S. Prt. 110-20
EXECUTIVE SESSIONS OF THE
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
TOGETHER WITH JOINT SESSIONS WITH THE
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
(HISTORICAL SERIES)
=======================================================================
VOLUME XIX
__________
NINETIETH CONGRESS
first session
1967
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
90th Congress, First Session
J.W. FULBRIGHT, Arkansas, Chairman
JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island
MIKE MANSFIELD, Montana EUGENE J. McCARTHY, Minnesota
WAYNE MORSE, Oregon BOURKE HICKENLOOPER, Iowa
ALBERT GORE, Tennessee GEORGE D. AIKEN, Vermont
FRANK J. LAUSCHE, Ohio FRANK CARLSON, Kansas
FRANK CHURCH, Idaho JOHN J. WILLIAMS, Delaware
STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota
THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey
JOSEPH S. CLARK, Pennsylvania JOHN SHERMAN COOPER, Kentucky
Carl Marcy, Chief of Staff
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
110th Congress, First Session
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BILL NELSON, Florida GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Meyers, Jr., Minority Staff Director
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
90th Congress, First Session
RICHARD B. RUSSELL, Georgia, Chairman
JOHN STENNIS, Mississippi MARGARET CHASE SMITH, Maine
STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington JACK MILLER, Iowa
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina JOHN G. TOWER, Texas
HOWARD W. CANNON, Nevada PETER H. DOMINICK, Colorado
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
STEPHEN M. YOUNG, Ohio
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
THOMAS J. McINTYRE, New Hampshire
DANIEL B. BREWSTER, Maryland
HARRY F. BYRD, Jr., Virginia
Charles B. Kirbow, Chief Clerk
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
110th Congress, First Session
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
BILL NELSON, Florida SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
EVAN BAYH, Indiana SAXBY M. CHAMBLISS, Georgia
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
MARK J. PRYOR, Arkansas ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina
JIM WEBB, Virginia JOHN CORNYN, Texas
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Mike Kostiw, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Pages
Preface.......................................................... IX
Future Hearings, January 11...................................... 1
The World Situation, January 16.................................. 39
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Subcommittees and Hearings Procedures, January 24................ 113
Minutes, January 24.............................................. 129
Minutes, January 25.............................................. 130
Minutes, January 26.............................................. 131
The Situation in Indonesia, January 30........................... 133
Testimony of Marshall Green, U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia
Background Briefing on Disarmament Problems, February 3.......... 159
Testimony of Richard Helms, Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency
Status of Development of Ballistic and Anti-Ballistic Systems in
U.S., and Briefing on Non-Proliferation Treaty, February 6..... 193
Testimony of Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., Director of Defense
Research and Engineering; and Hon. William C. Foster,
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Military Assistance to Latin America, February 6................. 217
Testimony of Gen. Robert Porter, Southern Military Command
Strategic Implications of Antiballistic Missile Defense
Deployment/Limitations on Use of Chemical and Bacteriological
Agents in Warfare/Sales of Military Equipment by the United
States, February 7............................................. 245
Testimony of Cyrus R. Vance, Deputy Secretary of Defense; and
John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs
Minutes, February 27............................................. 274
Minutes, February 28............................................. 275
Minutes, February 28............................................. 276
Minutes, March 1................................................. 277
Sales of Military Equipment by United States, March 2............ 279
Testimony of John T. McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs
Policy Implications of Armament and Disarmament Problems, March 3 289
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; and Adrian S.
Fisher, Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency
Minutes, March 6................................................. 311
Minutes, March 13................................................ 312
Arms Sales to Iran, March 14..................................... 313
Testimony of Henry J. Kuss, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Logistics Negotiations
Minutes, March 16................................................ 330
Minutes, March 20................................................ 331
Briefing on Africa, March 28..................................... 333
Testimony of John Palmer II, Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs
Minutes, March 30................................................ 366
Minutes, April 3................................................. 367
Additional Military Assistance to Pakistan, April 5.............. 369
Testimony of William J. Handley, Acting Assistant Secretary
of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Minutes, April 6................................................. 391
Minutes, April 13................................................ 392
Minutes, April 13................................................ 393
Minutes, April 14................................................ 394
Minutes, April 18................................................ 395
Minutes, April 19................................................ 396
Minutes, April 20................................................ 397
Minutes, April 21................................................ 398
Minutes, April 24................................................ 399
Minutes, April 25................................................ 400
United States Troops in Europe, April 26......................... 401
Testimony of Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense; and
Nicholas DeB. Katzenbach, Acting Secretary of State
Minutes, April 26................................................ 414
Briefing on Yemen and Greek Situations, April 28................. 415
Testimony of Lucious D. Battle, Assistant Secretary of State
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Minutes, May 2................................................... 442
Minutes, May 2................................................... 443
United States Troops in Europe, May 3............................ 445
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; and Eugene V.
Rostow, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Minutes, May 4................................................... 457
Discussion of Military Assistance to India and Pakistan, May 5... 459
Testimony of Lt. General Joseph F. Carroll, Director, Defense
Intelligence Agency
The Situation in Poland, May 15.................................. 471
Testimony of John A. Gronouski, U.S. Ambassador to Poland
Discussion Regarding the Secretary of State's Testimony, May 16.. 505
Minutes, May 16.................................................. 520
Minutes, May 16.................................................. 521
Briefing on Deployment of Antiballistic Missiles and Non-
Proliferation Treaty, May 18................................... 523
Testimony of Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director, Arms Control
and Disar- mament Agency
United States Foreign Policy With Respect to the Middle East and
Vietnam, May 23................................................ 539
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Briefing on the Middle East Situation, June 1.................... 587
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; and Robert S.
McNamara, Secretary of Defense
Minutes, June 5.................................................. 624
Minutes, June 5.................................................. 625
Briefing on the Middle East Situation, June 7.................... 627
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Minutes, June 8.................................................. 657
Briefing on Vietnam, June 8...................................... 659
Testimony of William J. Porter, U.S. Ambassador to Korea
Briefing on the Middle East Situation, June 8.................... 697
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Briefing on the Middle East Situation, June 9.................... 705
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Minutes, June 20................................................. 729
Military Assistance to India and Pakistan, June 22............... 731
Testimony of Jeffrey C. Kitchen, Deputy Secretary of State
for Politico- Military Affairs
Minutes, June 22................................................. 738
Minutes, June 27................................................. 739
Briefing on Glassboro Talks, June 28............................. 741
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Minutes, June 29................................................. 775
Minutes, July 10................................................. 776
Minutes, July 11................................................. 777
Briefing on the Congo Situation, July 11......................... 779
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Minutes, July 12................................................. 825
Minutes, July 13................................................. 826
Minutes, July 25................................................. 827
Foreign Assistance Act of 1967, July 26.......................... 829
Testimony of Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense
Minutes, July 27................................................. 854
Minutes, August 1................................................ 855
Minutes, August 22............................................... 856
Minutes, September 12............................................ 857
Minutes, September 22............................................ 858
Minutes, October 2............................................... 859
Minutes, October 6............................................... 860
Minutes, October 10.............................................. 861
Minutes, October 11.............................................. 862
Minutes, October 23.............................................. 863
Minutes, October 23.............................................. 864
Minutes, October 31.............................................. 865
Minutes, October 31.............................................. 866
Minutes, November 1.............................................. 867
Minutes, November 2.............................................. 868
Need for Open Hearing with Secretary Rusk on U.S. Policy Toward
Southeast Asia, November 7..................................... 869
Testimony of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Minutes, November 16............................................. 926
Briefing on the Vietnam Situation, November 16................... 927
Testimony of Elsworth Bunker, U.S. Ambassador to South
Vietnam
Minutes, November 17............................................. 972
Motions Regarding Testimony by the Secretary of State, November
30............................................................. 973
Minutes, December 7.............................................. 991
Minutes, December 8.............................................. 992
Minutes, December 12............................................. 993
Briefing on Greece and the Middle East, December 14.............. 995
Testimony of Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary of State
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Briefing on News Stories on the NLF in Saigon and the U.N.,
December 14.................................................... 1027
Testimony of Nicholas DeB. Katzenbach, Acting Secretary of
State
Minutes, December 15............................................. 1065
APPENDICES
A. Committee on Foreign Relations Publication for 1967: Hearings,
Committee Prints, Senate Documents and Reports................. 1067
B. Volumes Published to Date in the Historical Series............ 1071
PREFACE
----------
``You certainly are getting more than your share of
crises,'' one senator commiserated with Secretary of State Dean
Rusk during an executive session of the Foreign Relations
Committee in 1967. Although national attention necessarily
focused on the war in Vietnam, where the United States had sent
a half million troops and spent billions of dollars to fight a
war that had come to seem endless, foreign policy crises were
erupting around the world that year at an alarming rate.
Members of the Foreign Relations Committee displayed
mounting skepticism about Vietnam, discounting the overly
optimistic reports they received from the State Department and
from U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Elsworth Bunker.
Increasingly, committee members looked toward a negotiated
settlement as more likely than a military victory in Vietnam.
Because of such attitudes, the administration of President
Lyndon B. Johnson kept the committee at arm's length on
anything related to the war. Secretary Rusk cancelled scheduled
appearances to testify so often during the year that Senator
Albert Gore, Sr., complained of seriously impaired
communications between the committee and the State Department.
Instead of Vietnam, therefore, the committee devoted its
hearings to the state of the world, from a coup in Greece to a
war in the Middle East and a rebellion in the Congo. However,
members always kept in mind the potential connections between
the Vietnam war and events occurring elsewhere.
Committee members worried that America's preoccupation with
Vietnam could serve as an invitation to troublemaking in Asia,
Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. Committee chairman J.
William Fulbright cited involvement in Southeast Asia as having
hindered the United States' response to the ``Six-Day War''
between Israel and its Arab neighbors. ``I do not hesitate to
make a decision that the Middle East is far more important to
the security of this country than Vietnam,'' Senator Fulbright
lectured Secretary Rusk--who earlier that year had assured the
committee he did not foresee a war in the Middle East. In his
own explanation of the world situation, Secretary Rusk insisted
that the United States was fighting communist aggression where
it existed, not communism as an ideology in the abstract. He
wanted to assure the committee that despite the war, the
Johnson administration sought detente with the Soviet Union,
but committee members remained dubious. By the year's end,
Senator Claiborne Pell chided an assistant secretary of state
that the administration seemed to see everything that happened
anywhere as ``one vast Communist plot, and that what went on in
any part of the world had its effect in any other part of the
world because the strings are all being pulled from one
place.''
Through its hearings, the committee also demonstrated
concern over the ``militarization'' of U.S. foreign policy.
Subcommittees devoted a great deal of time to examining arms
sales in the Middle East and in the Indian-Pakistani
territorial disputes, and followed closely the development of
anti-ballistic missile systems and the negotiations for nuclear
non-proliferation. Senator Eugene McCarthy complained that the
Johnson administration had embraced an arms sales philosophy
that unless the United States sold arms to other countries it
would lose its influence over the policies of those countries.
Vietnam and its larger implications caused committee
members to ponder the Senate's constitutional responsibilities
over foreign policy. When President Johnson sent planes to the
Congo, Senator Fulbright raised the possibility of the
president sending as many troops as he wanted without
congressional authorization. ``I do not see that it would be
entirely inconsistent with Vietnam or any other place,'' the
chairman said to Secretary Rusk. ``How many did you send to the
Dominican Republic? You sent 22,000. You could have sent
100,000 if you wanted. I do not know why you could not sent
100,000 or 200,000 into the Congo if you thought it
desirable.'' He added, ``I do not know where you draw the line
here.'' During another closed committee meeting, Senator
Fulbright complained to his colleagues: ``I get fed up with
being told we are committed to something all the time,'' simply
because the president said the nation is committed. That was
not what he meant by commitment, Fulbright asserted: ``I think
the commitment is something that is taken by the Congress and
the Executive, not just a unilateral action.''
Committee members of both parties agreed that a Republican
Policy Committee report had asked the single pertinent question
of the year: what is our national interest in Southeast Asia?
For all their efforts, the committee could never get a
satisfactory response from the Johnson administration.
Admitting his mistake in supporting the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution and his assumption that President Johnson had not
intended to widen the war, Fulbright lamented that the war had
``grown so gradually that we never have been able quite to get
the full impact of where we are going.'' That sense of drift
and helplessness pervades these hearings.
The selection of transcripts for these volumes represents
the editor's choice of the material possessing the most
usefulness and interest for the widest audience. Subheads,
editorial notes, and some documents discussed in the hearings,
are added to bring the events into perspective. Any material
deleted (other than ``off the record'' references for which no
transcripts were made) has been noted in the appropriate
places, and transcripts not included are represented by minutes
of those sessions, in chronological sequences. Unpublished
transcripts and other records of the committee for 1967 are
deposited at the National Archives, where they are available to
researchers under the access rules of that agency. Some
transcripts may require further declassification procedures.
In accordance with the general policy of the series,
portions of the volumes were submitted to the Departments of
State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency for
review and comment.
The Foreign Relations Committee extends its appreciation to
the Senate Committee on Armed Services for its cooperation in
approving the release of those sessions in which its members
participated.
This volume was prepared for publication by Donald A.
Ritchie of the Senate Historical Office.
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr.
FUTURE HEARINGS
----------
Wednesday, January 11, 1967
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:20 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Morse,
Gore, Church, Symington, Dodd, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper,
Aiken, Carlson, and Mundt.
Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Holt, and Mr.
Henderson of the committee staff.
The Chairman. I think the committee will come to order. We
have a quorum here.
Congratulations to everybody and the committee in
particular. We have a quorum the first morning.
reduction of u.s. forces in europe
Well, gentlemen, the main purpose of this is just to
discuss a variety of things. One of the letters I suppose we
ought to take up first is Senator Mansfield's. I have a letter
here signed yesterday addressed to me about Senate Resolution
300 which was introduced last summer regarding how a
substantial reduction in U.S. forces permanently stationed in
Europe can be made without adversely affecting either our
resolve or agreement to meet our commitments under the North
Atlantic Treaty.
This letter was addressed to me personally, asking if I
wished to join in its sponsorship, but the reason I bring it up
here----
Senator Mundt. Who wrote the letter?
The Chairman. Mike Mansfield. He introduced the resolution
last summer.
The reason I am bringing it up here is not whether I should
sign it or not but is about its procedure. He proposes, I
think, to take this up on the floor without any committee
dealing.
Now, when this matter was considered before on increasing
from two to six, we had extensive hearings. This committee and
Armed Services.
As a procedural matter it seems to me very bad not to send
this kind of resolution to some committee because, well from
your point of view, no Republicans participated. This came out
of the Democratic Policy Committee. If we start the precedent
of resolutions going direct to the floor from the Policy
Committee, it seems to me it is very objectionable.
What I thought, if the committee thought well of it, was
for the committee to authorize me to write a letter requesting
that it be submitted to this committee.
Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a very
brief comment that I have prepared on this matter. It is my
hope that we can confirm the Mansfield resolution relative to
troop assignment to NATO----
The Chairman. Speak a little louder. I cannot hear you.
Senator Morse. It is my hope that we can confirm the
Mansfield resolution relative to troop assignments to NATO and
that it will be referred to this committee. Since the committee
held extensive hearings last year on NATO, additional hearings
may not be necessary although there have been rather dramatic
changes in Germany and in German attitudes toward Eastern
Europe since our hearings. In any case, I think the resolution
should be referred to this committee and reported out before it
goes before the Senate.
role of the policy committee
The Party Policy Committee should not become a substitute
for a standing legislative committee, and I agree with the
Chairman that I think that a resolution of this importance
should be submitted to the committee first and not go to the
floor of the Senate.
As you know, that has been my position for many years in
the Senate, that committees should not be by-passed. You always
have the protection, if it becomes necessary, of sending a
legislative matter to a committee under instructions and you
always have the protection of discharging a committee if the
committee seeks to bury the legislation.
But I speak respectfully, I think if this is still the
position of the majority leader, and I am surprised it is,
because I thought I read in the paper some time ago a statement
attributed to him that he was not insisting on the matter going
directly to the floor.
The Chairman. I make it clear this letter does not insist
on it. But I thought it was his idea before that it do that,
and I was anticipating this question and that is why I brought
it here. He did expect it to be taken up, I think, last summer
without going to the committee.
Senator Morse. He did. He made this argument, but I only
want to say, and I close, that I would support the suggestion
of the chairman that the letter be sent to the majority leader
advising that it go to the Foreign Relations Committee to hear
it.
In fairness to the Armed Services Committee, I want to say
it may very well be that it should go to the Foreign Relations
Committee and then to the Armed Services Committee or possibly
that we have joint hearings on it, but I do not think that the
Foreign Relations Committee should give up what I think is its
right to pass on this resolution because of its clear foreign
policy import.
Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, I fully agree with what has
been said, with what you say and what Senator Morse says.
problems with joint hearings
Personally, I would just like to see it referred to this
committee with the idea that we could act on it and then refer
it to the Armed Services Committee, if we felt proper, rather
than having joint hearings. Those hearings were pretty painful
proceedings.
The Chairman. There are too many people.
Senator Sparkman. Yes, and if it is authorized I will make
a motion to the effect that the chairman be instructed to
follow that course.
The Chairman. Yes, that is in order.
Is there any further discussion?
Senator Hickenlooper?
military v. foreign policy
Senator Hickenlooper. I have some reservations on this.
First, I thoroughly agree that under no circumstances should
this--if we can prevent it--resolution go directly to the floor
from a strictly party committee such as the Republican Policy
Committee or the Democrat Policy Committee, or anything else. I
think it is a terrible practice.
Number two, I would like to hear a little bit more
justification why it should go to this committee rather than
the Armed Services Committee. I think maybe it should, at least
we should have something to say about it, but it seems to me
that the question of the reduction in force in Europe under an
alliance agreement, and that is what it is over there, that is
primarily either a professional area or a top executive area
discussion on national defense.
Senator Morse. Would you yield, Bourke, on that point?
Senator Hickenlooper. Yes, I just want to have some
discussion, I am not committed.
Senator Morse. I only make a one sentence comment. The
original commitment came from this committee. The original NATO
commitment was a Foreign Relations Committee matter.
Senator Hickenlooper. We do not handle the military conduct
of the war; we may sign a treaty.
Senator Morse. But there is no question of military under
this treaty because it is the relationship to foreign policy.
Senator Sparkman. I think this is wrapped up in foreign
policy implications.
a political matter
The Chairman. I think so, too. To me this is not a war.
This is political judgment as to the relationship between
Western Europe, ourselves, and Russia. The reason for NATO
really was fear of invasion of Western Europe by Russia and
this entails, in my view, essentially a political judgment as
to what those relations are now and whether or not there is
justification for the continuation of, well, NATO as such, and
certainly how much you do in pursuance of NATO.
I would think as between the two this is far more a
political matter at this stage than it is military.
Frank was the NATO man last year. What do you say?
Senator Church. Well, I would agree with that, Mr.
Chairman, particularly inasmuch as the level of troops to be
maintained there turns on political considerations fully as
much as military considerations. In fact, the major arguments
for retaining so large a force had been based in recent years
not upon a military assessment, but rather upon the political
consequences of reductions, particularly West Germany, and of
course the whole Gaullist attitude toward the disposition of
American forces is a political one.
It seems to me that it is all inextricably bound into
foreign policy considerations.
Senator Clark. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
INTERNAL SENATE POLITICS
Senator Clark. I would certainly support this motion, but I
am a little bit concerned about the internal Senate politics of
this and wondering whether we cannot get off on perhaps a
little better foot in this session than we have sometimes in
the past. Whether it would be desirable for the chairman before
he writes a letter to sit down with Dick Russell and Senator
Mansfield and see if some amicable arrangement agreeable to all
three could be worked out.
Now, Stuart is not here; he wants to come. Maybe I am not
as good a mind reader as I think I am, but he is on both Armed
Services and this committee, and I suspect that he would be a
little bit upset if we were to assert sole jurisdiction.
John Sparkman will remember that at that meeting of the
NATO Parliamentarians in Paris in November, which he and I both
attended, there were a couple of pretty belligerent fellows
from the House of Representatives who really kind of took the
point of view that NATO is primarily a military alliance. They
were not much in favor of any efforts to get a better
relationship either with de Gaulle--you remember at that
briefing, John, those fellows gave Chip Bohlen and Cleveland
such a bad time, and I know that the NATO Parliamentarian group
is kind of split on the political committee which would rather
switch than fight and the military committee which wanted to
relieve tensions. I believe it might be worthwhile to see if we
cannot work out an arrangement with the Armed Services.
I agree that joint hearings are kind of rough. There are
too many people. But maybe some sort of genius can come along
which would work out a friendly relationship, either refer it
here first and there second, or get some kind of an agreement
that a committee of the two committees should sit, just in the
interests of hoping that the 90th Congress will not get off on
yackety yack between the Armed Services and the Foreign
Relations Committees which we are going to have on Vietnam
anyway.
The Chairman. That is a good suggestion. I would like to
work it out, and I do not think you meant to be exclusive.
Senator Morse. Not at all. I made the point maybe we ought
to have joint meetings.
The Chairman. I would object because they are unwieldy and
difficult to conduct when you have got that many people. And I
would think it would be better to have it here and then Armed
Services.
What do you think about that? I think Joe has a point.
Senator Sparkman. I think it is a good idea.
The Chairman. I do not want to have a row and have a
contest right off the bat. Do you think it would just be better
I talk to Mike Mansfield about it? But I would like to be able
to say the committee feels it ought to come here.
Is there anybody who does not feel that way?
ADVISE THE LEADERSHIP
Senator Morse. I think, Mr. Chairman, that you ought to
talk to Mike and also talk to Everett Dirksen and probably the
two of them together. I am sure they do not agree but
nevertheless I think that it is important that the minority
leader be advised, too.
Senator Clark. Do you not think you ought to talk to Dick,
too?
Senator Morse. I think that was agreed.
The Chairman. How do you feel about that? I do not want to
say. Do you feel they ought to come here?
USURPATION OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES
Senator Hickenlooper. I feel we have an interest in it, but
I feel that probably 60 percent of the interest is in the Armed
Services Committee or should be, and I go a step further. We
have noticed in the last year or two or three the usurpation of
certain fields of activity that ought to be in the Foreign
Relations Committee taken up by other committees, and we get
our tail over the dashboard a little bit on that. I guess there
is not much we can do about that. But we can, of course--this
may be the committee's area of responsibility, but we are
getting into other fields, I suppose. I just feel that 40
percent of it is probably here and 60 percent belongs to Armed
Services Committee. I think both committees ought to take a
look at it, but not with a joint meeting. I agree it is almost
impossible to get any satisfactory results.
CREATE TWO SUBCOMMITTEES
Senator Morse. It is possible, Mr. Chairman, to have one of
Joe's suggestions where you can have two subcommittees or a
subcommittee of each of the two committees hold the hearings
and report to their full committee.
The Chairman. That is a possibility. What does the
committee think about that?
