us vote on it.
Senator Cooper. Let me say this, if I can.
I am on both committees. If this committee does appear and
sustain its request for $250,000, of course, I will vote for it
today. I just will say that.
The Chairman. Do you want to call the roll?
Senator Pell. What are we voting on exactly?
The Chairman. The substitute of the Senator from Ohio. He
wishes to stay at $200,000.
Senator Pell. If you want it $250,000, you vote no.
The Chairman. You vote no.
Senator Pell. Thank you.
Senator Lausche. And when you do that you are mistaken.
Senator Pell. I often am.
The Chairman. Call the roll.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Sparkman.
Senator Sparkman. No.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Mansfield.
Mr. Morse.
Senator Morse. No.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Gore.
Mr. Lausche.
Senator Lausche. Aye.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Church.
Senator Church. No.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Symington.
The Chairman. I will vote Symington no. He did leave his
proxy.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Dodd.
Mr. Clark.
Senator Clark. No.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Pell.
Senator Pell. No.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. McCarthy.
Mr. Hickenlooper.
Senator Hickenlooper. Aye.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Aiken.
Senator Hickenlooper. Aye.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Carlson.
Senator Carlson. No.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Williams.
Mr. Mundt.
Senator Mundt. Aye.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Case.
Senator Case. No.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Cooper.
Senator Cooper. No.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. No.
Mr. Kuhl. Ten nays and four ayes.
The Chairman. The substitute failed.
ADOPTION OF THE MOTION
Now can we vote. Do we need a roll call or can we go by a
voice vote?
Senator Lausche. I wanted to be registered as voting no.
Senator Carlson. Mr. Chairman, in view of my vote, I want
to state this. The Post Office and Civil Service Committee,
which really is a small committee, and I am a member of it, is
asking for $225,000, and I just could not conceive that this
committee should get less.
The Chairman. We won't spend it unless we need it.
Senator Lausche. Will you assign someone to work for me
especially with this extra $50,000 as the chairman of the
Southeast Asia Subcommittee, a very important one?
Senator Morse. You bet it is.
The Chairman. I have some other questions here now.
Ambassador Goldberg----
Senator Clark. We did not vote.
The Chairman. All in favor of the motion of the Senator
from Alabama say aye.
[Chorus of ``aye.'']
The Chairman. Opposed, no.
Senator Lausche. No.
Senator Hickenlooper. No.
The Chairman. The record will show the Senator from Ohio
votes no.
INVITATION FOR THE COMMITTEE TO VISIT THE U.N.
Ambassador Goldberg--let me go back. Mr. U Thant sent me an
invitation inviting the committee to come to New York and have
lunch with him, and so on.
Goldberg came here right after that and we had a
conversation about it. He strongly recommends that it be
enlarged rather than just go for a luncheon with U Thant. He
would like for the committee to agree to come up there and he,
if I understood him correctly, offered to make the arrangements
for transportation, and to spend a day and to meet with a
series of delegations or people from various parts; in other
words, perhaps two or three from Western Europe, and two or
three or more.
He is going to undertake to set this up, if we agree. He is
going to manage this for us, with the idea of giving us an
opportunity to hear the views and exchange views with people
from various parts of the world. Latin America would be a
group; one from Western Europe; one from Eastern Europe; the
Middle East, and so on. I cannot give you all the details.
What I wanted to do today is to find out whether or not the
committee is interested. It would entail going up and spending
the day, all day, in these various meetings, among other
things, as I understand it, a luncheon with Mr. U Thant.
The suggested period would be--and this has got to be
subject, of course, to negotiation, but I could not be very
specific because I had not had an opportunity to ask you--March
15th to 16th or the 22nd and 23rd. I just wanted to know
whether the committee is interested or not. I do not want to
get out on a limb and say we are, and not have but one or two
go.
What is the sentiment of the committee?
Senator Morse. I think we ought to have the advice of Case
and Church first.
The Chairman. It is purely for our information.
A USEFUL TRIP
Senator Church. I am strongly, I am very favorably,
disposed. I think that the more this committee can learn as a
committee about the situation in New York, the more familiar we
are with the U.N. and with our own mission, and with the
Secretariat and with U Thant, with the views that are so
pervasive there on matters that are critical to our own
national interest, the better. Since I think this is the most
appropriate way to do it and the most effective way to do it, I
would hope that the committee would be interested in Goldberg's
invitation.
I have told Goldberg I am strongly in favor of this. I
would hope that as many members of the committee as possible
would go. I think it would be useful.
The Chairman. I sort of felt that unless as many as ten
wanted to go it would not look right. If as many as ten wanted
to go--not everybody has to go.
Senator Clark. I wonder if we would not want to ask the
members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee also.
The Chairman. Then you get too many if they all went.
Senator Case. They will take care of that.
The Chairman. What do you think about the idea? Do you wish
me to work out a day, and would you say as many as ten would
go?
I would like all of them to go, but I do not want to just
have three or four go and have all this sort of trouble.
INVITATION FROM U THANT
Senator Lausche. From whom is the principal invitation? Is
it from U Thant?
The Chairman. It started with U Thant. I had a letter over
there. It came some time ago. He would be glad to have a
luncheon, invite us all to luncheon, and this kind of grew out
of it.
Senator Lausche. I do not want to dignify U Thant, and
especially on the basis of what Senator Morse said the other
day, of his statements around the world, and if we are going to
go----
Senator Morse. What statements?
Senator Lausche. The other day in our discussions you
pointed out that U Thant is our choice and he was making
attacks upon us.
Senator Hickenlooper. I cannot hear what you are saying,
Frank.
Senator Case. He is everybody's choice, Frank, is what you
are saying.
Senator Lausche. U Thant has been making statements that
are not helpful to our cause in the world as it stands today,
and I do not want to dignify him by going to New York with him
being the principal inviter. I look upon it differently if the
principal invitation comes from Goldberg.
Senator Church. May I say something on that?
My understanding on that is the principal invitation comes
from our Ambassador to us.
Senator Lausche. If we go there we ought to put U Thant in
the background.
Senator Church. Yes. During the fall, a group of
Congressmen did come up at Goldberg's invitation. They did come
to the American Mission for briefings. They then lunched with U
Thant, and went through the Secretariat and visited the
principal U.N. buildings, and this is what Goldberg has in
mind.
The Chairman. That is my understanding, that it would be
one of a whole series of meetings that would take place
practically all day. My guess would be we would want to leave,
we will say, around 8:00 or 8:30. We would come back that
night. We do not spend the night there. You do not have to
register in hotels or anything else is the way I understand it
is to be done.
Senator Mundt. Mr. Chairman, I have to leave. I am in favor
of the idea, and I will go.
Senator Pell. So am I.
The Chairman. Let me have a show of hands of who would be
willing to go who are here.
[There was a showing of hands.]
Senator Case. Could I just say one thing. I suggest we keep
down the social side of it.
Senator Mundt. You are going to have to adjust to the
Senate schedule.
THE TEN-MINUTE RULE FOR QUESTIONING
Senator Lausche. Mr. Chairman, I move that in the open
public hearings that there be applied the ten-minute rule. I
will not discuss the issue, and let this whole body act upon
it.
The Chairman. Of course, I am perfectly willing for the
committee to act on it. We tried it last year and we have also
had two meetings this year without it, and in my view it worked
better without it than it did with it. Yesterday the total time
consumed was less than an average of ten minutes for everybody
there. Now practically everybody was there yesterday, and I
would prefer to try it without it. If it becomes intolerable,
why, we can revert to it.
We also tried it when the Secretary was here and it went
very smoothly, which is the normal way. But if you wish----
Senator Lausche. What did you mean yesterday when you said
to me in private that you had so many complaints about the
application of the ten-minute rule----
The Chairman. You were one who complained last year about
how unsatisfactory it is in circumstances that you only have
ten minutes.
Senator Lausche. No, I never complained about that.
The Chairman. Last year you did and so did others.
Senator Lausche. No, I did not.
The Chairman. But anyway if you wish to vote on it----
Senator Morse. I think we ought to have discussion on it. I
am a great believer in self-discipline.
The Chairman. That is what we tried yesterday, and I would
prefer to go that way.
THE MINORITY NEEDS MORE TIME
Senator Case. I think, as a matter of fact, Frank, you
spoke to me about this before. There are times when you are in
the minority and you would need and require more than the ten
minutes that would be attributable to one member to present
that minority position fairly, and I think this is a good idea.
Senator Lausche. I will not argue the matter. Each one
knows how he has--the juniors how much they sit back and
finally leave the meeting because they never get to them.
Senator Case. Sometimes we ought to start at the bottom.
That is the only change.
Senator Pell. Maybe we could have a compromise. The
chairman could present a little bell to us and ring it after
ten minutes. We do not have to stop, but at least we would not
forget that ten minutes had gone by.
The Chairman. I thought yesterday everybody was very,
very----
Senator Lausche. Yesterday there was self-imposed adherence
to the rule.
The Chairman. That is right. So was their----
Senator Lausche. Are you recommending a substitute?
Senator Pell. No. I was being flip.
Senator McCarthy. What is the substitute?
Senator Lausche. Let us have the question.
Senator Pell. Do you want a vote, really?
TABLE THE MOTION
Senator Case. I move the motion be tabled for the time
being.
The Chairman. The Senator moves it be tabled for the time
being.
Senator Morse. Second.
The Chairman. All in favor of the tabling say ``aye.''
(Chorus of ``aye.'')
The Chairman. Call the roll, Mr. Kuhl.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Sparkman.
Senator Sparkman. Aye.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Mansfield.
Mr. Morse.
Senator Morse. Aye.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Gore.
Mr. Lausche.
Senator Lausche. No.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Church.
Senator Church. No.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Symington.
The Chairman. No--aye, I mean.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Dodd.
Mr. Clark.
Mr. Pell.
Senator Pell. No.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. McCarthy.
Senator McCarthy. Aye.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Hickenlooper.
Senator Hickenlooper. Aye.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Aiken.
Mr. Carlson.
Senator Carlson. No.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Williams.
Mr. Mundt.
Senator Mundt. No.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Case.
Senator Case. Aye.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Cooper.
Senator Cooper. Aye.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Aye.
Mr. Kuhl. Eight yeas and five nays.
The Chairman. The motion is tabled.
Senator Lausche. All right, you poor junior, weep.
INVITATION TO JOURNALISTS TO TESTIFY
The Chairman. I want to ask the guidance of the committee
on this.
There have been two members who raised this question, and I
have raised it, too, about having some witnesses in Executive
Session.
What would be the committee's view about asking one or more
of the three Americans, Harrison Salisbury, Harry S. Ashmore
and William C. Baggs, who have been in North Vietnam, to come
to executive session and answer questions and brief the
committee?
Are you interested or not? I can have them with coffee,
without it, or does the committee wish to have it as an
informal executive session without any publicity?
Senator Pell. As one member I would strongly support it.
Senator Hickenlooper. Who are the three?
The Chairman. The three who have been there--Salisbury,
Baggs and Ashmore. One is a former editor who is now working
for the center, but Baggs is the editor of a Florida paper.
Salisbury is on the New York Times. Ashmore has been on various
papers, but is not presently on a paper. They are all
newspapermen.
Senator Lausche. Why do you want them in executive session?
Senator Morse. Why in executive session?
The Chairman. I do not care, but if you want it in open----
Senator Morse. If you want them in executive session for
security reasons, that is something else.
The Chairman. I was personally curious to hear their
reports and details, and minor details that they have not had
in their reports. I have read what has been in the paper, but
these are the only Americans of this caliber--there have been
Women's Strikes for Peace, and so on, that I thought they might
not have quite the same attitude.
Senator Cooper. A minister.
The Chairman. These people are trained observers.
Regardless that their views may be on policy, they are
observers, and I would be interested in hearing them. I want to
know if the whole committee is interested, and should I ask for
a--I can have either kind, whatever the committee wishes.
WITNESSES SCHEDULED TO APPEAR
Senator Lausche. May I ask what witnesses you have
scheduled to appear.
The Chairman. In open?
Senator Lausche. There are certain witnesses that will take
one side. Those names I have seen scheduled. Now, what
witnesses do you have other than the State Department
representatives who will take the side affirming what is being
done in South Vietnam now?
The Chairman. Well, I don't know what side these people are
going to take on that. The only two that are firmly set are for
next Monday and Tuesday, Kennan and Reischauer.
Senator Case. George Kennan?
The Chairman. George Kennan, and former Ambassador
Reischauer. They are both former ambassadors.
Senator Lausche. Outside of the State witnesses.
The Chairman. We have asked the Secretary of Defense, and
the Secretary of State agreed to come yesterday, but then, you
know about that, he wrote a letter and requested it be changed
from that hearing to the one we had. He still is in the
position of coming at a later date, and McNamara has asked to
be delayed until after he had finished his other hearing.
Senator Lausche. That is not an answer to my question. You
have outsiders. Kennan, I know how he will testify.
The Chairman. Well, I do not.
DO THEY SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION?
Senator Lausche. But what outsiders are there that you can
know in advance they are supporting the government's position?
We have not----
The Chairman. I do not ask them, any of them, are they
going to support the government's position. In fact, Mr.
Reischauer is not testifying directly. I cannot control what he
testifies to because I cannot control the committee's
questions, but it is generally on our relations with the Far
East, Japan and--well, the Far East. He has been a long-time
scholar of China.
Senator Lausche. Bill, may I suggest that you hold this
over until tomorrow's meeting, the decision on these three men.
The Chairman. On Salisbury, Ashmore and Baggs?
Senator Lausche. Yes. I may want to offer other names to
come in.
The Chairman. Well, this is certainly not intended to be
exclusive. These are just people who have been there.
Senator Lausche. We can decide the whole thing tomorrow.
The Chairman. Of course, these other hearings, there are
several other names that are under consideration that have not
been invited yet.
Senator Lausche. Who are they?
The Chairman. Mr. Alf Landon is one of them who I think
might be----
Senator Hickenlooper. When did Alf come back from South
Vietnam?
A BROADER SERIES OF HEARINGS THAN VIETNAM
The Chairman. This is not on South Vietnam alone. These
hearings, as I have tried to make very plain in the paper, are
not just hearings on South Vietnam. They are on the overall
general position of the United States in the present world.
Now, some of them will be asked questions about Vietnam.
But yesterday, much to my surprise, nobody asked the Secretary
of State any questions on Vietnam, and it might be the same
with other witnesses, but it is much broader, a much broader
series of hearings than just Vietnam.
But, as I say, I cannot guarantee that people won't ask
about Vietnam. If they want to they can ask anything they like.
Senator Lausche. I think it was a good thing nobody opened
the thing up.
The Chairman. It was all right with me. But when you say
Vietnam, the subject matter with Kennan is not Vietnam. Now,
you may ask him about Vietnam. The subject matter is the
relations of this country with the Communist world. He has long
experience in this area, and if you want to ask him about
Vietnam, all right. But you do not have to.
My main interest with Kennan is what is his attitude about
how our relations with Russia, in particular, and the Communist
world in general as they are developing, and what is our
policy. Is it promoting it or not.
OTHER WITNESSES
Senator Lausche. You mentioned Alf Landon. Who else?
The Chairman. He is one who Senator Carlson----
Senator Carlson. I want to say this for Alf Landon. We had
a lecture series started under his name at Kansas University.
We are going to have some outstanding people following him in
the last two or three months. Alf made an excellent statement,
and some day I want to put it in the record.
The Chairman. I read it, and I want to endorse what you are
saying. I thought it was a remarkably intelligent piece.
Senator Carlson. I have asked Governor Landon about coming
back here, and he called me just before I came back to
Washington that he has had a bad back problem. I hope the
Chairman won't invite him until later.
The Chairman. Of course it would have to be at his
convenience.
Senator Case. I would like to ask for one more. I would
like to hear McGeorge Bundy.
Senator Pell. How about General Curtis Le May, to get
another view, and an extreme view. I think it might be
interesting.
Senator Hickenlooper. He is no more extreme on his side
than some of these people.
Senator Pell. That is what I am saying.
Senator Hickenlooper. We are asking a bunch of extremists
to come in here.
The Chairman. I sent a letter the other day asking the
ranking minority member for suggestions of who he wanted for
witnesses.
Senator Lausche. Who else?
FORMER CIA AGENT
The Chairman. There is another who came to see me. This is
in the Executive record--I would just throw it out for your
consideration. An unusual fellow as far as I am concerned, and
I never heard of him before, but he was born in Korea. He came
here in 1930. He is a naturalized American, and he spent 20
years as a CIA agent largely in research, but he is in the CIA,
or he was in the CIA, from 1946 to 1965. I have never before
run into a man with this kind of particular experience, and he
is a Korean by birth, but an American by naturalization.
I was going to raise him just because I thought you would
find him interesting; I did, because I never had seen a fellow
with this kind of experience.
Senator McCarthy. Can former CIA members talk to this
committee?
The Chairman. I asked about this. He asked to see me; I
never heard of the fellow. He wrote me a letter a month ago and
asked to come and talk to me. His name is Chowe.
Senator Lausche. What is his name?
The Chairman. Chowe. Anyway, there are a number of people
of this kind. I think the fellow was very interesting. He can
give you a different slant on many different things. He does
not undertake to say you are right or wrong in Vietnam. I did
not ask him about that. I asked him about a lot of other
things. He volunteered them. As a matter of fact, he came and
volunteered the story about a great deal of information I had
never heard about in the CIA.
Senator Lausche. Hold these over until tomorrow.
The Chairman. These are not final decisions. I am asking
for guidance. What I really wanted to know is, because the
staff has to get in contact, whether the committee generally is
interested in Salisbury because, if not, I do not want to
invite him to the committee. If we have him at all I will have
him to tea or lunch or something of that kind. That is all in
the world I want to know. If you want him in open session and
the committee feels that way, that is also possible.
Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, I move that we have these
witnesses that the chairman has mentioned, and that the
chairman and Senator Hickenlooper do as they did last year,
serve as a screening committee for any additional witnesses
that anyone may suggest, and that you two decide on the type of
people to have and set the time.
The Chairman. It is not exclusive. If you want someone
else, all you need to do is suggest him, Frank.
Senator Lausche. I challenge the right to act on this at
this time. We do not have a quorum.
The Chairman. I do not know if that takes action, but that
is all right. I was simply seeking the sentiment of the
committee on these people.
[Whereupon, the committee adjourned.]
MINUTES
----------
TUESDAY, JANUARY 24, 1967
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Latin American Affairs
of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met in executive session at 4:04 p.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Senators Morse (subcommittee chairman), Fulbright,
Sparkman, Mansfield, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Cooper.
The meeting was held to discuss proposed amendments to the
OAS charter and the current treaty negotiations with Panama,
and also to discuss the prospects for the OAS summit meeting.
Lincoln Gordon, Assistant Secretary for American Republics
Affairs, accompanied by John N. Irwin, Special Ambassador for
negotiation of Panama Canal Treaty; Sol Linowitz, Ambassador to
the OAS; and Robert F. Woodward, Assistant to Ambassador Irwin,
appeared before the group.
For a record of the proceeding, see the official
transcript.
[The subcommittee adjourned at 5:55 p.m.]
MINUTES
----------
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 25, 1967
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met in executive session at 12:30 p.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Morse, Gore,
Lausche, Church, Symington, Dodd, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken,
Carlson, Williams, Mundt, Case, and Cooper.
The committee discussed whether to hold further hearings on
Ex. D. 88/2, the Consular Convention with the Soviet Union. It
was agreed that Mr. J. Edgar Hoover would be asked to come
before the committee and also that time would be set aside to
hear public witnesses.
William S. Gaud, Administrator of AID, accompanied by
Daniel Steiner, William C. Gibbons, and Charles D. Paolitto,
testified on the subject: ``Presidential determination to
increase the number of countries receiving development and
technical assistance.''
For a record of the proceedings, see the official
transcript.
[The committee adjourned at 1:30 p.m.]
MINUTES
----------
THURSDAY, JANUARY 26, 1967
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Disarmament
of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met in executive session at 10:30 a.m. in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Senators Gore (chairman of the subcommittee),
Clark, Pell, and Aiken.
The subcommittee discussed the content of hearings to be
held and possible witnesses.
For a record of the proceedings, see the official
transcript.
[The subcommittee adjourned at 10:55 p.m.]
THE SITUATION IN INDONESIA
----------
Monday, January 30, 1967
[Editor's Note.--On September 30, 1965, junior level
military officers staged a coup against the Indonesian high
command, killing five generals and wounding the chief of staff,
Gen. Abul Haris Nasution. Other military forces under Gen.
Suharto suppressed the coup, blamed the uprising on the
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), and set about eliminating it
in a bloody counter-coup. President Achmed Sukarno, who had
ruled Indonesia since 1945, remained in office following these
events, but in January 1967, the Armed Forces Information
Center published an article accusing Sukarno of complicity with
the Communist plotters. The Provisional People's Consultative
Congress investigated the charges and on March 12, 1967 removed
Sukarno's executive and ceremonial powers, making Gen. Suharto
the acting president.]
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Far Eastern Affairs
of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:05 p.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Frank Lausche (chairman of the
subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Lausche, Fulbright, Sparkman, Mansfield,
Gore, Pell, McCarthy, Aiken, Carlson, Mundt, and Case.
Also Present: Senator McGee.
Carl Marcy and Norvill Jones of the committee staff.
Senator Lausche. I think we might as well get started.
Mr. Green, this is a meeting of the members of the
Subcommittee on Far Eastern Affairs, and such other senators
who will appear.
We want to hear from you your observations on what the
conditions are in Indonesia. If you will proceed with the
presentation of your views, and later open yourself to
questions, we will appreciate it.
STATEMENT OF HONORABLE MARSHALL GREEN, UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR
TO INDONESIA; ACCOMPANIED BY H.G. TORBERT, DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS
Ambassador Green. Thank you very much, Senator. I
understand I am speaking in closed session or executive
session.
Senator Carlson. Yes.
Ambassador Green. Because I want to speak with candor.
Well, I think as Senator McGee will testify--he has just
been out there--there has been a tremendous change around in
the past year. I was confirmed in the next room here in June,
1965. I went out there the next month and at that time the
whole country was slipping towards the Red camp. Some people
thought it already had joined the Red camp.
Senator Lausche. When was that?
Ambassador Green. That was July 21st that I arrived in
Jakarta.
This was a time when they were stoning our consulates and
Embassy and we were harassed at every turn. The communist power
was growing. Sukarno on August 17, 1965, spoke about the
Jakarta-Peking-Pyongyang-Hanoi axis. That is how far this thing
had gone.
GREAT CHANGE IN ONE YEAR
Well, the whole situation, of course, as you know, has
changed in the course of this past year due to events which I
will come back to, and today the Communist Party in Indonesia
has been banned. The relations with Peking are almost at a
breaking point. In other words, they share our assessment of
Peking's menace to that part of the world. They have ended the
confrontation. They have rejoined the United Nations. They have
rejoined all of these specialized agencies of the United
Nations. They are participating actively in the new regional
community in Southeast Asia and they are looking for good
relations with all the countries that can help them.
Now, that means Eastern European countries as well as, of
course, the Western countries and Japan. This has not been very
easy in terms of their relations with the Soviet Union because
they have banned the Communist Party. But the Soviets have
helped them in the past, particularly in military assistance,
and they hope to receive that assistance.
So this has been the great change that has taken place in
one year.
I suppose that there is no place in the world in modern
times where there has been such an abrupt shift around as there
has been in Indonesia in the last year and a half. Certainly I
say that on the basis of 23 years of working in the Far East.
Now, the big event that changed all this, as you know, was
the abortive coup that was launched by the Communists and some
of their friends on September 30, 1965.
COMMUNIST ALLIES
Senator Lausche. When you say by some of the Communists,
whom do you mean?
Ambassador Green. By the Communist Party, and I said some
of their friends who were working on the outside.
Senator Lausche. Who were they?
Ambassador Green. Well, for example, Subandrio, who is not
a declared member of the Communist Party but, according to the
trials that have taken place now, he was involved in this plot.
Senator Lausche. Were there any other outside nations
involved?
Ambassador Green. No. Well, Communist China may well have
been involved. We have not proved it, But there is
circumstantial evidence that points to involvement.
ABORTIVE COUP
Now, what happened in this abortive coup was that the PKI,
which is the Communist Party, moved swiftly in an effort to
kill the top seven generals. They succeeded in killing five of
them two of them escaped, General Nasution and General Suharto.
That was a mighty lucky thing because these two surviving
generals moved fast and brought in the Siliwangi Division which
is the local division up there in Bandung, and they suppressed
the coup in the Jakarta area within a matter of days.
They then faced a tremendous task of how to move against
the Communists who were all over the country. It was an
enormously powerful party, as you know, the largest in the
world outside of the Communist bloc or the Sino-Soviet
countries, with the possible exception of Italy.
They face an enormous task, but they have proven themselves
capable of meeting that challenge.
Now, in the course of the next month, month and a half,
there now appears to have been a very bloody aftermath to this
abortive coup. The pictures of the killed generals and how they
were killed; the accounts of how they were tortured by the
Women's Communist Organization; how their bodies had been
heaved into the crocodile hole, which is up near the air base.
These bodies then being exhumed. They were photographed and the
photographs were sent all around the country and this touched
off a very sharp wave of reaction in the local communities.
BLOODY AFTERMATH OF THE COUP
As a result of this, the Moslems and others moved against
the local Communist organization, the farm levels and villages,
not so much in the cities and towns. This all happened in the
countryside and I estimated when I came back here in February
that 300,000 people had been killed in this bloody aftermath,
which had been many times the number that have been killed in
South Vietnam since the war started. Since that time, I think
we would up that estimate to perhaps close to 500,000 people
that have been killed in this aftermath. Of course, nobody
knows. We merely judge it by whole villages that have been
depopulated.
The Island of Bali, for example, which is a small island,
4,000 square miles, there were about perhaps 100,000 people
that were killed there alone. There was something of a holy war
reaction. In the case of Bali, it is not Moslem. It is Hindu.
But they had a religious way of life. The Communists tried to
secularize it and this was the reaction of the people once they
realized the Communists were on the run and the army was on
their side.
In the case of East Java, it was the reaction of the
Moslems more than any other religious group that resulted in
this decimation. So the military had definitely gained the
upper hand. It squashed the Communist coup effort and by
November and December they were really in a position to take
over the reins of government.
THE PROBLEM OF SUKARNO
However, they had counted on President Sukarno moving over
either on to their side or keeping quiet, moving into the
background. But Sukarno at that time more or less thumbed his
nose in their face and has been doing it ever since. So they
were then faced with the problem, are we going to move against
Sukarno and all the people that support Sukarno--you know, he
has been called the George Washington of Indonesia--or are we
going to move against him with all the consequences that might
be entailed in a civil war?
They decided they would not do so. They still hoped that
the President could be brought around. Well, he wasn't. And the
minute that Sukarno realized that Nasution and Suharto were not
going to move against him, he was then emboldened to come back
and begin to get back some more of his friends into the top
places of government. As a matter of fact, in February of 1966,
he dismissed Gene Suharto and he named one of the worst
cabinets in Indonesia. Of course, there are no Communists, but
it is nevertheless one of the worst cabinets that has ever been
named in Indonesia. This started off, touched off, the large
scale student demonstrations. Where there have been hundreds
and thousands before, you know, there were tens thousands that
were out on the street and that atmosphere.
SUHARTO GIVEN SPECIAL POWERS
Then Suharto went to President Sukarno and said: I cannot
be held responsible for the security of this country unless you
give me broad responsibilities for handling all security
matters in this country. He was given those special powers by
Sukarno who had no choice.
Since that time, Suharto has broadly interpreted these
powers to run the country and he has done it just that way. The
only thing he hasn't done is that he has not moved abruptly
against President Sukarno. He has pressured him. He has reduced
his powers. He has chipped away his power base and he has done
it very successfully, but he hasn't totally eliminated it.
Well, we are faced today with I would say two principal
problems, one on the political side and one on the economic
side.
POWER STRUGGLE CONTINUES
On the political side is this power struggle that
continues, or you could rephrase it, the problem of what to do
with President Sukarno. His power is going down and down and I
just saw a news ticker that indicates that the palace is
surrounded with students at this moment. What they are going to
do, I don't know. They apparently have switched the guards.
This may be for the President's own protection rather than they
are going to take any sudden movement against him. I do not
think that General Suharto will move abruptly against the
President, to arrest him or to exile him or to shoot him or
anything like that. I think he will continue to pursue what he
calls the constitutional course of action to get the MPRS,
which is their super Parliament, to pass some kind of law
against the President or to take some action against the
President by impeachment, but he is not going to act outside
the constitutional framework.
The reason I think partly is because he wants to avoid
civil strife. He doesn't want to start a tradition of coups and
counter-coups. He wants to establish as far as possible the
constitutional base and preserve that tradition in his country.
SUKARNO IS A COMMON TARGET
But also I think that Suharto has been very wily. He
realizes that as long as the President is around, that he
becomes the target of the students, of their army, of the
intelligentsia, of the commercial groups. He is the common
target and this keeps the new order, as we might call the group
around General Suharto--it keeps them together with a common
focus. He can also make a scapegoat of the President. As long
as he is around, everybody is critical of Sukarno for being
responsible for the economic chaos of the country and this, of
course, has happened. So he has his reasons for handling the
job the way he does.
In any event, the retention of Sukarno, although it does
involve a number of problems, has not prevented the new
government from moving ahead and doing the things that are
required in the circumstances. He has been a drag. He has
pulled the clock back sometimes, but the clock nevertheless has
moved forward and a lot of things have been changed in
Indonesia, almost all of them for the better.
QUESTION OF STABILIZATION
This raises the second major problem that is facing
Indonesia today, and that is the question of stabilization. The
economic chaos left by 10 or 15 years of Sukarno's jingoism was
one of the worst that I know of in modern history. They were
left with a debt of $2.7 billion, about half of that owed to
the Soviet Union, about $200 million or so owed to the United
States.
Of course, there are a lot of other creditor countries as
well. The infrastructure of the country had deteriorated during
this time. The roads, railroads, airlines are in miserable
shape. Only about 30 percent of the shipping tonnage is
operable today. Meanwhile, the cost of living has shot way up
under runaway inflation.
Between mid-1965 and mid-1966 the cost of living went up 20
times, 2,000 percent.
Senator Lausche. Since when?
Ambassador Green. In that one year's time, between the
middle of 1965 and the middle of 1966, the cost of living went
up 20 times. The money inflated in that same period by 7\1/2\
times. The exports which had been $800 million a year back in
1965 had all slumped down to about $500 million a year in 1965,
over that 10-year span. Everything was running downhill. It was
one of the few countries in the Far East, that and Burma, I
guess, where there has been a deterioration in the per capita
or GNP over the last 10 years.
So this is the situation that General Suharto inherited.
Now, he had the wisdom to turn to a group of first-rate
economists who worked in the University of Indonesia. All of
them I would say had been trained in the United States, three
of them at the University of California, one at Harvard--he
overcame that handicap. I went to Yale. And one from MIT.
Now, these men are all first-rate economists. They gave him
sound advice on how to approach the problem. One of the things
they urged was that Indonesia should rejoin the International
Monetary Fund and IBRD. They should get a team of IMF men out
there to help out with their problems. This would be a sure way
to restoring some confidence in Indonesia in the international
banking and governmental circles.
So Suharto turned to these people. They drew up a
stabilization plan and I say that plan has been a first-rate
plan in every sense of the word.
STABILIZATION MEANS HARDSHIP
Now, this is not easy to accomplish because stabilization
means hardship. It means stringencies and it always is
accompanied by a certain political risk, particularly with
Sukarno around, where he might be able to take advantage of the
objections and feelings of the people and their political
leaders. But that has not happened. The stabilization plan that
calls for a balanced budget in calendar 1967 has passed the
Parliament without any objections. They have instituted the
plan now and, as a result of it, prices of foodstuffs have been
level for the last 3\1/2\ months, even though----
Senator Lausche. I think we had better go upstairs.
Senator Sparkman. This is a roll call. We will be back in
just a few minutes.
[A short recess was taken.]
WILL SUKARNO BE TRIED?
Senator Sparkman. Is there any likelihood that Sukarno will
be tried?
Ambassador Green. He will be tried in a certain sense. He
may be tried in a certain sense by the MPRS which is sort of
the super parliament, constituent assembly, in March. Whether,
as I say, it will be impeachment proceedings or censure,
whether it will be calling for the resignation of the
President, whether it will be a call for his exile or not, no
one knows. Nobody knows what action will be taken.
A SOUND PLAN FOR STABILIZATION
Senator Lausche. You were discussing the economic
situation, I think when we left.
Amssador Green. Yes, I am not sure exactly at what point I
broke off, but I was describing the fact that General Suharto
had turned to a group of good economists as well as to the
International Monetary Fund for advice. They came up with a
sound plan for stabilization. They moved ahead with their plan,
as a result of which the cost of food has stabilized. The cost
of textiles has actually gone down. Some other costs have gone
up. But that was anticipated because they were withdrawing
subsidies--electricity, transportation--and, of course, that
was passed on to the consumer. That was all part of the
stabilization plan.
Anyway, we think they are doing very well on this plan,
moving ahead in a determined way, and obviously this relates
very directly to whether or not other countries are going to be
able to assist Indonesia, because people do not want to put
money into any economy where it just goes down the rat hole of
inflation.
INDONESIANS NEED DEBT RELIEF
Now, assuming that the Indonesians continue to manage their
economy well and there is the right managerial follow-through,
which is always uncertain, they are still going to be dependent
upon whether or not they can get adequate debt relief because,
as I said, they built up this huge debt of $2.7 billion. If you
service that debt in one year, that would be almost as much as
their total foreign exchange earnings for that year. Therefore,
they obviously have got to reschedule the whole debt.
They have had meetings now, in Tokyo, in Paris, another one
in Amsterdam. There seems to be general agreement among the
Western creditors' group--that includes the United States,
Japan, Holland, Germany, France, Italy, a number of other
countries--that Indonesia should be given rather sweeping,
almost standstill debt relief this coming year.
Senator Aiken. Private creditors, too?
Ambassador Green. The private credit has not yet been
resolved, but presumably it will be along the same lines. Then
at the end of this year, calendar 1967, there will be another
meeting to see whether or not it has to be extended. It
probably will. Meanwhile they will resolve the future long-
range debt by rescheduling over a longer period of time.
Now, no one knows what the East European group will do, but
it looks as though they will be giving them liberal debt relief
as well. Therefore, if all goes according to Hoyle, as it seems
to be going, that problem will be satisfactorily resolved.
In addition to that, even if they get virtually total debt
relief this year, this calendar year, they are going to need
something between $170 million and $300 million--let us say
$225 million of new net foreign aid in order to balance their
budget. And our approach to this problem is that we want to be
sure, first of all, that there is a liberal debt relief and,
secondly, with regard to net aid, that other countries do their
fair share.
Now, what fair share is I don't know. But we will be
talking in Amsterdam at the end of February about the general
principles of future assistance. We will not probably go into a
pledging session with them, but we will talk about the general
principles that will guide us.
So those are the two main problems--the political and the
economic problems.
THE COMMUNIST MENACE IN ASIA
I think sometimes that our focus is so much on the
immediate problem, let us say on the Communist menace in some
countries, or in the case of Asia, how you deal with Sukarno,
that if you were to remove that immediate problem you would
have beyond it another range of mountains. It would be a big
and vast one and, in the case of Indonesia, once this problem
of Sukarno is out of the way and stabilization programs move
ahead satisfactorily, there will still be a lot of problems.
The whole question of how you bring a traditional society
into the modern age is involved here, problems of corruption
and nepotism, what we call baptism, which is the adulation of a
man like Sukarno, a charismatic personality.
The problem of how to reach agreement--mushiwara--people
talking back and forth and reaching a consensus, which is fine
in the village council, but in the modern state is a rather
painstaking, lengthy process. All those problems.
THE CIVILIAN-MILITARY MIX
How is the new government going to establish a political
base when two or three of the major parties now outlawed--how
are they going to get back on the political scene? Will they
become a part of the political base of this new government
under General Suharto? The problems of how--what kind of a mix
between civilians and military should you have in the
government? These are all parts of this overall problem of
moving from the traditional into a modern state.
Now, if I could just touch on one of those problems, the
problem of the civilian-military mix, this is a military
government in many ways. General Suharto is the First Minister
and he is obviously calling the signals. But he is drawing on
the advice, as I just pointed out, now in the economic field of
these economic specialists at the University of Indonesia and
on outside consultants.
General Suharto also turns to Adam Malik who is the Foreign
Minister and head of the political section of the government.
Adam Malik is in my opinion one of the outstanding leaders in
East Asia today. There are other good civilian leaders, too.
So what we have today is the best carburetorization between
the civilian and military, just about the right mix, because
the military are just enough involved in the government--it is
not a junta government--just enough involved so that they take
a responsible attitude towards the total operations of the
government. Yet they are not so far in the government that they
have taken it over and monopolized it themselves and have
excluded good civilians which, of course, would lose for them
the support of the students, the intellectuals, and some of the
commercial types.
Now, there are nevertheless problems, of course, for a
government made up of civilians and military this way when you
run into difficulties in the economic front, or when some of
the politicians talk out of turn that oppose you. There is a
natural temptation for military leaders to try to suppress the
civilian segments. I don't think that General Suharto will do
that. I think he recognizes the importance of maintaining this
kind of mix that I just referred to now. So far these three
leading men--we call them the Triumvirate--made up of General
Suharto, General Nasution and Adam Malik, and the Sultan of
Djogjakarta, make a good team indeed and General Suharto has
the wide respect as a leader. Malik commands widespread
admiration for his tactical brilliance and for how to get
things done as well as for his general views and philosophy. I
think the Sultan of Djogjakarta is widely liked if not beloved
because he comes from central Java where indeed most of the
resistance to the modernization takes place and where President
Sukarno has most of his strength.
Senator Aiken. He speaks for industry.
Ambassador Green. He does, indeed, and he is a very nice
gentleman and I think anyone here would agree. Together they
make up a very good team, I think.
QUALITIES OF THE NEW LEADERS
As far as our overall--I must just say one more thing about
this team. One of the qualities that seems to me that they all
have in common is that they are working for the country and not
for themselves. In general, President Sukarno, if he is ever
held up in the judgment of history, it will seem to me his
greatest failing was that he was out for his own glory, a
policy of self-glorification, and the people were the victims
of this policy. These people are approaching their tasks not
for their own personal gain, but for the gain of the country.
Another thing about them is determination. Because there
had been so many people killed in this last year or two in
Indonesia, and because in a way there is a terrible retribution
if the Communists or their friends ever get back again, they
are more determined that they have to succeed. Human survival
is at stake here.
Another quality it seems to me is moderation, pragmatism. I
have seen the same thing throughout East Asia in the last few
years. It has been the movement from the ideological attachment
of the first generation of revolutionary leaders to the
modernists who are basically pragmatists and are concerned with
the problems of modernization and development as opposed to the
problems of a country winning its independence. This country
has gained its independence now.
These are qualities of leadership and to me they are very
important ones. They are men we can talk with and deal with
reasonably.
U.S. POLICIES TOWARD INDONESIA
Now, as far as our own policies towards Indonesia are
concerned, basically we believe exactly what the Indonesian
leadership believes in. We believe in the unity of Indonesia. I
started right out with that because there has been some
question in the past. We believe in the unity. We believe in
the progress and stability, political-economic stability, of
Indonesia. These are basic policies. Those, of course, are the
policies of the new government, too, and when we say why do
Indonesians and Americans get along, it seems to me one of the
basic reasons we get along with the new government is we are
basically attached to the same objectives and principles.
I think if I may say so, as a matter of personal judgment,
very privately, of course, I think they appreciate what we are
doing in Vietnam. Certainly they are deadly opposed to the
Communists and they are opposed to Peking's policies. As far as
the policies for carrying out these broad objectives are
concerned, obviously they need assistance badly as I have just
said.
It falls principally in the economic sector. And also I
think certain civic actions support, not with lethal weapons,
but for certain spare parts and other things to help them get
with the civic action program. These are going to be involved.
Now, we have a great opportunity in Indonesia because we
started with the tabula rasa--all the aid was practically wound
up--of trying to approach our problems on as broad a
multilateral basis as possible. This may not be possible the
first year or the second year, but because we are already
talking with these other creditor group countries in Tokyo,
Paris, now Amsterdam, and since you have to approach the whole
problem of the debt rescheduling and further assistance, really
it is one single problem. We are getting more and more
agreement on the principles involved in assistance to Indonesia
and we want Indonesia to come up with the help of the
International Monetary Fund, again part, you might say, of a
multilateral approach, with what are indeed their most urgent
needs, have these things carefully reviewed by the INF, and
then these things put up to the other countries so they can
decide in what ways they can assist Indonesia in the most
meaningful way possible.
I am very hopeful that this approach will work. If we do, I
think we can avoid lots of the troubles and pitfalls of the
past.
A SENSE OF MISSION
I mentioned specific action just now. It seems to me that
there is particular relevance to the needs for civil action
programs in Indonesia because the military have all this
knowhow. They have all this equipment, and, of course, they
have the authority as well.
Meanwhile they have ended confrontation. They had to
mothball almost all this fleet they have got from the Soviet
Union and a result of all that is that a lot of officers are
without jobs. It is important that they have a sense of mission
and that the mission relates the needs of the people, and they
have turned to us and asked us for help in that regard. I have
discussed this thing in Washington. I think there is increasing
recognition of the importance of helping them out on a low-
cost, high-impact program, especially in central and Eastern
Java where most of the people live.
I might say that 70 percent of the Indonesian people live
on the island of Java which you can see is but a small slice of
the geography of the vast sprawling country, larger than the
rest of Southeast Asia put together. And I think that we will
have other advantages as well, tactical advantages, in our
personal relationships with the military and of helping
preserve the same kinds of approach and attitude.
Well, if I could just wind up because I know you have lots
of questions, Senator. I just wanted to end up by saying, as I
said to you in the beginning before some of your colleagues
arrived, it has been a tremendous year and a half of transition
and the transition in my opinion has been almost uniformly for
the good: the confrontation over; the rejoining of the United
Nations; the launching of what so far has been an effective
stabilization program; the banning of communism from Indo-China
and, of course, it has problems, as I said, with their
relations with the Soviet Union and for the overall; the new
leadership and qualities of the new leaders; for those things I
think we have much to be thankful. I think we have a good group
we can work with. I don't think there is any group we can
expect on the present scene or in the predictable future that
will be as good as this one. I hope we will be able to give
them the requisite help, along with other countries, doing it
as much as possible with this multilateral approach that I know
you have discussed in this committee.
AMBASSADOR'S ARRIVAL IN INDONESIA
Senator Lausche. Thank you. I just want to put a few
questions to inform those members who were not present when you
began to testify about what you said.
What is the significance of July 21st that you mentioned?
Ambassador Green. That is simply the date I arrived in
Indonesia, having been confirmed in the next room.
Senator Case. What could be more pertinent?
Senator Lausche. Now, then, you stated there was a
tremendous and miraculous change between what you saw when you
came and what the condition is now.
Ambassador Green. For which I bear no responsibility.
CHINESE-INDONESIAN AXIS
Senator Lausche. Now, then, you spoke about an axis. The
Peking-Hanoi----
Ambassador Green. Pyongyang-Jakarta axis.
Senator Lausche. And that was in the making.
Ambassador Green. Sukarno announced this on August 17,
1965. He said that we had this axis. I am not sure it was ever
worked out in any formal way, but he was boasting that there
was such an axis.
Senator Lausche. Peking-Hanoi,----
Ambassador Green. The axis actually had five countries
involved. Indonesia, China, Red China, North Vietnam, North
Korea, and Cambodia. But I might say he never consulted
Cambodia and Monsignor was quite angry when he heard about it.
Senator Lausche. That was the axis that was being
discussed.
Ambassador Green. He announced it when Chen Yi was there as
his distinguished advisor.
INDONESIAN COUP
Senator Lausche. When did the coup occur?
Ambassador Green. September 30, in the wee hours of the
morning. Actually, October 1st.
Senator Lausche. And the object of the coup was to
eliminate the seven military leaders.
Ambassador Green. That is right.
Senator Lausche. They eliminated five, but two survived?
Ambassador Green. Correct.
Senator Lausche. And the survival of the two produced this
encouraging situation that now prevails.
Ambassador Green. If two generals had not survived,
Nasution and Suharto, it is possible that no one would have
moved rapidly and quashed the coup.
Senator Lausche. Now, then, after that they took pictures
of the hideous brutalities that were committed upon these five.
Ambassador Green. Yes, sir.
Senator Lausche. And the nation became informed about it
and with that there was seething indignation and a purpose to
eliminate the Communists. You estimate 300,000 were killed. The
present calculation is that there were 500,000.
Ambassador Green. Some people think there were 500,000.
Some think there were more. Some think less. But I would up my
estimate from 300,000.
Senator Lausche. Now, there was economic chaos produced by
Sukarno leaving a debt of $2,700 million.
Ambassador Green. Right.
Senator Lausche. The nations who are creditors have
extended the time of the payment of debts, but in addition to
that, there is need of $225 million of new foreign aid.
Ambassador Green. That is right.
Senator Lausche. And it is a purpose that that foreign aid
may be provided by us and other nations of the world.
Now, all right. Mike?
Senator Mansfield. I have no questions.
U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO INDONESIA
Senator Sparkman. Just a question. Is there any military
included in that request? Military assistance?
Ambassador Green. In that figure of $225 million? No, sir.
Senator Sparkman. Does Indonesia look for military
assistance?
Ambassador Green. It does.
Senator Sparkman. Ought we to give it?
Ambassador Green. Now, I must correct my statement. When I
said $225 million, if you are including in that figure
assistance from the Soviet Union as well, which I believe it
would be, the Indonesians would like to get some spare parts
for military equipment that they had already received from the
Soviet bloc. So that would be part of it. But not a major part,
a small part.
Senator Sparkman. Now, let me ask you----
Senator Case. In this $225 million calculation--is that
overall or just for----
Ambassador Green. That is overall. And that $225 million,
as I say, I was hitting between two outside figures of $160
million to $300 million, something in that range. But $225
million would be acceptable.
ROLE OF GEN. NASUTION
Senator Sparkman. We used to hear a good bit about a man
named Nasution.
Ambassador Green. Yes.
Senator Sparkman. What has happened to him?
Ambassador Green. General Nasution, who was one of the two
surviving generals----.
Senator Sparkman. Is he one that you named?
Ambassador Green. That is right.
Senator Sparkman. He and Suharto were the two that
survived.
Ambassador Green. That is right. But Suharto has moved out
into the No. 1 position and General Nasution is the president
of this MPRS, constituent assembly, or super Parliament,
whatever you want to call it.
Senator Lausche. John, may I ask him to redescribe what
they showed to the people of the country that infuriated them
into taking the lives of these 300,000. You spoke about the
bodies and the alligator pits and so on.
Ambassador Green. Yes. What had happened was that these
murdered generals--there were five of them--one or two had been
shot and killed right at the beginning, but three of them at
least were not dead when they picked them up. They took them up
to the Halim Air Base and there these three surviving generals
were tortured to death, slashed slowly to death by Gerwani,
which is the Communist women's organization. When their
lacerated bodies, which meanwhile had been dumped into the
crocodile hole which is the name of sort of a pit down there,
when they had been exhumed three or four days later, the army
saw to it that pictures of this grisly scene were widely
publicized all around the country. Meanwhile, in the
countryside where the village folk had been living under the
increasing pressures of the Communists, the atmosphere was
already one of dry tinder and this was the spark that lit the
whole thing and sent it into such violent conflagration.
Senator Sparkman. Some of General Nasution's children were
killed.
Ambassador Green. His daughter was killed, and this is very
material, Senator, because this produced something of an
emotional reaction. This little girl was an innocent victim,
shot to death.
Senator Lausche. Frank?
FOREIGN AID TO INDONESIA
Senator Carlson. Just one or two questions. How much
foreign aid are we giving now, if any?
Ambassador Green. We are.
Senator Carlson. Grants in aid and loans?
Ambassador Green. We are giving the Indonesians about $48
million or $49 million in P.L. 480, Title V assistance. These
are dollar sales.
This represents mostly cotton, 225,000 bales plus 100,000
tons of rice. This already has been agreed to. All of it hasn't
arrived yet, but most of it is there by now.
In addition to that, there is $10 million in a spare parts
loan again, to be repaid in 20 years, I believe.
In addition to that, maybe there is a million dollars or so
in grant assistance for educational purposes as well as for a
food-for-work program which is really grant in aid, although it
is provided in the form of cracked corn and vegetable oil.
REASONS FOR SOVIET AID
Senator Carlson. In view of the fact that so many of the
Communists were killed during the blood bath, how can we expect
the Soviet Union to give aid or continue to give aid?
Ambassador Green. Because they have put such a tremendous
investment in Asia I suppose they want it covered. It is a
terribly important country, the fifth largest in the world.
Some people say the third richest in the world. And the Soviets
have, as I pointed out, invested $1.4 billion in aid. They want
to cover that.
Also I think they are hopeful that in the long run there
will be a recovery of the Communist Party. Meanwhile they damn
the Chinese for having driven the Communist Party in this
direction and they sort of damn us in a very faint way for
being imperialists, and maybe we are getting in too close with
the new government. They keep making rumbles on this from
Moscow, but I think if I were in the Soviet position, I would
be acting very much the way they do.
Now, they are obviously deeply perplexed. It is not easy
for them to give assistance to Indonesia when Indonesia is
banning the Communist Party.
FOREIGN INVESTMENT WELCOME
One thing I would like to mention, Mr. Chairman, is that
one of the things the new government is welcoming is foreign
investment. This is another 180 degree change in policy. The
first conversation I had with General Suharto on May 27, 1966,
he raised the question of how they were going to develop the
outer islands. I said I felt private investment, foreign
investment, was the soundest way. There wasn't that kind of
money. The government didnt have that kind of money. Well, not
as a result of that, but I merely mention it, this was the
first time the subject was discussed with the General. Now they
have changed their foreign investment policy to attract foreign
capital investment, as a result of which the Hotel Indonesia is
jam packed with potential foreign investors out there looking
into the possibilities.
Meanwhile, the law has been changed to favor foreign
investment and protect foreign investors, and they have
discovered, they think, oil in the Java Sea, no point deeper
than 180 feet, and if this oil finding turns out to be what
they think it is, maybe a second Gulf of Mexico.
Senator Lausche. Mike.
Senator Mansfield. Nothing.
Senator Lausche. Karl?
RELATIONS BETWEEN SUHARTO AND NASUTION
Senator Mundt. Curiously enough, of all places, we have a
lot of South Dakota businessmen out in Indonesia. How they ever
found it I don't know, but I have been in close touch with them
and they are pretty high on this Nasution. They seem to feel
that if elections were held, he might wind up as the President,
as the best counter against the Communists rather than Suharto,
a fine fellow and honest, but who doesn't seem to have the
outgoing personality that appeals to the masses.
Would you comment on that?
Ambassador Green. General Nasution has a bit of this
charisma quality maybe, and certainly Mrs. Nasution does, too.
They are both highly popular. But I think there is no question
that General Suharto is very much the man the people are
looking to these days for leadership, that General Nasution has
been in charge of the army many years and he is senior in the
army ranks. The relation between Suharto and Nasution is good.
Nasution comes from Sumatro for one thing, and Suharto comes
from Java. Since 70 percent of the people come from Java, this
is an important factor.
I would hope very much that Nasution and Suharto could
continue their harmonious relationship. It is productive,
helpful. One thing Nasution has lost a bit of standing with
students for is because in November-December, 1965, when he was
in charge, he stood back from facing down Sukarno. Then Sukarno
dismissed him in the cabinet shift of February 23, 1966, and
that was quite a blow to his prestige. He recovered a good deal
of that prestige. He is more outspoken in his opposition to
Sukarno than is Suharto.
COULD SUKARNO RETURN TO POWER
Senator Mundt. Can you envision any contingency whereby
Sukarno might get back into power?
Ambassador Green. Oh, I could. It is conceivable that he
could come back if their whole stabilization program should go
on the rocks and they couldn't make a go of things, and if the
new order, as they call the group around General Suharto, was
not able to maintain the unity, which is terribly important. If
things began to slip up, then Sukarno might look pretty good in
retrospect. So that there is a possibility of coming back.
I think the chances are definitely against him, but I don't
think we should rule it out.
Senator Lausche. Will you tell Senator Mundt what you
stated a moment ago about there being a bit of craftiness in
the operation of Suharto in allowing Sukarno to still remain in
the picture.
Ambassador Green. Yes. His reason for keeping Sukarno on is
partly this. He doesn't want to risk civil war, although I
don't think that that would be the result of moving sharply
against Sukarno today. Nevertheless, that has been one reason,
partly because Sukarno was the old commander-in-chief, the
George Washington of Indonesia, as they always say.
But I think it is also because he wanted to use Sukarno as
a scapegoat, to have him there so that he could be the focus of
resentment. After all, he is the man who is responsible for
this mess. Leave him on and people are reminded of that fact.
If he goes in exile, by this time people might be criticizing
the new government for some of the problems which really are
described as Sukarno's folly.
Also you maintain better unity in what you call the new
order, which is made up of rather disparate forces like the
military and the students, the business community, if they have
a common target and they are all against Sukarno, most of them.
This helps to make unity.
So I think in his rather clever Javanese way Suharto has
handled this thing quite well. But, you know, you can't go on
playing that game forever. There comes a time when your
administration can suffer, you might say almost from tired--
when you have to spend so much time putting out the fire
Sukarno lights, hand-holding, going to palace functions which
are interminable, and also because students begin to get pretty
angry if you haven't moved against him in a final way.
It is also confusing to the outside world--I have been
around the country just now talking with a lot of people--that
Sukarno is lingering on this way. It does confuse a lot of
people as to what the new Indonesia adds up to.
Senator Mundt. That is all.
Senator Lausche. Al.
STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS
Senator Gore. Well, Mr. Ambassador, you speak of the
students in the sense of organization, of unity. Is this a
rabble or is there some organization in this?
Ambassador Green. The students are extremely well
organized, not throughout the country but in the West Java area
and some of the other main population centers of Indonesia.
They are very well organized. There are two principal
organizations, the Kami--not our kind of Commies--these are the
university students, and the Kappi which are the high school
students.
These two groups are very violently anti-Sukarno and anti-
Communist, and so forth. You will find slogans put out by the
students that are the same throughout the country on the same
day, which shows you how well they are organized.
They are in close touch with General Suharto and the
military. They have been working very closely with him. They
haven't always agreed. Sometimes they are restrictive, but I
would say they had acted in a very responsible way so far. They
haven't been a rabble.
Now, there are other students that aren't members of these
groups, particularly in a place like Surabia, Eastern Java,
that are under the domination of other elements that are
against the Kami. But the Kami and Kappi, these two huge
student organizations, nevertheless represent the increasing
view of the student population of Indonesia and today command
good slice of the student population's support.
A VOLATILE ELEMENT
Senator Gore. The reason I asked the question, we see ``the
students'' in many parts of the world being propagandized and
utilized. It seems to be a very volatile element and might be a
source of danger as well as strength.
Ambassador Green. Suharto recognizes that very point. He
doesn't want to have Parliament in the streets. He recognizes
the students' feelings, on the other hand. This is one of the
reasons why Suharto has wanted to move in a constitutional way.
This is a very important consideration, that he wants to have
enough forward motion against Sukarno and his ilk to chip away
from their power and debase them eventually, but he wants to do
it in a constitutional way, partly so that the students don't
get the idea that this is the way to change governments.
Senator Gore. Of course, we see another example of
students, youth, in the Red Guard in Red China. Now, they can
be put to evil as well as good purposes.
About two or three years ago, Mr. Ambassador, we were told
in executive session that we had continued small amounts of
military aid to the military leaders largely to keep liaison
with them, that several of this group that were liquidated had
received their military education in the United States, and
that this aid at the proper and crucial time might prove to
have been very valuable to us.
Can you shed any light on that now?
PARTICIPANTS TRAINING PROGRAM
Ambassador Green. I think our Participants Training Program
in the past has been very useful. There were about, oh, I
guess, 8,000 or so Indonesian students in the United States,
and this included several thousand of the military. And I do
think this had a very important result. As I look back over our
old aid program, it wasn't so bad after all. In fact, we did a
pretty good job, I think. And there were some scatteration
projects and all that kind of stuff. But one area where we did
the best of all is in the human resources field, training of
people.
Senator Sparkman. One of those----
Ambassador Green. This would be the Participants Training
Program bringing people under either our AID program, or under
the State Department Cultural Program, or under the Military
Assistance Program.
Senator Sparkman. One of those hangover programs was also
one of communications which I believe served a good end with
the Armed Forces.
Ambassador Green. Yes, that is right.
Senator Sparkman. During the revolution.
PHILCO COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM
Senator Lausche. Speak on that because they came before us
specially in this room----
Senator Sparkman. To continue it.
Senator Lausche [continuing]. Urging that we provide them
with money to install a communications system which was
presented to us as being essential to keeping a line in
Indonesia. You know of what I speak?
Ambassador Green. I know exactly what you are referring to.
You are referring--you are talking about the Philco
Troposcatter System. Well, this system--I am not enough of a
specialist to judge this one. This is up to the Indonesians to
judge on their own account.
The trouble with Philco was it was very expensive and it
would take a long, long time to build it. There may be cheaper
and better ways of building a communications network for
Indonesia. I grant that the building of a good communications
network is essential and it is true that the link that was
already established under Philco between Jakarta and Bandung
was a fairly important factor in the quick reaction of these
two surviving generals.
Senator Lausche. That is the point.
Senator Gore. Yes. So overall you say----
Ambassador Green. But I think you have to be careful on
this one because there are other kinds of communications
networks. Some of them may be considerably cheaper and more
within the means of the Indonesians to support.
CONTINUATION OF U.S. AID
Senator Gore. To come back to the overall question of aid,
is it your conclusion that the continuation of U.S. aid
programs even in miniscule amounts had considerable
significance ultimately in the showdown?
Ambassador Green. I think that the aid program which we had
of $800 million of U.S. assistance--maybe in the 10 or 12 year
period up until 1965--I think it was a good aid program by and
large. There were some things that obviously weren't as good,
but by and large it was a good aid program. The Indonesians
knew it and today in retrospect it looks darn good because out
of the $800 million that we gave Indonesia at that time, only
29 percent of it was repayable in dollars. So that we didn't
leave them saddled with a debt the way the Soviet Union did,
for example.
Therefore, that is one factor.
Our training program, as I said before, left a long term
good result. The turnkey plus projects we had for helping to
build a factory with another one of our loans, and then we saw
to it that that factory was managed by our people until they
were prepared to take it over. Then they took it over, and when
they took it over, they were able to operate it as indeed they
are today.
The two big projects that we helped them with in fertilizer
and cement are operating at almost 100 percent capacity and
they are the only two big factories in the country of that size
operating anywhere near 100 percent capacity because of the way
this thing was handled.
MULTILATERAL AID
Senator Case. Mr. Ambassador, I don't know whether I missed
something coming in late or not, but have you laid out a
specific program or is this general background on the role of
foreign aid?
Ambassador Green. What I was talking of was in just general
terms, but we haven't reached a point of setting out
specifically what we will do in this calendar year of this next
fiscal year. We are talking about it still in the Department,
but as you can see from my remarks, I think it is very
important that we lend a helping hand to Indonesia, but we do
it as far as possible in consultation with other countries,
other creditors, and that we do our share, but we see to it
that other countries do theirs as well.
Senator Case. This is an ideal time, isn't it, to get
multilateral operations going because we are doing nothing now.
Ambassador Green. Yes, it is. To the extent that it is
possible to do.
Senator Case. We have to realize----
Ambassador Green. We are already discussing these things
with other creditors and we don't want, for example, a country
to give Indonesia short term credit because that is just going
to compound the problems of the debt rescheduling two or three
years from now. We want to be sure that the terms of assistance
other countries give to Indonesia comports with their overall
debt problem and rescheduling problem and our own assistance,
and we are hopeful that the Soviet bloc will give Indonesia the
kind of debt relief that we are giving. I think they will from
what I have heard.
Senator Mundt. If they don't, are you going to change your
mind about giving relief?
Ambassador Green. Well, I think this is going to raise a
very serious problem obviously, and I think the Indonesians
know that.
INDONESIAN SELF-SUFFICIENCY
Senator Case. How close are they to being self-sufficient
in food?
Ambassador Green. Well----
Senator Case. Is this one of the----
Ambassador Green. The growing population of Java is the
reason why they are in a food deficit position today. The
population increases there over 2\1/2\ percent every year. It
is one of the most overcrowded bits of real estate in the world
today. And they live in the illusion that people can move to
these outlying islands. They don't figure the tremendous cost
of resettlement which makes this prohibitive. Also people that
go to these islands find it forbidding and they tend to come
back.
Senator Case. You mean cold?
Ambassador Green. No. They find that there is no rice--
other kinds of food. They miss their old homestead, rather
typical.
Now, as the population of Java increases, it has moved from
a position of at one time exporting rice to the outlying areas
to a position where it exports nothing except officials and
problems. And obviously there is a major problem in facing up
to family planning, or whatever you want to call it.
The Indonesians are too preoccupied with other questions
right now that they really haven't done much in this field.
Senator Case. This is a good time to get going on that,
too.
Ambassador Green. That is right.
Senator Case. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lausche. Senator Cooper?
COMMUNISTS KILLED DURING COUNTER-COUP
Senator Cooper. You said an estimate of 300,000 to 500,000
were killed. Is it correct that 25 percent of the population in
Indonesia is Communist?
Ambassador Green. You could argue that at one point there
were as many as 25 percent of the Indonesians who in one way or
another supported either the Communist Party or one of its
front groups.
Senator Cooper. The Communist Party at one time did have
support of many peasants, people in the countryside, also the
army.