Senator Clark. Why do you not explore it with Mike and
Dick?
The Chairman. I will be glad to explore it. I wanted an
expression of how you feel about it. Do you all, Karl, do you
think we have an interest?
Senator Mundt. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I think in this
particular instance we have a better claim to jurisdiction than
the Armed Services Committee.
The Chairman. That is what I wondered.
Senator Mundt. What Frank says is exactly right. It is the
political implications we are going to listen to mostly. They
are not going to talk about the fear of an immediate invasion
from Russia. If there have been any military affairs
implications it must be connected with the war in Vietnam in
some way, about the deployment of troops. But I do not want to
get into a quarrel with the other group either.
I would think we could pass some kind of a resolution
saying that the Foreign Relations Committee feels that there
should be hearings, whether we want to have participation or
something, and I do not know how far we have to go in
nursemaiding the Armed Services Committee on these matters.
It is perfectly all right to consult, but I think you would
be fortified if you went there and said, ``We are going to have
them. We didn't want to have a quarrel. Do you want to have
subcommittees, joint committees?''
Do you want them to come in tandem or how, but I definitely
feel we ought to have a hearing.
Senator Carlson. I agree with the chairman on it.
Senator Aiken. We ought to look it over. The military
aspect, as Karl says, will probably relate to deployment of
troops that might be taken out there.
The Chairman. It is just more what you do with the troops,
whether or not you go here or over to Vietnam. That is a matter
which is military.
Senator Aiken. We have a political and economic situation
involved.
Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, I think this idea of having
two subcommittees could work, but I think it would be
preferable to have it before the full Foreign Relations
Committee, although that could be explored.
The Chairman. Well, then, if I understand it correctly I
will take it up and talk to the majority leader about it, and I
assume we will probably then talk either with him or separately
with Dick Russell and the Republican leader.
Well, that disposes of that.
TESTIMONY OF SECRETARY RUSK
I think you have already had notice that the Secretary,
Secretary Rusk, has agreed to come in executive session on
January 16 and in open session on January 23. He called me and
asked, requested, that our hearings not go longer than a full
morning, that is when it is in open, because of the strain and
the lights and so on. He is assuming there will be television--
I do not know whether there will or not. I guess there will;
there usually is when he appears. And I said that I thought
that was a reasonable request. He said he would rather, because
of the strain and the lights. So I said we would agree to have
it run one day up until 1 o'clock, say.
Mr. Marcy brings up a question that is always a difficult
one. He says that Senator Symington cannot come on the 16th. He
wishes it to go on the 17th, and this creates a problem that if
we wanted to run over in executive session--what I said about
going in the afternoon applies only to open session with lights
and all that. It does not apply to executive session. He would
not be free on the afternoon of the 17th.
Senator Pell. Excuse me, I would like to bring up a point
here, too, if I can.
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Pell. And that is I realize it is a good idea for a
few people questioning because it goes through with greater
ease, but when meetings are scheduled for Monday morning at 10,
it is very difficult sometimes for those of us who, if we have
a speaking engagement--I may be in the minority on this, I do
not know if anybody else shares the same view, and as a matter
of routine when we have the choice and initiative, could not
meetings be scheduled for Tuesday mornings and not Monday
mornings?
The Chairman. Well, Tuesdays are our regular meetings for
the conduct of our regular business such as I have got--I have
got several other items I am coming to; for example, the
consular agreement mentioned last night. Katzenbach came and
said he wanted us to take it up, and we have hearings. If you
mean we will not just utilize Monday, it is going to make it
very difficult. That means Friday, too.
Senator Pell. Fridays it does not mean because people do
shove off, they shove off in the afternoon but maybe I am the
only one, in which case I withdraw my point, but----
The Chairman. I would like to accommodate the members. How
do you members, all of you, feel about Monday? We are going to
have an awful heavy schedule because there are a number of
things I am going to mention in a minute.
Senator Mundt. I would rather have Monday than Friday.
Senator Hickenlooper. We have other meetings and it could
be Tuesday.
Senator Aiken. Get it over with.
Senator Pell. I am in a minority so I withdraw.
The Chairman. You do not live far away so you cannot get
back on Monday.
Senator Pell. I made two speaking engagements that day.
The Chairman. You do not speak on Sunday, do you?
[Discussion off the record.]
Senator Pell. So I am in the same condition on the 23rd
where I probably will not be able to be here.
The Chairman. Well, you know, as big a committee as this
is, there is going to be somebody, I think, nearly every day,
and we just almost have to proceed in some way.
Senator Pell. Yes.
The Chairman. With that understanding, the executive is on
the 16th and open on the 23rd.
SIZE OF THE COMMITTEE
By the way, did the Steering Committee take action on the
size of the committee?
Senator Clark. Yes; this has to still be off the record.
[Discussion off the record.]
APPEARANCE BY SECRETARY MCNAMARA
The Chairman. McNamara, we have contacted McNamara. His
position is simply that he would like to appear before Armed
Services before this committee, and I wrote to Russell and he
feels that way. So he will appear there first and the date has
not been set, has it, Marcy, you have not heard any further
about it?
Mr. Marcy. No, sir.
The Chairman. It is not that he does not want to come, but
simply he would like to appear in public before that committee
and then we will have him as it is agreeable after that.
I mentioned the consular agreement. The President, as you
know, mentioned it last night. Katzenbach has already----
Senator Hickenlooper. He mentioned so much last night I
must have missed that.
The Chairman. It was buried down----
Senator Sparkman. With east and west trade.
The Chairman. But Katzenbach came up and said they are
anxious to proceed with it.
The question is what do you think about hearings? We have
had some hearings. It is my understanding that--in fact, I have
some letters here, limited to official use, from Douglas
MacArthur referring to Mr. Hoover's attitude toward this, and I
understand Mr. Hoover feels that his former testimony may have
been--I do not know whether you would say distorted a bit. He
is not adamant against this at all. If I understand it
correctly he simply made the observation that it would entail
additional surveillance, I guess you would say. But he is not
of the view that it should not be done is the way I understand
it. You can look at it if you like.
MISINFORMATION ON CONSULAR TREATY
Senator Carlson. I want to say on this consular treaty, our
people may be getting misinformed. I am getting a lot of mail
and we ought to have some additional hearings.
The Chairman. The Liberty Lobby has mounted a strong
campaign against it, relying I think primarily on the former
testimony of Mr. J. Edgar Hoover.
Senator Carlson. If we have a hearing, it may clear up some
of this.
The Chairman. I think we should, too. Does everybody
believe that?
Senator Sparkman. I do.
The Chairman. Any objection?
Senator Clark. If I may make one very brief comment, when I
was in Russia in November and before I went, when I talked with
Dobrynin\1\ in a briefing, the Russians really could not care
less about this consular treaty because they think it is so
much more to our advantage than it is to theirs, with which I
agree, that they are not pushing particularly hard. I think it
is very much to our advantage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Soviet Ambassador to the U.S. Anatoly Dobrynin.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Chairman. I do, too. I think it is to our advantage.
Senator Sparkman. I think it would ease a lot of pain if
you could get a modification of Hoover's statement because it
has been----
Senator Dodd. Is this on the troop commitment to Western
Europe?
The Chairman. We have discussed that. We wanted to bring it
up after you got here. We discussed that at some length.
SENSE OF THE POLICY COMMITTEE
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I almost mentioned in the
caucus yesterday but I did not, the Democratic caucus, that I
am fairly certain that it was the sense of the majority, if not
all of the members of the Policy Committee, that this should be
referred to a joint committee of the Armed Services and Foreign
Relations Committee, and when the majority leader did not bring
it up, I mentioned it to somebody who was sitting there, who
was on the Policy Committee, and he said he understood
Mansfield was going to take it up with you as to what would be
the preference. But I know that my feeling, as the only member
of both committees, was that it should go before a joint
committee of Armed Services and Foreign Relations.
It is clear that it involves both committees very
fundamentally and very definitely, and in their mission, you
might say, so I hope it would be agreeable to this committee.
The Chairman. We have just discussed it. It is agreeable, I
mean in the sense of jurisdiction. There was quite a strong
sentiment if you got both full committees together it is
unwieldy. We suggested that it either go to the committees
successively, one and then the other, or a joint subcommittee
so you do not have so many people at one time where it is
unsatisfactory.
Senator Symington. I only wanted to report to you the way
it was left in the Policy Committee.
The Chairman. What would you think of it going to this
committee first and then that committee?
Senator Symington. I think that would be wrong. I would
rather see a joint subcommittee.
The Chairman. You would rather have a joint subcommittee.
Senator Symington. Yes, because there is so much work
involved.
The Chairman. Take eight or ten of this committee and join
with them together.
Senator Symington. That is right; this committee has a
tremendous amount of work and we have this draft law, as well
as appropriations and authorizations. There was some
resistance, I think it is fair to say, to doing it at all
because of the amount of work involved. This time I think we
ought to either fish or cut bait, because of these tremendous
expenses abroad. They are absolutely incredible under the
circumstances in the amount of money they are asking for in the
Far East and the amount of bodies they are asking for.
A PSYCHOLOGICAL BARRIER
Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, may I say--Tom and Stu were
not here--I would much prefer the joint subcommittee to going
to one committee or the other first because, let us face it,
there is a psychological barrier there, people being what they
are, and if it comes here first, people on the Armed Services
Committee, some, will psychologically be disturbed. If it is
the other way, there will be some here. I think a joint
subcommittee would be much better than going to one committee
first and then the other. I agree with you, Mr. Chairman, that
having a joint hearing of the two full committees is very
unwieldy. I do not think it is necessary
After all, each full committee will take it up on the basis
of the report of their subcommittee.
Senator Clark. Mr. Chairman, can I put in a plug, in
passing, for a more frequent use of subcommittees, either ad
hoc or the standing subcommittees, in order to expedite our
work?
The Chairman. Mr. Marcy and I have been talking about that
and we will talk about it further, I mean with the committee. I
think you are right, we ought to use that more. If I understand
it and everybody is agreeable to the Senator from Missouri's
suggestion preferring the joint subcommittee meeting.
Senator Morse. On Joe's subcommittee comment, I would like
to say that later in the morning I have on my agenda to raise
with the committee a subcommittee matter. I will cover it then,
and I quite agree with Joe.
RESCHEDULING SECRETARY RUSK'S TESTIMONY
Senator Symington. Can I bring up something you passed on?
I have a very important engagement next Sunday, almost as
important as the U.N. organization in 1945, when the Kansas
City Chiefs are going to show the National Football League they
have got the thing sewed up as much as they think they have.
With that premise, I was hoping that perhaps Secretary Rusk
could come on Tuesday. I talked to Carl about it and I talked
to the Secretary about it, because it is impossible for me to
get back here in time in the morning. I just thought, I would
hope, that you could because there is no way I can get back at
10 o'clock on Monday morning. I could get back in the
afternoon, but I would hope--the Secretary said it would be all
right with him if it would be all right with you. He did on the
17th. I spoke to him and he spoke to Carl, and I asked Carl to
speak to you.
Senator Pell. I subscribe, for the reason I already said,
to what Stuart said. Monday morning at 10 is very difficult.
Friday mornings at 10 we are around. But Monday morning is very
difficult.
Senator Symington. I am going to try to hold all my
engagements to weekends the way this thing happened last year,
but this makes Monday morning difficult.
Senator Aiken. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me any member of
this committee who cannot be here Monday morning can afford to
buy a Sunday paper and learn everything that we will be told
Monday morning.
Senator Sparkman. Did you see Bart Starr's picture, you
know, big color?
Senator Symington. I would like to ask this question. If it
is going to be a question that he could come back in the
afternoon on Monday but he could not do it on Tuesday, then if
I can get here in time for Monday afternoon, could we have an
agreement that he will be back Monday afternoon?
The Chairman. Oh, sure.
Senator Symington. I withdraw my objections.
The Chairman. That was one of the main reasons we preferred
Monday was the fact he could be here in the afternoon because
it is likely we would not get through with him in any case.
Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, could I be the devil's
advocate for just a moment?
The Chairman. Yes.
SENATORS ACCOMMODATING THEMSELVES TO COMMITTEE SCHEDULE
Senator Morse. I am very fond of the Senator from Missouri,
as he knows. I am talking now of any relationships to any
requests that have been made. It is my opinion that the
efficiency of this committee was greatly interfered with last
year because of the generosity of our chairman in trying to
accommodate the personal requests of members of the committee.
I think this is the time for us to adopt a procedure policy at
the beginning of the session as follows: Namely, that although
we would like to have people at our meetings that cannot be
there, we have just got to accommodate ourselves to the
committee schedule, and, if we cannot be there, we cannot be
there. But I do not see, Mr. Chairman, how you can run this
committee if you never knew whether or not a date you have set
is one that you are going to be able to carry out.
I would like to suggest that as a matter of policy, we
decide this morning that if we cannot be at the meetings, that
if just too bad, but we are going to have to accommodate
ourselves to the schedule.
Senator Symington. There is one point about that if the
Senator will bear with me, because a great many of this
committee are members of the Finance Committee on both sides of
the aisle, which I am not, and I find there is a great deal of
adjustment of the dates on the Finance and Foreign Relations
Committees. Inasmuch as I am the sole member on Armed Services,
I hope my beloved friend from the State of Oregon will not
object to working it out. Even when I am here, I get badly
stuck between two----
Senator Morse. You missed my point. My point is that the
chairman has got to work out what should be our schedule of
hearings. He has to do it with other committees and find out
what our membership and conflict is with other committees. But
my point is he has to work out a schedule and we have to follow
the schedule.
Every time you get an exception, may I say, for X or Y on
this committee, you inconvenience A and B. They may not say
anything, but every time you change it A and B are discommoded
and I think we have to have a schedule to follow.
CONFLICTS WITH OTHER COMMITTEES
The Chairman. May I say I talked to Marcy at length about
this. One reason for Monday is that it is one of the days where
practically no other committees meet and we thought--Tuesday is
a favorite day for all committees, and you run these conflicts
you are talking about, membership in other meetings.
Take Senator Gore. He is a very high ranking man on
Finance. He likes to be there, and I like to have him there
because I cannot go to it. They always meet on Tuesday, is that
not correct, practically always, on other days. Mondays was one
of the reasons why it looks inconvenient from your point of
view. It is free from those other conflicts more than most days
of the week.
Senator Pell. The only question that comes to my mind is
the planning ahead. Sometimes you want to make one day in your
home area; should it be a weekday, should it be a Monday, or
should it be a Friday? We have to weigh these things. As a rule
I thought--I have always got the feeling that Monday was
probably the better day to choose as opposed to Friday. Monday
morning, as happens in Senator Symington's case, is the
earliest to get back.
The Chairman. He is only going to be out there once. He
will be very disillusioned about that.
Senator Pell. Friday, on the other hand, people may leave
but they always leave in the afternoon.
Senator Morse. We have to cancel some meetings. I canceled
a meeting up in George Aiken's state. I was supposed to lecture
up there in the university. I notified them I could not do it
and I canceled it.
The Chairman. I would like to do the best I can with the
committee. I need guidance. We thought this was an idea. I will
do anything that the consensus believes in.
Senator Carlson. I just want to say this. I want the
chairman to set the meetings. I am going to have to miss some.
But I do not want anything to interfere with this meeting next
Sunday in San Francisco. I want the Senator from Missouri to be
there and bring back the bacon.
PROBLEMS TRAVELING TO THE WEST
Senator Mundt. I think what Wayne said makes a lot of
sense. I would like to add one little codicil. If you will
follow the practice of what you have done here of giving us a
little advance notice, like a week, we can adjust to your
schedule. I agree you cannot change your schedule for an
individual member without interfering with some other member.
We have an altogether different problem out West from what Clay
has. He cannot be back Monday morning. I cannot get back home
unless I leave Friday morning, so it varies. Set it and give us
a week or so notice and we will adjust, like Wayne canceled a
meeting.
The Chairman. I am certainly open to suggestions, and Mr.
Marcy has been around here a long time. He sort of thought
Mondays and Tuesdays--Tuesdays are our regular days and Monday
would fit in as well as any day with anybody. But I do not want
to be arbitrary about it. As far as I am concerned, it is about
half dozen of one and six of the other.
Senator Symington. One more point I have following Karl's
point, too. If we do try to go out on weekends, which is what I
am going to do this year, then I respectfully say because of
the problem of getting back from your state and my state that
Tuesday and Wednesday would be better than Monday and Tuesday.
If you come back Sunday, you fly all day Sunday night which
cripples you a little bit and you can get back sometime Monday,
and then Tuesday and Wednesday it gives you a chance to get out
Friday. It takes you a little longer than it does me.
Senator Hickenlooper. Are you establishing a Tuesday to
Thursday club?
Senator Symington. Thursday is Armed Services.
[Discussion off the record.]
The Chairman. I will talk to Mr. Marcy further. Personally,
it does not make much difference to me. I am perfectly
agreeable to any way. I would just like to accommodate as many
as possible and get as many people here. We did pretty well
last year.
THE SPACE TREATY
Let me go over a few other things. The space treaty is one
which we anticipate will be signed this month and they will, I
know, they have already mentioned it, want it acted on quickly
because of their--they think it is psychologically important.
Katzenbach has mentioned it, and so that is another matter
which I am sure we will have hearings on. This is what I meant
a moment ago. We are going to have to utilize more than Monday
and Tuesday. This is just starting with Rusk. I think we are
going to be Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday very likely when you
get into these other matters that I mentioned.
[Discussion off the record.]
HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES
The Chairman. Then we have a few other things. These things
bother me, no end. I wonder what you all think or should we
just forget about them. I get these letters all the time. They
come here you know, there are--I mean on the human rights
things, what do you all think about those? Should we forget
them or should we act on them? You have been to the U.N.--by
the way, I think we ought to have a time set aside--I want to
hear what the Senator from Idaho has to say about his
experience in the U.N. But this is a matter particularly
relating to the U.N. What do you think about it?
Senator Church. Of course there is a good deal of feeling
up there that is adverse to the United States on this matter
because although we have voted finally for the approval of
these conventions, we have never ratified any of them. As time
has passed, more and more comment, adverse comment, has
developed against us on the ground that we are not really for
these conventions and the proof of it is that, although we go
through the motions in the U.N. where they have been approved
by very large majorities, we have failed to ratify these
conventions and make them a part--make them binding treaties.
I have not studied the conventions very carefully, but I
think with the possibility of certain reservations that may be
necessary, we could proceed with hearings, obviously secure the
ratification of some of the conventions without any difficulty.
Senator Dodd. Is the Genocide Convention one of those?
Senator Church. Yes, it is one of those. But I think if we
were to move on any one, perhaps the one that would encounter
the least difficulty, it would be helpful to us with the U.N.
We really do not care about these and we know the African and
Asian countries are quite--they put a lot of store in these
conventions.
Senator Sparkman. When you refer to the human rights
convention, is that an old one or was it passed in the U.N.
either this or last year?
Senator Church. This relates, it relates back several
years.
The Chairman. It is an old one, the one I had in mind.
Mr. Marcy. There are three of those that have been up here
since, in the Kennedy regime--yes, they came July of '63. There
is one on the convention of political rights for women. There
is another one, the convention concerning the abolition of
forced labor. There is a third, a supplementary convention on
the abolition of slavery, the slave trade, an institution of
practices similar to slavery, and then there is the genocide
convention, which has been with us since 1949.
Senator Sparkman. Those three that you mentioned
specifically though, they are relatively new.
Mr. Marcy. They are, yes.
Senator Sparkman. I think they were adopted in that
preceding session of the General Assembly. The genocide is old,
and I think there is a human rights with it also, adopted way
back in '57.
DIFFICULT FOR OTHER NATIONS TO UNDERSTAND U.S. POSITION
Senator Church. Just a reading of these, particularly
reference to slavery and women's rights and that kind of thing,
it is very difficult for many of these countries to understand
why the United States with all our talk of democratic rights
and individual liberties and equality and so forth cannot find
it possible to ratify conventions against slavery.
Senator Hickenlooper. One reason they do not understand
some of those things, they do not understand the American
system of government. They do not understand these treaties can
abrogate or replace under certain conditions some of the
provisions of our Constitution.
Senator Church. I know.
Senator Hickenlooper. For one I am not for letting the
African countries run this country through emotion or
otherwise. They have been doing it for a little while, and I
think it is time we stopped letting them be influential on
these things.
May I say most of these conventions, I think, can be worked
out, as Frank said, and made satisfactory.
Senator Sparkman. I was going to ask if we should act
favorably on these last three, and I understand or from what I
have heard about them, they are more or less--they are more or
less unobjectionable. Would that ease your situation?
Senator Church. John, I think anything that would break the
ice to show that we are prepared to follow through, and we will
hold hearings, and I think ratification of one or two of these
would be extremely helpful to the United States.
Senator Sparkman. I think a couple of them could be done,
maybe three of them if I heard correctly about them. But so far
as the old human rights and the genocide, those old ones, there
are about three of them are there not, two or three, I just do
not believe there is any chance.
Senator Church. Forget the old ones and take the three most
recent ones.
Senator Church. We have some constitutional problems, as
Bourke said, and we have to look at them. But there is a
possibility of ratification of some of them.
THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
Senator Pell. I would like to also, Mr. Chairman, having
had some contact with the U.N., put in a strong plug of support
for Frank's view, and I would like to particularly hope we
would not put out a hand on considering the genocide convention
because I think it is the most important one in the whole
crowd. I think the genocide convention is as important as it
was when it was considered in the late forties, and I would
hope very much indeed we would consider it.
Senator Hickenlooper. Have you studied what it will do to
the Federal Constitution?
Senator Pell. I studied it, I read it, and I realize the
problems.
Senator Hickenlooper. That is what has been holding it up
all these years.
Senator Pell. I am well aware of it.
SUBCOMMITTEE SITUATION
Senator Morse. I think here is the place where you could
assign to a subcommittee the consideration of this matter to
report to the full committee, for example, under the direction
of Senator Church. Let us face it, you cannot begin to handle
all the things that are going to come before this full
committee, if the full committee retains jurisdiction over all
of them. I think this is as good a place as any for me to renew
my proposal of last year that the full committee should approve
and authorize a program of activity for its subcommittees. The
Mansfield resolution, the Vietnam hearings, the outer space
treaty are items that will occupy the full committee, along
with others. The final report of the Committee on the
Reorganization of Congress shows this committee held far more
full committee hearings in the 88th Congress than any other
Senate committee. We held 196. The next high number was the
Commerce Committee with 127. But Foreign Relations had only 33
subcommittee meetings in the 88th Congress whereas Commerce had
116.
The full committee will have a heavy schedule of major
business in 1967. But I do not think our activity should be
limited to what the full committee can handle.
The arms races in Latin America and the Middle East are
possibilities for such a subcommittee. So is a full review of
the Alliance for Progress and many other items that could be
handled either under existing subcommittees, or special ad hoc
committees.
Mr. Chairman, let us face it with the kind of a setup we
have in this committee for your subcommittees, they are going
to be appendages, in my judgment, with very little
effectiveness. I speak most respectfully because of my high
regard for our staff, but this staff cannot handle full
committee business and subcommittee business.