Ambassador Green. The Communist Party itself had 3 million
at one time. It now appears that some of those members weren't
very strong members, but anyway, it had 3 million membership,
and then outside that 3 million, there were about 22 million or
so who supported these different front activities.
Senator Cooper. Java was one of the chief seats of
Communist strength.
Ambassador Green. Yes, sir.
SUKARNO IS DISCREDITED
Senator Cooper. What you said a while ago, they couldn't
hold up the fact that Sukarno still had some strength, that
plus the large number of Communists remaining--would you say
there is still some danger of a return of Sukarno?
Ambassador Green. I doubt the danger of Sukarno's return is
very great. I would say that the odds were almost overwhelming
against Sukarno getting back on the scene again. He is very
widely discredited and the very fact that things were so bad in
the past--he let things run so badly down hill and they are
suffering so much as a result. It has tended to discredit his
image even further.
He has refused to denounce the Communists and this, of
course, has affected him even more.
Now, these 25 million people who supported the Communists
one way or another, a lot of those were people just sort of
being on the bandwagon for their own safety. They were
anticipating a slide into the Communist camp and they wanted to
protect themselves come the events.
PROBLEMS WITH MALAYSIA
Senator Cooper. Has the problem with Malaysia been settled?
Ambassador Green. I think it has been settled. There are
somethings, loose ends that have to be tied up. They don't have
normal diplomatic relations now with Malaysia, but the
relationships between Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur are I must say
very, very close indeed. They are fellow Moslem countries and
in a way they are two brothers who have discovered the folly of
their having been at each other's throats for so long.
Senator Cooper. You think the present government is making
progress economically and in a fiscal way to give some strength
to Indonesia.
Ambassador Green. Yes.
Senator Cooper. To correct some of the chaos that you
described.
Ambassador Green. Very definitely. And better than I would
have anticipated three or four months ago.
Senator Lausche. Do you have another question?
DEFINING INDONESIAN COMMUNISM
Senator Case. Just one question. You used--you use it all
the time--what do you mean by Communist? I am not being funny.
I really mean when you say this you have a specific thing in
your mind. Are you talking about the influence of China, the
influence of Russia?
Ambassador Green. Well, each time I use it it might be in a
little different context, but when I was talking about PKI, the
efforts to seize power, I was referring to the organization,
the leaders. The leaders in Indonesia, but operating I think
with the aid and comfort and fiscal support in some ways from
Communist China.
Senator Case. Pretty much Chinese? Is Russia in there at
all?
Ambassador Green. No, I do think Russia has been
disillusioned, became increasingly disillusioned with the PKI,
the Communist Party of Indonesia, because it came very
definitely under Peking's influence and Russia therefore moved
from a position of supporting the PKI to a position of
supporting the Indonesian government. This happened in about
1963, 1964, 1965, in that period.
Senator Case. Was Russia involved in the coup?
Ambassador Green. No, in no way.
Senator Case. Thank you.
WAS THE U.S. INVOLVED IN THE COUP?
Senator Fulbright. Were we involved in the coup?
Ambassador Green. No, sir.
Senator Fulbright. Were we involved in the previous attempt
at a coup about four years ago?
Ambassador Green. No. I don't think so.
Senator Fulbright. CIA played no part in it?
Ambassador Green. You mean 1958?
Senator Fulbright. Yes.
Ambassador Green. Well, I think there was definitely some
sympathy for the break-away group.
Senator Fulbright. We had no part in that?
Ambassador Green. I was not involved in the events and I am
afraid I cannot answer.
Senator Fulbright. You don't know about it. You haven't
heard about it?
Ambassador Green. I don't know for sure what happened.
Senator Fulbright. They don't tell you about any of the
past history in these places when you are assigned to a
country?
Ambassador Green. Well, I can glean a number of things,
Senator.
Senator Fulbright. You don't know whether CIA was involved
or not. And we were not involved in this coup.
Ambassador Green. No, sir. Definitely not.
Senator Fulbright. We have been told that this would not
have taken place had we not been doing what we were doing in
Vietnam. Is that correct?
Ambassador Green. Oh, I wouldn't say it is correct to say
it wouldn't have taken place. I think that as I was saying
perhaps before you came in----
Senator Fulbright. I'm sorry I was late. I had another
engagement and I couldn't be in on time.
A FORWARD FLOW OF A RED TIDE
Ambassador Green. I think when these two surviving generals
faced this tremendous Communist menace, several days after the
abortive coup, that they had a tremendous problem because not
only did you have this important Communist Party and all these
sympathizers we were just talking about here, too but the
Communists had infiltrated into the armed forces. As a matter
of fact, one of the first things that the military had to do
was to relieve several battalions in central Java and put them
into obscure locations where they couldn't be in harm's way.
And, of course, the air force commander was involved in the
coup. And so was all of that, and Sukarno's feelings being what
they were suspected of being, sympathetic to the Communists,
the new emerging government, Suharto and Nasution, were faced,
as I say, with a tremendous problem. Had there been at that
point a forward flow of a Red tide which might have been the
result of our not being firm in Vietnam, then I think events
could have developed in a somewhat different way.
I think for one thing the generals might not have been so
determined and I think the Communists might have been more
emboldened to resist.
Senator Fulbright. What do you mean by the forward flow of
the Red tide? That is very colorful language. What is the Red
tide?
Senator Case. You have to write books if you are going to
use language like that.
CHINA AND RUSSIA IN VIETNAM
Ambassador Green. I don't write books, but what I meant was
that if there hadn't been any interposition of American
strength between the Communist pressures from the north and
Indonesia itself, if the Indonesian leadership had felt that
there was no protection and in fact China was the wave of the
future and that there was a threat from the north----
Senator Fulbright. Is it China you believe that is
occupying Vietnam?
Ambassador Green. I don't think it is occupying Vietnam,
but I think it is supporting North Vietnam.
Senator Fulbright. Yes, it is. And so is Russia. Russia is
supporting them more than China now, isn't it?
Ambassador Green. I don't know.
Senator Fulbright. Wouldn't you say the Russian support
today is greater, more valuable to Vietnam than the Chinese?
Ambassador Green. I don't know the answer to that.
Senator Fulbright. You said a moment ago the Russians had
shifted from supporting the Chinese in Indonesia to supporting
the government, is that right? Didn't you say a moment ago that
the Russians had shifted their position from support of the PKI
to the support of the government?
Ambassador Green. That is right.
Senator Fulbright. Or did I misunderstand?
Ambassador Green. That is correct.
CHINESE OBJECTIVES IN ASIA
Senator Fulbright. Don't you consider the Russians part of
the Red tide, or is it only the Chinese?
Ambassador Green. Not the way I was using the words Red
tide then--figuratively.
Senator Fulbright. Are only the Chinese Communists bad and
not the Russians?
Ambassador Green. I look upon the Russian and the Chinese
objectives in this part of the world as quite different. I look
upon the Chinese purposes as more expansionist than Russia in
this part of the world.
Senator Fulbright. Why do you?
Ambassador Green. Because I don't see any evidence that the
Russians are on the move to take over any of this part of the
world.
Senator Fulbright. Well, what is the evidence that the
Chinese are moving to take it over?
Ambassador Green. I think that they are supporting directly
or indirectly, for example, the troubles in the Northeast
Thailand front and their broadcasts and statements are all of
an incendiary nature to support the so-called wars of
liberation in this part of the world.
Senator Fulbright. Do you think that broadcasting
statements are in themselves aggression?
Ambassador Green. Well, if they say it and if they appear
to mean it, why wouldn't it be so, particularly since they are
giving aid and comfort to the so-called Thai liberation
movement?
Senator Fulbright. The Thai liberation. You shifted to the
Thais. How many Chinese do they have in Thailand in this
attack?
Ambassador Green. I don't know of any Chinese that they
have.
Senator Fulbright. No.
Ambassador Green. But this is the question of giving
support by radio broadcasts, propaganda, and I don't know what
kind of agents they have operating down there. It is because
this Thai--this group that they have in Hunan Province, the
Thai liberation group there, that has been under the Chinese
Communist wing for some time now and have intentions for taking
over Thailand.
NO USE OF CHINESE TROOPS
Senator Fulbright. Do you know of any Chinese troops that
are outside of their border in this area?
Ambassador Green. No.
Senator Fulbright. Outside of their border in any area?
Ambassador Green. Well, they have been in the case of India
but they came down----
Senator Fulbright. Presently?
Ambassador Green. At present, I don't know of any Chinese.
Senator Fulbright. Well, I don't know what you mean by the
Red tide is slowing over their area.
Ambassador Green. Well, I didn't say that the Red tide was
just China. I said that the Red tide was Hanoi, Peking. I
didn't--I said I didn't think it was Russia.
IS VIETNAM A THREAT TO INDONESIA?
Senator Fulbright. Well, then, leaving out China and
Russia, do you think that Vietnam as such, either North or
South, is a threat to Indonesian security?
Ambassador Green. Indirectly. I think if North Vietnam were
to take over by force South Vietnam, have success in that
endeavor, that it would have an impact upon----
Senator Fulbright. What would----
Ambassador Green.--Indonesians.
Senator Fulbright. Do you think there would be a threat to
Indonesia?
Ambassador Green. Well, it is hard to say. It is a
speculative situation.
Senator Fulbright. Well, if you can't say----
Ambassador Green. I can't say in exactly what way.
Senator Fulbright. I can't either, but you leave the
impression that there is a great threat. I am just trying to
develop why you think so. Do they have any navy or air force?
Could they attack Indonesia?
Ambassador Green. I think if they succeed in their
aggressive efforts and take over South Vietnam, if this is the
condition which you propose to me, if they get away with it, I
think that other countries in the area will feel that much less
secure, that is all. They will not act with the same degree of
determination that in the case of Indonesia your Communists,
pro-Communist groups there, would be the more emboldened and it
will have a certain sapping affect.
BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL AID
Senator Fulbright. On the aid, you are advocating a
bilateral program with Indonesia? Direct aid from the United
States?
Ambassador Green. I said I believed that to the maximum
extent possible we should approach this problem on a
multilateral basis. I didn't think we would be able to achieve
that maybe this year or even the next, but we should make every
effort to do so. I therefore thought this year we would have to
approach it on a bilateral basis, but to pursue a policy of
maximum coordination of our information; disclosure of what we
intend to do and other countries are intending to do, and to
try to bring multilateral organizations like the Asian
Development Bank, the IMF, into the act as far as possible.
Senator Fulbright. How much are you advocating? Do you know
what they are asking for?
Ambassador Green. They haven't asked us for a specific
figure, but I said that their requirements might run in the
range, let us say, of $225 million in net new foreign aid this
calendar year and that I thought we should do our fair share,
and I didn't attempt to say what that would be. And we should
approach the problem in such a way to try to maximize foreign
contributions.
Senator Fulbright. How much military aid? Is that economic
or both?
Ambassador Green. I was talking there about economic aid. I
am not recommending any military hardware; that is to say, any
lethal weapons, but I do think a modest support of their civic
action program would be desirable.
Senator Fulbright. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lausche. Any other questions?
REIMBURSEMENT OF AMERICANS FOR PROPERTY
Senator Aiken. I would like to ask one question.
To what extent has Indonesia reimbursed Americans for
expropriated property?
Ambassador Green. Well, there has been no reimbursement of
expropriated property simply because they haven't claimed to
have expropriated any property. There were certain American
companies that were forced out and in the case of the rubber
companies actually they bought those assets of Goodyear and
U.S. Rubber. They forced Goodyear out of the Bogor tire
factory, but now Goodyear is talking about resuming management
of the factory.
They have established a board, interagency board, to
discuss claims of any American investor who claims that his
property has been forced out of his hands either with a view to
compensation or with a view to restoration.
Senator Aiken. Is the oil finding a ready market? Does what
oil they produce find a ready market now?
Ambassador Green. Yes, it does.
Senator Aiken. Produced by American companies for the
Indonesian government?
Ambassador Green. That is right.
Senator Aiken. What do the oil people mean when they say
they felt they could handle that business better than the
government could?
Ambassador Green. Well, the American oil companies--there
are two big ones, Caltex and Stanback--they have been studying
operations now although they were almost forced out of business
the year before last, and they are operating as a private
company. They give the Indonesians 60 percent of the profits.
Senator Aiken. And they are quite optimistic about not
extending any serious loss, aren't they, in the long run?
Ambassador Green. That is right. I think they were very
worried at one time, one of our principal problems.
USE OF U.S. AID
Senator Aiken. I was just wondering if we give the
government their material aid, cash aid, whether that would be
used to pay off, to pay for some of the expropriated property.
Ambassador Green. No. I think that----
Senator Aiken. You think it wouldn't. Not even the rubber
people.
Ambassador Green. No.
SUKARNO'S PLAN FOR AN AXIS
Senator Lausche. To get the record complete, you began to
state earlier the statements made by Sukarno about this axis of
Indonesia, Hanoi and Cambodia, Peking and a fifth.
Ambassador Green. Pyongyang, North Korea.
Senator Lausche. What did Sukarno say on that subject? Did
you say that he had made a statement?
Ambassador Green. Oh, yes. He made it on August 17th. He
merely announced where the country was going and that now they
are establishing this axis. He mentioned those five capitals as
being partners working together. He said it in the presence of
hundreds of thousands of people, tens of thousands, in the
physical presence, and over the radio and television to the
whole country.
Senator Lausche. That was a statement made----
Ambassador Green. By him.
Senator Lausche. Over the radio to all of the people of his
country.
Ambassador Green. Yes.
Senator Lausche. That this axis was established.
Ambassador Green. That is right.
Senator Lausche. Identify the countries again in the axis.
Ambassador Green. Communist China, North Korea, North
Vietnam, Indonesia, Cambodia.
Senator Lausche. Five countries.
Ambassador Green. But he did it without ever asking
Cambodia.
Senator Lausche. Anything further?
Senator Cooper. No. I think it was very fine to hear from
you, so clear, so helpful.
Senator Lausche. Thanks. Thanks very much for a very
thorough report, and I am grateful to you.
U.S. POSITION IN VIETNAM
I would like to put this question. In your opinion, would
our position in Southeast Asia, if we pulled out of south
Vietnam, be as formidable as it is now in Indonesia, Malaysia,
Thailand, Taiwan and Japan?
Ambassador Green. I think that it would be. Our strong
stand in South Vietnam has provided a kind of shield behind
which these countries have felt capable, emboldened to move
ahead with trying to put their houses in order the way in fact
this happened in Indonesia. Had there not been this
interposition of American strength--people may not like this
term--the Red tide, but I still do, I do not think that it is
likely that the Indonesian leaders, the new military leaders,
would have acted in as determined a way as they did.
Now, I think it is very important that we not say this
publicly because Indonesia wants to take credit for its own
actions. We don't want to look as though we are always taking
credit. That is why we haven't said it, but that is the way I
feel.
Senator Lausche. Yes, and I think you have exactly stated
the position that we are in. But to me it seems that to claim
that our presence did not give courage and strength to those
people is absurd and cannot be maintained.
Thanks very much.
[Whereupon, at 5:35 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
BACKGROUND BRIEFING ON DISARMAMENT PROBLEMS
----------
Friday, February 3, 1967
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Disarmament
of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:45 p.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Albert Gore (chairman of the
subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Gore (presiding), Fulbright (chairman of
the full committee), Sparkman, Mansfield, Symington, Dodd,
Clark, Pell, McCarthy, Aiken, and Cooper.
Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl and Mr. Bader, of the
committee staff.
Senator Gore. The committee will come to order.
This afternoon the Subcommittee on Disarmament begins a
series of hearings on the current disarmament and armament
problems. It would appear that we have come to a critical
moment in this general area. The country has before it
enormously important decisions affecting not only our national
security and allocation of our resources, but the whole
organization of our economic and national life. I refer
specifically to the immediate anti-ballistic missile question,
but there are also important issues developing in the
nonproliferation area as well as the sale of conventional arms.
Chairman Fulbright shares the belief of the subcommittee
that the subjects I have mentioned are of great importance and
that it might be useful for the subcommittee to hold hearings.
Because these issues are extremely complex, I believe it
would be useful to explore the question of what we know--that
is, what our government knows and what we do not know about
what others are doing as a necessary background of knowledge to
an examination of the policy implications of the decisions now
under consideration. In order to ensure that we have a sound
and accurate base of information on which to base our
discussions and possible judgments, I have invited Mr. Helms of
the Central Intelligence Agency to give to the subcommittee a
thorough briefing.
Mr. Helms, we are pleased to have you here this afternoon.
Please be assured that we appreciate the sensitivity of the
information you bring. Please proceed in your own way.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD HELMS, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE,
ACCOMPANIED BY CARL E. DUCKETT, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY, AND JOHN S. WARNER, LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL
Mr. Helms. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
introduce Mr. Carl Duckett, who is the Deputy Director for
Science and Technology in the Central Intelligence Agency, who
has come with me in the event you desire to ask me any highly
technical questions about missiles and weapons and so forth.
Senator Gore. Maybe for the sake of the record, he should
give his full name and title.
Mr. Duckett. Yes, sir. Mr. Carl Ernest Duckett, and I am
the Deputy Director for Science and Technology of the CIA.
Senator Clark. D-u-c-k-e-t-t?
Mr. Duckett. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Helms. Mr. Chairman, I understand you wish me to
discuss today the military threat posed by the Soviet Union and
Communist China, touching on the related economic and political
considerations. I would also like to cover in very brief form
some of the problems of nuclear proliferation in other
countries.
I want to give the general thrust of the present situation
and also to cover what we believe to be the future trends.
Now, we all recognize that we could spend an entire day on
a detailed discussion of the strengths and the hardware of the
Russian and Chinese military establishments. So I will attempt
to cover this in the briefest compass I can and I hope will
give it enough information so that it will enable you to ask
the kinds of questions that will be of interest to you.
SOVIET STRATEGIC ATTACK FORCES
First, I would like to cover the Soviet strategic attack
forces.
ICBM's
I. The new Soviet ICBM's--which we call the third
generation--are coming into operational status now at a rapid
rate.
A. At this time last year, the count had been stable at
about 225 for a good year and a half.
1. The Soviets at that point had completed their
deployment of the first and second generation missiles.
2. In 1964, however, they began their new program,
comprising two new missile systems.
B. One of these, we call the SS-9. It is a large and
accurate missile which can carry a [deleted] megaton warhead
5,000 miles, or a [deleted] megaton warhead about 7,000 miles.
C. The other, the SS-11, is less accurate and smaller. We
estimate the maximum yield of its warhead at [deleted]
megatons.
II. The silos for these new ICBM's become operational, at
present rate of construction, two years or little more after
they are started. As a result, the estimated number of
operational launchers has already moved up from that plateau of
225, which I just mentioned, to about 385.
A. Our current National Intelligence Estimate, issued about
60 days ago, concludes that by the middle of this year the
Soviet Union will have about 425 to 485 ICBM's ready to launch.
By mid-1968, the figure should be 670 to 765.
1. These short-term estimates, of course, can be
based on the number of silos already under
construction, making allowance for acceleration or
delay in the pace of completion.
B. At longer range, we estimate that the Soviet ICBM force
will have somewhere between 800 and 1,100 operational launchers
four years from now, in mid-1971 to be specific.
CHANGING CHARACTER OF SOVIET ICBM FORCE
III. The numbers, however, do not tell the whole story. The
present deployment is also changing the character of the Soviet
ICBM force.
A. First, it is going to be harder to knock out. All of the
new launchers are in hardened silos with each silo at least
three miles from its nearest neighbor.
1. Two-thirds of the first and second generation
ICBM's were exposed on launching pads. [deleted]
The new mix means that by the middle of next year,
about 80 percent of the operational launchers will be
hardened, and there will be [deleted]
B. Secondly, the main emphasis of the new deployment is on
the SS-11 system. By mid-1968, there may be as many as 400 of
these, making up more than half of the Soviet force.
1. The SS-9 system has the accuracy and the big
warhead needed to attack hardened military targets.
2. The contrast, the SS-11, with less accuracy and a
much smaller warhead yield, is more suitable for large,
soft targets. In other words, it has been referred to
as a city buster.
The Soviets, by putting their missile force in silos
and concentrating on the SS-11, are working for what we
call ``assured destruction''--that is, the capability
to destroy a significant portion of the population and
resources of the United States even if U.S. missiles
should strike first.
IV. This improvement of strategic attack capabilities is
bound to give the Soviet leaders greatly increased confidence
that they have achieved a sufficient ``assured destruction''
capability to serve as a deterrent.
A. We do not believe, however, that between now and the
mid-1970s the Soviets themselves expect to be strong enough to
consider the deliberate initiation of a war against the United
States.
SOVIET CAPABILITY FOR ATTACK
V. Let me review briefly the status of the remainder of the
Soviet capability for strategic attack.
First, Medium Range and Intermediate Range Ballistic
Missiles:
A. There have been no major changes during the past year in
the Soviet Intermediate-range and Medium-range ballistic
missile force.
1. There are about 100 intermediate and 600 medium-
range operational launchers.
2. About 90 percent of the sites are in the Western
USSR, constituting a massive threat to Europe.
3. We do not expect much change over the next 10
years in the size of the MRBM/IRBM force, but, again,
the character will probably change.
4. As the existing systems become obsolete, launchers
on soft pads will be phased out. Present research and
development also suggests that the Soviets are working
for mobile systems, and solid fuel. They have paraded
prototypes of mobile missiles, including one which they
called a mobile ICBM, and they have tested a solid-
fueled missile to about 3,000 miles, which is right on
the borderline between Intermediate and
Intercontinental range.
Now, for the Soviet Submarine Force:
B. It has a growing missile capability.
1. A nuclear-powered submarine now under construction
is the first unit of a new class which will apparently
carry eight or more tubes for submerged launch of a new
missile with a range of 1,000 to 2,000 miles, and this
is a brand new submarine.
Senator Gore. Is this single head or multiple head?
Mr. Helms. Single head. We know of no multiple
warheads in the Soviet Union inventory.
2. A few operational submarines have been converted
to fire a 700-mile ballistic missile while submerged.
3. The rest of the missile units have to launch from
the surface.
4. There are 36 submarines, with about 100 launchers
altogether for ballistic missiles, in the Soviet
submarine inventory. Most or these missiles have a
range of 350 miles.
5. Another 47 submarines carry a total of about 250
cruise missiles, with the primary mission of attacking
naval task forces. This missile has a range of about
450 miles.
6. About 45 of the 360 Soviet submarines are nuclear-
powered. The power plants are noisier than ours, and
Soviet skippers slow down to less than 10 knots they
want to try to avoid detection.
SOVIET BOMBER PROGRAM
Long Range Aviation:
C. As for strategic air threat, Soviet Long Range Aviation
now consists of 950 to 1,000 bomber and tanker aircraft. The
number is declining slowly, and there has been no evidence of
any new Soviet heavy bomber program.
1. The Soviets have about 200 heavy bombers, some of
which are used as tankers. We estimate that they could
mount a strike of about 100 aircraft on two-way
missions against the United States.
2. The rest of Long Range Aviation consists of
medium-range aircraft, featuring the super-sonic-dash
BLINDER medium bomber. We expect the mediums would be
used primarily to attack U.S. and allied targets on the
Eurasian landmass.
3. The Air Force, however, has two major
reservations--that is our Air Force. One is that we
believe that long range aviation is likely to have a
new heavy bomber in the next few years. The other is
the Air Force calculation that in all-out war, 300
medium bombers could be used to supplement the 100
heavies in an attack on targets in the United States.
I cite this because this is an Air Force disagreement
in the intelligence estimates, and I wanted you to be
aware of it.
4. The Soviets have developed air-to-surface missiles
to extend the operational usefulness of manned
aircraft. They appear to be having trouble, however,
with the missiles designed for the BLINDER. The
principal operational missile at present delivers a
nuclear warhead about 350 miles, with a terminal speed
approaching twice the speed of sound.
SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE
Now, may I turn to Soviet strategic defense.
I. The status of Soviet strategic defense is the subject of
a sharp difference of opinion in the intelligence community
over Soviet anti-missile capability. So that we can have a
clear understanding of the controversy, let me point out that
it involves two separate missile systems.
The first system is referred to as the Moscow System.
A. Around Moscow, the Soviets are indeed deploying an array
of missiles and radars conclusively demonstrated to be an ABM
system.
B. Part of the system should be operational this year and
the entire complex by about 1970.
C. When it is finished, Moscow will be protected by about
100 solid-fuel missiles that can reach out several hundred
miles and explode a nuclear warhead above the atmosphere.
1. We think the system would have a good capability
against a limited number of existing missiles, but it
doesn't have what it takes to cope with a major attack,
or with the penetration aids that incoming missiles
will have in the future.
2. The intelligence community is agreed on this
evaluation of the Moscow System.
EARLY WARNING RADARS
D. The system starts with early warning radars in
northwestern Russia that cover the avenues of approach for
missiles coming from the continental United States. They can
probably detect a missile as much as 1,600 miles away.
1. These radars are now being calibrated, and should
be operational this year or early in 1968.
E. Nearer Moscow, there is a big radar which acquires the
incoming missile from the early warning facilities, tracks it,
and probably assigns targets if there are a number of them
coming in.
F. Finally, at a dozen sites forming a ring about 50 miles
from the center of Moscow, are the engagement radars, which aim
the missiles on their nearby launchers and track them to the
target.
G. We have recently calculated that this system--including
all of the radars but not the developing and testing--will have
cost the Soviets the equivalent of about three billion U.S.
dollars, from the start of construction through 1970.
H. This system I have just described is unique to Moscow.
You only have to think for a minute about what Moscow has meant
in Russian history to realize that the Soviets will defend
Moscow with any system that might help, regardless of cost,
effectiveness, or feasibility.
I. We have seen no indication that this system will be used
anywhere else in the Soviet Union.
THE TALLINN SYSTEM
Now, let us leave Moscow and look at the other defensive
missile deployment.
This one is being deployed extensively. We call it the
Tallinn System after the city in Estonia where the first such
complex was built.
The Tallinn System is the object of controversy that I have
just mentioned because so far there just isn't enough hard
evidence to be positive of its purpose.
A. CIA believes that this system is more likely to be a
defense against high-flying, high-speed aircraft and other
aerodynamic vehicles. This is the conclusion of the current
estimate.
B. The other view is that the weapon is basically an anti-
ballistic missile, with a secondary mission against aerodynamic
vehicles. This is the view of DIA, the Army, and the Air Force.
Senator Gore. Would you read that sentence again?
Mr. Helms. Yes, sir.
The other view is that the weapon is basically an anti-
ballistic missile with a secondary mission against aerodynamic
vehicles.
This is the view of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Army
Intelligence, and, Air Force Intelligence.
C. Both views rely on inferences drawn from deployment
patterns, the nature of associated radars, Soviet requirements,
and, other similar factors.
1. Neither side can line up enough evidence to
disprove the other view.
II. So far we have evidence of 26 complexes for the Tallinn
System. Some of them form a forward defense against the
northwestern Soviet Union, while others are situated for local
defense of specific targets.
We think that more than 20 of these complexes can be
operational this year. At the present pace of deployment, the
Soviet Union would have about 75 of them by 1972--I say could
have.
A. Most of the complexes have three sites, with six
launchers at each site. The 26 complexes now under construction
will apparently have a total of about 550 launchers.
B. On the basis of the evidence at hand we believe the
Tallinn System missile will probably reach to a ceiling of
about 100,000 feet, with a slant range of as much as 100
nautical miles.
It could engage manned aircraft flying at three-and-a-half
times the speed of sound.
Further, some of the Tallinn System locations do not have
the early warning and long range radar coverage that an
effective antiballistic missile system would have to have.
REST OF THE SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE PICTURE
III. The rest of the Soviet strategic defense picture is
relatively static.
A. New jet fighter aircraft which are now becoming
operational will give the Soviet Union improved all-weather
capability, and greater interceptor range.
B. There are about 1,000 sites in the Soviet Union for the
SA-2 surface-to-air missile system. Performance in North
Vietnam has not been particularly impressive--more than 1,500
missiles have been fired to bring down a maximum of 44 manned,
American aircraft. The SA-2 has an inherent blind spot against
aircraft operating below 1,000 feet.
C. The SA-3 system is supposed to be more effective at low
altitudes, but the Soviets have deployed it to only about 110
sites in the Soviet Union. This suggests that it has not come
up to expectations.
General Purpose Forces:
About two thirds of Soviet military manpower--some 2
million men--are in what we call general purpose forces: the
ground forces, tactical air, and tactical navy.
A. The number of divisions has remained fairly constant.
There are 109 divisions almost completely equipped and ready
for early commitment to battle.
1. Their manning ranges from about 60 percent of
wartime levels in the Soviet interior, to 90 percent in
Eastern Europe
2. Another 32 cadre divisions have only about 20
percent of full strength.
B. The Soviets are gradually but steadily improving the
ground forces weapons.
C. They are also making a start in developing strike forces
which they could use for action at distant points--a Soviet
shortcoming until now.
1. Airlift is being improved, a marine corps has been
created, and there has been an increase in airborne and
amphibious maneuvers.
D. The Soviets continue to help the modernization and
improvement of the East European satellite forces. The East
Europeans can now contribute about one million men in 42
divisions for Warsaw Pact needs.
SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTING
I. [deleted]
A. The Soviets have run their underground test program at a
leisurely pace--slightly over one shot a month over the past
two years. [deleted]
C. In early 1965, the Soviets conducted the first test in a
program to investigate peaceful uses of nuclear explosions.
1. This test, the most spectacular of the series, was
a [deleted] explosion which dammed the Shagan River
near the Semipalatinsk test site.
D. [Deleted.]
E. There were underground shots at Ufa, just west of the
Urals, in 1965, and at Azgir, north of the Caspian, in 1966,
which probably tested a technique for stimulating the flow from
oil and gas deposits.
II. [Deleted.]
Senator Dodd. Mr. Chairman, is it orderly to ask a
question?
Senator Gore. Yes, sir.
Senator Dodd. Should we wait until the end?
Senator Gore. I believe it might be better to wait until
the end.
Senator Dodd. I did not want to make notes because then I
will forget.
Senator Gore. I think it might be well to make notes with
the understanding of the staff that the notes will be destroyed
after the briefing.
Proceed.
PROBLEMS OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY
Mr. Helms. The Soviet Economy.
I. The Soviet economy continues to have problems, notably
with the allocation of critical resources. Over the next few
years we do not expect that the growth of the Soviet GNP will
match the performance of the 1950's.
A. The Soviet GNP and total Soviet industrial production
are each a little less than half of ours,
B. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union virtually matches our
defense effort, mainly because the Soviet consumer is way down
in the pecking order when it comes to allocating output.
C. Military and space spending remained fairly constant
between 1962 and 1965, but we estimate that outlays in 1966
were up about 7 percent.
1. The state budget for 1967 includes an admitted
increase of 1.1 billion rubles for defense, and hidden
allocations elsewhere in the budget may make the actual
increase considerably larger.
D. For our purposes today, let me just say that we conclude
that the Soviet economy will come up with whatever expenditures
are considered desirable for defense, no matter what the
condition of the rest of the economy.
SOVIET POLICY
I. In the Kremlin today, the General Secretary of the
Party, Leonid Brezhnev, seems to have the most important voice
in making key assignments, and he is getting more and more of
the spotlight.
A. The Soviet leadership, however, was brought into power
in reaction to Khrushchev's erratic personal leadership, and it
is still functioning by and large as a collective government.
B. That means that it is a relatively cautious government,
not given to radical departures from established policies and
procedures.
C. The present leadership stands better with the military,
as far as we can judge, and this is largely because it has
dropped Khrushchev's attempts to cut back on military spending.
II. Domestic pre-occupation centers on the economy. It has
been so hard to reach decisions on resource allocations that
the Soviets are in the second year of their present Five-Year
Plan, and the plan itself has not received final approval yet.
SOVIET DISPUTE WITH CHINA
III. In foreign affairs, the overriding concern right now
is the dispute with Communist China.
A. Tension between Moscow and Peking has intensified
markedly in recent months, as you all have seen in the
newspapers. The Soviets feel they have gotten the upper hand in
the world Communist movement, and they are beginning to behave
somewhat more boldly.
1. For instance, they are again trying to convoke an
international meeting to condemn the Chinese.
2. The Soviets have exploited Peking's rejection of
appeals for united Communist action in support of North
Vietnam.
3. Peking's retort has been that Moscow is secretly
conspiring with the United States against the Asian
Communists.
4. Moscow, to avoid giving any substance to the
Chinese charges, has been taking the line publicly that
there can be little advance in U.S.-Soviet relations
until the Vietnam conflict is settled.
B. The Kremlin has made it clear in private, however, that
the Soviet Union wants to keep lines of communication with
Washington open, despite the strains and constraints imposed by
the Vietnamese fighting and sensitivity to charges of Soviet-
U.S. collusion.
1. If it were not for Vietnam, the Soviet leaders
would probably prefer to resume the dialogue with
Washington on matters which are of greater concern to
Soviet national interests, such as European security,
arms control, and East-West trade.
2. The agreements recently reached on civil air
routes and the peaceful use of outer space showed that
limited cooperation is still possible.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks on the Soviet
weapons systems, on their economy and political approach, and I
would now go over to China.
CHINESE COMMUNISTS' NUCLEAR WEAPONS
I would first like to talk about Chinese Communist advanced
weapons.
I. The Chinese Communists are making a concerted effort--on
their own and with overriding priorities--to develop modern
weapons for strategic attack. They are devoting increasing
resources to missiles and nuclear weapons.
A. [Deleted.]
B. We estimate that they could begin to deploy a medium-
range ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead this year, and
their first crude ICBM's in the early 1970s.
II. [Deleted.]
C. The tests indicate that the Chinese can manufacture
nuclear bombs which can be carried by their medium bombers--
about a dozen old TU-4 BULLS similar to our B-29, and two TU-16
BADGER jet bombers.
1. [Deleted.]
2. Their likely immediate goals, however, are
probably warheads for short- and medium-range missiles,
and possibly a weapon for the IL-28 BEAGLE light jet
bomber. The Chinese have about 250 of these aircraft,
which have a better chance of reaching a defended
target than the BULLS.
D. In the present state of Chinese technology, any weapons
they might make now would be crude and inefficient by our
standards. By Far Eastern standards, however, they are a
significant addition to Chinese military prestige.
CHINESE MISSILE DEVELOPMENT
III. The Chinese probably started their missile development
by test-firing Soviet MRBM's given them before the Sino-Soviet
split in 1960.
A. They may have begun testing their own native versions as
early as 1963.
B. Now they are apparently working on several surface-to-
surface missile programs.
1. The pace of activity at Shuang-cheng-tzu has
increased sharply since the fall of 1965. They
apparently are conducting more MRBM firings, and they
recently built a new launch complex, possibly for
training troops in the launching procedures.
C. During the past year they have also built a very large
launch complex, which we call Complex B. The reports we have on
the size of the facilities indicate that this complex is for a
large missile, probably an ICBM. This missile could also be
used as a space booster.
1. Complex B probably will be ready for firings by
the latter part of 1967, but we have no evidence that
the Chinese have any ICBM components so far. Therefore,
we cannot say whether an ICBM vehicle will be ready for
test flights that soon.
2. If the Chinese inaugurate a reasonably successful
flight test program, within the next year or so, they
probably could have a few ICBMs deployed by the early
1970s.
3. These probably would be inferior in reliability
and accuracy by U.S. standards, and also by Soviet
standards, but they could--in Chinese eyes--constitute
a limited inter-continental deterrent.
D. The Chinese Communists have built one copy of the Soviet
G-class submarine. In the Soviet fleet, this class is armed
with three ballistic missiles 350-mile range. We have to assume
that the Chinese are working on a missile to fit the submarine.
CHINESE CONVENTIONAL FORCES
I would like now to turn to Chinese conventional military
forces.
I. Despite Chinese progress in advanced weapons, the
military power of Communist China for some years to come will
derive primarily from the numerical strength of its enormous
ground forces--about 2,300,000 men--and great reserves of
manpower.
II. There are more than 100 infantry divisions and about a
dozen armor and artillery divisions in the Chinese Communist
Army, concentrated in the heavily populated regions of eastern
China.
A. The Chinese Army has the capability to overrun any of
its mainland neighbors in short order, provided it does not run
into significant opposition from a major power.
1. It has demonstrated its ability to move and fight
with primitive transportation and rudimentary logistic
support.
2. If it should come to all-out war, however, the
Chinese will be badly hampered by shortages of armor,
heavy ordnance, mechanized transport, and fuel.
III. The Chinese Air Force and Navy are oriented primarily
toward defensive missions.
A. The bomber force at present consists of 250 jet light
bombers, which I mentioned a few moments ago as BEAGLES. We
believe the Chinese will start producing BADGER jet mediums
about 1968.
B. The bulk of the jet fighters consist of about 1,900 MIG-
15s and MIG-17s, obtained 10 or more years ago.
1. Over the past two years, the Chinese have begun
assembling supersonic MIG-19s in an aircraft plant at
Shen-yang, known better as Mukden, in Manchuria which
was provided by the Soviets before 1960. The Chinese
inventory of MIG-19s has risen from 150 to about 350,
and they have been able to supply another 50 to
Pakistan in 1966.
2. The Chinese have about 35 of the Mach-two, delta-
wing MIG-21s, supplied by the Soviet Union in the early
1960s.
IV. Peking's Navy is the weakest element of the Chinese
armed forces.
A. It has the world's fourth largest undersea fleet, with
34 submarines, most of them medium-range torpedo attack boats.
They have no experience in extended operations, however, and
most of their training appears to take place within 20 miles of
the coast.
B. The Chinese are building submarines, destroyer escorts,
and guided-missile patrol boats. They have four obsolete
destroyers, six new DEs, and 11 patrol boats.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA
I would like now to turn to Chinese political developments.
I. Communist China is being racked by the greatest
political convulsions since Mao Tse-tung took control in 1949.
A. Mao, at 73, is aging, sick, and more and more
inflexible.
1. He is clearly concerned that his Communist Party
is losing the revolutionary zeal of its early days, and
cannot be relied on to keep China on the right track
after he is gone.
2. The teenaged millions of the Red Guard are
supposed to rekindle that zeal with their youthful and
unbridled enthusiasm.
3. When Mao reappeared last summer after a protracted
absence from public view, he passed over the men who
had been the heads of the party hierarchy and named
Defense Minister Lin Piao as Number Two Man--in effect,
Mao's designated successor.
B. To Mao Tse-tung, the cultural revolution is probably
primarily a drive to reshape the Communist Party, or replace it
with a more reliable, more fanatical, and younger version.
C. But for the men who aspire to succeed Mao, it has become
a naked struggle for power and for survival.
II. It is difficult to determine from day to day where the
cultural revolution stands, who is on which side, or who is
going to come out on top. The struggle seems to have entered a
critical phase in January.
A. The most dramatic development has been Mao's call for
the Red Army to back up the Red Guards and eliminate resistance
to the cultural revolution.
1. We had been speculating when the resistance first
developed that the army would have been called in even
earlier if there had been no doubts about its
reliability.
2. Now there is evidence that the armed forces are
considerably less than monolithic in their loyalty to
Mao and Lin.
III. When and how will the turmoil in Peking finally be
resolved?
A. We have no idea. The opposing forces, judging by the
protracted struggle, must be quite evenly matched. If the clash
between workers and Red Guards spread--particularly if the
army's loyalties are divided--then we may soon see something
for which there is no other term but Civil War.
1. Some days, it looks as though the opposing
elements are digging in for a long winter of political
trench warfare.
2. The next day, a war of movement and a showdown
appears imminent.
3. I would say it is still too early to speculate
usefully on the outcome.
B. There are two points, however, which we can make.
1. First, as long as China's leaders are pre-occupied
with this internal wrangling, they will find it
difficult to reach agreement on any new policy lines.
So, we do not expect any radical departures from
existing policies.
2. Second, whoever wins, we can see no reason for
suspecting that there will be any dilution of Peking's
implacable hostility to the United States.
CHINA'S ECONOMY
I would like to now turn to the Chinese economy.
A. China has regained only part of the ground lost when the
Great Leap Forward collapsed in 1960 and Soviet aid was
withdrawn.
1. Prospects to regain the momentum of the 1950's
appear remote, even without the disruption of the
``cultural revolution.''
2. The longer the political upheaval lasts, the
greater the likelihood of severe damage to the economy.
3. There have already been extensive strikes,
shutdowns, and disruption of transportation.
B. It has taken an overriding priority on defense to permit
the progress China has made in advanced weapons.
1. One of the ministries hard hit by the waves of
political purges and poster denunciations has been a
ministry directly related to the missile effort.
C. Stagnation in agriculture remains the chief obstacle to
a resumption of adequate economic growth.
1. Peking claims a record harvest in 1966, but actual
grain production was somewhat lower in 1966 than in
1955.
2. It was not much above the level of 10 years ago,
when there were almost 150 million fewer people to
feed.
3. There were localized ration cuts, and it was only
thanks to grain imports that the average ration could
be kept above the lean levels of the poor year of 1960.
4. China imported more than 5 million tons of grain
from the Free World in 1966, and will probably have to
import substantially more this year.
I now would like to turn, Mr. Chairman, to the subject of
nuclear proliferation.
[Deleted.]
INDIA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD NUCLEAR WEAPONS
II. The Indian attitude toward development of nuclear
weapons has been complicated by Peking's nuclear capability.
A. Prime Minister Gandhi has maintained the government's
``no bomb'' nuclear policy despite criticisms in Parliament.
1. Both the Prime Minister and the new Chairman of
the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, Dr. Sarabhai, have
stated that India's present economic and industrial
position does not permit launching a nuclear weapons
project, particularly from the viewpoint of developing
delivery systems.
B. [Deleted.]
1. An agreement with Canada, however, stipulates that
plutonium produced in the one reactor now operational
will be used only for peaceful purposes.
2. Two other reactors which will be operational in
1969 and 1970 are covered by safeguards.
Other Countries:
ISOTOPE SEPARATION
III. I would like to end the discussion of proliferation
with a brief mention of isotope separation.
A. [Deleted.]
B. U.S. experience has shown that for the production of
moderate quantities of uranium-235, the centrifuge process is
economically attractive in comparison with the gaseous
diffusion process.
C. [Deleted.]
D. We believe however, that none of the countries working
on the process has yet developed a centrifuge to the point
where an economical plant of production size could be built.
CHINA'S SUPPORT OF NORTH VIETNAM
Mr. Chairman, I have, or I am prepared, to discuss two
other matters, if you choose, these having to do with the
Chinese contribution to North Vietnam and the possibility of
Chinese intervention in North Vietnam, It is not strictly the
topic that we have agreed that I would discuss, but if you had
any interest in this, I would be glad to cover it.
Senator Gore. What is the pleasure of the committee?
I would like to hear it. Yes, we would.
Mr. Helms. We estimate that there are 26,000 to 48,000
Chinese Communist military personnel in North Vietnam.
Senator Gore. What is the figure?
Mr. Helms. 26,000 to 48,000. There is a wide spread there
because we have no way of actually counting the number of
individual Chinese. We simply know the units that are there and
what the units are for, and these units are of a kind that do
not have a very specific table of organization and personnel.
They can be larger or smaller, depending on how you want to use
them. And we have been trying to narrow this figure, but the
only thing we can say now is that the range is between 26,000
and 48,000.
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question in
context?
Senator Gore. Yes.
Senator Symington. Are they, Mr. Helms, logistic or combat
troops or both?
Mr. Helms. No, sir. This is what I wanted to cover, Senator
Symington.
Senator Symington. I am sorry.
Mr. Helms. Thank you.
Senator Symington. Thank you.
Mr. Helms. As far as we can determine, there are no ground
combat formations.
B. Evidence shows that there are two antiaircraft artillery
divisions and possibly elements of two more, manning the 85-
millimeter and 100-millimeter guns defending some of the key
targets.
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT
C. The rest of the Chinese personnel are mainly railway,
engineer, and logistic units, building airfields, bridges, and
the like, laying track, and keeping the supplies moving. In
other words, there are no combat personnel, I repeat.
Senator Gore. You would not regard the manning of anti-
aircraft guns as combat?
Mr. Helms. Well, not in the sense that it is used in the
military technology.
Senator Gore. I understand.
Mr. Helms. In other words, these are not fellows manning
guns shooting at other soldiers.They are fellows manning anti-
aircraft guns.
Senator Gore. Shooting Americans down.
Mr. Helms. That is the idea, but they are not combat forces
in the way the military uses the terms.
EFFECTIVENESS OF SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES
Senator Aiken. Our witness stated yesterday, that what he
could learn from the time he was there, Russian SAM's are
comparatively ineffective, and most of our planes are brought
down by conventional weapons.
Mr. Helms. That is correct.
Senator Aiken. If that is correct, I have to reverse my
opinion.
Mr. Helms. The reason for this, Senator Aiken, if I may
take just a moment, is that by having a mix of surface-to-air
missiles and antiaircraft guns, the surface-to-air missiles are
quite effective at certain altitudes. Therefore, our planes, to
avoid them, go in on the deck, and in that way they just run
into the antiaircraft fire. And there is enough of it so there
is just no way of missing it, and this is why so many have been
brought down by AA rather than surface-to-air missiles.
Senator Aiken. But you do not think I am too far wrong in
not crediting the Russians for their firing.
Mr. Helms. I do not.
Senator Gore. It is for the purpose of avoiding the SAM
fire that they come in on the deck, so to speak.
Mr. Helms. That is right. So, I think the question comes
down as to who is manning the antiaircraft guns, and they are
being manned by a variety of personnel.
POSSIBILITY OF CHINESE INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM
Now, may I discuss just a moment our beliefs about the
possibility of Chinese intervention in Vietnam.
VI. We believe that there are three situations in which
Peking would feel obliged to intervene in force in the
Vietnamese fighting.
A. One of these would arise from U.S. air strikes against
targets in China. In May 1965, Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi
asked the British Charge in Peking to pass along a warning to
this effect.
B. The second circumstance which would trigger Chinese
intervention would be a major U.S. invasion of North Vietnam.
Chinese leaders passed this word to a visiting delegation from
Ghana, shortly before Chen Yi talked with the British.
C. In addition, if the collapse of the Hanoi Government
should seem imminent, China might probably move into North
Vietnam to ``restore order.''
VII. It is always dangerous to assume that the Chinese are
going to be guided by rational decisions, but we believe that
Peking is bound to feel that the domestic political turmoil and
the intensification of the dispute with Moscow leaves China
less ready than it might otherwise be to engage in direct
hostilities with the United States.
A. Another factor which would contribute to increased
Chinese caution would be a growing belief in Peking that the
United States is determined to persevere, over the short run at
least, in the Vietnamese war.
THRESHOLD OF SENSITIVITY HAS BEEN RAISED
B. We think, therefore, that the threshold of sensitivity--
the level at which Peking would feel forced to fight--has
probably been raised a degree or two.
1. For example, a shallow incursion by U.S. troops
into the Demilitarized Zone between North and South
Vietnam might be less likely today to trigger a Chinese
reaction than it would have in 1965.
C. Chinese statements concerning the ``inevitability'' of
war with the U.S. now appear only infrequently.
1. Peking has made no mention of ``volunteers'' for
Vietnam since the fall of 1965, except for brief
flurries last summer and again in December, after
bombings in the area of Hanoi and Haiphong.
2. Peking has always said that the Vietnamese must
bear the primary responsibility for fighting; in recent
months this theme has been given additional emphasis.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gore. Thank you very much, Mr. Helms.
SOVIET ADVANTAGES IN ANTI-MISSILE DEVELOPMENT
Beginning where you began, with a few questions, will you
or your assistant give us an estimate of the lead or advantage
which the Soviets may have over the United States in the
development and deployment of anti-missile missiles at this
time? I would want to know the extent of the tests of anti-
ballistic missiles which they conducted before entering the
test treaty, concluding the test treaty, and also if you think
their underground tests, particularly the last ones, had some
bearing upon anti-ballistic missiles.
Now, this is a big question. Divide it into about three
parts.
Mr. Helms. I understand and I would like very much to have
Mr. Duckett answer it.
But, before I do, sir, may I explain one thing. We in the
Agency are not competent to talk about the United States
forces. In the first place, we have never kept track in the
Agency of what the United States has in its arsenal. We have
not made what are referred to as net estimates--in other words,
a comparison of where the Soviets stand and where the United
States stands in various weaponry, for the very simple reason
that our charter is to take care of countries outside of the
United States and not to involve ourselves in these comparisons
in the United States.
That is for the Department of Defense or the State
Department or for somebody else to do, so I would like us, if
we may, to confine our remarks to the Soviet systems rather
than the U.S. systems.
Senator Gore. I agree.
Mr. Duckett. Sir, if I could discuss the Soviet anti-
ballistic missile capability in two contexts.
First, the development or the technical capability of the
system; and secondly, its development status, because both are
pertinent and are different.
From a developmental standpoint, the test program has been
a long one, starting certainly by 1960.
VULNERABILITY TO ATTACK
The components which we can now identify in that system we
described as around Moscow, are components which we feel limit
the system in two key ways: One, it appears there will be a
rather limited number of interceptor missiles involved, at
least in this initial deployment, and that means by definition,
therefore, only a limited number of targets can be attacked.
So this would make it vulnerable, if you will, to what you
would call a saturation attack.
Secondly, we believe that the kinds of radars we see are
the types which cannot contain much of the sophistication which
the United States has felt would be desirable to handle a
complex type of attack, and by complex here I mean an attack
including decoys, penetration aids, and other devices to make
the radar have a difficult time separating out the actual bomb.
We do not believe the system has any appreciable capability
to handle that type of attack.
Senator Gore. You mean when you refer to separation out of
the actual bomb, the incoming missile being fired at Russia?
Mr. Duckett. Yes, sir, that is correct.
In other words, if there are in that attack, not only
bombs, but also various penetration devices to attempt to hide,
if you would, or to prevent the radar determining which is the
real bomb, we think this system would have difficulty handling
that type of attack.
So, those are the limitations. The limitation with regard
to number of interceptors, and its apparent lack of ability to
handle what we would call a sophisticated attack.
DEPLOYMENT OF THE MOSCOW SYSTEM
Now, as to deployment status, it is difficult to pick
particular dates here and the reason is that the deployment of
the Moscow System has not gone at a steady pace. As best we can
determine, and for reasons we cannot determine, possibly
technical, the deployment has not started and proceeded at a
steady rate from the beginning. Rather, there have been periods
when there was relative inactivity around these installations
suggesting that there was some modification or change taking
place.
You see, therefore, sir, until we know that one of these
sites is totally operational, we cannot say that there will not
be other delays or changes in the pace of construction.
We do recognize, however, that at least the first of these
Moscow installations will probably be ready, if there is no
further disruption, by sometime during the latter part of the
year.
HOW AN ABM DEFENSE WOULD WORK
Senator Gore. Now, just here. Senator Aiken and I have some
small advantage over other members of the committee in that we
have heard the technicians in the Atomic Energy Commission
describe the manner of operation of an anti-ballistic missile
missile defense.
Would you, for the benefit of the committee, describe
theoretically how this system will operate? First, I think you
would perhaps agree that this system was tested by the Soviets
in perhaps 1961.
Mr. Duckett. Yes.
Senator Pell. Also, how classified is this?
Mr. Helms. As far as the classification is concerned,
Senator Pell, what we are talking about now has about the
highest classification we have.
Senator Pell. Thank you. I was wondering if some of these
theories have been in the press.
Mr. Helms. But when we are talking about this anti-
ballistic missile system, it involves all the collection
devices at the disposition of the United States Government and
some of these we are trying very hard, at least as to their
quality, to keep as secret as we possibly can, so nothing can
be more highly classified than what we are talking about now.
Senator Pell. Thank you.
Mr. Duckett. Sir, I think if I may, I could best treat the
question of how the systems work by giving a very brief
description and then being most happy to amplify on any part of
that that I could.
May I again remind the chairman that I am referring to the
Moscow System only in this conversation.
That system we are certain employs a very large, long-range
type of missile. Although we cannot give precise numbers as to
range and altitude, we do believe its range and altitude both
are measured in hundreds of miles, and that would say that one
of the characteristics of this system would be that it would
intercept the incoming missiles well outside of the atmosphere.
THE MEANING OF INTERCEPTION
Senator Gore. When you use the word ``intercept'' many
people have an idea that they are going to have a head-on
collision. You don't mean that at all?
Mr. Duckett. No, sir. Obviously, the question of the
relative closeness that is required for killing the incoming
missile is a function of the type of kill mechanism which this
missile will employ, and my honest answer is we do not know the
precise kill mechanism and thus cannot describe precisely how
close an intercept would be required for a kill.
KILL MECHANISMS
Senator Gore. Well, what are the possible kill mechanisms?
Mr. Duckett. The possible kill mechanisms which we have
studied are what I would call normal nuclear effects, meaning
gamma rays and other forms of radiation. X-rays have caused
more concern, I believe, because X-ray effects are far more
pronounced outside of the atmosphere.
Senator Gore. In terms of distance, say their radar detects
an incoming missile, and they wish to fire an interceptor
missile, and it explodes in the projected trajectory of the
incoming missile. By use of gamma and ordinary nucleonic rays,
what would be the range of destruction?
Mr. Duckett. Sir, I will say in all honesty I don't believe
that we in the United States know from our own measurement
programs a very precise answer to that question.
I think there is a considerable uncertainty based on the
advice we could get from the experts, but certainly if one is
talking about the gamma radiations, the kind of numbers that we
are advised by our experts are, in fact, measured in ones, or
at most, tens of kilometers for any of these effects. In other
words, a fairly close intercept is required for these types of
mechanisms.
DEFENSE AGAINST THE POLARIS
Senator Aiken. I was going to ask whether you would
estimate that the defense against the ICBM was more effective
than the defense against the Polaris.
Mr. Duckett. I see.
Senator Aiken. I think that is important. I have had a
feeling that the Polaris can hit them if they get too bold.
Mr. Duckett. Yes, sir, I believe I can answer, Senator, in
this way: The radar systems which I have referred to, that are
part of this Moscow System, and also the radars which are
situated to the north of Moscow, are not situated in such a way
that they could cover more than a small part of what we would
call the Polaris threat zone. That is, there are no radars
which we have identified which are pointed, for example,
towards the Mediterranean or towards Spain, and thus if Polaris
were fired from that area today, we do not have identified, at
least, any Soviet radar which would be likely to detect them.
Thus, I would have to say that our best evidence today is
that the Moscow system is deployed primarily, if not entirely,
towards the ICBM threat.
Senator Aiken. And the Polaris is possibly our major
deterrent to avoid a war?
Mr. Duckett. Yes, sir. We do not see what we would identify
as a capability against Polaris.
Senator Aiken. Yes.
DEFENSIVE AREA AROUND MOSCOW
Senator Gore. Well, proceeding with the possible mechanism,
do I deduce from what you say that if the defending missiles'
detonation depends upon gamma, and for want of a better word
orthodox nucleonic rays, you would have a defense area ranging
from a four to a hundred square mile area?
Mr. Duckett. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire, sir, if you are
referring to the entire area around Moscow defended--I am not
sure that I understand.
Senator Gore. Now, here is the detonation----
Mr. Duckett. Around any detonation.
Senator Gore [continuing]. Of the anti-missile missile in
the calculated trajectory of an incoming missile.
Mr. Duckett. I understand.
Senator Gore. How large an area is created by a ball of
fire, a ball of rays? Would this be, you say, a mile if you go
a mile in all directions----
Mr. Duckett. Yes, sir.
Senator Gore. Or if it is 10 miles in all directions?
Mr. Duckett. Mr. Chairman, again here I would re-emphasize
that I don't believe that we have agreed figures even in the
United States on these kinds of questions. But I know of no one
who believes that what I think we are both agreeing we could
refer to as conventional radiation, would be likely to afford a
kill of an incoming weapon for any distance greater than, say,
one mile. And that would be a one-mile sphere, actually, one
mile in any direction.
Senator Gore. A sphere two miles in diameter?
Mr. Duckett. Two miles in diameter, correct, sir.
Senator Gore. All right.
EFFECT OF X-RAYS ON WEAPONS
Now, if they depend upon X-rays, what would be the area?
Mr. Duckett. All right, sir.
I think, again, Mr. Chairman, this is an even more
controversial figure, and may I say that certainly I am well
aware we feel that it is an important thing to be aware of,
that there are figures by various U.S. scientists that extend
out to hundreds, to literally thousands of miles with various
theories of how X-rays might affect a weapon.
So, we simply do not have from the advice we have been able
to acquire any number which I can quote to you as a figure
representing X-ray effects.
I would add, therefore, that we do not believe today that
we have any mechanism available to use that allows us to state
with any certainty what kill distance the Soviets might achieve
with X-rays.
I believe it is accepted, however, by most U.S. scientists
that this would be, in fact, a distance measured in tens and
possibly even out to a hundred miles or more, and it is
certainly a far greater distance than the conventional kill
technique.
Senator Sparkman. You mean in diameter or radius?
Mr. Duckett. Senator Sparkman, I am referring here to the
actual distance from the burst to the actual warhead.
Senator Sparkman. Oh, yes.
Mr. Duckett. And that distance, as I am saying, and in some
people's minds, is tens of miles and in others it is in
hundreds of miles, and we don't know the answer.
Senator Gore. So, within the order of estimates, you would
have a ball of X-rays with estimates of its extent ranging from
a ball of X-rays with a radius of 20 miles up to a radius of
two to three hundred miles?
Mr. Duckett. Yes.
Senator Gore. Of course, if this were perfected, why then,
the defense is calculated to come within the proximity of an
incoming missile much more readily.
Mr. Duckett. Yes, sir.
SOVIET MISSILE TESTS
Senator Gore. Now, I don't want to ask too many questions
myself, but I think a very crucial question here is whether or
not the Soviets tested X-rays or gamma rays in their tests in
1961. They did, as I understand it, fire a missile through the
ball of rays with radar observation.
Can you give us a description of that?
Mr. Duckett. Mr. Chairman, there were tests conducted in
the fall of 1961 and again in the fall of 1962 which did
involve nuclear explosions in the area where the developmental
work on the antiballistic missile program has been conducted.
Those tests involved a series of bursts. However, our best
information is that all of the nuclear bursts were, in fact, on
the missile that was fired into the area rather than bursts
that were on the interceptor missile coming out of the
antiballistic missile combination. So, I would like to express
first that we have no knowledge of any tests where, in fact, an
interceptor missile carrying a nuclear warhead has been
conducted by the Soviets.
However, in these tests, it is true that in addition to the
missile which was on the actual warhead, which did burst, it
was followed in some cases by one additional missile and in
other cases by two additional missiles, which were simply
following along the same trajectory so as to pass through, if
you will, the area where the detonation had occurred.
[Deleted.] We believe that the most likely reason for these
tests was to determine the effect of this nuclear explosion on
the radar equipment on the ground.
I base that on----
TESTING THE BLACKOUT EFFECT
Senator Gore. In other words, the test may have been
testing the blackout effect?
Mr. Duckett. Precisely.
Senator Gore. Interference with communications?
Mr. Duckett. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I refer specifically to the
testing to determine if, in fact, the radar on the ground could
see through the nuclear cloud and pick up an incoming missile
through that cloud.
I stress here, however, that whereas we state we believe
this is the most likely purpose of these tests, we certainly
much accept that depending on how extensively they monitored
and measured these tests, it is certainly possible effects data
could have been acquired even though this would not have been
the primary purpose.
[Deleted.]
U.S. NEWS ARTICLE ON SOVIET TESTING
Mr. Helms. Mr. Chairman, may I point out for just a moment,
that in the February 6 issue of U.S. News and World Report,
there is an article on this subject which starts on page 36 and
runs across the top of the page and which is rather a scary
article. We have examined this very carefully and can find no
evidence that anyone has in support of this article which says
the Soviet know about the X-ray effects, and they were testing
it and so forth. We have analyzed it very carefully and we
believe what Mr. Duckett has just told you and not what appears
in this article and other publications.
Senator Gore. I certainly don't want to over-step my time.
I suggest that we first conclude our questions with respect to
the Soviets and take them up topic by topic as Mr. Helms
presented them.
Senator Sparkman?
Senator Sparkman. No questions right now.
Senator Gore. Senator Symington?
Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST?
Mr. Helms, I want to ask one question. I was rather shocked
to see the size and caliber of the United Arab Republic Air
Force, the number of first-class MIGs they had, et cetera.
I was also surprised to see their relatively heavy
development in submarines, especially because of their getting
closer to the Communists and, therefore, the availability to
their submarine developments, two Russian submarines, et
cetera.
With that premise, it looks to me as if there could be some
trouble there. [Deleted.]
As far as the aircraft are concerned, they figure they can
stand off what the Egyptians have now and also on the ground.
KEEPING INDIA FROM BUILDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Senator Symington. There is only one other question that
interests me. And I am very interested in these hearings that
Senator Gore is conducting because if you do not put the cork
in this proliferation, I think we are going to blow ourselves
up in due course.
When we continue to feed those cows in India, do we have
any specifications about what they should or should not do in
nuclear fashion? Do we discuss it with them? Do you know of any
discussion in your agency or in the State Department about it,
letting us know what they are doing if we continue to feed them
and their cattle. I say that in a somewhat snide manner, but I
see 2 million more tons going out today and so forth.
Mr. Helms. Well, sir, this is probably not my proper field,
but I do sit in meetings in the executive branch. And you do
know that the Administration is very conscious of this problem
[Deleted.] and doing everything they can to keep track of any
activity in this field, and I think we are pretty well
informed, Senator Symington.
Senator Symington. When do you think they will have some
nuclear weapons that they could deliver on their friends, the
Pakistanis, or the Chinese?
Mr. Helms. I do not think they have started to build them.
Senator Symington. Yes.