This committee has, in my judgment, unlike most committees
in the Senate, never sought to get the financial support, the
staff support, that a Foreign Relations Committee ought to
have. I renew my suggestion that you take these subcommittees,
you recognize that their staffs be enlarged, that they be given
staff, under the supervision of the chairman and the
professional director of the staff, Mr. Marcy.
LATIN AMERICAN SUBCOMMITTEE
But let me as a special pleader tell you about my problem
in the Latin American subcommittee. I cannot possibly carry on
what needs to be done on the Latin American subcommittee if I
am going to have to rely on the existing staff. Carl Marcy and
Pat Holt and Lowenstein and the rest of them cannot possibly
give to me the professional assistance that I need to conduct
the kind of hearings that ought to be conducted on Latin
America. Alliance for Progress ought to be gone into.
I want to say that I have already had two conferences with
Assistant Secretary Sol Linowitz, who by the way, has made a
tremendously favorable impression on me. He talked to me before
the President sent him to Latin America. He talked to me after
he came back. I want to have an early meeting of the
subcommittee in the late afternoon in which I would invite the
full committee, to which I would always invite the full
committee if I am given jurisdiction to conduct some of these
things, and have him brief us. I think he is terrific in his
understanding already of Latin American policy.
But I want to say, Mr. Chairman, we are just kidding
ourselves if you think that these subcommittees of this
committee are more than facades. We have no real jurisdiction.
We have no staff, we have no financial resources, and I would
propose a complete reorganization of the subcommittee setup,
under the control of the Chairman, but with authority for us to
go ahead and conduct the studies that the full committee will
never get around to conducting.
I think what is needed, Mr. Chairman, we cannot do it this
morning, but you ought to get Carl Marcy and his staff to work
with some of us on various plans for a reorganization of
subcommittees. I would like to see not only my committee, but I
would like to see the NATO committee, I would like to see the
other subcommittees, start subcommittee hearings this year that
amount to something.
Senator Clark. Would you yield for just a second?
Senator Morse. I am all through. I yield.
COMPARISON TO LABOR COMMITTEE
Senator Clark. I would like you to comment to the chairman
about the experience you and I both had with the Labor
Committee where we could not possibly get through the workload.
Senator Morse. That is probably why it makes me a biased
witness. We have on the Labor Committee real jurisdiction given
to the subcommittees. We have our staff, and I think, for
example, you check them for security, you approve of them on
this committee, but you give these subcommittees the needed
staff they need to do this job.
Let us face it. Marcy and his associates just cannot be of
service to these subcommittees and be of service to the full
committee to the degree that we are going to need their service
unless you are willing to make the fight to enlarge the
subcommittee staffs with some jurisdiction given to the
chairman of each subcommittee under your direction, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Sparkman asked to comment. He has to
go. Did you want to comment on it?
Senator Sparkman. Well, I merely say this. I have always
inclined toward as many meetings by the full committee as
possible for the consideration of matters. But I realize there
is a lot of truth in what the senator says, particularly with
reference to the time element and also with this problem that
we have of getting a quorum present because of conflict with
other committees.
But any way we go at it we are going to have our hands
full.
Senator Morse. Sure.
Senator Sparkman. That is all I care to say.
The Chairman. Senator Gore?
THE DISARMAMENT SUBCOMMITTEE
Senator Gore. I wanted to raise a question about a
subcommittee, the Disarmament Subcommittee, of which I happen
to be the chairman. The most interesting and entreating
paragraph in the president's speech last night was the one
which seemed to me to be addressed directly to the Soviet Union
rather than to us, and that is on the antimissile program. Here
is a disarmament question per se, and if it would be agreeable
with the subcommittee, with the full committee, I would propose
to have some hearings on this. However, it is matter of such
overweening importance, I would not wish to go into it if the
full committee wishes to do so. If the full committee can find
time to do so, fine. But it seems to me here is something of
mutual interest to the United States and to the Soviet Union,
the two countries being the only ones with the technological
competency to create such systems, and yet this has been a
decision that has been procrastinating now for many, many
months. How long it can safely be postponed without reaching
some agreement is a matter, I think, of urgency.
Of course in my view it would be far preferable that the
United States and the Soviet Union mutually agree to abstain
from such a costly and wasteful expenditure, but it is very
dangerous to this country, in my view, to procrastinate until
the Soviet Union may suddenly have a fait accompli and we are
left second.
So it seems to me this is a subject which either the full
committee or the subcommittee should examine. I am willing to
see either done, and I want to submit it to you.
Senator Clark. Mr. Chairman, I would like to support Albert
as a member of this subcommittee. I think this is probably the
most important single foreign policy matter that confronts us
today, a good deal more important than things that are
considered to be vital.
ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS
If we get ourselves into another escalation of this arms
race by the placement of antiballistic missiles around Moscow,
Leningrad, and Washington, and New York, the total cost is
going to be well over 20 billions of dollars.
Senator Symington. Eight months of the Vietnamese war.
Senator Clark. It is absolutely and fully for either
country to do it, and I think a skillful agreement pushed by
this committee could get us off the hook because it is not
outside of the Soviet's interests either.
The Chairman. That is one thing that pleased me last night
because he decided two things. From the intelligence community
it is my best information they do not believe that the Soviets
are very far along on this ABM at all. The only one that is
being currently pushed is around Moscow. It has very limited
possibilities and it is the only one, and I think he is quite
right in taking a further look. It is my impression that is
what he has in mind in the meantime, to do the best he can
diplomatically to try to----
Senator Gore. I raise no critical comment. I say this is
just a matter of such overweening importance that either this
committee or the subcommittee should go into it.
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, may I say a word?
THE AMOUNT OF WORK
First I agree without any reservation of any kind with the
position taken by the Senator from Oregon. In fact, the Chair
will remember I presented this to him sometime back.
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Symington. Because in my opinion this is the most
important committee, so long as it does not get subordinated to
the executive branch, in the Congress of the United States.
Now knowing Senator Gore, I think it would be a wonderful
thing if he could really get his teeth into this disarmament
thing.
You can do it as well as anybody around, but you have so
doggone much else to do.
The Armed Services Committee is a very important committee,
especially because it authorizes well over 60 percent, I think,
now of the budget, the United States budget. We could not do
anything that really meant anything if we did not have some
major subcommittee like Stennis's Military Preparedness
Subcommittee and Jackson's Military Construction Committee. The
Military Preparedness Subcommittee has a complete staff, with a
great many members, and they are all excellent people.
Now, everything is done just like when we testified. I used
to testify from the executive branch to committees. The
chairman of the committee is always the chairman of any
subcommittee, if he wants to be there. At times the chairman
would come in. If Mahon has a meeting and Cannon would come in,
he immediately would chair the meeting.
But from your standpoint, your health, the amount of work,
the way the world is today, I just do not think you can take it
and at the same time do a good job without impairment to your
health. I just could not be more serious about this.
One other point; just before I left, Doug MacArthur came
down to see me, and he was very upset about the Middle East.
That is the little subcommittee I happen to be the chairman of,
and he told me all about it and he said he felt that the
Israelis made a very serious mistake.
VISIT TO THE MIDDLE EAST
Well, I came back from the Far East last week through the
Middle East, and putting it mildly, in my opinion, they sure
did make a serious mistake. I spent a couple of days with Luke
Battle in Cairo, who is a very bright fellow and seemed to be
fully up on it, and has an excellent staff and then I went up
and had a long talk with Hussein in Jordan, who in my opinion
fully expects to be assassinated. He is our one great friend we
have out there.
I talked to Levi Eshkol and I did not pull any punches, and
I said, ``This is going to hurt you a lot more than anything
you have done since the state was formed in 1948.''
I talked to Abba Eban, I talked to General Moshe Dayan who
is out, the military hero.
I then stopped to talk in Athens--I spent a good many hours
with Walworth Barbour, the ambassador to Israel.
I went to Athens, and I had another break. In Athens is an
ambassador, a seasoned fellow who was formerly an assistant
secretary of state. Phil Talbot, our ambassador, and I spent a
good many hours with him, and he said, ``You see, the story
going around the Middle East and based on my experience is just
plain murder,'' he said. ``The Israelis attacked Jordan because
they knew Jordan was a friend of the U.S., but they did not
attack Syria or UAR, especially Syria, because they felt they
were friends of the Soviets,'' and also my impression was very
definitely that the UAR is moving quietly but definitely into,
further into, the Soviet bloc.
Well, these things are the kind of things, just thinking
out loud, if you could have some hearings on and just to get
information, because I noticed since I have got back that
everything that I did in Israel was very well covered by the
press, pictures in my own home town paper and that kind of
stuff, whereas there was none of it, you might say, on the Arab
side.
I am not choosing up sides. I do think they made a bad
mistake on this and their arguments are very specious as to why
they did it. I do think if we have any friend in the Arab
world, it is Hussein, and I do think he is in very serious
trouble.
So these are the kinds of things that if you held some
hearings, I think you could bring out and get a better grasp
of.
Just like I would sure like to see Albert get into this
disarmament thing and have some hearings about this situation,
because actually, without violating any security or anything,
the hearing that you, Bourke, and I went to the other day, I
was impressed with the fact that the information we got was not
coordinated or was not the same as the information released
recently by the Secretary of Defense to the American people on
that particular subject.
So you just have a lot of information floating around, and
if you do not fragment this committee into subcommittees with
some authority and some staff, always subject to the approval
of you and the full committee, I just do not think you can do
the job the way the world is today. End of statement.
COMMITTEE'S USE OF SUBCOMMITTEES
Senator Morse. I would like to have further discussion of
it at our meetings after the evidence is brought in. I want to
stress what Stu said in his last statement. My proposal does
not involve any independence of the subcommittees. My proposal
involves your approval in your capacity as chairman, and it
involves the approval of the full committee with regard to the
subject matters taken up. But once assigned to the
subcommittee, then the subcommittee will do what it does in
other committees, it acts for the full committee and reports
back to the full committee.
You know I never have hearings without sending each one of
you a letter inviting you to come to the hearings. I have not
talked to the staff. I have my information from other sources,
so I do not think it would be proper for me to involve the
staff in the inquiries that I have made. But I would like to
get all sides of it and all the facts.
I think you will find that of the major committees of the
Senate, the Foreign Relations Committee is the most
understaffed. The Foreign Relations Committee in a sense has
sort of a closed staff, a very small number of people, highly
qualified. There is no reason why a subcommittee should not be
authorized to select a subcommittee staff of two or three
people representing--serving both the majority and the minority
of the subcommittee as qualified as the people on the full
committee staff, with an expertise on the work of that
subcommittee, in the jurisdiction of that subcommittee.
SIZE OF THE COMMITTEE STAFF
My question to you is: Why is it that the Foreign Relations
Committee maintains as small a staff as we maintain when we are
up against the State Department and the Pentagon building with
almost unlimited staff to draw on? Why have we kept this staff
as small as we have kept it in comparison with other staffs?
Take the Labor Committee. We far exceed this committee, Armed
Services Committee, Stu has already stated.
I just want to say part of our problem is we do not have
the assistance that we need as members of this committee to do
our job, and I think we ought to change the staff policy of the
committee.
The Chairman. Well, I am very glad to hear this discussion.
What do you think over here on this side about it, Bourke and
George?
Senator Hickenlooper. I think you run a tremendous danger
just like other committees have run. I think a lot of these
committees have run just clear out of the reservation on their
subcommittees, vast staffs that they have set up, and they
become autonomous subcommittees practically. I think it is hard
to justify it except to give a lot of jobs to a lot of people
and a lot of autonomy to a lot of folks.
That is just the practical answer. You have asked me and I
tell you.
The Chairman. I want to know----
Senator Symington. Would you feel that way about it if you
had a Republican President and were chairman of this committee?
Senator Hickenlooper. I had thought about it during eight
years of the Eisenhower Administration.
The Chairman. George, what do you think?
Senator Aiken. Mr. Chairman, I try to practice what I
preach. I find in my own office that if they pushed up a little
bit to get their work done, they do a whale of a lot better
work than they do if there are too many people in the office.
Nobody wants to do it if they have one too many. But if they
are pushed up they take it and go and do it.
REPORTS OF THE LATIN AMERICAN SUBCOMMITTEE
Senator Hickenlooper. What Senator Morse said about his
Latin American Subcommittee, I have been on that subcommittee.
I have been on it ever since it was set up. I read every report
Pat Holt has put in about the investigations of these countries
in Latin America. I think they are more profound and more
penetrating than any subcommittee hearing that we could have
here on that subject.
Now, I don't mean to say we should not----
Senator Morse. But those very reports ought to be the basis
for a thorough and intensive study and investigation of the
subcommittee.
Senator Hickenlooper. He is very thorough and his
observations over the years have been very accurate.
Senator Morse. With all due respect to Pat Holt, he is no
substitute for the Senatorial responsibilities of the members.
Senator Hickenlooper. No.
Senator Morse. That is what you are going to make it if you
are going to turn the investigation over to the staff members.
Senator Hickenlooper. Not until there is reason to think
the staff member is inaccurate.
Senator Morse. But the point is he doesn't begin, his
reports don't begin to cover the type of study I am talking
about.
BACKGROUND ON STAFF AND SUBCOMMITTEES
Mr. Marcy. Senator, I might just remind the committee on a
little background on this.
In 1958, a subcommittee was created, of which Senator
Sparkman was chairman, to look into the whole staff problem. At
that time the committee, that is the subcommittee, recommended
to the full committee, that the present structure continue to
exist. At that time, it pointed out that the staff had six
professionals and eight clerical employees. The final
conclusion, except insofar as the subcommittee recommended the
addition of one employee to assist in the coordinating
functions in connection with the visits of distinguished
foreign visitors, that is Miss [Milrae] Jensen, it did not
believe that there should be any additions to the staff at the
present time.
Now, that was in 1958.
Senator Clark. Nine years ago. The world has sure changed
since then.
The Chairman. May I say, last year we utilized, I thought
very effectively, five ad hoc subcommittees, assigning certain
jobs to them, and they did a lot of work and reported a lot of
bills. The tax conventions, in particular, and claims
convention, legislation under Senator Sparkman.
I think we have got to move in some degree in this
connection. It is a question of how much, in my opinion, and
also it is not easy to get good qualified staff people. You
look around here and it is hard to get them, the ones that are
really qualified for this kind of work like our professional
staff.
Senator Pell?
BRINGING STAFF TO COMMITTEE MEETINGS
Senator Pell. There is another problem here along the line
of what Wayne said, which is that this is the only--it maybe a
very good idea, I haven't made up my own mind--but this is the
only committee, I believe, in the Congress where you can't
bring your own staff people in with you, and so when you have a
continuing responsibility on a specific subject that you are
following it leaves you a little scattered, because there is no
staff man you can talk to.
The Chairman. Harry Byrd never allowed one of my staff to
go to the Finance Committee. I don't think they do under any
circumstances.
Isn't that right?
Senator Dodd. We don't in Judiciary.
The Chairman. It is the custom.
Senator Dodd. We don't do it in Judiciary.
The Chairman You do not?
Senator Dodd. No.
The Chairman. I don't think it is peculiar at all.
Senator Pell. I am sorry.
The Chairman. Senator Dodd?
FOCUS ON BIG PROBLEMS AS A TOTALITY
Senator Dodd. I don't know whether it is improper or not
but I would like to hear from the staff, what they think about
this.
The Chairman. Sure, it is not improper. We have talked
about this before.
Go ahead.
Mr. Marcy. Well, Senator, this, as the members know, comes
up about every two or three years and it seems always to boil
itself down to a very fundamental question as to whether the
committee wants to focus on fairly big kinds of problems as a
totality, which is the way the committee has generally done, or
whether it wants to break up into sort of a series of
subcommittees, each going in sort of a different direction.
Senator Symington. That is not so.
Mr. Marcy. I might say that the staff has for some time
thought that it might be advisable to set up one or two, we
thought mostly in terms of one, one subcommittee which would be
kind of a continuing thing with a separate staff. It would be
assigned to specific kinds of things.
I think, for example, the problem would be illustrated if
we tried to hold hearings during the next two months on, say,
the subject of the Middle East, disarmament and the Alliance
for Progress. I think they need to be approached in sort of
separate way.
AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEES HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL
Senator Church. Mr. Chairman, I am generally in sympathy
with the position of the Senator form Oregon and the Senator
from Missouri. I think the experiment of the ad hoc committees
has been a rather successful one.
Furthermore, I don't think this committee is getting its
work done functioning as it has been functioning over the
years. I think that is quite evident in terms of the things we
haven't taken up, and in terms of the extravagant amount of
time we have had to spend on foreign aid and that sort of
thing.
So that we are not really penetrating many of these
questions as thoroughly as we should.
I think that in light, and this is no reflection on the
staff, I think this is the finest professional staff that I
know anything about, but in light of our experience with the ad
hoc committees, I don't see why we couldn't retain for the full
committee the most important things that we want to look at as
a whole committee, and give some of these subcommittees
assignments of a substantive character. Let them conduct
hearings; let them bring in their recommendations, and print
hearings for the full committee to review.
Senator Morse. Certainly.
Senator Church. And the full committee has the final say.
Set it up in such a way that we won't proliferate all over the
place. Establish the limits and give the chairman of the full
committee the final say concerning the work of the
subcommittees which they would take up.
Senator Morse. That is all I have asked for.
Senator Church. I mean this is a perfectly reasonable
request.
Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, may I make a comment?
The Chairman. Yes.
COMMITTEE HAS GAINED IMPORTANCE
Senator Gore. I think we are picking ourselves to pieces
here. I think introspection is good, but I would like to call
attention to one thing. We had a quorum this morning. Two years
ago the Chairman was complaining nobody ever attended meetings.
This committee has attained an importance in the last year that
it hasn't had in a long time. I think hearings before the
American people not only rehabilitated this committee in its
importance, but did more than anyone thing has done in a decade
to restore the co-equal status of the Legislative Branch with
the Executive. The public hearings we had, whether you agree
with what was said here or there or disagree, had an impact on
the American people no other committee of either house of
Congress has done since I have been a member of the body, which
has been 28 years now.
So I think that while we are finding fault with ourselves,
let us recall that what the committee as a whole did last year
was the single most important thing that this or any other
committee, in my opinion, has done in a long time.
So let us improve through ad hoc, through subcommittees,
through staff, but let us not forget that the most important
thing is this committee as a whole, playing its constitutional
function in the open before the American people.
Senator Church. I agree with that.
HAVE A SUBCOMMITTEE HANDLE NATO MATTERS
The Chairman. Let me say one thing. Last year I was more
than willing to have a subcommittee handle NATO and we got to
talking about it and it looked like we were downgrading NATO if
we don't have a full committee.
Remember that?
Should it be a full or subcommittee? I was for it and I
intended it for it. You went over there and when we got down
there they put it up to me, ``If you do that, it will look as
though you are not really interested in NATO,'' so they put the
pressure on me. I had to do it. That is what happened. I was
all for it.
Senator Church. That may have been a subject----
The Chairman. I mean this is what you often run into. On
these other things, the things I mentioned, there were five
subcommittees. No one thought those were so important that it
had to be full, and they went off very well and you did the
work well.
We can do that more. I am perfectly willing to do it. We
have already talked about this morning a subcommittee to meet
with Armed Services on these troops in Europe. I am all for it.
I think it would be a good idea.
Senator Church. I just wanted to say one thing. I should
think some of these U.N. conventions, for example, could be
taken up by a subcommittee.
The Chairman. I do, too.
Senator Church. And hearings held and printed hearings
distributed.
The Chairman. I do, too. I am all for this.
I do think if we move in this direction--last year I said
we will try these ad hoc and see how they work and if they work
well, we will do more of it.
I am all for it. I think we do have a couple of more staff
men, but they are hard to get. The committee did look over a
lot of them and you would be surprised how difficult it is to
get good ones.
Senator Clark. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make two
points.
EXERCISE OVERSIGHT FUNCTION
First, I would thoroughly agree the committee is not
getting its work done as expeditiously as it could and I think
the ad hoc device is an excellent thing, two or three members
well-informed and then report to the full committee for action.
So, as Senator Mansfield pointed out to all committee chairmen
including you, he believes this is a session where we ought to
exercise our oversight function, and a large part of this
committee is not legislative but oversight--Vietnam. NATO
hearings are an example.
The Chairman. That is an example.
Senator Clark. You cannot carry on more than one or two of
those things a year if you are going to have the full committee
do it, if you, Mr. Chairman, have to be the fellow out there in
the front all the time.
Now, it is true, the argument is made and to some extent it
is downgraded. But I call on my colleague from Oregon to point
out whenever they have a problem involving education they go to
the Senator from Oregon and not to the chairman of the
committee, Senator Hill, who is a wonderful magnificent
committee chairman I serve under. When they went to go to the
man on manpower problems, they come to me. But in the course of
a not too long period of time, you get the press oriented to
the fact the committee is organized so that most of the
committee work is done at a subcommittee level.
When you come to the full committee you have the most
gracious and able man in the Senate, of course present company
excepted, but we have to break down so the subcommittees can
have more status than they have now. It won't be done
overnight.
INACTIVE SUBCOMMITTEES
I have one more point. I serve on three subcommittees--
Disarmament, Economic Institutions and Tom Dodd's economic aid
problem. Those subcommittees have been pretty darned inactive
during the last two years I have been on the committees and why
have they been inactive--to some extent because the chairmen
have been too busy, but to a very large extent they have no
staff to organize witnesses, to handle it.
I think if you take those three subcommittees,
International Institutions, Disarmament, and Financial and
Economic Interests Overseas, one good staff man could start off
serving those three subcommittees as a start.
Now, Mr. William Bader has competence in that particular
area, and if we find that he can't do it by himself with those
three subcommittees maybe we ought to get more staff.
I don't have a shadow of a doubt that Wayne Morse has got
to have at least one man and maybe more to handle this Latin
American problem because Pat Holt can't do it.
GIVE FOREIGN AID BILL TO A SUBCOMMITTEE
The Chairman. Let me make one observation. You know the
Foreign Aid bill is long with this committee. What percentage
of those hearings were on foreign aid, you mentioned a great
number. About 30 or 40 percent. And it has disrupted this
committee for years. You know how much time it takes.
Senator Dodd. Couldn't you give that to a subcommittee?
The Chairman. Well, it has always been considered so
controversial and so difficult that the full committee handles
it. I would be perfectly willing to try a subcommittee.
Does everybody think that could be done with a
subcommittee?
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say,
first, my remark to Bourke was pretty fresh and I didn't mean
it that way and I regret saying it that way. I think he knows
how I feel.
I want to apologize for that crack. It really wasn't a
crack.
Senator Hickenlooper. Then there is no need to apologize
for it.
Senator Symington. Well, bless your heart.
The thing that worries me is, I am not a lawyer and nearly
everybody else here is, but I used to have a lot of experience
in management. For a good many years of my life, I went into
sick businesses and tried to work them out and they are still
going, if I may make that immodest remark.