U.S. ABM SYSTEM
One more question, which if you do not want to answer, I
would be regretful, but understanding, perhaps--there is quite
a discussion going on now in a good many different places among
a good many different experts about whether we should build an
antiballistic ballistic missile or whether we should proceed on
it. Based on your knowledge of what you have been testifying
about, would you think we should go ahead now or do you think
we should wait until these discussions are over, which is the
position of Dr. Foster, or do you think we should not go ahead
or do you think it is beyond your province? There are four of
them.
Mr. Helms. Senator, I believe that is beyond my province. I
beg your indulgence.
Senator Gore. Senator Clark.
COLLAPSE OF THE HANOI GOVERNMENT
Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, I have to go. I wonder if I
may ask this rather quick and rather innocuous question.
I was interested in your giving the three conditions under
which China might enter the Vietnam war.
Mr. Helms. Yes, sir.
Senator Sparkman. I think it was Harrison Salisbury
yesterday, was it not, who gave three conditions. I noticed a
little variation, but not very much. You said, or I believe he
said, an attack on the Chinese territory, invasion of the
north, or an effort on the part of Hanoi to stop the war. Were
those not the three that he gave, as I recall?
Senator Gore. Mr. Helms gave as the third one the imminent
collapse of the Hanoi regime. Maybe, they were about the same
thing.
Senator Sparkman. I said there was very little difference.
I just wondered whether you meant the same thing. I think he
related it to an effort on the part of Hanoi to stop the war.
Mr. Helms. Senator Sparkman, to me it is not the same
thing.
Senator Sparkman. Not the same thing.
Mr. Helms. When we talk about the collapse of the Hanoi
government, we mean it's going out of business, the collapse of
order and government and all the rest of it in Hanoi. In other
words, that they have had it, to use the vernacular. I do not
think the Chinese would come in because Hanoi or Ho Chi Minh
decided he wanted to alter the course of the war, change its
character or stop it.
Senator Sparkman. He said an effort to make Hanoi continue
the war.
COLLAPSE OF MAO'S GOVERNMENT
Talking about the collapse of the Hanoi government, is
there any likelihood that Mao's government might collapse?
Mr. Helms. We do not know, sir. There is always that
possibility.
Senator Sparkman. Thank you.
Senator Gore. Senator Clark.
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, Senator Clark said he
would yield to one more question.
EFFECTIVENESS OF BOMBING NORTH VIETNAM
When I was out there a year ago, Mr. Helms, I talked to
everybody in the windows, Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, above all
Hong Kong, Mr. Wells, et cetera. I could find nobody in the
State Department or military or the Agency that felt any amount
of bombing including civilian bombing of Hanoi would bring in
the Red Chinese into North Vietnam and, therefore, I have been
especially intrigued with all this--well, I will not use the
word, because we are on the record, but about the dangers of
the bombing.
On the other hand, I found about half of the people who
felt they would come in if we went into North Vietnam, and all
the people felt they would come in if we went into North
Vietnam with ground troops, around Haiphong or Hanoi, because
that would show we were trying to take over a government,
instead of taking over land.
Is there any change in that position now as far as your
Agency is concerned?
Mr. Helms. No, sir. The way you gave this, I am not sure
which was Agency position, and which was State, and which was
Defense and so on.
Senator Symington. I want to be sure. I do not want in any
way to have a trap question. I found nobody, either in State or
the military, who felt any amount of bombing or any amount of
air attack would bring in the Chinese.
Mr. Helms. That is our belief, unless it collapsed the
Hanoi government.
Senator Symington. Your last answer is the reason I asked
the question.
Mr. Helms. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. Thank you.
Senator Gore. Senator Clark.
U.S. WEAPONS COULD DESTROY MOSCOW
Senator Clark. Mr. Helms, I have drawn a tentative
conclusion from what you and Mr. Duckett have testified to, and
I wonder if I am right, that despite the Moscow system the
various United States weapons systems could today destroy
Moscow.
Mr. Helms. That is correct.
Senator Clark. That is right.
CHINA'S MILITARY CAPABILITY
Now, you spoke of the Chinese conventional threat, and if
they had a capability outside their borders to attack
successfully their neighbors unless a military power, such as
the United States, intervened. In your judgment, does the
present political turmoil in China affect their external
military capability, or is it likely to, if that turmoil
continues?
Mr. Helms. Senator Clark, until now we have not seen any
evidence that it has affected their military capability. I
think it has--it could. I do not think there is any doubt about
it. I think the extent to which the army gets involved in
domestic matters with the Red Guard and other things could very
well affect their capacity to move in an assertive and an
aggressive way. We rather have the impression that the Chinese
are inward these days. That does not mean they are not manning
their radars, flying their aircraft, marching their troops, and
all the rest of it. They are. That goes on as it always has.
But it could be affected over the long term by this increasing
amount of disorder.
Senator Clark. But do you think at the present time, and I
am thinking more of logistics than I am of their firepower, do
you think they have a logistical capability of moving
successfully pretty far outside their own borders in the
absence of resistance from a major military power?
I was thinking about the Indians.
Mr. Helms. I would not like to leave that impression,
because the Chinese army has a very limited truck park, and
when they extend their logistic lines as far as Tibet and over
into the area where they would have to go down into India, they
are stretched pretty thin, indeed. I think there is a very real
question as to how far they could go in India and maintain
their forces.
Senator Clark. How about northeast Thailand?
Mr. Helms. That is a different problem. They could walk
down there rather than in India.
CURTAILING INFILTRATION FROM NORTH VIETNAM
Senator Clark. Our friend, Mr. Joseph Alsop, from day to
day expresses his views about the situation in the Vietnamese
war. What can you tell us as to the accuracy of his recent
views that the rate of infiltration from North to South Vietnam
has been very seriously curtailed as a result of various steps
which we have taken? And what can you also tell us as to the
accuracy of his view that, I think it is his view, by
implication at least, that we have so successfully curtailed
that rate of infiltration that our enemies in Vietnam are going
to have to rely from here on in primarily on Viet Cong
guerrillas who, in turn, are becoming younger and younger and
less and less effective, and they are running out of troops?
Mr. Helms. Senator Clark. I want to answer your question as
forthrightly as a man can answer it. So, let me step back just
a minute and say that we in the administration have permitted a
situation to develop in which the same sets of figures are used
by different people in different ways by adding them up and
subtracting from them and so forth to the point where there is
such a confusion about infiltration rates that an honest man
has a very hard time laying his hand on anything that makes
very much sense.
So, rather than answering Mr. Alsop's contention, I would
like to answer your question this way: We believe that the
North Vietnamese have the capability of infiltrating into the
South the number of troops that they need, require, or think
they need to maintain their forces there.
Senator Clark. Just a couple of more questions.
ARMS RACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
I am just as concerned as Senator Symington about the
danger in the arms race in the Middle East. I, too, have just
come back from there, although I did not go into the matter in
nearly as great a depth as Senator Symington.
I got the general impression based on conversations I had
with politicians, and with one conversation I had with the
Israeli chief of military intelligence, that the UAR does not
presently want to go to war with Israel because they are afraid
they would get licked. The Israelis know this. And that the
balance of power for the foreseeable future, as between the
Arab states, which more or less ring Israel, and the Israelis,
is such, that there is no present danger of an Arab attack on
Israel. How would you explain that?
Mr. Helms. I think that is correct. I would subscribe to
that. I do not think there is any doubt that the Israeli army
is far more competent than the Egyptian or any combination of
Arab armies. Their air force is much better and much better
manned.
I recognize that one should be very careful in using
characterizations, but the Egyptians have not shown any great
capability to man very well the sophisticated equipment which
the Soviets have given them. The Israelis are far better at
this and, therefore, I do not believe that any single Arab
state or probably any combination of them intends to attack
Israel these days.
RUSSIAN INTERESTS IN MIDDLE EAST
Senator Clark. I also got the view over there that the
Russians, as a political matter, were looking with rather
covetous eyes on the other end of the Red Sea, the Aden area
and the Somalia area. And that their support of the UAR in
Yemen and their view that the British pretty soon are going to
get out of Aden, and the thought that de Gaulle was shortly
going to conduct a plebiscite to see whether he should give up
French Somaliland, posed a pretty considerable threat that the
vacuum thus created might be filled, not directly by the
Russians, but by Russian--if at least not satellites, at least
allies who would be Russian oriented.
Would you comment on that?
Mr. Helms. We agree with your assessment.
SUBCOMMITTEE'S JURISDICTION
Senator Gore. With due apologies to my colleagues, could we
not stay a little more along the line of the jurisdiction of
this subcommittee.
Senator Clark. Well, I think, Mr. Chairman, if you will
excuse me saying so, and I hope you would agree with me, that
the conventional arms race in the Middle East is a problem for
the Disarmament Subcommittee of a high order of priority. These
questions of mine were intended to develop what could be done
to terminate an arms race in the interests of arms control and
disarmament.
Senator Gore. All right, proceed.
Senator Symington. Maybe it is my fault, because I was
trying in the conventional--this growing conventional danger of
the UAR with the reaction on the part of the Israelis
[Deleted.]
Senator Gore. Well, I certainly do not mean to imply that
the arms race in the Middle East is not of great importance. I
guess I had just overly anticipated that we would stay on the
ballistic and antiballistic development today. But if members
desire to go elsewhere, proceed.
Senator Clark. No, I only had one more question.
Senator Symington. It is probably my fault.
[Deleted.]
Senator Clark. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gore. Senator Cooper? Senator Pell?
JET AIRCRAFT TO JORDAN
Senator Pell. One question, along the line of Senator
Symington and Senator Clark, is we were informed by the
committee, and I am sure everybody else knows, that we were
giving a rather large supply of brand new jet airplanes, I
think, to Jordan. Would that not very much upset the present
balance from an intelligence viewpoint? Is Jordan at the low
end of the balance of terror, or whatever it is called, in that
part of the world?
Mr. Helms. The jet aircraft that we give to Jordan is not
going to upset the balance of power in the Middle East in a way
that would be dangerous in our opinion. In the first place, the
Jordanians have been one of the Arab countries that has taken a
rather moderate road, as you know, and has stood for peace and
quiet in the area. These jet planes, obviously the Israelis
object to it, and come in and make comments about it, and put
all the pressure on our government they can about it, but they
are not fearful of them.
Senator Pell. Thank you. No further questions.
MOSCOW MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM
Senator Gore. Well, I have a few more questions on the
question of ballistic defense before going to the Chinese
situation.
Now, you have indicated your judgment that, even with the
operational deployment of the Moscow System, that with a
multiple attack of sophisticated weapons without question the
screen could be successfully penetrated. Do you mean
sufficiently to destroy Moscow?
Mr. Helms. We believe so, sir. Yes.
Senator Gore. You believe so.
Now, if the Soviets successfully deployed one system around
Moscow, to what extent would this imply that the deployment of
additional systems or a multiplication of that system, or an
integration of that system with others, could possibly
neutralize or minimize the effect of an offense against them?
Mr. Helms. Well, sir, as I mentioned, we do not see any
evidence whatsoever that this Moscow System exists anywhere
else in the Soviet Union, or that they intend to install it
anywhere else in the Soviet Union. Therefore, we are of the
opinion that in the year 1967, if the United States were to
attack the Soviet Union, we would obliterate the Soviet Union.
Senator Gore. Well, that is not the purport of my question.
THE TALLINN SYSTEM
My question was, is the nature of this system such that if
it, in fact, should be multiplied----
Mr. Helms. I see.
Senator Gore [continuing]. What would be the defense
potential?
Mr. Helms. Well, it would be better than the Tallinn System
that they are presently installing. It would do a better job
than the Tallinn System which they are installing, but we
believe it would have the same defects that the Moscow System
presently has and that, therefore, we would be able to
penetrate it.
Senator Gore. Yes.
Now, coming to the Tallinn system, I have heard scientists
express the view that it is primarily for ballistic defense.
Others, as you say, including your judgment, say that it is
primarily for high defense against high, fast-flying planes.
Now, assuming that it had both capabilities, which I think
from all I have heard is likely to be the case, to what extent
it has capability is a matter of disagreement. But assuming
that it has dual capability, to what extent would it serve as
an initiation or a beginning of deployment of more so-called
Moscow Systems? Are they radically different, or are their
radars and other components, computable and supplementary?
Mr. Helms. They are sufficiently different that we do not
believe that they would be interchangeable and that you could
mix one with the other.
Senator Gore. Then, to bring this to a conclusion, you do
not now foresee a sufficient deployment of either the Moscow
System or the Tallinn system, or a multiplication or merging of
these two which would compromise seriously our strategy of
deterrence, our ability to destroy?
Mr. Helms. No, sir.
Senator Gore. Before going to the Chinese situation, are
there other questions with respect to the Russian?
Senator Symington?
Senator Symington. No, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gore. Senator Cooper?
IF RUSSIA MADE THE FIRST STRIKE
Senator Cooper. Would it be the same answer if Russia made
the first strike?
Mr. Helms. I beg your pardon, sir?
Senator Cooper. Suppose Russia made the first strike, would
your answer be the same?
Mr. Helms. Yes, sir, it is my understanding of American
capability that we could still do the job even if they made the
first strike. That is the basis on which our forces are
deployed at the present time.
Senator Cooper. With the added factor of the installation
of this system?
Mr. Helms. Yes, sir.
Senator Gore. Now, going----
Senator Symington. Just one point. I think the questions
that you have raised are terribly pertinent because our problem
is to gauge, as the ABM decision comes up for decision by
people--Senator Gore, as you know, serves on the Joint Atomic
Energy Commission--the nature and the degree of the anti-
ballistic development in the Soviet Union, correct?
Senator Gore. Yes.
FRIGHT-MONGERING ABOUT ABM
Senator Symington. With that premise, what you say to us
today, as I understand it, is that they have a very high degree
of development, very possibly around Moscow, but it is not
carried out in the rest of the country.
Mr. Helms. Correct.
Senator Symington. Is that correct?
Mr. Helms. Correct.
Senator Symington. And that does not bear out a lot of the
fright-mongering that has been going on.
I am not saying we shouldn't have an ABM system, but I am
saying you cleared that completely to me this afternoon, that
their very highly developed unit is only around one city, is
that correct?
Mr. Helms. That is correct.
Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Pell. May I ask a question?
Senator Gore. Yes.
RUSSIAN DEPLOYMENT AIMED AGAINST U.S.
Senator Pell. Are there any signs of any development vis-a-
vis China or is the whole defense to ICBM's launched from the
Continental United States?
Mr. Helms. So far the deployment looks to us as though it
was designed: (a) against the United States, in other words,
the normal missile path over which we would fire our missiles;
and (b) to defend certain particular industrial complexes
inside the Soviet Union.
We see no deployment thus far that we believe is directed
specifically at China.
Senator Pell. Thank you.
GANTRY DEVICES
Senator Gore. Now, coming to the Chinese situation, you
gave some adjectives, which I don't recall, in describing the
size of the complex for missile firing and weaponry
development. Would you break this down into gantry size? What
size thrust, what size launching pad, what size gantry do you
find?
Mr. Helms. May I ask Mr. Duckett to answer that? I have
forgotten the numbers.
Senator Pell. The what?
Senator Gore. Gantry.
I believe ours at Cape Kennedy run to--what height?
Mr. Duckett. Mr. Chairman, the gantry device involved for
the Saturn V, which, of course, is the very monstrous space
launcher, is something over 500 feet in height. However, the
more conventional missile associated or weapon associated
gantries would be customarily in the two to three hundred foot
height for our, say, Titan-Atlas type systems.
Senator Gore. In other words, if we were going to test an
ICBM of five to seven thousand miles, we would use a gantry of
in the order of 200, 250 feet?
Mr. Duckett. Yes, sir. I would add, Mr. Chairman, however,
that that in itself wouldn't, we would feel, be a guide of good
criterion because the Minuteman is launched with little, if
any, sort of a gantry at all. But I believe if I have captured
the sense of the Chairman's question, that I could best answer
the Chinese one this way. [Deleted.]
Senator Gore. In other words, to elaborate this point----
Mr. Duckett. Yes, sir.
Senator Gore. Do you think insofar as the gantry device is
concerned, or the launching pad complex, that they are now
constructing or have constructed such facilities to test an
ICBM?
Mr. Duckett. We do believe, sir, that is the most likely
function for this new launch facility, [deleted.]
[Discussion off the record.]
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE
Senator Pell. Wouldn't it be sound psychological warfare
for the Chinese to build at very little expense a bamboo
illusionary gantry to make us think they have this capability
when they really didn't?
Senator Gore. Again, off the record.
[Discussion off the record.]
Senator Gore. Back on the record.
Will you proceed?
You said that there were two measurements that you were
undertaking to determine. One was the size and height. What is
the other one?
Mr. Duckett. Mr. Chairman, if I may go off the record again
for just a moment.
[Discussion off the record.]
Senator Gore. Back on the record.
NUCLEAR THREAT FROM CHINA
In the committee hearings earlier this week, I felt it
necessary on two occasions to express some reservation to the
statements of two eminent elder statesmen of the country, whose
statements seem to me to downgrade the nuclear threat from Red
China.
From what you gentlemen have said to us, they are nearing
the test stage of an intercontinental ballistic missile. They
have had several tests of nuclear devices. Have those devices
been equal to the device with which we destroyed Hiroshima?
Mr. Helms. You answer that.
Mr. Duckett. Mr. Chairman, certainly the devices, and
particularly the last one, are well beyond the capability of
our Hiroshima bomb.
Senator Gore. That ran to the order of [deleted] as
powerful?
Mr. Duckett. Yes, sir. My understanding of the Hiroshima
bomb was on the order of 20 kilotons and in the case of the
most recent Chinese tests we believe that its yield was on the
order of [deleted].
Therefore, more than a factor of [deleted] in terms of
yield.
Senator Gore. Then, if China had one intercontinental
ballistic missile, with a warhead equal to [deleted] the weapon
that obliterated Hiroshima, and it should be trained on Tokyo
or New Delhi or even toward a Soviet city, it would surely be
something that could not be ignored.
Mr. Helms. It could not be ignored in any sense.
Senator Gore. Or for that matter on Saigon.
Mr. Helms. Or on Saigon.
CHINA'S NUCLEAR STOCKPILE
Senator Gore. Now, what is your projection of the nuclear
stockpile which China has now or will have two, five, seven
years from now, in that order?
Mr. Helms. Would you answer that, Carl, if you can.
Mr. Duckett. I would like to answer part of the question
and then I will have to get the specific projections.
I would answer that part of the question dealing with
today's stockpile, and, that is, that we believe that it is
most likely that [deleted].
Senator Gore. How large a gaseous diffusion plant do they
have?
Mr. Duckett. This part, sir, I am willing to check some
documents or offer to give you the numbers because I would hate
to have those wrong. I don't trust my head to give you that, so
I would prefer either to give you this later or attempt to dig
it out of my material.
I don't have that clearly in hand.
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I have to leave. May I ask
one question?
Senator Gore. Yes, indeed.
CHINA AS A SERIOUS NUCLEAR MENACE
Senator Symington. Mr. Helms, in a very broad way, when do
you think the Chinese will be a serious nuclear menace to the
security of the United States? What time period, very broad
guesstimate.
Mr. Helms. Well, sir, as best we can estimate it, and I
want to say I am terribly anxious not to mislead you, and I am
making these estimates with the information we have available.
But it is not adequate, in my opinion. We are talking about the
middle 1970's, but I don't know whether that is a good estimate
or not.
Senator Symington. That is what I wanted to know.
Senator Gore. Excuse me, I was talking to somebody else.
[Discussion off the record.]
Senator Gore. Well, back on the record.
DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY
The Chinese are giving top priority, are they not, to the
development of a nuclear capability?
Mr. Helms. This they are certainly doing.
Senator Gore. [Deleted.]
Senator Gore. Do they have reactors to make plutonium?
Mr. Helms. Yes.
Senator Gore. When would they have----
Mr. Helms. [Deleted.]
Senator Gore. Yes.
Now, just in a general way, when would you estimate that
the Chinese would have a stockpile of weapons in the order of a
number, say, from one to 500?
Mr. Duckett. Mr. Chairman, we have to date been unable to
actually estimate that they will stockpile numbers in the
hundreds. I say that not to infer that we do not think they
will at some date stockpile numbers such as that. Rather, to
illustrate that we believe that into the, well, into the
1970's, they will be forced to use those facilities which we
now know about. We do not see those facilities producing
numbers in the hundreds of stockpiled weapons as far ahead as
we can project from those with reasonable confidence.
So, I would simply say that our estimating to date is on
much lesser numbers. And we will certainly provide to you,
preferring to do it in a more precise way, those numbers in
this nearer term period up into the early and mid `70's. But
this does not include the hundreds of weapons in any case, sir.
THE DANGERS OF GUESSING
Senator Pell. Mr. Chairman, if you will forgive me, I would
just like to congratulate the witnesses on the conservation of
their statements and their bearing upon on what is really
known. We have seen in the past the temptation to make real
guesses into guesstimates, and I congratulate you on not
guessing. This is one of the greatest dangers on which
decisions are somewhat untenable.
Mr. Helms. Thank you, sir.
THE U.S. IS LIGHT YEARS AHEAD OF EVERYONE ELSE
Senator Cooper. What are the factors which inhibit an early
developmental capability to strike the United States?
Mr. Helms. Sir, they just have got to develop the
industrial equipment and the knowhow and all the rest of the
things to do these things, and they are in a pretty primitive
state. I think it is important that we realize that the Soviets
and the United States are light years ahead of anybody else in
the world in these fields, particularly when it comes to the
industrialization that is necessary to do this. The Chinese are
just going to have a very difficult time catching up.
But we believe that they have the capacity, the manpower
and so forth to do it, and they will get there eventually.
Senator Gore. Of course, this is a factor, it seems to me,
which may be a very troublesome and perhaps a limiting one upon
the Soviets in reaching the feeling of freedom to conclude an
agreement with us with respect to ABM vis-a-vis the United
States and Russia. That is why I was particularly interested in
developing this at this point, not so much as to when it would
be a threat to the United States, but as to its immediate
effect upon this drive by our government to conclude an
agreement with the Soviets.
Mr. Helms. Of course, this is quite possible, Mr. Chairman.
I mean what is going on in the Soviet mind on this problem is
very hard to get at, but I think you put your finger on
something that may turn out to be the case. They may say this
isn't directed at you, but we still have a problem, and that is
on our landmass, and we don't have the Pacific Ocean protecting
us.
Senator Gore. Yes. In other words, if they have a hundred
weapons aimed at the cities of Russia, and if they set up a
deterrence of their own vis-a-vis China and Russia, then all
this will be in addition to their huge land army.
Obviously, we haven't gone into the proliferation
negotiations at all.
AN ABM MORATORIUM
Now, if the United States and the Soviet Union do agree to
a moratorium on ABM, what assurances could we have, what
verification, what type of verification could we have that they
were complying with this?
Mr. Helms. Well, Senator Gore, I think that this
verification problem, as you know, has been about as
controversial in the disarmament field. I confidently feel that
we could in the intelligence community tell whether or not the
Soviets were complying about an anti-ballistic missile system.
This is the kind of system, in order to operate, that has to
have some exposure, and I think we could keep track of that
pretty well. This is not to say, if I may say so, that I would
necessarily like to go into a meeting of the executive branch
of the Government and put my hand in the fire for this because
there are certain problems which could develop in our lives
that might make this difficult for us. But in the state of the
art in 1967 we could verify it.
Senator Gore. You think you could verify it?
Mr. Helms. Yes, sir, I believe so.
Senator Gore. Particularly the installation of a system of
the sophistication of the Moscow System?
Mr. Helms. Yes, sir, because these radars are big, and they
are exposed.
Senator Gore. They have to be exposed to operate.
Mr. Helms. That is right, and they have to be big.
Senator Gore. Well, it is 25 until 5 and I suppose--Senator
Cooper, do you have a question before we conclude?
Senator Cooper. No, thank you.
Senator Gore. We want to thank you. It is entirely possible
that other members of the subcommittee would have some
questions, and, in fact, we will want to talk with you about
the non-proliferation situation a little further.
We will have to call you when we can arrange a date.
Mr. Helms. Thank you, sir. I would be glad to appear at any
time.
Senator Gore. Thank you. You have been very helpful.
Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the subcommittee recessed,
subject to call of the chair.]
STATUS OF DEVELOPMENT OF BALLISTIC AND ANTI-BALLISTIC SYSTEMS IN U.S.,
AND BRIEFING ON NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY
----------
Monday, February 6, 1967
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Disarmament
of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC
The, subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:20 a.m.,
in room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Albert Gore (chairman of
the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Gore (presiding), Lausche, Clark, Pell,
McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Williams, Case, and Cooper.
Also present: Lt. Col. E. L. Harper, USAF; Lt. Col. A. B.
Outlaw, USAF; Col. Wm. B. Arnold, USAF; Maj. Christopher, ACDA,
Congressional Liaison; Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director, Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency; Herbert Scoville, Jr.,
Assistant Director, Science & Technology Bureau; and Charles N.
Van Doren, Deputy General Counsel.
Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, and Mr. Bader, of the committee staff.
[This hearing was published in 1967 with deletions made for
reasons of national security. The most significant deletions
are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the
remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the
published hearings.]
STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN S. FOSTER Jr., DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE
RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
* * * * * * *
CONTROVERSY OVER VALUE OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE [P. 4]
The first controversy arose around the question, ``Could a
bullet hit a bullet?'' This phase passed, first when
calculations showed the feasibility of such an intercept, and
later and most definitely when successful intercepts of actual
ICBM targets fired from Vandenberg AFB were accomplished by the
old NlKE ZEUS system in 1962-63. We had 10 out of 14 successful
intercepts with the average miss distance less than 470 feet--a
distance at which destruction is assured from a nuclear burst.
After this ``simple'' problem was solved, it was realized
that the offense would replace the easy-to-intercept single
warhead with clouds of objects, or take other deceptive
measures. Examples of these objects were decoys designed to
look like warheads to the radar, and chaff designed to conceal
the warhead in a cloud of light objects. Against those more
sophisticated targets there was a necessity for the defense to
discriminate among them so as to know which objects to take
under fire. Hence, many objects might have to be tracked and
observed simultaneously. Also, it might be necessary for the
defense to wait for atmospheric reentry of the targets and rely
on slow-down and burn-up of the lighter objects before this
discrimination could be accomplished.
If you turn to the page and then turn the whole assembly
sidesways, you will see a figure which depicts the kind of
things that go on under the worst conditions during an attack.
Up in the right-hand corner, you see a cloud. This is
intended to represent the situation when there are large
numbers of objects coming in a very large distribution of
chaff. The radar, and looking at it at a distance of several
hundred miles, sees it merely as a cloud, and can acquire and
track that cloud as it comes into the vicinity of the target.
When the cloud has reached a distance of about a hundred
miles, it then is possible for the radar to distinguish
different objects within the cloud, and to make a designation
on several of them.
Subsequently, however, if you get to the lower left-hand,
you will see that the cloud itself stops, and at ranges of 25
to 50 miles one would expect to see individual objects
penetrating through the atmosphere toward the target. As you
see in this case, some of them are indicated as radiating.--
radar jamming--and others are merely decoys looking like
reentry vehicles. Still others must be considered to be reentry
vehicles including thermonuclear war heads.
DEFECTS OF NIKE-ZEUS SYSTEM WERE REMOVED
Turn now back to the middle of page 2. The old NIKE ZEUS
system, when confronted with these more sophisticated targets,
had two fatal defects. One was that it used what are now
considered to be old-fashioned mechanical radars, which had to
be mechanically slewed or pointed at each target in turn. This
required a matter of seconds.
One practically had to have a radar for each target. The
ZEUS missile could not be delayed in firing until atmospheric
reentry of the targets took place, because it was too slow.
Hence, discrimination could not be aided by atmospheric
filtering.
Because of these defects, the NIKE X concept was born.
First, the mechanical radars of NIKE ZEUS were replaced by
phased array radars, which by varying the electrical phase of
the power over the face of a fixed antenna array could change
the direction of the radar beam in a matter of microseconds
(Figure 2). This imparted a capability of tracking many objects
simultaneously, and thus removed one of the ZEUS defects.
Second, a very high-performance short-range interceptor
missile, the SPRINT was introduced, capable of flying to 80,000
feet in 10 seconds. It was smaller, cheaper, and had much
higher acceleration than ZEUS, and thus could afford to wait
until reentry of the targets before being committed to fire.
Atmospheric filtering was now feasible, and the remaining
targets could be attacked with the high firepower SPRINT'.
The old ZEUS interceptor was retained in the system for
long range attacks on simple targets. We now had two
interceptors--the ZEUS weighing 24,000 pounds, three-stage,
carrying a nuclear [deleted] warhead, and designed to intercept
out to about 75 miles; and the SPRINT, 7,400 pounds, two-stage,
carrying a [deleted] warhead, and designed to intercept out to
about 20 miles.
The NIKE X development, initiated in 1963, was thus much
more effective than the old ZEUS system. It must be noted,
however, that it was essentially a ``terminal defense'' system.
The SPRINT effective radius was about 20 miles, which meant
that it could only defend cities or selected sites. Hence,
since it is obviously impractical to deploy terminal defenses
at every small city or village in the United States, it was
subject to a by-pass attack. That is to say, an enemy could
always target the undefended cities and obtain high casualties.
This option was available even to unsophisticated opponents.
The sophisticated opponent, by concentrating his firepower,
could overwhelm the defense at any selected defended site.
DEVELOPMENT OF ``AREA DEFENSE''
The next important development in defense effectiveness
came with the introduction of ``area defense'' in the period
1964-65. I would like to define the term ``area defense.'' The
concept is presented pictorially in Figure 3.
The detection sensor is the Perimeter Acquisition Radar
(PAR) which detects ballistic missiles at long ranges of
approximately 1,600 n.m. This is about the range at which an
incoming missile appears above the horizon. The PAR radar
tracks the incoming missile and predicts its future path. To
intercept the incoming missile, we employ the SPARTAN missile
which is a long range interceptor developed from the old NIKE-
ZEUS. Once the PAR radar has predicted the future path of the
target, a SPARTAN missile is fired so as to intercept it.
Senator Clark. Well, it is a missile, isn't it? It is also
a target.
Dr. Foster. That is correct.
Senator Gore. It is your target.
Dr. Foster. That is correct.
Senator Clark. It is their missile.
Dr. Foster. Well, their missile is a complete system on the
pad. Shortly after boost the re-entry vehicle and multiple
object if there are to be multiple objects are severed off.
Senator Clark. It is semantics, but I want to clear what
you are talking about. What you mean is that the object which
is intended to explode on American target is what you are
talking about when you say you are going to intercept it at
1,660 miles.
Dr. Forster. Yes, that is correct. Acquire at 1,600 miles
and subsequently intercept it at some shorter distances.
Senator Clark. Yes.
Dr. Foster. This interceptor has a range of over 400 miles,
and intercepts the incoming missile well above the atmosphere.
Because of its long range, the SPARTAN can intercept incoming
missiles directed at targets several hundred miles from the
SPARTAN battery location. Thus, because each SPARTAN battery
can defend a fairly large area, it requires only about 14
batteries to provide coverage of the entire continental United
States. The SPARTAN missile is guided by a missile site radar
(MSR) which is associated with each battery. The PAR radars
would be defended with short range high performance SPRINT
missiles to prevent their being targeted first to blind the
defense.
CHANGE IN CONCEPT OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS
The advance which made area defense feasible was a change
in the concept of the nuclear warhead. The SPARTAN warhead is a
high-yield nuclear warhead with a high-energy X-ray output
(``the hot bomb''). Such a warhead, and particularly a large-
yield warhead, substantially increases the kill radius of the
interceptor at altitudes of, say, 300,000 feet.
Senator Clark. When you say kill radius, you are talking
about killing the missile and not killing a lot of people?
Dr. Foster. That is correct. It is the radius at which we
can be confident of killing----
Senator Clark. Destroying?
Dr. Foster [continuing]. An incoming warhead.
Senator Gore. Well,----
Dr. Foster. Destroying it.
Senator Gore. Since Senator Clark has made this
interruption, I Wonder if you could indicate here just what
would be the kill radius from X-rays?
Dr. Foster. The kill radius from X-rays takes place above a
hundred thousand feet as the major mechanism for kill of enemy
warheads, and above these altitudes the kill radius is assumed
to be about 10 miles against hardened Soviet warheads.
Senator Gore. When you say, let's understand what you mean.
If we are speaking of the same term when we are saying radius,
are you speaking of five miles each way from the detonation?
Dr. Foster. I mean 10 miles each way.
Senator Gore. Then you are speaking 20 miles radius?
Dr. Foster. Yes, sir, I am speaking of a sphere 20 miles in
diameter. If there are any objects within that sphere with our
explosion at the center, then we would believe that they are
destroyed.
Now, in actual fact today the community would agree that we
would destroy the existing--the system we are talking about,
could, if it were deployed destroy the existing Soviet warheads
at much greater distances.
Senator Gore. When you reduce your diameter of the sphere
to 20 miles you think that would be the minimum of any
foreseeable sophistication of incoming weapons?
Dr. Foster. Well, Mr. Chairman, I believe that it is
possible in time to configure re-entry vehicle and the
thermonuclear warheads within them so that they could sustain
even greater x-ray intensities than those I have indicated. The
number of 10 miles I associate with the kind of hardening that
can be achieved by the Soviets during the few years after our
initial deployment of such a system.
Senator Gore. What do you mean a few years, just an order?
Dr. Foster. Five years.
Senator Gore. And say it would take us three years to
deploy.
Dr. Foster. We could have a system, say, by 1973 and I
would claim that the effectiveness of the U.S. ballistic
missile defense would be about 10 miles against Soviet radar--
excuse me, Soviet reentry vehicles in the field through until
1978.
LENGTH OF TIME TO IMPROVE U.S. OFFENSE
Senator Gore. A very pertinent question here is the time
element with respect to our own improvement of reentry of our
own missiles. The Soviets are now deploying a system, the
Tallinn System, over some 26 other areas. How long will--if we
proceed upon the tactical philosophy of improving our offense
as the best defense, in what period of time will we be able to
accomplish this hardening and improvement which you think it
would take the Soviets five years to accomplish?
Dr. Foster. Well, Mr. Chairman, we have, as you know, been
working aggressively on this general area ever since 1961, and
currently have in our missiles the products of the program. We
are, however, continuing to increase the hardness of the
reentry vehicle so although the systems deployed by 1969 will
be harder than those currently deployed and those by 1971 will
be still harder. I believe I may have given the committee some
misunderstanding with respect to your earlier question.
It is not so much-- the kill radius that we talked about
for the U.S. high-yield warhead associated with SPARTAN is not
so much to make sure that we can kill the object we are aiming
at. We can surely do that because, as I indicated, we had been
able in 1962 and '63 to bring a missile to within a few hundred
feet of an incoming ICBM.
It is important, however, because it forces the enemy, if
he wishes to attack with many objects coming in simultaneously
from one missile, to put each of these objects a large distance
from its neighbors, and so in trying to kill them all at once
we can only be sure of killing things out to a radius of 10
miles.
Senator Clark. From where?
Dr. Foster. From the point of detonation. All of the other
objects, if they are to still survive, must be outside of that.
That then forces the enemy to either use lighter warheads,
lighter objects that he can throw to larger distances, or more
propellant to throw them to larger distances, or more
propellant to throw them to larger distances.
Well, to continue----
DEVELOPMENT OF PERIMETER ACQUISITION RADAR (PAR)
Senator Aiken. May I ask you one question there? Is it
possible to change direction of a missile at specified
distances from the target?
Dr. Foster During flight, Senator?
Senator Aiken. Yes.
Dr. Foster. Yes, it is.
Senator Aiken. And have you developed a PAR so that it will
adapt itself to change in the direction of the missile?
Dr. Foster. Yes, we have, Senator.
Senator Aiken. Our defenses, will they change with the
direction?
Dr. Foster. Yes, that is a particular feature of the PAR
radar.
Senator Aiken. That is a particular feature of PAR?
Dr. Foster. That it can track essentially instantaneously
over a large volume of the sky.
POSEIDON MISSILE
Senator Gore. Doctor Foster, as I recall it, the C.I.A. was
unable to verify that the Soviets had accomplished a multiple
warhead missile such as our Poseidon. How far are we along in
the development of a multiple warhead missile?
Dr. Foster. Well, Mr. Chairman, as you know, we have
already deployed in the Polaris system the A-3 missile--excuse
me, the A-3 contains three separate warheads.
Senator Gore. Yes. But the Poseidon has----
Dr. Foster. The Poseidon could have as many as 14 separate
warheads.
Senator Gore. That is what I thought. When will this be----
Dr. Foster. That is to be deployed beginning 1970.
Senator Gore. And our nuclear submarines will be redesigned
to carry the Poseidon instead of the Polaris?
Dr. Foster. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Senator Clark. Is this a big job of redesigning?
Dr. Foster. Yes, it is a fairly thorough redesign.
Senator Aiken. You want to change the design of the
submarine?
Dr. Foster. No, it is not so much----
Senator Aiken. Torpedo tubes or what?
Dr. Foster. It is not so much the redesign of the
submarine. The boats are essentially the same.
One uses new equipment in the control of the missile.
Senator Aiken. I see.
Dr. Foster. And, of course, a brand new missile that is to
go basically in the same tubes.
Senator Gore. There are, of course, some differences in
assessment of our intelligence units. I wonder in this instance
if the Armed Services intelligence would agree with the C.I.A.
that there is no hard evidence that the Soviets have developed
a multiple head.
Dr. Foster. I believe the intelligence community is in
agreement that there is no hard evidence that the Soviets have
developed a multiple warhead capability.
Senator Gore. Has their science academy announced such?
Have the Soviets made claims of such?
Dr. Foster. Not to my knowledge, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to draw your attention to a terribly important
difference between multiple warheads and the so-called MIRV.
Multiple warheads as it is used in the A-3 missile simply means
three, in this case, three warheads on a single missile. And a
plan----
Senator Gore. Will you say that again?
Dr. Foster. The current missile aboard Polaris submarines--
--
Senator Gore. You are speaking of our missiles now?
Dr. Foster. That is correct; yes--has three warheads on the
top of the missile.
Senator Gore. Yes.
Dr. Foster. The design is such that after the missile is
fired and the reentry vehicle section is separated from the
rest of the booster system the separate warheads and their
reentry vehicles are directed to separate trajectories in
space, such that they would fall on the ground at different
times but make approximately an equilateral triangle with their
aim point, with their impact points around the central aiming
point. This separation----
Senator Gore. In other words, they would arrive on the same
target but with different trajectories and, therefore,
different times?
Dr. Foster. Yes, that is correct. They burst with a
separation distance of about two kilometers on a side.
Now, that separation, that deployment arrangement, is
designed in at the factory, so to speak.
Now, there is a quite different system to be aboard the
Poseidon and the Minuteman III. This system involves an
entirely separate propulsion system after the burnout of the
last stage. This propulsion system has guidance and a program
to take each of its payloads to a different target that is put
on the guidance by the commander of the vehicle.
Senator Gore. This is the MIRV?
Dr. Foster. This is the MIRV.
Senator Gore. Yes.
Dr. Foster. This propulsion system, then, under the
direction of guidance, orients the whole vehicle on a
trajectory which will load to impact on a specified point. At
that stage, it eases off one of the payloads, which will then
subsequently go to that impact point. The propulsion system,
then, again under the direction of the guidance, reorients the
remainder of the payload on to a new target. When it is on the
course toward the new target, it eases off a second payload,
and so on, until it is discharged, in the case of Poseidon, as
much as 14 different reentry vehicles.
Senator Gore. One of the 14 is discharged?
Dr. Foster. That is correct. But not at high velocity.
Senator Gore. Yes.
Senator Cooper. May I ask a question?
The A-3 then is directed toward one target?
Dr. Foster. That is correct.
Senator Cooper. The other systems you talk about, the
Poseidon and the Minuteman----
Dr. Foster. Yes.
Senator Cooper [continuing]. The payloads, as you call it,
could be separated and they could be directed to----
Dr. Foster Different cities.
Senator Cooper [continuing]. As many targets as it is
desired.
Dr. Foster. That is correct.
MISSILE ACQUISITION
And continuing, Mr. Chairman, this high yield warhead in
the SPARTAN has a substantially increased kill radius for the
interceptor at altitudes about 300,000 feet. The lethal range
increases from a few hundred feet to several miles.
Consequently, the offense is unable to rely on relatively
small clouds of confusing objects a few miles in radius.
To carry this warhead, a larger interceptor----
Senator Gore. What do you mean clouds? You don't mean
natural clouds?
Dr. Foster. No. sir.
Senator Gore. The cloud created by the----
Dr. Foster. A dispersal of the large mass of tinfoil. Call
it chaff.
Senator Gore. In other words, artificial clouds?
Dr. Foster. Yes. Artificial.
I believe you can see it on Figure 1.
Senator Gore. I saw that. But I wanted to be sure--you are
not speaking of any sort of possible natural phenomenon?
Dr. Foster. No, sir, I am not.
Senator Gore. No matter how intense it might be?
Dr. Foster. That is correct.
Senator Gore. Okay.
SPARTAN REPLACED THE ZEUS
Dr. Foster. To carry this warhead, a larger interceptor
than the old ZEUS missile was required. The SPARTAN missile
weighs about 35,000 pounds, is three-stage, carries a [deleted]
warhead, and is designed to intercept at about 300 miles or
more.
With the introduction of SPARTAN, the ZEUS interceptor was
no longer required--in effect, the SPARTAN replaced the ZEUS.
Figure 4 shows the ``footprint'' on a map of the U.S.
defended by a SPARTAN battery. A footprint is the area defended
by SPARTAN from a specific direction of attack. The SPARTAN
might intercept directly overhead an ICBM aimed at a point
several hundred miles away.
Comparatively few SPARTAN batteries can defend the whole
United States from simple attacks. Figure 5 shows an example of
14 SPARTAN batteries, with four PAR radars located across the
northern U.S. border, defending against an ICBM threat from the
Chinese Peoples Republic.
Senator Clark. That is what CPR means?
Dr. Foster. Yes.
You will note I said simple attacks. It is still possible
for a sophisticated opponent, by warheading hardening and by
separating his incoming clouds of objects into widely separated
clumps, to confuse the defense and make the firepower demands
on SPARTAN too high. In this case, terminal defense SPRINT's
must be relied upon if we are to furnish a defense.
Senator Gore. I am violating may own suggestion, but maybe
we had better reconsider. I find this so difficult that it may
be helpful to others as well as me to ask a few questions as we
go along.
Dr. Foster. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
DEFENSE AGAINST A SIMPLE ATTACK
Senator Gore. Now, do I correctly understand that this
defense against a so-called simple attack described here on
Figure 5 that that would be roughly what is referred to in the
press, otherwise as the thin defense?
Dr. Foster. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gore. That is the system, the cost of which would
be anticipated, say from four to six billion dollars?
Dr. Foster. For the defense of the United States only would
be in the vicinity of three to four billion.
Senator Cooper. How much?
Dr. Foster. Three to four billion.
Senator Gore. That is the defense against the relatively
unsophisticated weapons which the Chinese are now developing?
Dr. Foster. Yes.
Senator Gore. Thank you.
Senator Clark. Would you yield, Albert?
Senator Gore. No, anybody. Let's just ask some questions as
we go along.
COST OF CITIES' DEFENSE
Senator Clark. The thing that bothers me is he says on page
6, which he hasn't got to yet, that the cost of the 25-city
defense would be $10 billion of the 50 cities defense $20
billion. So, I wondered how that correlated with the very much
lower figure which you just mentioned.
Of course, he has not gotten to it.
Dr. Foster. Mr. Chairman, if I may I would like to read
that point and then answer the question.
DEFINITION OF A BATTERY
Senator Cooper. May I ask a question here? Will you define
battery?
Dr. Foster. A battery, Senator, is a site. A location where
one has a radar and a number of defensive missiles.
Senator Cooper. I notice in your first drawing on page 4,
what you call the SPARTAN footprint.
Dr. Foster. Yes, sir, that indicates----
Senator Cooper. Would it need more than one battery to
protect that footprint area?
Dr. Foster. No, sir. Rreferring again to Figure 4, you see
an area outlined there in the central portion, in the northeast
portion, of the United States. In the upper region of that
area, you will notice a dark triangle. That is intended to
indicate the point at which the radar and the SPARTAN missiles
are located.
Senator Cooper. Yes.
Dr. Foster. From that point then the missile can defend the
area indicated by the surrounding line.
Senator Clark. What do those little plus signs mean?
Dr. Foster. I believe, Senator, those are the intersection
of the lines of longitude and latitude.
Senator Cooper. Would a battery have several missiles?
Dr. Foster. Oh, yes. It could have, for example, 20 or 30
missiles.
Senator Cooper. To protect an area such as designated on
the map, do you have any idea how many missiles would be
required?
Dr. Foster. We would plan on 20 to 30.
Senator Cooper. Twenty to thirty?
Senator Clark. Looking at Figure 5 which you mentioned,
would you define what the phrase at the top of the figure means
``Minimum Energy (23) Attack from E. China.'' What does that
mean?
Dr. Foster. It refers to an attack coming from the eastern
portion of China, attempting to get maximum range from the
missile, which, in turn, would amount to a reentry vehicle
coming into the United States at an angle of 23 degrees from
the horizon.
Senator Clark. What does minimum energy mean?
Dr. Foster. Yes, I am afraid I forgot to take that----
Senator Clark. I thought it meant 23 missiles.
Dr. Foster. I forgot to take that technical designation off
the graph.
Senator Gore. I hope that my colleagues will now see why
twice last week I felt the necessity of raising a reservation
at the hearing with Ambassador Kennan and Ambassador Reischauer
who tended to downgrade the importance of the Chinese
development.
When the Secretary of Defense tells us that he anticipates,
and the C.I.A., and the Atomic Energy Commission tell us that
they expect the Chinese to test an intercontinental ballistic
missile of from five to seven thousand mile range this coming
summer, and that we see from satellite pictures that their
laboratories for nuclear development are as large as ours, in
some cases larger, than it is anticipated that the Chinese will
have the capability of making just such an unsophisticated
nuclear ballistic missile attack on the United States as this
defense in Figure 5 is calculated to provide a defense against.
It that true?
Dr. Foster. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The defense position as
indicated by Figure 5 as designed to provide defense of the
United States against Chinese attack amounting to tens of
missiles successfully reaching the area of the United States.
Senator Gore. Well, for the benefit of my colleagues, the
Atomic Energy experts estimated that within five years the
Chinese would likely have both missile and warheads in the
order of hundreds.
I don't know that--now, the C.I.A., may I say, the other
Friday did not agree with that estimate. They did not exactly
put an estimate upon time, and since you----
Dr. Foster. Mr. Chairman, I will check for the record. I
believe we cannot give you hard evidence to support several, to
report a statement, saying that, to the effect that the Chinese
could have several hundred warhead in five years.
Senator Gore. I didn't say several!
Dr. Foster. A hundred.
Senator Gore. They were asked the question, not by me but I
think by Senator Pastore, whether in five years their stockpile
would be termed in dozens and hundreds or in thousands. There
were three experts there and, as I recall it, they conferred
among themselves and thought it more nearly would be measured
by hundreds rather than dozens or thousands. That is a very
inexact estimate, but if this is designed to protect, say,
against tens----
Dr. Foster. Successfully reaching the United States.
Senator Gore. Yes.
Dr. Foster. That means one would have to multiply by two or
three to take care of reliability, lack of reliability.
Senator Gore. I am not trying to specify the danger, but I
am trying to indicate to my colleagues this certainly is not
something that can be taken lightly.
TESTIMONY OF INTELLIGENCE EXPERTS
Senator Clark. Albert could you clarify for the record who
these experts were; were these Atomic Energy employees?
Senator Gore. Yes.
Senator Clark. And not CIA and not Pentagon?
Senator Gore. One of them is the head of the Los Alamos
Laboratory, and the other was Dr. Brandbury. I can get that for
you, if you would like.
I think we should have them here, too.
Senator Clark. I think so, too. Because I take it from what
you say, and I didn't know it, that the Atomic Energy
Commission has its own bunch of intelligence experts who may
not agree with either DOD intelligence or CIA intelligence. Is
that correct?
Senator Gore. Well, I think--well, the Atomic Energy
Commission has a great deal of intelligence work which they
have done with respect to detonations by any country. They play
a very little role in the intelligence effort with respect to
proliferation.
Senator Clark. Which would overlap the covering of the same
subject by DOD intelligence and CIA intelligence.
Senator Gore. I think that is a reasonable statement.
Do you agree with that, Doctor?
Dr. Foster. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
[Deleted.]
Senator Clark. But sometimes don't agree. At least, I
gather from what you said----
Dr. Foster. That is correct, yes.
Senator Gore. But, by and large, [deleted].
Dr. Foster. Yes, when Mr. Helms or Mr. McNamara gives a
statement on what the community's position is, it has always
included a full treatment of the opinions and thoughts and
ideas of the technical members of the Atomic Energy
Commission's laboratories.
Senator Clark. Were those the only three who do this
detailed technical intelligence work for our Government--DOD,
CIA and the Atomic Energy Commission? For example, nobody over
at ACDA does any of this?
Dr. Foster. No, sir, I believe the answer to your question
is correct.
Senator Gore. What about NASA?
Dr. Foster. They do not generally get into this work.
Senator Gore. You have then these three agencies.
Dr. Foster. Yes, that is correct.
Senator Gore. If it is agreeable with the subcommittee,
since we have had the CIA and the DOD, it might be well to have
the AEC.
Senator Clark. I would think so.
Senator Gore. Would you agree, Senator Cooper?
Senator Cooper. Yes.
MINIMUM ENERGY ATTACK
Senator Clark. Before you leave this, Dr. Foster, I wonder
if you could define a little more in layman's terms than you
have so far what this phrase on figure 5, ``Minimum Energy (23)
Attack from East China.'' means. I have particular reference to
what you mean by minimum energy, and again because I did not
get it the last time, what 23 stands for.
Dr. Foster. Yes, Senator. Imagine stepping back 5,000 or
10,000 miles from the earth and see what is happening from a
point on earth. One can launch a missile and have it cover a
trajectory of a few thousand miles and land at another point.
One has the option of deciding just how the missile reentry
vehicle reenters the atmosphere. One can, so to speak, loft the
missile. One can point it up to a very high angle, and have it
go rather far from the earth, and then come in to the target
very steeply.
Senator Clark. Like a lob in tennis as opposed to a drive.
Dr. Foster. Exactly. However, if you wanted to get maximum
range, you would not lob it quite so highly. So this refers to
angles that are of a trajectory that are set to give you the
maximum range, and hence--or to reach those targets, use
minimum energy. That is what the minimum energy refers to. 23
degrees refers to the angle between the line left by the
reentry vehicle and the horizon, horizontal.
Senator Clark. And your opinion is, I think I have got it
right, you opinion is that such an attack is a definite
possibility from the Chinese People's Republic with a total of
missiles in the general vicinity more or less of a hundred
within how long a time?
Dr. Foster. I do not recall the intelligence estimates on
this for a hundred missiles.
Senator Clark. Just give us a wide range.
Dr. Foster. For example, I will correct this for the record
if I may. I recall that one could have--the estimate is that
one could have about ten missiles by 1972 to '73, and 30, a
significant number of missile, by 1974 to '75.
Senator Clark. That is good enough for me.
* * * * * * *
Dr. Foster. Mr. Chairman, I believe Mr. McNamara's posture
statement treats that subject very, very carefully. Let me try
to help here.
From the point of view of providing assured destruction of
the Soviet Union, that is to say from the point of view of
having enough military capability in the United States so that
our strategic forces could absorb an all-out attack by the
Soviet Union and to, in turn, deliver destruction that we would
consider totally unacceptable to them on to the Soviet Union,
it is Mr. McNamara's position, and I agree, that the deployment
of ballistic missile defenses by the United States is not
required.
Senator Gore. That is vis-a-vis the United States and the
Soviet Union.
Dr. Foster. Or for that matter China.
Senator Gore. Well, China's power of defenses as of now is
nowhere in the order of the Soviets.
Dr. Foster. So, from that point of view of maintaining
assured destruction capability of the United States, there is
no need to deploy new or for the foreseeable future ballistic
missile defenses.
DEFENSE SECRETARY'S ATTITUDE TOWARD ANTIBALLISTIC DEFENSE [P. 10]
Senator Gore. What you are really saying here, it seems to
me, is that the Soviet deployment of the Moscow and Tallinn
systems do not compromise our power of retaliation. Therefore,
it does not compromise the strategy of deterrence.
Dr. Foster. The Soviet deployment of ballistic missile
defensive systems does affect the ability of equipment to
penetrate and so as we see them deploy----
Senator Gore. You said that.
Dr. Foster [continuing]. Initiate whatever changes are
necessary to make the penetration.
Senator Gore. I understand. But you say that we are capable
of making such improvement in our missiles that regardless of
the defenses now envisioned within their capability----
Dr. Foster. Yes, that is correct.
Senator Gore [continuing]. That we will continue to have an
assured capacity of sufficient destruction in the Soviet Union
that we would have a retaliatory threat, even after the Soviets
made a first attack, of sufficient magnitude that it would not
seriously compromise our strategy of deterrence.
Dr. Foster. Yes. That is correct.
Senator Gore. Now, what I am trying to understand is the
position of the Department of Defense. As you know, of course,
Mr. Vance will be here and you referred to him before. What I
am trying to get at is what is the position of the Department
of Defense, or what is your own view of the necessity of
building at some appropriate time a defense against a Chinese
threat such as is contemplated within that possibility of your
figure 5? Do I make myself clear?
Dr. Foster. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
* * * * * * *
ADEQUACY OF U.S. SILOS [P. 11]
Dr. Foster. Well, Senator, the ballistic missile defense
system--excuse me, components that we have developed over the
last several years can be used to protect the United States
population, as I have indicated, against Soviet attacks, if
they are light, and they can be used to protect us against
Chinese attack.
They, however, can also be deployed to protect our
MINUTEMAN-silos.
The reason we might want to do that is simply because in
the last two years the Soviets have concentrated on increasing
the number of their hardened and dispersed ICBMs. As a
consequence, they can soon--could soon have the capability to
destroy a large number of U.S. MINUTEMEN if they chose to put
accurate guidance in their current designs. They do not at the
moment have accurate guidance. So the Soviets cannot, in my
opinion, have any substantial effect on MINUTEMAN deployment.
If however, in the future they were to get an accurate
delivery capability, then they could indeed begin to take out
substantial numbers of our MINUTEMAN force.
Our response to this degradation could take a number of
forms. One that is being seriously considered is the deployment
of a ballistic missile defense system of those silos.
Senator Gore. Another are submarines.
Dr. Foster. Yes. We could put in additional or improved
submarines.
Senator Gore. Another possibly would be a moveable
launching pad?
Dr. Foster. On land.
Senator Gore. On land?
Dr. Foster. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gore. Are there others?
Dr. Foster. Yes. We could deploy a larger missile in or
near the current fixed MINUTEMAN sites and provide defense
again for that.
Senator Gore. I do not understand.
Dr. Foster. One of the concerns about the current MINUTEMAN
in the event of a substantial increase in Soviet capabilities
is its limited payload, and so one might think of an improved
capability involving a 5,000 to 10,000 pound payload missile
installed essentially in the current MINUTEMAN network. Such a
missile would have a substantially higher value than the
current MINUTEMAN, and hence would--the defense of such missile
would be far more attractive
Senator Gore. I understand. You said larger missiles with
better defenses.
Dr. Foster. Yes.
Senator Gore. Okay. So you have these four ways in which
you might react if the Soviets developed or perfected a
guidance system which would give them the capability of taking
out MINUTEMAN silos.
Dr. Foster. Yes.
Senator Gore. Any further questions, Senator Cooper?
Senator Cooper. No.
* * * * * * *
Dr. Foster. Penetration aids program.
You will note that I have described a flexible set of
building blocks consisting of PAR and MSR radars and two types
of interceptor missiles, SPARTAN and SPRINT. We also have a
very large, sophisticated radar called TACMAR, designed
specifically against sophisticated attacks. They can be put
together in various ways to provide varying levels of defense
against different threats.
For example, if we wished to defend the United States
against a large Soviet attack, we would provide an overlay of
an area defense such as I have described. As I mentioned
earlier, however, it would be necessary to depend primarily on
terminal SPRINT defenses, including TACMARS, at selected
cities. A 25-city defense (including the area component) would
cost about $10 billion. A 50-city defense would cost almost $20
billion.
TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE [P. 12]
As a matter of technical judgment, I believe that these
larger deployments carry with them technical risks. The
likelihood of large and sophisticated attacks with the
deployment of significant U.S. defenses increases the technical
uncertainty of the defensive system. In the absence of
atmospheric nuclear tests, we simply cannot calculate all the
effects of many simultaneous nuclear explosions. We would have
to expect that in an all-out exchange, dozen of their warheads
would likely explode in our cities.
By the way--this is likely whether or not we have
atmospheric tests.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that sums up the technical
assessment of BMD. It has changed greatly in recent years and
no doubt will continue to change. That is why, even in the
absence of a deployment decision, a high-priority R&D program
is so necessary.
BIOLOGICAL DAMAGE RESULTING FROM DETONATIONS
Senator Gore. I would say to the subcommittee that Dr.
Foster has requested, if possible, he would like to be excused
pretty soon. How urgent is this, Doctor?
Dr. Foster. It is not very urgent, Mr. Chairman. I am at
your convenience.
Senator Gore. Thank you, Doctor.
I would like explore one question with you and then yield
to my colleagues. At our last tests in the atmosphere over
Johnson Island, communication was knocked out for a period of
hours. I realize that this communication may not have been at
frequencies which our signal system in the missiles may operate
at, but it does raise a very serious problem, a very serious
danger, it seems to me, that the detonation of a nuclear
explosion designed specifically to conglomerate communication
might compromise our own radar signal systems. Do I
sufficiently describe the problem to elicit an answer?
Dr. Foster. You certainly do, Mr. Chairman.
We were aware in the 1958 period and subsequently that
detonations at high altitudes could give rise to
electromagnetic signals of rather high intensity and hence we
planned those experiments in 1962.
As a result of the measurements that were taken, all of the
subsequent studies of our assured destruction forces, as well
as our ballistic missile defense examinations, have included a
thorough consideration of these effects. Specifically, for
example, we have chosen the frequencies of the ballistic
missile defense systems in the NIKE-ZEUS program so as to
minimize these effects. Our communications program involving
satellites is designed in large measure to avoid disruption of
the service because of this effect. In our offensive forces,
the MINUTEMAN and POSEIDON are being configured so that
warheads in those missiles can be burst at very high altitude
so as to maximize the difficulties that are inherent in any
Soviet systems.
Senator Gore. Let us see if I understand what you said in
your last statement. Our own offensive missiles are being
configured and designed so as to explode at varying altitudes,
thus complicating, if not compromising or minimizing, the
effect of the Soviet antiballistic missile defense system.
Dr. Foster. No, Mr. Chairman. I am afraid I was not
sufficiently clear on that point.
Senator Gore. Is that true? Are we seeking to?
Dr. Foster. Mr. Chairman, to maximize the disturbance on
communications, one must burst the warhead not near the ground
but near the top of the atmosphere. To do so, however, requires
that you have the necessary command mechanisms in the missile
system, and what I indicated was that in our advanced POLARIS
and MINUTEMAN systems we are going to have a procedure and a
configuration such that if desired we can burst the warheads at
the optimum altitude to cause the greatest electromagnetic
disturbance to communications in the Soviet Union.
Senator Gore. Well then, the answer is yes.
Dr. Foster. Yes, sir.
Senator Gore. Now, turning it again to our defense problem,
will you describe the possibility of the Soviets and possibly
later the Chinese utilizing electronics in the same way to
disturb our own detection defense, if we relied upon such a
system?
Dr. Foster. All right. This is in the event we deployed a
ballistic missile defense.
Senator Gore. Yes.
Dr. Foster. What measures are we taking, have we taken, or
would we take, to minimize the possibility of disruption.
Senator Gore. With what possible success or failure.
Dr. Foster. Well, Mr. Chairman, we have recently, on
considering the NIKE X system, changed the frequency of the PAR
radar, the perimeter acquisition radar, which I described
earlier, so as to minimize the difficulty from this particular
tactic.
At the very outset the frequencies of MSR and TACMAR radars
were sufficiently high so that the disturbances that could be
caused by such tactics were very temporary.
Senator Gore. Well, very temporary--if it is a matter of
seconds it might be fatal.
Dr. Foster. Well, Mr. Chairman, the whole engagement takes
place over 5 to 10 minutes on any one threat, and the blackout
to our high frequency radars occurs over a few tens of seconds
to a minute. It is that kind of a time scale.
Senator Gore. I know on one of your tables here we are able
to--the missile, a possible hostile missile, would appear over
the horizon at, say, 300 seconds from the time of our earliest
possible interception. If you have say in the case of a
multiple warhead, and there is this cloud of tinfoil or chaff
as you refer to it, and then there is a period of detecting
which is the decoy and which is the real McCoy, you have a
matter of seconds, very few seconds involved. That is why I
asked you the possible duration of this electronic blackout.
Dr. Foster. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
I do not want to try to predict the final tactical solution
that we will have for this threat you describe. One of the
solutions is as follows:
If we see coming over the horizon at a range of 1,500 miles
a steady stream of chaff and even possibly can see objects
within the chaff, one tactic we have is as follows: We wait for
two or three minutes until the chaff has come perhaps halfway,
and if we are attempting to--and then we might attempt to
attack the whole length of the chaff simultaneously. So, we
would first send a missile that would go out to, perhaps, 500
miles range, and then subsequently others at shorter ranges all
timed to burst at once. So, it would be in a sense like Bunker
Hill, and the whole threat, volume would be taken out at one
time. We would then wait for----
Senator Gore. Is this going to be a human decision sitting
at a key or is this going to be an electronic decision
predetermined?