ORGANIZATIONAL GROWTH
There comes a time when anything you do grows to a point
where you have to make major basic changes in organization, and
I say organizational structure along with it, functional
structure. You have to have an organization, reorganization of
your chart, and then you have to have a functional
reorganization. I know that they put a book out, the
Metropolitan Club had its 100th Anniversary and it said all the
members of the State Department were founders of it, and I
think 37 was the total members of the State Department in
Washington.
When my wife's grandfather was Secretary of State, John
Hay, at the turn of the century, there were just over a hundred
people in the State Department at that time.
The Chairman. The whole department?
Senator Symington. The whole department.
Senator Hickenlooper. They did pretty well.
Senator Aiken. That is good.
Senator Symington. We had the two greatest allies the world
has known, the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, too.
But to me it just seems as we watch the growth by hundreds
and hundreds of thousands, I think millions would be fair, of
the administrative branch and nobody has more respect for this
staff than I do and I always get a good rapid answer from Carl
Marcy or anybody else on the staff. It isn't that at all to me.
It is just a case of getting organized to handle the workload
which is infinitely more today, plus what Albert said about the
interests of the people.
THE COMMITTEE GOT PEOPLE INTERESTED IN FOREIGN POLICY
The one great thing that this committee did last year, it
got the people interested in the foreign policy of the United
States to an extent that they never even dreamed about, in my
opinion, that is when I get back to the hustings. It is going
to be much more, it is not going to be less, because now the
people are really interested in it and there is a lot of doubt
about this tremendous ground war in Asia, and a lot of
nervousness about this situation in the Middle East, and a lot
of work which has been done incidental to our occupation in
Europe and so on.
I know it is hard to get staff people, but I would say it
is a lot easier to get staff people into this problem today
than three or four years ago because there is a lot of interest
in it and good people follow where the interest goes. And I
hope this could be considered not as a criticism of the staff
and not as a criticism of the committee and, above all, not
criticism of you because you are the one more than anyone else
in the United States who has gotten the American people
interested in foreign policy.
A MANAGEMENT PROBLEM
I would hope it would be recognized on a management basis.
There is nobody I respect more than Bourke. He is your ranking
member, people like George Aiken next to him, nearly all over
there feel the way you do about most of these problems, the
senior members of the committee. We just have a management
problem on our hands and it was the kind of thing I was deep
in, it was my life's work 20 years ago, and I think we have got
to face up to the management problem.
The staff situation, a lot of things that could be done,
you could approve, have people, final approval, you could have
the top of your own staff consulted with your own final
decision on members of the subcommittee staff. Just thinking
off the top of my head it might be an excellent idea not to put
the subcommittees on television. God knows I wouldn't like to
try to get some real facts and dig in on the Arab-Israeli
problem on television and so forth and so on.
The Chairman. That would be explosive.
Senator Symington. There are a lot of ways that you could
bind this thing and the way the thing ran. This isn't the
committee with the least staff by any means, with all due
respect to my friend from Oregon.
The Agriculture Committee is a committee that has got for
my money much the least staff as against the money involved and
so forth and so on.
The Chairman. Finance has had no staff until this year.
Senator Symington. My experience on the Agriculture
Committee, I mean on the steering committee, and I know, Joe,
they spend their time up there, instead of fighting to get on
the committee, they spend their time fighting not to get on the
Agriculture Committee.
The Chairman. George wanted to say something. He has been
waiting here.
Senator Symington. I am all through now. But I think it is
a management problem here we are discussing today at least as
much as anything else.
The Chairman. George?
AD HOC VERSUS AD INFINITUM
Senator Aiken. I have been listening very attentively to
the discussion relative to ad hoc committees and the staffing
of ad hoc committees, and I am sure if they were well staffed
they would have some very interesting staff meetings.
But I also have a great regard for the intelligence and
education of my chairman and I wanted to ask him what is the
distance between ad hoc and ad infinitum.
Senator Gore. Mr. Chairman, getting back to the overall
thing----
The Chairman. I don't know.
Senator Gore. I guess you assigned me more ad hoc duties
last year than anyone.
The Chairman. I think more individual bills you handled
than any of them.
Senator Gore. Well, some of them we reported and the
committee acted upon in the Senate and some of them we reported
on unfavorably, and I think events have sustained us. I am
willing to do whatever you want me to do in that regard.
PROVOKING PUBLIC DISCUSSION
But, again, I repeat, the overall function of this
committee, as Stu Symington said, touched the American people.
It stimulated an awareness and a study. It provoked study and
discussion groups all over the United States.
I would like to see us conduct another hearing of a level
that would challenge the intelligent and public spirited people
of the country.
For instance, what are the valid indices of the great
decisions today of a preeminent world power. Are we stuck with
shibboleths, are there abstractions that have emotional and
political appeal on which we should not base decisions? Where
are we? What is our position in the world, and why?
It seems to me if you could get some of the eminent
scholars of the country once again, not to examine whether we
should or should not be in Vietnam, that is past, but to
examine the position of this country in the world of today's
technology, that we could once again play an important role in
public education and once again assert the constitutional
importance of the Senate.
STATE DEPARTMENT OPPOSITION TO AN EFFECTIVE COMMITTEE
Senator Morse. I want to say the Senator from Oregon is not
going to take the rap that he gets from certain quarters
because the subcommittee on Latin America is not conducting the
hearings it ought to be conducting. They should be conducted
and conducted under your jurisdiction. I am not asking the
subcommittee appoint staff but asking that you and the full
committee appoint them. I am pointing out that nothing I have
heard this morning justifies keeping the staff at its small
number. We can get people. Sure it is hard to get them. Sure we
can enlarge the staff by getting qualified people and we should
do it.
I want to say no member of this staff in my judgment can
serve as a substitute for the responsibilities of the
committee. Pat Holt makes very fine reports, but those reports
ought to be conducted under the direction of the subcommittee
and they ought to be subject to review by the subcommittee, and
we ought to be able to call people in and determine whether or
not they stand up.
I think they will stand up. But the State Department would
love to have some of these subcommittees continue to be
ineffective.
The last thing Rusk and Rostow and Gordon want is a vital
working effective subcommittee on Latin America, but you had
better keep your eyes on Latin America, may I say to this
committee, because you have got great problems and trouble
stirring themselves up in Latin America, and the subcommittee
should do the job on the subject and not Pat Holt, in effect
operating somewhat independent of the subcommittee. All I am
asking for is that you enlarge your staff, that you can take
complete jurisdiction over the subjects that will be taken up
by your subcommittee and that we get on with the job of doing
what--let's face it, this full committee is never going to do
in regard to the Latin American problem because you haven't got
time to do it, but the subcommittee can.
You would know when we would have our meeting, we wouldn't
be interfering with your jurisdiction. I would have them at
night, if necessary, but we would do the work.
But I only want to say as chairman of this subcommittee
that the full committee is letting down the subcommittee, in my
judgment, speaking as its chairman. I don't care how many
members on the subcommittee want to let the present
arrangements continue. It is not a good arrangement, and you
are not going to do the job on Latin America and you either get
a new subcommittee, if you want to get a new chairman, go ahead
and get him, but I want to say I am going to continue to
express why this subcommittee is not doing its job. It is not
doing the job because it isn't properly staffed.
AMERICAN RESPONSIBILITIES AS A GREAT POWER
The Chairman. Well, I certainly am glad to have this
discussion, and I will talk with the staff and see if we can
come up with some concrete suggestion and maybe look into the
matter of getting some more.
I don't want to go too far, but I certainly think we ought
to move in this direction and we will do it better.
I want to make a comment here, Senator Gore brought up a
question which was the last item on my agenda and the time is
almost running out.
The staff and I have been discussing this during this
interim and I think you are quite right. We had a general
subject that we are talking about called American
responsibilities as a great power, a general subject to survey
in some open hearings--of course we expect to start out in the
usual way with whatever the administration wishes to say on
this with Secretary Rusk and McNamara and others, that is the
foreign policy prospects for '67. In that anything may be
discussed, and this subject, general subject would be involved.
I wanted to raise this question with you, a subject, for
example, of this which we kicked around here at some length,
the nature of our commitments, this nature of our being
committed all the time.
A number of these treaties, the President last night
referred to them, and he is going to live up to all of them. We
made a great many treaties during the 50's, a review of this as
a part of this overall review of our relations as the greatest
power in the world today and what that means.
Another one was this man Edwin Reischauer is back. I have
been thinking about, I would certainly personally like very
much to have him. He ought to be as well qualified as anybody,
for example, to discuss our relations with the whole Pacific
area, not just Vietnam but he is especially qualified, it seems
to me, to testify about our relations with Japan, China, the
whole area of which Vietnam is simply one part.
Senator Symington. I couldn't agree with you more.
AN EXAMINATION FOR OUR OWN EDUCATION
The Chairman. This is the way we have been thinking about
it and it is what I wanted to bring up.
What does the committee think about it?
I think it is on all fours with what the Senator from
Tennessee stated. I completely agree with that. This is an area
in which the full committee----
Senator Gore. But an examination----
The Chairman. That is correct. My own view is not at all we
are attacking anybody. This is an examination for our own
education, our own benefit as well as the public as to what
kind of a role should the United States play under these
present circumstances, and this is a complicated matter. It
sounds vague but it is very real.
Senator Clark. Mr. Chairman, could I make one brief
comment?
The Chairman. Does this appeal to you?
Senator Symington. Yes.
Senator Clark. It appeals to me very much.
I would like to make one brief comment to my very good
friend Carl Marcy for whom I have the most profound admiration
as a magnificent chief of this committee, but I hope when he
starts to look around for a new staff man, Carl, we won't have
as one of the criteria a timid little Ph.D. who is prepared to
wipe the dandruff off the shoulders of members of this
committee. I think that is what you mean.
The Chairman. I don't know what you mean. Maybe Mr. Marcy
does.
[Discussion off the record.]
A COMBINATION OF ACTUAL EXPERIENCES
Senator Symington. I think it would be a wonderful thing to
get Reischauer. I stayed twice with him in Tokyo.
The Chairman. He is an example. I hope we can get other
people.
You necessarily, when you get outside of the government,
are going to be confronted with the difficulty of getting
people who have a combination of actual experiences, as he has,
plus a sufficient historical, political, social background and
so on, and that he can relate it to us. This is difficult to
get those people.
Senator Clark. We have no finer fellow on the staff than
Jim Lowenstein, with whom I spent a month with in Europe who is
absolutely terrific. He came to this committee from a good spot
in the State Department because he thought he could be more
useful here.
The Chairman. We have a new one we haven't used much who
will turn out the same way, and he is Bader. He was in the
State Department and it was partly because of Jim Lowenstein
and everyone seemed to agree.
Senator Pell. I came in and became a Senator. [Laughter.]
TESTIMONY FROM LOWER LEVEL OFFICIALS
Senator Morse. Bill, I don't know whether you can get--
whether protocol stops you or other restrictions do, but I wish
we could get in Edward E. Rice, who is our consul general in
Hong Kong, if our State Department will come and let him
testify in executive session.
The Chairman. It is a great problem.
I would like to have some of these lower level people. The
State Department seems to take the view the Secretary ought to
talk for them. They don't want their underlings to testify. I
hate to embarrass the underlings because they might fire them.
I would like to do it, personally. I agree with you.
Senator Morse. Carl Marcy can tell you if you get a
briefing that we got in Hong Kong from Rice, it is far
different from what the Secretary tells you when he comes in
here.
The Chairman. Well, I have the same feeling.
What can we do about it, as a practical matter?
Senator Symington. I can tell you what we can do about it.
We ran into exactly the same thing in the Armed Services
Committee, and I think I was the one who suggested first that
we put the witnesses under oath. Then we had the Preparedness
Subcommittee, under John Stennis, an able, fair, efficient
fellow, and these fellows come in and we tell him who we want
as witnesses. We don't let them tell us who we want as
witnesses, and we pull in two or three fliers in Vietnam and
they are under oath so they can go right back and say, ``You
don't want me to perjure myself, do you?'' And they come up
there and they give us more information in less time as against
all this stuff that we get from the Joint Chiefs, you see.
We really begin to cut the mustard as to what the facts
are.
DOVES AND HAWKS
One thing I don't know and that worries me a very great
deal, based on my relationship with this government, is whether
there is any accuracy in the fact that essentially McNamara is
a dove and essentially Rusk is a hawk and the degree of it. I
do know that when I talk to Walt Rostow who is now in a
protective position as part of the Executive Branch that he was
pretty darned hawkish, you see.
Well, I think it might be, I certainly would subscribe to
what Neil Sheehan wrote in the New York Times the other day
after this last trip of mine, not a dove but no longer a hawk.
When these fellows come down like the JCS they can't cross
a ``t'' or dot an ``i'' that isn't approved by higher
authority.
So it seems to me if we had a subcommittee operating on the
theory of getting the facts from less important people, and you
come in and run the committee any time you want to handle it
and call the people in here, I think to call in some of these
ambassadors from outside this country and if necessary put them
under oath.
TESTIMONY FROM JOURNALISTS
The Chairman. Let me ask you--I am glad to have this angle.
The other angle that bothers me--I would like to have
newspapermen. We went over this in the Dominican thing.
Does the committee feel that this is unfeasible?
Some of these people have more experience.
Senator Symington. I don't know, but I know one thing. You
have the right as chairman of this committee to ask anybody in
this government because we put the money up.
Senator Pell. I think you have the right to ask foreigners,
too.
The Chairman. We have never done it. These are the
precedents which this committee has had long before I came
here. It seems to me that we ought to have a little greater
freedom to ask anybody who appeals to us.
Senator Symington. I couldn't agree with you more.
The Chairman. These have been traditions, and I thought it
ought to be the decision of the committee.
Do you think we ought to contemplate, I will certainly
submit any of these changes to the committee, but shall we
investigate it, for purposes of discussion?
Senator Morse. I think so because we are entitled to give
the American people the facts they are entitled to receive from
any source.
JEOPARDIZING SUBORDINATE OFFICIALS
Senator Hickenlooper. This is the old story with this
committee and other committees to try to get in subordinate
officials to try to get them to testify when their own necks
are out eight feet. If they offend their superiors, they will
get their heads chopped off and you just put them there and put
them under the guillotine.
Look at [Otto] Otepka, sitting there in the State
Department being there for two years because he told the truth
to the [Thomas] Dodd committee and they just, they have got him
sitting over there, nothing to do and they are trying to get
rid of him, but they don't have a case against him.
You have got----
Senator Symington. In 1948, I bucked the Secretary of
Defense as Secretary of the Air Force. In 1949, Mr. Truman had
a meeting in the cabinet room and he said, ``I want everybody
here to support this budget whether they like it or not and if
they don't want to support it I want them to say so now.''
A lot of people in the room, but he looked at me the whole
time he was saying it, and I said, ``I just want to ask you one
question and then I will make up my mind. Are you asking me to
go up on the Hill and perjure myself?''
And he looked at me for about 15 seconds and he said,
``Will you give me your word of honor you didn't instigate the
question?''
And I said, ``I will,'' and he said, ``Go up there and tell
them what you believe.''
If you get these fellows and put them under oath and put
them--it is pretty tough if anybody above them, and we will
know about it soon enough if they are castigated for perjuring
themselves before this committee in order to follow a party
line.
Senator Hickenlooper. Stu, nobody knows better than you do
it doesn't happen the next week after they do it. It happens
two years later when they find themselves going down the hall
and pretty soon the door opens and they fall off and you can't
go back and prove it.
[Discussion off the record.]
Senator Gore. That has been a helpful session.
[Discussion off the record.]
PROSPECTIVE WITNESSES
The Chairman. I am going to ask Mr. Marcy to try to contact
these people along these lines, if you have any suggestion
about it. Some of them I mentioned, if this meets with your
approval, the Communist world in '67, some hearing on this
subject. I would like to have men like George Kennan and
Schulman who are the recognized authorities on that subject.
Does that suit you?
Senator Gore. Yes.
The Chairman. And Asia, the Pacific.
Senator Gore. We not only need to examine ourselves in this
world, but we need to examine our adversaries in this world.
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Gore. In order to determine our place.
The Chairman. And our relations to them, what they are like
and our relations.
Senator Gore. What are our dangers, prospects and
limitations.
The Chairman. For example, this subject has been suggested,
Asia, the Pacific, and the United States, that type of thing
may have a man like Reischauer, he is the best type of man I
can think of to best describe what is presently the situation
in Japan, the Far East. He is a long time scholar of China. If
anybody could interpret that situation, it seems to me he would
be as good as anybody.
But that is the type of hearing.
This is strictly educational, not intended to attack
anybody at all, simply the information of what it is like out
there, what these people think and what our relations to them
ought to be.
Does that make sense to you?
Senator Gore. Yes.
CHANGING AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD FOREIGN POLICY
The Chairman. And on down, the changing American attitudes
towards foreign policy. I mean what is going to here, our
attitude, what we are afflicted with, what limitations and so
on, and the nature of U.S. commitments.
We talked about this last year. It seems to me we ought to
clarify this matter.
I get so fed up with being told we are committed to
something all the time, which I don't think is so. What makes
the commitment is having the President say we are committed,
and I don't think that is what I mean by commitment. I think
the commitment is something that is taken by the Congress and
the Executive, not just a unilateral action.
Senator Gore. SEATO committed us to confer.
The Chairman. I think they absolutely misrepresent what
SEATO is. He repeated it again. Of course that is what Rusk has
been saying over the past couple of years. He didn't say it in
the beginning, but he is saying it now.
When you read what Dulles said SEATO meant it isn't what
they now say it means.
Senator Gore. It isn't what Rusk said at the beginning.
The Chairman. Well, if I understand it, that is the way we
will proceed. Who can we get on some of these? I would like to
have James Gavin again on that----
Senator Pell. Matthew Ridgway maybe.
The Chairman. And Ridgway. Who we can get.
Senator Pell. I think Ridgway is more coherent in his
arguments.
SCHOLARS AND GENERALS
The Chairman. Gavin we had, and I thought he did a very
good job. It is perfectly all right to have them both. The
reason I do is we naturally have to have so many scholars
because they are available and I would like to use whatever
generals we can to offset the attitude we are stacking these
hearings and not having generals.
Whatever generals that are called at all reasonably I would
like to have them not because I have such respect personally,
they are wiser than others, but to offset the emotional
prejudice in some quarters against the scholars.
Does that make sense to you?
Senator Pell. Perfectly.
The Chairman. The same with this fellow Griffith. He is a
scholar. He was as good as you can find among the generals, and
lived in China and he has a reasonable attitude. It offsets the
criticism they offered toward people like Fairbank and Bartlett
and others.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ John K. Fairbank, Professor of Asian History at Harvard, and
Ruhl J. Bartlett, Professor of Diplomatic History at The Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Marcy. Do you want to mention----
The Chairman. Did either one of you see Alf Landon's speech
that he made in Kansas three months ago?
Well, it is a remarkable speech. I couldn't believe it, and
I am all for having him. I never dreamed of having a fellow
like that but he made a speech I think you would thoroughly
approve of, and I think it would be very good politically to
have him sandwiched in among these scholars. The speech is
available if either one of you have time to read it. I am sure
you would approve it, and coming from that quarter it
absolutely knocked me out of my chair.
It is amazing, he is quite a fellow, at least from this
speech.
INVITE SUGGESTIONS FOR WITNESSES
Senator Gore. Why don't you invite all members of the
committee to suggest possible witnesses. We would not be
obligated to invite all, but out of the suggestions might come
a very helpful suggestion?
The Chairman. I have no objection other than the personal
relations. They have a feeling if they submit some, we have 19
members and if you don't take them they will be offended.
Senator Pell. I think you are right.
The Chairman. If they put in a friend or a fellow----
Senator Gore. I withdraw it.
In other words, I am asked to submit a man and then you
didn't invite him. I withdraw the suggestion.
The Chairman. You can get into awful serious trouble.
Last year the way we did it was this way, Albert, after
thinking about it. The way that was done--I didn't know a lot
of the people--I asked Carl and the fellow Robertson who is the
China expert in the Library, Far East, and Barnett of Columbia
who is a recognized authority. I didn't have anything really to
do with it. I didn't know most of those people. They got
together, surveyed the situation and tried to fit the man to
the subject and that is the way they were selected until the
very end when Bourke said to me, ``I think we ought to have
somebody on our side,'' and I said, ``These aren't on my side,
they are supposed to be the best there are.''
Well, anyway, that is the way we got the other three. It
didn't work too bad in this sense, Albert, because after we got
through these, then Bourke, we satisfied--he submitted those
three names and he was satisfied.
If we started out, I imagine we would have had 15 names,
Mundt's and various ones, all of them had submitted them and we
hadn't got them, I am afraid they would be mad.
But those three satisfied him.
What we want is not quantity but quality if we can get it,
the very best that we can get. I don't want to get just one
point of view. I would like to get people who have had
experiences who can give both points of view or whatever points
of view there are.
A NEW POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE
Senator Gore. Well, just as last year, as more or less of a
tangential effect of our Vietnam hearing, the hearing created a
new political atmosphere in which the administration had some
maneuverability with respect to China, it seems to me if we
could get the proper erudition on the subject many of the World
War II dogmas could be examined and I have an idea many of them
are not very valid any more.
The Chairman. I agree with you, I am sure.
Senator Gore. And yet we need the study ourselves, but
perhaps even more importantly for the American people.
The Chairman. That is right. That is what I meant. We ought
to be the forum for, the sounding board for these scholars and
thoughtful people who have no other way of reaching the
American people. I mean these people we had, Fairbank, nobody
ever heard of him. He could write a book or article or write a
speech and he wouldn't get beyond the 200 people who read him
but with this forum, in a way he reached millions of people,
and that is what I think we can do. It is a question of getting
people who really know this subject. I thought we did pretty
well: we had darned good people.
BUSINESSMEN AS WITNESSES
Senator Pell. In this connection, most of the witnesses we
had were scholars. I was able to get a passport validated for
an American businessman from Textron, a friend of mine, a
businessman. If he succeeds in getting in, somebody who can
speak firsthand as a man with considerable intellectual
curiosity, a lawyer, and he believes in opening up contacts
there, that would have even more of an impact.
The Chairman. You remember this man Blackie who was head of
Caterpillar? We had him on East-West Trade. He was smart and he
made a good witness. That is a top businessman in this country.
Senator Pell. Even better than a general.
The Chairman. He is one of the most successful businessmen
in the country with worldwide business and he made a good
witness on East-West trade. That is a thing which I think could
well be involved.
EDUCATING THE ADMINISTRATION
Senator Gore. Not only do we educate the American people
and ourselves but again referring, adverting to the China
hearings, I think the Administration got a little light on it
as much as we did.
The Chairman. The Administration needs it as much as we do.
Senator Gore. I believe they welcomed the effect and
reacted to it.
The Chairman. They do on China. They got miffed on Vietnam
because they thought it challenged their policy.
Senator Gore. I mean China.
The Chairman. I think that is correct.
TRIP TO CAMBODIA
Senator Pell. Speaking on firsthand knowledge, too, is
there any more on the trip to Cambodia? I talked to Carl about
it. I don't think there was. As I understand it, we are waiting
now a little bit on our dignity. Shouldn't we reactivate it?
Mr. Marcy. The latest on that was that the Cambodians
advised that we not press it, not respond affirmatively to
their invitation to come until Prince Sihanouk was back from
some medical treatment in Paris.
The Chairman. That is right.
He went to France.
Mr. Marcy. He is still in Paris. They expect him back some
time in February.
Senator Pell. Late January.
Mr. Marcy. I am sure we really can't get a reply from them
until he really does get back, but in late January or early
February it would be appropriate either for us or for them, I
think, to open the question again. We can do it simply by
telephoning New York.
Senator Pell. The reason I wanted to raise it is just
simply to get three senators to make plans to go two or three
weeks. The best time would be in January during a slack period,
and I didn't know.
The Chairman. Can I try out another idea?
Senator Pell. Couldn't we agree on this before leaving
this? Would it seem agreeable about making a phone call before
the end of the month?
The Chairman. Yes, inquire as to when.
Mr. Marcy. I think we ought to wait until the Prince is
back, because what they will do is to fire off an inquiry to
Cambodia.
Senator Pell. Let's find out from the State Department so
we will know when he is back.
The Chairman. State Department when he is back, and then
put the inquiry. Sure, that is right.
HAVE A HISTORIAN TESTIFY
We had a subject here, changing American attitude toward
foreign policy. This is kind of a historical thing, what do you
think about a man like [Henry Steele] Commager or [Arthur]
Schlesinger?
Senator Gore. Change and the need for change.
The Chairman. In connection with it. If it is not changing
enough, how it ought to change. This is more or less a
historical review type of thing in which I think is the process
of self-analysis along the line you are thinking that in order
to change, in order to see we have to analyze what we have
thought as to how relative it is to present conditions and how
it originated, the kind of a forum of self-analysis.
Senator Gore. May I make a suggestion? Does this appeal to
you----
[Discussion off the record.]
JUSTIFICATION OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM
The Chairman. Let me try another thing on you.
I say this if we have these hearings you can't keep from
appealing our involvements, and I think the issue for the
justification about our involvement is still the crucial one.
What bothers me and a lot of the people who don't like this is
I don't feel there is valid justification for our ever having
become involved and, therefore, the way they pursue it and so
on just doesn't go down with me. I think we are in a false
position, and the quicker we liquidate it in a reasonably
dignified manner the better. I don't think it is a matter
purely of manners, you might say, and dignity of a great
country. You just drop it and get out. You have to have an
acceptable form of negotiation to get yourself out, to
extricate yourself. As far as the hearings, Albert, I don't
want to announce them and don't want to say this is just
another Vietnam hearing. I want that to be developed as a part
of an overall examination of our relations and our
responsibilities as the most powerful country in the world to
the rest of humanity, is more or less the way I want it to come
up.
Does that make sense?
Senator Gore. Yes, you can't ignore it. It is a part.
The Chairman. It is a part but I don't wish to have it said
we are just again attacking this problem because the
administration will get its back up and the people will say I
am trying to pursue an old vendetta.
A LITTLE SELF-CRITICISM
Senator Pell. Couldn't we do it with a little bit of
modesty and criticism and self-criticism by suggesting we are
doing now what we should have done five years ago as far as
Thailand goes by doing that saying we should have done this in
Vietnam in '61 and didn't but we are going to do it, by God
now?
The Chairman. I have tried to be as contrite as I can in
the Tonkin Gulf and others. I didn't realize what we are
getting into, and I am quite willing to say I was shortsighted.
I had no idea that we were going to go this way.
Senator Pell. This would be a good opening.
The Chairman. That is honest with me. I had no idea. I
thought when I was on this and with this President, I thought
he was just as determined as I was to keep out of a major war
out there. That is what I believed in 1964.
Senator Gore. I assume that what the President said last
night--since we decided to send troops to Vietnam he was using
an editorial ``we.''
The Chairman. I think so. [Laughter.]
Does that meet with your general idea of how we should
proceed on this, on the people? I have got some others here.
Hutchins is very outspoken on this. These are people. Bob
Hutchins. This Eric Fromm has written a lot on this. Some
people think he is a Communist, I don't think he is, but I
don't know whether it would be safe to have him or not. He
lives in Mexico.
Senator Pell. Hutchins.
The Chairman. We will try to see what we can do.
[Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the committee recessed, subject
to call of the chair.]
THE WORLD SITUATION
----------
January 16, 1967
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman,
Mansfield, Morse, Lausche, Dodd, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper,
Aiken, Carlson, Williams, Mundt, Case, and Cooper.
Also present: Senator McGee, Assistant Secretary Douglas
MacArthur III, Deputy Assistant Secretary H.G. Torbert, Jr.,
Mr. Ernest Lindley, Special Assistant to the Secretary of
State, Major A.B. Outlaw, Department of Defense.
Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Holt, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Tillman,
Mr. Jones, and Mr. Lowenstein of the committee staff.
Mr. Chairman. Well, we will come to order.
We are very pleased this morning to have the Secretary of
State, but before we proceed, I want to welcome the new member,
Senator Cooper, from Kentucky.
We are very pleased, indeed, to have you on the committee,
and we are sure you will make a great contribution to the
deliberation of the committee.
Senator Carlson. We are delighted.
The Chairman. After seeing the new Republicans yesterday, I
am bound to congratulate them on the quality of their new crop.
Senator Aiken. We accept the congratulations.
Senator Cooper. I am glad to be on the committee.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, we are very glad to have you
and assume you would like to give us a kind of a rundown of the
general situation before we have questions, if that is
agreeable.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE
Secretary Rusk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen. I
would like to start by paying my personal compliments to
Senator Cooper. Not only has he had a very distinguished
service as a Senator, but he was one of our great ambassadors
in an earlier day, and I am proud to be associated with him on
this committee.
If it is agreeable, Mr. Chairman, I might comment fairly
briefly on certain important developments that have occurred
since the Congress adjourned and then go as promptly as
possible into comments and discussions and questions.
TURMOIL IN CHINA
First, I think perhaps the most important single thing that
is happening in the world today is happening in mainland China.
We believe that it is very important even though we do not know
exactly what is happening there. It is the kind of ignorance
which does not embarrass us too much because it seems fairly
obvious that the leadership in China is not exactly clear on
what is happening.
But the combination of a struggle among individuals with
regard to the succession to Mao and some ideological debates
within the top leadership that occurred last summer that we are
gradually becoming aware of, and perhaps some revival of
regional difference and regional influences in China have
created a situation of considerable turmoil.
I would caution members of the committee about drawing too
many conclusions too rapidly about the news, that is, the
normal press dispatches, particularly those that are based upon
posters in Peking, but we do know that there seems to be a
considerable struggle between the apparatus of the Communist
Party in China, or considerable elements of the apparatus of
the party, and the so called Red Guards under the leadership of
Mao Tse-tung, with the army playing a somewhat equivocal role,
perhaps in between.
SHIFTS IN CHINESE LEADERSHIP
Just to indicate the confusion that exists there reflected
in our own lack of understanding of exactly what is happening,
Lin Piao has not been heard from for about two months, since
November, even though Mao had nominated him to be his successor
and had highlighted his role up to this point. He has dropped
out of the picture temporarily. I can be incorrect by the end
of the day because he may reappear.
There was a report this morning that Liu Shao-chi, who was
demoted in the party, the chief of state, so-called, is out in
western China. If this is so, this could be of some importance
because we have had some indication that the regional armies
are playing something of an independent role here. We are
keeping this point in mind because Lin Piao has his army around
Peking and presumably he would have had a considerable
advantage in the Peking area. But Chen Yi, who was under attack
by the Red Guards, has long connections with an army which is
in the southwest of China, and the supposition is that he has
at least some independence of position because he has the
support of his own former army in another part of the country.
We do know that Chou En-lai seems to be trying to play a
mediating role among the different elements, and he is a fairly
key figure to keep your eyes on in this situation. If he is
able to bring Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi and some of these
different elements in some standdown on hostilities, then it
may be that the regime could be reconstituted, perhaps somewhat
weakened, on the basis that it existed say two weeks ago. But
the leadership, undoubtedly they are eyeing each other among
themselves.
We do know that there have been considerable acts of
violence in different parts of the country, that railways have
been interrupted, that factories have been shut down because of
strikes, that very large numbers of workers seem now to be
moving into Peking itself with divided loyalties, and almost
anything can happen.
POSTPONEMENT OF WARSAW TALKS
The most immediate impact upon us is that they have asked
us to postpone our next talk in Warsaw for two weeks for what
they call administrative reasons. It may be that the ambassador
there is going back to Peking or has gone back for a visit. It
may be there is some difficulty about what line he is to take
in issuing his instructions.
It is interesting to note that Peking's diplomats in about
25 countries have been going home in considerable numbers in
the last two weeks, indicating that they expected to be back in
their post in about 60 days. We, of course, are watching this
very carefully to see whether it might in any way be connected
with some foreign adventure somewhere. But the pattern does not
seem to indicate that, and it looks more like something
connected with the cultural revolution, perhaps indoctrination
of the diplomatic corps or purge of the diplomatic corps. We
just cannot yet say. But we would expect to have our next talk
with Peking in Warsaw in February. If that is postponed again,
I think that perhaps will be a reflection of the disturbances
going on in China.
Senator Aiken. When was the last talk?
Secretary Rusk. The last talk was, I think, in September.
NO ROLE FOR NATIONALIST FORCES
There is one point that has come into public attention I
would just mention in order to discount completely. That is,
any suggestion that the Nationalist forces on Taiwan have any
role to play here, or intend to play any role here, or have any
capability of moving onto the mainland to interfere in this
situation. This talk out of Taiwan is talk, and they have now
said publicly in the last few days that they acknowledge the
requirement of an agreement with us before they make any move
under the security and arrangements we had with them in the
middle of the fifties. They know we are not going to give them
that commitment, and I think that that situation is more talk
than anything else.
We have not yet seen any direct connection between the
events in China and in moves outward from China. There is
always the possibility that people who are in that kind of
trouble at home might try to unify themselves or try to divert
attention from their own problems through some international
adventure, but we do not see the displacement of military
forces or other indications suggesting that they plan to
intervene in South Vietnam.
RISK OF CHINESE INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM WAR
I noticed over the weekend a report from a French editor
that there was some sort of an agreement between Peking and the
United States on the basis of which they would stay out of
Vietnam, that is, if we would not attack China, that we would
not ourselves invade North Vietnam and we would not bomb the
dikes. I do not know of any such agreement. There has never
been any exchange on that between ourselves and Peking.
We have assumed that, of course, if we attack China we
would be at war with China. We have assumed if we were to move
land forces north of the 17th Parallel that that would raise
very substantially the risks of a Chinese intervention, but for
reasons of our own, including humanitarian reasons, we have not
had the intention of bombing those dikes in the Red River
Valley. They could cause very, very heavy flooding and ruin a
great many civilians up there.
But we have had the impression from time to time through
third parties that Peking's basic attitude was if we leave them
alone, they will leave us alone, and that certainly is all
right with us, but we do not know to what extent we can rely on
that.
All I am saying on the merits is there is something in
those three points mentioned by the French editor, but we are
not aware of any agreement or any communication from Peking to
that effect.
The closest thing to it was a comment passed along by a
third-country diplomat shortly after a press conference in
which I had said that the idea of a sanctuary is dead. I was
referring there to North Vietnam, but Peking said--told a
third-country diplomat, in essence, that if the United States
leaves Peking alone, they would leave us alone, but that was
about a year and a half ago, and coincides somewhat in time
with the events allegedly spoken about by the French editor.
EFFECT OF CHINESE EVENTS ON HANOI
Now, on Vietnam, Mr. Chairman, we do not see that the
events in mainland China have significantly affected the
Vietnam situation with possibly two exceptions. One is that
there seems to be some reaction in Hanoi against the events in
China. The speculation is to the point as to whether events in
China are giving Hanoi any larger freedom of action in this
situation, whether that might open up possibilities for
contacts that did not exist before.
Secondly, we do have contacts and----
[Discussion off the record.]
Secretary Rusk. I cannot report----
HANOI'S READINESS TO TALK
Senator Hickenlooper. May I ask the Secretary, has it not
been characteristic of wars in the past when one side is losing
and feels it is on the verge of collapse, then it wants to talk
and is willing to talk? Is there anything significant in the
fact that the rumblings out of Hanoi seem to be a little more
conversational than they were in the past?
Secretary Rusk. I would not want to leave the impression,
Senator, that the contacts that have existed lately really are
pointed toward a readiness or desire to talk. There are a good
many things that have been put to the other side from our
direction that have had no response. That might change at
almost any time.
There are those who think they may be somewhat more willing
to talk, but we have not been able to dig that out in any fully
satisfactory way, and, in general, the answer to your question
is yes.
WHETHER THE UNITED STATES REFUSED TO TALK
The Chairman. How about our situation, we were told two
years ago that you--we refused to talk because we were losing.
It was just the opposite.
Secretary Rusk. That is not correct, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Which is not correct, that we were told it or
it was not true?
Secretary Rusk. I mean what you were told was not correct.
The full story of that is not on the record, and one of the key
witnesses there is now dead, Adlai Stevenson. There were
contacts before, during, and after that particular episode with
the other side. We were misled as to the channels that were
being used during that period.
I was told, for example, that the Soviet Foreign Office
knew nothing about this, that this was not known to the Soviet
ambassadors and Mr. Gromyko and so forth. Then a year or so
later I was told this had been actively discussed with Mr.
Andrei Gromyko during a period when I was regularly in touch
with him and the matter did not come up, and I was told under
no circumstances should we raise it. Further, we did tell the
Secretary General if he had a channel to go back and explore it
and try to develop it further and see more about the situation
with whom one talks and what about. Insofar as I know, he never
did that.
Adlai Stevenson, the week before he died, on the BBC in
London said that he was never very clear about with whom the
talks were supposed to be held and on what subject.
Now the problem about surfacing that whole business is that
it would get in the way of contacts through the Soviet Union.
Hanoi has flatly and categorically denied it. The possibilities
of channels of the sort that were discussed at that time have
been further explored without results, and we prefer to deal
with this kind of a question with regard to the future rather
than trying to just rehash the past.
But the story, as I knew it, is not the one that is
generally talked about in regard to that episode.
CESSATION OF THE BOMBING
The principal point that is being raised now in contacts is
the question of a--is an unconditional and permanent cessation
of the bombing. I point out those two words because this is
rather different from what was said last autumn. Last autumn
the suggestion was made in a number of quarters, including
Communist quarters, that a suspension of the bombing for a
period of time might make it possible to develop the basis of
discussion of some more toward negotiations, and we suspended
the bombing for twice as long as had been suggested to us by
key elements on the other side, and without result.
Now, the price has gone up very considerably. They are
saying unconditional and permanent or they say unconditional
and definitive or, in that Harrison Salisbury view,
unconditional and for good. That is a rather different problem
than a temporary suspension.
The other side has told us that the temporary suspension is
nothing but an ultimatum; that this matter has to be taken up
on the basis of a complete and permanent stoppage.
At the same time we are not able to get anything from the
other side at all about what they would do if the bombing
stopped, and we have been probing on that point, continue to
probe it, are doing so now, as to what the effect would be.
U THANT'S THREE POINTS
Secretary General U Thant has his three points. The first
that we stop the bombing. The second, there be a mutual de-
escalation, and the third, there be negotiations with the Viet
Cong.
We have said so far as the first point is concerned, okay,
what about the second point? On that there has been nothing,
Hanoi has rejected U Thant's second point, mutual de-escalation
of the violence, and has said with regard to U Thant's third
point that the Viet Cong, the National Liberation Front, is the
sole spokesman for the South Vietnamese people.
Those who call upon us to accept U Thant's three points
usually do not take into account the fact that Hanoi has
already categorically rejected points two and three. We
continue to try to find some sort of an indication or
suggestion, informal or otherwise, private or public, as to
what the result will be if we stop the bombing and no one yet
has been able or willing to tell us what that could be.
FIVE YEARS SUSPENSION
The fact that they are calling for a permanent stoppage of
the bombing makes it a very serious problem, because we have
had now, experiences with three periods in which there was no
bombing, five years, five weeks, five days, and we know that
the infiltration simply continued.
Senator Mansfield. Mr. Secretary--Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rusk. Yes.
Senator Mansfield. What do you mean five years suspension?
Secretary Rusk. Well, there was no bombing for five years
from 1960 when they announced publicly they were going to seize
South Vietnam. They moved the entire 325th Division of the
North Vietnamese Regular Army into South Vietnam before we
started the bombing. During that five-year period when there
was no bombing of North Vietnam, we went to the Laos
Conference, we made major concessions, as some persons saw it,
took the Soviet nominee to be prime minister of Laos and
accepted the coalition government worked out among the three
elements there. We got no exchange for that, no performance
whatever on the other side with respect to North Vietnamese
troops in Laos or the use of Laos as an infiltration route to
the south, or ability of the coalition government to function
in Laos or the ability of the ICC to function in Laos. During
all that period there were literally hundreds of contacts with
the--in South Vietnam and there we did not see any peace in
South Vietnam.
Senator Mansfield. Mr. Secretary, I think you are going
back a long way and stretching it pretty thin when you use the
five years, five weeks, and five days analogy, because in 1960
how many troops did we have in Vietnam?
Secretary Rusk. We had----
Senator Mansfield. Very few.
Secretary Rusk. We had about 600 and a military aid mission
there.
Senator Mansfield. We had no air forces of any kind, and I
am not at all sure we were even instructing the South
Vietnamese air force. If my information is correct, and it is
from the Defense Department, the organized cadres did not come
down from the north until 1964. At that time they were
identifiable, and I think I can reinforce those figures and
that fact.
Secretary Rusk. You mean organized units of the North
Vietnamese Regular Army?
Senator Mansfield. Yes.
Secretary Rusk. Well, that is different than cadres, I
think, Senator, because they were infiltrating cadres including
North Vietnamese long before 1964. Organized elements of the
North Vietnamese Army, I think I would agree with you.
Senator Mansfield. Cadres and organized units and, if my
memory is correct, the figure was 400 at the end of 1964, and
that figure was supplied to me by the Department of Defense.
U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF SOUVANNA PHOUMA
I note that you call Souvanna Phouma the Soviet nominee for
prime minister of Laos who we decided to accept after we had
rejected and kicked him out two years previously, which was a
serious mistake on our part, as a result of the Geneva Accord
on Laos.
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Mansfield. Was Souvanna Phouma not our nominee,
too?
Secretary Rusk. He came to be when we accepted him, but
there was another prime minister that the Eisenhower
Administration had recognized in 1960.
Senator Mansfield. That is true, and during that time I
think we had a very large part to play in ousting Souvanna
Phouma, undermining his position, and helping to create the
situation which developed in Laos in those years, is that
correct? I think your ambassador had something to do with it at
the State Department.
Secretary Rusk. I think there is something in that, yes.
Senator Mansfield. That is all, Mr. Chairman. I will have
something else later.
The Chairman. Proceed, Mr. Secretary.
STEPS TOWARDS NEGOTIATIONS
Secretary Rusk. Well, the key question in Vietnam at the
present time is the question of whether we can get steps taken
by both sides to move this matter towards a peaceful solution
either at the conference table or through negotiations or de
facto. And at the present time I cannot report to the committee
we have had any indication from the other side what any
reciprocal step might be, although there are many
opportunities, many ways, many channels by which that could be
taken up.
FRANCE AND NATO
As far as that is concerned, there is a pretty clear
understanding now between the 14 on the one side and France on
the other as to where the dividing line is and those NATO
matters in which France will participate and will not
participate. The 14 have constituted themselves into a defense
planning committee. France does not attempt to interfere in the
activities of the 14, or to veto or obstruct what the 14 feel
that they must do.
France, on the other hand, does take part in the political
discussions that go on in the council of the 15, and there
seems to be a pretty clear understanding now as to just where
one starts and the other leaves off.
At our last NATO meeting it was a good business-like
meeting, and I think we transacted our business more
efficiently than we have for some time, the 14 dealing with the
military and the 15 taking up the political matters.
I think the most interesting thing is the full exploration
which is being made by practically all of its members on
relations with the east.
We had before us at our last NATO meeting a report, I
think, that has been made available to the committee, a report
of contacts between members of NATO and Eastern European
countries of a period of about six months, and there were about
185 of those contacts in terms of exchanging visits or exchange
of visits or exchange of delegations and things of that sort.
GERMANY AND EASTERN EUROPE
It is quite interesting to see that the new government in
the Federal Republic apparently has decided it is going to
explore the possibilities of improved relations with Eastern
Europe. There are delegations in Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and
Poland to look at that situation. They apparently have come to
the conclusion that 20 years of harsh confrontation has not
moved them any nearer reunification or settlement of the German
question, and they are prepared now to explore the possibility
of improved relations to see whether that might not reduce the
fear of the Germans among some of the small Eastern European
countries, open up better contacts between West and East
Germans and perhaps bring about a political situation
atmosphere in which some movement can be made in the direction
of reunification.
SOVIET ROLE IN VIETNAM
Let me say as far as we are concerned, we were interested
that when Gromyko came to the United Nations Assembly last year
and visited Washington briefly, as well as from contacts we
have had with him since then, is that the Soviet Union has not
taken the view that because of Vietnam there is nothing to
discuss. They have been prepared to sit down and talk about
particular issues with us despite Vietnam.
[Discussion off the record.]
Secretary Rusk. If you want to refer to this problem on the
public record, you can go back to the Bucharest communique of
the Warsaw Pact countries in July in which the Eastern European
countries called upon the U.S. to comply with the 1954 and 1962
agreements. Our answer to them was, ``all right, we agree to
that, let's get going.''
The difficulty is that Moscow does not feel that it is in a
position to take a public political initiative with Hanoi in
such things as calling a conference or authorizing the ICC to
take up some of the chores that we would hope it would take up,
because it seems to be immobilized by the problem with China
and also somewhat handicapped by its relative lack of influence
in Hanoi itself.
So we have felt that we ought to go ahead and try to
discuss other subjects with the Soviet Union, to see whether we
find other points of agreement.
CONSULAR AGREEMENT
As you know, we did conclude a civil area agreement, We
hope very much that the Senate will find it possible to approve
the consular agreement during the present session. In passing,
Mr. Chairman, let me repeat here, from our point of view at the
present time what is important about that treaty is not the
possibility that we might open up consulates. That we could do
today under existing legislation, one consulate in one place
and one consulate in another. Ninety-five percent of our
interest in this treaty is in those provisions providing
consular access and protection for American citizens traveling
and living in the Soviet Union. I told the committee when we
were discussing that earlier that as far as consulates are
concerned, we would be prepared to consult further with the
committee before moving to establish the consulates, but we do
have need for consular access to American citizens. They are
traveling in the Soviet Union in larger and larger numbers.