Dr. Foster. I think a bit of each, Mr. Chairman. You are
however, describing an extremely advanced threat.
Senator Gore. I understand----
Senator Aiken. They depend on computers, Mr. Chairman. It
probably will get there three months late like social security
checks.
Senator Gore. I hope not.
Dr. Foster. Any objects which remain, the hard objects
would subsequently then come and reach the atmosphere and would
have to penetrate. Those that appeared as real objects would
then be attacked by SPRINT. The SPRINT has a nuclear warhead.
Senator Gore. Yes.
Dr. Foster. The warhead, however, has a very low yield and
is mainly fusion and so there is little blackout and, as a
consequence, there is esentially no blackout associated with
this aspect of the engagement.
Senator Gore. Well, I am overstepping my allotment of time.
I wanted to ask one perhaps less technical question, but one
which has disturbed me a great deal in thinking about this, and
yet I have not heard anyone discuss it for a long while.
Another result of I believe our last atmospheric test in
the Pacific was that it blinded rabbits hundreds of miles away.
We are speaking here of a possible defense system of SPRINT
missiles which have a maximum range of 20 miles and if we are
defending our cities with SPRINT missiles, and a multiple
attack comes in, and we have this series of nuclear explosions
overhead, just coming to the biological question, what is the
danger of blindness or other effects of blast and radiation?
Dr. Foster Mr. Chairman, I think we have to be concerned
with two kinds of effects. The first, as you indicate, is
blindness. There, I believe, the problem was not SPRINT but the
SPARTAN explosions.
If the SPARTAN missile were to be commanded to detonate its
warhead at altitudes above 350,000 feet, we have no serious
problems. If, however, for some reason, and this is not in the
general plan, it is forced to detonate it, at, say 100,000
feet, then we could have some serious cases of blindness,
although, of course, that difficulty would be minor compared
with the consequences of having had the enemy warhead penetrate
to the ground. So in the current use----
Senator Gore. It would be a hard choice between being
killed or blinded.
Dr. Foster. I do not believe so, Mr. Chairman. The
individual----
Senator Gore. I would choose to be blind for a while.
Dr. Foster. Yes. The individual would have to be looking up
at that time in about the right direction to cause serious
trouble.
Senator Gore. How did it happen that these rabbits were
looking up? Did they not--with the detonation instinctively
flicker in that direction?
Dr. Foster. Mr. Chairman, the damage is caused
substantially before the eye can close, and we arranged to have
the rabbits despite their desires, looking up in that
direction.
Senator Gore. That is a technical question.
Dr. Foster. In summary, Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that
in the normal deployment and tactics of the NIKE X system that
there would be any serious damage either to our population or
to the Canadians north of us in the event we had SPARTAN
detonations, detonations of the SPARTAN warhead.
The other question, of course, is the fallout, and in this
case also the bursts are at heights well above the ground, so
that there is no problem with fallout at least in the nearterm.
It would nevertheless raise the activity in the atmosphere. It
would be subsequent activity, and radiation damage.
Senator Gore. Senator Clark.
Senator Clark. Dr. Foster, how far away are we from
deployment of both SPARTAN and SPRINT if we were to make a
decision right now to go ahead and deploy them?
Dr. Foster. I believe, Senator, that with an orderly
deployment, that is to say doing it right, and that being the
guiding rule in the deployment, we would not have an initial
operating capability of the first battery until 1971.
Senator Clark. And in order to create the situation
revealed by your figure 5, how long would that take?
Dr. Foster. That could be completed by mid-1973.
Senator Clark. And could you state precisely what the cost
of deployment of the SPRINT and SPARTAN would be on that time
schedule to the extent indicated by our figure 5?
Dr. Foster. Yes. That would be $3 billion to $4 billion,
and then if one wanted to, in addition, deploy, extend the
equipment to give the necessary coverage of the MINUTEMAN
system, that would take, extend it, another six months and
would increase the costs another billion dollars.
FALLOUT SHELTER PROGRAM
Senator Clark. This is exclusive of any fallout shelter
program, is it not?
Dr. Foster. Yes that is correct.
Senator Clark. Would you recommend such a fallout shelter
program if we decided to deploy?
Dr. Foster. Yes, I believe I would, and that amounts to
about $800 million above the current plan.
Senator Clark. For the entire country.
Dr. Foster. Yes that is correct.
Senator Clark I take it from the answer to the questions
addressed to you by Senator Gore that you are not particularly
disturbed about the radioactive fallout aspect of a deployment
and actual use of SPARTAN and SPRINT. Is that correct?
Dr. Foster. That is correct, Senator. However, I would be
very disturbed with the fallout associated with the all-out
thermonuclear exchange.
Senator Clark. Of course, I assume that would be
devastating.
Dr. Foster. Yes. To be more specific, I do not believe that
blindness or fallout are aspects of our current concept of NIKE
X which should be considered in any way as a serious
limitation.
DEPLOYMENT OF NIKE X'S
Senator Clark. Have we deployed any NIKE X's yet?
Dr. Foster. No, sir. We have not. We are in the process of
deploying prototype models to Kwajalein so that we can check
out a system. That will not be completed until 1967.
* * * * * * *
ESTIMATED U.S. DEATHS IN EVENTS OF ALL-OUT ENEMY ATTACK [P. 14]
Senator Clark. If you would turn to page 6 of your
statement and the last sentence on page 6 which I quote: ``We
would have to expect that in an all-out exchange dozens of
their warheads would likely explode in our cities.'' With what
estimate of human casualties?
Dr. Foster. Tens of millions.
* * * * * * *
Dr. Foster. Let me try to start anew. In the event of no
defense and an all-out attack by the Soviet Union on the United
States, 150 million could be killed.
If we deployed a very large ballistic missile defense
system----
Senator Clark. Including SPARTAN and SPRINT.
Dr. Foster. Including SPARTAN and SPRINT and all the radar
and so forth--let us say it involved $20 billion so that we
would have 7,000 or 8,000 SPRINTS and 1,000 or more SPARTANS,
and if the Soviets took no measures to penetrate that defense
of ours, then we could cut our losses to a few tens of
millions.
* * * * * * *
TESTING OF INCOMING MISSILES [P. 23]
Senator Gore. I have one question about research and
development that I can just hardly resist asking here. I
realize that even though we decide against the deployment of--I
say we, the government, decides against the deployment of an
ABM system, it is absolutely necessary to continue research and
development both with respect to ascertaining as much as
possible of what improvements in ballistic defense the Soviets
may be able to make, and what hardening and improvement of our
own offensive capability is necessary, and also this latter
about which I wish to ask a question.
What would be within our technical capability by way of
deployment of ballistic defense in the event that we later
decided upon such an installation? Now, with that background to
my question, how do you test, how do you measure, say, over
Kwajahein and over Johnson Island you have the firing
theoretically of incoming missiles, and from another island or
from another location you fire an interceptor missile. I
realize or I think I realize that by telemetry of the various
kinds you can measure the proximity of the exchange. But how
would you measure the possibility of X-ray or gamma ray
penetration of the incoming missile when you neither generate
the X-ray or gamma ray by your interceptor missile nor have the
effect of such on the theoretically attacking missile?
Dr. Foster. Mr. Chairman, that is an extremely critical
question. As you indicate, we do plan to direct against
Kwajalein Minuteman and Poseidon missiles configured so as to
represent the most effective means of penetrating ballistic
missile defenses. We will be able to see on the radar, with
several radars, just how that attack looks.
We can, at the same time, direct one or more SPARTANS and
SPRINTS into the general area and simulate an attack, the
intercept of an attack, at several altitudes.
That, as you indicate, however, is not enough because we do
not know the effectiveness of these defensive warheads without
actual nuclear explosions.
It is for that reason that a fair fraction of our current
underground test program involves the detonation of specially-
tailored nuclear warheads so as to provide the X-rays and the
gamma rays and the neutrons of the various types for radiation
of our hardened reentry vehicles, and for that matter our own
SPARTA and SPRINT warheads, so as to make sure that they do not
destroy one another.
In the last three years we have had a whole series of very
complicated experiments which prove, first, that our offensive
warheads will work and, second, that they are as hard as we say
or if we find them to be vulnerable we fix them, and then
measure to see that they are, indeed, repaired.
So, this underground program is a very vital part of
maintaining the effectiveness of our offensive force to provide
a sure destruction.
Senator Gore. Can you measure underground the potentiality
for generating X-rays and gamma rays and also measure the
deposition of those X-ray on various types of missiles?
Dr. Foster. Yes, Mr. Chairman. We can and we do.
SOVIET ATMOSPHERIC TESTING
Senator Gore. Now, one question leads to so many. The
Soviets in 1961 did conduct, and with multiple radar
observation, the actual atmospheric detonation of a nuclear
weapon and the penetration of that sphere of influence, for
want of a better word, by another missile with radar
observation in it in 1961.
Now, to what extent do those atmospheric tests on ballistic
defense which they conducted give them an advantage over what
we can do with underground tests?
Dr. Foster. One cannot know what the Soviets learned in
detail from their atmospheric experiments. We can only form a
judgment. In my judgment what they learned in those tests is
very small compared with what we have subsequently learned in
our underground program.
We, ourselves, had a number of experiments in the
atmospheric series, as you know, and we learned some things
which have turned out to be of great importance in the design
not only of our offensive but our defensive systems. I suspect
it is the same way with the Soviets.
Senator Gore. Senator Clark?
Senator Clark. May I ask one question that will take only
thirty seconds?
Senator Gore. Yes.
Senator Clark. Would I be justified in assuming that a
comprehensive test ban between ourselves and the Soviet Union,
adequately policed and enforced, could bring further research
and development into antiballistic missile system pretty much
to a halt on both sides?
Dr. Foster. I cannot speak for the Soviet Union. However, I
do not think it would bring ballistic missile defense research
and development to a complete halt in this country.
Senator Clark. Would it cripple it?
Dr. Foster. It would have a very serious effect on it, yes.
Senator Clark. Presumably, it would have the same effect on
the Soviets.
Dr. Foster. Yes; and, of course, it would seriously affect
our confidence in its effectiveness particularly against
sophisticated attack.
Senator Clark. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gore. Well, rather arbitrarily we must say thank
you.
Dr. Foster. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. I do not want to leave
that last question without----
Senator Gore. Let the record show that you were excused,
but were unready to go.
Dr. Foster. No, Mr. Chairman, I am worried because the
question of complete cessation involves to my mind, not so much
its effect on a ballistic missile defense program, but its
effect on the maintenance of our assured destruction
capability.
Senator Clark. Yes. But at that point, we turn to reliance
on international cooperation, adequately policed, as opposed to
conflict, as evidenced by further research in lethal weapons of
destruction.
Dr. Foster. Yes, I understand. If one can be sure that we
are no longer relying on an assured destruction capability,
then my concern would disappear.
Senator Hickenlooper. Of course, you would have a very
interesting section to your question, adequately policed.
Senator Clark. That is what we are going to ask Mr. William
Foster about.
Senator Gore. The committee thanks you very much. You have
been very forthright, and I think very able. There are many,
many unresolved questions. I dare say before we finally
conclude, we will request you to come back for a return
engagement.
* * * * * * *
UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
Subcommittee on Disarmament
STAFF MEMORANDUM
Suggested Questions for William C. Foster, Director of the
Arms Control & Disarmament Agency
Non-Proliferation Treaty
1. How will a non-proliferation treaty help to keep those
nations you believe closest to the threshold of nuclear weapons
from deciding to build a bomb? In other words, why do we want a
non-proliferation treaty?
2. In 1965 the Indian delegate to the ENDC said that it is
an ``unrealistic and irrational proposition that a non-
proliferation treaty should impose obligations only on non-
nuclear countries while the nuclear powers continue to hold on
to privileged status or club membership by retaining and even
increasing their deadly stockpiles . . .'' How would you answer
this charge that a non-proliferation agreement without other
disarmament measures is an unrealistic and irrational
proposition? Do you think India will sign a nonproliferation
treaty?
3. What is the Germans' problem with a non-proliferation
treaty? How could we meet their objections?
4. What are the prospects for denuclearized zones--such as
in Africa or the Caribbean? There are reports that the United
States is insisting on the right to transit nuclear weapons
through the Panama Canal in any such zone. Is this true?
Comprehensive Test Ban
1. Would you agree that the most meaningful way to stop the
spread of nuclear weapons is a comprehensive test ban?
2. Has the United States or the Soviet Union technically
violated the partial test ban by spreading debris from an
underground test beyond territorial boundaries? If so, why
haven't such charges been brought by one side or the other?
Conventional Arms Sales
1. A recent study of conventional arms sales done by the
staff of the Committee said that ACDA did not have a
significant role in the arms sales process. Do you agree?
2. Do you agree with another conclusion of the study that
policy coordination in the arms sales field is weak?
3. The Senior Interdepartmental Group, as I understand it,
is the forum established by the Secretary of State for the
coordination of major foreign policy decisions. Last week this
group discussed a major arms sale to Morocco. Did a
representative from ACDA attend that meeting?
4. How many professionals in the Arms Control & Disarmament
Agency work full time on conventional arms control?
Anti-Ballistic Missiles
1. What effect would an ABM arms race have on arms control
measures now under consideration, such as a non-proliferation
treaty or an underground test ban?
MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO LATIN AMERICA
----------
Monday, February 6, 1967
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on American Republic Affairs
of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:05 p.m., in
room S-116 the Capitol, Senator Wayne Morse (chairman of the
subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Morse (presiding), Sparkman, Gore,
McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Cooper.
Also present: Mr. Marcy and Mr. Holt of the committee
staff.
Senator Morse. Gentlemen, this is a long standing tradition
in this committee. We meet informally. We take a record, but it
is an executive record, and it is available to you and to us
only from the point of reference. No announcements are made as
far as this committee is concerned. I have found--I don't know
what Frank would say--that I would rather have one of these
meetings than three or four formal meetings. This is where you
learn what is really going on in the executive branch. As far
as I am concerned, we will do more of it this year, Frank, when
we get together with the AID people.
I met a scientist down at the White House this afternoon.
They are going to send up his name and a memorandum to me,
Pat--a man who will be in charge of the agricultural program in
AID in Latin America. He has had a long and distinguished
service in the Department of Agriculture. I think his last name
is Wilcox.
Senator Carlson. We had Wilcox over here in the
Congressional Library for years, and he moved down to the
Department.
Senator Morse. No, not that Wilcox. This man used to be a
professor in Minnesota. It is this kind of a meeting that helps
us. That is why we thought that you ought to chat with us first
about whatever you care to in regard to the great Panama
experience you had, and then the command that you have no. What
you think of this military aid program in Latin America. What
you think the problems are. We have one or two questions to ask
you later, but I would rather have you visit with us first.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL ROBERT PORTER, SOUTHERN MILITARY COMMAND,
ACCOMPANIED BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT S. SMITH, PLANS AND
POLICY OFFICE, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND, AND ROBERT R. CORRIGAN,
POLITICAL ADVISOR TO COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND
General Porter. First, I think I should tell you a little
bit about my background. I have heard of Senator Morse, and I
have known Senator Carlson over the years.
I went to West Point in 1926 from Nebraska, and I have been
on military duty since that time. I have lived in every part of
the world except Southeast Asia. That is the part I don't know
anything about. Most of my time was either in Europe or in the
Middle East, until I was sent down to Panama two years ago. I
have just finished two years in Panama. I have traveled a great
deal, studying the problem, getting acquainted with our people,
the ambassador as well as the local people. I guess we have
clocked altogether over 250,000 miles of travel in the last two
years.
The thing that has startled me about Panama and about the
whole area was, frankly, how little I knew about it from having
worked here. I thought I knew the problem from the military
point of view because I had working plans and policy in the
Pentagon, and I worked in the National Security Council
Planning Board for two years when President Eisenhower was the
President, and have seen things. I thought I knew what was
going on. I didn't realize that these countries are so
different. It is just astounding.
SITUATION IN VENEZUELA
The situation is--dynamic isn't a very good word, but the
situation is changing so rapidly in these countries that the
situation today, I know, for example, in Venezuela, will be
different in three or four months.
Just as an example, the Minister of Defense was up here as
a guest of Secretary McNamara the first of November, Minister
Gomez from Venezuela. He told McNamara, ``We have no problem as
far as internal security is concerned. Well, within ten days
all hell had broken loose again.
Of course, this time it culminated with them going into the
university, and they found in the university that this was
really the headquarters for the guerrillas. The arsenal was
there. I had heard a joke on this Venezuelan situation from an
educator friend. I have two brothers who are professors, and I
met this man through my brother. He said he was in Venezuela,
and he saw a sign indicating an art class. He was lost, and he
had little time anyway. He went up to the top floor to see
where this art class was, and found that they were painting
``Yankee Go Home'' signs, and they were actually getting credit
in the university.
Senator Morse. It is a public scandal.
General Porter. And they were teaching commercial art
there.
Well, this was last year that this happened. But it just
shows the situation. Well, of course, Gomez had said that he
had no problem.
I think a lot of this problem is what the head committee
that is working for the guerrillas, if they decided they are
going to stay in the background, or whether they are going to
go into an act of insurgency.
CUBANS IN VENEZEULA
Senator Morse. Pat points out to me that ten days or two
weeks ago, a group of Cubans was alleged to have landed in
Venezuela, and they haven't been apprehended yet. Apparently,
it is pretty reliable that they landed, isn't it?
Mr. Holt. So I am told, but the general would know a little
better than I do, I am sure.
Senator Morse. Why wouldn't the military establishment of
Venezuela, I suppose this is possible--you would think they
would get some trace of them, wouldn't you?
General Porter. No, I am not certain. With the size and the
long coastline of Venezuela--people can come ashore in Oregon,
and you wouldn't know about it. Actually with our Coast Guard,
we are as well organized if not better than the Venezuelans. I
made landings on beaches where we had gotten supplies in time
of war. If you come in at night, you can just disappear,
particularly if you have got friends there that have things
organized.
Senator Morse. Yes, they could have advance agents there.
General Porter. And right now, from what I can understand
about the situation in Venezuela, the Cubans are supporting
Douglas Dravo and his faction of the FALN,\1\ and if the thing
has all been taped, and where I read, things that have been
said at the Havana conference, there is extensive coordination
beginning to come from Cuba.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This could well have been worked out, and they would know
where they were coming.
Senator Morse. General, this is Senator Gore of Tennessee,
General Porter. The general has just started to chat with us.
We started with Panama, but we got off and were talking about
the Venezuelan situation. He thinks it will have its effect.
ATTITUDE OF THE PANAMANIAN PEOPLE
What do you think about the general attitude on the part of
the Panamanian people as different from their government toward
the United States? Do you think the conditions have improved
over what they were a couple of years ago?
General Porter. Well, of course, I am still learning in
Panama. I do feel that the Panamanian people as a people, the
little man, has a tie with the Panama Canal, and he has a lot
of good image of us and of Americans because of his tie with
the Panama Canal.
For example, the President started out as a truck driver,
President Robles. He was a truck driver. That was his first
job. The first money he got was as a truck driver. Well, he is
really one of the best friends we have got down there. He is
having a hell of a time now because he is trying to hold the
coalition government together, and most of the people in the
coalition think they would make a better President than he is.
Senator Gore. You know we are afflicted with a little of
that now and then here.
General Porter. But his instincts are good. He is a
religious man, and he thinks the students ought to be
responsible. He backed Zaguardia law and order.
Senator Morse. Senator Hickenlooper, this is General
Porter.
Senator Hickenlooper. Hello, General. Nice to see you
indeed.
General Porter. We were just talking a little bit about
Panama. It is a tricky situation, because the press is hostile
to us.
Senator Morse. Senator Cooper, this is General Porter.
THE RIOT IN PANAMA WAS PLANNED
Senator Hickenlooper. General, I was in Panama. I left
about 7 o'clock on the morning that bloody riot broke out down
there.
General Porter. This was in January '64?
Senator Hickenlooper. Yes. I came on to Washington.
General Porter. It looked spontaneous. It was planned by
someone, and this is part of the problem, particularly with the
university down there, and the group in the university planning
these things to take advantage of what well could be a
legitimate grievance.
MILITARY AID TO LATIN AMERICA
Senator Morse. Am I correctly advised, General, that it
falls under your jurisdiction to make recommendations to the
administration regarding the whole question of the military aid
program to Latin America? Does that fall under your bailiwick?
General Porter. Yes. I am sort of the field man, I guess
you would say, for the Department of Defense in the Latin
American area. I am the senior military man in the area, and we
get the country programs together as they come out of each of
the countries, put them into a package and send them to Defense
with our recommendations.
Now, of course, there are guidelines which are provided not
only by the Congress, but by the administration as to how we
are going to proceed, but I tried to make a program out of
these.
Senator Morse. That is why we would like to have your frank
appraisal of the situation. Within the committee, I think this
is a fair statement to say, there is a division of point of
view in regard to military aid to Latin America, in these
general respects. Not that there is any difference of opinion
that aid isn't needed.
There is a difference of opinion as to the type of aid, and
as to the amount of aid, and as to whether or not the
governments themselves are doing all they can for themselves.
For example, we have been cutting aid on this committee less
than the House. It works out as a compromise in conference with
the House each year. We got it down to $85 million, didn't we,
Carl?
Mr. Marcy. That was the cash amount.
Senator Morse. One of the questions they suggested I ask
you, that you are free to discuss, is where are the cuts to be
made to come within the $85 million statutory ceiling on sales
and grants. Are all sales handled from Washington, or does the
General have a voice in them?
General Porter. Well, you have asked me about four
questions.
Senator Morse. I know. I just wanted to throw it out on top
of the table. You kick it around in your own way.
MILITARY ASSISTANCE VARIES FROM COUNTRY TO COUNTRY
General Porter. Okay. Let me begin by saying that as far as
the Military Assistance Program is concerned, it took me about
a year to make up my mind on the Military Assistance Program as
to just what it was doing and what it could contribute in Latin
America, because there the situation varies so from country to
country.
I can see a country like Colombia, where there is an active
insurgency which has been going on actually as a result of the
Bogatacia in 1948. It has been going on and originally you
couldn't tell whether these were bandits or people that were
just outside the pale, because of the acts that they had
committed in the early fifties, or just what it was.
But in the two years I have been down there, it is very
obvious that much of this so-called banditry throughout the
countryside in Colombia, and most of these countries, has been
stopped. And what we are dealing with are actually groups that
are trying to pull the government down and get the support of
the people to begin bringing communism into these countries.
Now, also, as I have gone around and looked at the
countries and gotten acquainted with the military, these people
are quite different from the men that I knew when I was a young
lieutenant at Reilly, and the Chileans would come up and go to
school with us and so on. The playboy is gone from the younger
military people, and the impression, as I have gotten
acquainted with senior commanders, they are really in the
twentieth century. They are working very hard and are very much
interested in the nation-building problems that they have got
in their countries.
DISCIPLINED MILITARY OFFICERS
Now I had always thought of the Latin American military,
based on what I had read and what I had been taught when I was
in school, that they were a bunch of parasites and were really
beyond the pale. This isn't the case at all, and particularly
the younger officers, the officers that have been through our
school here during the last twenty years. They think pretty
much the way an American military man does.
They are a disciplined group, and their interest is in
supporting their country. They have many of the same instincts
I have when somebody says something about the United States
which I don't like. Why my blood pressure goes up. They have
that same instinct.
In these countries where their literacy rate is low, they
are hard at work teaching the youngsters that come in. And most
countries have the draft, teaching them to read and write, and
they are working now, most of the countries are beginning to
have a program where they are teaching the man a trade, so when
he finishes, he has a trade and can go back to being a plumber,
electrician, carpenter.
Otherwise when they get out of the service and they haven't
anything to do, they have been taught to fire a rifle. Of
course, they probably knew how to do that, or at least throw a
machete or a knife, as a youngster, because the law of survival
is pretty much the rule down there.
But they are teaching these people a useful trade, so that
they aren't suckers for somebody that has some money who is
going to recruit a private gang or get themselves involved, and
it turns out he is in a guerrilla action too. So, I think this
is a constructive thing that I didn't know existed when I went
down to Panama two years ago.
Senator Morse. May I interrupt you. This is Senator
McCarthy, General Porter, and Mr. Corrigan and Colonel Smith.
MOTIVATION AND EQUIPMENT
General Porter. One of the problems that we face in all of
these countries is to give these men, if they have gone into
the military service, they must have the same motivation I had
when I went to West Point in 1926. I wanted to be a soldier,
and I have really never quite gotten over it. I can't explain
quite why. Some people become ministers, and I sometimes wonder
why they do that.
They have a motivation in this regard, but unless they have
the equipment with which to train, and they have had the basic
education and technical knowledge that can teach men to stand
and be shot at in time of struggle and strife, you haven't got
much to deal with.
One of the problems that I have seen down there is that
unless these youngsters are motivated to train their men, they
are going to become a bunch of bums eventually. From what I
have seen and heard----
Senator Morse. Senator Sparkman, this is General Porter.
Senator Sparkman. Yes, sir, General. Glad to see you again.
I am not going to be able to stay long. I wanted to come in for
such time as I could.
General Porter. The motivation of these people has to be
kept in mind, particularly if you are trying to deal with them
as the senior commander. And all of these people are now having
problems with equipment which they bought from us, either at
the end of World War II, or which was given to them at that
time, or it came in under the Military Assistance Program after
we had such a program, because it is getting to be about twenty
years old.
Senator Hickenlooper. Are you talking about the people in
Panama?
General Porter. I am talking generally.
Senator Morse. About Latin America.
General Porter. Now I trained at the beginning of World War
II with a broom in a Jeep. That was an anti-tank gun. It worked
all right out on maneuvers, but when you tried to fire,
assuming you were firing with it, you are in trouble. I am just
using that as an illustration.
It is a question of getting these people on motivation more
than anything else. All these countries have problems now of
trying to hold a high quality man in the military. The next few
years are going to be very critical.
Senator Morse. Come up here, Senator. Senator Aiken, this
is General Porter. Behind you is Colonel Smith. You know the
secretary across from you.
Senator Aiken. I have seen him around.
QUESTIONS THE EQUIPMENT SENT TO LATIN AMERICA
Senator Morse. One of the things that we kick around up
here, and I have discussed frequently, is the type of equipment
that we are supplying. Questions are raised why tanks, why late
model military aircraft, why so much heavy equipment? Why
submarines and destroyers?
Why not the type of equipment that they need for
maintaining internal disorder rather than the type of equipment
that it is alleged we supply them which is used between
nations? Everybody knows they are not going to war against each
other down there, for many reasons, and that the type of our
equipment is subject to question.
The argument is made, take the Argentine Military
Establishment there, is all out of proportion as to the number
of officers to the rank and file. That is typical of some other
military establishments, it is alleged.
Now it is questions such as that that you could help
clarify very much, because we don't claim to have the expertise
that qualifies us to say. But, nevertheless, it gets into your
debates on this whole matter of military aid. You get the
argument that if we don't supply the equipment, they will go to
Russia, France or Czechoslovakia. Some take the position, well,
let them go. Let us supply them with the things that will help
develop them economically rather than militarily.
SITUATION IN PERU
The charge is made that some of the countries like Peru,
the Indians fill the rank and file, and the sons of the
families of the wealthy fill the officership. You know the
argument. But I have the job as chairman here of throwing them
out on the table and you commenting on them.
General Porter. Let me take this last one first. Actually
the Minister of Defense, General Arbelu, is a full-blooded
Indian. Now there was a time in Peru when what you say was
true, but there is great change taking place in all of these
countries, and right now in Peru the Indian is beginning to be
brought into the fringes of the money economy.
For example, up at Cusco, where I was in August, the Army
is running an experimental farm where they have 60 families
teaching them agriculture, and they have some men who were
doing their service up there, and they are training them in the
trades courses. It is potato country, but also they are
teaching them to handle livestock, chickens.
In two years, they have taken these Indian families--cocoa
was one of their sources of getting through the day, and of
course it has a numbing effect. It is a form of drug. Cocoa,
liquor and beans were pretty much all they had to eat. Now
these people are beginning to wear the clothes that they wear
down in the low countries. In other words, they are beginning
to get away from the Indian clothes and are beginning to wear
western clothes.
They are going into a protein diet. And this hacienda,
which is a big one, and it never paid its way in the last 25
years, is in the black, through methods that are being taught
these people.
It is interesting that as they come in, all of them, whole
families are learning to read and write. So that these are
things that are taking place.
Now the officer corps in all of these countries is no
longer from the oligarchy. It is coming in from the middle
class, and this Indian I am telling you about, who is the
number one military man in Peru today, he worked his way up
through the ranks. But what you say was true 15 years ago.
SITUATION IN BRAZIL
We are in a state of change down there, great change. This
is one of the encouraging things to me, that the officers are
beginning to come up from the ranks, or they are coming up from
the middle class, or the lower middle class, and they have the
interests of their people very much at heart.
For example, in Brazil, I was in Northeastern Brazil last
spring. We were up in the area where the sugar plantations are,
and these big land holdings, and the most critical people of
the slowness of Castelo Branco with his land reform program
were the military officers. We were going out to see a road
project. We had an engineer building a farm-to-market road, so
they get their produce out of the interior.
``YOUR FORCES ARE TOO BIG''
When you look at all of the projects, everybody has his pet
project that he wants to get pushed to the front. There is
about 25 or 30 years' progress, and they are trying to get it
all done in one or two years. It is a question of how much you
can force things like this, and come out without anything
besides chaos and strife.
Now on the side of the military establishments, I have
worked with foreign military forces before I went down there. I
was out in the Middle East and worked with Turkey, Iran and
Pakistan for two years in this organization, and I know pretty
much the problem in that area, and you hear these criticisms
there too. The threat, as we see it, to these countries, and
the reason they need forces, and what they say the threat is,
and why they have forces, is quite different.
I haven't been able to rationalize with them to the extent
that I can come right out and say, ``Your forces are too big.''
I have brought out this subject several times. But I am really
not in a position, in spite of the fact I can see the threat to
them pretty well, to say move over, and I will tell you how to
run your Army, or I will tell you how to run your Air Force or
your Navy, because my usefulness is done if I did that.
When you look at the problems in Argentina and the
communications problem they have in areas between Corrientes
and Mendoza, and when you go down to the south country, it is a
hell of a big country. Communications are not too good. And by
our standards of what would be required if we had mobile
reserves and transports to get them around, and what they need
are quite different.
Then in Brazil, I brought up this matter of size of forces,
and they said, ``Well, these men that we are getting into the
Army, we are teaching them to read and write. If they weren't
in the Army, where would they be? They would be unemployed, and
they wouldn't be learning a trade. They wouldn't be learning to
read and write.''
AN ALTERNATIVE TO MILITARY SERVICE
Senator McCarthy. General, could I raise a question at that
point. This is one of the questions that bothers me. You make
the Army really the best profession in the country. You said
earlier that if you didn't give them advanced equipment that
the best men would be lost.
Where would they go, to other professions? If so, would
that be bad? Do you have to put them in the Army in order to
teach them to read and write? I think this was one of the basic
questions that concerns those of us who are really looking at
this thing. You say they wouldn't learn to read and write if we
didn't put them in the Army.
General Porter. You have three questions here. Let's take
one at a time.
Senator McCarthy. I know it. They are all questions you
made. I just wanted to back you up on it to see if there isn't
an alternative.
General Porter. And your questions are darn good questions,
and I am not sure whether I can answer to your satisfaction.
All these countries have something like a draft law, and they
will get the men. Now the men that normally they are drafting
into the Army, if they are already students, they have
exemptions the way we have in our country, and they are not
going to be drawn into the Army.
Senator McCarthy. Of course, we are doing the same thing in
our draft now.
General Porter. That is right.
Senator McCarthy. Teaching them to read and write.
General Porter. And I worked that a hell of a lot of my
time.
Senator McCarthy. That is right.
General Porter. But a lot of these people are outside of
the money economy. A lot of them have never worn shoes. Their
basic habits of sanitation and so on are very primitive.
Now if these people aren't drawn into the Army and pulled
out of their farm community, they would probably never get out
of it, because the school situation in a country like Brazil is
really quite discouraging. You have been down there. You have
seen it. Wouldn't you agree with that, Bob?
Now what we are doing with a lot of these boys that are
coming out, we are bringing them into the twentieth century. In
the coastal country I would agree with what you say. When you
get into Sao Paulo, the Rio complex, and up to Belo Horizonte,
I think that in that area, yes, they would have an opportunity.
But you get into the northeast, up into the back country of
Recife, they are just going to exist there all their lives.
This is one way of helping prime this pump. Teach them a trade
and bring them along.
TEACHING SOLDIERS TO READ AND WRITE
Senator Hickenlooper. General, is it fair to say that when
they go into the Army, they are under a discipline to read and
write?
General Porter. That is right.
Senator Hickenlooper. And if they are not in the Army,
their own discipline is not sufficient to give them any
stimulus to learn to read and write?
General Porter. That is absolutely right. Not only that,
but when they began to get hope, and a lot of these people, you
look at them, they are not well when they are small, and they
grow up and have been undernourished all their life. I was
talking to people down in the Amazon about this. I was asking a
doctor in Peru about the health of the people in the Amazon
Basin. She said a lot of these people endemically, by the time
they are old enough to live and do a man's work, haven't the
strength to do it because of the ailments that they have got.
Senator Hickenlooper. Do you know Dr. Popano who ran that
agricultural farm? He died here a short time ago.
General Porter. I have read about him.
Mr. Corrigan. Yes.I knew him very well.
Senator Hickenlooper. When I was down there I stayed all
night at the farm, just about that very thing you are talking
about. He ran that school, getting these youngsters in from all
over Central America theoretically. He had some from Colombia.
He said a startling thing. He got them in there; they would
come in as freshmen. It would take them about four to six weeks
to get the worms out of them. That is number one.
Then he said within three months they would gain 40 to 60
pounds just by getting a reasonable diet. Then he said they
were ready to learn. He said before that they were indolent.
They didn't have the stimulus.
General Porter. To go back to Senator McCarthy's question,
I feel that probably, and this is just off the top of my head,
15 or 20 percent of the people that go into the Army might go
ahead and get a third grade education or a fourth grade
education anyway. The group that is being called into the Army.
But the rest of them would not, and they would have less than a
50/50 chance of meeting a decent wage during their lifetime
unless they could learn to read and write.
LENGTH OF SERVICE
Senator Cooper. What is the length of service in these
countries? What does it average, and what do these men do when
they get out of the Army? Does what they learn there carry on
in civilian life?
General Porter. It varies. The minimum tour is a year. In
some countries it is two years.
For example, in some of the countries, if a man shows an
interest in getting a trade, they will extend his service until
he can become a plumber or a bricklayer or a carpenter. The
Army has vocational schools where they are training them to do
this. They are getting ready to do this in Guatemala, for
example. They are doing this in Peru. They are doing this in
Colombia. But it varies, Senator, from country to country.
Now these people will normally go back to their village
initially. How long they will stay there depends on whether
they can make a contribution when they get back. But if they
have a trade and can do such things as bricklaying, they are
short of people that can do this all over the country or if
they can fix a radio set or do primitive electrical wiring.
So the chances are better that they are going to stay and
work in the countryside and make a decent living there, or
begin to, if they have the trade. Otherwise, their having seen
the city, they are going to drift back.
MILITARY SALES PROGRAMS
Senator Morse. I think it would be helpful to the
committee, if you gentlemen of the committee agree with me, if
the general would explain to us how the sales programs are
handled.
You have got an $85 million ceiling, so-called. How are the
sales programs handled? Are they handled in Washington? Does
the General Staff handle them? Who makes the selection? To what
extent do we turn down their requests for purchase? I think we
are pretty ignorant about that up here, at least I am. I wish
you would explain that to us.
General Porter. Well, the sales program is handled pretty
much out of Washington. We are just in the throes of changing
now actually, and I think Mr. McMillan is coming over here to
testify tomorrow. At least, I was told that. He is to come over
here tomorrow.
Senator Morse. Before Armed Services.
General Porter. I think that is right. The sales program
has been handled directly from Washington. It has been that way
for a long time, principally because from the very beginning,
when the Latin American countries wanted to buy something in
the United States, the military attache went over to State,
talked to them in State. Then referred them to people in
defense, and passed on the shopping list of the things that
they said they needed. Then they would indicate encouragement
or discouragement. I will be very honest and say that in the
two years I have been down country, I have felt that the Latin
Americans felt very discouraged about trying to buy from us,
feeling that we did everything we could to slow down selling
them anything, even spare parts for equipment they had.
It has come about in part because of the procedures we
have. They have to get an export license, and they come up.
They go over to the Pentagon and get a quotation if they want
to buy from the military. Then they send that down country. At
that time. we are notified in Panama, my headquarters, that
they are going to buy or want to buy. Normally then we make a
comment as to whether we think that is needed or not. There are
cases where I have found out about it afterwards.
Senator Hickenlooper. Don't they submit it to you first?
General Porter. No.
Senator Hickenlooper. They don't say, ``We have the
recommendation''?
General Porter. No, because it comes in through their
attache, you see. Now this is in a state of flux, and they are
beginning to draw our people in country into it, but this has
been handled this way in the last 40 years, and we are just in
the state of trying to change it.
$85 MILLION CEILING
This $85 million ceiling that the Senate put on this year
is forcing us to do that. You see the policy that Mr. McNamara
has announced is that if they will buy, we will take it out of
the grant program. So this is an oversimplification of the
ground rules. It would take 15 minutes with a prepared paper to
give you an accurate statement. But this is pretty much the
intent.
That anybody who has the money and will buy, they would
take priority. Well, this is throwing my programs for these
countries, making them damned complicated, because I am not
certain as to just how much of this money is going to be
available to buy spare parts and to buy weapons and the things
that I need in these 20 programs.
I will say this: That every request to buy that has come in
here in my 20 years down country has really been looked at
carefully by both the people in State and Defense, to see
whether it was in our interests to sell.
A LOT OF LOST MOTION
Senator Hickenlooper. It seems to me there is a lot of lost
motion in that--probably there is a good reason for it, I don't
know. It would seem to me that the best way to do it is if
Country X wants certain equipment, they should submit it to the
local people, and there should be a recommendation that this is
either excessive or it has utility, or if available and if
compatible with other programs, it should be granted. Then come
up here and get the job done, instead of rushing up here and
back three or four times, and so on.
General Porter. I think that the procedure you are
suggesting is one that is under consideration now, but we
haven't had this fully established.
Senator Hickenlooper. We haven't abolished the Commission
for the widows of the War of 1845, I guess. It takes a long
time to get these things done.
General Porter. You run into additional things. There are a
number of purchasing missions, for example, here in Washington
from these countries. I feel that people down country would
prefer to come in, the military people would be very happy and
prefer to come in this way, but this is the way they have been
doing it for 25 years.
GRANTS CAN BE A WINDFALL
It would be useful to us, because we could get a better fix
on what the requirements were, and our people in country would
know about them too. But in some of these countries where they
have limited means and they get a windfall of $100,000, the
equivalent of that in foreign exchange, they are going to get
it spent and committed before the end of the fiscal year, just
the way some of our people do here, particularly when you have
crying needs. They are going to get the first thing that they
can.
Senator Morse. They come up here from State and the
Pentagon Building through their officials. The State and the
Pentagon Building get in touch with you then to get your
recommendation before you go ahead and make any arrangements
with them?
General Porter. That is right. Normally I know about it.
There have been cases where I haven't, but I think this is the
exception.
Senator Morse. I think it is so important if you are going
to do it, as Senator Hickenlooper says, it is the cart before
the horse. If you are going to do it that way, they certainly
ought to get back to you for your recommendation.
General Porter. Actually, what I have found out in my two
years down there is that the Latin American is not a program or
a plan, whatever he is, whether wearing a civilian or military
suit. They sort of live from hand to mouth. One of the things I
have been trying to do is get these people working, and I know
they are working through the Alliance for Progress to do the
same thing, to try to get them to chalk out where they are
going to be in five years, and how they will get there in the
most economical way. We are just beginning to make some
progress.
Senator Hickenlooper. They can always do it manana.
A NEW BREED OF MILITARY OFFICERS
General Porter. But we are getting a new breed down there
now. Truly there are a lot of people that are beginning to see
that unless they program ahead, they are going to be blown by
the wind, and they are never going to get to their destination.
Senator Hickenlooper. I think they have a lot of capable
people in each of these countries, but the question of the
percentage of the influence and control that those capable
people have realized, what you are saying, how much authority
they have from time to time.
General Porter. Well, it has been encouraging in the two
years I have been down there to see that the military are doing
better now than they were two years ago, and not so much
through anything I have been able to do except to just beating
away on them. And this matter that unless you know where you
are going, how you are ever going to get there. You just start
out in a certain direction, and you wander and are blown around
by the winds.
SITUATION IN ARGENTINA
For example, in Argentina, we had just gotten the Argentine
military to develop for themselves a five-year program to try
to improve their forces. In doing that, it was interesting to
see from the beginning what they needed.
They were beginning to cut back in the size of forces and
equipment. For example, this A4B deal. They were going to
retire, as I recall, two planes for each A4B that they were to
get, and they were to get 50.
Actually, we began to show them that they could do better
than that, because the maintenance problems in trying to train
the pilots, they do the same training program and keep their
pilots proficient with less planes than what they planned to
buy. But they had never faced up to these things until we began
talking to them and getting this sort of thing worked out.
Going back to my life as a young lieutenant in the early
days here, we were pretty provincial in those days too. When
you face up to the fact that most of these countries are about
50 years behind us in planning and programming techniques, and
in their sense of responsibility and in their schooling, it is
pretty hard to bring them up to 1967 when they are in 1920 or
1927 in a lot of their thinking and in a lot of their
activities.
FORMULA FOR CUTTING OFF FUNDS
Senator Morse. When Congress put a ceiling on, speaking
hypothetically now, like the $85 million ceiling, and State and
the Pentagon have to cut under that ceiling, is there any
particular formula that is followed as to whether the cut will
be taken off of grants or taken off of sales?
General Porter. Well, let me explain how our programs are
put together.
Senator Morse. That is what we need.
General Porter. We have a table that shows the money amount
under the $55 million ceiling that was on before the $85
million was put on. We had a table which showed the amount.
They put in what was called defense articles for each country
under that $55 million ceiling. Added to that was a certain
amount for training. And then the overhead and administrative
costs and the program were involved.
At that time under the $55 million ceiling on defense
articles, there was no ceiling on sales, you see, the amount of
credits that could be developed. I want you to listen to this,
Bob, because he helps put the programs together in country. I
am explaining how we put the program together.
Now under that table 36, as they call it, that is showing
what money could be available, based on programs and
discussions that come out of the countries. Then we go ahead
and put a program together.
Now with the $85 million ceiling that had been put on, this
actually was about a 60 percent cut in each of these programs,
if you took it right across the board, because of the sales
that would have to be accommodated under this $85 million
ceiling. So, we went back to work and began to see what we
would do, what programs we would defer, based on the
programming ahead.
TRAINING PROGRAMS
Mr. McNamara requires us to have a 5-year program for each
of these countries. The only thing we could do would be to take
certain types of equipment that weren't as much needed for
modernization, and looking at the threat that was in the
country and the state of training of people, and people that
had gone into the program, get them trained. Start training,
for example, on communications equipment or something like
that, so it wouldn't create complete chaos in these countries
due to this change in policy, which came from the $85 million
ceiling.
For example, it takes about 50 weeks' training to get a
radio operator trained to run a military radio these days. We
have to put him in training far enough ahead so that when the
equipment gets there, we can marry him up with this piece of
equipment.
Now in doing that, we fixed up some articles or lists from
each of the countries to get a deferred list of items that
would not be funded in each of these countries until we could
see how the sales program worked out. It is pretty difficult 18
months ahead of time to see what foreign exchange they are
going to have available in country, and what the credit is
going to be from country to country.
This list is being held together intact over in the
Department of Defense now, but it is not being funded under the
'67 program until we see what money is available for grant aid.
But the Pentagon agreed, I pushed them, to go ahead with the
grant program higher than the sales figure in that the material
that was in the grant program was so important, particularly
during this year, to the continuity of operations in country.
For example, where there are spare parts; some replacement
vehicles; communications vehicles; certain aircraft that are
needed; batteries, a lot of things. Batteries, for example, for
a submarine which needs to be fixed. If we just stop this in
mid-stream, it would do nothing but create chaos in all twenty
countries.
My interest is in trying to get in any change of policy to
get an orderly change so that we don't completely wreck their
military establishments in one or two years. Now this list that
we have now, that we have what, $11 million?
Colonel Smith. $11.1 million. Yes, sir.
General Porter. In checking today and talking to the people
in the Pentagon on what the military purchasing commissions
here are talking to them about, it looks as if we are going to
have to go back into our grant aid programs again to try to see
what more we can get out of them. In other words, the grant
program is going to take another beating. I don't know whether
I have answered your question.
THE LOAN PROGRAM
Senator Morse. It helps very much. Before I call on Pat for
a supplement, there is another facet of this that I would like
to have you explain to us. You have got the grants, and you
have got the purchases, grants and sales.
Now, we have the loan program. That is causing some
confusion up here. Last year at the last session a bill was
offered for the calendar, and went over, and it will be up
shortly. As I recall, Pat--Carl, this is that loan bill that
came out of Armed Services--it was three destroyers for Brazil,
two for Argentina, one for Colombia, and a submarine for Chile
and a submarine for--it was Colombia, I guess.
Mr. Holt. Three destroyers for Argentina, two for Brazil,
one submarine for Chile, one destroyer for Colombia, two
destroyer escorts for----
Senator Morse. No airplanes?
Mr. Holt. This is just naval.
Colonel Smith. This is what?
Mr. Holt. This is the '66 bill that didn't pass.
Senator Morse. It didn't pass. It was held up. We took the
position it ought to get into Foreign Relations for review too.
They got it on the calendar the last week as I recall, and it
raised some questions. Now I understand that there is a
proposal, based upon the 1965 Loan Act, for a destroyer to be
loaned to the Argentine.
Mr. Holt. If I understand it correctly, there was
legislation passed in '64 or '65.
Senator Morse. Sixty-five.
Colonel Smith. That is correct.
Mr. Holt. Authorizing the loan of destroyers for Argentina.
Colonel Smith. Three for Brazil, two for Argentina. Chile
was cut out and so was Peru.
Mr. Holt. Right. But this has never been fully implemented,
and it is not proposed to do so.
Colonel Smith. It has never been fully implemented, and it
is being considered for implementation. As a matter of fact,
they have gone for the one destroyer for Brazil as of today.
The situation is about halfway through the rebuild for Brazil.
General Porter. These destroyers, the U.S. offered the
Brazilians and Argentina destroyers which were of early World
War II vintage, and the cost to them of repairing these
destroyers was how much, Bob, a couple of million dollars?
Colonel Smith. About $5 million.
General Porter. I know, but between the A, B and C type,
there is about $1 or $2 million more to repair a C type than a
B type.--
Colonel Smith. That is right.
General Porter. To get it so it would be of any use to
them. Of course they were trying to get C and O to give them,
make D type available. And he said no they are out in Vietnam.
So there has been a lot of study of this type C destroyer on
the part of both Brazil and Argentina, to try to find the
destroyers that are in the best condition.
They have been studying these ships for six to eight
months, trying to find a ship that they thought would be worth
rehabilitating, you see, because we have taken out of mothballs
naturally the best and put them back in the fleet to use them
out in Vietnam.
Colonel Smith. Senator, it doesn't cost the taxpayer now on
these loans. The country receiving the loan, for example,
Brazil, pays this rehabilitation activation cost. In fact, on
the $85 million ceiling-- a few words about title X. The value
of the hull itself is charged against this ceiling. There is no
U.S. money spent on these destroyers when they are loaned, and
we have a recapture clause at any time.
WHAT TYPE OF EQUIPMENT IS NECESSARY
Senator Morse. What can we say about the nature of this
equipment in answer to the charge that this is the type of
equipment that we shouldn't be making available? That we should
make a different type of military equipment available to them?
Who am I to say? I don't know what type of equipment they
ought to have. The argument is that this kind of equipment
isn't necessary to maintain internal order. It isn't necessary
to protect them from a Communist coup. They need helicopters
and light equipment for that, and personnel for that, rather
than this heavy equipment constantly building up the military
establishment.
It goes back to the first point, however, that the General
made very early here in the day. If we are going to get the
class of personnel that you want, referring to what you say,
you have got to have training in all the various aspects of
military operation.
General Porter. Let's just talk a minute about the Navy
problem in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela. They
are the countries that are the leaders down there as far as the
Navy is concerned.
These countries live by the sea. When we started in with
this, under the Rio Treaty--and are talking about Western
Hemisphere defense--this was going to be a partnership, and all
of our bilateral with them back in the early fifties was to be
a joint effort.
SWITCHING INTERNAL SECURITY
Now we started during the Kennedy administration, right
after Cuba, we began switching over to internal security. But
we never really went down to renegotiate these bilaterals.
In some of these countries, they still are thinking in
those terms. But actually you look at the situation in Brazil,
or Argentina, with their long coastline and the responsibility
that the Argentina navy has for the south country in Argentina.
I don't say that the destroyer is what is actually needed. I am
not sure what they need because they are doing all sorts of
things. They are the administrators for that southern area of
Argentina.
But they need destroyers to deal with the policing of their
maritime provinces in the south. The seas are bad. Their Navy
is something like ours. They have Air, they have Marines, they
have pretty much a complete force, but they are trying to
police these maritime areas principally with their forces.
THE PANAMA CANAL PROBLEM
From where I sit in Panama looking at the Panama Canal
problem, we have taken the Panama Canal as a commerce route
that will always be open. If anything did happen there, and I
should probably cross myself and knock on wood because
hopefully we will never get into this situation, then all of
our shipping between the east and west coasts is going to have
to make that long route down there. The smaller craft are going
to go through the Magellan Straits and a the big craft are
going to go around the Cape. Then because of the weather,
Navies of Argentina and Chile are going to have to lead a lot
of these merchant ships by the hand, because there is no coast
guard as such.
The Navy handles the coast guard operations for the whole
country, and then destroyers are about the smallest craft that
can live in some of the high seas you get down in the south
country there around the Cape of both sides.
NAVAL ROLE IN CHILE AND ARGENTINA
Yet, for example, in Chile, down in the straits of
Magellan, I was down in December and studied that thing because
of its strategic position. You have 49 knot winds. That is the
ordinary, day in and day out blow that they have down where the
Straits of Magellan exit into the Pacific Ocean. There are
terrible storms there all the time.
I really feel, and I didn't feel strongly on this until I
went down there on this and studied these problems, that there
is a deep water role for the Navy of Argentina and Chile.
That doesn't mean they need aircraft carriers or cruisers,
but they need destroyers. They need craft that will stand up in
bad weather because merchant ships get into distress and they
have to police the southern waters.
Brazil with its big coastline and its problems is really a
maritime power because of overseas trade. The same way with
Peru. Between 95 and 100 percent of their trade goes by ship,
and the other less than 5 percent by air.
That is the only way they can get the stuff out. These
countries have a tradition, a naval tradition. As a soldier it
is sort of hard for me to explain what a Navy tradition is, but
they have very capable people, and Peru is probably the best.
Chile comes next. But these destroyers are really needed by
these countries, not for the guns on them, but for the role it
permits them to provide as far as their country is concerned.
BAD STRATEGY
Senator Morse. What are we going to say to the argument--
and I am just putting this out in our own executive session
before it goes to the floor--that if we expand the loan
program, which is what this '66 bill allegedly attempts to do,
and therefore was a runaround the $85 million--and there was a
demand to block it until we looked at it longer--what are we
going to say to the argument that if you are going to put a
ceiling on for grants and sales, then subsequently come around
with a loan program that loans a great deal of equipment,
whatever its value is, that amounts in fact, to increasing the
ceiling. Therefore, the legislation ought to put one ceiling
and say to the Pentagon Building that this covers loans, and it
covers grants and it covers sales.
I think it was bad strategy, just giving you my opinion.
Carl, you listen to this. You were in on this discussion we had
at the end of a year when they brought up at the last minute
this loan bill, and it stirred up such a hornet's nest around
here.
General Porter. This is on the Navy ships?
Senator Morse. Yes, on the Navy ships. What are we going to
say to meet the argument that the Pentagon Building should come
in with one package, and that legislation in a given session
shouldn't wait until after the foreign aid bill is passed. Then
they lose out, say, in the foreign aid bill by getting a lower
ceiling than they wanted, and then subsequently give us an end
run play with a proposal for a lot of loans of equipment, which
in effect breaks the ceiling? How are we going to meet this
next year?
Mr. Marcy. Let me add one thing, Senator. The other fact
that is added there is sales. You see, in effect, when you make
a sale of military equipment, you are using part of the
economic strength of that country to buy the military equipment
which in turn means perhaps you have to increase the economic
aid. So sales, grants and loans are all combined.
Colonel Smith. I don't believe Senator Morse's point here
is that your present, the last Fulbright amendment, included
grants, sales and these ship loans.
Senator McCarthy. It didn't include the ships.
Colonel Smith. They all counted under your $85 million
ceiling.
You must be referring to a bill with which we are not
familiar.
Senator Morse. This is a question of fact that I didn't
cover. I am glad I raised it. The $85 million also included the
loans.
Colonel Smith. It included ship loans unless there is
wording in this new bill that exempts it from the ceiling.
VALUE OF SHIPS COUNTED AGAINST THE CEILING
Senator McCarthy. I thought the ships were granted by a
separate act that had no relationship to the ceiling.
Colonel Smith. They are granted, Senator, by Title 10 code
as a separate act. However, by the Fulbright amendment, their
value counts against the ceiling.
Senator Corrigan. And their rehabilitation.
Colonel Smith. The rehabilitation would count if the U.S.
does it. If they do it, it does not count.
Senator Morse. The Colonel says they must do it.
General Porter. We are telling them they must do it, but
this is still being worked out because they are so short of
money.
Colonel Smith. If they borrow money to do it, it counts
under the ceiling or even if we guarantee the loan.
Senator McCarthy. You mean if the Defense Department does.
Colonel Smith. That is correct, sir.
EXPORT-IMPORT LOANS
Senator McCarthy. Are the Export-Import loans guaranteed by
the Defense Department or are they separate?
Colonel Smith. No, sir. Export-Import guarantees certain
reverse loans.
Senator McCarthy. They don't count, the Export-Import
loans, for the shipment of military equipment would not be
included.
Colonel Smith. If it is military equipment sponsored by
DOD, it counts against the ceiling.
Senator McCarthy. I see, but if it were an entirely private
sale?
Colonel Smith. Private sales do not count.
Senator McCarthy. Approve it, you would still have to
approve the private sale.
Colonel Smith. If they were to get an Export-Import loan
without Defense Department guarantee, which is almost
impossible, it would not count. But that has never happened.
Export-Import will not touch this normally.
Senator McCarthy. Didn't they buy some arms from this
fellow over in Alexandria because it was cheaper to buy from
him than from the Defense Department, last year, Venezuela did?
Colonel Smith. Venezuela? If they did, and they didn't get
a loan through the DOD----
Senator McCarthy. That would be outside the scope.
Colonel Smith. It would be outside the scope.
SALE OF AIRPLANES TO CHILE AND ARGENTINA
Senator McCarthy. Let me ask about a specific sale or
transfer. The 50 airplanes, what are they getting, 25?
Colonel Smith. Twenty-five.
Senator McCarthy. They asked for 50, and they will probably
get the other 25. You don't think so?
Colonel Smith. I don't think so.
General Porter. We don't see where they are going to come
from.
Senator McCarthy. We originally approved 50 though. So the
reason we are not selling them 50 is that we don't have them?
General Porter. That is right.
Senator McCarthy. At the time, the Chileans argued that
anything you could do to cut it down was good from their point
of view. They said, ``If they get 50, we have got to have 30
just for political purposes.'' Now why couldn't we have said 25
in the first place instead of 50, so the Chileans could then
say, ``They got 25, we have to buy 15.'' We went for 50, and
now we say they really don't need 50, 25 will do. This is the
kind of game they play, and I don't understand.
General Porter. This interplay between Argentina and Chile,
from where I sat, didn't look the same way to me.
Senator McCarthy. That is what the Ambassador told me.
General Porter. He was trying to make a case and make a
name for himself by using Argentina as a lever to get us to go
ahead and sell F-5's.
Senator McCarthy. His first position was don't sell to
Argentina; we won't buy any.
General Porter. He was speaking for himself.
Senator McCarthy. I thought he was speaking for the
Christian Democrats. He is the number two man.
AIRCRAFT FOR PILOT TRAINING
General Porter. I know, but actually the military had to
have replacement aircraft to keep their pilots in training.
They were so short of aircraft that they had to find aircraft
from some place. General Rosavitz, when I first went down to
Chile, was talking about trying to find an aircraft that he
could use for pilot training, and we offered him an F-86. Well,
the F-86 has some wing problems. By the time they got through
with the wing modification, they would have a lot of money tied
up in those aircraft, more than he felt they were worth.
Now this was the reason that the Argentine went to the A4B,
instead of the F-86.
Rosavitz, though, was prepared to take an aircraft that
would keep the pilot training going. But Tomich up here got
into the act. The first thing you know, this had political
overtones, and we had a so-called arms race, competition
between Argentina and Chile. This would never have happened had
this been handled only on the military circuit, and had we been
able to say, ``Look, come 1970 there will be a new aircraft
that you can go ahead with, put your money in for 10 or 15
years available, so you can keep your pilots going.''
A lot of these pilots go into civil air work down there,
and they have used the military as a recruiting ground for
their civil air fleet which makes sense. We are doing it here
if we can. We are having trouble keeping military pilots in the
Air Force now, flying DC-6's and 7's.
ARMS RACE WAS JUST A DEVICE
I will be very honest with you, and please don't ever use
this. But this whole business of an arms race between Chile and
Argentina was a device used on the part of the Chileans, hoping
that they could shake us loose from F-5 earlier. It was picked
up by the newspapers because the newspapers down there are
pretty much hostile to Frei, and the first thing you know, it
is taken from one country to another and the thing just
snowballs.
Senator McCarthy. Who wanted to shake loose the F-5's, the
government or the military?
General Porter. These Air Forces in South America would
like very much to have the F-5 because they see it as an
airplane that is easy to maintain over the long term, in the
next 15 year. They feel that within 15 years a propeller-driven
airplane in the commercial world is going to be pretty much a
thing of the past. They are looking to their pilot training, as
General Rosavitz said to me, trying to keep the seed alive.
Also we are working to try to get some sort of a counter-
insurgency aircraft going, which would be a propeller-driven
job. But that hasn't been coming along too well, and we
couldn't offer them and suggest that they put their money into
an F-5 or something like that because we didn't have anything
we could promise them.
HOW THE FIGURE WAS REACHED
Senator McCarthy. What about the question of the number, 50
as against 30 in Chile, which was the Chilean number they
insisted they would need to offset 50 advanced jet aircraft in
Argentina? Why not 25 and 15? I mean what are they worth, $2
million a piece roughly?
General Porter. Here is the way the 50 figure was arrived
at.
There were certain squadrons of aircraft in Argentina that
needed to be replaced. In doing that, they had a certain number
of aircraft, and I can't recall the exact figure, I think
something like 80, that they were going to replace, either 100
or 80, that they were going to replace with these 50 aircraft.
They figured with the pilots, if they stood down from these
80 aircraft, they could keep their training going with the 50
aircraft.
Senator McCarthy. I want it clear I don't think there is
danger of military action between Chile and Argentina.
General Porter. No, and the military down there knows this
is not going to be.
A QUESTION OF APPEARANCES
Senator McCarthy. It becomes a question of appearances and
of politics and of the economic consequences of this sort of
thing. You talk about training in these F-5's and whatever
other jets they have got. The word I get is that the experience
of these pilots in these hot fighter planes doesn't qualify
them for commercial use. Our airlines are short of pilots, but
they are saying they are not getting the kind of men out of
these hot jets that they used to get out of the military. They
don't make good pilots on a commercial jet.
General Porter. I think that is a matter of opinion. As a
soldier I am not qualified to answer that sort of question.
Senator McCarthy. I don't know whether that is true or not,
but that is what I am told. Then they say we go to South
America and they want to train them on hot jets so they can
transfer them to commercial flying. It would be better to
transfer them to jet transports or something like that.
General Porter. This speed of aircraft, this A4B is below
Mach 1, so it really isn't a supersonic plane. The F-5 is just
over. So we are not talking about these really advanced jets,
and so on. This 30 versus 50, this is the first time I have
heard that, Mr. Senator.
Senator McCarthy. That was the Tomich ratio as I heard it
the first time. That if it was cut down they wouldn't need as
many.
General Porter. I really think this ploy on the part of the
Chileans shows how desperately they want us to sell them
aircraft. They would have bought the A4B. They would have
bought anything that would fly if it would get them a
reasonable aircraft, but we didn't have it, you see, and with
procedures and our policy, the F-5 was not in sight for at
least five years.
BRITISH PLANE
Senator McCarthy. How good a plane is this British one they
are buying now?
General Porter. Well, our people say it is a pretty good
plane. It won't do the things actually that the F-5 will do for
them.
Senator McCarthy. It is supersonic?
General Porter. No, it isn't. It is subsonic. In a dive it
will break the sound barrier.
Senator McCarthy. You can do that with most any airplane,
can't you? You mean it can go supersonic and come out of it?
General Porter. That is right. It has to go into a dive to
do it, but it isn't truly a supersonic plane. We haven't got
any down there. Now going to newspapers, the Peruvians have
been looking at some that the British have, this Electric.
Senator McCarthy. The lightening? That is what they sold
Saudi Arabia.
Colonel Smith. The aircraft is good, Senator. The question
is how long they will continue support of the aircraft.
General Porter. This is a problem. Now on this particular
thing of support, the thing that the Latin American military is
concerned about, they feel if they can't come to us and buy and
they go to Europe and buy, they are going to pay more to begin
with. Then there isn't the assurance that there will be the
spare parts, and they know that they are going to have to tool
up again to get the spare parts, which means another contract.