Many of our tourists, despite certain education we try to give
them before they go, do some of the things in the Soviet Union
that tourists do in many countries such as manipulating
currency and picking up souvenirs and things of that sort, and
it makes it very difficult for us to give them reasonable
protection without the formal agreements of a consular
convention.
Senator Hickenlooper. At that point, Mr. Secretary, if you
would care to comment----
Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir?
GIVING RUSSIA MOST FAVORED NATION STATUS
Senator Hickenlooper. With me, the one hurt under the
saddle of this consular treaty is why do we have to give the
Russians under the Most Favored Nations clause extend to all
other countries, 20 or whatever it is, immunity from
prosecution for crime by the employee nationals of a country. I
could go as far as the consular official, something of that
kind, although we do not do it to any other country. We will
have to extend it under the Most Favored Nations clause, as I
understand it. Why do we have to do it with the Russians?
Secretary Rusk. I think the point on which a judgment will
have to be made, Senator, is whether our interest in the
reciprocal privilege is not stronger than their interest on
this point. You see, our problem with our own employees in the
Soviet Union is a far more severe one than problems we would
have here, but this is one of those questions on which----
Senator Hickenlooper. That is the thing that is unclear to
me.
I cannot rationalize that in my own mind nor can I quite
understand the reason for it. Go ahead.
Secretary Rusk. That is right. Let me get some material
down on that in the terms of numbers and in terms of our
interest on----
Senator Hickenlooper. I think we have numbers on it. I
think I have numbers in my files on the thing and that is what
mystifies me. The more information I get, the more I am
confused, so I do not know, maybe I had better just stay as I
am.
Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, I do think he ought to provide
the rest of us, however, with the memorandum, because I do not
have the figures.
Secretary Rusk. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. We had some figures, but maybe we ought to be
brought up to date. We had some.
Senator Morse. In the committee file?
The Chairman. Yes, about the number of Americans going
there and Russians here, showing in my view we had much more to
gain than they did by giving this protection.
Senator Hickenlooper. Also the number of immunities we
grant. It is my understanding that there would be 400 and some.
I do not mean to get into an extended discussion of it, but
there would be 400 and some other employees.
The Chairman. That could be mutually controlled.
Senator Hickenlooper. By other countries which we would
have to extend to consulate officials and employees who are
nationals of the sending country.
Secretary Rusk. Well, Senator, the point--I realize you do
not want to go into that in great detail, but on the matter of
Most Favored Nations treatment for other countries, that would
only occur where they would be prepared to give us reciprocal
arrangements. We know some of these other countries are not
interested in giving us that privilege. Therefore, this would
not come into operation. So, we will have to try to find out
informally if we can----
Senator Hickenlooper. Perhaps some of them would not ask
for it.
GERMAN RELATIONS WITH FRANCE
The Chairman. Were you going to say something more about
the Germans?
Secretary Rusk. Yes.
The Chairman. I thought you were going into this recent
meeting of Kurt Kiesinger and Charles de Gaulle. What is your
interpretation?
Secretary Rusk. Our interpretation of that is that the new
German government wants to find out whether it can get a more
relaxed relationship with President de Gaulle. They felt that
they were caught up--the Germans felt they were caught up in
some sort of special bilateral issue between Paris and
Washington. There probably were some feelings on President de
Gaulle's part about the role of the United States in Europe as
well as in other world affairs, but basically the issue was
between President de Gaulle and the other 14.
It is our impression that the new German government will
try to move on those points where it can move with France, but
within the limits of a basic commitment to NATO, and without
creating a big gap between Bonn and the United States and some
of the largest issues.
We ourselves have told the Germans and the French that the
United States has a basic interest in good relations between
Germany and France. After all, two world wars came about
because these two countries started fighting each other.
We do believe that it is important that Germany improve her
relations without going down the same route as President de
Gaulle in certain subjects, particularly, for example, NATO,
but we will have to see.
I think the atmosphere at this last meeting was good, but I
do not have the impression that the Germans changed underlying
basic policy toward NATO.
What was important, I think, Mr. Chairman, is that de
Gaulle, as well as we, have encouraged the new German
government to explore the possibilities of improved relations
with the East on the ground that we have tried over a period of
20 years another approach, the Adenauer approach in effect. Now
another approach might be more promising for the longer range
future, depending a good deal, of course, on what the reaction
of Eastern Europe would be.
I would like to come back to that from two or three
different points of view, if I may, and I am going to try not
to take too much of your time, but I think the committee would
be interested in the present state of play of the
nonproliferation treaty.
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY
The parliamentary situation is that there is no agreement
between the United States and the Soviet Union as yet on
particular language for a nonproliferation treaty. However,
there is some language which we think the Soviet Union would
probably accept which might be acceptable to us, depending upon
the consensus we might reach among allies. It is very important
that you understand that we have not agreed with the Soviet
Union, but that we are discussing this language with our
allies.
The language itself, and I will pass this around the table
for anyone to see, the language itself stems right out of our
own national legislation in this field. Each nuclear weapons
state, party to this treaty, undertakes not to transmit to any
recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other explosive devices
or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or
indirectly.
As I say, that is what our national legislation at present
says.
I think it is quite important that if this language becomes
acceptable to note that a good deal of underbrush has been
worked out and cast aside. For example, the Soviets agree that
we are talking about warheads and we are not talking about
delivery vehicles and that is a very important advance.
Secondly, they agree that they are not talking about what
happens in case of war, in which event a treaty of this sort
disappears. The Soviet allies in Eastern Europe have delivery
vehicles and, in the event of war, presumably warheads would be
made available to them. The same thing would happen in NATO if
that terrible situation ever came about. Third, they are not
talking about how an alliance makes the overriding political
decision to go to war, which seemed at one point to be part of
the problem.
A METAPHYSICAL POINT
We have discussed centering around an almost metaphysical
point. Mr. Gromyko illustrated it with a little diagram in
which he said that a nuclear power should not transfer nuclear
weapons to a non-nuclear power.
All right, no difficulty about that.
Secondly, that a nuclear power should not transfer nuclear
weapons to non-nuclear powers through an alliance.
No problem on that.
Then we got into difficulty when he said and cannot
transfer weapons or control over them to an alliance itself,
that is stopping there. And this got into all sorts of
metaphysical problems about just what is the alliance apart
from its members, and got confused with the question of the
political decisions of an alliance, about whether to go to war
or not and matters of that sort.
This language here that I just mentioned seems to cut
through that and concentrate on the hardware, the actual
nuclear warheads.
Now, we have discussed this and I would appreciate it very
much if members of the committee would make no reference to
this outside because we have discussed this with the four
members of NATO who are members of the Geneva Conference, that
is, the other three, Britain, Italy and Canada.
We are also discussing it with the Germans, and we are also
discussing it in a preliminary way with the Japanese.
We will shortly be discussing it with the rest of the NATO
members.
ACCEPTABLE TO GERMANY
I am encouraged to believe that at least as far as the NATO
countries are concerned, including Germany, this is probably
going to prove acceptable and, therefore, I think we can
assume----
Senator Lausche. Did you say it will be acceptable to
Germany?
Secretary Rusk. That is the present indication. They have
had some problems about such things as the European Clause,
reserving a right for a unified Europe to have its own nuclear
force. But it now seems clear to them that if a unified Europe
comes about through the political consolidation of the present
European members that it would be a nuclear power through
direct succession from France and, say, Great Britain. That if
there are other arrangements which may come 10, 20 years in the
future that they could invoke the review clauses that would be
in such a treaty or if necessary, actually withdraw from the
treaty.
Let me say, that we will be in consultation with the
appropriate committees of the Congress on this before any
agreement is given to any language that might be developed
here.
But I just wanted to let the committee know we think there
has been some movement.
PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES
But there are two other problems that are of major
importance in the nonproliferation matter that you should know
about. One is that the non-nuclear countries, such as India and
Japan, are going to raise or likely to raise some very, very
difficult problems. For example, both of them say, ``Well, now,
it is all very well to get rid of nuclear weapons or for us to
foreswear nuclear weapons, but we need to reserve the right to
have nuclear explosives available for peaceful purposes.''
Nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes is a bomb for all
practical purposes. We hope to be able to work out among the
nuclear powers, at least some of the nuclear powers, a
procedure by which we can make peaceful uses of explosives
available to non-nuclear countries, under some arrangements by
which you make a judgment on its feasibility and desirability
and so forth. So, if Mauritania wants a harbor and applies to
the nuclear powers to explode a device there and dig them a
harbor, there will be some way in which this can be done.
Otherwise, some of the non-nuclear countries are likely to use
this at least as a pretext for not coming into this treaty.
Secondly, there is a very difficult question about
safeguards. We feel ourselves that this non-proliferation
treaty would be a very important instrument which to deal with
the safeguards problem. When you look ahead over the next
several years, with the rapid developments of nuclear power,
there is going to be enough fuel lying around to make a
considerable number of bombs a day within the next decade or
so, or by 1980, and so a general application of a safeguard
system is extremely important.
The Soviets are more or less disinterested in safeguards in
this situation. But they, I think, would take it, provided we
could all take the IAEA safeguard, the Vienna safeguards.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ International Atomic Energy Agency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
THE EURATOM PROBLEM
Then we run into the Euratom problem because the five
members who are members of Euratom are unwilling to accept IAEA
rather than their own safeguard, worked out among them. In that
matter France has a veto. So, I want to alert you to the fact
even though we got agreement on Article I, there are tough
problems remaining. We need to do something about.
Senator Clark. Mr. Secretary, are all five of those
countries strongly opposed to IAEA?
Secretary Rusk. No, Senator, you are quite right. I think
four out of the five would probably accept IAEA safeguards.
Senator Clark. Are you sure France would not?
Secretary Rusk. This is being tested, now. But the trouble
is their attitude toward a non-proliferation treaty is frigid.
[Discussion off the record.]
Secretary Rusk. The present indication is they would not
now sign a non-proliferation treaty although they might do it
at a later stage. They tell us they won't get in the way of a
non-proliferation treaty, but that is about as far as we can go
along this line.
Mr. Chairman. I talked a little longer that I had planned
to.
SITUATION IN ISRAEL
The Chairman. Just one other subject before you go on. I
wonder about Israel. There seems to be, from this morning's
press, a very dangerous situation there. Could you say a word
about it?
Secretary Rusk. The issue at the present time centers along
the Israeli-Syrian border. There are three elements in the
problem in terms of repose in the area. One is the activities
of a Fatah organization of terrorists, who we think are not
directly and actively supported by any of the governments
concerned. Particularly not by Jordan, who has been trying to
operate against them but who use Syrian and Jordanian territory
for acts of sabotage and terror over the Israeli border.
On that particular point, Jordan and Israel have greatly
increased their police action on their respective sides of the
border to try to deal with that activity as a police matter.
There is a more complicated matter between Israel and
Syria. At the time of the armistice, Syrian forces were
occupying a strip within the historical boundaries of the
mandate. Under the armistice, Syrian forces withdrew from that
strip under demilitarized regulations. Israel claims since this
was territory within the mandate and is Israeli territory, and
they claim to exercise sovereignty over the subject as to
demilitarized regulations.
The Syrians claim this has never been legally established,
and so you have both Israeli and Syrian farmers in this strip.
Arms are fired into the area from the Syrian side typically,
with response from the Israeli side. Israelis patrol on
occasion in this area with their own armored vehicles, so you
have a continuation of this particular kind of struggle.
DO NOT EXPECT A MAJOR WAR
I don't myself, think, sir, that this is likely to lead to
a major war.
The Chairman. You do not?
Secretary Rusk. Athough--because I don't think, for
example, the Syrians are particularly interested in it. We know
the Israelis are not interested in a major war in this
situation, but it is a very troublesome problem as to how you
handle these repeated acts of terror back and forth across the
border, particularly in that area.
General Bull, the head of the U.N. force out there, is
trying to make some arrangement--the Arabs would say, ``Let the
U.N. forces take charge in this demilitarized area and provide
the police forces,'' while the Israeli and Syrian farmers go
ahead with their agricultural work. As a matter of fact,
farmers on both sides apparently get along pretty well until
somebody from outside the demilitarized zone starts shooting in
from outside the area.
But that is about the situation, Mr. Chairman. It is tense,
but we don't----
The Chairman. You don't expect a major war?
Secretary Rusk. We don't expect a major war.
U.S. OBJECTIVES REGARDING CHINA
The Chairman. I wonder, you started out on China and you
said you thought it was probably the most important matter at
the moment, I wonder if you could briefly say what our attitude
or policy is toward China. What is our objective with regard to
China at the moment or to put it another way, is our policy to
continue nonintervention and to continue all possible means to
exclude them from the U.N. and so on? Would you say just very
briefly what our attitude is?
Secretary Rusk. I think our principal problem we have with
China is the one which a foreign minister of an eastern
European country described as moving Peking to peaceful
coexistence and the issue we have in trying to organize a
durable peace in the Pacific Ocean basin.
But as far as Peking is concerned, the key question turns
out to be always the attitude toward Formosa. In our bilateral
talks with them, as I have indicated to the committee, before
they start and end with a statement by the Peking
representative that ``There is nothing to discuss unless you
are prepared to surrender Formosa,'' and when we say we can't
surrender these 13 or 14 million people contrary to their will,
then nothing else happens. That is, we have tried to talk about
disarmament, tried to talk about Southeast Asia, exchanges,
exchange of plant material, for example, relevant to the food
problem and things of that sort, scientists, scholars, newsmen,
and so forth.
The same issue remains in the United Nations. The question
of what to do about Peking is coupled with the question of what
to do with the Republic of China. If we are not prepared to
surrender Formosa, then Peking is not going to talk to us
bilaterally about serious matters in any responsible sense. If
the United Nations is not prepared to expel the Republic of
China, then the problem remains about where it is.
We are continuing our contacts with Peking, but it comes
back to that question as to what you do about the 13 or 14
million people there, as well as in the longer run, what their
attitude is going to be toward what the Soviets call peaceful
coexistence.
The Chairman. You sum up there is no change in that
situation, no movement?
Secretary Rusk. No present change indicated.
The Chairman. No present change.
Secretary Rusk. For the reasons I stated.
U.S. OBJECTIVES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
The Chairman. Could you restate for the record the
objectives of our policy in Southeast Asia? What is it we are
seeking now to achieve there?
Secretary Rusk. We should like to see an accord with our
treaty commitments there through a situation in which in the
first place our allies are safe and secure, in which the
smaller countries of Southeast Asia are free to live their own
national existence under what policies they wish, but living in
peace with their neighbors across their frontiers. We have said
many times we consider that as far as what used to be Indo-
China is concerned, we consider the 1954 and 1962 agreements to
be an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia. That if the
movement of men and arms from North Vietnam to South Vietnam
would stop, we could work out the peace very quickly, and we do
believe those '54 and '62 agreements do provide such a basis.
But that the countries with whom we are allied in Southeast
Asia, that means the Philippines and Thailand, ought to be free
from molestation.
We have no objection to their being non-aligned if that is
their wish. We supported the non-alignments of Laos and of
Cambodia, of Burma, any of those countries that want to be non-
aligned, but we are concerned about the stability of peace in
the area.
THE FOURTEEN POINTS
I have, Mr. Chairman, made a few notes on the so-called 14
points that were used last year as they have developed during
the course of the year, and I will be glad to pass those around
for anyone who wishes to have a look at them.
We have not released these to the press in their present
form, although I think everything that is on these three pages
has been said publicly at one time or another, but Mr. Marcy
might want to have these.
SEATO OBLIGATIONS
The Chairman. One reason I asked you that was because I
heard a part of your appearance on that early morning show, I
think a week or maybe ten days ago.
Secretary Rusk. Today Show.
The Chairman. Perhaps, and you correct me if I misstate
this, you said one of the reasons we are there is in accordance
with obligations in the SEATO Treaty. But beyond and above that
is the necessity for stopping the, I think, tendency or
inclination to aggression. Was that a correct statement or not?
Do you remember how you put it?
Secretary Rusk. I don't recall that I put it just that way.
I did point out----
The Chairman. You put it correctly.
Secretary Rusk. I did point out that we ourselves have a
very important stake in the organization of a durable peace in
the Pacific. We have alliances with Korea and Japan and the
Republic of China, Philippines, Thailand, Australia, and New
Zealand. And our interest in a stable peace in the Pacific
compares to our interest in such a peace in the Atlantic.
I would be glad to get--I don't happen to have a transcript
with me, Mr. Chairman, but we have not set ourselves up to play
the role of general policeman in the world. I think the last
time we gave an account of various crises there were about
seventy, and we took an interest in about six of them over the
various years, but we do have specific commitments and we do
feel these specific commitments are very important to the
possibility of organizing peace.
The Chairman. I thought perhaps I misunderstood you, that
there was something beyond those specific commitments in the
way of aggression that was, I thought you gave in detail. I
could be wrong about that.
SECRET REPORT ON BOMBING POLICY
Mr. Chalmers Roberts recently had a story from which I
quote:
There is a top secret report by the Central Intelligence
Agency and Pentagon Defense Intelligence Agency casting doubt
on the military efficacy of bombing.
Is there such a report?
Secretary Rusk. Well, that--there are many examinations of
that question. I don't think there is a report that is looked
at frequently.
The Chairman. A recent report.
Secretary Rusk. I think the key points that are made in
these examinations is that the bombing has not stopped the
infiltration, that it has not brought the other side to the
conference table, but that from an operational point of view in
terms of lines of communication and the capacity of the other
side to sustain his effort, the expense to him of sustaining
his effort, shows that the bombing does impose upon him a very
substantial additional burden.
The Chairman. Is that the principal reason for maintaining
the bombing, the burden it imposes on the North?
Secretary Rusk. Well, that is an important reason. I think,
also, Mr. Chairman, that if you look at a situation where North
Vietnam could be safe and comfortable, and undisturbed while it
sends its armed forces and arms into South Vietnam, that the
prospect that this war would last a long time is greatly
strengthened.
I don't know what the incentive would be for North Vietnam
to stop doing what it is doing if it could be completely
comfortable.
The Chairman. It is an ideal situation for it to occupy,
sit there safe without being afraid of any damage being done to
them while our men and South Vietnamese men are being killed.
NOT FIGHTING COMMUNISM AS AN IDEOLOGY
This question has been asked me on one or two occasions
along this line: In the State of the Union Message the
President used the word ``Communist'' six times in discussing
the situation in Vietnam. But in talking about the Soviet
Union, Eastern Europe, and China he did not use the word once.
If it is United States policy to fight communism as an ideology
in Vietnam, what is the position with regard to building
bridges with Communists in Eastern Europe?
Secretary Rusk. Senator, I think the point is that we are
not fighting communism as an ideology. We are not undertaking a
world crusade to do that. What we are doing, as we have done
before, is resist aggression by these Communist countries
against those with whom we have commitments and/or in whom we
have a vital stake. I said that because we did go to the aid of
Greece without a treaty obligation. We went to the aid of Korea
without a treaty obligation.
But this point arises, for example, in connection with the
question as to whether we are at the front edges of a detente
with the Soviet Union and eastern Europe. We think we well
might be, we hope we are, and we will explore every possibility
of contributing to that detente.
But we didn't get there, we didn't get to this present
position by giving away Azerbaijan or Greece to the guerrillas
or the eastern provinces of Turkey or Berlin or Korea or the
Congo and some of these other situations. It has been a long
and difficult path to the point where there is considerable
prudence on both sides.
What we would hope to see is a corresponding prudence of
the eastern wing, the Asian wing; of the Communist Party, which
has isolated itself even within the Communist world, largely
because of its excessive militancy, and there is some
possibility of that when we see the shape of the second
generation of leadership in Peking, and this may come sooner
than sometimes we think, there may be a little more prudence
there.
NEW GENERATION OF SOVIET LEADERS
We do have a second generation now present in the Soviet
Union. There is no longer an old Bolshevik in the government of
the Soviet Union. Mr. Mikoyan was the last one.
There seems to be some prudence there.
I don't want to exaggerate that because when we look at
what the Soviets are doing in Egypt, Syria, Algeria, and
Somalia, we still have some problems, but we are prepared to
contribute to that possibility of detente if we can manage it.
So, this is not a general question of ideology. These are
specific acts taken against countries with whom we have treaty
commitments.
COMMUNIST AGGRESSION
The Chairman. Is it fair to say if the North Vietnamese
were not Communists that we would have intervened in this case?
Do you think we would or would not?
Secretary Rusk. Well, I think when you gentlemen approved
the Southeast Asia Treaty, when it was signed, it was made
clear by the government at that time that treaty referred only
to Communist aggression. I think the thinking behind that was
that neighborhood quarrels across frontiers are not the
problems that are going to inflame the entire world. We didn't
get involved when Algeria and Morocco were shooting each other,
and we haven't gotten involved in a lot of these neighborhood
disputes, but where you have pressures outward from a regime
which proclaims that it is going after the world revolution and
supported by militant minds, then you have the possibilities of
a momentum of aggression that deeply threatens the
possibilities of the peace of the world.
The Chairman. Do you think that this is realistic to apply
to a country of 14 million people that were about to take over
the world or even planning to?
Secretary Rusk. It is not just these people. Their big
brothers to the North have also announced they are going after
some of these other countries, like Thailand.
The Chairman. Then it is the Communists--what I am trying
to clarify is, is this the overshadowing reason because they
are Communists or not? Is this in your opinion, and the
Department, or the government's opinion, the principal reason
we are there because they are Communists and part of an
international conspiracy?
Secretary Rusk. That is what the SEATO Treaty----
The Chairman. What do you think? I was trying to pick your
brains.
Secretary Rusk. Well, I think, sir, there is a difference
between those quarrels which have a built-in insatiable
appetite on one side, and there is a world revolution----
The Chairman. Is that characteristic of North Vietnam in
your opinion?
Secretary Rusk. And Peking, yes. I mean----
The Chairman. Then, if you change it a little, then it is
Peking, is this Peking's aggression we are dealing with? I am
just trying to take one step at a time.
Secretary Rusk. Well, we haven't made a special point that
this is Peking's aggression, but Peking's support of Hanoi in
this matter is crucial to Hanoi's position, and if Peking
showed the slightest interest in peace in this situation my
guess is that peace could be arranged rather quickly.
CONFUSION OVER U.S. INTERVENTION
The Chairman. But this is the point that I think is behind
much of the confusion and perhaps the dissent that you--I
think, the government objects to. If we can clarify it, I think
it would be very useful to those of us who are called upon to
clarify it nearly every day. To our constituents and otherwise,
as to just why it is we are there, what makes this quarrel so
important.
You have already said you didn't intervene in these other
areas, Tunisia, Algeria. You didn't intervene in other places,
but you did here.
Now, why is it that this is so peculiar?
First, let me, let's eliminate it, it isn't because North
Vietnam is so powerful that it threatens the peace of the world
in itself as a country, is it?
Secretary Rusk. It threatens the peace of Southeast Asia,
Vietnam, Laos and Thailand.
The Chairman. But if it wasn't Communist, what in your
opinion would we have done, would we have intervened?
Secretary Rusk. My guess is if it were not Communist it
would not be doing what it is doing. If you look at the
actions----
The Chairman. Why would you guess that? I don't follow that
at all. I mean, the Germans haven't resorted to force, but they
certainly are eager for reunification of their country, and
there are very substantial reasons. But here I think it would
be natural that these people would want to reunify their
country. Every country seems to want to do that.
Secretary Rusk. And if the people themselves deciding these
questions freely on their own in the two parts of the countries
involved were to agree on reunification, we would not object to
that.
It is the attempt to impose reunification by force that we
objected to, we would in Germany and we would in Korea.
U.S. OPPOSITION TO VIETNAMESE ELECTION
The Chairman. We did object to an election in '56, didn't
we? We objected to an election being held at that time, and I
understood from what people have written about it because we
thought if you had an election it would be reunified under Ho
Chi Minh.
Secretary Rusk. Incidentally, I have not been able to find
in the record instructions to our embassy saying that we
opposed elections out there. I have been trying to find what
the instructions were during that period. But at that time, Mr.
Chairman, it seemed to be obvious to everybody that there was
no possibility of a free election in the North and, therefore,
the question was do you have free elections in the South only
with everything rigged in the North?
General Vo Nguyen Giap in 1956, I think it is in your
committee report, I have brought up at a public hearing last
year, General Giap in 1956 described what was happening in the
North during that period and the mistakes they made in terms of
terror and intimidation and torture and things of that sort. He
was very frank about it. And it was the judgment at that time
in Saigon that under those circumstances a free election was
simply not possible, apart from the problems they might have
had in South Vietnam about free elections.
The Chairman. That makes free elections, I guess--I don't
know any other way, however, to bring this to issue.
GRADUAL NATURE OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT
Senator Lausche. Will the chairman point out to me so that
I will be able to better understand what he is aiming to prove,
is it your position that we should pull out?
The Chairman. No, I don't think that is feasible. I wish we
never had been involved.
Mr. Max Frankel said the other day, he is one of the people
more or less sympathetic with our position there. He says if
the matter was up today for our sending five hundred thousand
troops from ab initio--from the beginning--to save Saigon, we
wouldn't do it. The reason we are there is because of the very
gradual nature of the involvement, a little at a time, a little
more and a little more and finally we find ourselves there.
This is his theory, and I was trying to really see if the
Secretary could give me information that is better able to
answer questions as to why we are involved here.
Is it fear of Vietnam? No. Is it because of China, and if
so, is there evidence China is a very aggressive nation, and
should we be fearful of China and try to destroy her now? I
don't know what we want to do with her. I just wondered.
A LARGER CONTEXT
Secretary Rusk. I don't want to take up an undue amount of
time, but I would just like to pull back a step or two and take
a look at this in a somewhat larger context.
The Chairman. I think that is good.
Secretary Rusk. President Kennedy, President Johnson and
their Secretary of State have not come to the Senate with
additional alliances. President Kennedy came down here with a
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. President Johnson has concluded the
Civil Air Agreement. He presented you the consular agreement,
and he hopes we can present you with an East-West Trade
Agreement. He presented you with a space treaty, and we hope we
can present you with a nonproliferation treaty.
But after the war during the 50's at a time when the
Communist world was pressing almost on all fronts, and
resorting to armed force and a number of circumstances, we made
some alliances in the interest of building a stable peace in
the world.
Now, in the case of the SEATO Treaty, the administration at
that time, and the Senate said that each party recognizes that
aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area would
endanger its own peace and safety and agrees it will in that
event act to meet the common danger and so forth.
Now, if this matter were presented afresh today, I mean if,
say, yesterday there was the kind of an invasion of South
Vietnam that occurred in Korea by organized divisions publicly
and formally coming across the demarcation line, I am not at
all clear that Mr. Frankel is right in saying that we couldn't
do it. I think that is something that the President and the
leadership would have to look at and look at in terms of what
happens in the world if we fail to meet one of these solemn
treaty commitments in the organization of peace.
WORKING TOWARD DETENTE
I point out since 1947, we have spent something on the
order of $900 billion in defense budgets and fantastic
resources. And we have only barely by the skin of our teeth
been able to come to a position where there may be some
possibility of enough prudence on both sides to work toward
some sort of a detente, say, between ourselves and eastern
Europe. We are only four or five years away from a major crisis
over Berlin and only five years ago from a most horrible crisis
over Cuban missiles. It only has been a very narrow thing that
we begin to see the possibility of something like peaceful
coexistence with some sort of real content in the expression
opening up here.
I think the overriding question is how do you organize a
durable peace. And it is not for me to be presumptuous, Mr.
Chairman, but I think it is worth your committee's considering
whether it might wish to address itself to that problem, taking
into account such changes as might have occurred since 1945,
since the United Nations Charter was signed, to see what the
changes are, if any, what they mean and how these changes bear
upon the general problem of organizing a durable peace in the
world.
APPREHENSIONS ABOUT ESCALATION OF THE WAR
The Chairman. Well, of course, what bothers me is I think
we are more apprehensive, I am today, than at any other time. I
am more apprehensive than 20 years ago. I am apprehensive about
this war and its escalation. I don't want to prolong this.
I want to call on Mr. Mansfield. I want to again recall for
the record in your own Department of State memorandum of March
8, 1965 which was entitled ``Legal basis for U.S. action in
Vietnam,'' that your own statement refers to the U.N. Charter
and the Geneva Accords and didn't even mention the SEATO
Treaty. This is what causes so much trouble with us, trying to
understand it.
It wasn't until recently that the SEATO Treaty has been
given in justification for this involvement, and I am still
very puzzled about it.
Mr. Mansfield?
THE SEATO TREATY
Senator Lausche. Will you re-read that SEATO Treaty
declaring why these nations have joined in the compact? That is
considered as a challenge to their own security.
Secretary Rusk. In the preamble they said, among other
things:
Desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace and freedom and
to uphold the principles of democracy and individual liberty
and the rule of law, and to promote the economic well being and
development of all peoples in the Treaty area, intending to
declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that any
potential aggressor will appreciate that the parties standing
together in the area, and desiring further to coordinate their
efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace
and security.
But there was added by the United States the understanding
in the treaty, that the United States, in executing the present
treaty, does so with the understanding that its recognition of
the effect of aggression and armed attack and its agreement
with reference thereto in Article IV, paragraph 1, apply only
to communist aggression.
The reason for that was that it was not the desire to
become involved in other kinds of neighborhood disputes,
particularly, for example, the Pakistan-India dispute and I
gather Senator Mansfield may recall this better than I. And I
gather when Mr. Dulles made it clear that this was the
interpretation of the United States, that there was a period of
24 hours or more when the Pakistan representative was very
uncertain about whether Pakistan would sign it or not. That is
my recollection of what the record shows.
The Chairman. I don't think it was contemplated that we
would intervene in a civil war on account of this, either.
Senator Sparkman?
Senator Sparkman. Well, Mr. Chairman, I have been in and
out.
I noticed some other items we have on this suggested agenda
here,\2\ I don't know whether you have seen them or not.
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\2\ MEMORANDUM
Suggested Areas of Questioning for Secretary Rusk, January 16, 1967
1. Vietnam
a. Effectiveness of bombing in North Vietnam;
b. Indications of willingness to negotiate on part of North Vietnam
and National Liberation Front;
c. Progress of pacification;
d. Political developments in South Vietnam;
e. United States military activity in the Mekong Delta;
f. Basis for statistics on incidents, casualties, desertions, etc.
2. Thailand
a. Scale and targets of counterinsurgency efforts;
b. United States role in counterinsurgency;
c. United States military buildup on Thailand;
d. Are Thai troops being sent to Vietnam?
3. Significance of Current Uproar in China
4. Prospects for a Non-Proliferation Agreement
5. Soviet Deployment of a Limited Anti-Ballistic Missile System
6. Prelimary Findings of the Tripartite Working Group on NATO Force
Levels in Europe
7. Reasons for Delaying Food Shipments to India and Estimate of
Future Indian Requirements
8. Situation in Rhodesia and Southern Africa Generally
9. Implications of Military Aid and Sales in Latin America.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Secretary Rusk. I haven't seen it.
Senator Sparkman. That I might ask you rather briefly
about.
First, have you asked questions about Thailand?
The Chairman. No, I did not.
Go ahead.
THE SITUATION IN THAILAND
Senator Sparkman. I wonder if you can give us something
about the Thailand situation, first of all. Just what are we up
against there and what are the prospects?
Secretary Rusk. At the present time, there are several
hundred, rather than several thousand trained guerrillas
operating in the northeastern part of the country. This is a
rather remote area, and has been difficult for the government
to organize its police and security forces on as tight a basis
as would be necessary to deal with such small numbers of
guerrillas.
We also know in North Vietnam there is a training camp for
Thais who have been trained in North Vietnam to enter Thailand.
We know that Thailand is under pressure from its north and
northeast, but we feel unless there is a major increase in the
effort made by the North Vietnamese or the Chinese coming
directly down from China that the Thais seem to have the
capability of dealing with this. They have been very careful
themselves not to have U.S. soldiers involved in their
activities in the villages. We have helped them with
transportation into the general areas on occasion through
helicopter lifts. But beyond that, Thailand is a member of the
SEATO Treaty, is supporting the effort in Vietnam, has made
certain of its facilities available to us and to our armed
forces, and is contributing certain forces to South Vietnam.
On the internal side, they are doing reasonably well on the
economic side. They are now working on a constitution
acquisition that is led by Prince Huan, who served here once as
ambassador. In the months ahead, it is possible they will
promulgate that constitution and move toward a more elected
government than they have at the present time.
HANOI'S OPPOSITION TO U.S BASES IN THAILAND
Senator Sparkman. I notice the New York Times had quite an
article in a recent issue, as did the Washington Evening Star.
The New York Times article is entitled ``Hanoi Demands Thai Ban
on U.S. Use of Bases.'' Just how strong is their demand and do
they threaten action in the event that----
Secretary Rusk. Well, they are taking action at the present
time within the limits of these guerrilla operations that I
mentioned.
Senator Sparkman. Are they under the direction of Hanoi?
Secretary Rusk. Well they are being trained in North
Vietnam.
There is a Thai training camp there. We have taken pictures
of it. We have prisoners who tell us where it is and what goes
on there.
They then apparently infiltrate through the northern part
of Laos into the northeastern part of Thailand.
THE MEKONG VALLEY
Senator Sparkman. Just as a matter of curiosity, I saw
somewhere reference to that northeast section of Thailand along
the Mekong River saying it was the poorest section of the
country. I thought that was a very fertile valley.
Secretary Rusk. The Mekong Valley itself is reasonably
fertile. They were damaged by the heavy floods that occurred
along that part of the Mekong this past year, both in Laos and
in northeast Thailand. But I think one of the principal reasons
for the backwardness of northeast Thailand when you look at it,
is more generally, rather than just in the river valley where
there is communication by river, is lack of communications and
mountain jungle, undeveloped in the usual sense. I think it's
the lack of communications that is the principal problem in
terms of both development and security. It is somewhat like the
northeast corridor of Cambodia in that respect where we know
the Viet Cong are using Cambodian territory. We don't think
with the approval or the permission of Prince Sihanouk but yet
it is remote and rugged terrain into which his own security
forces can't go to monitor the situation in any way.
PRESS COVERAGE OF A HUSH-HUSH OPERATION
Senator Sparkman. In that same issue of the The Star there
was a headline ``14 million dollars annual savings possible by
the B-52 use of those bases,'' Is that a pretty reasonable
evaluation?
Secretary Rusk. Well, there are some operations advantages
in the short run compared with the several hours from Guam. The
bases there are not at the present time fitted for B-52
operations. This is a question for the future. No decision has
been made. The Thais apparently would be agreeable but we
ourselves have not made a final decision on that point.
Senator Sparkman. Why have we had such little discussion
publicly of what we are doing in Thailand? Is it a hush-hush
operation? The papers seem to get hold of it somehow.
Secretary Rusk. Well, there are two or three reasons. One
is that we do not wish officially to talk about which
particular operations go from which bases, but more importantly
the Thais themselves feel that the settlement of the situation
in Southeast Asia would be facilitated if these matters are not
made major matters of public prestige and things of that sort.
We are in Thailand. The Thai Government has a veto on that. We
think they themselves will say more about this fairly shortly.
But they have been very insistent upon not going into details
because they say that in the Southeast Asian situation it is
better to try to keep the Vietnam situation from a political
point of view in as narrow channels as possible in order not be
get the problems of a settlement too complicated.
These are open secrets. The only problem is how far we go
in confirming officially what goes on.
Senator Sparkman. Yes.
Secretary Rusk. In order to avoid the Thai sensibilities.
Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, I have lots of questions
but everybody around the table wants a chance to ask, so I will
pass.
The Chairman. Senator Hickenlooper?
RESTRAINTS ON BOMBING
Senator Hickenlooper. Mr. Secretary, with reference to the
question which Senator Fulbright asked you and which was
discussed with respect to the bombing, whether or not that had
any effect of lessening or diminishing the activities of the
North Vietnamese, does the fact that we don't bomb a lot of
military targets up there lessen the probability of quieting
them down? In other words, the stories we get here are that
Russian MIGs sit on the airfield up there and our pilots are
forbidden to bomb those airfields or destroy those Russian MIGs
sitting there.
Then we get the argument which doesn't appeal to me very
much, if we bomb these they will just move into the air bases
in China and if we bomb those then the fat will be in the fire.
Is it not a fact we are not bombing many targets in North
Vietnam which would really hurt their military efforts?
Secretary Rusk. Well, the list of important targets that
could be called military targets that have not been bombed is
really relatively small, Senator.
Senator Hickenlooper. Quite important, though, aren't they?
Secretary Rusk. Well, I suppose in one sense the most
important of these would be the Haiphong harbor and there are
one or two plants inside the perimeter of Hanoi. For example,
there is a steel plant, a cement plant which would have some
direct relationship to their operations.
We have kept the airfields outside of the immediate Hanoi
area out of our operation because it takes a great deal of
striking to do it, and the repair of an airfield is not too
complicated a matter.
Senator Hickenlooper. But the destruction of MIGs would be.
Secretary Rusk. Yes. Actually, the MIGs have not been all
that much of a problem in terms of our own forces. We have felt
that, and I don't want to preclude what the future might hold
in this in either direction, but we have felt we ought to try
to keep the situation within certain limits, if we can find
some possibility that the other side is prepared to talk sense
about peace in this situation.
You know we have had some recent MIG 21 engagements in
which I think some nine MIGs were shot down. Which were at
least about half of what they had there. The MIGs have not
given us much trouble nor indeed have the SAM sites in the
main. The principal problem has come from the conventional
anti-aircraft scattered all over the place. There are other
factors to be taken into account about the airfields. They are
very, very heavily protected by anti-aircraft. The prospects of
substantial losses on our side are pretty good, and the
question is as to whether the losses would be larger if we held
our hand and took on these follows in the air. But, again,
these are tactical decisions the Commander in Chief would have
to make at the end of the day, and I wouldn't want to foreclose
the future.
TARGETS ARE AUTHORIZED FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Hickenlooper. Are those decisions made in South
Vietnam or are they made over here at the pentagon?
Secretary Rusk. The principal fixed targets are authorized
from Washington.
Now, there are certain areas in what is called route
reconnaissance authorized for the purpose of hitting trucks and
barges and other things that are moving supplies to the south.
But the principal fixed targets are authorized from here in
light of the recommendation from the field and from the Joint
Chiefs.
One of the factors, I might add that are taken into account
in regard to those fixed targets is the prospect of civilian
casualties and one of the columns in which you take up these
questions shows the probable civilian casualties, and there
have been some targets which have been taken off the list
because of the prospect of significance of civilian casualties.
IMPACT OF VIETNAM WAR ON INDONESIA
Senator Hickenlooper. Let me ask you this question. I want
to hurry on because I have a good many questions to ask here:
Would you care to venture an opinion as to what would have
happened by now in Indonesia under Sukarno's leadership if we
had not stood fast in South Vietnam?
Secretary Rusk. It is very hard to be precise about that--
--
Senator Hickenlooper. I know you can't----
Secretary Rusk. I am inclined myself, Senator, to think
that there was a connection but not a decisive one, that in the
event of October a year ago, in Jakarta this was a PKT
operation with some Chinese help, that did not expect to rely
upon the presence of Chinese armed forces from China. They
almost succeeded and came within a gnat's eyelash of
succeeding. They got six generals and had they gotten two more
the thing would have been over.
But I think the presence of U.S. and British forces in
Southeast Asia, a combination of them there, did lead these
generals to believe they at least would not be subject to major
intervention from China. Now, saving Haidsah----
[Discussion off the record.]
Senator Hickenlooper. Would you say if we had not been in
South Vietnam, communism would have made tremendous strides in
Indonesia.
Secretary Rusk. That would be the implication of what he
said, of his remark; but I would be inclined to discount his
remarks somewhat.
I do feel, Senator, that what is--that the stand we have
taken in Vietnam has made a considerable difference to all of
those free countries in Asia, the ten, for example, who met in
Korea this past year and affirmed their support of South
Vietnam and expressed their appreciation for those giving help,
both Asian and non-Asian, and from Korea and Japan right around
through, all the way to India, there is a confidence that, I
think, would not have been there, that is making some
difference as to how they comport themselves.
THE RHODESIAN SITUATION
Senator Hickenlooper. I want to move on for just a quick
question or two here: As you know, and I have talked to you
about this, the Rhodesian situation troubles me very greatly,
and I was greatly disturbed when the President signed the
executive order of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia on
January 5th.
I fail to agree with him in my own mind. I suppose I can
rationalize it if I go way-round rationalization, as to why did
he undertake to attempt to destroy one of the most progressive
and successful governments and economies in all Africa by this
kind of action. I understand the sovereignty theory and all
that that is being advanced. I don't happen to agree with it,
but I understand it, I understand what it is. What are we
trying to do there?
Secretary Rusk. Well, first, Senator, we feel that this is,
in the first instance, a problem for the Commonwealth,
Britain----
Senator Hickenlooper. Why did we get into it?
Secretary Rusk. Well, we didn't buy into it ourselves, on
our own initiative. We didn't go around drumming up business on
this one. It was presented to us in the first instance by joint
action and joint position by some 18 members of the
Commonwealth, and a reference of this question to the Security
Council by the Commonwealth.
Now we are sitting in the Security Council, and when it
comes before the Council we have to ourselves decide what
attitude we take. The United Kingdom introduced a resolution.
We had to vote yes or no or abstain. We did help to fend off
much more extreme resolutions in the Security Council, for
example, the use of force, but we have felt that basically,
quite frankly, that the attitude of the Commonwealth is sound
in this situation, that the Rhodesian question is, in fact, a
threat to the peace in the longer run unless there is some
modification of view. What we have been hoping all along was
that discussions would lead to a peaceful settlement of the
situation. They came very close in the conversations on the
cruiser Tiger between Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Ian
Smith, but it broke down apparently on the issues as to which
side was going to trust the other during the interim period of
about three months.
Now the hope is that when the present Rhodesian leadership
looks down the longer range of the future, that they will
become convinced that further negotiations and talk are
required, and that the British would also take that view,
although both sides have become very grumpy about further talks
at the present time.
This is not a matter which has to be settled overnight, but
there surely has to be some movement toward a settlement with
which the 4 million Africans in Rhodesia can live and with
which their neighbors can live. Otherwise you are going to have
a situation in which all sorts of people would be mobilizing
themselves to try to prevent the movement into this part of
Africa of an apartheid approach.
The Communist world will seize these issues and exploit
them to a very considerable extent. So we feel that the Ian
Smith regime must make some adjustments here in order to get
this on the track of peaceful settlement that its own 4 million
majority can live with.
THE DESTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA
Senator Hickenlooper. The net result of the British
position and ours would seem to me to be--or would seem to me
to be the destruction of Southern Rhodesia, that is, in other
words, for a viable going economy to be turned over to the
natives over there, who mentally are not capable of running a
government with the same success that it is being run now.
Secretary Rusk. Excuse me----
Senator Hickenlooper. Go ahead.
Secretary Rusk. Well, please.
In the first place, Senator, I do not believe that the
Africans either in Rhodesia or outside Rhodesia would require
that the government of Rhodesia be required to be turned over
overnight all of a sudden to blacks.
Senator Hickenlooper. That has been the case in most other
countries in Africa, has it not?
Secretary Rusk. Well, that has been true--well, they have a
white member of the cabinet in Tanzania; I think they have
white members in Kenya, and Liberia, they have worked out
relations between the races in a rather constructive fashion.
One of the problems in the Rhodesian matter is that it is
the kind of an issue that could destroy the working
relationships between the whites and blacks in that government
even in those countries where the working relationships are
sound and in reasonably good order. But we do feel that--and
this is the Commonwealth view--that there needs to be some
movement in this matter. There are many interim steps to be
taken which would bring more repose in this situation.
Now, if Ian Smith were to permit some of those interim
steps, the stake could be worked out.
Again let me say that the Tiger agreement represented some
of those interim steps and apparently the key point on which
that broke down was the question of who would be responsible
for law and order in the country during an interim period when
a new constitution would be promulgated and on the basis of
which Rhodesia would become independent. That constitution
itself would itself have included interim steps rather than a
final solution and apparently the cabinet in Salisbury would
not agree to let the Governor General have control of the
security forces of the country during that brief interim period
before a new constitution might be promulgated and that is
where it broke down.
Senator Hickenlooper. I think my time is up.
LEGAL MEMORANDUM
Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, I have a brief memorandum
here on some of the legal aspects and charter aspects. I might
give this to Mr. Marcy in case any members of the committee
might wish to have a look at it.
The Chairman. Senator Morse.
Senator Lausche. Could copies be provided of that legal
memorandum?
Senator Morse. The committee can provide them.
The Chairman. The committee can make copies if you want
one.
The Senator from Oregon.
Senator Morse. Mr. Secretary, I shall confine my questions
to certain problems that I think have arisen as a result of U
Thant's proposals. I shall read this legal memorandum that you
have just referred to with great care.
DISAGREEMENT OVER SEATO
I only want to say in passing, by way of a caveat, of
course, I do not share in any degree the State Department's
position on SEATO. I think that the chairman has pointed out
here the March 8, 1965, memorandum as to the administration's
legal justification for its involvement with North Vietnam. It
does not even whisper about SEATO within the realm of sound
international law.
I think all the rationalization, in my judgment--that is my
characterization of the State Department on SEATO in recent
times--is an afterthought, and I think completely unsound in
international law, but I shall discuss that in further detail
elsewhere.
CONFIDENCE IN U THANT
But what does bother me, Mr. Secretary--and you can be very
helpful to us in what I think is a growing confusion in the
country in regard to our relations to U Thant, I do not sit
here holding any brief for him. I want your help on it,
however.