The maintenance of it will be much higher than it would be if
they can get into our market.
MC NAMARA'S HARD-NOSED POSITION ON GRANTS
Senator Morse. You have been very generous with your time.
I only have three quick questions to ask now.
It has been reported to us, though not reliably, that the
Secretary of Defense has recommended against the continuation
of the grant program for the military equipment to Latin
America. I would like to know whether or not that is true.
Second, has the State Department agreed with him?
General Porter. I am not certain that you should ask me
that question.
Senator Morse. All right. That is all I need to know.
General Porter. Because I am a subordinate over there. I
could tell you what my view was as to the importance of the
military program down there, but I am not in the policy-making
business. I make recommendations.
Mr. Corrigan. Could I say--I am with the State Department,
and I am Political Advisor to General Porter. I think I can
merely tell you that I have been in the State Department for
the last few days talking with some people about a lower level
over there in the Latin American section, and they tell me that
this is true.
That apparently Mr. NcNamara is taking a hard-nosed
viewpoint that grant military assistance should stop rather
precipitously within a year or two. ARA, the Latin American
section, Mr. Lincoln Gordon, is taking very strong exception to
this. He thinks that such abrupt stoppage of the grant military
assistance program would be mischievous and counterproductive
at a time when we don't know exactly where we are going in our
relationship with Latin America. He thinks eventually that
perhaps there should be a diminution of it, but it should be
more orderly and not a meat-ax approach.
I understand that last Friday there was a meeting on this,
a so-called interdepartmental regional group meeting, IRV, and
there Mr. Lincoln Gordon did take a strong position that he
disagreed with the McNamara position, which was expounded at
that meeting by a representative of Mr. McNamara's office.
I understand Mr. McNamara's representative, on the other
hand, did hold to his guns, and that this matter is being
referred up to what we call the senior interdepartmental group,
which is chaired by the Secretary of Defense. If they don't
come to an agreement there, the matter would be referred to the
President.
GRANTS VERSUS CREDIT
Senator Morse. This is a hot one up here you know, this
grant versus credit.
General Porter. You know from where I sit I think the grant
program is terribly important to us down there, because the
only way we really are going to influence and control the
introduction of weapons into South America in my judgment,
considering the nationalistic attitude of the people and their
Spanish temperament, is through collaboration, where we are
working together and we can give them advice, and say ``Look,
we will help you get this equipment if you need it and if you
can justify it.''
Now the way we are going to go, the way things are
developing now, we are not going to be able to do this.
Venezuela is a good case in point.
In Venezuela now where there are advisers, when they ask us
our views, we can tell them, but we are not privy to what is
going on in Venezuela. But if you look at the grant aid program
and look at how much budget in most of these countries is
available for modernization, replacement of old rifles with the
M-1 and things like that, you will find that the 5 percent or
so of their budget that our military assistance grant program
provides is over 50 percent of what they have for modernization
of their equipment. When you look at the trends, what this does
in the way of giving new radios to them, new equipment of that
nature, and the vehicles that will carry the radios so you can
use them out in the field, helicopters and things like that,
this is the difference between having a force which will be
able to do the job and not having it. They are pretty well
mixed up. Their budget is pretty well tied up to about 85 or 90
percent in all of these countries on fixed charges of cost of
personnel, maintaining their plant, or civic action activities,
if they are committed to road building, these educational
programs, and it is hard to smoke these things out.
NON-MILITARY COSTS FOR CONSTRUCTION
For example, in Brazil, it shows if you just look at their
budget, about 60 percent of the Brazilian budget goes into the
military. But if you actually could break out the non-military
cost of the Brazilian forces, you would find that less than six
percent of the money, looking at their overall budget, actually
goes for internal security, pure internal security or national
defense projects. About ten percent of that is going into
roadbuilding, railroad building, and other civil action
projects that they are in.
Senator Morse. Airfields.
Mr. Corrigan. And running the service up and down the
Amazon. The Navy does that, you see, and going into the back
country, the airfields and the air service, running the medical
service into those back areas. One of the most difficult things
that I have gotten into is trying to figure out just exactly
what goes into their defense appropriation and how much is
used.
It varies from country to country. In Argentina quite a lot
of the budget goes into civil action type stuff there, but the
Argentine has never admitted it was civic action, but it is up
in the northwest.
MILITARY ADVISORY GROUPS
Senator Morse. Senator McCarthy, we have one other
question, as you know, that we discussed here that I thought
the General could help us with. That deals with the military
advisory groups in these various countries.
I wanted to discuss with him if he would from the
standpoint of Nicaragua. First, what do you think is the
situation down there, and how large is our military advisory
group? To what degree, if any, do the critics which are
attributed to the military getting involved in military coups,
working with an American military advisory group. And I think
we ought to have ammunition to answer those criticisms.
Senator McCarthy. Are there any other countries that have
military advisory groups in major countries in Latin America,
or is it only United States groups there?
General Porter. In Paraguay, there is one from Argentina
and there is one from Brazil. But they are working on specific
things.
Senator McCarthy. These are Latin American countries?
General Porter. That is right.
EUROPEAN ADVISORS
Senator McCarthy. Any of the European countries?
General Porter. No. Up until World War II, yes. Germany and
France had all of them. We started in 1940 or '41.
Senator McCarthy. What is the tradition of the Brazilian
Army? Was that German-trained or not? Do you know?
General Porter. Bob, can you answer that?
Mr. Corrigan. Prior to World War II, it was. Since World
War II, it has not been.
Senator McCarthy. What about Argentina? That was German,
wasn't it?
General Porter. Bolivia was German; Chile was German.
Senator McCarthy. I know Chile was German. I thought
Argentina was not German. I wondered whether you noted any
difference in the way in which their army responded in
political crisis on the basis of whether they were German,
French or British trained.
General Porter. I think actually in Argentina the French
were there, because they are still sending French----
Senator McCarthy. I think so. Generally, where the French
are, the army is a little more political.
General Porter. Peru is French also.
Senator McCarthy. Chile was German.
General Porter. Chile is German.
Senator McCarthy. They are loyal to any administration,
aren't they?
General Porter. Yes. Bolivia was German also. But the
reasons that the Chileans are loyal to their administration is
for other reasons.
Senator McCarthy. You don't think it has anything to do
with being trained by Germans?
General Porter. No.
Mr. Corrigan. So was Brazil. They weren't too loyal when
they kicked out Goulart.
Senator McCarthy. I was thinking of that. You think most of
the army there is becoming Americanized?
General Porter. Oh yes. The German Ambassador in Panama,
who had been in Bolivia, told me he was sorry the Germans
didn't leave Bolivia sooner, because there were still some bad
effects in the Bolivian Army.
Senator McCarthy. German tradition?
General Porter. From the days of German tradition. He was
getting after me because we hadn't been able to change all of
these things. I don't think that is a very good analogy.
Senator McCarthy. It isn't analogy, but a question.
Sometimes the things run deep. But the point is now, so far as
the military advisory groups, they are either from other Latin
American countries or they are all from the United States.
SITUATION IN NICARAGUA
Senator Morse. That last ticker was that the election had
gone better than three to one for Somoza.
Senator McCarthy. Where did they get that one third?
General Porter. I think Nicaragua. This is probably as
difficult an area for me to understand as there is. I frankly,
from what I have seen of the situation there, feel that we are
dealing with probably the most backward country. I put this and
Bolivia as the two most backward countries in the area.
I think that things are much more limited there than they
are in the other Central American areas, even Honduras
included. I say this because the rule of the machete is still
pretty much the rule in Nicaragua. For example, I think I told
you this, Colonel Francisco was coming back from inspecting a
unit on the coast here about four months ago, and about 40
miles from Managua, he ran into a road jam. He got out of the
car and went walking to find out why these cars were stopped.
There were over 50 cars that were halted.
He got up at the head of the column and discovered that
there were two families that were shooting it out across the
road. This had been going on for about six hours. This was a
private feud, the Hatfields and McCoys or something like that.
By dark there were well over 100 cars that were waiting there
until dark came and the people went home and they went to
Managua.
I don't know just how you deal in our terms, in our
political life, with this sort of going on in the countryside,
you see. From what I have seen of Nicaragua, it is pretty much
a peculiar place from the word go. I just don't know how to
rationalize what goes on there.
I will say this. That La Guardia is pretty well-trained by
our standards. But when you take a Nicaraguan who is used to
this sort of life I was just telling you about, and you give
him a life, and he is provoked, up to a point he is pretty
well-disciplined. He is not going to take the brickbats on his
helmet. He is going to use his bare bayonet much more quickly.
ASSESSMENT OF GEN. SOMOZA
I really feel from what I have seen that Somoza will
probably give them a good administration. This is just my own
judgment. I don't know Somoza well. The president that had died
of a heart attack was a very, very fine man. He was loved by
the people. Aguerro, I don't know him. I don't know whether you
know him or not. He ran last time and withdrew. Do you know
Aguerro at all?
Mr. Corrigan. No. But only this morning, General, I was
reading at the State Department an analytical telegram from our
Embassy in Managua, where, reporting the results of numerous
conversations Embassy people had had with people of different
political beliefs and opinions, and even among the conservative
people of substance like in the professions and whatnot, a
number of people, these conservatives, of course, are very
unhappy about Somoza.
They feel that Somoza has exaggerated and insisted on
keeping power too long, and they are sorry that Samoza decided
to run. They would rather see the thing evolve in a way from
where maybe the Samozas would let people like Schick, who are
good people not associated with the family, but nevertheless
did move ahead and insist on running for the presidency. These
people said therefore they were not too sanguine about the way
things may develop in Nicaragua, particularly because they felt
that this fellow Taucheau is a bit of the Aryan side, that he
may be more suppressive than his brother Luis. But they all
went on to say, these opponents of Somoza, talking of the
political party who is the opposition party, they all went on
to say Aguerro would be terrible.
The point I wish to make is that apparently these people of
substance feel that this wasn't the time. They didn't have the
fellow of sufficient stature and ability to move in and change
the situation.
Senator Morse. This hotel episode would show that.
Mr. Corrigan. It was scandalous and outrageous.
Mr. Holt. You know the old saying. You can't beat somebody
with nobody. This is a lot of what is involved in Nicaragua.
This Aguerro is nobody----
Mr. Corrigan. This situation that is evolving has to
evolve, and I think this situation in the past two days will
temper this, rather than the reverse. I am inclined to hope
that he will become a little more politic, a little more bland
and a little more clever in building up his relationships than
being oppressive. This is the question. We have to see how he
evolves with power once he has power.
EXERCISING INFLUENCE
General Porter. In our military advisory group, we have
between 25 and 30 people in our mission there, Army, Navy and
Air Force total, and they are dealing with advising the
military academy.
They are working, trying to teach them how to use
communications. Teaching them to maintain their equipment. They
are working on training to try to teach them how to train
soldiers so they will stand when people are shooting at them
without running. And it is a minimum number there. I really
feel it is a benefit to us because these people are talking to
the military people, and are feeling their pulse, and it gives
us a way of restraining them.
Senator Morse. Exercising influence.
General Porter. That is right.
Senator Morse. General, you have been very, very generous.
You have too, Mr. Corrigan, and I appreciate it very much.
[Whereupon, at 5:35 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
Strategic Implications of Antiballistic Missile Defense Deployment
----------
Limitations on Use of Chemical and Bacteriological Agents in Warfare
----------
Sales of Military Equipment by the United States
----------
Tuesday, February 7, 1967
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Disarmament
of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:10 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Albert Gore (chairman of the
subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Gore, Sparkman, Symington, Clark, Pell,
McCarthy, and Aiken.
Also present: Senator McGee.
Captain Hibler; Mr. Knaur; Jack Stempler, Special Assistant
to Secretary of Defense; Mel Christopher, Congressional Liaison
to ACDA.
[This hearing was published in 1967 with deletions made for
reasons of national security. The most significant deletions
are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the
remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the
published hearings.]
* * * * * * *
STATEMENT OF CYRUS R. VANCE, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
* * * * * * *
DR. FOSTER'S CONCLUSION ABOUT NIKE-X BEING READY FOR PRODUCTION [P. 35]
Senator Sparkman. Mr. Secretary, before you go further, I
wonder if I may break in. What was Dr. Foster's conclusion
about Nike-X being ready for production?
Mr. Vance. He indicated that we had components which would
permit us to commence the production and deployment of a Nike-X
system at this time, but he also came to the very strong
conclusion that from a technical standpoint he did not believe
that the deployment of a Nike-X system to protect against
Soviet attacks upon our population was a wise and sound course.
He thought it presented grave technical difficulties.
Senator Sparkman. Thank you.
* * * * * * *
DIFFICULTIES WITH THE SOVIET UNION [P. 35]
Senator Gore. So as of now your decision is to defer any
deployment but to continue with research and development.
Mr. Vance. That is correct, and we have also asked this
year, Mr. Chairman, that the Congress appropriate $377 million
for FY 1968 which, together with the $168 million already
appropriated in FY 1967, could be used for production should
the talks with the Soviets fail. If they failed, the issue
could then be reconsidered and a new decision would be possible
at that time should the President choose to make it.
Senator Gore. What is the status of those discussions?
Mr. Vance. Communications have started between our two
countries. No substance has as yet been discussed between the
two countries. They have indicated an interest in such
discussions.
Senator Gore. No actual conference has occurred on it.
Mr. Vance. There has been one or, I believe, two
preliminary discussions.
Senator Gore. I see. Of reasonably high officials?
Mr. Vance. Of high officials, in which there was an
indication that they were interested in further exploring this
problem with us.
Senator Gore. Fine.
* * * * * * *
ESTIMATED COST OF TOTAL DAMAGE-LIMITING PACKAGE [P. 38]
Mr. Vance. To test the contribution that each of these
Nike-X deployments might make to our damage limiting
objectives, we have projected both the U.S. and Soviet
strategic nuclear forces (assuming no reaction by the Soviets
to the U.S. ABM deployment) to fiscal year 1976, by which time
posture B, the heavier defense, could be fully in place. These
forces are shown on the tables.
With respect to another table in my classified statement,
there is one very significant number--that is the total number
of ballistic missile warheads, which is the third item on this
table. That shows that in 1976 the total number of ballistic
missile warheads which the U.S. would have is 7,328. In
contrast, it is estimated that at that time the Soviets,
assuming no reaction on their part to an ABM deployment by the
United States, would be between 1,133 and 1,598.
Senator Aiken. What size warhead?
Mr. Vance. They would vary.
Senator Aiken. What is an average, would it be mostly
small?
Mr. Vance. They would be, primarily, small. I can give you
that in terms of megaton equivalents if you would like; it
would be 1,825 equivalent one megaton weapons.
Senator Aiken. Medium range or ICBM?
Mr. Vance. These are all ICBM's and submarine-launched
ballistic missiles.
Senator Aiken. Never mind.
Senator Gore. Now in your estimate of 7,000 plus for the
United States----
Mr. Vance. Yes, sir?
Senator Gore. [continuing] In the event of the Poseidon
missile, are you counting that as one warhead or 14 warheads?
Mr. Vance. 14 warheads, sir.
Senator Gore. So you are really in many respects, so far as
actually the ballistic missile is concerned, the number would
be smaller.
Mr. Vance. Quite right, sir.
Senator Gore. Thank you.
Senator Sparkman. Does that mean the 400 would be 5,600 out
of that 7,328?
Mr. Vance. There are 400 large submarine-launched ballistic
missiles (Poseidon class)----
Senator Sparkman. 14 times that would be--14 times 4.
RUSSIAN POLARIS DEVELOPMENT
Senator Symington. Following the chairman's question, Mr.
Secretary, have you made any provision for the logical
development of a 14-headed tube on a Polaris submarine by the
Russians in your figure?
Mr. Vance. Yes, sir. We have made computations which I will
come to later on.
Senator Symington. My point is you have 1,133 and 1,598
here. Does that include 16 times 14 in it?
Mr. Vance. This assumes no reaction on the part of the
Soviet Union to a U.S. ABM deployment, which I think, as I said
before, is a most unrealistic assumption. I believe they will
react, Senator Symington.
Senator Symington. I do not mean to be short about it, but
actually these figures do not mean a lot if they have a lot of
Polaris submarines with 14 in each tube.
Mr. Vance. I am going to point out later on that I do not
think this is the posture the Soviet Union will be in if we
deploy an ABM. I think they will be forced to react and will
have substantially more warheads than shown on this table.
Senator Symington. I do not mean to labor it. But certainly
you do not mean they will develop a 14-weapon Polaris missile
just because we do not put up an ABM, do you?
Mr. Vance. They may develop a multi-warhead Polaris-type
missile. Whether it would be able to have 14 warheads or not, I
do not now know, Senator Symington; they might decide instead
simply to proliferate land-based ICBM's which also could have
multiple warheads.
Senator Symington. Thank you.
Senator Gore. As I believe the CIA told us, as of now we
have no information that they have developed or are developing,
attempting to develop a multiple warhead.
Mr. Vance. That is correct. We have no information at this
point in time which leads us to believe that they are
developing multiple warheads. They may be, but we have no
information at this point.
Senator Symington. It was not too long ago that we did not
have information that they were developing Polaris submarines.
Senator Sparkman. May I ask this one question, sir?
Mr. Vance. Yes, sir.
RUSSIAN SAM DEFENSE SITES
Senator Sparkman. SAM sites, we have 112 and they will have
between 1,360 and 2,006. Why that great difference?
Mr. Vance. It is a difference of emphasis which they place,
as opposed to us, on defense. They have always been very, very
strong on defense, as you may know, Senator Sparkman. We feel
that they have wasted billions of dollars on their SAM defense.
Both the military and the civilians in the Defense Department
agree that despite the Soviets' massive deployment of surface-
to-air missiles, our bombers could still penetrate and that at
least 85 percent of them would get through. So that we feel
that this vast expenditure of billions of dollars by the
Soviets on SAMs in the past has been essentially a waste of
money on their part.
* * * * * * *
ESTIMATES OF SOVIET AND UNITED STATES FIRST STRIKE FATALITIES [P. 41]
Mr. Vance. We believe that even if we struck first they
would still have the capability to come back and inflict that
amount of damage upon the United States. And we have reviewed,
not because we ever intended to do so, the question of whether
or not the United States could ever launch a pre-emptive strike
on the Soviet Union and receive an acceptable level of damage
in return. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and we are all in
agreement that we could not do so, even if we struck first.
* * * * * * *
Senator Gore. You and Secretary McNamara take the position
that the best, most fortuitous balance of terror so far as we
are concerned is to pay relatively small attention to defense
and maximize our power of assured destruction.
Mr. Vance. That is correct, sir.
Senator Gore. Thank you.
Senator Sparkman. I think it was Winston Churchill's
analysis that the development of atomic and nuclear weapons
would prevent a third world war; was it not?
Mr. Vance. I believe he did comment to that effect.
Senator Sparkman. Because of the horror and terror of it.
Senator Symington. I do not think that is quite right. The
development of nuclear weapons, according to a conversation I
had with him in 1954, made him feel that the British were
helpless in the future against an all-out attack. He also felt
it gave greater advantages to Russia because of the size of
their land mass, and the time involved if there was ever
another war. Therefore, it was important for us--he always
classified himself with us--to be sure that we never lowered
our deterrence.
I am inclined this morning to support the decision not to
have the ABM. I did not have the privilege of hearing Mr.
Foster yesterday. But I did hear him before the Armed Services-
Appropriations Joint Committees, and, based on his position, I
am inclined to support it. But in supporting it, I am in no way
reducing my conviction that the best way to prevent a future
war is to be sure we have adequate deterrence against Russia,
so that they know they would be destroyed if they attacked us.
Mr. Vance. I am absolutely in agreement with that. We must
assure our destruction capability.
Senator Sparkman. I am given a quote by the staff,
``Security will be the sturdy stepson of terror.''
Mr. Vance. Will be the what, sir?
Senator Sparkman. ``Will be the sturdy stepson of terror.''
I am sure that he advocated the maintenance of the deterrent
forces. But he said the maintenance of that deterrent force
would prevent World War III. I am sure he said that.
Senator Symington. An equally famous quotation is his
characterization of the ``balance of terror.'' The word
``balance'' is the important one.
Senator Sparkman. Yes.
Senator Gore. I would like to put a question here that has
been troubling me. Suppose we are convinced that despite
whatever defense systems the Soviets install, we can still
wreak this havoc in such horrible proportions as described
here. Suppose that they are convinced that their system is
impregnable. Then has not our strategy of deterrence been
compromised?
Mr. Vance. Mr. Chairman, during the last several years we
have released more information of a formerly classified nature
than ever before, because we wanted the Soviet Union to know
our capability so that they would not misinterpret our power,
and our capability to destroy them as a viable nation should
they attempt to attack us.
We have been criticized for releasing so much information,
but I think it is vitally important that the Soviet Union
should know what our capability is so they do not miscalculate.
Senator Gore. I was not referring to their information
about the number of our warheads and even the nature of the
improvements. But suppose that they have a confidence in their
defense which we do not share but which they hold? Is not the
crucial question their conception of our power of retaliation
rather than our conception of it?
Mr. Vance. It is, sir; no question about it.
Senator Symington. In other words, what the Chairman is
saying, as I understand it, it is better for us not to have the
deterrence and have them feel we do, than to have it, and have
them feel we do not.
Mr. Vance. I think it is better that we have it and they
know it.
Senator Symington. That is best.
OUR STRATEGY OF DETERMENT [P. 44]
Mr. Vance. I think that this is one valuable thing that can
come out of discussions with the Soviet Union. If we can sit
down and go through these matters with them and sit down and
very frankly discuss our capability to penetrate such system.
Senator Gore. We are going to tell them that we have 14,
multiple, 14-head warheads that can go different directions and
different trajectories.
Mr. Vance. Exactly what we would tell them I cannot say
precisely at this point. But we would be making it as clear as
clear could be that we have that capability to penetrate.
Senator Gore. Okay.
Senator Sparkman. If they have been reading our papers and
listening to radio, they would know it anyway.
* * * * * * *
COSTS OF AN EFFECTIVE DEFENSE SYSTEM AND THE WAR IN VIETNAM [P. 44]
Senator Symington. I understand. But it worries me. The
cost of the project is so heavily emphasized in the defense of
the civilians, it might cost--for example, a figure given us
was $40 billion in 10 years. At the same time the civilian
heads are so determined to pursue a war that is costing us,
according to the staff of the Appropriations Committee, $30
billion a year chasing these little people around the woods
over there in Vietnam. So if it comes down to a question of
price, I am perfectly willing to consider the civilian heads
probably better informed and better in a position to make a
decision. But it is hard for me to see why the ABM system is so
heavily defended in not being put up because of the price, $40
billion over 10 years, when we are spending somewhere between
$2 billion and $2.5 billion a month in this little country over
in Southeast Asia. That is the one thing that runs through my
mind as I read these details of the heavy costs.
* * * * * * *
INCREASE OF SOVIET SECOND STRIKE POTENTIAL [P. 45]
Mr. Vance. If the Soviets are determined to maintain an
Assured Destruction capability against us and they believe that
our deployment of an ABM defense would reduce our fatalities in
the ``U.S. Strikes First, Soviets Retaliate'' case to the
levels shown in the table above, they would have no alternative
but to increase the second strike damage potential of their
offensive forces. They could do so in several different ways,
by deploying a new large, land-based ICBM (either mobile, or
hardened and defended), or a new submarine-launched missile
like our Poseidon, or by adding large numbers of hardened but
undefended SS-9s or SS-11s. They have the technical capability
to deploy any of these systems with MIRVs (or single warheads)
by the mid-1970s. Shown in the table below are the relative
costs to the Soviet Union of responding to a U.S. ABM
deployment with a land-mobile ICBM system. I think the table is
self-explanatory.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of Fatalities in an All-Out Strategic
Exchange (in millions) (ASSUMES SOVIET REACTION
TO U.S. ABM DEPLOYMENT)
---------------------------------------------------
U.S. Programs Soviets Strike First, U.S. Strikes First,
U.S. Retaliates Soviets Retaliate
---------------------------------------------------
U.S. Fat. Sov. Fat. U.S. Fat. Sov. Fat.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Approved (no response)...................................... 120 120+ 100 70
Posture A................................................... 120 120+ 90 70
Posture B................................................... 120 120+ 90 70
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
If the Soviets choose to respond to our ABM deployment with
MIRVs, penetration aids, and such a system (200 missiles
against Posture A and 650 against Posture B) the results would
be as shown below, and this is a very significant table. It
shows very simply----
Senator Gore. We are back where we started.
Mr. Vance. [continuing] That we are back where we started.
* * * * * * *
SOVIET INCREASE OF SECOND STRIKE [P. 46]
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, if I may, before we go to
the next subject; these assumptions can be very wrong. For
example, several years ago some of us were criticized,
including President Kennedy, about a missile gap.
The fact is, if there was a missile gap it was created by
Mr. Dulles and destroyed by Mr. Dulles; eliminated would be a
better word.
Senator Gore. You mean Allen?
Senator Symington. Yes.
Between December 1959, the record will show, and August
1961, the Central Intelligence Agency, at both times under the
direction of Mr. Dulles, in four separate reductions, reduced
the number of ICBMs on launching pads in Russia 7.5 percent.
Therefore, sometimes I always worry, regardless of the
efforts made, as to the ability of any of us to know exactly
what is going on behind the Iron Curtain, although I understand
we have better results now because of satellite information.
Mr. Vance. That is correct, sir.
Senator Symington. But when you say that they would have no
alternative but to increase the second strike, which they would
do, for example, by developing new missiles for their Polaris-
type submarines, surely you do not mean to imply they won't do
that anyway, do you?
Mr. Vance. No, I do not mean to imply that. They might very
well.
Senator Symington. I would say that they would do it on any
basis, wouldn't you? They would make the best weapon they could
for their new Polaris submarines.
Mr. Vance. I think what they will do is assure themselves
that they maintain a sufficient capability for Assured
Destruction, so that they feel that we will not strike them
first. I think that they will do whatever is required to put
themselves in that posture, in the same fashion that we have
done in the past and will continue to do.
Senator Symington. Thank you.
DEFENSE AGAINST CHINESE CAPACITY
Senator Gore. In my view, Mr. Secretary, if we could
succeed in dissuading the Soviets from deploying their system,
this would be a very great accomplishment. I have wondered if
they were in a position to do so or would be willing to do so
in view of the Chinese--the very rapid strides they are making.
You are coming to that later?
Mr. Vance. I am coming to that, but I would be glad to
comment on that now.
I think that in any discussions we have with the Soviet
Union, both of us would reserve our rights to do what each of
us might have to do with respect to China.
Senator Gore. Could I ask a technical question right here?
Mr. Vance. Yes, sir.
Senator Gore. Now, the deployments that are being made in
the Soviet Union now, we have been told, are aimed at or
instrumented--I have difficulty in talking in this field--
designed, I guess is a better word, to protect them against
missiles that would be coming in on trajectories which the
United States would be calculated to use in case of an attack.
Mr. Vance. That is correct. That is the way their present
system appears to be designed.
Senator Gore. Now, my question is to what extent is it
feasible and, if feasible, at what cost, for the same systems
to be designed or redesigned to provide protection against
missiles coming from the land mass of China?
Mr. Vance. I do not have an exact cost figure, but the
Soviets would have to change the placement of their radars,
they would probably also have to change the placement of some
of their missile sites, and the small missile site radars that
go with them.
I do not have an exact cost figure, but I think it would be
quite low because, as I will indicate later on, for us to build
a system which would be quite effective against the Red Chinese
would cost, we estimate, only about $3.5 billion.
Senator Gore. That is a light defense?
Mr. Vance. That is a light defense; that is right.
Senator Gore. But this does not, as I have understood this
estimate, contemplate a submarine capacity on the part of the
Chinese.
Mr. Vance. We would take care of any submarine capacity of
the Chinese through our regular antisubmarine warfare
components.
We know that they have at this point only one missile
submarine. There are no indications that they yet have any
missiles for that one submarine. They may be working on
missiles for it. But we feel confident that we could take care
of that one submarine with our current ASW forces, and we are
also confident that if they move to a bigger submarine program
that we would be able to take necessary steps to contain that
particular threat.
But, as I say, we have made no final decision with respect
to whether or not we should deploy an ABM system against the
potential Red Chinese threat because the lead time is such that
we do not have to make the decision now.
SOVIET MISSILE AND RADAR SYSTEMS
Senator Gore. One other question that is so elementary but,
nevertheless, those of us who are elementary in our level of
knowledge can only ask elementary questions. Are the silos, the
hardened silos, in which the Soviets are placing their
interceptor missiles, perpendicular or are they slanted toward
the trajectories of the missile lanes it is anticipated the
United States will use? Do the missiles take off
perpendicularly? This will give some measure of how difficult
it would be, some measure of the difficulty, if they wanted to
redesign, replace their radars and use the same missiles that
are now being installed as a defense against ours for defense
against the Chinese.
Mr. Vance. I think the determining factor is the way their
radars are placed.
Senator Symington. You have to go out of the ground
vertically.
Senator Gore. I thought so. This is what I would want to
know. This would have a bearing, this could have a bearing, if
they could use the same silos or same missiles by changing the
direction of their radars and the telemetry.
Mr. Vance. I think the critical thing is the placement of
their radars, and they would have to change the placement of
some of their radar facilities to reorient their system against
the Chinese and away from the United States.
Senator Gore. How difficult would this replacement be? I
know this must be a big installation.
Mr. Vance. It is a big installation, sir, and it is quite a
costly installation. They have two of these so-called Hen House
radars up in the northwest section of the Soviet Union, giving
coverage to the threat corridor of ICBMs coming in from the
United States, and they have one under the process of
construction called the Dog House down southwest of Moscow.
One would expect that they would have to put either Hen
House or Dog House types over to the east to take care of the
threat corridor for missiles coming in from China.
Some of the radars, such as those emplaced around Moscow,
essentially protect the city from any direction and
consequently would not have to be changed to defend against the
CPR. But the large Hen House radar, for example, essentially
covers a sector. If the Soviets were defending against China we
would expect such a radar to be oriented in that particular
direction.
Senator Gore. Now, this committee would be concerned in the
case of, including myself, of the question of the verification.
Mr. Vance. Yes.
Senator Gore. Supposing the Soviets said the silos they
were constructing, supposing they said, ``The defenses we are
deploying are safeguards against the Chinese whose hostility is
increasing toward us.''
Now, could we be reasonably certain that this would be true
or untrue?
Mr. Vance. As you know, we have a considerable and growing
unilateral capability through our satellites to determine both
the deployment of missiles and the deployment of radar systems.
As to whether or not it would be necessary to have some
form of on-site inspection in addition to our unilateral
capability is not yet clear, and this is probably one of the
issues we will have to discuss with the Soviet Union in any
talks we have with respect of a moratorium on or a cessation of
ABM deployment.
Senator Gore. One other question and then I will let you
proceed with your statement.
PROTECTION AGAINST THE EAST OR WEST
What is the relative time element in deployment of the
construction of the missile and the silo, the launching
mechanism, on the one hand, and the radar installations which
you say would be necessary to change as to location if this
cellar be, silo be, in which a missile is on station, is to be
used as protection against the East or against the West?
Mr. Vance. Are you asking me how long it would take the
Soviets or how long it would take us?
Senator Gore. Well, I am trying to get some idea, just for
my own satisfaction, if we reach such an agreement as is being
sought, which I hope we can conclude, how much reliance could
we safely place upon the Soviet word that they were deploying
as a defense against China if, in fact, the silo and missile
could be used for either, and it would require a shifting of
the radar from here to there. What I am trying to get at is
what time element would be involved in re-installation of the
radar or the necessary facilities to use this silo and this
missile as an antiballistic defense against us?
Mr. Vance. I will give you my best estimate, and I would
like to correct it for the record. I believe it will be two to
three years.
Senator Gore. Two to three years?
Mr. Vance. Yes, sir.
Senator Gore. If the deployment of the entire, the overall,
system runs from five to seven.
Mr. Vance. Yes, sir.
Senator Gore. That is what I wanted to get.
Mr. Vance. I would like to get that for the record.
New radars and interceptor missiles, if already in
production, could probably be installed in 2-3 years.
Senator Gore. So this will be an extremely important part
of the negotiations.
Mr. Vance. I would think it would be an extremely important
part.
Senator Gore. Thank you.
* * * * * * *
RED CHINESE NUCLEAR THREAT [P. 49]
Mr. Vance. With regard to the Red Chinese nuclear threat,
an austere ABM defense consisting, for example, of four PAR and
15 Missile Site Radars, together with some 400 Spartan and 200
Sprint missiles (the latter to protect the principal radars),
might offer a high degree of protection to the nation against a
missile attack, at least through the 1970's. The total
investment cost of such a program might amount to about $3.5
billion, including the cost of the nuclear warheads.
The effectiveness of this deployment in reducing U.S.
fatalities from a Red Chinese attack in the 1970's is shown in
the table below:
U.S. FATALITIES
(In Millions)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chinese Strike First
(Operational Inventory)
-------------------------
25 Missile 75 Missile
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Without ABM................................... .5 10
With ABM...................................... 0+ 1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * * * * *
SENSE OF URGENCY REGARDING NEGOTIATIONS [P. 50]
Mr. Vance. It is very hard to give any precise figure on
this, Senator Symington. I wish I could. I think it all depends
on how the discussions seem to proceed.
If we are making progress then we would be willing to wait
longer than otherwise. But if it becomes obvious that nothing
is going to come out of these discussions, then I think that we
would have to reconsider our position more promptly. It is just
very hard to put any precise time on this.
Senator Symington. Within a year?
Mr. Vance. I think that there would be a good chance that
within a year we could know one way or the other on this.
Senator Gore. Well, that is giving us an order of time.
* * * * * * *
PRACTICABILITY OF ABM SYSTEM AGAINST ENEMY SUBMARINE ATTACK [P. 52]
Mr. Vance. Antisubmarine tactics are to get the submarine
before it can fire, in other words, to track it and be on top
of it so that when it gets ready to fire, why, you can kill it.
Senator Gore. Do we know where the Soviet submarines are
all the time?
Mr. Vance. We do, with a few exceptions, We have really
extremely good information with respect to Soviet submarines.
Recently one submarine did get in close to the U.S. coast
without our knowing it was there. We had one similar case in
the Pacific where we lost one of their submarines for a while
and then picked it up. But, by and large, we have really
excellent information with respect to where Soviet submarines
are. This is done by a number of different procedures.
We have our so-called SOSUS stations, which are long-range
listening stations which can detect things hundreds of miles
away under the water. [Deleted.]
Senator Symington. Will the Senator yield? But it is much
more difficult to track a nuclear submarine than a non-nuclear
submarine, is it not?
Mr. Vance. The answer to that is no, quite frankly,
Senator, because the Soviet nuclear submarines are really quite
noisy. The most difficult ones to track right now are the
Soviet submarines which are diesel and battery powered. When
they go down to three knots on battery, then it is virtually
impossible to hear them.
Senator Symington. When I was out at Guam two months ago, I
went out on a Polaris and they tell me they are dead for sixty
days. They receive but they do not broadcast, and that they
were practically impossible to detect.
Does that mean our nuclear submarines are much easier to--
--
Mr. Vance. Our submarines are much quieter than the Soviet
submarines.
Senator Symington. But then following their development of
the art, they will be more quiet.
Mr. Vance. There is no question but we must plan on them
becoming more quiet. But at the same time we are trying to
increase our capability to detect either kind of submarine. We
are devoting a lot of effort to this.
U.S. ACTION IN EVENT OF ENEMY SUBMARINES POSITIONING OFF OUR COASTS
Senator Gore. What would we do if we discovered that a
significant number of Soviet or Chinese submarines were taking
suspicious positions off our coasts? We would become quite
alarmed and might just provoke an exchange.
Mr. Vance. If we saw such a situation developing, we would
deploy the necessary forces to contain such a threat.
Senator Symington. But if the Senator will yield, if they
want to hit you they do not have to have submarines. They could
put twenty different ships in our harbors with false bottoms,
and drop them and disappear, and nobody would know, and they
would all go off at the same time, and they would destroy
twenty ports the same as if they had dropped a delayed fuse in
the water. It is interesting from the stand-point of attack,
but it does not have to be done that way, if we want to get
technical.
Sentor Gore. This is a frightening world.
Mr. Vance. It is a frightening world, Senator; I agree.
Senator Sparkman. It becomes more so as we move along.
Mr. Vance. It does indeed.
Senator Sparkman. Let me ask one question, talking about
the ABM: Where would it fit in with the defense of Western
Europe or would it fit in? Could it be made to fit in?
Mr. Vance. It would have, in my view, a limited capability.
On the other hand, I doubt that it would prove an effective
defense just as it would not prove an effective defense here.
They could saturate it and, therefore, I think it would be an
unwise move on the part of our European allies to expend the
funds trying to protect their population, just as I feel it
would be an unwise move on our part. It just simply would not
do it.
Senator Sparkman. Then we are to regard this as a defense
of our continental nation?
Mr. Vance. Yes.
The deployments I have been discussing this morning are
protections for the continental United States, designed to
protect the continental United States.
* * * * * * *
CHINA AS A NUCLEAR POWER BY 1980-85 IS QUESTIONED [P. 53]
Senator Symington. To me it is a pretty tricky sentence.
Senator Gore knows more about this than I do. But, as I
remember it, the Russians were four years behind us, roughly,
on the explosion of the hydrogen weapon, and had a more
sophisticated hydrogen weapon than we did and I do not think
you can talk in any sense of the term today, the theory of it
anyway, about 1980-85 before China is a full nuclear power.
Mr. Vance. I would be the first to say that predictions
more than five years in the future are extremely risky,
Senator.
Senator Symington. I thank you for that. That was my only
point, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Vance. I was trying to present it as we best saw it at
this time on the basis of the intelligence estimates which have
been made in the government.
FUTURE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY COULD ALTER BALANCE OF POWER
Senator Gore. Now, I have heard CIA, the Atomic Energy, and
your own experts on this subject. My impression of the
consensus is that by the--and indeed, Secretary McNamara said
by the mid-1970's say 1975, that the Chinese will have a
significant nuclear and intercontinental ballistic capability.
It is estimated that they will test their first ICBM this
summer in a range from 5,000 to 7,000 miles.
Should that test be successful, then one would assume it is
a question of building more of what they are testing. They have
tested nuclear weapon to the extent of 10 or 20 times in power
of the one with which we destroyed Hiroshima.
So if they, say, if by 1975 they have 100 capable of
attacking the United States, this is, it seems to me, a
significant alteration of the balance of power in the world. We
then face a threat which we have not previously faced, and they
have a deterrence not only against us but against the Soviets,
and they have a power of intimidation over their neighbors that
they had not previously had.
Would this not be a significant alteration of the balance
of power and have a significant effect upon the whole strategy
of deterrence?
Mr. Vance. It might well have a significant effect on the
balance of deterrence, and that is why I have carefully
differentiated between a system designed against the Soviet
threat and one designed against the Chinese threat.
I have merely said that as of this time, the lead times are
such that we do not feel that we have to make a decision this
year with respect to the deployment of a system oriented
against the Chinese threat.
Senator Gore. But you are holding all options with respect
to the Chinese.
Mr. Vance. We are indeed, sir.
Senator Gore. And you would expect in the negotiations the
Soviets to do the same thing.
Mr. Vance. I would, sir.
Senator Gore. Is this not possibly one of the most
complicated factors which makes it really impossible for
Russia, and more impossible, I guess, than the United States,
to negotiate and reach an agreement vis-a-vis the United States
and the U.S.S.R.? Here is this third complicating factor which
both powers must take into account and, perhaps Russia with her
proximity and her existing hostility, I do not know that the
hostility is any greater than against us, but it is certainly
an immediate thing with their border troubles and their history
of hostilities between the Chinese and the Russian people?
Mr. Vance. It is clearly a complicating factor and one
which would be a very delicate one in connection with the
discussions which we expect to have with the Soviet Union.
Senator Gore. Senator McGee, would you like to have a
question before we go to another phase of his testimony?
Senator McGee. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say, inasmuch
as the chairman put the elementary questions because of his
elementary school understanding of this, I am at pre-school,
and maybe getting into the kindergarden today. I appreciate
your courtesy in letting me attend.
Senator Gore. Senator Aiken?
FRANCE'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY
Senator Aiken. I have not heard France mentioned at all.
Mr. Vance. In what respect, sir?
Senator Aiken. In regard to achieving capability, ICBM or
anything else. Do you write them off?
Mr. Vance. I think that in time they will achieve a limited
capability. I do not think that this limited capability will
really be a credible deterrent to the Soviet Union, and I
really do not think that the French nuclear force can be
anything but, quite frankly, a destabilizing influence in the
whole world.
* * * * * * *
STATEMENT OF DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CYRUS R. VANCE BEFORE
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE FEBRUARY 7, 1967 [P.
55]
* * * * * * *
5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reaffirmed their
recommendation that a decision be made now to deploy, with an
initial operational capability in FY 1972 a NIKE-X system which
would provide for area defense of the continental U.S. and
local defense of 25 cities against a ``low'' Soviet threat.
* * * * * * *
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
POSTURE A POSTURE B
---------------------------------------------------------------
Invest. Cost Invest. Cost
Number ($ Billion) Number ($ Billion)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Radars:.........................................
MAR......................................... 0 0 8 $2.8
TACMAR...................................... 7 $1.9 3 0.6
PAR......................................... 6 0.8 6 0.8
MSR......................................... 26 3.8 95 8.4
Invest. Cost............................ .............. $6.5 .............. $12.6
Missiles:.......................................
SPARTAN..................................... 1200 $1.7 1200 $1.7
SPRINT...................................... 1100 0.7 7300 3.1
---------------------------------------------------------------
Invest. Cost................................ .............. $2.4 .............. $4.8
DoD Invest. Cost................................ .............. $8.9 .............. $17.4
AEC Invest. Cost................................ .............. 1.0 .............. 2.0
---------------------------------------------------------------
Total Invest. Cost (ex-R&D)............. .............. $9.9 .............. $19.4
Annual Operating Cost........................... .............. $0.38 .............. $0.72
No. of Cities w/Term. Def:...................... 25 .............. 50 ..............
IOC with Decision 1/67:......................... FY 72 .............. FY 72 ..............
Deployment Completed:........................... FY 75 .............. FY 76 ..............
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is worth noting, in connection with the costs shown in
the foregoing table, that had we produced and deployed the
NIKE-ZEUS system proposed by the Army in 1959 at an estimated
cost of $13 to $14 billion, most of it would have had to be
torn out and replaced, almost before it became operational, by
the new missiles and radars of the NlKE-X system. By the same
token other technological developments in offensive forces over
the next seven years may make obsolete or drastically degrade
the NIKE-X system as presently envisioned.We can predict with
certainty that there will be substantial additional costs for
updating any system we might consider installing at this time
against the Soviet missile threat.
The deployment of a NIKE-X system would also require some
improvement in our defense against manned bomber attack in
order to preclude the Soviets from undercutting the NIKE-X
defense; and we would want to expand and accelerate the fallout
shelter program. The investment cost (including R&D) of the
former is estimated at about $1.5 to $2.4 billion and would
provide for a small force of F-111 or F-12 type interceptors
(e.g., 48 F-11s or 32 F-12s) and about 42 airborne warning and
control aircraft (AWACS). The expanded fallout shelter program
would cost about $800 million more than the one we are now
pursuing. We would also need some of our anti-submarine warfare
forces for use against Soviet missile submarines, but we are
not yet clear whether these ASW forces would actually have to
be increased over the currently planned levels. In any event,
the ``current'' estimates of the investment cost of the total
Damage Limiting package would amount to at least $12.2 billion
for Posture A and at least $21.7 billion for Posture B.
To test the contribution that each of these NIKE-X
deployments might make to our Damage Limiting objectives, we
have projected both the U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear
forces (assuming no reaction by the Soviets to the U.S. ABM
deployment) to FY 1976, by which time Posture B, the heavier
defense, could be fully in place.
PROJECTED U.S. ANO SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES, MID-1976
(Assuming no reaction by the Soviets to U.S. ABM deployment) *
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. USSR
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ICBMs (Hard Launchers)..........................................................
Large (TITAN II/SS-9 Class)................................................. 0 276-249
Small (MINUTEMAN/SS-11 Class................................................ 1000 500-950
Mobile...................................................................... 0 50-0
SLBMs...........................................................................
Large (POSEIDON Class)...................................................... 400 0
Small (POLARIS/SSN-5 Class)................................................. 128 307-399
Total No. of 8M Warheads........................................................ 7328 1133-1598
Bombers (for Intercontinental Attacks)..........................................
Heavy....................................................................... 255 70-110
Medium...................................................................... 210 300-500
ABM (Anti-ballistic Missile Defense)............................................
Area interceptors........................................................... .................................. 800-3250
Terminal Interceptors....................................................... .................................. 300-1500
Air Defense.....................................................................
Fighters.................................................................... 697 1700-2400
SAM Sites................................................................... 112 1360-2006
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*The Soviet forces are based on extrapolation of the latest intelligence estimates.
* * * * * * *
If the Soviets are determined to maintain an Assured
Destruction capability against us and they believe that our
deployment of an ABM defense would reduce our fatalities in the
``U.S. Strikes First, Soviets Retaliate'' case to the levels
shown in the table above, they would have no alternative but to
increase the second strike damage potential of their offensive
forces. They could do so in several different ways, one of
which is reflected in the table below: by deploying a new
large, land-based ICBM (either mobile, or hardened and
defended), or a new submarine-launched missile like our
Poseidon, or by adding large numbers of hardened but undefended
SS-9s or SS-11s. They have the technical capability to deploy
any of these systems with MIRVs (or single warheads) by the
mid-1970s. Shown in the table below are the relative costs to
the Soviet Union of responding to a U.S. ABM deployment with a
hand-mobile ICBM systeem:
LEVEL OF U.S. FATALITIES WHICH SOVIETS BELIEVE WILL PROVIDE DETERRENCE a
(Millions)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost to the Soviet of Offsetting U.S. Cost to Deploy an ABM
------------------------------------------------------------------------
40 $1 Soviet cost to $4 U.S. cost
60 $1 Soviet cost to $2 U.S. cost
90 $1 Soviet cost to $1 U.S. cost
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ U.S. fatalities if U.S. strikes first and Soviets retaliate.
If the Soviets choose to respond in that way to our ABM
deployment with MIRVs, penetration aids, and such a system (200
missiles against Posture A and 650 against Posture B), the
results would be as shown below:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of Fatalities in an All-Out Strategic
Exchange (in millions) 1976 (Assumes Soviet
Reaction to U.S. ABM Deployment)
---------------------------------------------------
U.S. Programs Soviets Strike First, U.S. Strikes First,
U.S. Retaliates Soviets Retaliate
---------------------------------------------------
U.S. Fat. Sov. Fat. U.S. Fat. Sov. Fat.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Approved (no response)........................... 120 120+ 100 70
Posture A........................................ 120 120+ 90 70
Posture B........................................ 120 120+ 90 70
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In short, the Soviets have it within their technical and
economic capacity to offset any further Damage Limiting
measures we might undertake, provided they are determined to
maintain their deterrent against us. It is the virtual
certainty that the Soviets will act to maintain thelr deterrent
which casts such grave doubts on the advisability of our
deploying the NIKE-X system for the protection of our cities
against the kind of heavy, sophisticated missile attack they
could launch in the 1970s. In all probability, all we would
accomplish would be to increase greatly both their defense
expenditures and ours without any gain in real security to
either side.
2. Defense Against the red Chinese Nuclear Threat
With regard to red Chinese nuclear threat, an austere ABM
defense consisting, for example, of 4 PAR and 15 Missile Site
Radars, together with some 400 Spartan and 200 Sprint missiles
(the latter to protect the principal radars), might offer a
high degree of protection to the nation against a missile
attack, at least through the 1970s. The total investment cost
of such a program might amount to $3.5 billion, including the
cost of the nuclear warheads.
The effectiveness of this deployment in reducing U.S.
fatalities from a Red Chinese attack in the 1970s is shown in
the table below:
U.S. FATALITIES
(In Millions)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chinese Strike First
(Operational Inventory)
--------------------------------
25 Missiles 75 Missiles
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Without ABM............................ 5 10
With ABM............................... 0+ 1
------------------------------------------------------------------------
This austere defense could probably preclude damage in the
1970s almost entirely. As the Chinese force grows to the level
it might achieve by 1980-85, additions and improvements might
be required, but relatively modest additional outlays could
probably limit the Chinese damage potential to low levels well
beyond 1985.
It is not clear that we need an ABM defense against China.
In any event, the lead time for deployment of a significant
Chinese offensive force is longer than that required for U.S.
ABM deployment; therefore, the decision for the latter need not
be made now.
3. Defense of Our-Land-based ICBM Forces Against a
``Higher-Than-Expected Soviet Threat''
As I indicated earlier, our Assured Destruction capability
is of such crucial importance to our security that we must be
prepared to cope with Soviet strategic threats which are
greater than those projected in the latest intelligence
estimates.
The most severe threat we must consider in planning our
Assured Destruction forces is an extensive, effective Soviet
ABM deployment combined with a deployment; of a substantial
ICBM force with a hard-target kill capability, in the form of
highly accurate ICBMs. To date, Soviet missile accuracy has
been substantially inferior to our own, and we expect it to
remain so. However, if the Soviets develop accurate Multiple
Independently-Aimed Reentry vehicles (MIRVs), they might, by
equipping their SS-9 boosters with 6 MIRVs (each with a CEP of
0.3 n. mi. and a yield of 3 MT), be able to destroy large
numbers of our Minuteman missiles. An extensive, effective
Soviet ABM system much better than the one we consider
probable) might then be able to intercept and destroy a large
part of our residual missile warheads, including those carried
by submarine-launched missiles. (The Soviet offensive and
defensive threats assumed here are both substantially higher
than expected.
Under the assumption that the Soviets have started the
development of highly accurate reentry vehicles (including
MIRVs) a reasonable upper limit on the build-up in their threat
would be the following:
GREATER-THAN-EXPECTED SOVIET THREAT
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Soviet Threat to Minuteman \a\ FY 70 FY 71 FY 72 FY 73 FY 74
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SS-9..................................................... 180 180 180 150 100
SS-9 MIRV................................................ 0 50 100 150 200
(Six 3-megaton.
RVs/Missile).
SS-11 (improved accuracy)................................ 160 260 360 460 660
Total No. of BM Warheads................................. 340 740 1140 1510 1960
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\The older Soviet ICBMs, the current SS-ll and the submarine-launched ballistic missiles are excluded because
they do not have sufficient accuracy to post a threat to our hardened and dispersed Minuteman force.
The effect of such a deployment could be to reduce the
number of U.S. Minuteman surviving attack to the levels shown
below:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 70 FY 71 FY 72 FY 73 FY 74
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Minuteman Surviving \b\.................................. 800 590 390 245 160
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\b\ In addition, the Polaris and Poseidon force would survive.
To hedge againt the possibility of such a threat to our
landbase missile forces, we have authorized the development and
production of the Poseidon. Should still additional offensive
power be required, and such a requirement is not now clear, we
are considering the development and deployment of a new
Advanced ICBM (a large payload missile with an as yet
undetermined basing system designed to reduce vulnerability to
such a Soviet threat.
The deployment of the NIKE-X as a defense for our Minuteman
force, however, would offer a partial substitute for the
possible further expansion of our offensive forces. The
contribution one illustrative NIKE-X deployment might make to
the survival of our Minuteman force against the greater-than-
expected Soviet threat, compared with the ``No Defense'' case
is shown below:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 70 FY 71 FY 72 FY 73 FY 74
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No Defense Case
MM Surviving............................... 800 590 390 245 160
NIKE-X Defense
ABM interceptors........................... 0 55 395 475 475
MM Surviving a............................. 800 590 515 465 390
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a The number of Minuteman ``surviving with NIKE-X Defense'' assumes the Soviets attack the defended Minuteman
silos first. They might attack our radars first if they felt they had enough information on our defenses and
were willing to gamble that we would delay launching our Minuteman for at least 15 minutes while their attack
proceeded. In that case, the number of surviving Minuteman might be 100 fewer.
But I want to emphasize that we have absolutely no direct
evidence that the Soviet Union is developing MIRVs with such
low CEPs, or, in fact, that they are developing MIRVs at all.
Indeed, the tests we have seen to date indicate a far lower
order of accuracy for Soviet ICBMs. Nevertheless, the
intelligence lead time would be relatively short--about two
years between the first indication of such a development effort
and the start of deployment of the systems. Therefore, in
examining the worst case, we have assumed that they could have
such an operational capability as early as FY 1971. But even
against this higher than expected combined Soviet, MIRVed
missile/ABM threat, and even without a NIKE-X defense of
Minuteman, our proposed strategic missile and bomber forces
could still inflict 40 percent or more fatalities on the Soviet
population throughout the 1969-1976 period.
More extreme threats are highly unlikely. In any event, the
changes we are now proposing in our strategic offensive forces
would make it dangerous and expensive for the Soviets, to move
in the direction of more extreme threats to our Assured
Destruction capability. If we assume, as I believe we should,
that the Soviet Union would want to reduce the vulnerability of
their own offensive forces against the possibility of a first
strike by our very accurate forces in the FY 1972-73 period,
they must further disperse and harden their strategic missiles,
which is exactly what they appear to be doing now. To do so is
expensive and for the same budget outlay results in reduced
missile payloads. Not to so would leave the Soviet force highly
vulnerable to a first strike.
* * * * * * *
ESTIMATED EXPENDITURES [P. 63]
Mr. Vance. Let me give both 1967 and 1968.
Senator Symington. Fine.
Mr. Vance. I will give them to you in terms of new
obligational authority. For research, development test and
evaluation concerned with chemical and biological warfare,
there is $103 million in the 1968 budget; there is also $248
million for procurement and $12 million for operations and
maintenance, for a total FY 1968 program of $363 million.
Now, let me give you some breakdowns.
Senator Symington. I do not care about that unless you
wanted to do it. I was just thinking, I think I am right in
saying, that on chemical and biological warfare, just a quick
mathematical interpretation in my head, that you are spending
between one-fifth and one-tenth of one percent of your total in
that field.
Mr. Vance. I think that is correct. I can give you the
figures for 1967 on that.
Senator Gore. I would like to have it, if you don't mind.
Senator Symington. I just want to develop the thought. Let
me finish. I think it was about 1955 that I got a briefing on
this subject. It was not covered in the committee, and we were
spending about $50 million. I think the figures will show in
1955, or a little less, maybe $48 million in this field. I am
glad to hear we have doubled that, although we have more than
doubled our military expenditures. I am very glad this subject
has come up here this morning because I think it is one thing
that, we have gotten so interested in nuclear problems that
then the problems of a general limited war we may well have
sloughed this off a bit, and yet it seems to me that it is
terribly important, especially in the fields of killing animals
and killing people.
* * * * * * *
FISCAL YEAR 1967 AND 1968 BUDGET FIGURES [P. 64]
Senator Symington. Would you give us those figures.
Mr. Vance. Yes. With respect to 1967 the total funds are as
follows: For research development, test and evaluation, $109
million; for procurement, $169 million; and for operation and
maintenance, $12 million--for a total of $290 million.
I would like to point out one other thing if I might, and
that is the distribution of these procurement funds in the FY
1968 budget. I think it might be interesting to you. They have
gone up quite substantially this year, and the reason is that
they break down as follows: For smoke, flame and incendiary,
$160 million; for riot control agents, $7 million; for
defoliants, $46 million; for defense materiel, $15 million; and
for other chemical and biological, $20 million.
But the big increase is the result of the smoke, flame and
incendiary category which is caused by our operations in
Southeast Asia.
Senator Gore. I would like to ask a question about a
somewhat related matter here, and that is the possible use of
radioactive agents, radioactive metal pellets.
As you know, a city can be depopulated as well with
radioactivity as it can with blast.
Mr. Vance. Yes, sir.
Senator Gore. What is the status of that art? What are you
spending on that or is this in the Atomic Energy field?
Mr. Vance. There has been some work done in the past on
very clean bombs which would have little blast effect but a
very heavy short-term radiation effect.
As to the amount of money which is being expended on such
weapons at this time, I simply do not know, sir. I think that
the best thing for me to do would be to supply that figure for
the record.
Senator Gore. Very well, I wish you would. It may be just a
wild dream or nightmare, but is it not technically possible to
shower a city with radioactive agents, and that any person who
stayed in the city over a period of twenty-four hours would
have a lethal dose. Therefore, if the people were adequately
warned and notified, once such city is showered with such
agents, the whole place could be depopulated; however, it might
be important industrially.
Mr. Vance. I am not an expert in this field. I know that
there are people who have done a good deal of work and who hold
a theory somewhat similar to that which you have expressed.
I hesitate to speak on how effective this could be because
I simply do not know what the state of the art is with respect
to such weapons at this point.
Senator Gore. Of course, we know that the armed services
bought some watches, wristwatches, that they had to discard in
large numbers because there was a little too much radioactivity
on the dial, but if you are not prepared on this, why, it is a
part of the whole armament and the threat today.
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I would like to continue
on that if I may.
Senator Gore. I did not mean to break in.
Senator Symington. The thought I wanted to express, at
first I was excited about those figures, but then when you read
them I got less excited because of the tremendous additional
effort that is being devoted to chasing these little people
around the woods. You will pardon the expression, but I am
getting a little apprehensive about the price.
I believe about twelve years ago when we had a briefing on
this, a special briefing for me and my legislative assistant at
that time, we were very interested in certain diseases,
anthrax, I remember, for cattle; tularemia, whatever the name
of that rabbit disease was.
Mr. Vance. Tularemia.
Senator Symington. Is that right?
Mr. Vance. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. And you had great hopes for that type
and character. But from what I have read we are only spending
around $20 million a year as against a possible hedge in a
multi-billion nuclear picture in this chemical and biological
warfare. Am I correct, based on figures you read?
Mr. Vance. Yes, sir; on that type of thing. However, we
have substantial stocks in many of these items. If you would
care to I can go through the various types of stocks we have.
Senator Symington. I do not want to take too much time on
it but, Mr. Chairman, may I respectfully suggest that some time
in the future, that some time we might have a hearing on
chemical and biological warfare.
Senator Gore. Maybe we had better set a time for that.
Mr. Vance. Fine.
Senator Symington. On anything that could be lethal
delivered by a missile or any other way, suitcase, that would
not be nuclear.
Senator Gore. Is that agreeable with you, Senator Aiken?
Senator Aiken. Yes.
I was wondering about the neutron bomb, wondering what Dr.
Teller's progress is, what progress he is making with that.
Mr. Vance. That is what I was talking about before.
Senator Aiken. That is what you were talking about.
Mr. Vance. Yes.
Senator Aiken. Is he making any progress with it?
Mr. Vance. I do not know where he stands on the neutron
bomb.
Senator Aiken. I know his eyes used to shine when he
mentioned that.
* * * * * * *
STATEMENT OF JOHN T. McNAUGHTON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS [P. 66]
* * * * * * *
3. Military sales to developing countries have amounted to
about 10 percent of the total. I should underline the fact that
the Department of Defense does not respond independently to
requests from countries of the Middle East, Latin America,
Africa or other underdeveloped areas for the purchase of arms.
These requests are subject to the most intensive review and
debate within the U.S. Government; usually, serious efforts are
made to reduce the requests in either quantitative or
qualitative terms; non-U.S. alternative sources of supply are
often sought for foreign policy reasons, Mr. Chairman; that is
when the U.S. does not want to be involved in the case.
Senator McCarthy. Is that when you have the Germans ship
the tanks for you to Israel?
Mr. McNaughton. Senator McCarthy, we did not do that. I beg
your pardon. I thought you were talking about Iran--the Iran
case.
Senator McCarthy. No.
Mr. McNaughton. The German case to Israel about two years
ago, this was involved in that case, yes. This attempt, this
desire not to have the United States as a source of supply, and
later on, Mr. Chairman, I am sure you will want to have
questions about this delicate situation in the Middle East, and
the extent to which the United States is involved.
* * * * * * *
TANK AND AIRCRAFT SALES TO ISRAEL [P. 67]
1. The first is our recent tank or aircraft sales to Israel
(1964 and 1966) were concluded primarily to prevent the
development of an arms imbalance in the area which would have
had a seriously destabilizing effect. The imbalance was being
created by a heavy infusion of modern Soviet equipment
(principally tanks and MIG 21's) to the U.A.R., Syria and Iraq.
Our negotiations with Israel were protracted, and a serious
American effort was made to have them meet their requirements
from European markets. In the end, however, and especially with
respect to aircraft, available European equipment proved either
too sophisticated or too expensive; we at length acceded to
Israel's request [Deleted.] assurances from the Israelis.
[Deleted.]
SALE OF SMALL AIRCRAFT TO JORDAN
Our recent, 1966, sale of a small number of aircraft to
Jordan was the result of a similarly protracted and reluctant
process. The United States Command had levied on Jordan a
requirement to acquire three squadrons of supersonic aircraft
as Jordan's contribution to the all-Arab military posture. The
U.A.C. would provide a limited sum of money (contributions from
member states); Jordan could buy western aircraft if it chose,
but the U.A.C. showed a clear preference for MIG 21s, which
were available at a cut-rate price. The pressures in the Arab
world were such that Jordan was compelled to comply. The
pressures were such that Jordan asked the U.S. to sell suitable
aircraft on generous credit terms. Over a period of 18 months,
we repeatedly insisted that Jordan explore all possibilities in
the U.K., France, Sweden and other markets; but European prices
and the credit terms proved far too severe--far beyond
purchasing power of the limited funds available from the U.A.C.
In the end, when it appeared that Jordan would be forced to
accept MIG 21s, and thus to open its country to a large Soviet
training mission and also to U.A.R. military influence--a move
which we regarded as inimical to the integrity of Jordan and a
grave danger to stability in the Middle East--we agreed to sell
Jordan a small number of F-104's from our MAP inventory. In
concluding the arrangement, we successfully reduced the
Jordanian request from 60 to 36, and consummated ultimately an
initial sale of only 12 of the 36.
MILITARY SALES TO IRAN
[Deleted.]
* * * * * * *
AMOUNT OF ARMAMENT GERMANS HAVE SOLD OR RESOLD [P. 69]
Senator Gore. The Germans say they cannot afford to buy
more arms from the United States, as I understand it, unless
they are able to sell their own surplus of old used equipment.
The question I wanted to ask you is how much armament have
the Germans sold or resold?
Mr. McNaughton. I do not have the exact figures on that,
Mr. Chairman. Let me see, I have--they both grant and sell, Mr.
Chairman. Germany both grants and sells. They also have a grant
program, and I have the figures for Turkey, for example, and I
do not have any further figures on what they have done by way
of transfer of equipment. I can get this for you.
Senator Gore. Fine. Will you supply that to us.
Mr. McNaughton. I will submit it for the record.
The information requested is classified and was furnished
separately to the committee:
MILITARY EQUIPMENT OF U.S. ORIGIN SUPPLIED TO A THIRD COUNTRY BY THE FRG, 1954-1966
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Estimated
3rd Country Receiving Item Description Quantity How Originally Acquired How Provided by FRG? Transfer Value
from US? ($Millions)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHAD..................... Submachine gun, cal.45, Thompson... 500................. Nash List \1\........... Sales................... ..............
81mm Mortar........................ 30.................. Nash List............... Sales................... 0.8
Transceivers PRC 6................. 48.................. Nash List............... Sales................... ..............
VRC 7.............................. 24.................. Nash List............... Sales................... ..............
GREECE................... F-84F Aircraft..................... 69.................. Nash List............... Grant................... ..............
Machine gun, .50 cal, Browning..... Unk................. Nash List............... Grant................... ..............
Communications Equipment........... Unk................. Nash List............... Grant................... 9.5
F-84 Spare Parts................... Unk................. Nash List............... Grant................... ..............
Prime Mover, M-4, 18-ton........... 91.................. Nash List............... Grant................... ..............
INDIA.................... Trainer a/c, T-6G (Harvard)........ 34.................. Nash List/Sales......... Sales................... 1.5
IRAN..................... F-86 Sabre VI Aircraft \2\......... 90.................. ........................ Sales................... ..............
Machine guns, cal.30............... 858................. Nash List............... Sales................... ..............
Submachine gun, .45 cal............ 4,092............... Nash List............... Sales................... ..............
Rifle, Recoilless, 75mm............ 339................. Nash List............... Sales................... 14.5
Rocket Launcher, 3.5".............. 658................. Nash List............... Sales................... ..............
Ammunition......................... Misc................ Nash List............... Sales................... ..............
Machine gun, cal.50, Browning...... 200................. Nash List............... Sales................... ..............
ISRAEL................... Anti-aircraft guns, 40mm........... 54.................. Nash List/Sales......... Grant................... ..............
Tanks, M-48........................ 60.................. Sales................... Grant................... 20.0
Helicopter, H-34................... 30.................. Sales................... Grant................... ..............
JORDAN................... Ammunition......................... Misc................ Nash List............... Sales................... ..............
Rifles, M1......................... 30,100.............. Nash List............... Sales................... ..............
BAR's.............................. 1,412............... Nash List............... Sales................... 1.1
Mortars, 81mm...................... 250................. Nash List............... Sales................... ..............
SUDAN.................... Rifles and Carbines................ 32,600.............. Nash List............... Sales................... ..............
Rocket Launcher M1A3............... 1,200............... Nash List............... Sales................... 2.0
Mortars, 81mm...................... 380................. Nash List............... Sales................... ..............
Ammunition......................... Misc................ Nash List............... Sales................... ..............
TURKEY................... Aircraft, Fighter, F-84F........... 116................. Nash List............... 42 Grant & 74 Sales..... ..............
Rocket Launcher, 3.5".............. 5,000............... Nash List............... Sales................... ..............
Mortar, 4.2"....................... 100................. Nash List............... Grant................... ..............
Howitzer, 105mm, SP................ 50.................. Nash List............... Grant................... ..............
Tank, medium, M48.................. 108................. Sales................... Sales................... 25.0
Tractors, Bulldozers, etc.......... 115................. Sales................... Grant................... ..............
Commo Equipment.................... Unk................. Nash List............... Grant................... ..............
Machine gun, .30 cal, Browning..... 2,250............... Sales/Nash List......... Grant................... ..............
Ammunition......................... Unk................. Sales................... Grant................... ..............
VENEZUELA................ F-86K \3\.......................... 74.................. Sales................... Sales................... 2.2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Nash List comprises all the military equipment and services which the U.S. has supplied the FRG under grant aid. This equipment was provided as
a part of 1954 US/FRG agreements to organize and equip German forces. Eight years later, in 1962, U.S. reversionary rights to this equipment were sold
to the FRG for $75 million. Conditions of this sale require the FRG to coordinate and obtain U.S. agreement in the transfer (sales or grant) of any
equipment to non-NATO third countries. For NATO countries, sales or grant must be coordinated for selected major items and, by subsequent agreement,
FRG aid for Greece and Turkey is coordinated to assure integration of U.S. and FRG support.
\2\ These planes were manufactured in Canada under U.S. license. Prior to provision to Iran, the FRG obtained assurance from GOI that the aircraft were
solely for Iranian use. In late 1966, it was reported that some of the planes were in Pakistan. Both the FRG and Canada protested. Iran stated that
the aircraft were in Pakistan only for repair.
\3\ Produced under U.S. license in Italy for U.S. MAP use subsequently paid for by the FRG.
* * * * * * *
DISTINCTION BETWEEN OUR COMPETITORS [P. 72]
Mr. McNaughton. Senator Symington, you had asked why we
draw a distinction between our competitors.
When it comes to balance of payments, of course, the
difference may not be so great, but if you are talking in terms
of whether, for example, a determined Chile, which wants jet
aircraft, is going to get aircraft from one country or another,
there is no, so far as I know, there is no real push for
Soviets sales, for example, in Latin America, although the
committee has learned there is some intelligence that there are
some overtures in this regard recently. But we do not mind much
having the British fill that need for an inexpensive aircraft
in Latin America, which is under the level that we are trying
to keep Latin America to with the Hawker Hunter in Chile.
We are trying to keep Latin America below the supersonic
aircraft at an economic level, and we have so far succeeded,
and the Hawker Hunter, in effect, was sold to Chile. We could
have had that business easily. It would have been easy to have
the business in Chile by selling more expensive F-5s which were
exactly what Chile wanted.
Saudi Arabia is a case in which the balance of
considerations, everything taken into account, we, in effect,
allowed part of that deal with Saudi Arabia to go to the United
Kingdom.
Senator McCarthy. Wasn't it on condition that they buy $300
million of F-111 from us?
Mr. McNaughton. It was more than that. I mean----
Senator McCarthy. I mean the British bought from us and you
let the British sell in Saudi Arabia.
Mr. McNaughton. $400 million worth of business in Saudi
Arabia.
Senator McCarthy. $300 million.
Mr. McNaughton. No, it was more than that, $2 billion.
Senator McCarthy. Saudi Arabia?
Mr. McNaughton. No, the whole deal was, the British deal--
--
Senator McCarthy. I mean you let the British sell to Saudi
Arabia.
Mr. McNaughton. About $400 million worth.
Senator McCarthy. Yes, sir.
Mr. McNaughton. Phased over a ten-year period it comes to
over $400 million.
Senator McCarthy. How much would they pay for the F-111?
Mr. McNaughton. They actually have not paid, but the deal,
as I recall it, runs in the neighborhood of $2 billion,
including the phantom and C-130 aircraft.
Mr. Vance. Approximately $2 billion, the F-111 and the
followon spares.
Senator Gore. $2 billion.
Mr. McNaughton. It is broken down into several pieces.
There is a total deal of which the F-111s are a piece.
Senator McCarthy. How much?
Mr. McNaughton. Which adds up to $2.5 billion.
Senator McCarthy. How much are they?
Mr. McNaughton. The F-111 part of this I have listed as
about $725 million.
Senator McCarthy. That is quite different.
Mr. McNaughton. Of the $2.5 billion package, there is a $2
billion package with the British, and this $2 billion package
they wanted some business running the other way. We ultimately
agreed that provided they could meet competitive terms on
price, delivery, quality, that we would buy from them or find
things to buy from them, $325 million, and the $400 million,
Senator McCarthy, that was part of that package.
Senator McCarthy. And the Hawker Hunter is part of it, too.
Mr. McNaughton. No, it is not.
Senator McCarthy. Well, you said you could have gotten the
business if you wanted to.
Mr. McNaughton. All we had to do was sell F-5s.
Senator McCarthy. Why did you not?
Mr. McNaughton. We do not want Latin America to have that
airplane.
Senator McCarthy. Well, you said the F-5 was no worse than
the Hawker Hunter.
Mr. McNaughton. No, it is a supersonic plane.
Senator McCarthy. I thought you said it was the same.
Mr. McNaughton. It is hotter.
Senator McCarthy. I thought you said it was roughly the
same kind. We have some subsonic planes.
Mr. McNaughton. The subsonic planes are wearing out,
Senator McCarthy.
Senator McCarthy. I think the point is that you do let some
of our allies sell, don't you, when you really could get the
business away from them if you wanted it.
Mr. McNaughton. That is correct.
Senator McCarthy. Saudi Arabia is a clear case.
Mr. McNaughton. That is a case for one reason. Chile is a
case for another reason.
MILITARY DETERMINATION OF FOREIGN POLICY
Senator McCarthy. What I am concerned about is the
manipulations concerned in the Defense Department. We sit
around here trying to be foreign policy experts, and all of
this kind of stuff is going on
[Deleted.]
* * * * * * *
POWER IMBALANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST [P. 73]
Senator Symington. Right. There was a question of balance.
I want to make this point to you. I have just come back
from the Middle East. The situation in Jordan is extremely
serious. I personally hope we do everything and anything we can
to help this fellow in his problem in Jordan, but in my opinion
there is a tremendous imbalance out there as a result of what
has been going on, and I think it is operated on too classified
a basis from the Congress. I am not talking about from the
people.
For example, there is no question about it, you check it
when Mr. Battle comes back, because he briefed me at length on
it, and he is a very brilliant fellow and is coming back here
as assistant secretary. Now, today the quality of the U.A.R.
air force is fantastic as against the number and quality of the
Israeli air force.
They bought their airplanes from France because we were too
high toned to sell them, for various reasons that I have never
been able to figure out, and get the business over here. So
they buy the Mystere from France, and the new plane, whatever
it is, the Mirage, and the Russians, who are, our embassy tells
us in the highest classification, moving very rapidly into the
U.A.R., they now ship there just as an illustration. The U.A.R.
today has over four times more MIG's than the Chinese and the
North Vietnamese combined, and sixty of those MIG's are
considered the most modern that they have. This is the
information I got only last month.
Now, it is all very well to say that the Israelis can
handle the U.A.R. because of pilot security, et cetera, but any
day that the Soviets really get annoyed or there were any other
mercenaries who really knew how to fly came in to run those
U.A.R. airplanes, in my opinion, Israel is dead.
* * * * * * *
[Whereupon, at 12:45 o'clock p.m., the subcommittee was
adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the chair.]
MINUTES
----------
MONDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 1967
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC
The committee met in public executive session at 10:00
a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Gore,
Lausche, Symington, Dodd, Clark, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Williams,
and Case.
William M. Roth, nominee to be Special Representative for
Trade Negotiations, and William B. McComber, nominee to be
Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, were
heard in public session and then ordered reported. William S.
Gaud, to be U.S. Alternate Governor of the Inter-American
Development Bank, and Maurine B. Neuberger, to be a member of
the General Advisory Committee of the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, were also approved.
S. 623, the International Bridge Act of 1967, was discussed
and carried over.
The following treaties were ordered reported: Customs
Conventions: Ex. J, 89/2, on Containers; Ex. K, 89/2, on the
Temporary Importation of Professional Equipment; Ex. L, 89/2,
on the A.T.A. Carnet for the Temporary Admission of Goods; Ex.
M, 89/2, regarding E.C.S. Carnets for Commercial Samples; Ex.
N, 89/2, on the International Transport of Goods under cover of
T.I.R. Carnets.
Fisheries Conventions: Ex. H, 89/2, Exploration of the Sea
Convention; Ex. T, 89/2, notes Amending the Convention on Great
Lakes Fisheries; Ex. U, 89/2, International Convention for the
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas.
Maritime Conventions: Ex. Q, 89/2, Inter-American
Convention on Facilitation of International Waterborne
Transportation (Convention of Mar del Plata); and Ex. R, 89/2,
Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Tariff.
Discussion followed on whether or not to hold public
hearings on the Foreign Aid Bill.
[The committee adjourned at 12:30 p.m.]
MINUTES
----------
Tuesday, February 28, 1967
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC
The committee met in executive session at 10:15 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Gore,
Lausche, Symington, Dodd, Clark, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Williams,
Mundt, Case, and Cooper.
Ex. D, 88/2, the Consular Convention with the Soviet Union
was discussed and ordered reported, with minority views, by a
vote of 15-4.
S. 990, to establish a United States Committee on Human
Rights for International Human Rights Year-1968, was considered
carried over.
Discussion on educational trip to Vietnam by some members
of the committee.
[The committee adjourned at 11:15 a.m.]
MINUTES
----------
Tuesday, February 28, 1967
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Disarmament
of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC
The committee met in executive session at 2:25 p.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Senators Gore (chairman of the subcommittee),
Fulbright, Mansfield, Lausche, Symington, Pell, Case, and
Cooper.
General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
accompanied by Captain Louis L. Meier (USN), appeared to
testify on the development of the Nike-X Antiballistic missile
system.
[The committee adjourned at 4:00 p.m.]
MINUTES
----------
Wednesday, March 1, 1967
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Disarmament
of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol. Senator Albert Gore (chairman of the
subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Gore, Fulbright, Lausche, Clark, Pell,
Hickenlooper, Aiken, Case, and Cooper.
The subcommittee heard testimony from Gerald F. Tape,
Commissioner, Atomic Energy Commission; Dr. Norris E. Bradbury,
Director of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory; and Dr.
Michael M. May, Director of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory,
Livermore.
[The subcommittee adjourned at 12:10 p.m.]
SALES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT BY UNITED STATES
----------
Thursday, March 2, 1967
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Disarmament
of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in
Room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Albert Gore (chairman of the
subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Gore (presiding), Fulbright, Morse,
Lausche, Symington, Clark, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, and Carlson.
Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, and Mr. Bader, of the
committee staff.
[This hearing was published in 1967 with deletions made for
reasons of national security. The most significant deletions
are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the
remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the
published hearings.]
* * * * * * *
STATEMENT OF JOHN T. MCNAUGHTON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT'S MILITARY SALES PROGRAM [P. 134]
Mr. McNaughton. I want to double check this figure because
our total sales program runs about one and a half billion per
year, and how it could be a billion dollars in profits out of
one and a half billion dollars of business is a little
difficult for me to understand. I will double check that
number.
But, on the question of Senator Morse's proposal, you
cannot discuss the question of, for example, sales to Jordan,
sales to Israel, sales to Pakistan or India in open session
without risking very serious problems with the countries
involved. This is why we have requested a closed hearing on the
subject. The State Department would feel even stronger than we
do about this.
* * * * * * *
Senator Fulbright. I just did not want you to leave the
record, in answer to Senator Lausche, as if CENTO amounted to
something. The way he asked it, and you said yes, there is
CENTO, it sounded as if it was of some significance, and it
really is not.
Senator Lausche. Well, the fact is it was at one time, and
I was going to follow up with the question whether or not the
significance did exist when Russia was trying to move in on the
Congress or sometimes by press reports of speeches by my
deputy, Mr. Kuss. Generally, by the critics of the sales
program.
Mr. McNaughton. The image that is given, for example, all
the way through the committee staff report, is one of the
United States energetically seeking business.
Senator Fulbright. The same way right here.
Mr. McNaughton. This is untrue, and I think it should be
fully understood that this is untrue.
The efforts that we put into this program by a factor of
five to one are efforts to avoid selling.
Senator Fulbright. I can guarantee that is not true here.
* * * * * * *
ARMS SALES TO HELP BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS SYSTEM [P. 137]
Mr. McNaughton. I can guarantee that it is true in fact. It
is my program, and this is where most of our efforts go--such
as the Iranian program, trying to find--ways to keep a country
from spending its resources on things it should not spend them
on. This is not always the case, but in no case do we practice
the hard sell, and I think that should be fully understood.
Almost 90 percent of our sales are to the industrialized
nations anyway where the problem on the first sale it does not
arise, but we do not press sales.
EXAMPLE OF A CERTAIN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRY
Let me read you what happened just two, three days ago when
the Air Minister Gomez from Brazil was here. Brazil is a
perfect case of what Senator Fulbright refers to where I think
almost a half billion dollars of economic grants or loans may
go in a very short period of time.
Senator Fulbright. Yes.
Mr. McNaughton. The Air Minister was here, and he told me
that Brazil is the largest country in South America. It has the
largest Air Force, but it has old and outclassed fighters and
aircraft. He wants to upgrade his Air Force, to keep it
current. To improve the morale of his pilots, he wants just 12
F-5's, the supersonic light Northrop airplane, to be delivered
within one year. He wants them by the middle of next year, and
he told us, he said, ``I don't want your grant, I don't want
your credit. All I want is an agreement that Northrop can sell
them to us,'' and the implication is, ``If you don't sell them
to us we are going to get them somewhere else.''
What I told him was, here is an extract from the memorandum
of conservation:
``When Mr. McNaughton joined the group the Minister
recounted his reasons for early acquisition of the F-5. Mr.
McNaughton stressed the following points: (a) We place emphasis
on economic and social development and were against the
diversion of resources from this important sector at this time.
``(b) That the acquisition of the F-5 by Brazil would
inevitably lead to a chain reaction demand for it by other
Latin American countries who are not able to afford such
expenditures at this time.''
This morning I find the pressure is still on. He is still
in town. The question is what do you do about it. Now, this
gets into the whole policy question of our relations with
Brazil, the State Department, AID----
Senator Fulbright. It does.
Mr. McNaughton.--DOD, who are all dealing in this problem
trying to slow down, to prevent, these proud people from buying
something they do not need, they have no business having, and
this is where I spend my time to avoid selling them and,
hopefully, to avoid having them drooling their money off
somewhere else buying Mirages or Lightnings from the British--
Mirages from the French or Lightnings from the British. This is
where the effort goes, and I would like to point out----
Senator Hickenlooper. Is your point that if we do not sell,
leaving aside entirely the aid we put into Brazil, they will
find the money some place and buy from the British and the
French. It looks like we are giving to them on the one hand,
and taking away with the other.
Mr. McNaughton. Senator Hickenlooper, this is a part----
Senator Hickenlooper. That money might as well come back
home as to go to Britain or France.
Mr. McNaughton. This is entirely correct.
What is going on there obviously is an internal political
fight within the country.
We had the same thing happen in Chile where they ended up
buying the Hawker Hunters from the British. You have an
internal fight going on there where for political reasons the
government decides they have to allocate something for this
purpose, and then the question comes up of one of restraint,
trying to hold this thing down, and Chile wanted F-5's. We
refused to sell them F-5's. We tried to sell them something
that they considered too antiquated, which would have been a
non-upgranting of their present force, and they eventually went
to Hawker Hunter.
Venezuela ended up buying aircraft from Germany. We did not
veto this. It is an F-86, not a great step forward.
Senator Lausche. Can you veto sales by Germany?
Mr. McNaughton. Well, we have a veto over resales by
Germany to non-NATO Countries.
Senator Lausche. That is our equipment that sold to
Germany?
Mr. McNaughton. That is right. But one point I think you
should understand, that these efforts, imperfect as they may
be, Senator Fulbright, are paying off in Latin America, for
example. In Brazil----
Senator Gore. In dictatorships?
Mr. McNaughton.--they are paying off in terms of military,
the size of the military establishment.
By using restraint, for example by agreeing to allow them
to have 25 A-4B's in Argentina they are replacing two squadrons
of Meteors of 50 aircraft.
In Brazil, for example, we gave them 54 T-33's to replace
50 plus 33 aircraft. They have smaller Air Forces.
There is a human, psychological, political, internal
problem that these governments have a deal with, just as you
have a deal with who sits where around the table or who is
where in the Pentagon. These problems are important to these
people and, therefore, we move slowly to contract their
expenditures on sophisticated types of equipment which, in our
view, are unnecessary to the Latin Americans.
The figures I wanted to give you, in Brazil, for example,
in 1961, they had 165 combat aircraft. The 1967 figure shows
122-165 down to 122.
Argentina has reduced combat aircraft from 275 to 125
combat aircraft.
Bolivia, from 15 down to 8 in that period.
Chile, from 57 to 48.
Now, what we have is a case in which the old Mustang, the
P-51, which used to be the airplane--well, when we finally sold
these to Latin America, they kept them for a long time. And
then they moved to the F-80, the F-86. They are now looking for
the F-5, how long can we postpone the F-5? They do not need it
at all.
Senator Gore. Why does Chile need an F-5?
Mr. McNaughton. Chile does not need an F-5.
Senator Gore. Why does Argentina need one?
Mr. McNaughton. Argentina does not need one. No one in
Latin America needs one.
Senator Gore. Why should we either give or sell them one?
Mr. McNaughton. Because you have got the French, the
British--Senator Hickenlooper's point, at some point when the
F-5 is--their old equipment, in effect, has worn out, it
becomes more expensive even to maintain the old equipment than
to buy new, there will be a break point, and this could come in
1969.
Mr. McNaughton. Because you have got the French, the
British--Senator Hickenlooper's point, at some when the F-5
is--their old equipment, in effect, has worn out, it becomes
more expensive even to maintain the old equipment then to buy
new, there will be a break point, and this could come in 1969.
Senator Lausche. If I may interrupt, the principle which
Senator Gore is now enunciating, that is, why should we sell it
to them, in trade with Red Russia, the proponents of trade
argue that unless we engage in trade with them, other nations
will, and that is about the same principle that you are up
against.
Mr. McNaughton. But not in Latin America. The Soviet
problem is not a problem in Latin America.
Senator Lausche. But if we do not help them along in this
internal contest, they will go to France or they will go to the
United Kingdom to acquire their planes.
Mr. McNaughton. That is correct.
Now, Frei in Chile obviously had a very serious problem,
and he ended up having to decide that something of this nature
had to be done, some sophisticated aircraft had to be
purchased. His Air Force had to be upgraded to some extent in
order to maintain the political fact of balance the way he
would like it.
* * * * * * *
PUBLIC HEARING ON MILITARY EXPORT SALES [P. 140]
On the question of public hearings you, of course, should
address this question to the Secretaries involved, but my own
view is that it would be very difficult to answer the specific
questions that come up as to why sales in this case, why not in
that case. What were the other agreements that the country made
that made this a more sensible deal than appears by just a
transfer of arms, this sort of thing. This can hardly be done
in public session without gravely injuring our relations with
the countries involved.
[Deleted.]
Senator Gore. Aren't we?
Mr. McNaugthon. We are in fact, but there is an explanation
for it that cannot be given in public.
What we are trying to do is to keep this Jordan separated
from the Nasser group which is being, in effect, subsidized by
the Soviets. We are trying to keep Jordan, which is trying to
behave vis-a-vis Israel; we are trying to keep them from
falling into the grasp of a Nasserite group and, therefore, we
have to provide some arms to Jordan under various
circumstances. Israel then finds herself surrounded by the
Nasserite group, and, likewise, needs arms.
Senator Gore. Meanwhile, Jordan will not cooperate in
solving the Palestine refugee problem to which we have provided
subsidy all these years. Jordan, has no prospect of ever
becoming a viable economic state. It will be a permanent
American subsidized entity.
What is its justification?
Mr. McNaughton. Do I gather that----
Senator Lausche. May I interrupt here? I was in Israel in
November of 1955. Please take this off the record.
[Discussion off the record.]
MILITARY SALES BY RUSSIA
Senator Lausche. Do you have full information to what
extent Russia is selling military equipment to the different
nations of the world?
Mr. McNaughton. We have. I do not have it with me, Senator
Lausche.
Senator Lausche. But you have it?
Mr. McNaughton. We have, I think, fairly reliable
information on this.
Senator Lausche. Is Russia restraining itself from selling
to countries that want to buy from her?
Mr. McNaughton. It is hard, just as it is difficult for the
Senators to see from the data, that the United States is
restraining itself, I cannot say that we can see from the
evidence we have that Russia is restraining herself for
political reasons.
All we can see are the items that show up, and it runs into
$2 billion just around the Mediterranean, the southern edges of
the Mediterranean.
Senator Lausche. It has been selling to Pakistan, has it
not of late?
Mr. McNaughton. I do not have information on that in my
mind.
Senator Lausche. Maybe I am confused.
Mr. McNaughton. Let me check on that for you, Senator
Lausche, on Pakistan.
Senator Lausche. Ayub was talking about going to Russia,
was he not?
Mr. McNaughton. He was talking about going to China.
Senator Lausche. China?
Mr. McNaughton. We do have information of his getting
equipment from China.
Senator Lausche. You do not have to check it. My thought is
that while we are reviewing the military equipment we are
selling, we should also obtain detailed information about what
Russia is doing.
Mr. McNaughton. Senator Lausche, we could do that.
Senator Lausche. I am talking about our committee.
Mr. McNaughton. Not only Russia and China, but we would be
glad to make available to you what we have on this.
Senator Lausche. The issue is we do not sell whether
someone else will.
Mr. McNaughton. In some cases.
Senator Lausche. In some cases others have sold.
Mr. McNaughton. That is right.
Senator Lausche. And they are prepared to sell?
Mr. McNaughton. And in some cases we do not care, and in
some cases we do.
Now, the Pakistan case is a case of getting equipment from
China, not from the Soviet Union.
Senator Lausche. I see.
Mr. McNaughton. One hundred and seventy medium tanks and 60
MIG-19's from China to Pakistan.
* * * * * * *
EFFORTS AT BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE SOVIETS [P. 146]
Mr. McNaughton. The second point I want to make, though, is
one I think you might discuss with witnesses from State. Not
this question about ACDA or State participation, but the
question of whether any efforts have been made to get bilateral
deals with the Soviets to cut out arms races.
Senator Clark. I think you know that my interest in affairs
of this kind. We have tried on one or two occasions to make
some progress in having them stop these sales, and we stop the
sales.
They just get incredibly linked together, and they say,
``Well, if you will take everything out of Turkey'', or
something of that nature, and where our national interest
cannot permit this to happen, so they become very, very
difficult.
Senator Clark. You agree this is a State Department and not
a Defense Department responsibility to negotiate with the
Russians?
Mr. McNaughton. That is correct. But I made a statement in
response to your statement that nothing has been done, and I
want you to know that we have made efforts along this line, and
the Committee might be interested in talking to State about it.
* * * * * * *
COPRODUCTION ARRANGEMENTS [P. 146]
Mr. McNaughton. I would like to confirm that this is the
specific legislation which applies to Senator McCarthy's
question, but I suspect that is the root of the authority from
Congress.
Senator McCarthy. It is probably right. [Deleted.]
* * * * * * *
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT POLICY ON ARMS SALES AND GRANTS [P. 147]
Mr. McNaughton. I am prepared to answer the question,
Senator McCarthy. In cases in which we have given grant
assistance, for example, Nationalist China, if we had given
grant assistance, the country comes along, the time arrives,
when we can shift the sales along the line that Senator
Symington was talking about, then we maintain the same
relationship that we had with that country but instead of
granting equipment we sell equipment.
This will begin to happen in Greece, perhaps soon. Maybe in
3 or 4 years from now in Turkey; maybe some time in the future
in Korea. It is already happening in the Republic of China; in
Iran we see it happening.
These are cases where this shift is taking place, and the
last time I testified, Senator McCarthy, you will recall I
pointed out that the total involved of the two is remaining
about the same.
Senator McCarthy. Well, he says this has to be maintained
through the sales media.
Now, couldn't we maintain these if we simply granted the
arms to them?
Mr. McNaughton. Certainly.
Senator McCarthy. Why does he say you have to do it through
the sales media?
Mr. McNaughton. Because we assume that the grants will be
reduced as the countries become more able to pay for what they
use.
Senator McCarthy. We might be better off giving granting
them. This makes a formal commitment. Where would Nationalist
China go, for example, if we did not maintain this
relationship? Through the sales media? It is just a kind of a
wild statement, it seems to me, that does not stand up under
any kind of testing.
Mr. McNaughton. I can tell you where China would go,
Senator McCarthy. They would dig down into their socks and take
it out of their development program.
Senator McCarthy. I am talking about Nationalist China.
Mr. McNaughton. I am talking about that.
Senator Gore (presiding). What would be wrong with that?
Mr. McNaughton. Because we are interested in the economic
development of Nationalist China. This is an argument against
buying more.
Senator McCarthy. If they are going to buy it from somebody
else or not from us----
Mr. McNaughton. Or anybody.
Senator McCarthy. Anybody.
Mr. McNaughton. This is one reason why in Nationalist China
we do not insist that the whole program be sales, Mr. Chairman.
* * * * * * *
PUBLIC HEARINGS ON ARMS SALES PROGRAM [P. 148]
Senator Gore. The Secretary expressed the view from his
standpoint it would be inadvisable for the Executive Department
to testify publically on many matters. I take it that if the
full committee, insisted upon a public hearing, this would be a
matter which would address itself to your superiors and,
perhaps, even to the President.
Mr. McNaughton. I would think so, Mr. Chairman. I hope you
would consider very seriously the impact on our relations with
every country mentioned today if the whole--the deals that had
to be arranged in each of these cases, which almost necessarily
would have to be surfaced to give the full picture in each
case, were brought out in public session or if a person had to
take the Fifth, so to speak, with respect to half of each of
these pictures, because the inferences could be drawn from that
as well, I just hope you consider this, Mr. Chairman, before
you make this recommendation.
* * * * * * *
ARMS SUPPLIES TO RIVAL NATIONS [P. 149]
Senator McCarthy. What really saved us in India and
Pakistan is that the British were supplying most of the Indian
equipment and we were supplying arms to Pakistan. We did not
have to prove our superiority or they prove theirs over ours.
But if you had had Russian equipment in India and American
equipment in Pakistan, we would have said we have got to test
our equipment, we have got to prove our weapons are better than
theirs.
I think the British claimed their Centurion tank did prove
to be better than our tanks in the India-Pakistan War.
Our explanation, I understand, was that the British tank
crews were better trained. But if it had been Russian equipment
against American equipment, you would have had a hard time
settling it.
So now you get this thing up. I think you are better off if
Morocco and Algeria both were supplied by the French, or by the
Russians, or maybe both supplied by the United States, so we do
not have to prove anything if there is a border incident
between Algeria and Morocco. But we are giving airplanes and
tanks and American equipment right there today, so when the
test comes who is going to prove out to be, to have, the better
equipment or the better ally.
The test is going to be between the Centurions and the
Pattons.
The Defense Department seems to feel this is all good. With
this policy we have political control, they say. And without
it, we would lose everything.
Mr. McNaughton. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make clear
for the record that I disagree with Senator McCarthy's
interpretation of the defense Department's position----
Senator McCarthy. I just read it.
Mr. McNaughton. I am shocked at the suggestion that we
would encourage a war to test equipment.
Senator McCarthy. I did not say a war.
Mr. McNaughton. Or a continuation of a war.
Senator McCarthy. I did not say a war.
Mr. McNaughton. In order to prove our equipment is better
than someone else's.
Senator McCarthy. I did not say that. I said there is a
temptation to do it. It would be much harder to draw off.
Mr. McNaughton. I am shocked at the suggestion that we
would be tempted to encourage a war or continue a war.
Senator McCarthy. I did not say we would. I said we would
be tempted to prolong it in order to prove the superiority of
weapons and even to test them.
[Discussion off the record.]
Senator Gore. I suggested a few days ago that in my view
you would not succeed in persuading the Russians to limit the
deployment of defensive systems so long as we were rattling our
offensive missiles and bragging about having superiority.
It seems to me if we are going to succeed in preventing
this intensification of the arms race we must negotiate some
modification of our own offensive stockpile; that offensive and
defensive measure must be taken together.
To what extent this can be accomplished, I do not know. But
I personally welcome this response from the Soviets that I just
read off the record. I want to say that.
[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., subcommittee adjourned.]
POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF ARMAMENT AND DISARMAMENT PROBLEMS
----------
Friday, March 3, 1967
U.S. SENATE,
Subcommittee on Disarmament
of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Albert Gore (chairman of the
subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Gore, Fulbright, Mansfield, Lausche,
Symington, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams,
and Cooper.
Also present: Senator McGee.
Mr. Marcy and Mr. Bader of the committee staff.
[This hearing was published in 1967 with deletions made for
reasons of national security. The most significant deletions
are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the
remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the
published hearings.]
* * * * * * *
STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY
ADRIAN S. FISHER, ACTING DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
AGENCY
* * * * * * *
SERIOUS THOUGHT NOT GIVEN TO A NONPROLIFERATION TREATY [P. 152]
Now that we are getting to a point where there might be a
treaty, they are having to face the fact that they may be
expected to close off the nuclear option by formal treaty
indefinitely into the future and, therefore, some of the
misgivings which we might have known about earlier are now
coming to the surface, because this is a major step for certain
countries in certain situations, and in this regard I would
refer to India, for example.
Here is a country looking across the mountains on Mainland
China, which is building nuclear weapons, and so the Indian
Government recognizes that this step would be for it a very
major and important decision.
We think it will make the decision in favor of the
nonproliferation. I do not think we ought to underestimate the
importance of it to them.
So it is not, I think, surprising that, when you get up to
the hurdle, there is some hesitancy about taking the hurdle. We
saw that in a minor way in the Latin American discussions of
the Latin American nuclear-free zone. When they finally got up
to the point of say, ``Let us put it on paper and signing it,''
then there were two or three countries that just were not sure
they wanted to close off this option indefinitely into the
future. They all did, but it was an illustration here in this
hemisphere of a phenomenon that is going to be observable in
other parts of the world.
POSSIBLE PEACEFUL APPLICATION OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES
A second point has been the reluctance of some governments
to forgo the possible peaceful application of nuclear
explosives. Let us put aside for the moment whether in some
cases this might be a pretext rather than a reason, and accept
the fact that there is a valid concern about being denied the
possibilities of the use of peaceful explosions for peaceful
purposes, for civilian purposes, indefinitely into the future.
Senator Aiken. May I ask you: Is that covered in the Inter-
American Agreement?
Secretary Rusk. It was quite frankly not covered fully to
our own satisfaction because in the Inter-American Treaty they
did have some language which seemed to say if peaceful
explosions can be developed in a way that does not produce
weapons through some technical advances in the future, we do
not wish to close off that option.
In the present state of the art, we do not see that
distinction coming along. But I would like to emphasize that,
as we see this problem, peaceful explosions are, in fact,
weapons, and explosions that can dig a harbor can destroy a
city. So we do not see how you can stop proliferation by
leaving open the possibility of developing explosive
capabilities for engineering and civil purposes.
The state of the art theoretically, I suppose, could change
some time where there might be certain types of explosions that
would not have anything to do with weapons, but we do not see
it at the present time. So we feel that we cannot except
peaceful explosions from such a treaty.
However, this is a valid interest on the part of a good
many countries. We ourselves, as you know, are contemplating
the possibility of using such explosion for an Isthmian Canal.
It might well be that a country like Mauritania might wish
to have a harbor dug. It is short of a good harbor. It may be
that a good many things in many parts of the world might happen
in this connection.
We have discussed with the Soviet Union and with a good
many other governments, the possibility of trying to make some
international arrangement under which existing nuclear powers
could furnish the services of a nuclear peaceful explosion in
situations where it would be feasible from an engineering point
of view-but to do that either through IAEA in Vienna, or
perhaps, through the Security Council of the United Nations, or
through some other international arrangement, which would make
it possible for us to say to the non-nuclear countries around
the world, ``If the time comes when you need an explosion for
peaceful purposes, we would ensure that you have this service
available to you.'' That is what we would like to do.
* * * * * * *
TECHNOLOGICAL SPINOFF FROM THE WEAPONS FIELD [P.154]
Senator Rusk. Those of you on the Joint Committee, I think,
would probably agree with that. The gadgetry of weapons
introduces very little into industry as such, and has any
peaceful or industrial or commercial application. So that we
think that that is a concern that can be met on the merits, and
the German attitude seems to be reasonably relaxed on that at
the present time and in the light of technical explanations,
which have been provided.
* * * * * * *
PROBLEM OF SAFEGUARDS PROVISIONS IN TREATY [P. 154]
Secretary Rusk. There is a major complication at the moment
in Euratom because Euratom has set up its own safeguards. Those
safeguards are, from a technical point of view, comparable to
the IAEA safeguards and, from the point of view of inspection
alone, would be satisfactory.
But the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, for example, and
possibly some others, take the view that inspection of allies
by allies is not adequate and, therefore, there ought to be
more general international safeguards in order that all could
have equal assurances about the non-use of these materials for
weapons purposes.
The Euratom countries are divided on this at the present
time. It is now being studied in Euratom, and they will be
having discussion of this at a ministerial level, I understand,
later this month.
There are two or three possibilities in which this matter
might be solved. One would be for the IAEA to put in effect a
Good Housekeeping stamp of approval on the Euratom safeguards.
Another might be for the IAEA to safeguard the safeguard
system, to test it periodically to be sure that the Euratom
safeguards are working adequately.
A third might be for the members of Euratom to approach
this from a national point of view, rather than from a group
point of view, and each one of them, the non-nuclears--this
would exclude France--the non-nuclears to say, ``Well, we are
in Euratom, but where there is a Euratom facility in my country
we will accept the IAEA safeguards for that facility,'' even
though there may not be unanimity in Euratom itself.
Now, we do not exclude the possibility that France will
vote with the others and accept IAEA safeguards in Euratom, but
if France does not there still is that possibility.
I would like to raise with the committee for thought, and I
will be doing it also with the joint committee, one point that
could make some difference in the attitude of other governments
in this matter because there is a sense of discrimination if
the IAEA safeguards are to be applied solely to the non-nuclear
countries.
Now, if we, for example, were in a position to say that we
ourselves will accept IAEA safeguards on the peaceful uses
installations in our country, this could relieve the political
situation considerably with respect to this sense of
discrimination, and it might encourage some of the others to
move more forthrightly in this field.
Senator Hickenlooper. Our only trouble there would be
inspection, would it not? Do we consider our safeguards more
stringent than those of IAEA, the International Atomic Energy
Agency?
Secretary Rusk. Nevertheless, if IAEA had access to all of
our peaceful uses installations----
Senator Hickenlooper. I say that is the trouble, which is
inspection. There is the access.
Secretary Rusk. My understanding of the IAEA safeguards is
that they are so constructed as not to get into such things as
industrial secrets. Our Atomic Energy Commission has no
difficulty with this so far as our peaceful installations are
concerned. Now, weapons installations would be another matter.
But we will go into that in some detail because it has some
technical aspects. But my understanding is that the character
of the safeguards is such that you apply them at a critical
point to determine what is being done, and you do not have to
get into the question of how it is being done from a
technical----
Senator Hickenlooper. I think there are some technical
difficulties if we do get into industrial operations that
violate the rules.
Secretary Rusk. I will get Dr. Seaborg and others to
consult.
Senator Gore. In any event, the existence of the IAEA is,
despite its limitations, a definite plus. We have something
agreed upon with which to start.
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Now, it is most unlikely that the Soviet Union would accept
IAEA safeguards instead of its own country, or that France
would accept it. Britain has a special problem and, perhaps,
this could be left off the tape for just a moment.
[Discussion off the record.]
Secretary Rusk. The Soviet Union would be prepared to see a
treaty go forward without a safeguards article.
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, may I make a respectful
suggestion that the Secretary complete his statement before we
question him, if possible, so that we will be sure we can all
be here.
Senator Gore. The Chair thinks it is a very pertinent
suggestion and agrees with it. Is there objection on the part
of the committee?
Proceed, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Rusk. Well, my remarks are quite informal at this
point, Mr. Chairman. I will bring them to a conclusion on this
matter of the nonproliferation treaty.
I was just saying that the Soviet Union would probably
accept a treaty without a safeguards provision.
We feel that a safeguards provision is very important, and
we understand that the committees here in the Senate feel that
it is very important, so we have a good deal of work to do
still on that point.
EFFECT OF TREATY ON POLITICAL UNIFICATION OF EUROPE
On another subject, which is potentially a source of very
great difficulty, is the effect of a nonproliferation treaty on
the political unification of Europe. Now, this involves a
matter which we have been talking with the Soviets about for
literally four or five years.
It has to do with political arrangements in Western Europe
that may or may not have anything to do with the proliferation
of nuclear weapons. I think our friends in Western Europe would
be unwilling to sign a proliferation treaty which barred the
possibility of a political unification of, say, the six states
now in the present EEC.
We ourselves do not wish to bar European unity through such
a treaty.
Senator Lausche. Who does?
Secretary Rusk. But the attitude of the Soviet Union is
likely to be very severe on this point.
Looking at it from their point of view, they would say,
``Look, how do you expect us to accept the notion of a
politically-unified Europe in which there would be Germans and
the Unified Europe would be a nuclear power by succession,''
say, from France or France and Britain if Britain is a part of
it by that time?
This is a very serious question, and one that we are likely
to have to face fairly soon now because we are getting to the
point of making clear what our respective interpretations are
on the language which your subcommittee has already had, if,
indeed, that language survives the present discussion, that is,
the present international discussion.
There are theoretically two or three ways of dealing with
this. One would be to say if you do not have a common
interpretation on so fundamental a point, then you go back to
the drawing board because you have not had a sufficient meeting
of the minds to claim that you have a treaty.
A second would be for us and other signatories to make
clear our own interpretation of that point publicly, as we
would in any event have to do in presenting such a treaty, say,
to the Senate, and then hope that the Russians would at least
be silent. We do not know whether they would be silent or
whether that would be a satisfactory solution, but it is this
point which we have had in mind when we have said to you and to
our allies that we do not have an agreement with the Soviet
Union yet on the text of a nonproliferation treaty, because the
words which you have in front of you, perhaps, conceal the
possibility of a basic misunderstanding of what the words mean.
Now, it is true that political unity of Europe is some
distance off, at best. It is possible that it may never come
into existence for other reasons entirely. It seems at this
stage to be a rather hypothetical obstacle, but we may be faced
with the problem: Do you have a treaty if the words can be
agreed at a time when beneath the surface there is a major
difference of interpretation by at least a number of the
principal signatories?
I do not want to minimize the difficulty of that problem,
and I do not want to pretend that we can see any answer at the
present time until we explore further what the Soviet attitude
on that point is likely to be. If they are willing to gamble,
this is a hypothetical question long in the future, and sign
the treaty with the full knowledge of the interpretation which
the rest of us put on it, this point, then there may be no
great difficulty.
* * * * * * *
ASSURANCES AGAINST NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL [P. 155]
Secretary Rusk. A further point that has come into the
discussion is the question of assurances, assurances to non-
nuclear countries who may think they will be subject to nuclear
blackmail. This is not so much a problem with those who are
allied, say, with the United States, countries like Japan or
our NATO allies. It is more of a problem with countries who do
not have such an alliance, such as India living next door to a
nuclear China.
This is very troublesome because for us to give anyone, for
example, the kind of assurances which might give them complete
comfort would involve a very far reaching extension of American
commitments. It could only be done by a treaty, and it would
have to be done almost on the NATO formula, that an attack on
one is an attack on all.
If a country like India is to feel that it is the
beneficiary of ironclad guarantees--and I am not at all sure
that we ourselves want to entertain the idea--that if there is
to be a nuclear exchange anywhere, from anywhere in the world,
that we insist on being a part of it.
So, this is a major problem, and it may be the key question
upon which the Indian decision would be made as to whether or
not to sign.
I do not want to suggest to this committee that we ought to
go racing down the track of providing these assurances to
individual countries in connection with a nonproliferation
treaty, but it is something which is very much worth
considering, very much worth consideration.
REVIEW AND AMENDMENT OF TREATY
On the question of review and amendment, the duration of a
treaty is a matter that has been discussed. I believe you, Mr.
Chairman, have suggested a possible ten-year duration clause.
There have been suggestions from other quarters that there
might be a five-year duration clause.
One of the advantages of a shorter term--that is, some term
such as five or ten years--would be that it would tend to
eliminate certain of these hypothetical problems such as what
do you do about explosions for peaceful purposes; what do you
do about the European unity clause, and things of that sort.
But, on the other hand, if there is a termination date
there is considerable prospect that a number of countries would
race during that period--perhaps I could amend this language on
the tape--race during that period to become eight months
pregnant, and that you then might find that at the end of that
period you would have an epidemic of nuclear powers, new
nuclear powers, arriving on the scene. So, it is a troublesome
question.
It seems to me that there will be some advantages in our
having an open-ended treaty subject to periodic review. In the
present text we are talking about a review every five years.
But it may be difficult to achieve a permanent treaty, and at
some stage we may have to come back and discuss with you
whether it is better to have a treaty for a period of years
than no treaty at all, given the attitudes of a considerable
variety of governments on this subject.
At the present time, the momentum is toward a permanent
treaty, but there are one or two problems that do point back to
the possibility of, to the possible desirability of, a shorter
term treaty.
We will ourselves favor an open-ended treaty as far as time
is concerned.
Mr. Chairman, those are the key issues that are under
discussion at the present time.
PROCEDURES OF DISCUSSIONS
Procedurally, we are now discussing these matters closely
with our allies. We should hope during the course of the next
two to three weeks to bring those allied discussions to a
conclusion soon, test the allied interpretation of this
language with the Soviet Union, and then table, if possible, a
treaty in Geneva for the consideration of the Geneva
Conference, and then submission to other governments.
* * * * * * *
ABM MATTER TIED IN WITH NONPROLIFERATION TREATY [P. 157]
Senator Rusk. You know that the President yesterday
announced that he had received from Mr. Kosygin a letter which
said that the Soviet Union is prepared to discuss both
offensive and defensive nuclear weapons, and was prepared to
enter into negotiations with us to see whether steps of
disarmament could be taken in both fields.
There was no detail in the letter. It is our impression
that the Soviet Union is working on these matters within its
own structure. It, too, may have some interdepartmental
negotiations underway on this, and that they are in the process
of preparing a position on which they would enter into any
detailed discussions with us.
But we do have some impressions, not spelled out in Mr.
Kosygin's letter which was very short, and said, ``We are ready
to have discussions,'' not spelled out in his letter but
nevertheless a present picture.
You remember they rejected the notion of a freeze on
offensive and defensive weapons which we proposed in Geneva
last year.
I suppose the reason they rejected the freeze was because
they considered the existing situation unfavorable to them.
They, at the present time, seem to make it clear that they are
not interested in talking about freezes, but in mutual
limitations to an agreed level on both sides.
It is my impression--although we have no specific proof of
this--that they would expect numerical equivalence between the
Soviet Union and the United States in such negotiations. That
is a pretty difficult and complicated thing for us to accept or
to bring about or to inspect because if you get into the
questions of that sort, you get into questions of what kinds of
warheads, what kinds of megatonnage, what kinds of deliveries,
what types of missiles, a great deal of fine print which is
almost impossible to monitor in any event inside of a society
which does not accept inspection.
So that I do not want to leave any false optimism before
the committee on this matter.
We are encouraged to know that they are prepared seriously
to discuss the matter, and we will be discussing it with them.
But we do not have any reason at this point to suppose they
will think about it in terms of a freeze, nor do we have any
clear indication as to what they would do about the ABM's which
they have already deployed in the Soviet Union, in the Moscow
area.
So all that I can report on this point is that they have
agreed to talk in a more systematic and official way than had
been communicated to us earlier.
They have asked us to make any further proposals that we
might have on this matter, and those are being now prepared in
the executive branch.
* * * * * * *
PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF OUR STOCKPILE [P. 158]
Senator Gore. It seems to me that with the superiority
which we have publicly asserted, which may be more apparent
than real, it would be unrealistic to expect the Soviets to
agree to stop their defensive buildup. The first question I
would like to ask you relates to the public disclosure of our
stockpile.
We have been informed in the committee that megaton-wise
the stockpile vis-a-vis the US and the USSR is roughly equal.
In the number of warheads and missiles we have about a three or
three and a half to one superiority. Secretary McNamara has
publicly announced our stockpile of missiles.
I can understand he thought he would impress the Soviets
that no matter how much they deployed a defensive system our
missile offensive stockpile was so great that their defense
would be overwhelmed.
But, on the other hand, it seems to me that this gives a
weapon to the Soviet military to insist upon a defense because
we are waving our bombs and bragging about our superiority.
I wonder if you would give us your views with respect to
that.
Secretary Rusk. I think, sir, that in the course of NATO
discussions it was felt necessary to go into these matters in
considerable detail with our allies, and under those
circumstances the matter of--these things do tend to become
public in general orders of magnitude.
We have no doubt that the Soviet Union has known for a long
time the general order of magnitude of our stockpiles and our
weapons situation, and the fact that they have added certain
new information-gathering techniques, with which members of the
committee are familiar--some which we also have--we do not
think that this is a matter of disclosing information to the
Soviet Union, but rather telling our own people and other
peoples in the alliances the approximate situation. I doubt
that that would influence very seriously the actual negotiating
position because they know that.
* * * * * * *
DECISION TO DEPLOY ARMS DEFERRED UNTIL FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIETS
[P. 160]
Senator Gore. I seem to detect from your statements this
morning that the essence of the Administration decision now is
to perhaps defer a decision to proceed with deployment. I have
understood Secretary McNamara to be in opposition to deployment
even though the Soviets did not agree. Has the administration
reached a decision in that regard?
Secretary Rusk. I think, sir, that, as you know, there are
substantial funds in the present budget for continuing with an
active research and development program for ABM's, but no final
decision has been taken with respect to deployment until we can
test a little more fully the possibilities of some agreement
with the Soviet Union.
I would not want to leave the impression that a final
decision has been made that come what may we should not deploy
anything. It may well be that in any event certain light
deployments may be felt required, for example, to protect the
strategic strike force and to maintain its deterrent
capability. But those are matters on which the executive and
the appropriate committee of Congress will be in full touch
with each other.
I think what has been done thus far is to defer a final
decision on that point until we can find out where we are in
our discussions in this matter with the Soviet Union.
Senator Gore. Senator Fulbright.
Senator Fulbright. Mr. Secretary, I think it has been a
very interesting statement. I will ask a few questions
pertinent to this matter.
I understood from our briefings with the CIA and the
military that there is some difference of opinion about the
character and effectiveness of the ABM system around Moscow.
The CIA gave me the impression they did not think anything very
serious--that it was not very advanced, and that they doubted
its effectiveness. Do you have any view about this?
Secretary Rusk. My own impression, and I do not have the
exact technical reports in front of me, is that as far as the
Moscow system is concerned, it is a first generation system
which is likely to become operational within the next year or
two and that there is no doubt among the different members of
the intelligence community that this is an ABM system.
There are some other installations in other parts of the
Soviet Union about which there is some discussion as to whether
those are, in fact, serious ABM systems, or whether they are an
antiaircraft or other type system.
Senator Fulbright. That is right. I understood that, too.
But even as to the Moscow one, I gathered from Mr. Helms he was
not too upset. He left the impression with me it was a
difference in view as to its importance between him and the
military, and it could be, it is kind of a utilitarian concept
around Moscow, it could be very effective or effective against
planes but also has some capability against missiles, but they
were not too excited about it in contrast to the military.
* * * * * * *
DISTRIBUTION OF U.S. MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL ABROAD
[P. 161]
Senator Fulbright. In addition to that, you might give us
information--if you do not have it immediately, perhaps, you
could supply it for the record--on the CIA, and AID, State
Department, Agriculture, Labor employees abroad. In other
words, I think it is significant if there is going to be any
agreement either on ABM or nonproliferation or almost any field
that the Russians feel there is some degree of equivalence. We
must realize that they are not going to sign an agreement if
they think we have an insurmountable advantage. Do you agree
with that on principle?
Secretary Rusk. I think that is probably correct, Mr.
Chairman. I think that there is another possibility. Let me
contrast two situations.
Senator Fulbright. Yes.
Secretary Rusk. The one would be a formal agreement signed
by the two sides on this question. That is going to be
extremely difficult and complicated, in my judgment, because
that sort of an agreement has to be written against the
prospect of violation, and the fine print becomes extremely
complicated, and we run into the difficulty of inspection
straight away.
It is not inconceivable that there is an alternative, and
that is we both proceed by mutual example, with neither side
giving up its freedom of action, but each side acting in
relation to what the other side is doing.
Now, we did that during a period of about two years on the
Defense budgets until the situation in the Far East brought
that process----
Senator Fulbright. And you were making some progress.
Secretary Rusk. We were making some progress on that.
Senator Fulbright. I am inclined to think for the
preliminary stages this is the area where you are most likely
to make progress.
Secretary Rusk. In view of the capabilities of both sides
to keep a general eye on the situation, something like a mutual
example may be a way to get started. But I do not want to
prejudge the results. If we can work out something with the
Soviet Union, maybe it should be more precise.
Senator Fulbright. I understand.
I wonder if you would undertake to do what the military has
already done, to give the committee an estimate of the number
of persons included in these activities abroad in all of these
fields. Is there any reason why you cannot say how many CIA
agents we have abroad?
Secretary Rusk. There is some problem on that.
Senator Fulbright. Even in view of the revelations that
have been made recently?
Secretary Rusk Yes. [deleted]
Senator Fulbright. Well, I will abide by your judgment.
* * * * * * *
THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL MACHINERY [P. 163]
Secretary Rusk. Well I think you are right, Mr. Chairman.
On the nonproliferation matter, for example, the IAEA ought to
play a major role in regard to safeguards, perhaps in regard to
the provision of explosions for peaceful purposes.
Whether the Eastern Europeans would cooperate on a basis
that would be generally acceptable--in other words, what would
they do about a veto. We do not know what that would do. We are
prepared to go a long way in this ourselves.
Senator Fulbright. For example, when you were speaking of
the blackmail problem, of what a terrible problem it was, and I
agree with you, I would certainly hesitate about the United
States unilaterally making any assurances on protection,
because this, in a sense, puts you up as a kind of antagonist
to the Soviet Union. It seems to me in this case that some
utilization of the U.N., an agency in which both the U.S.S.R.
and the United States are influential members, will be
required. I do not see how you are going to get around those
very dilemmas you already mentioned if you do not utilize some
form of international machinery.
I was told in Sweden that there was very strong feeling
about this proliferation treaty.
There would be some public feeling against an agreement in
which the nuclear countries maintain their status quo. They
want an agreement, but they want us and the Soviet Union to at
least make some undertaking for the gradual transfer of
responsibility to an international organization.
Secretary Rusk. That is, to me, a reasonable attitude on
the part of a good many non-nuclear countries. It is a very
hard objective to achieve.
Senator Fulbright. Very.
Secretary Rusk. And, therefore, the question is do you wait
until the nuclear powers find some way to begin some nuclear
disarmament before you try for a nonproliferation treaty. What
we have tried to do with that, Mr. Chairman, we are trying to
take that problem somewhat into account in a preambular
declaration in which we all repeat the commitments we have made
to make the effort, in the United Nations resolutions and
elsewhere, and we will be sure that you have, if you do not
already have, the text on it. We are trying to work something
out on that. This is a reasonable concern of the non-nuclear
countries.
Senator Fulbright. It seemed so to me and being reasonable
they are in a position to thwart us if we do not make a gesture
by simply not signing. There is no way for us to make a country
like Sweden sign if we do not do something in this case.
Secretary Rusk. You remember in the case of Sweden, Mr.
Chairman, when they signed the Atmospheric Test Ban Treaty they
reserved the right to have nuclear weapons in the future. In
other words, they said, ``We won't test, but we want the
right''----
Senator Gore. Who said that?
Secretary Rusk. Sweden.
Senator Fulbright. They are capable of making it, too. They
are very ingenious people.
Secretary Rusk. I am not sure whether it is a completely
real argument on their part. It is a good idea, but I am not
sure it is a real argument or a little defensive apparatus as
they come up to the hurdle of making a final commitment that
they won't go nuclear. I am just not sure in their particular
case.
Senator Fulbright. I imagine others though--you already
mentioned the Indians--have the same, but I expect they are not
unique among the non-nuclear powers, are they, in this
attitude?
Secretary Rusk. I think that is correct.
Senator Fulbright. I was told that several others had
exactly the same view.
I do not wish to occupy the time, although there are many
other aspects of it that I am sure can be discussed.
In conclusion, I do want to urge you to use all the
ingenuity you can, to determine whether some kind of
international organization could participate; perhaps a new
committee, within the U.N. in which the U.S.S.R. and ourselves
can have confidence. I can understand the difficulty of
involving too many countries and the difficulties that have
resulted from such large membership. But surely some devices
within that organization can be developed in which there is not
that problem, to which some of these functions can be given.
I really do not see any alternative to it. I cannot imagine
that the rest of the world will sit by idly, and even if the
Russians are not disposed to agree with us entirely at the
moment, they appear to be coming along.
Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure that the
subcommittee has been told, and I may have to take this off the
record when the time comes, the Soviets have agreed to hold
technical talks with us on PLOWSHARE type activities.
Senator Gore. At Geneva?
Secretary Rusk. Bilaterally, and we would hope that,
perhaps, this might be an additional way in which we could get
into the question of how they and we, and maybe Britain, could
provide PLOWSHARE type services to--
Senator Fulbright. Jointly.
Secretary Rusk. Through non-nuclear countries, jointly,
through some joint arrangement.
Senator Fulbright. I would urge you to go as fast as you
can in this direction, with the least important and least
difficult step to begin with, if there is one. I had the same
thought about the importance of the Antarctic Treaty, not that
it in itself solved a lot, but a start in the right direction
was made, and I hope we will do something in this case.
Senator Gore. Senator Hickenlooper.
HAVE SOVIETS EVER MADE ANY CONCESSIONS
Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Secretary, do you know of any
time in recent history that the Soviets have agreed to anything
that in any way stood in the way of their advancing to at least
full equality or superiority over the United States? In other
words, have they made any real concessions of any kind? I am
not talking superficially.
Secretary Rusk. No, I understand, Senator. It was the
judgment of our experts at the time that the conclusion of the
atmospheric test ban treaty would, in fact, work to our
advantage relatively. Now, that is an arguable and debatable
point.
Senator Hickenlooper. It is so far as I am concerned.
Secretary Rusk. But this was the view that we had in front
of us at the time.
I think, broadly speaking, the answer to your question is,
No.
Senator Symington. What was the question?
Senator Hickenlooper. It was a rather long-winded and
complicated question, and I do not know that I can repeat it,
but I will try to.
Senator Symington. I would appreciate that. I could not
hear you.
Senator Hickenlooper. I asked the Secretary if he knew of
any occasion in recent history, since the Soviet Union has come
to major world power, when they have made any concessions of
any kind other than superficial ones for incidental
accommodations, where they in any way impaired their ability to
at least come equal, or superior, to the United States in
various major fields.
I understood his answer to be in the main, no, with the
exception of the Test Ban Treaty, and I have argued that point
with him. I do not quite agree with the fact that it was of any
advantage to us.
* * * * * * *
REASONABLE PARITY ASSUMED [P. 165]
Secretary Rusk. We would have great difficulty in accepting
arrangements which we felt were putting us at a disadvantage.
What we are trying to work on in these matters--and differences
of views can differ on it--is to try to get some sort of
ceiling and downward turn in the arms race in a way that does
not change the relative position of either side.
* * * * * * *
EFFECT OF BOMBING PAUSES ON NEGOTIATION EFFORTS [P. 166]
Secretary Rusk. We sent the North Vietnamese a message
which was returned to our embassy on the first day as though it
were unopened. On the first day Peking said that even if we
stopped bombing there would be no negotiations. I happened to
be in Vienna with Mr. Gromyko at the tenth anniversary of the
Austrian State Treaty on the third day of that suspension and
he told me that the pause was an insult, that it was an
ultimatum.
So that was our experience at that particular time. We did
send the other side a message, which was returned to us, trying
to elicit some response from them.
Senator Lausche. Well, then the pause was intended
definitely to lead toward an understanding that we would go to
the negotiating table.
Secretary Rusk. That was the hope at the time.
Senator Lausche. And there were communications between the
two countries in which North Vietnam completely rejected the
efforts which we made.
Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir, they returned the communication.
Senator Lausche. Now, they returned it without opening it.
Secretary Rusk. I have no doubt they took off a copy before
they sent it back, but they gave it back to us in the same form
in which we had given it to them, sealed in the envelope.
Senator Lausche. Am I correct that in the beginning of 1966
there were 37 days of cessation?
Secretary Rusk. Running from Christmas, 1965, through----
Senator Pell. Will the Senator yield for a moment on this?
Senator Lausche. Yes.
Senator Pell. There is one further point, and, as you know,
I have been very reticent of any discussion of this subject.
But it has since come out in the press; and that is in
connection with the '65 short cessation. I think the record
should show, because as I say it has been in the press, that
there was a communication, it may have been meaningless--the
Secretary and I have discussed this privately--it may not have
been meaningless, but there was a communication from the North
Vietnamese Government at the end of that cessation of bombing
period, would that not be correct?
Secretary Rusk. In the five day?
Senator Pell. Yes.
Secretary Rusk. No.
Senator Pell. In Paris.
Secretary Rusk. Are you not perhaps thinking of the 37 day?
Senator Pell. No, I am thinking of the five-day period in
Paris when it was in the press afterward. I have never said
anything about it, but I read it in the press later.
Secretary Rusk. I know of the discussion of this subject in
connection with the 37-day suspension, but I do not recall that
this happened in the five and a half day. I will look this up.
Senator Pell. We had phone conversations, one phone
conversation or two, and the question was the communication at
the end of the period which came a few hours before the end of
the cessation of its bombing, which was resumed by the time we
got it. It had already resumed, but we were concerned about
this matter. I have never discussed this matter.
Secretary Rusk. Senator, let me check back on this. I think
we are talking about two different pauses.
* * * * * * *
HO CHI MINH COMMUNICATION TO THE POPE [P. 167]
Senator Lausche. Was there anything essentially significant
that happened with respect to this last stoppage, and that is
by way of a statement made by the ambassador of North Vietnam
to France, and a communication sent by Ho Chi Minh to the Pope.
Secretary Rusk. That came at the end of this period of six
days. You recall, Senator, that the two countries who are the
co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference were then in conference in
London; Mr. Kosygin was there with Prime Minister Wilson, and
they took certain initiatives, communicating with the parties
to see if they could move the situation off center, but without
success. The Hanoi response was as contained in President Ho
Chi Minh's message to the Pope on February 13, and I will be
glad to put the text of that in the record if the Senator
wishes.
DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN ABM SYSTEM [P. 169]
Senator Williams. If we decide to deploy them, how long
would it take us to get them actually installed?
Secretary Rusk. Mr. Fisher tells me--I am not familiar with
this point myself--that to deploy these missiles in suitable
arrays, with all the facilities that would go with them, would
require four to five years.
Senator Williams. What I was trying to determine is, how
far ahead in deployment are the Russians at this point, two or
three years?
Mr. Fisher. My understanding, Senator Williams, is they
have about a year to go before the initial operational
capability of a limited system around Moscow. There is
considerable argument what the other systems are. They have
about a year to go around Moscow. We have four to five to go
before our system would reach an operational capacity. That
would put them three or four ahead of us with the qualification
on it that the system around Moscow is not considered effective
against the totality of U.S. missiles. It does not provide
adequate radar coverage to protect against POLARIS missiles,
and that automatically starts an argument in the intelligence
community of what have they done it for if it is not any good,
but there is an understanding that it would not be effective
against POLARIS missiles because the radar coverage now
existing just does not cover certain segments from which
POLARIS missiles will come.
* * * * * * *
REPORTS OF U.S. ``CRISIS'' FOR WEST GERMANY [P. 175]
Secretary Rusk. Senator Symington, I think the committee
should know from the beginning of the Geneva Conference we have
had the most intimate consultation among the four NATO members
who are part of that conference, plus the German liaison
representative who is present in Geneva, that this matter has
been discussed frequently in NATO itself, and that at the
present time we are consulting with our allies before there is
an agreement with the Soviet Union.
Now some of our allies doubt what I just said. Some of them
seem to think there is an agreement under the rug we are not
disclosing. Now, for reasons that I explained to the committee
earlier this morning, this just is not true. There is a major
question of interpretation still outstanding between us and the
Soviet Union, so this is not a case of our having an agreement
with the Soviet Union under the rug on which we are consulting
with our allies in the spirit that nothing can be changed. We
are, in fact, now in process of consulting our allies prior
to--we hope to be--a final stage with the Soviet Union, and
before a treaty text is actually presented in Geneva.
Senator Symington. Well, this article worried me.
Secretary Rusk. There have been, Senator--and I may have to
deal with the record a little bit on this--there have been
certain kinds of resistances in Germany to the whole idea of a
nonproliferation treaty. First, they say that they have already
renounced the manufacture of nuclear weapons, therefore they do
not need a treaty. Secondly, some of them say that ``In any
event, we are prepared to take these obligations to our allies,
but we do not want to undertake obligations of the Soviet Union
and thereby give the Soviet Union a right to interfere with our
affairs here.''
Some of them have said that this would sentence them to
permanent inferiority to France inside the alliance in Europe.
Some of them have hoped that maybe this issue could be used as
a card to play in bargaining with the Soviet Union with respect
to a settlement of the German question. There have been a
combination of ideas on this subject.
Now, Chancellor Kiesinger and Foreign Minister Brandt have
brushed aside most of these problems in their own views about a
nonproliferation treaty, but they do have some internal
political problems with respect to it.
We will do our best to satisfy them on the fair question
such as effect on industry and peaceful uses and questions of
that sort, but there is built into a nonproliferation treaty--
there is inherent in such a treaty--a discrimination between
nuclear powers and nonnuclear powers.
The whole purpose is not to let further countries become
nuclear powers. So there is not much we can do about that, but
I think it is quite clear, Senator, that within NATO itself,
and within European NATO, leave out the United States, if the
Federal Republic of Germany should become a nuclear power, NATO
would disintegrate because the other European allies in NATO
would not be prepared to see this happen. I think the Germans
understand that, and my guess is that at the end of the day
they will sign, perhaps grumpily, but I think they will sign.
* * * * * * *
MUTUAL INTERESTS EXIST WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION [P. 176]
Now, there are some people who forget about that when they
raise questions about why we are trying to probe for points,
even small points, of possible agreement with the Soviet Union.
Now, in the case of trade, for example, Senator, basically
what we are doing, if the Congress will give us permission, is
to agree with our friends in Europe.
You will notice that for 15 years we were in a minority of
one in COCOM.
Senator Symington. Yes, sir.
Secretary Rusk. And our friends in Europe kept pushing down
the COCOM list and trading and so forth, and we were resistant
to it and finally we said, ``We will agree with you then.''
EAST-WEST TRADE
Well, that immediately created a what does this mean, you
say. In the case of trade, Eastern Europe has 24 percent of its
foreign trade with Western Europe, 1.6 percent of its trade
with us. When we say to our Congress, ``Will you give us
permission to enter into agreements where we can change our
arrangements somewhat,'' then some of our friends in Europe
say, ``Well, you are going way out of our way to make overtures
to Moscow,'' when in fact all we are doing is agreeing with our
friends in Europe.
Senator Symington. Several years ago the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Secretary of Commerce both testified in open
hearings the United States was the last developed country in
the world not doing its best to sell everything it could behind
the Iron Curtain, except in most cases sophisticated war
materials.
Secretary Rusk. That is right.
Senator Symington. And yet when we try to improve our
position through trade, as I understand your point, we are
criticized by a die-hard group over here as being in effect
overly friendly with Moscow.
Secretary Rusk. I have added another point, Senator. I have
said to some of our friends in Europe of course what you would
really hope is that we continue our policy of no trade while
you continue to develop the Eastern European market without our
competition, and they have and sometimes they will say, ``Yes,
I expect that is right.''
Senator Symington. I will correct my use of the word there,
but we understand each other.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
* * * * * * *
ROLE OF ACDA IN ARMS NEGOTIATIONS [P. 177]
Secretary Rusk. The Committee of Principals is made up of
those whose advice the President inevitably will want to have
and have to have before the President makes decisions on these
very important questions. That includes Defense for obvious
reasons; CIA is heavily involved because some of these issues
turn crucially on our ability to be assured that arrangements
we may propose can be monitored and inspected and verified.
So that I do not believe that the composition of the
Committee of Principals creates any distortion. The Committee
of Principals are those whose advice any president would feel
he would have to have before he made any final decision.
On the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, Mr. Foster is
carrying the principal negotiations on those. He is in Geneva
now, and I am not sure that I should put this on the record, he
will shortly be visiting certain of the capitals in Europe to
go into these matters further to try to bring the NATO matter
to a conclusion.
* * * * * * *
[P. 178]
Senator Clark. Now, when you say the people at the top
level, will Ambassador Thompson stop at the Gromyko level or
will he move right up?
Secretary Rusk. No, he has talked--we would certainly think
this would certainly go to Mr. Kosygin, and, as a matter of
fact, Senator, I would probably want to take this out of the
record----
Senator Gore. Mr. Secretary, this record will be closely
held, and, so far as any public release is concerned, you will
have complete discretion to change it.
Secretary Rusk. Thank you very much, sir.
The real people on this subject, Senator Clark, are
probably in the back room of the Kremlin, those people who
almost never expose themselves internationally, but who really
join the Presidium in the actual determination of policy on
important subjects.
Senator Clark. I imagine that would include their own
equivalent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Secretary Rusk. Yes, that would include them----
Senator Clark. Their intelligence sections.
Secretary Rusk [continuing]. And key members of the
Presidium, who are represented publicly by Kosygin and
Brezhnev.
[P. 178]
Senator Clark. You will remember the very strong
recommendations in that regard made by Mr. Wiesner's committee.
Secretary Rusk. Yes.
Senator Clark. During the ICY.
Secretary Rusk. And we pressed the regional representatives
to consider coming forward with proposals affecting their
regions; for example, Mexico and Brazil for Latin America;
Egypt and Ethiopia for the Near East and Africa and otherwise.
Very little has been done on that. But, more importantly,
Senator, I myself have discussed this on more than one occasion
with Mr. Gromyko, hoping that we and the Soviet Union quietly--
and I must take this out of the record--hoping that we and the
Soviet Union quietly could begin to concert our policy to level
off and turn downward this unfortunate neighborhood arms race
in the Near East.
Unfortunately Mr. Gromyko has said that action in the
nuclear field is the limit of their interest. They have not
been willing seriously to take up the race in conventional
arms. As you know, they are supplying substantial arms to
Egypt, Syria, Algeria, and now----
Senator Clark. Iran.
Secretary Rusk [continuing]. And now selling arms to Iran.
We regret this very much because we think this is an arms
race that ought to be unnecessary and that something ought to
be done about it.
If we could get some help from the Soviet Union on that, I
think we could make some headway.
AGREEMENT WITH SOVIETS ON NUCLEAR MATTERS
Senator Clark. This might be worthwhile taking up at Geneva
at that level to start with. We would at least like to see the
Russians join with us in halting that arms race in the Middle
East.
Secretary Rusk. There may be some point in our making some
public proposals along these lines so that everybody
understands what the situation is. We would be prepared to
encourage and cooperate in any such effort, but there are
others who will not.
Senator Clark. I understand you want to get out of here by
12.
Secretary Rusk. It is up to you. It is up to you.
Senator Clark. It occurs to me that this business of the
political union of Europe as an objection to the
nonproliferation treaty might be handled, might it not, by an
escape cause and will you not have an escape clause in the
treaty anyway so that if political union became a pragmatic
matter of some urgency, they could, if they want to, get out
from under?
Secretary Rusk. A withdrawal clause.
Senator Clark. Yes.
Secretary Rusk. They could utilize a withdrawal clause.
We would like to be able to find an answer that is somewhat
better than that because that makes the proliferation treaty
itself somewhat fragile in theory anyhow.
But, Senator, I think there is an understanding among all
concerned that the political unification of Europe is quite a
distance ahead, and I hope we can find some way not to let that
presently hypothetical question bar present advance on
nonproliferation.
Senator Clark. Would you agree that if we can make some
progress with respect to the ABM discussion between the USSR
and ourselves, including the discussions for some curtailment
of offensive weapons and missiles, this might well remove the
major objections by the non-nuclear powers to the nuclear
proliferation treaty because then the presence of ourselves
would have made those concessions in terms of reducing their
own capability, which I understand India and Sweden and some
others have been asking for some time.
Secretary Rusk. I would think if we and the Soviets could
make any progress at all either in putting a ceiling on the
nuclear race or turning it down somewhat, that this could have
a very stimulating effect on the non-nuclear areas, no question
about it.
Senator Clark. This, of course, is a matter in which the
ACDA is very much interested.
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Clark. The final question--how long, in your
judgment, can we make--this is a diplomatic and political
matter guided, of course, by proper military advice with
respect to deployment of ABM's. I could hope we could wait long
enough for a negotiation with the Soviets along the lines of
the Kosygin letter to proceed at the usual leisurely pace with
which the Soviets always engage in such negotiations.
Secretary Rusk. I do not want to be categoric about the
decision that the President will have to make in consultation
with congressional leaders. But it is my present view that we
would be able to wait during a very, very substantial period of
active and promising negotiations. In other words, I do not
think we are going to hurry if there is any possibility that we
can reach some result with the Soviet Union on this.
Senator Clark. I am happy to hear that. The chairman will
recall that General Wheeler testified that there was enough
money in the budget, which is coming up, to enable them to go
as far ahead as the Joint Chiefs thought they needed to with
the development and even perhaps the initial deployment of an
ABM without making a public fuss about it.
Secretary Rusk. I think that is true for the present and
under the budget that is now before the Congress.
As you know, it is now publicly known there is a difference
of view on this matter between General Wheeler and the
Secretary of Defense, and General Wheeler has spoken about the
ABM's on television, for example.
This has been a friendly disagreement, but it is an
important disagreement on that particular point. But this is a
matter where the President and the civilian leadership will
make the decision at the end of the day.
ATTITUDE OF NON-NUCLEAR POWERS TOWARD NONPROLIFERATION TREATY
Senator Clark. What is your view as to the diplomatic
desirability if India gets too difficult, giving a bilateral
guarantee to India because of the possible Chinese threat which
would seem to be a good deal greater than that against any
other country?
I can see this might cause a lot of diplomatic flap, but I
am concerned that India may balk on this nonproliferation
treaty.
Could you comment on that?
Senator Gore. He commented on that while you were out.
Secretary Rusk. Senator, I think this is one----
Senator Clark. Do not repeat what you said.
Secretary Rusk. It is a very, very serious question for us,
quite apart from this question for India. I do not think,
first, that India would be interested in a unilateral guarantee
by the United States alone in this matter. They would, I think,
say that it would have to be at least by the United States and
the Soviet Union acting together.
Senator Clark. This should not be too difficult for the
Soviet Union point of view.
Secretary Rusk. That could create some problems. Apparently
they have discussed that with the Soviet Union apparently
without much encouragement. But for us, Senator, there is also
a very, very major problem as to whether we ourselves want to
extend our own commitments that far. Do we pledge the lives of
a hundred million Americans in the first two hours to this end?
Senator Clark. I certainly think not.
Secretary Rusk. It is a very grave decision for us to take.
Senator Clark. Just let me interrupt, and I would think
that the Indian guarantee, if it came forward at all, would be
merely against China and not with respect to the Soviet Union,
which hopefully would join with us.
I do not think you have to worry about France and Britain
attacking India, but if the Soviet Union and ourselves were
prepared to guarantee against China, in my opinion, maybe I am
wrong, this does not confront you with the difficulty you spoke
of because, as I understand it, China has no effective air
force and our manned bombers could destroy the Chinese nuclear
capability overnight.
Maybe it raises the question of first strike.
Secretary Rusk. I would hope, Senator, that some way could
be found for the United Nations to strengthen what has been
said on this subject in such a way that countries like India
would feel sufficient reassurance to be willing and able to go
ahead with a nonproliferation policy.
Senator Gore. Senator Pell.
Senator Pell. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, first I regret not having been here when Mr.
Macomber's name was up for confirmation, and I am delighted to
see such an old friend and competent officer as he is
accompanying you for the first time. The record will show what
is said even though he is out of the room.
Secretary Rusk. Thank you very much, Senator. I am
delighted to have Mr. Macomber with me.
ABM NEGOTIATIONS IN MOSCOW
Senator Pell. Secondly, in connection with the ABM's, I am
delighted to hear that Ambassador Thompson will be occupying a
leading role as a negotiator.
Do we intend to move right into those discussions, or will
there be a time lag?
Secretary Rusk. I think, sir, that we would like to begin
them soon rather than late. We have the impression that the
Soviets are still in the position of preparing their own
position. I do not think I said this a little earlier, but this
latest communication we had from them was an invitation for us
to present some additional views on the subject. We do not yet
have from them any that gives us a real feel of what their
approach to it is going to be, except that offensive and
defensive weapons will have to be discussed together; and,
secondly, this should be in the framework of disarmament rather
than in terms of freezes.
Senator Pell. Right.
Secretary Rusk. So that is about the only major clue we
have at the present time.
Senator Pell. Thank you.
1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL
Another question I had here was in connection with the
disarmament subject, and this is, do we ever intend to ratify
the 1925 Geneva Protocol on which I believe the U.N. Assembly
passed a resolution calling on all nations to refrain from the
use of gaseous warfare and bacteriological materials in
warfare? What is our position on that?
Secretary Rusk. May I ask Mr. Fisher to comment on that?
Mr. Fisher. Yes, the U.N. resolution, I believe the term
was, invites people to ratify the 1925 protocol. We voted for
it, in the explanation of the vote considered by various
countries through their own constitutional structures. That
convention is not now before the Senate. It was recalled, I
believe, shortly after World War II, in sort of a review by the
Foreign Relations Committee of things that had been up here for
a long while.
The real consideration, Senator Pell, is whether or not it
is best to invest the substantial effort that would be required
to get that through on the basis of the 1925 convention or
whether we should consider the problem of bringing it up to
date, try to negotiate an up-to-date treaty which takes into
account many developments since 1925, which, for example, deals
with all forms of biological warfare which are not by its terms
covered in the 1925 convention.
Senator Pell. But to interrupt for the moment, the only
thing on the table in a multilateral matter would be the 1925
convention, would it not?
Mr. Fisher. That is correct, and our feeling would be,
however, we have discussed this frankly with 5,000 scientists
who visited the President's science adviser and myself two
weeks ago, that perhaps it might be better to consider
undertaking a major study in this context looking at all the
control problems of BW and CW in a 1967 context rather than the
context of ratifying the 1925 convention.
Senator Pell. I would hope the reason that is inhibiting
you is not the fact we are occasionally using tear gas in
Vietnam.
Mr. Fisher. No. We would be perfectly clear in our own view
that incapacitants, nonlethal incapacitants, are not covered by
the 1925 convention, and any ratification, if they would have
taken place, would have made that perfectly clear.
Senator Pell. Thank you.
In connection with the words in Senator Lausche's
colloquy----
Senator Clark. Would the Senator yield for one moment?
I would like to supplement in the strongest possible way
the view Senator Pell has expressed about the high degree of
desirability of moving into the problem of arms control, in
radiological, chemical, and biological warfare. I think we have
neglected it.
Mr. Fisher. If I can comment, we have had to put the cart--
the horse research before the cart, because in many people's
minds there has been the view that this was an insoluble
problem because of the difficulties of control that the
theretofore 1925 convention was a mere paper promise and
therefore forget about it.
[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
MINUTES
----------
MONDAY, MARCH 6, 1967
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met in executive session at 2:40 p.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Morse, Gore,
Church, Symington, Dodd, Clark, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper
and Case.
Michael Wood, former Director of Development, National
Student Association, and Phillip Sherburne, former President,
National Student Association, testified on the National Student
Association and the C.I.A.
[The committee adjourned at 5:45 p.m.]
MINUTES
----------
MONDAY, MARCH 13, 1967
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Mansfield, Morse,
Gore, Lausche, Church, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken,
Carlson and Case.
Arthur Goldberg, Ambassador to the United Nations,
accompanied by Leonard C. Meeker, Legal Adviser, Department of
State, testified further on Ex. D, 90/1, the Treaty on Outer
Space.
The proposed Latin American Resolution and the question of
staff members going on trips while the Senate is in session was
also discussed.
[The committee adjourned at 12:10 p.m.]
Arms Sales to Iran
----------
Tuesday, March 14, 1967
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs, of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Stuart Symington (chairman of
the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Symington, Fulbright, Gore, Clark,
McCarthy and Hickenlooper.
Also present: Peter Knauer, Assistant for Congressional and
Special Projects, Office of the Director of Military
Assistance, Department of Defense; and Lt. Col. Albertus B.
Outlaw, Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
(Legislative Affairs).
Also present: Mr. Marcy and Mr. Bader of the committee
staff.
[This hearing was published in 1967 with deletions made for
reasons of national security. The most significant deletions
are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the
remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the
published hearings.]
STATEMENT OF MR. HENRY J. KUSS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS NEGOTIATIONS; ACCOMPANIED
BY MR. W.B. LIGON, DIRECTOR, NEAR EAST NEGOTIATING DIRECTORATE
AND ECONOMIC PLANNING-COORDINATION OASD (ISI) FOR ILN
* * * * * * *
EXECUTIVE BRANCH DECISION IN IRANIAN CASE [P. 4]
Mr. Kuss. First of all, this machinery included intensive
and detailed discussions with the country itself. For several
years, we have agreed with the Government of Iran that military
supplies will not be sold or bought by them, by any country,
without clear analysis of their need and the economic
capability to support the impact of such purchases.
Secondly, a U.S. military team bringing in our unified
command and joint staff machinery, worked with the Imperial
Iranian forces in analyzing the threat and recommending the
types of equipment which would be desirable.
Simultaneously, our State Department and AID machinery, at
the embassy level, worked with the Central Bank, not just with
their defense ministry, but with the Central Bank of Iran, to
determine financial resources which would be available to meet
total Iranian development and consumption requirements as well
as the effects of contemplated military procurement on such
resources.
Both these military and economic analyses were reviewed by
the Shah, and his prime minister and other governmental
agencies of Iran, and discussed with our ambassador.
All of this information was then made available in
Washington to the State Department, AID, and Defense machinery
for further consideration.
There were many adjustments made in the application of this
machinery. Needless to say, they didn't all adopt my
recommendations. There were many changes.
On the basis of these views, a decision was made at the
highest level in the United States Government concerning the
program which we would be willing to undertake.
From the time that the Shah gave indication of his first
need for additional equipment, to the time that my office was
informed of the program to be specifically negotiated, over
nine months elapsed with consultative machinery operating in
Iran and the United States.
In the final analysis, the most surprising thing to me is
that the Shah waited nine months since he was financially
independent; certainly he is politically independent and had
achieved the approval of the Majlis in November 1965 for the
purchase of $200 million outright from any source.
This waiting period only proves to me to some extent that
he really preferred the United States to continue as principal
military supplier even though he had to wait through all of the
time for the machinery to be processed, and even though he did
not get all that he was capable of purchasing in the process,
in the first analysis.
I should like to conclude my opening remarks with a
highlight summary of the situation taken from reports by people
in our AID, Defense and political machinery, who are a lot
closer to the situation than I personally can confess to be.
These statements from our AID, political, Defense people on
the scene are as follows:
1. While Iran's economic situation is basically sound, the
United States would greatly prefer that it limit the
expenditure of further resources on military equipment. This is
an important element of what was the basis for our final
decision.
The impression is that we wished to limit the amount of
military supply that we provide.
However, there is no prospect of convincing the Shah that
Iran need not develop what he considers an adequate defense
establishment to protect his fully exposed vital oil
installations in the south. Moreover, it is in the United
States interest to maintain a close military relationship with
Iran in order to protect our interests and to enable us to
maintain a dialogue with the Shah on the broader issues of
Iranian economic development and their relationship to military
expenditures.
The United States has made significant progress in the last
two years in stimulating the Government of Iran to examine this
relationship.
ECONOMIC GROWTH IN IRAN
For its own part, the Government of Iran has made great
strides in promoting economic growth in Iran, whose GNP
increased nearly 10 percent last year. Iran is credit-worthy
and, given its inability to rapidly absorb large amounts of
foreign financing for its development program, there is room
for additional military credits on reasonable terms.
Senator Hickenlooper. Given its inability?
Mr. Kuss. Yes. In other words, it can't grow up overnight.
All revenues are coming in faster than it can really spend them
on development projects.
Senator Hickenlooper. Therefore, they have some extra money
left over to buy arms?
Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir. That is the point I am making here.
The United States government has constantly tried to apply
brakes to Iranian military spending. Last year, although the
Shah planned $200 million in just one year from us in
purchases, in accordance with the requirements as confirmed by
the special U.S. military survey team, the U.S. government
limited the Shah to $50 million a year, with the possibility of
similar tranches over the next three-year period.
Limitations upon limitations have been placed on what he
can do with military programs.
2. Recent months have seen the steady--and I am quoting
now--continuation of a clearly visible trend toward a more
independent Iranian posture on the world scene. Developments
affecting Pakistan, one of Iran's closest allies, have
reinforced the Shah in his conviction that Iran must be
prepared to stand on its own feet. In setting his twin goals of
economic development and national defense, the Shah has linked
military security to economic and social progress, and believes
that he cannot have the latter without the former. Partly also
because of a deep-seated Iranian Nasserist antagonism and
partly because of the USSR's new policy of friendliness toward
Iran, Iran has shifted the focus of its major concern from the
threat of communism in the USSR in the north to Nasser and Arab
nationalism in the south. The Shah is acutely aware of the
vulnerability of his oil lifeline in the south to surprise
attack and the susceptibility to subversion of the Arab
minority, in Khuzestan.
The Shah feels compelled to maintain an adequate defense
establishment in face of a large-scale Soviet arms supply to
UAR, Iraq and Syria. He believes strongly that it is in the
interest of the United States, as well as Iran, that Iran be in
a position to deter or cope with regional threats rather than
calling on us a la Vietnam.
Egypt has several times Iran's arsenal.
The reason for the Shah's insistence on aircraft of the
type of F-4, and he did insist, was that even neighboring Iraq
already has delivered 18 of the all-weather Mach 2.3 MIG-21's,
whereas Iran has nothing better than day-flying Mach 1.3 F-5's.
SHAH'S MILITARY REQUIREMENTS
He has expressed his desire to meet his military
requirements from the United States, but he has made it
abundantly clear also that if the United States is unwilling or
unable to meet his major military requirements, he is
determined to go elsewhere to acquire what he needs.
3. The Shah's arms purchases from the Soviets are in
relatively non-sensitive areas such as trucks, armored
personnel carriers and ack-ack guns; his payments are primarily
in natural gas which for 60 years have been flared off. The
Shah's purchasing from the Soviets seems to him, and I am
reporting, seems to him, to be not without some value. He is
convinced that it will undercut Soviet propaganda about the
United States being solely arms merchants to Iran, and about
Iran's being an American puppet.
He also believes it will cause difficulties in the Soviet
relationship with Nasser and other radical Arabs.
Gentlemen, I deliberately didn't try to answer all the
questions in my opening statement but that poses a lot of
questions, I am sure.
* * * * * * *
END-USE AGREEMENT WITH WEST GERMANY [P. 7]
Mr. Bader. While you are getting that--let me ask you a
question. As I understand it, we include in our military sales
or grant agreement with West Germany a so-called end-use
agreement. Is that correct? That is, we have total veto, as Mr.
McNaughton said, over the final disposition of American
military equipment.
Mr. Kuss. That is right.
Mr. Bader. Is that correct?
Mr. Kuss. I negotiated them; yes, that is correct.
Mr. Bader. Fine.
So in the case of the these F-86, if they are not in Iran--
if they actually belong to Pakistan--then the West German
government and perhaps the Iranian government, if they were the
middleman in this case, have turned aside what was American
desire and policy with regard to Pakistan. Would that be
correct?
Mr. Kuss. I believe that would be correct.
May I continue my answer?
Mr. Bader. Certainly.
Mr. Kuss. To supplement what you said, let me put it in the
record that the United States was supplying military equipment
through grant and sales to Iran at the time that this
circumstance arose.
The United States approval of the German sale to Iran was
influenced by the fact that there appeared to be legitimate
requirements and the experience of the purchase would not
unduly upset the Iranian defense budget.
* * * * * * *
Senator McCarthy. I just want to know, what is the game?
Why do the Canadians do it for Germany under our license? The
Canadians don't have a serious balance of payments problem with
Germany. We do.
What are the politics of it?
Mr. Kuss. The Canadians have--I am not sure the balance of
payments is the consideration at all.
Senator McCarthy. Why? That is the question.
Mr. Kuss. The Canadians have as serious a balance of
payments problem as ourselves, if one is to talk balance of
payments, and the Canadians having financed a production line
for F-86's for themselves were in a position to provide F-86's
for Germany during the build-up period.
Senator McCarthy. Is that because we couldn't do it?
Mr. Kuss. We could have done it.
Senator McCarthy. Why didn't we? I want to know why the
Canadians with our license produced and sold it to Germany. Who
arranged this? Did this involve cooperation on the part of the
Defense Department and our manufacturers of F-86's? What I want
to get at is the process by which these complicated decisions
are made, like the one involving the sale of Lightning fighters
to Saudi Arabia, for example. We sell F-111's to England and
they in turn sell Lightning fighters to Saudi Arabia. Northrop
Aviation, however, says really what the Saudis should have are
F-5's, but, in the end, the Saudis are told: ``You really can't
go out and do the kind of thing you are urging them to do,
compete in the open market really for arms sales because
somebody just said you have got to take Lightning fighters and
we are in turn going to supply F-111's to England.''
Mr. Kuss. My answer to the first question, to start with,
first of all, the North American Aircraft Corporation has the
right to license foreign manufacturers to produce F-86 aircraft
in this case.
Senator Symington. F-86 is a North American; not Northrop?
Mr. Kuss. North American, right.
I understood the question to be F-86--has the right to--
this was some years ago, of course, with the F-86--they have
the right to license other countries to produce the F-86
aircraft with the approval of the United States Government.
They obtained that right through their contractual arrangements
with the Defense Department.
They then obtained the approval of the Office of Munitions
Control, who would also check it out with Defense, to license
Canada to produce, not only for themselves, but for other
countries as they were able to work out mutually-agreeable
sales arrangements.
TOTAL U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAN [P. 8]
The United States Government, in reviewing that license,
approved it but insisted that the license itself contain a
clause that if the Canadians were to sell those airplanes to
any other country that they must get the approval of the United
States Government, specifically for that other country, number
one.
And, further, in that particular agreement, that if the
other country were to ever sell it to any other country, they
must also get the approval in succession of the United States
government.
Senator Symington. If you will yield to me a minute,
Senator--as I understand it, then, some 90 F-86's were sold by
Canada to West Germany, correct?
Mr. Kuss. That is correct.
Senator Symington. And those were sold by West Germany--
Mr. Kuss. Maybe more, sir.
Senator Symington. All right, we are talking about these
90.
* * * * * * *
MOVEMENT OF F-86'S FROM IRAN TO PAKISTAN [P. 8]
Senator Symington. I understand about the initiation; I am
just talking about these planes.
They moved from West Germany into Iran, then from Iran to
Pakistan. Did we know that they had moved from Iran to Pakistan
when they did, or did we find out later?
Mr. Kuss. When we knew, and we consulted with the
Government of Canada, both the----
Senator Symington. Let me ask the question again to be sure
you understand my point.
Did we know at the time the planes moved from Iran to
Pakistan that they were going from Iran to Pakistan, after they
were sold to Iran by West Germany? Did we know it at the time?
Mr. Kuss. No.
As a deliberate plan of our own. No, we did not know.
Senator Symington. We did not know.
Senator McCarthy. I think he is saying that we didn't know
it was going to be through these three stages when we first
licensed them in Canada.
Senator Symington. Just bear with me.
Mr. Kuss. We expressed no objection to a sale to Iran, not
Pakistan.
Senator Symington. We licensed the sale to Iran.
Senator McCarthy. You approved that one, not the next one?
Senator Symington. When did we discover Iran had moved them
into Pakistan by sale, barter or gift?
Mr. Kuss. I don't have a date here. I will be glad to
supply it for you.
Senator Symington. Roughly how many weeks or months was
it--was it some months after they went into Pakistan that we
found out that they had gone to Pakistan?
Mr. Kuss. It was some months, and after consultation with
Germany and Canada, both countries protested. Iran stated that
the aircraft were in Pakistan only for repair. Action was taken
to try to influence the return of the aircraft to Iran. The
Federal Republic of Germany held up further sales which they
had pending at that time to Iran as a result.
At the moment on this transaction we have two points of
information which I believe that you have seen, sir. The
Washington Daily News had indicated that the aircraft had been
returned as a result of strong U.S. pressures. This return of
the aircraft is generally confirmed by DIA but we are still
waiting for specific confirmation.
* * * * * * *
BRITISH SALE OF AIRCRAFT [P. 10]
Mr. Kuss. The Lightning is a British air defense aircraft
and solely usable for that purpose and no other purpose.
Senator Symington. Right. And that plane went from
Britain----
Mr. Kuss. To Saudi Arabia.
* * * * * * *
SALE OF F-86 AIRCRAFT BY WEST GERMANY TO IRAN [P. 11]
Mr. Bader. Is this also the case, as I have heard reported,
of some 200 to 400 M-47 tanks that have gone through Merex to
Pakistan via Iran.
Mr. Kuss. There have been no M-47 tanks that have gone from
Iran to Pakistan, to my knowledge.
Mr. Bader. Fine.
The West German Government has----
Mr. Kuss. As a matter of fact we have had that under
discussion with the West German Government, and we both have
held up any sale to Iran for the very purpose that we thought
they might----
Mr. Bader. They might go there.
Mr. Kuss. That they might go there.
Mr. Bader. Thank you.
F-4 SALE TO IRAN
I would like to go to the F-4 sale, Mr. Chairman, with your
permission.
Senator Symington. Very well.
Mr. Bader. Mr. Kuss, as I understand it, there are two
basic agreements between the United States Government and the
Iran Government with regard to military assistance, that is
agreements to talk about what you call in the Defense
Department hardware. First is the September 1962 memorandum of
understanding, and the second is the July 1964 memorandum of
understanding, is that correct?
Mr. Kuss. That is correct.
Mr. Bader. Now, in the memorandum of understanding of 1962,
we--in the major grant items there were 52 F-5's, is that
correct?
Mr. Kuss. Yes, that is correct.
Mr. Bader. That is roughly correct.
Now, would you explain to the subcommittee the terms of
this July 1964 memorandum of understanding? As I understand
it--and I must say I am quite confused about it--it has been
amended in August of 1966, is that correct, to allow for the F-
4 sale? Am I correct in the information that the July 1964
memorandum of understanding, as amended in August of 1966,
permits the sale to Iran of roughly $400 million of military
equipment, including the supplemental $200 million that covers
the F-4 sale?
Mr. Kuss. That is right.
Mr. Bader. That is right.
Mr. Kuss. May I say, there is one basic sales agreement and
that is the 1964 agreement. In that agreement we acquired
promises from the government of Iran that they would not
proceed at any independent pace on the purchase of this
military equipment, but that it would be subject to an annual
review of the economic availabilities of foreign exchange to
their development program as well as for other purposes. And we
did not wish to destroy that arrangement that we had achieved
from them in 1964. Thus, when we came to the conclusion that it
would be necessary to add $200 million of credit to the 1964
agreement, we thought it best to add it to an agreement under
which we had far more links, controls, reviews, analyses, if
you will, agreed to by the Government of Iran than if we were
to establish an entirely new agreement.
Mr. Bader. When did the Shah of Iran first approach the
United States about his requirement for an aircraft with the
capability beyond that of the F-5?
Mr. Kuss. From my personal knowledge, he was talking about
aircraft well beyond the F-5 before the 1964 agreement was
established.
Mr. Bader. With direct reference to the F-4's, was this in
the beginning of 1966?
Mr. Kuss. F-4s, and other aircraft, well beyond the F-5.
Senator Symington. Let me ask what counsel is interested
in, and what we are interested in: Was there mention in any of
these agreements of the F-4, the ones that they eventually got?
Mr. Kuss. No, sir.
Senator Symington. When was the decision made to ship F-
4's? When was the decision made and why was it made?
Mr. Kuss. May I review that----
Senator Symington. Yes.
Mr. Kuss--For the record?
As we have pointed out on numerous occasions, there is a
tremendous amount of machinery in existence.
Senator Symington. We understand that.
Mr. Kuss. In the executive branch. One part of this
machinery was the military machinery, the joint staff
machinery, that we sent to Iran to review with the Iranian
armed forces what they stated as their requirements.
Mr. Bader. This is the so-called Peterson mission.
Mr. Kuss. This is the so-called Peterson report.
Mr. Bader. When was that issued?
Mr. Kuss. The Peterson report was issued in approximately
early '65.
Mr. Bader. The Peterson report was the basis of the
military justification for F-4's.
Mr. Kuss. Excuse me, early '66.
Mr. Bader. That was the basis for the military
justification.
Mr. Kuss. March 1966.
Mr. Bader. March 1966.
Mr. Kuss. March 1966, and in the Peterson report they
recommended that it would be necessary for F-4D aircraft, D
aircraft, be provided to combat the Mig 21's that were
available in the southern regions that the Shah was--to meet
the threat that was established.
Mr. Bader. And this was in March of 1966.
Mr. Kuss. This was in March of 1966, right.
Mr. Bader. Did the Peterson report recommend two squadrons
of F-4s which we have now sold to Iran?
Mr. Kuss. I do not recall; I would have to check.
Mr. Bader. According to the Peterson report, as I read it,
they recommended six squadrons of F-5 aircraft and one squadron
of F-4C aircraft during the fiscal year '67-'71 time frame.
Mr. Kuss. You have got to read the Peterson report in two
ways. First of all, we were anxious to keep things as
restricted as possible. The Peterson report not only gave a
report on what was within, shall we say, a constricted level,
but it also indicated that many hundreds of millions of dollars
more worth of equipment could have been justified if one were
dealing with the kind of threat that the Shah was talking about
in Iraq, Syria, and the U.A.R.
Mr. Bader. When was the decision made to go from one
squadron of F-4's, which the Peterson report recommended, to
two squadrons of F-4's which was the final agreement?
Mr. Kuss. This decision was communicated to the Shah on the
10th of August.
Mr. Bader. On the 10th of August.
Mr. Kuss. The decision was made, of course, within our own
executive branch shortly before that at the highest levels of
government.
Mr. Bader. Will we also deliver to Iran the original----
Senator Symington. Excuse me just a second. You say the
highest levels of government. By that, do you mean the
President?
Mr. Bader. Yes, sir. I do.
Senator Symington. Is it true that Secretary McNamara
opposed this sale?
Mr. Kuss. Proposed?
Senator Symington. Opposed it.
Mr. Kuss. Opposed the sale?
Senator Symington. Yes.
Mr. Kuss. No, not to my knowledge, sir.
Senator Symington. Not to your knowledge. Thank you.
Mr. Bader. Will we also deliver to Iran the 13 squadrons of
F-5's that were called for under the 1964 agreement?
Mr. Kuss. I would have to check that.
May I put that in the record? There is a substitution of F-
4 squadrons for F-5 squadrons, and I just want to be sure about
the numbers, and I would like to insert them.
F-5 AIRCRAFT PROVIDED BY THE UNITED STATES TO IRAN
Mr. Bader. It was the decision of the highest levels, that
is the President, that this would be F-4D's rather than F-4C's,
as well, that would be the latest and most sophisticated----
Mr. Kuss. F-4D's
Mr. Bader (continuing). Models coming off the line and
later models coming off the line.
Senator Symington. Who is the one who knows about these
sales?
Mr. Kuss. It all depends on which question you ask, sir.
Senator Symington. I see.
Mr. Kuss. If you want to ask the question about the model
of the F-4, I can answer that.
Senator Symington. What was the day the decision was made
to ship the F-4's?
Mr. Kuss. I believe I said it was communicated on the 10th
of August.
Senator Symington. Fine.
CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATION ABOUT SALE TO IRAN
Now, when was the Congress notified that F-4's were going
to be shipped to Iran?
Mr. Kuss. I do not believe the Congress was notified,
Senator, until Mr. McNaughton spoke on the subject.
Senator Symington. That was after it was in the press.
Mr. Kuss. Correct, sir.
Senator Symington. And we talked about governmental
machinery.
Is it the policy of the Defense Department to tell the
press before it tells the Congress about these sales?
Mr. Kuss. As a matter of fact, I do not believe we told the
press. I believe the British leaked it because of competition.
It was not our doing.
Senator Symington. So the British leaked it to the American
press.
Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. Do you know who first published it in
the United States?
Mr. Kuss. No, I do not.
Senator Symington. Do you not think that, if we sell the
most sophisticated fighter to a foreign country, that
information should be supplied to the Congress?
Mr. Kuss. I would like to answer that question this way:
The F-4D, as we sold it to the Iranian Government, was not the
most sophisticated fighter that we were dealing with in terms
of sales to other countries. For example, it is not the same
airplane we sold to the British.
Senator Symington. Well then, let us say the second or the
third or the fourth most sophisticated airplane.
Mr. Kuss. I would like to answer that question by saying
that in addition to considering the problem, there were many
security meetings held at which we reviewed the switches, the
panels, black boxes of the F-4D, which related to nuclear
capability. They were taken out. We reviewed the missile which
was related to the F-4D and substituted SIDEWINDER missiles
which had been released already.
We eliminated the SHRIKE which is used on the F-4D. We
eliminated the WALLEYE missile which is used there. We
retrofitted some of our F-4D's with CORDS and DCM and
eliminated that.
So on balance we took a decision that we felt that this
would not be a security lapse here or any sensitivity, if
things went wrong.
Senator Symington. Let me repeat my question, please.
Mr. Kuss. All right.
Senator Symington. Do you not think, if you make a sale of
a sophisticated, modern airplane to a foreign government, the
Congress should be informed of that?
Mr. Kuss. I think I can best answer that question by saying
it is not my function to determine that answer, sir.
Senator Symington. Well, then you could say this also,
could you not; that you did not inform the Congress?
Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. And you do not know anybody who did
inform the Congress.
Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. And to the best of your knowledge it
would have remained a secret unless a foreign country had not
leaked it to the press.
* * * * * * *
FOREIGN AND MILITARY POSITION CHANGED BY SALES [P. 14]
Senator Symington. So you knew that the sale was going to
be made before you agreed to sell them the F-4's.
Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir, and we protested against it
considerably. We made a major point of it in our negotiation,
and made sure that the Shah was clear that our willingness to
sell sophisticated and sensitive equipment was conditional
pending clarification of Iran's position with respect to the
purchases from the Soviet bloc.
Now, the Shah responded to us on that and noted that he
wanted to reaffirm that if it came to Soviet equipment, he
would limit it to nonsensitive equipment. He went on further in
our discussions with him on the subject to note that he had
declined to send Iranians to the U.S.S.R. for training----
Senator Symington. I understand those points.
Mr. Kuss. I think these are important.
Senator Symington. We have had that information given to us
in great detail.
Mr. Kuss. I do not think the last group were.
He has limited the Soviet technicians, only a few, to go to
Iran to instruct Iranians on maintenance. The Soviets wanted
the team to remain two years. He gave them six months. And, as
a consequence, it was on balance when you consider the
tremendous position we have there, the number of technicians we
have there, the large predominance of $1.4 billion, I think,
that it will add up to, of the military equipment that we have
provided, that we still maintained our position in a changing
world, a world in which he was growing more independent, and in
a world in which he had gas to sell that he could not sell
anywhere else.
* * * * * * *
STEEL MILL SALE BY U.S.S.R. TO IRAN [P. 15]
Senator Symington. If they are building a $280 million
steel mill and a $400 million pipeline plant, and they are
purchasing over $100 million in military equipment, would you
not say, inasmuch as all this has happened in recent months,
that the position of the Russians from an economic standpoint
was rapidly moving at least into an equilibrium with our own in
Iran?
Mr. Kuss. No, sir, I do not believe so. I have certainly
pointed out very clearly on the military side that it is not
anything like an equilibrium. It is a man trying to dart in
through the armor with a little pin.
On the economic side, I can only say that when in 1962 we
decided, the Congress, along with the Executive Branch, to
eliminate development aid for Iran, it was inevitable that Iran
was going to turn to business means in the area to find its
way. And that in 1964, the 1964 military agreement was
essentially an agreement to phase out military assistance as
well, and when you move into a situation where you no longer
are giving it away, you find that you have got to find
different ways and means of handling your problem, and you no
longer have the absolute control that we had when we were in
the position of largesse to everybody giving it away.
Senator Symington. At any time did we suggest to the
Iranians that they purchase what they needed in the way of
additional military equipment somewhere else?
Mr. Kuss. Absolutely not. We, number one, opposed the
Russian program, made a major point of this.
Senator Symington. Yes, you answered the question, if it is
no, and you explained to us that you did oppose the Russian
plan.
* * * * * * *
EVENTUAL AIRCRAFT SALES TO IRAN AND PAKISTAN [P. 16]
Mr. Kuss. We expressed no objection to a Canadian-German
arrangement which would get them to Iran for the use of the
Iranian armed forces.
Senator Symington. Right.
How did they get to Pakistan?
Mr. Kuss. We found out through intelligence channels that
some of the airplanes were in Pakistan.
Senator Symington. You are going to let us know how many.
Mr. Kuss. And we are going to let you know how many, and we
also have found out that upon remonstration on our part, the
Canadian part, the German part, the newspapers have reported
that they have been returned. DIA has reported they have been
generally returned, but they are not sure about the number.
Senator Symington. Returned from where to where?
Mr. Kuss. From Pakistan to Iran.
Senator Symington. To Iran.
Did we ask the Iranians for an explanation of how they got
from Iran to Pakistan?
Mr. Kuss. We dealt, since our arrangements were with the
Canadians and the Germans, through the Canadians and the
Germans.
Senator Symington. Did we ask the Canadians and/or Germans
how they explained how the planes got from Iran to Pakistan?
Mr. Kuss. Yes, that is where the Germans stopped selling
any more equipment to Iran.
Senator Symington. What did the Germans say as to how they
got from Iran to Pakistan?
Mr. Kuss. The Germans indicated that the first Iranian
explanation was that they were in Pakistan for overhaul. As you
know, Pakistan does a great deal of overhaul for most countries
in that area. This was not satisfactory to anyone, and that is
why we have been pursuing this further.
* * * * * * *
RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARMS SALES [P. 17]
Senator Fulbright. But who makes the decision to sell arms?
Who determines the country's capacity to purchase without
endangering their economy? Do you as an official of the Defense
Department?
Mr. Kuss. It is my responsibility since the management for
funds must be put somewhere to see to it that that is managed
in a viable way.
But we have a government that has many elements to it and
in almost every case, and particularly in the Iranian case, the
machinery operated from the Teheran Embassy, economic aid
people, with the Central Bank people, to the AID people in
Washington, and it was as a result of their actions that the
program was reduced, the Shah requested, to a much, much
smaller program.
* * * * * * *
RATIONALE BEHIND SALE TO IRAN QUESTIONED [P. 18]
Mr. Kuss. Well, as you say, I probably wouldn't agree with
you.
Senator Fulbright. I don't think you would.
Mr. Kuss. But only because it is the machinery, the very
machinery that you propose to exercise which came to the
conclusion to provide the kind of arms and to eliminate
economic aid in 1962, to eliminate military assistance in 1964
on a phased basis, to provide arms on a very stringent basis,
and to not supply everything that the Shah wanted. It is this
very machinery that you speak of that came to that conclusion.
Senator Fulbright. I am sure Iran wants it.
I was there with Mr. Douglas Dillon in 1959. I suggested to
the Shah that if he spent money on the improvement of the
ordinary citizens, he would be more secure than trying to
protect himself with arms. But there is nothing I can do about
it, and I don't know that it does any good to bedevil you about
it. I realize you are an official in the Department of Defense.
I only hope you do not go too far in loading everybody down
with arms that can't afford it.
Mr. Kuss. Let me repeat again, Senator, that as far as the
underdeveloped country, arms sales are fairly meaningless to
us. They amount to 10 percent of our total program. My office
is occupied with doing things with people with whom we used to
be giving billions in foreign aid in our alliances.
When it comes to the application to these non-developed
countries, my responsibility is to see to it that if we do
extend credit they have got the money to repay it, that we
manage it on an appropriate basis.
Senator Fulbright. I am not arguing about their having the
money for purchases. I expect you will get it.
What they are doing is taking it out of the hides of poor
peasants. That is what is creating a politically explosive
situation.
The Shah will get the money from the Majlis. You don't
dispute that?
Mr. Kuss. Let me make that clear. The Majlis has, as you
pointed out, voted $200 million that he could spend in one
year. We didn't agree with that. We didn't agree with that at
all. We dealt with the Central Bank, Mr. Sami, whom you
probably know is a very capable man there.
Next we dealt with our economic mission in Teheran; next
with the AID group. What we dealt with was a situation which
compared what each tranche of military equipment would involve
in the way of debt pre-payment against any balance of foreign
exchange that was left over after all of the feasible projects
could be administered for the economic development program. We
dealt with that as a given factor by our AID people who did not
take the Shah's estimates of all revenues, reduced them and who
did not take all of the Shah's estimates on what his economic
programs were feasible, and the programs that we are dealing
with here, all through it have a ceiling something like this,
and this curve here is the debt pre-payment capability which
our economic advisers told us was possible after covering the
other programs.
Senator Symington. If the chairman will yield.
Senator Fulbright. I will.
Senator Symington. It would seem clear from your testimony
that you felt the Shah had a right because of danger to his
country to make arrangements to obtain these airplanes. Is that
correct?
Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. All right. Now, in the Peterson report--
--
Senator Fulbright. Danger from whom?
Senator Symington. I was going to get to that. In the
Peterson report it says, and I quote: ``The combined forces of
these latter three countries represent a overwhelming military
capability vis-a-vis Iran. But for the foreseeable future the
possibility of their making such a combined assault on Iranian
forces seems quite remote. A unilateral attack of Iran by UAR
forces is unlikely. But if it should come, it would be limited
to naval action unless the Israeli issue were first resolved or
unless the UAR achieved hegemony over the minor states of the
area, a circumstance not readily foreseen.''
Now, as I understand it, therefore, you believe that the
threat comes from Syria, the UAR, and Iraq primarily, is that
correct? The Pentagon feels that way?
Mr. Kuss. That is a result of the Peterson report, yes.
Senator Symington. All right. How many Mig 21's has Iraq
got roughly? I think this is very important.
Mr. Kuss. They have 18 on hand, and I believe another 18
coming.
Senator Symington. That is 36. How many has Syria got?
Mr. Kuss. Actual order of battle on hand, 18 for Iraq,
Syria 26, 102 for UAR.
Senator Symington. Wait a minute, you are ahead of me. How
many has Iraq got?
Mr. Kuss. Eighteen.
Senator Symington. And how many do you say they are going
to have?
Mr. Kuss. My records indicate they will have 18 more.
Senator Symington. That is 36.
Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. How many has Syria got?
Mr. Kuss. The order of battle indicates 26 here.
Senator Symington. Twenty-six. That is a total of 62,
correct?
Mr. Kuss. Right.
Senator Symington. Now how many did you say Egypt has?
Mr. Kuss. 102. Those are just Mig-21's.
Senator Symington. But the SU-7 is an improved Mig-21, is
it not?
Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir. That is 38 additional SU-7's in the
UAR.
Senator Symington. Well, I mean do you not want to include
the best they have got? The figure I got in Cairo last month
was 60 SU-7's. But you have got 38; you have 102 and 38.
Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir. I would like to check.
Senator Symington. That is 140 and 62. That is over 200 of
the latest model fighters that those three countries have. Why
do you not sell more F-4's to Iran if you want to put them in a
balance of power position against these three countries? In
other words, what do you really do for the Shah by giving him
one or two squadrons of F-4's if your premise is correct that
these three countries are enemies and they have over a hundred
of the most modern Russian fighters. I am following Senator
Fulbright's thinking on this.
OUR MILITARY POSITION IN IRAN
You have been to Iran and so have I. It is a country where
there are very rich people and very poor people. What good does
it do to let them take their resources, and buy these airplanes
from us, if they get them at all, as against what they could do
with that money for the betterment of their economy because the
number of planes that you have agreed on does not make them
safe against these countries. Incidentally, all these latter
countries are really satellites of the Soviet Union, are they
not?
Mr. Kuss. They certainly are.
Senator Symington. Therefore, if the Soviet Union wanted to
move against Iran, the military imbalance is still stronger, is
it not?
Mr. Kuss. It certainly is. May I answer the question?
Senator Symington. I am just asking a few as we go along.
As I understand it, we are selling military equipment to
them, sophisticated military equipment; and the Soviet Union is
selling them unsophisticated military equipment, plus a
tremendous steel mill, for which they are going to be paid in
natural gas, and in oil. Is that correct?
Mr. Kuss. That is correct.
Senator Symington. Would you say that in our effort to
preserve a military position which is at best theoretical, we
are passing over the economic control of the country to the
Soviet Union?
Mr. Kuss. I do not see it that way. With a few projects, I
do not see it at all. I would believe that the relationship of
our western influence in both the economic area and the
military area is probably about on the order of the $1.4
billion military to $100 million Soviet.
SOVIET INFLUENCE IN IRAN
Senator Symington. But we are putting the Soviet Union in
about equilibrium when it comes to economic control.
Mr. Kuss. I do not believe so.
Senator Symington. You do not think so?
Mr. Kuss. No, sir.
Senator Symington. You think we still control the economy
of Iran?
Mr. Kuss. First of all, I do not believe that the word
``control'' is one that the Soviets use.
Senator Symington. What do you think the word should be?
Mr. Kuss. I believe that the good influence, if you will,
that we have in Iran is sufficiently great, in a preponderance,
in a majority, to warrant the course of action that we took,
and that was the on balance decision of both our economists,
our political people, and our military people.
Senator Symington. You told the subcommittee this afternoon
that we did our best to prevent the sale of the Russian
military equipment to Iran, but we were unsuccessful. Is that
correct?
Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. And at the same time you also told the
committee that the Iranians are working out with the Russians a
big steel mill, and that they are going to have, with the help
of the British and the Russians, a $400 million gas pipeline
with which they are going to pay for this military equipment,
along with gas. Is that correct?
Mr. Kuss. That is right.
Senator Symington. So there is a major recent economic
influx of the Soviet Union into Iran, and also a major and
unprecedented movement of military equipment into Iran from the
Soviet Union, correct?
Mr. Kuss. Not in proportion to our influence.
Senator Symington. But there is a major influx.
Mr. Kuss. Yes, sir; there has been a change.
Senator Symington. And all told, the operations of the
Soviets, economic and military together, for say the last 18
months, is greater than our own; so in effect we are moving
more out of the picture with our grant-in-aid and our military
sales, and our economic sales; and the Soviets are moving more
into the picture.
Mr. Kuss. We are----
Senator Symington. Is that correct?
Mr. Kuss. No, sir. We are hardly moving out of the picture
militarily. We have found other monies have been given away to
substitute for the military side of the equation.
* * * * * * *
ARMS SALES TO WEST GERMANY [P. 21]
Senator Fulbright. You said the decision to sell in Teheran
was made at the highest level after considering all aspects. I
assume you mean the relative need of their domestic economy,
and you finally came up with a decision that they needed these
arms, is that correct?
Mr. Kuss. As well as the politics of whether we can stand
the Russian situation.
Senator Fulbright. Politics.
* * * * * * *
[P. 22]
Mr. Kuss. All of these have to be considered. It has to be
required, must be more economically purchaseable in the United
States. Then they will endeavor to do it. Now, the problem
today is not in meeting the basic part of that agreement. The
problem today is essentially the basic internal German economic
problem, a budget that cannot be changed materially because of
a revenue system that is dependent upon revenues from the
States, a requirement for a complete tax reform system.
Today the German armed forces have one-half the procurement
budget in 1967 that they had in 1963. So you can imagine just
that kind of a change. Why? Because they have not been able to
go along with the increases that would have been necessary to
keep up their total establishment because of the revenue
limitations in the total federal program.
Now, this is something we cannot control It is something
that they must control, and I want to make clear that our
agreement with them is that yes, they will balance, they will
endeavor to procure equipment, if it is required, and if it is
economical to do so, and for five years they have done so.
* * * * * * *
[Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the subcommittee was recessed, to
reconvene subject to the call of the chair.]
MINUTES
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 16, 1967
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met in executive session at 2:10 p.m., in
Room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Gore,
and Case.
Eugene Groves, President, National Student Association,
accompanied by Richard Stearnes, International Affairs Vice
President, testified on the association of the National Student
Association with the C.I.A.
[The committee adjourned at 4:05 p.m.]
MINUTES
----------
MONDAY, MARCH 20, 1967
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m., in
Room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman,
Mansfield, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, Pell,
McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Case and Cooper.
S. Con. Res. 16, extending greetings to Canada on the
occasion of its Centennial, was ordered reported favorably.
S. 623, International Bridge Bill, was ordered reported
favorably.
S. 1029, to improve certain benefits for employees who
serve in high risk situations, and for other purposes, was
discussed and no action taken.
Ex. E, 89/1, 90/1, Amendments to the International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, was ordered reported
favorably.
Ex. O, 89/2, International Telecommunication Convention,
was discussed and carried over.
Ex. D, 90/1, Treaty on Outer Space, was discussed and it
was decided to have some items clarified by someone from
downtown before further consideration.
S.J. Res. 53, recommending increased assistance to Latin
America, was discussed and a hearing set for Thursday p.m. was
moved up to Tuesday, March 21, p.m.
[The committee adjourned at 12:15 p.m.]
BRIEFING ON AFRICA
----------
Tuesday, March 28, 1967
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on African Affairs
of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3: 10 p.m. in
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Eugene J. McCarthy (chairman
of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators McCarthy and Hickenlooper.
Also Present: Senators Symington and Carlson.
Mr. Marcy, Mr. Henderson, and Mr. Bader of the committee
staff.
----------
Senator McCarthy. Do you want to just talk to us, Mr.
Palmer? This is kind of a new committee, and we have no policy
with reference to Africa. If you do not have one, why we are in
good shape.
STATEMENT OF JOSEPH PALMER II, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
AFRICAN AFFAIRS; ACCOMPANIED BY: FRED L. HADSEL, DIRECTOR,
OFFICE OF INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS; AND WILLIAM E. LANG, DEPUTY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (AFRICAN AND FOREIGN MILITARY
RIGHTS)
Mr. Palmer. Maybe between the two of us we can devise one,
Mr. Chairman.
Senator McCarthy. We ought to hear what it is. If you would
like to talk to us generally about two or three items that we
have indicated in the letter, why I think that would be a good
beginning.
Mr. Palmer. Fine.
You had mentioned that you would like to discuss the
military programs in Africa. Would you like to start on that,
Mr. Chairman?
Senator McCarthy. I guess that is as good as any.
Senator Hickenlooper. There are only two things I want to
discuss in Africa: Rhodesia and South Africa.
NORTH AFRICAN MILITARY PROBLEM
Senator McCarthy. Why do we not do a quick one on the North
African military problem, and then we will go to South Africa.
Mr. Palmer. Well, I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, of
course this situation in North Africa has been one of
continuing concern for us. As you know, there have been
tensions in the area in the past, but they have been kept under
fairly manageable control, with the exception of one clash
between the Algerians and the Moroccans back in 1963. On the
whole, our military program in North Africa until just a couple
of years ago was a fairly modest one. We have been supplying
both Morocco and Tunisia for some time since independence with
military assistance.
Mr. Lang can give you the figures if you would like them.
But what has given the problem increased importance in the
last two or three years has been the very massive Soviet
buildup, supply of arms to Algeria. This again, of course,
during the Ben Bella regime. It has continued on under
Boumedienne and has achieved very, very substantial
proportions, about $180 million worth of military assistance to
Algeria since 1963.
It is not only the quantity of it, but it is the types of
weapons that have given both the Moroccans and the Tunisians
concern--jet bombers, fighters, surface to air missiles and
other very advanced types of equipment--with the result that
quite an imbalance has been created between the armed forces of
Algeria and those of Morocco on the one side, and Tunisia on
the other.
Now, we have done a lot of skull practice to try to get our
best estimates as to why this has come about and how it has
come about.
ALGERIA AND EGYPT
I think our best estimate involves a number of factors.
First of all, under the Ben Bella regime Algeria was, of
course, committed to export revolution. They were training
guerrillas. We have good reason to believe they trained them
for the Congo and for other areas, and it was a very
revolutionary government. Boumedienne----
Senator Hickenlooper. And an ally of Nasser.
Mr. Palmer. I am sorry.
Senator Hickenlooper. And an ally of Nasser.
Mr. Palmer. Yes.
When Boumedienne came to power he downplayed this, and the
direction of his policy has been much more toward trying to
develop Algeria internally. Nevertheless we think that most of
these commitments were made during the Ben Bella period and
have been continued during the Boumedienne period.
As you know, Algeria emerged into independence with a Maqui
type force, and the Algerian government was faced with the
necessity of converting that into a more traditional and modern
standing army.
There was a certain amount of speculation that what may
well have happened is Ben Bella took a look at what the Soviets
were doing for Egypt and said, ``I don't really know what I
need, but you tell me what I need.'' The Soviets used this at a
time when their relationships with Algeria were extremely
favorable to try to put in a lot of equipment hoping to
ingratiate themselves and buttress their influence that really
was over and above Algeria's needs.
Then, of course----
Senator Hickenlooper. Do you mind if I interrupt?
Mr. Palmer. No, sir.
Senator Hickenlooper. Is it possible that this is a squeeze
play on the part of the Russians with Egypt on the one side and
Algeria on the other, to squeeze out Libya and Tunisia.
Mr. Palmer. I think this may have been one--an original
part of the strategy.
Senator Hickenlooper. And eventually isolate Morocco and so
on.
Mr. Palmer. I think this could have been an original part
of the strategy, Senator. However, I think that Boumedienne's
relations with the Soviets have not been nearly as close as Ben
Bella's were, and I doubt if it is--nor Boumedienne's
relationships with Egypt, with Nasser are as close as Ben
Bella's were, although Boumedienne will be attending a meeting
in the next few days in Cairo along with some of the other so-
called progressives in Africa.
But thus far----
Senator McCarthy. What are the cultural differences between
Algeria and Egypt? They are considerable, are they not?
Mr. Palmer. They are considerable, yes. There is, of
course, very great, strong Berber influence on the Algerians.
Senator McCarthy. Yes.
Mr. Palmer. They do consider themselves as Arabs, but as a
different type and a different part of the Arab world.
I think there are other factors, too, that led to this
massive Algerian buildup. First of all, the fact they did get a
rather bloody nose in this 1963 conflict with Morocco and also
the fact that the government in Algeria is a military regime,
and the man in power has to be in a position of reasonably
satisfying the military commanders to continue to get their
support.
So that I think the rationale, I think, and the explanation
for all of these things is found in this combination of
factors.
NO AGGRESSIVE INTENTIONS
Now, we do not really think that the present government of
Algeria has any aggressive intentions with respect to either
Morocco or Tunisia.
Senator Hickenlooper. Why are they building up their
military forces?
Mr. Palmer. Well, as I say, I think this is partly an
inheritance of the past from the Ben Bella regime, partly
transformation of their military forces into a more traditional
army. I think it is partly an overreaction to the beating they
took in 1963. I think it is generally part of their suspicions
as a revolutionary regime that somebody may try to take their
revolution away from them. I think it is partly because they
are a military regime in and of themselves.
As I say, we do not really think that Boumedienne--who is
quite different, we think, from Ben Bella--really has any
present intention of taking a crack at either Morocco or
Tunisia, nor do I think that the Moroccans or the Tunisians
really think this is a serious present possibility. But what
worries them very much is the future.
Algeria is still not an entirely stable government by any
means. There is internal dissidence within the country. One
cannot be sure that there may not be further changes within the
country.
Furthermore, about 2,000 Algerians have gone to the Soviet
Union for military training, and although I think there is good
reason to believe that not too many of these have been
indoctrinated, nevertheless it may well be and could easily be
that a number of them have been. In the event that there was a
change of government, and given this huge military machine that
is being built up, this is what really concerns the Moroccans
and the Tunisians and has caused them to look to their own
weaknesses and to come to us in terms of assistance.
There is, of course, always the danger in the meanwhile,
too, that there may be a mishap. The border between Morocco and
Algeria is, of course, a disputed border. There has been
trouble there in the past, but since 1963--and particularly
since Boumedienne came to power--they have usually found a
peaceful means of reconciling their differences.
Moreover, the OAU, the Organization of African Unity, has
set up a commission to try to deal with this problem and to try
to bring about a reconciliation between the two. I think this
has had a deterrent and helpful effect in minimizing the
possibility of mishaps.
CONDITION OF THE MOROCCAN KING
Nevertheless, the problem of an arms race is very much
there. As you are all aware, I know, when the King of Morocco
was here very recently, he did again reiterate to us a request
that he had made some months before, which we had tried to
resist at that time, for further defensive weapons. At the time
we were resisting, of course, the full extent of the Algerian
buildup was not clear, but in view of the intervening period
and greater clarity about the extent and the quality of this
buildup, we felt that there were legitimate defensive
requirements.
Senator Hickenlooper. It seems I saw a story in the paper
that he had a heart attack just recently.
Mr. Palmer. I do not believe it was a heart attack. This is
Bourguiba, I think, that you are talking about.
Senator Hickenlooper. No, both of them.
Mr. Palmer. Well----
Senator Hickenlooper. The story I saw.
Mr. Palmer. In Hassan's case, I do not think it really can
be characterized as a heart attack. It was apparently a
circulatory ailment, and they say it was short of a heart
attack but enough to constitute a warning, so----
Senator Symington. It was an attack on the blood that did
not reach the heart.
Senator Hickenlooper. Only the red corpuscles.
Senator Symington. They do not believe in integration.
[Laughter.]
A FIVE-YEAR PROGRAM
Mr. Palmer. So this is essentially the program that we have
at the present time. We have agreed to sell $14 million worth
of arms to the Moroccans. The Tunisians have also made requests
on us for additional assistance to build up a minimal deterrent
force in Tunisia. Their armed forces are extremely weak at the
present time. At their request, we have under study a program
of about $25 million spread over five years, to build their
armed forces up to give them a minimal, as I say, deterrent.
We have only committed ourselves to one year's tranche of
this, the first year for $5 million.
Senator Symington. You say ``tranche,'' that lovely little
word. You give them five years to draw on.
Mr. Palmer. No, we have only said that we would supply them
$5 million worth of equipment this year.
Senator Symington. What is the tranche aspect of that?
Mr. Palmer. Well, as I said, it is a five-year program, but
the only thing we are committed to is the first year of that at
the present time.
Senator Symington. Can I ask a question there?
Senator Hickenlooper. Go ahead. You are chairman.
Senator Symington. When you have a first year commitment
and only agree to come through with the money for the first
year, how do you define the rest of the four years? Semi-
commitment, or is there some tricky word that describes that?
Mr. Palmer. Tranche was perhaps not a good word for me to
use.
Senator Symington. I was not thinking of tranche so much,
but I was thinking of how can you have a five-year agreement if
you only agree to give them the money for one year?
Mr. Palmer. No, we have not got a five-year agreement. We
gave them a report that would provide them with a minimal
defense capability over a period of five years.
Senator Symington. Who made the report?
Mr. Palmer. We did.
Senator Symington. Who is ``we''?
Mr. Palmer. Well, the Department of Defense--Bill, do you
want to speak to this?
Mr. Lang. Yes, Mr. Senator.
MILITARY TEAM IN TUNISIA
A military team went to Tunisia at the request of President
Bourguiba to see what changes or modifications of the Tunisian
armed forces would be needed to give them the best defensive
capability they could have taking into account their limited
resources.
Senator Symington. When was this?
Mr. Lang. This was a year ago last November.
Senator Symington. What was the name of the general who
headed it up?
Mr. Lang. It was not a general, but a colonel by the name
of Clowes.
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, while you were gone I took
the liberty of asking a couple of questions, and I would like
to pursue them a minute.
Senator McCarthy. Go ahead.
Senator Symington. The question was a five-year agreement
with Tunisia, as a result of an investigation made by the
Department of Defense presumably, Mr. Secretary, at the request
of the State Department.
Mr. Palmer. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. By a Colonel Clowes, and he went over
and told Tunisia they need $25 million to have a modern----
Mr. Lang. If I may complete the discussion, Mr. Senator----
Senator Symington. Let me just see if I got it straight up
to this point: at his request we tell him he needs $25 million,
which we are going to give them on the basis of a five-year
agreement. But we only put up the money for the first year, $5
million for the first year; is that right?
Mr. Lang. I think it might be helpful, Senator, to go into
a bit more detail as to what happened to the report.
The study was made, as I said, at the request of President
Bourguiba. Colonel Clowes headed a military team which stayed
in Tunisia about three weeks, prepared a report which was
reviewed by headquarters EUCOM, Commander, European Forces,
also by the Joint Staff, and was endorsed by both.
Colonel Clowes' report made a number of recommendations
that the Tunisians should follow or carry out in reorganizing
their forces, increasing the size of their forces to a
relatively small extent, but also changing the size and
composition of their units.
The report also indicated that Tunisians would need
additional equipment which they could absorb best over a five-
year period. This was not equipment that should be poured in at
one point in time.
PLANES TO LIBYA
Senator Symington. Are you in the State Department or
Department of Defense?
Mr. Lang. I am in the Defense Department.
Senator Symington. Whom do you work for?
Mr. Lang. John McNaughton.
Senator Symington. You work for Mr. McNaughton.
Mr. Lang. Yes.
Senator Symington. You also sold some planes to Libya, have
you not?
Mr. Lang. Not as yet, sir.
Senator Symington. But you plan to.
Mr. Lang. The negotiations will be begun fairly shortly.
Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. I thought we decided we were going to
sell F-5s to Libya.
Mr. Lang. The decision has been pretty much made, but the
negotiations not.
Senator McCarthy. Is this part of a general strategic plan
for North Africa? I mean Tunisia and Libya?
Mr. Lang. When you speak of a strategic plan, sir----
Senator McCarthy. What you have recommended for Tunisia,
did you conduct the same kind of study in Libya and make these
recommendations?
Mr. Lang. No. The Libyan sales agreement is not the result
of a survey team report.
Senator Symington. What is it the result of?
Mr. Lang. The request of the Libyan government, sir.
Senator Symington. You see, some of the people in the
Department of Defense were very glad this committee was getting
into this because they did not know what was going on
themselves. So by golly, if people in your own building do not
know, then I think we are entitled to find out. I say this with
great respect, but it gets pretty complicated. At any rate, Mr.
Chairman, would it be in order, as long as we are discussing
the north littoral of Africa, that you give us a report on what
you plan in Libya?
Mr. Lang. Fine, sir. We have completed the discussion, I
take it, on Tunisia.
Senator Symington. No. I think they are all together.
Exactly. What you are doing on Libya, the information that was
volunteered to my office was that you had agreed to sell the F-
5's to Libya. So I would like to find out whether the
information I got from Mr. McNaughton's department is correct.
Would you check that out and let me know?
Mr. Lang. Yes. I can recount now.
Senator Symington. No, that is all right, but it seems to
me you said we were planning on doing it. I understand we have
done it, so I would like to have that point checked for the
record and we can supply that.
On Tunisia, as I understand, there is a team in Tunisia; in
Morocco, I have been listening to----
I am almost through, Mr. Chairman. I just want to try to
understand. We are running right across here now. It looks like
Rommel. We are moving right over here now to get this thing
organized.
ROLE OF THE FRENCH
The Algerians, when de Gaulle let them go, were French
citizens; were they not? Is that correct?
Mr. Lang. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. Algerians were French citizens before
their independence.
Mr. Palmer. Yes.
Senator McCarthy. They were eligible for French
citizenship.
Senator Symington. I think they actually were.
Senator Hickenlooper. Part of Metropolitan France.
Mr. Palmer. The northern departments were part of
Metropolitan France.
Senator Symington. My last question or group of questions:
We are discussing what has been done in Morocco; we will skip
Algeria for the moment anyway. We are discussing what is being
done in Tunisia. We are discussing--what is being done in
Libya. Have we discussed with the French at the diplomatic
level what we are doing in the north littoral of Africa?
Mr. Palmer. Yes, we have. They are aware----
Senator Symington. Are they aware of what we are doing in
Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya?
Mr. Palmer. I think they understand the reasons for it. Of
course, their relationships with Morocco are not good at the
present time. They have not been good with Tunisia although
they are improving, and I think the French have been
understanding of the reasons why we have given assistance to
these countries.
Senator Symington. How are they with Libya?
Mr. Palmer. So far as Libya is concerned, I do not think
they have professed any interest in this.
Senator Symington. How about Algeria?
Mr. Palmer. Well, of course we have not been giving
assistance to Algeria.
Senator Symington. I just wondered what their relationship
with Algeria was.
Mr. Palmer. Oh, I see. Their relationships are clouded by a
number of financial problems at the present time. They have not
had since independence much of a military relationship with
Algeria, although they are now resuming the training of
Algerians at St. Cyr, which is the beginning of a renewed
French interest. They have sat back--we have thought somewhat
too much--and watched this Soviet buildup going on. We have
talked to them very frankly about it.
They have professed not to be concerned about it. I have
talked several times in the Quai about this myself. The last
time I talked in January, I had a feeling they were becoming
increasingly concerned about it.
FRENCH OPINION OF AMERICAN POLICY
Senator Symington. One final question. I do not want to
take too much time, Mr. Chairman. I would just like to get sort
of the package feel of this part of the world.
You say the French have understood what we are doing. Well,
I understand what we are doing, I think, especially after the
testimony. At least I understood most of what we are doing, but
do they agree to this? Do they think we are following the sound
course there? Do they approve of our arming Morocco, Tunisia,
and Libya against Algeria?
Mr. Palmer. I am not aware of any objections that they have
interposed. Are you Bill?
Mr. Lang. No.
Senator Symington. Are they putting anything up themselves
in order to help along a little bit? It is closer to them than
it is to us.
Mr. Palmer. If I can say, Senator, I would like to come
back to the Tunisian one again, too, because, as I said, we
have encouraged the Tunisians to look elsewhere for assistance
as well. We would like to spread this. We do not want to become
the sole suppliers, and so forth, and the Tunisians are talking
to both the French and the Turks. We are hopeful that they may
obtain assistance in those directions.
We would hope very much, too, the Moroccan-French
relationships would improve to the point that the French would
find it possible to do more in Morocco as well.
Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
SOVIET INFLUENCE
Senator McCarthy. Mr. Palmer, I do not know if you can do
this under two or three general concepts, but do you look upon
the arms buildup down there primarily as kind of a North
African problem, probably psychological and traditional and at
least contained in the North African context? Egypt, Algeria,
Morocco--I believe this is the old game they have played for a
long time. You are just using slightly more sophisticated
instruments of war instead of horses and rifles.
Mr. Palmer. I would say so, yes.
Of course what is giving it an alarming dimension are the
types of equipment that the Algerians are acquiring.
Now we have got a similar sort of situation, of course, in
the horn of Africa where again the Soviets are building up the
Somalia forces in that area. This again gives us concern,
although there, of course, the disparities are on Ethiopia's
side, but of course Ethiopia is a much larger and more complex
country.
The question that arises is what the Soviet motivations are
in all of this. I think they are probably the obvious ones of
influence. I think it may also suit their purposes very well to
create pressures on the adjoining states. This is one reason we
have been so anxious to minimize U.S. supply of arms to the
adjoining states so that they will not fall in the trap, and
they recognize the trap here, too, I think.
Senator McCarthy. What do the Algerians give in exchange
for arms or the people in Somaliland?
Mr. Palmer. I am sorry, sir.
Senator McCarthy. What do they give in exchange for Soviet
arms? Are these pretty much grants? The Algerians do not have
much, do they?
Mr. Palmer. I think in the case of Algeria it is half.
Mr. Lang. It is either half and half or two-thirds, two-
thirds cash. When I say cash, credit, two-thirds credit and
one-third grant.
Senator McCarthy. How about Somalia? They do not have
anything, do they?
Mr. Lang. I think perhaps the terms are roughly the same.
We do not have really too much information on the terms.
Senator Hickenlooper. What kind of credit is it? This
credit that is used is a loose term. And the cash, what kind of
credit? Is that foreign exchange, acceptable foreign exchange,
international foreign exchange such as dollars? What is the
credit?
Mr. Lang. It may be barter arrangements, sir. As I
mentioned earlier, Senator, we really do not have that much
hard information about the terms of the agreement between the
Soviets and the Algerians.
Senator McCarthy. They do not have much to give in
exchange, do they?
Mr. Palmer. Somalia does not.
Senator McCarthy. Somalia does not have anything.
Mr. Palmer. Algeria has somewhat more because there is a
considerable amount of petroleum.
Senator Hickenlooper. They get exchange out of oil.
Mr. Palmer. Yes.
Senator McCarthy. But the Russians do not need that kind of
oil.
Mr. Palmer. No, but it does in hard currencies.
WHEELUS AIR BASE
Senator McCarthy. What about the overall strategic plans?
You said we made a study in Tunisia and made these
recommendations. Is this simply in terms of this North African
complex or do our recommendations there and our concessions
with reference to Libya involve somewhat more comprehensive
strategic planning than just this self-contained North African
complex?
Mr. Palmer. Well, in the case of Tunisia, of course, we are
interested in stability in the area. We are interested in the
very prowestern orientation of Tunisia. Bourguiba has been
extremely courageous in speaking out on a great many political
issues of importance to us. He supported us on Vietnam. He has
taken a very forward stance. This put him at odds with the rest
of the Arab world with respect to the Arab-Israel conflict, and
he has stood for a great deal in Africa and the Middle East.
In the case of Libya, of course, our interests there are
much more direct. We do have an extremely important facility
there in Wheelus.
Senator Symington. What is important about the Wheelus
airbase?
Mr. Palmer. In the Wheelus airbase?
Senator McCarthy. Is it just a base or is it more than
that?
Senator Symington. I have been there, and I would like to
hear the modern version.
Mr. Palmer. As the Senator knows, the importance of the
facility right now, it is supporting all of our U.S. NATO-
committed air forces in Europe, in terms of year-round gunnery
training.
Senator Symington. So if we decided to reduce our forces in
Germany, for example, that would reduce the need for the Air
Force base, would it not, at Wheelus, because that is where
they do the staging?
Mr. Palmer. In terms of the percentage that it would be
used, but you would still have the requirement of forces in
Europe that would need that type of facility.
Senator McCarthy. Fleet support, in the Mediterranean.
Mr. Palmer. No, these are basically in support of the U.S.
Air Force units in Europe.
Senator McCarthy. Is that right?
Senator Symington. In other words, as I got the story when
I was in Germany, Wheelus was very important because they could
fly to Wheelus and fly around the desert when the weather would
not let them fly in Germany.
Mr. Palmer. Precisely.
Senator Symington. You wonder, inasmuch as the weather in
England is not as good as Germany, why they built about the
greatest air force in the world in their day, but I suppose it
is more comfortable this way.
Senator McCarthy. When they decided peace will stay for a
while, they decided to establish places in good climates.
Senaor Symington. The thought occurs to me very seriously
to see it all ties in together if you are going to maintain
this picture over there, keeping these troops in Germany to the
extent that we are keeping them and not following what
President Eisenhower recommended years ago, pulling a lot of
them out, and to the degree that you do not pull them out,
Wheelus is important.
When we had the staging base complex, which was long before
the intercontinental ballistic missile, then these bases were
terribly important. They were militarily important. Now I
understand you say they are logistically important, but if
there is nothing over there to support, then they become
relatively unimportant. Is that not correct?
Mr. Lang. If there were no forces in Europe to support.
Senator Symington. Right. And we have spent a good many
hundred million dollars in Spain where we are behind the
Pyrenees. The bases there are great and the weather is just
about as good. The bases are better as a whole; more bases
there than one base at Wheelus and so forth.
So this really ties into the whole operation over there.
THE PRIMARY THREATS
I would like to ask this question: Based on what you are
saying about Somaliland, and what we really are doing is, Mr.
Chairman, we are arming all the countries that we think are for
us in case they get attacked by Somalia or Algeria--or the UAR,
of course--that is about the long and short of it, is it not?
Mr. Palmer. What we are hoping there to do is to assure a
minimal defensive posture.
Senator Symington. Let me repeat my question.
We are arming these countries in order to help them defend
themselves in case they are attacked by Somalia, Algeria, or
the UAR. Is that not correct?
Mr. Palmer. Those are the primary threats to them, yes.
Senator Symington. Or anybody else that wants to attack
them.
Mr. Palmer. Yes. That is correct.
Senator Symington. Even France.
Mr. Palmer. Yes, sir. But when we say arming them, Senator,
I would like to point out that we have held back and held down
very much the quantities of arms that we have made available to
these countries.
Senator Symington. We are only arming------
Mr. Palmer. To assure that they were minimal just to give
them a deterrent capability, a defense capability so they would
not be overrun before the matter could get to the U.N.
OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT
Senator Symington. How do you know whether an F-5 airplane,
which is a supersonic fighter and extremely able, can be used
offensively or defensively? That is what I do not understand.
Do you have anything in the contract that says the plane cannot
go out of Tunisia?
Mr. Lang. All of the military assistance agreements, sir,
do specify that the equipment will be used only for internal
security or self-defense.
Senator Symington. Well, suppose they figured they were
pretty confident that Libya was going to, that Algeria was
going to attack them. Does the contract say they cannot attack
Algeria unless Algeria attacks them?
Mr. Lang. Self-defense, sir, usually means that you are
attacked first.
Senator Symington. Well, I know, but you are going to arm
all these countries, and every time that happens we end up in a
war.
SOVIET ARMS IN ALGERIA
Mr. Lang. Senator, it may be helpful to give some
dimensions to the Soviet buildup or the buildup of Soviet arms
in Algeria.
Senator Symington. I will tell you what I wish you would do
for the record, Mr. Chairman, if it is in order.
I wish you would give the details of the agreements and the
wording of the agreements, if that is agreeable.
Senator McCarthy. That would be fine. Also, if we could get
a kind of total really as to what the Soviet has in this area
in contrast with what we have got here.
Mr. Lang. Would you care for some of that now, sir? I have
some of the statistics.
Mr. Palmer. I think it would help.
Senator McCarthy. I think it would. I do not know, maybe
you ought to swing it on around what we have got in other Arab
countries. So far as Egypt is concerned, it plays both ways,
does it not?
Mr. Lang. Let me speak briefly, sir, to the buildup in
Algeria and compare it to what the Tunisians and the Moroccans
now have.
Senator McCarthy. All right.
Mr. Lang. In the case of Algeria and Morocco, the size of
the armies are not too far apart; Morocco about 50,000 and
Algeria 60,000. The Tunisians have 18,000.
In terms of tanks, the Moroccans have 75. The Algerians
have 429. The Tunisians have 17.
In terms of artillery, the Moroccans have 191. Algeria 681.
I do not have the statistics for Tunisia.
Armored vehicles, Morocco 120. Algeria 535.
Jet bombers, IL-28s. Algeria 27. I think close to 30 now,
and we think they are going to 36. Morocco, none at all.
Algeria, 97 Migs including the Mig-21 series.
Senator Symington. How many?
Mr. Lang. At least 25 or more.
Senator McCarthy. Twenty-five of the 21s.
Mr. Lang. That is right. There are 97 Migs in total.
Senator Symington. Any SU-7s?
Mr. Lang. No, sir. The Moroccans now have a grand total of
13 aircraft, nine of which are Migs. You recall the Soviets had
a program in Morocco in the late fifties and early sixties, so
this is the type of imbalance that exists in Morocco.
AN ADEQUATE DEFENSE AGAINST ALGERIA
Senator Symington. I would like to make this comment on the
basis of that plus the figures you have given like $25 million.
It is just a spit in the ocean what you are doing so far as
giving them an adequate defense against Algeria, especially if
the Soviets continue to build up in Algeria. Is that not a fair
statement?
Mr. Lang. The objective, Mr. Senator, is to give the
Moroccans and the Tunisians a defense capability which they
could employ taking into full account the advantages they have,
given their defensive terrain, which would enable them to hold
a major thrust for a period of some days until the U.N. or
another international body could consider the problem.
Senator Symington. Let me be straight on this, because I do
not think there is anything more important in our foreign
policy than what we are discussing today. It certainly has been
an awfully ignorant subject around the Armed Services
Committee.
I do not know how much the Foreign Relations Committee
knew, but we knew little or nothing about it on the Armed
Services Committee. Are you saying that with these amounts that
we are giving these countries that over a period of days or
weeks, whatever is necessary, that they would defend themselves
against the buildup in Algeria that you have just told us
about.
Mr. Lang. It is the judgment of the Joint Staff, sir, that
with the type of equipment and the quantities which we have
been speaking of, that the Moroccans and the Tunisians would be
able to hold against an Algerian thrust for a period of days.
Senator Symington. For how long?
Mr. Lang. This would vary, sir, where the attack would take
place. The minimum estimates are four to seven days.
Senator Symington. So we are giving them four to seven days
of hold until we can get to the United Nation. Is that it?
Mr. Lang. Yes.
Mr. Palmer. Until they can get to the U.N.
Senator Symington. When you say the Joint Staff, you mean
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Mr. Palmer. The joint organization which supports the Joint
Chiefs. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. And these are the figures they have
approved now to make it possible for these countries to defend
themselves against Algeria, is that correct?
Mr. Palmer. Yes.
Senator Symington. Thank you.
Senator Hickenlooper. What is the comparative strength in
hardware between Algeria and Morocco?
Mr. Lang. If I can just----
Senator Hickenlooper. As of now as against the time when
the Algerians were not successful against the Moroccans.
Mr. Lang. I do not have the statistics, Senator, with me,
but I would say----
Senator Hickenlooper. I mean the balance. Is the balance
about the same now as it was then?
Mr. Lang. No, because the Soviet buildup has taken place in
Algeria since 1964. There have been large--huge quantities of
arms going into Algeria from '64 through the present.
Senator Hickenlooper. Thanks.
COMMITMENT TO TUNISIA
Mr. Palmer. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I can clarify just
one other statement that related to Senator Symington's summing
up. We do not have a five-year commitment to Tunisia. What we
have given the Tunisians in response to their request is a
report that is based upon a five-year buildup of the Tunisian
armed forces. The only thing that we have committed ourselves
to is one year's assistance to them, and, as I say, we have
encouraged them to look to other countries to assist in
supplying equipment for the remainder.
Now, that is not to say we would not do something more in
subsequent years. But I just wanted to make that clear. We do
not a have a five-year commitment to Tunisia at the present
time.
NO DEFENSE PACT
Senator McCarthy. Mr. Palmer, could I ask, back eight or
ten years ago when we were bent on working out treaties like
CENTO and SEATO, there was some talk about an African
arrangement of some kind, as a kind of a southern tier which
would have involved what, Ethiopia, Libya, and kind of close
off Egypt, the Sudan. I think we were talking about that. Is
that idea still around?
Mr. Palmer. No. The idea is not current, Mr. Chairman, at
the present time, and I think that the nonaligned posture of
all of these countries----
Senator McCarthy. No plans for the Sudan then at the
present time.
Mr. Palmer. No, sir.
Senator Hickenlooper. What were you about to say about the
nonaligned posture?
Mr. Palmer. I think the nonaligned posture of these
countries would not make such a defense arrangement possible,
even if we wanted to assume additional obligations which we
have not wanted to in that context, in that area.
Senator McCarthy. Frank, I do not know whether we need to
press this North Africa.
Senator Carlson. I have been very interested in this. I
just see a picture on this map, and I can see these countries
where the Soviet Union has been building up. I can see also
where we have our military posture.
It gets back to when, I think it was Secretary Rusk was
before our committee, he talked about the balancing of arms
between nations. In other words, if one country got a little
ahead, it was our policy to build up the neighbors. I do not
know how far we can go. Maybe we should be going more
extensively than we are, I do not know. It is a problem.
Mr. Palmer. Well, it is a difficult problem, Senator. We do
not want to see them lose their independence. At the same time,
we do not want to see them dissipate resources that should be
going into economic development, and I should add to that that
the countries themselves do not want to. Both Bourguiba and
Hassan have given very high priority to their economic
development programs, but both of them do feel that this
imbalance does threaten their security.
COMPARISON TO VIETNAM WAR
Senator Symington. Let me ask this question, if I may.
Mr. Palmer. Yes.
Senator Symington. You have heard of the Vietnam war.
Mr. Palmer. Yes, sir.
Senator Symington. And we put in heaven knows what, great
tens of millions of dollars, and the people supplying the Viet
Cong have put in not even a small fraction of what we have put
in money and equipment. For example, they put in no air forces
at all really to speak of, except in North Vietnam. They have
nothing in South Vietnam.
If these people want to be independent down here, is it
necessary for us to supply them with these--with all this
equipment? Is there not a little Viet Cong in their hearts,
too, that they want to be independent and they are willing to
fight and die for what they think is right in those countries?
Mr. Palmer. I think there is that feeling, but I think that
they feel that they need a minimal capability in order to do
this. I think what we have been supplying, Senator, is a pretty
minimal capability.
Senator Symington. If we want to support the regimes in
this country, for example, as I have told the full committee
already and the Armed Services Committee, the biggest shock I
think I have ever had in armaments is the degree of the
armament of the United Arab Republic by the Soviets.
I was just in Cairo a few weeks ago, and I was surprised
the same before. They have tremendously increased their arms. I
do not think there is any remote chance if they made an all-out
attack there that anybody has the ability to defend themselves.
I would stake that on everything I have learned, assuming they
can operate the equipment.
If we are going to arm these people, and we have got a much
bigger gross national product that the Defense Department is
always talking about and justifying the budget, why do we not
really arm them?
I am only asking. Why just give them a little minimum
business to make them last a few days and then go down the
mine?
Mr. Palmer. Of course that involves a lot of recurrent
costs, Senator, that we had thought that our best posture here
was to give them a minimum capability. That is the best
judgment of our people. They should place their real reliance
on the United Nations.
EVALUATING THE EGYPTIAN BUILDING
Senator McCarthy. How do you evaluate the Egyptian buildup,
Mr. Palmer, and the Algerian one? Is this the Soviets showing
off and saying ``These are our friends,'' and saying ``Look
what we give to them''?
Mr. Palmer. Yes, I think that is a large element.
Senator McCarthy. They do not anticipate they will be used.
Mr. Palmer. Yes, I think it is a large element.
Senator McCarthy. So we take a calculated risk that this
power will not be brought into action, or, if it is, why we can
hold long enough for the U.N. to take some action.
Mr. Palmer. Yes.
Senator McCarthy. Is the U.N. concerned about this? Is
there any special action there?
Mr. Palmer. Yes. I started to say that King Hassan, when he
was last here in the United States, did have a talk with the
Secretary General of the United Nations in which he followed up
with a letter asking the Secretary General to intervene with
both Morocco and Algeria to see if it would not be possible to
reach some sort of an understanding to hold the level of
armaments down.
I would have to say in all confidence that I do not think
that this was handled as skillfully as it should have been by
the Moroccans because before the Secretary General had an
opportunity to explore this at all with the Algerians, where
the Moroccans published the letter, and this inevitably
resulted in a reaction from the Algerians who have taken the
position that there are a number of differences between the two
of them.
It is not only the level of armaments, but there is the
question of the disputed border. The disputed border is in the
hands of the O.A.U., and therefore----
Senator Symington. O.A.U.?
Mr. Palmer. Organization of African Unity, which is the
continental organization of African states. And that,
therefore, they did not think the United Nations was a proper
place for this.
We have been hopeful nevertheless, that at some point, if
it is not in the U.N. forum maybe in the O.A.U. forum or some
other forum, that some means can be found of trying to reach
some sort of an agreement, some sort of an accommodation with
respect to levels of forces, not only in this area but in the
area of the Horn.
But it will not be an easy thing to bring about or to
encourage.
Senator McCarthy. Well, I think maybe for today we probably
ought to leave this stand as it is. A request has been made for
additional information which I am sure you will supply.
CASH AND CREDIT
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one thing more,
just for a minute?
What are the terms of the deal with Morocco and what are
the terms of the deal from the standpoint of what Senator
Hickenlooper was referring to? We talk about credit. Could we
have the details of the deal language?
Mr. Palmer. Fine, sir.
Senator Symington. As to what we agree to take in the way
of credit terms and how much cash is involved and whether we
are using counterpart funds and whether the loans, if they have
any incident to the materials, bear an interest rate and if so
how much?
Mr. Palmer. I can give you details on the Moroccan
arrangement now, sir.
Senator Symington. You go right ahead and put it in the
record if you want, because the Chairman would like to go.
Mr. Palmer. The Moroccan package, 1965, involved 12 F-5s,
spare parts and AGE, totaled $11 million.
Senator Hickenlooper. What? How much?
Mr. Palmer. $11 million, sir.
Senator Hickenlooper. Thank you.
Mr. Palmer. Of that $11 million, the United States made a
grant for components of $5 million; $6 million is extended in
credit. Terms, 3 percent, ten years, repayable in hard
currency, 20 semiannual payments of the same size, sir.
Senator Symington. And Tunisia?
Mr. Palmer. Tunisia the negotiations have not been
completed, sir.
Senator Symington. And Libya?
Mr. Palmer. Libya the negotiations have not started, sir.
Senator Symington. Thank you.
SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA
Senator McCarthy. Do you want to start on South Africa with
a statement or just a question? Do you want to give us a kind
of review on that Rhodesian sanction problem and where it is
leading and what we really have in mind?
Senator Hickenlooper. South Africa, if I may interject--
first I would like to have an explanation for the fiasco of the
Enterprise or whatever it was in Johannesburg or in Capetown.
Mr. Palmer. Capetown.
Senator Hickenlooper. To me that is the most unconscionable
thing we have done in a long time. I would like to have an
explanation that makes me feel more kindly toward our own
people for pulling that kind of a thing down there.
Mr. Palmer. Well, as you know, Senator, in 1965 the
aircraft carrier Enterprise was due to put in to South Africa
for refueling.
Senator Hickenlooper. 1965?
Mr. Palmer. Yes, just to give a piece of background on
this.
At that time, the government of the Republic of South
Africa imposed certain racial restrictions on certain
operational aspects of the visit.
Senator Hickenlooper. They did that at the time the visit
was proposed.
Mr. Palmer. Yes, in 1965.
Senator Hickenlooper. At the time the visit was proposed.
Mr. Palmer. Yes.
Senator Hickenlooper. That is right.
Mr. Palmer. Specifically they required that the flight
crews that would be operating planes from the ship to shore and
so forth would have to be subject to South Africa's apartheid
regulations.
Senator Hickenlooper. I understand that.
Mr. Palmer. As a result of that, a decision was made at
that time not to put Enterprise in, but to refuel at sea.
This year or last year, when the question of the FDR
transiting from Vietnam to the United States came up, the
Department of Defense took the position that there was an
operational need to go into Capetown for refueling at that
time.
I believe, and Mr. Lang can confirm this, that there were
Atlantic maneuvers going on at the present time and tankers
were not readily available to refuel at sea. Moreover, there
would have been a cost of some $250,000, I think, to refuel at
sea.
Now, at that time we made inquiries of the South African
Government as to whether or not they would impose racial
restrictions with respect to the operational aspects of the FDR
visit.
Senator Hickenlooper. Operational aspects. What do you mean
by operational?
Mr. Palmer. Flights from the carrier to the shore.
Senator Symington. What about those flights? What is the
apartheid significance of those flights?
Mr. Palmer. That they would have had to go into South
African airports, airfields, and so forth, and that any crews
on board, if there were Negroes on board, would have to use the
African facilities and would not be allowed to use the white
European facilities.
SOUTH AFRICA'S APARTHEID POLICIES
Mr. Lang. If I might, in '65, the South African Government
in effect placed a condition on us that we could not have Negro
crew members aboard the aircraft coming from the carrier to the
airfield facilities.
Senator McCarthy. Oh, the problem did not arise.
Mr. Lang. Because they did not have the apartheid
facilities for them.
Mr. Palmer. Yes.
In any event, on the basis of those assurances that they
would not attach such conditions, the FDR was authorized to go
in. But shore leave was only authorized on the basis that it
would be for integrated activities, and quite a range of
integrated activities had been worked out by our embassy down
there and with various people in the community.
The commanding officer of the vessel, however, felt--and
there many other arrangements that were worked out by local
citizens and so forth that would have been segregated.
Under the circumstances it was decided that shore leave
would only be authorized on the basis of integrated activities.
The commander of the ship, with the concurrence of our
ambassador, felt that this was not really practicable and that
he could not give--if he authorized shore leave on this basis,
one could not be sure that certain members of the crew would
not be subject to South Africa's apartheid laws. Consequently,
he decided, with the ambassador's concurrence, to cancel shore
leave.
A CALCULATED INSULT
Senator Hickenlooper. Therefore, it seems all the blame for
this--the buck is being passed to the commander of the vessel.
I have had some information from South Africa, not only
from Americans but others, who said that some of the newspaper
stories said it was an absolute and astounding surprise to
these people who went on board to welcome them to find out,
when they went on board for the first time, the commander of
the vessel had to tell them that all leaves would be canceled.
That was after several days of preparation, several days of
discussion, several days when the arrangements were made.
I do not care whether they landed at South Africa or not,
or went into Capetown. That is beside the point. But to go
through all of this and then do what to me appears to be--and I
would like to be straightened out on it--a calculated insult to
South Africa. I think it has all the earmarks of an actually
calculated insult.
Mr. Palmer. No, sir. It was not a calculated insult. I can
assure you categorically.
Senator Hickenlooper.. It has that appearance to me.
Mr. Palmer. Senator, the problem arose from the fact, I
think, that the instructions were sent to the captain of the
vessel. I do not think the captain of the vessel should be
blamed. I certainly do not blame him--pretty much at the last
minute.
Senator Hickenlooper. I thought you said it was his
decision.
Mr. Palmer. It was his decision.
Senator Hickenlooper. What were the instructions sent to
him?
Mr. Palmer. But I think what gave rise to his problem,
Senator, was the fact that it was rather late notification to
him that the crews should only go ashore under integrated
circumstances, and he felt that this was too difficult. He felt
that this was impossible really to carry out.
Senator McCarthy. So they never told him not to put them
ashore, but merely told him if they go ashore they would have
to be integrated.
Mr. Palmer. That is correct. They could only go ashore for
integrated activities.
REACTION TO THE CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION
Senator McCarthy. Why was that order so late in coming?
Senator Hickenlooper. That is the point.
Senator McCarthy. Was it after the congressional resolution
or whatever it was that was introduced up here? What set if
off? Anything in particular, or was it just slow in coming
downtown?
Mr. Palmer. Well, Bill, do you want to say anything?
I think it was--I am trying to reconstruct something that
took place while I was not here. As a matter of fact, I was
overseas.
Senator McCarthy. There was an earlier incident similar to
this. There was a congressional protest against landing.
Mr. Palmer. There is no doubt about it.
Senator McCarthy. Two or three years ago.
Mr. Palmer. Yes.
Senator Hickenlooper. That is what he was talking about.
Mr. Palmer. There is no doubt about it.
Senator Hickenlooper. The Enterprise.
Mr. Palmer. There was a lot of concern expressed in this
country about the possibility of men who had been fighting
together in Vietnam being placed in a position of then having
to subject themselves to the practices of apartheid in South
Africa. And, as I say, the decision that they should only go
ashore on an integrated basis was a rather last minute
decision. It put the captain, there is no doubt about it, in a
difficult position. He had a judgment to make. He made it with
the concurrence of our ambassador.
Senator Symington. Could I ask a question why this was not
thought out before?
Senator Hickenlooper. That is the whole burden of my
concern about this thing.
Mr. Palmer. Well, there were two things: there was this
aspect of it; and there was the operational aspect of it. The
fact that the tankers were not available; the fact that there
was a considerable sum of money involved here in refueling at
sea.
Senator Hickenlooper. But if you say it cost $250,000 not
to refuel there, have you figured out what it cost as a result
of what we did, aside from what the cost in good will was?
Mr. Palmer. No, sir.
Senator Hickenlooper. You might get that up sometime.
Where did we ultimately end up by refueling?
Mr. Palmer. We refueled there, but the crew was kept on
board.
Senator Hickenlooper. So we saved the money.
Mr. Palmer. So we saved the money. Yes, sir.
Senator Hickenlooper. And set back relations between our
two countries and the possibility of settling the apartheid
business by several years, I think.
Mr. Palmer. Well, we are now reviewing, as we have
indicated, the whole question of port facilities in South
Africa.
DIVERSION OF OTHER SHIPS
As you know, subsequent to that, we did divert another
vessel to Mombasa while this review is going on. We are
undertaking this with the Department of Defense and will be
reaching some policy decision.
Senator Symington. Where is Mombasa?
Mr. Palmer. In Kenya, Senator.
Senator Symington. If you could divert one to Kenya without
any danger of trouble, why could you not divert the Enterprise
to Kenya?
Mr. Palmer. The FDR?
Senator Symington. Or the FDR.
Mr. Lang. The port facilities were not adequate, sir, to
handle a ship the size of the FDR.
Senator Symington. It was the size of the ship.
Mr. Lang. Yes, the draft of the vessel.
Senator Symington. Could you not run a line out, keep her
in deep enough water to refuel it? You do not have to bring a
ship to port to refuel it.
Mr. Lang. They do not have that type of facilities in
Mombasa, sir.
Senator Symington. I see.
PROMOTING BETTER UNDERSTANDING
Senator Hickenlooper. Well, I still do not know. I still
say that my whole inquiry goes not to the point that we did not
have them land at Capetown. It is the fact that for days ahead
of time they made arrangements, I am told by people who were on
the ground down there. They said the South Africans had bunting
and welcome groups.
Mr. Palmer. That is correct; they did.
Senator Hickenlooper. It was going to be a great thing for
them. And the idea around in that area was that this would do
more to get a little better understanding between South Africa
and the U.S. They tried to treat the colored people right, and
they would not isolate them off in compounds and all this sort
of stuff. Yet they just had a wet sock thrown in their faces,
not the day before or the morning before, but at the time when
they went on board the carrier to welcome them. That is the
first time they heard.
Mr. Palmer. That is correct. It happened when some of the
officials were on board.
Senator Hickenlooper. On the deck of the ship.
Mr. Palmer. That is correct.
Senator Hickenlooper. To me it was the most outstandingly
boorish thing I heard of from an international standpoint. In
other words, if they wanted to pass up Capetown or just go in
there to fuel and have it known in advance they were not going
to let anybody have shore leave, that is a matter of decision.
Mr. Palmer. I think all of us would agree, Senator, that
the matter was not handled as well as it should be.
Senator Hickenlooper. I think it is utterly inexcusable,
and I would like to go on a little bit also, if we are all
through asking about it. I do not want to stop this. I want to
go on to Rhodesia and find out some of the things we are doing
in Rhodesia. I did not want to interfere with any other
question.
U.S. FAVORS MAJORITY RULE AND SELF DETERMINATION
Senator McCarthy. That is the same question everybody is
going to ask. I will put it in these terms. Do we have a policy
of our own there, or are we really kind of riding out the
British position now hoping somehow or other this will work
out?
Mr. Palmer. In Rhodesia?
Senator McCarthy. Yes, in South Africa, in that area.
Mr. Palmer. Yes, I think we have very much of a policy of
our own on this, Mr. Chairman.
I think that we have historically stood for certain values
and for certain principles, including majority rule and
including self-determination, including the genuine
independence of states, including government by consent of the
governed.
Senator McCarthy. How do we implement it?
Mr. Palmer. Well, we implement it in such ways as we can.
It is certainly not uniform. Different situations call for
different means of trying to realize these objectives, I think.
Senator McCarthy. We are not prepared to go beyond the
British position, are we, on anything in this area now?
Mr. Palmer. We are not simply prepared to go beyond an
effort to resolve the situation in Rhodesia by peaceful means.
This much is very clear, and we have made this very clear to
everyone concerned, I think, Mr. Chairman.
What we have here is a declaration of independence that has
not been recognized by any country in the world, by those who
represent, say they represent, 220,000 whites in opposition to
4 million Africans. The whole thrust of the British effort in
the negotiations that have gone on now for quite some time is
to try to assure that there will be orderly and sustained
progress toward majority rule.
The British have never said that there must be, or had not
said until after the Tiger talks, that there had to be
immediate majority rule, that there could not be independence
before majority rule. But what they have said is that there
must be an understanding, there must be arrangements that would
assure that there would be unimpeded progress toward majority
rule.
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS
Senator Hickenlooper. Is majority rule more important than
economic and social progress in a country?
Mr. Palmer. I think that they are all important, Senator. I
think that when we have economic and social progress in
Rhodesia, we have it in South Africa. But when it results, I
think, in the denial of the ability of the vast majority of the
inhabitants to be able to have some prospect of being able to
conduct their own affairs, then I think it does become a very
grave moral issue.
Senator Hickenlooper. Are they in any degree----
Mr. Palmer. And political issue.
Senator Hickenlooper. Are they in any way capable of
conducting their own affairs?
Mr. Palmer. No, not at the present time. I want to make
this clear again, Senator, that what we are talking about is
not immediate majority rule, but unimpeded progress toward
majority rule. This has been the issue that has been at stake.
It is not immediate majority rule. Of course there would have
to be a transition period before there was majority rule, and
the question that has been at issue here has been the return to
legality, the return to British rule in a very light sense, to
something akin to the previous arrangements until such time as
it is assured that there will be unimpeded progress toward
majority rule.
Senator Symington. I would like to ask one question on
this, if I might, Mr. Palmer.
U.S. INTERVENTION IN RHODESIAN AFFAIRS
Secretary Acheson had a letter that impressed me a great
deal in the Washington Post in which he said that under the
United Nations Charter, as I remember it--I have not read the
letter for some weeks now--but we had no right to interfere
with the internal affairs of Rhodesia.
Has that letter ever been answered by the State Department?
Mr. Palmer. Ambassador Goldberg answered that letter and I
think answered it very effectively, Senator, in a letter that
he wrote to the Washington Post on January 8.
Senator McCarthy. He used the Civil War, did he not, as the
principal defense?
Mr. Palmer. Ambassador Goldberg?
Senator McCarthy. Yes.
Mr. Palmer. I do not recall.
Senator Symington. Which civil war?
Senator McCarthy. Our Civil War.
Senator Symington. The one in Rhodesia or the one in the
U.S.?
Mr. Palmer. One of Mr. Acheson's main arguments ran, of
course, to Article 27 of the Charter, the Domestic Jurisdiction
clause. Ambassador Goldberg, in replying to this, pointed out
that this is not intervention in the internal affairs of a
state because Rhodesia is not a state. It has not been
recognized as a state by anybody in the international
community.
Senator Symington. Just a rebellious colony.
Mr. Palmer. I am sorry.
Senator Symington. Just a rebellious colony.
Mr. Palmer. Just a rebellious colony.
Senator Symington. Did he quote George III, too?
Senator McCarthy. Secession.
Mr. Palmer. Yes, but at least we were recognized by people
as being an independent nation.
Senator Symington. Not by a lot of people.
Mr. Palmer. Not by a lot, but we were recognized----
Senator Hickenlooper. What would be wrong with us
recognizing Rhodesia?
Mr. Palmer. But we were recognized by quite a number,
Senator, and in this case nobody has recognized Rhodesia.
U.S. AS POLICEMAN OF THE WORLD
Senator Symington. One other question I would like to ask
here. Do you think that the mantle has fallen on the United
States now to be the policeman of the world, of the free world?
Mr. Palmer. To be what?
Senator Symington. To be the policeman of the free world.
Mr. Palmer. No, sir, I do not.
Senator Symington. Do you know of any country that we are
not defending or protecting that is supporting us and our
policies in Vietnam?
Mr. Palmer. Do I know of any country----
Senator Symington. That we are not either defending or
financing that is supporting us in Vietnam? I am just
wondering. I looked the map over and we are apparently taking
on the defense of all these countries with either money or
troops or both. I just wondered if there was any internal paper
that we have not seen like the F-4s to Iran, for example, that
there has been some decision made that we are going to be the
defenders of the free world and that we are going to finance
them as much as possible through various international
organizations and so forth.
Have there been things written on that that is established,
an American policy in this field that we do not know about?
Mr. Palmer. Not that I am aware of, Senator.
Senator Symington. Thank you, sir.
SPECIAL SUPPLY SHIPS
Senator McCarthy. Could I ask on that point, the Senate
Armed Services Committee turned down a proposal for these
special supply ships last week. I think there were three of
them that were being proposed, but the overall plan called for
30. Do you know whether it was planned that any of the 30
should lie adjacent to any of these areas in Africa?
Mr. Palmer. I do not know.
Do you know?
Senator McCarthy. Maybe you would know.
Mr. Lang. No.
Senator McCarthy. You know the ships we are talking about.
Mr. Lang. I do, sir. I know of none that were intended for
the African area.
Senator McCarthy. Are they all related to Europe?
Senator Symington. 30 to Europe?
Senator McCarthy. I understand there were about three ships
to supply a division which would mean ten divisions somewhere
around the world that was going to be supplied when the full
plan--I assume when the full plan became operative, and I am
sure we did not plan to have ten divisions in Europe.
We do not have to press this, but when we were talking 30
ships, was it three to supply a division or was it more than
that?
Mr. Lang. I do not know, sir.
Senator McCarthy. I thought it was three was my
recollection. Was it three or was it more than that?
In any case, they were asking for three, and I assume they
had to supply divisions somewhere because we do not move----
Mr. Palmer. I would like to make it clear in this
connection----
Senator McCarthy. In any case there was no plan to have
these ships lie off the coast of South Africa or Somalia.
Mr. Palmer. No, sir. Our basic policy remains as stated by
Secretary McNamara when he appeared before the Senate Armed
Services Committee and the Senate Subcommittee on the
Department of Defense Appropriations. He said that ``We have
made it clear that our policy is to avoid active military
involvement in Africa, and we will exert all our influence to
achieve peaceful resolution of these problems.''
This remains very much our policy in this part of Africa
and all over the continent. We do not want to get militarily
involved.
SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA
Senator Carlson. Getting back to Rhodesia, press dispatches
and reports from overseas, at least, indicate that the
sanctions of Great Britain are not bringing any results, that
they are going to fail. Have you any plans as to what we should
do if they do fail because we are committed to them?
Mr. Palmer. Well, I do not think it is demonstrable yet,
Senator, that they will fail.
Senator Carlson. I see.
Mr. Palmer. The program of voluntary sanctions that
preceded the program of mandatory sanctions has had
considerable effect. Granted that it is difficult to get good
large figures. Nevertheless, I think the indications are that
exports from Rhodesia dropped from about $400 million to about
$224 million in 1966, which is about a 40 percent drop. It is
expected that under the mandatory sanctions program they will
probably drop another $55 million in the first five months of
this year.
It is estimated that the gross domestic product of Rhodesia
has fallen by about 15 percent in 1966, and there will probably
be a further drop of about 10 percent this year.
I would say the two key products really are tobacco and
sugar. So far as tobacco is concerned, about 60 percent of last
year's crop remains unsold. The government has had to buy this
and has to store it, and this has created considerable
financial strains on the government.
As this year's crop, which is already being reduced as a
result, comes in and does not find a market, this will increase
the pressures.
The hope is, of course, that this will bring the Rhodesian
Government back to the negotiating table again and that it will
be possible to obtain a peaceful resolution of this problem.
Senator Carlson. Are efforts being made to do that?
Mr. Palmer. To negotiate?
Senator Carlson. Bring them back to the negotiating table.
Mr. Palmer. I do not think there are any active efforts
right at the moment, but it is certainly in everybody's mind.
SETTLING RHODESIA MATTER THROUGH THE U.N.
Senator McCarthy. Could I ask Mr. Palmer just on this one
point, Senator Hickenlooper, and I will recognize you next.
Is there any reason why Acheson's position was answered by
Goldberg and not the Secretary of State or the State
Department?
Mr. Palmer. Yes, because I think that the major
argumentation that was adducted by Mr. Acheson really ran to
positions that were taken in the United Nations.
Senator McCarthy. Does it mean we want to try to settle it
through the United Nations rather than by direct intervention?
Mr. Palmer. That is correct.
Senator McCarthy. This does not reflect a division in the
State Department which could not be presented in a statement by
the Secretary?
Mr. Palmer. No, sir. These are positions which Ambassador
Goldberg had taken as our representative.
Senator Hickenlooper. What was the reason given or the
reasons taken by the United Nations in this--granting that
Rhodesia was recognized as a dependency or a colony of
Britain--what business have we got in there in Britain's
internal affairs or the United Nations either?
Mr. Palmer. Well, I think Britain does bear certain
responsibilities to the United Nations under Article 73 of the
Charter with respect to nonself-governing territories, and so
that there is a U.N. interest.
Secondly, the British themselves took the program to the--
--
Senator Hickenlooper. In the first place, Rhodesia was
self-governing for all intents and purposes over the years.
Mr. Palmer. Yes. Was self-governing until such time as it
declared itself independent and at that time, at that point,
the United Kingdom, through orders in council and so forth,
reasserted their authority over the country. So----
DID THE U.S. PRESSURE BRITISH POLICY?
Senator Symington. Always the British all over the world
have been willing to approve the caste system of a country in
order to control it up until they began losing countries. They
have no basic color problem like we have in this country. Were
their policies in Rhodesia originally formulated or developed
under our coaching while the pound was in very serious trouble
as in Henry Brandon's book, ``In the Red,'' for example,
showing how twice we fished them out?
Did we put any pressure on Great Britain with respect to
her policies in Rhodesia, or were they all Mr. Wilson's ideas
as to how they should be handled?
Mr. Palmer. They were not only Mr. Wilson's ideas but his
predecessors, I guess, as well, Senator.
Senator Symington. There has been no pressure on our part.
Mr. Palmer. There has been no pressure on our part. The
whole concept of the Central African Federation, the federation
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, when that still was in being, was a
British concept.
Senator Symington. I am just being educated. I have no
criticism, no implied criticism in any sense.
One other question.
Mr. Palmer. We approved that.
THE STABILITY OF AFRICA
Senator Symington. Do you think, based on your saying in
answer to Senator Hickenlooper it is not going too well, do you
think the British are going to bring Rhodesia to their knees in
due course?
Mr. Palmer. I could not say that with any confidence,
Senator. I think only time is going to prove whether this
happens or not.
Senator Symington. Do you think it would be a good thing
for the stability of Africa if they do?
Mr. Palmer. Yes. I think it would be a good thing if they
came back to constitutional rule.
Senator Hickenlooper. If the Rhodesians came back to
constitutional rule.
Senator Symington. My question was will it bring Rhodesia
to their knees.
Senator Hickenlooper. What do you mean by constitutional
rule?
Mr. Palmer. Not to their knees, Senator. If they came back
into constitutional rule, and if they would agree to guarantees
that would result in unimpeded progress toward majority rule.
Senator Hickenlooper. I do not understand what you mean by
constitutional rule. There was no constitutional rule in
Rhodesia about one-man one-vote business down there at all, was
there?
Mr. Palmer. No, sir.
Senator Hickenlooper. What constitutional rule do you want
them to come back to?
Mr. Palmer. When I say constitutional rule, I mean come
back into their association with Great Britain.
DUAL FRANCHISE IN RHODESIA
Senator Hickenlooper. I see. Well, the only two viable
economies, really progressively developing viable economies in
all of Africa, I do not care where you go, are Rhodesia and
South Africa. It seems to me we are doing everything we can to
alienate them, to discourage them and to discourage their
further development, and I think both of them are trying to
make progress with some success.
They do not have apartheid in Rhodesia by law. They have
franchise, as I understand it, which anybody can qualify for,
black or white. It does not make any difference what it is.
Mr. Palmer. Yes, but it is a dual franchise, Senator,
whereby the Africans can only qualify. In practice the great
bulk of Africans, because of educational and income
qualifications, can only qualify for the B roll.
Senator Hickenlooper. That is right, but when they get the
income and educational qualifications, they qualify just the
same as the white man qualifies with education and income
qualifications. Is that not true?
Mr. Palmer. Yes, they can theoretically, but the
qualifications----
Senator Hickenlooper. I am not talking theoretically, but
legally.
Mr. Palmer. But the qualifications are put pretty high.
Senator Hickenlooper. Well, $300 a year income or something
like that, and certain minimal level of education, and it
really applies to the white man.
I am told that more land in South Africa is owned by blacks
than white, or in Rhodesia, is owned by blacks than white.
Mr. Palmer. It is about evenly divided there.
Senator Hickenlooper. They have a land reform program going
there, and as fast as these people will take the education and
the training, they get land, and so on.
Mr. Palmer. Well, Senator, a lot of these things, I think,
get lost in what the Rhodesians say and in what they do.
MISINFORMATION ABOUT RHODESIA
Senator Hickenlooper. I am not going on what the Rhodesians
say. I am going on what citizens from Iowa who have been down
there say. We have had several of them down there, and some
other places, and the most recent one was a man who is not
connected with government, and not connected with my state, but
has spent a great deal of time in Rhodesia and Zambia. He said
it is just unbelievable the misinformation which we get here in
this country about that situation, and nothing about the
slaughter in Zambia, that is the murders and the mass killings
in Zambia and the revolts there. Also, for instance, he said in
Rhodesia for 60 years the policemen have not carried pistols or
guns. They have got peace there, and people are satisfied. They
are making progress, and yet we kick them in the teeth.
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I have to leave now.
Senator Hickenlooper. I have to, too.
Senator Symington. If the Senator would yield, I would like
to ask a couple of questions.
MILITARY SALES IN AFRICA
Mr. Chairman, if it was in order, I would like to ask
unanimous consent that we have the amount of military sales
and/or gifts that we have made on the continent of Africa in
the last five years. Could we have a listing of that so we get
a feel for it?
Mr. Lang. Certainly, sir.
Senator Symington. That would include such countries as
Nigeria and Liberia; some of it I am sure is small, but I think
it might be interesting to note how it has been handled on that
basis.
Mr. Lang. Fine, sir. This for the past five years?
Senator Symington. We will make it ten years if you want.
That will cover the whole development.
Mr. Lang. Yes, sir.
UNREALISTIC PROGRAMS IN AFRICA
Senator Hickenlooper. I feel we have been undergoing for
some years a calculated and a definite program--I may be wrong
about this--of what we call liberty in Africa which is just as
unrealistic as it can be. But we have it on our hands now, and
all these little tribes with two huts and four yak tails have
gained independence.
Mr. Palmer. Well Senator, there is no doubt about it, the
continent is going through an extremely difficult period.
Senator Hickenlooper. We have to live with it and try to
solve it.
Mr. Palmer. A difficult period of time.
I would like to say, if I could, just in response to
several things that you have said, that I think that there are
black African states also who are making good progress towards
economic development and social development. I think the Ivory
Coast is certainly a good example of this. Tunisia, I think, is
a good example.
Senator Hickenlooper. Well, you cannot say Tunisia is black
Africa. It is Arab.
Mr. Palmer. No. But I am just saying of independent Africa.
Kenya is making good progress.
Senator Hickenlooper. So long as Kenyatta stays in there
maybe we have some hope, but the old man is going to die some
day.
Mr. Palmer. But only a few years ago a lot of the Europeans
in Kenya were saying, ``You know we can never stay in Kenya
because of Kenyatta.'' Now these same people are saying, ``We
are worried about what is going to happen if something happens
to Kenyatta.''
Senator Hickenlooper. Well, we were going to have a great
time in Tanzania with Nyerere, too, but it has gone about as
far left as it can go down the drain and it is a most
disappointing place.
The Congo is a chaos and still is.
Mr. Palmer. Well, Senator, I would like to speak to the
Congo, if I could, because I think there are some encouraging
developments that are taking place.
Senator Hickenlooper. Well, everything is always
encouraging, I realize that, when we are projecting ourselves
into the picture.
Mr. Palmer. No, we have lots of discouraging ones, and I
would be delighted to talk about those, too.
Senator Hickenlooper. Nigeria is having its troubles.
Mr. Palmer. Nigeria is having terrible troubles, and it is
a very anxious situation.
THE BASIS OF U.S. POLICY IS COLOR
Senator Hickenlooper. We are trying to chase the Portuguese
out of Angola, and so far as I can find out the Angolans do not
want them to be chased out. But we may chase them; we may
prevail there.
Mr. Palmer. I think it is very difficult to ascertain what
the Africans want in Angola. It is very difficult to find out.
Senator Hickenlooper. We are going to teach them what they
want. I do not know.
Of course Ethiopia is a great self-determining country. I
think they have one man--one vote there. One man is the
emperor.
Senator McCarthy. I think they only have one vote.
Senator Hickenlooper. One vote, a great ally of ours.
Mr. Palmer. But I think the fundamental difference here is,
Senator, none of the distinctions are drawn on color except
when you get down into this area.
Senator Hickenlooper. I think it is drawn on color. I think
the basis of our policy in Africa is color and probably to
affect American elections.
Mr. Palmer. No.
Senator Hickenlooper. I think there is an awfully lot to
that. I think there is a lot of humanity in what we are trying
to do, too.
Mr. Palmer. There is.
Senator Hickenlooper. I think there is a lot of it, but I
think there is an awfully lot to influence American elections
based on color. Otherwise, there are a lot of things that we
would not need to do if we wanted to really promote these
things on the basis of long-range, sound, progressive policies.
I am not blaming you for this, do not misunderstand that.
HARDENING OF ATTITUDES IN RHODESIA
Mr. Palmer. I would like to send you, Senator, if I may, a
copy of a recent speech that I have given on Rhodesia that
will, I hope, explain some of our concerns about the internal
situation in Rhodesia. I have lived there for two years,
Senator, and I must say I saw just one tremendous gap in what
people professed and what people did, such things as the Land
Apportionment Act. It does divide the land almost equally
between 220,000 whites and 4 million Africans. This is not the
whole story either, because I saw European grazing land being
burned off because of the fact that it was excess to the
grazing requirements, and just across the road saw African
cattle being slaughtered because the land could not support
them.
Now, believe me, I am not a revolutionary on matters of
this kind, and I know perfectly well that there is capital and
skills and so forth that have gone into these European
enterprises that are extremely important to the development of
that country in that part of the world.
To my mind, the important thing in that part of the world
is to try to create an atmosphere that is going to enable the
European to stay there and to continue to play his part in the
development of the country. I think this is vital in South
Africa, too.
But I am convinced, too, Senator, that unless there is more
movement, and again let me emphasize I am not saying immediate
independence by any means----
Senator Hickenlooper. That is what we are moving toward. Is
that not the whole connotation of what we are doing instead of
working along with these people to bring them up to the point
where there will be some responsible government there?
Mr. Palmer. But this is the problem, Senator, in Southern
Rhodesia, that the trend has not been in that direction. The
trend has been entirely in the opposite direction.
If you go back to Garfield Todd when he was prime minister
about eight years ago, ten years ago, I guess it is now, they
were trying to work on a policy of partnership. He was too
liberal for the white Rhodesians, and he was replaced by Edgar
Whitehead. Edward Whitehead again tried to do something about
the Land Apportionment Act, and he was replaced because of this
effort by Winston Field who was further to his right.
Winston Field in turn was replaced by Ian Smith.
Again the whole trend in Rhodesia has been toward the right
and not toward cooperation amongst the races, but to a
hardening of attitude among the races.
Now it is quite true----
TROUBLE IN ZAMBIA
Senator Hickenlooper. What is happening in Zambia?
Mr. Palmer. In Zambia there is trouble on the Copper Belt,
but a lot of this trouble arises from both communities. It is
not only from the black community but it is from the white
community. A lot of the problem in Zambia is that in the Copper
Belt a great many of the whites come from Rhodesia and come
from the Union of South Africa. So that----
Senator Hickenlooper. How many whites have they got in
Zambia?
Mr. Palmer. They have got about 70,000 or 80,000, I think,
at the present time. And I do not think that the fault all lies
on one side or all lies on the other, but Kaunda has had as a
basic tenet of his policy to try to encourage, to try to
promote good race relations in Zambia. He has tried just as
hard as Kenyatta has in Kenya.
One of the great dangers----
Senator Hickenlooper. Does he not claim he is the captive
of the revolutionary group in----
Mr. Palmer. No, sir. I think Kaunda is still very much of
an independent and very much devoted, both in words and in
actions, to good race relations in Zambia.
Senator Hickenlooper. I think so. I do not mean that.
Mr. Palmer. Yes. But the problem is that on both sides,
because of the Rhodesian proble