We certainly took the position that we wanted him to be
continued as Secretary General. We were one of those who urged
it upon him, some would say did more than urge, but we urged
it. He has been proposing variable formats for trying to pave
the way for negotiations and every time he does, it seems that
we get into controversy with him. It seems that we are the ones
that get into controversy with him. I do not find any other
nations that have been in controversy with him, at least it has
not been reported. Perhaps you can tell us if they do, and that
is one of the things I want to find out.
If we have the confidence that we expressed in him when we
urged his reappointment as Secretary General, why do we not
take the position that if he will set up a procedure for
triparty negotiations, we will look with great favor on it. Why
do we take the position that, as you expressed again this
morning, that we will not stop the bombing unless he can come
in and give us assurance of some kind of reciprocal action on
the part of North Vietnam? Is that a price that we should exact
until we have first found out what he can do with cessation of
bombing? I do not know whether he can deliver anything or not.
But I seriously doubt whether a continuation of our bombing is
justifiable on the basis of the argument you make this morning
when U Thant is telling the world that the United States ought
to stop bombing first.
U Thant is telling the world now that he disagrees that
Vietnam is of vital security interest to the United States. It
seems to me he has put us in a pretty bad light in the world,
and I wonder if the proper response is for us to simply reject
him or reject his ideas rather than make a plea here again
through the procedures of the United Nations for a United
Nations' manifestation backing him up and assuming their
peacekeeping obligations under the Charter.
That is broad outline. I only want to raise----
Secretary Rusk. Yes.
Senator Morse [continuing]. The question so you can talk to
this committee about why we are taking the attitude toward U
Thant that the public statements of you and our Administration
have been taking.
U THANT'S POSITION ON THE BOMBING
Secretary Rusk. Senator, first, on the question of stopping
the bombing, bear in mind that the other side is now very
specifically saying that this must be unconditional and
permanent, and this is a major step. There are three divisions
in and just north of the demilitarized zone today.
Senator Morse. Does he agree with that?
Secretary Rusk. Agree with that?
Senator Morse. Does U Thant agree with that? Is that what U
Thant means when he says we should stop the bombing?
Secretary Rusk. We have said--but U Thant is not the man
who makes this judgment. It is the other side who has to make
the judgment.
Senator Morse. He is the one who is making the proposals to
both sides, and we immediately reject his proposal about
stopping the bombing which I have not understood. If it is
true, I would like to have you tell me.
Secretary Rusk. I beg your pardon, we have not rejected his
proposal of stopping the bombing. We have said, ``Okay, that is
possible, what about point two,'' which is the mutual de-
escalation of the violence on both sides, and on that he has
not had anything whatever from the other side.
Senator Morse. I understand that.
Secretary Rusk. And the other side says, ``It is none of
your business.''
Senator Morse. I understand that. But my point is you have
to have a starting point here, and my point is when we say we
are not going to stop the bombing until U Thant delivers
reciprocity, we give the impression--I understand our points--
but we give the impression that we are the ones that right off
the bat throw in a block that makes it impossible for him to
act.
OPPOSITION TO U THANT'S PROPOSALS
Secretary Rusk. You mentioned one point about other
countries. The ambassadors of seven Asian nations, including
Japan, Malaysia, Laos, called on him the other day to take
strong exception to what he said in his press conference about
the security significance of Vietnam in this present
situtation. I might say they did that without any encouragement
from us. We did not stimulate them to do that, and I gather
that Australia and New Zealand are also doing the same thing
when they heard about the Asian move.
But Hanoi has rejected strongly U Thant's second and third
points, second point, mutual de-escalation of the violence,
and, third, on U Thant's point about the Liberation Front they
have said the Liberation Front is the sole spokesman for the
South Vietnamese.
Now, Senator, it seems to me there are two, as far as peace
is concerned, as it affects the United States. There are two
most elementary facts in this situation. One is substantial
numbers of the North Vietnamese regular forces in South Vietnam
and our bombing in North Vietnam. All right, why can we not get
rid of both of those at the same time, why can we not get rid
of both of those together? We have not been able--and I can
assure you, sir, we have scoured the earth on it--to get
anybody to give us any indication as to what would happen. They
do not even say they would come to a conference without doing
anything on the ground. They do not--let me illustrate the
point.
THE CHRISTMAS TRUCE
Very recently, during the two-day Christmas truce, when the
hour arrived, hundreds of vessels, most of them small, but
about 18 of them fairly good sized, suddenly made a dash along
the coast of North Vietnam to resupply their forces north of
the DMZ. They were all loaded and ready to go, just as Olympic
dash men at the starting point. They came down, they unloaded
several thousand tons of supplies and then scattered again
before the truce is over, you see.
Now, we need to have some indication that that is not going
to be the effect of stopping the bombing, that something is
going to happen on the ground that moves this toward peace.
Otherwise, we simply give them an unlimited and an indefinite
capability of doing it the comfortable way of sending their
people south and taking their time and being safe and secure
and not have anything to worry about at home.
This, I think, would be a very serious thing.
Now, we are trying to find out the answer to a secondary
question. If people cannot tell us what Hanoi would do if we
stopped bombing, they at least can tell us what they would do.
Moscow, Eastern Europe, U Thant and the rest of them, India,
what they would do if we stopped the bombing. There is no
response from the other side.
I would be interested in your own view as to whether this
would make any difference to your own position, Senator, if we
stopped the bombing and there was no response. Quite frankly,
we have not----
U.S. SHOULD NOT BE FIGHTING U THANT
Senator Morse. You ought to take judicial notice that would
make a difference with me. You ought to know me well enough for
this. My difference with you is we are laying down conditions
precedent that are not going to be accepted apparently even by
U Thant, and if we are going to try to work through U Thant, we
ought to give--make some attempt to see what he can deliver. If
we have made a bad bargain on U Thant, if we are now already
discovering that he cannot give us the leadership because of
the conditions he imposes, then let us face up to that.
I think we are getting a bad image created around the world
in regard to our relationships with U Thant. I think we should
not be fighting with U Thant at the present time.
Secretary Rusk. Well, when U Thant says, for example, that
he does not believe that the security of Southeast Asia is of
strategic importance to the West, there is nothing in his
present responsibility or his background of experience that
makes his judgment on that matter of very much importance. He
is not responsible for the strategic interests of the West.
Senator Morse. He certainly comes from a country that sits
on the front door of China, and Burma does not seem to be as
concerned about China as we are.
[Discussion off the record.]
THE DOMINO THEORY
Secretary Rusk. Mr. U Thant also said that he does not
believe in the domino theory. I do not believe in the domino
theory myself, and I have said that many times. The theory is
the theory of the world revolution pursued by militant means.
He mentioned countries X, Y, and Z. Hanoi, with the help of
Peking, has already named the countries X, Y, and Z. Vietnam is
X, Laos is Y, and Thailand is Z. So, I personally do not feel
when Mr. U Thant makes a statement of this sort by silence we
indicate that somehow we agree with him. We supported him for
Secretary General not because he and we would agree on every
one of the hundred or more items that might be on the agenda of
the U.N. or on an item like this which is not on the agenda of
the U.N. and he opposes putting it on the agenda of the U.N.,
but because he has on the whole done a good job as Secretary
General and the prospect was that he would be a considerably
better Secretary General than any of the alternatives that
seemed to be around.
ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
Senator Morse. I will not take more time other than to make
a comment on the last observation you made. Sure he is
Secretary General of the United Nations, but he is not
independent in his responsibilities to the organization, to
both branches of the organization, and I repeat, I would like
to bring this before the Security Council. After all, I think
the Security Council ought to sit down and go over his
proposals, because they relate to the image of the United
Nations, but I think we, on the other hand, ought to insist
that that Security Council stand up and be counted, either with
a veto or with a vote, an affirmative vote. I want to get
ourselves out of the position where we seem in many quarters to
be giving the impression that we are holding the United Nations
off. I would like to put the heat on that Security Council and
get a vote up or down, and I think the Secretary General ought
to be asked to sit down with that Security Council and go over
these proposals of his. He sits there as Secretary General and
makes these announcements that are going to affect the members
of the organization, and then a nation individually and
unilaterally, the United States in this instance, takes him on.
I do not think we should be in that position. I think the
United Nations, to whom he is responsible and of whom he is an
agent, ought to be taking him on.
Secretary Rusk. You know, I would not dispute that point
with you too much, Senator. There is pending before the
Security Council a resolution by which the Security Council
would call upon the parties to engage in negotiations for a
peace in Southeast Asia. It does not have the votes on the
Security Council for a variety of reasons. The Soviets would
veto. But there are others influenced in part by U Thant who
say----
Senator Lausche. Why not let the Soviets veto?
Secretary Rusk. But there are others who say that since
Hanoi and Peking say this is not the business of the United
Nations, that if the Security Council takes up this question,
and tried to get into it, that this would get in the way of a
use of the machinery which Hanoi and Peking say is the
appropriate machinery, namely, the Geneva machinery.
When this point was made by the Soviet delegate, Mr. Arthur
Goldberg said that is fine with us, let us use the Geneva
machinery, in which case the Soviet ambassador said, ``No, no,
we can't use that.''
This matter has been one way or another before the United
Nations at least a dozen times, and I have an up-to-date
memorandum on this point which I will be glad to furnish Mr.
Marcy for the committee.
A PERMANENT PRESENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
The Chairman. Will the Senator yield for one clarifying
thing?
You said no one would be more alarmed than Burma, unless it
be Thailand, if we pull out of Southeast Asia, which seems to
imply that you feel we have a permanent presence there.
Secretary Rusk. No.
The Chairman. That is the interpretation of it.
Secretary Rusk. No, I meant under present circumstances. I
am not saying what you would do if we have peace. Our Manila
declaration on that is quite specific on that point.
FORMAL ACTION RATHER THAN BACK SCENE NEGOTIATING
Senator Morse. You must not take more time on that, and if
you will only pardon me, I want to make this observation. I
just do not buy the argument that Hanoi and Peking should be
telling the United Nations what to do. The Charter makes
perfectly clear if there was a threat to the peace by a non-
member, the members, the signatories, have the job of enforcing
the peace. It is the primary purpose of the Charter. All the
other things that the United Nations do are ancillary to it.
The real reason for it was to enforce the peace.
I would put France and Russia, as the Senator from Ohio
said--with a veto, if they want to veto it, let them do it. But
the important thing is it would help clarify the situation.
Instead of giving the impression that the United States is
doing a lot of back scene negotiating, which isn't what the
Charter calls for--the Charter calls for formal action under
the juridical process thereof, and we ought to insist on it.
Secretary Rusk. I have some sympathy with that point.
The Chairman. Senator Aiken.
Senator Morse. The sad part of it is if we could closet
ourselves longer we might find ourselves in more agreement.
Senator Aiken. First, let me say I agree with the Secretary
that not only would Burma but every other country in Southeast
Asia be alarmed if we pulled out completely from that area.
My questions will be short and along a different line.
U.S. TRADE WITH CAMBODIA
Mr. Secretary, to what extent is our trade with Cambodia--
to what extent has it been increasing?
Secretary Rusk. I do not have the trade figures. Our
tourism has been more or less holding up. I would have to get
the figures on trade.
Senator Aiken. And we are now supplying some oil to
Cambodia?
Secretary Rusk. American companies----
Senator Aiken. Yes.
Secretary Rusk [continuing]. Provide oil in Cambodia and up
the Mekong River to South Vietnam.
CHINESE STEEL
Senator Aiken. That is right. But in that connection I read
last month the United States, through Bombay, had purchased a
very substantial amount of steel manufactured in China for use
in South Vietnam.
Then about two weeks ago there was another news item to the
effect that a freighter carrying steel from Bombay to the
United States had gotten into trouble or been sunk or
something.
Are American companies buying Chinese steel through Bombay
for use in this country?
Secretary Rusk. No. We tried to look into that. I think the
allegation was that this was a transaction through Singapore.
Senator Aiken. No question--no one questions that.
Secretary Rusk. But the information we have is that this
did not occur; that the steel was resold at Singapore to known
customers; these were not in Vietnam. I can't find any
substance to that.
Senator Aiken. The ship that got into trouble was
reportedly headed toward the United States. I did not know that
India had a surplus of steel.
Secretary Rusk. This sounds--I had not put my attention on
this shipping from Bombay to the United States.
Senator Aiken. But isn't it true that Communist countries
and Western countries do conduct considerable business with
each other through third parties?
Secretary Rusk. I think that is true.
Senator Aiken. There is no question about that, and that--
--
Secretary Rusk. Let us leave this off the tape.
[Discussion off the record.]
ESTABLISHING A BASE IN THE DELTA
Senator Aiken. I notice there was quite a lot made in the
news lately about establishing a base in the Delta. Is that
being constructed as a permanent base?
Secretary Rusk. I saw a report this morning that one of the
amphibious operations was off-loading to go back to its main
base. I think there may be some U.S. forces at some point in
the Delta.
Part of the Delta is in the immediate Saigon area. For
example, Long An Province, we have had some forces there for
some time. But I think the major effort at the present time is
in the Saigon area and particularly northwest of Saigon to try
to break the flow of men and supplies that might be coming from
the Delta up into the Third, Second and First Corps.
I just do not know what the future will hold on this. There
is no policy problem in my mind about doing in the Fourth Corps
what we are doing in the First, Second and Third. But there are
practical problems of how you best use your forces, under what
circumstances.
GUANTANAMOS IN VIETNAM
Senator Aiken. Isn't it quite likely when the situation
over there quiets down--I do not mean comes to an end, but
quiets down--or phases out, fades out somewhat, that we will
have one or two Guantanamos along the Coast of Vietnam?
Secretary Rusk. Oh, no. On that, sir, we have no interest
in maintaining a permanent position in South Vietnam.
This Cam Ranh Bay facility is a very substantial facility,
but David Lilienthal is on his way over there now to help work
out plans for conversion to civilian use in case of peace.
We have no desire, and we publicly have committed ourselves
to this many times, to maintain neither bases or troop presence
in South Vietnam if there is peace there.
Sentor Aiken. We have presence in Cuba. The difference is
we do not try to run the Cuban government from Guantanamo.
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Aiken. But why isn't a permanent base at Cam Ranh
Bay or some other place just as logical as Guantanamo?
Secretary Rusk. Well, we have bases in the Philippines and
in Okinawa, and we thought this might be a contribution towards
the possibilities of peaceful settlement to make it clear we
were not looking for a permanent position, a permanent
presence, military presence, in South Vietnam.
RUSSIAN ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS IN NORTH VIETNAM
Sentor Aiken. Another thing that puzzles me somewhat is the
fact that while the President is trying to get on friendlier
terms with Russia, that we are furnishing the Russians with the
most beautiful target practice they ever had in perfecting
their new antiaircraft weapons, as I understand it. We have had
nearly 600 planes shot down over North Vietnam. Don't we ever
talk to the Russians about that?
Secretary Rusk. Not very much about that precise point. The
SAM missiles have been fired over 1,000 times, and I think that
only 30 of them have effected a hit.
Purely in military terms, I am not drawing any political
implication from this at all. I think that technical or the
tactical advantages, perhaps, are on our side in terms of
learning how to handle surface-to-air missiles.
Senator Aiken. Of course, if they only get a missile out of
a thousand shots----
Secretary Rusk. They have sent their top missile men out of
Vietnam to find out what is the matter, and we know this is a
major discovery they have made, and that is that their SAM
missiles are not very effective.
Senator Aiken. They must have fired 600,000 shots to get
those 600 planes.
Secretary Rusk. No. Most of the planes that have been lost
have been lost to conventional anti-aircraft fire as the plane
goes in for particular targets.
Senator Aiken. Have the Russians been furnishing anti-
aircraft guns to them?
Secretary Rusk. Some of it, and some come from China.
Senator Aiken. And they have been perfecting their anti-
aircraft weapons without any risk themselves.
Secretary Rusk. Possibly.
Senator Aiken. I thought it might be well to speak to them
about it quietly, in a soft tone of voice, maybe of what they
will be doing wrong.
Secretary Rusk. If they could translate their position
there into influence on Hanoi, to get going on the 1954 and
1962 agreements, there would be very substantial advantages to
us.
INCREASE IN NATIONALISM
Senator Aiken. There really is an increase in political
nationalism throughout the world, is there not? Aren't the
countries really more nationalistic than they have been for
some time?
Secretary Rusk. If you would look at the world as a whole,
perhaps slightly, but I do not think it has changed too much
over the decades.
Senator Aiken. In most cases where it puts up barriers,
international economics have a tendency to knock them flat, do
they not?
Secretary Rusk. That is right, sir.
Senator Aiken. In other words, trade is important, and the
greatest potential wealth of the world, the trading area of the
world, is Southeast Asia, assuming that their purchasing power
can be developed.
Secretary Rusk. There has been a pretty steady growth in
regional economic arrangements, not just in the Common Market,
but in Central America particularly. Now they are talking very
actively about a broader Latin American free trade. You get
that same movement now among the free countries of Asia, so
that you have that over against the national feelings.
Senator Aiken. I have no more questions, but I have an idea
it is going to take a while to get out of Southeast Asia as it
did in the Philippines, and that was some time. We were there
50 years officially.
The Chairman. Senator Lausche.
THE THINKING BEHIND SEATO
Senator Lausche. Mr. Secretary, I want to explore through
questions and your answers what the predominating thinking in
the fifties when we signed the various treaties related to
Southeast Asia in inducing us to sign those treaties.
Secretary Rusk. I think the most succinct statement--pardon
me, excuse me.
Senator Lausche. I begin with the Southeast Asia Collective
Defense Treaty signed September 8, 1954. I understand, of
course, my colleagues understand, that the President of that
year, Eisenhower, sent that treaty to the Senate to be
approved; is that correct?
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Lausche. And that treaty contained Article IV which
reads:
Each party recognizes that aggression by means of armed
attack in the treaty area against any of the parties or against
any State or Territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement
may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and
safety, and agree that it will in that event act to meet the
common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.
Senator Dodd. Is that the SEATO Treaty?
Senator Lausche. That is the Treaty.
Secretary Rusk. Article IV, paragraph 1.
Senator Lausche. Yes. In other words, when that treaty was
signed, the President of the United States, the Secretary of
State, and the Senate declared to the world that our security
was involved whenever armed attack was made upon any one of the
nations that subscribed to that treaty, is that correct?
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Lausche. And the nations that signed the treaty
were the United States, Australia, France, New Zealand,
Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom, Cambodia,
Laos.
Secretary Rusk. Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam were
protocol states. They did not sign the treaty but were covered
by the special protocol.
Senator Lausche. I see, there is a note there.
ANZUS TREATY
Now then, I go to the next treaty, and that is ANZUS, that
is a treaty made with Australia, I suppose, New Zealand, and
the United States?
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Lausche. That treaty was signed in September 1951,
and at that time Truman was President?
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Lausche. Do you recall who was Secretary of State?
Secretary Rusk. Mr. Dean Acheson.
Senator Lausche. And that treaty came up to the Senate for
confirmation.
Now, I read from Article IV of that treaty:
Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific
area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace
and safety, and declares that it would act to meet the common
danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.
In order words, in 1951 on September 1, it was the firm
thinking of the Senate, President Truman and Secretary Acheson
and, I suppose, the government in general, that our security
was involved if any one of the signatories to that treaty were
attacked. Am I correct in that?
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
MUTUAL COOPERATION TREATY WITH JAPAN
Senator Lausche. I now go to the Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan
signed January 19, 1960, at which time Eisenhower was
President. Who was Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles?
Secretary Rusk. Mr. Christian Herter.
Senator Lausche. Herter.
Secretary Rusk. In 1960.
Senator Lausche. Article V of that treaty reads:
Each party recognizes that an armed attack against either
party in the territories under administration of Japan would be
dangerous to its own peace and safety, and declares that it
would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its
constitutional provisions and processes.
That was again a declaration of our interest in Southeast
Asia and the relationship that it had to our own security.
Secretary Rusk. Senator, pardon me just a moment. I think
in the Japan treaty, that was limited to attack on Japan. I do
not think that treaty got into Southeast Asia, did it?
Senator Lausche. Well, whatever it is----
Secretary Rusk. I think so.
Senator Lausche. That is the language. You are familiar
with it.
MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY WITH TAIWAN
Now then, here is the next treaty, the Mutual Defense
Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China.
Article V reads:
Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the West
Pacific area directed against the territories of either of the
Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety, and
declares that it would act to meet the common danger in
accordance with its constitutional processes.
That was signed December 2, 1954; Eisenhower President,
Dulles Secretary of State.
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Lausche. I suppose the Senate, made up of members
who are at this table today--and I will want the staff to put
in the record how the votes were cast at that time----
Senator Morse. I voted against it.
Senator Lausche. Then you are consistent.
Senator Morse. I did not want to put the staff to work.
MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY WITH KOREA
Senator Lausche. I now go to the Mutual Defense Treaty
between the United States and the Republic of Korea, October
1953, Article III:
Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific
area on either of the Parties in territories now under their
respective administrative control or hereafter recognized by
one of the Parties is lawfully brought under the administrative
control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and
safety, and declares that it would act to meet the common
danger.
THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES
Now, I ask you, has there been a single treaty entered into
with Asian nations and Southeast Asia that did not declare that
our security was involved and that, therefore, we entered into
those agreements?
Secretary Rusk. That underlying concept is in each of the
treaties we have in the Pacific Ocean area, in Asia.
Senator Lausche. Now, Eisenhower was President under most
of them. When Truman went into Korea, what was the motivation
for going into Korea at that time? Did it have underlying it
this same principle about the security of the United States
being involved?
Secretary Rusk. The basic view as to where the security
interests of the United States lay was the same. It had not
been put in treaty form at the time of the North Korean attack
on South Korea.
Senator Lausche. It was put into the treaty, in treaty
form, after Eisenhower took office.
Secretary Rusk. In 1953, yes, sir.
KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION AND VIETNAM
Senator Lausche. Now we have Truman and Eisenhower, and I
now come to Kennedy.
When Kennedy became President, how many troops were in
South Vietnam?
Secretary Rusk. There were about 650 U.S. military there as
a part of the military assistance mission.
Senator Lausche. How many were there when he tragically
lost his life?
Secretary Rusk. Approximately 20,000, sir.
Senator Lausche. Did he, by expanding the number of troops
that were there, give indication of his judgment that we could
not allow South Vietnam to be taken over by the Communists
through aggression?
Secretary Rusk. He did, sir. The first thing he tried to
do, if I might take a moment, is to explore fully the
possibilities of a peaceful settlement. He talked about this
with Mr. Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961. It appeared that
the two of them had reached agreement on Laos on the basis that
everybody get out of Laos and leave this small land-locked
country to take care of themselves.
He was unable to get agreement on South Vietnam at the
Vienna meeting, and you remember he sent some special missions
out there, among them General Maxwell Taylor, to take a look at
the situation to see what needed to be done in the light of the
situation, and so when he examined it fully and he had on the
one side no prospect that there was agreement with the
Communist world on Vietnam, and on the other side our
commitment, and the situation, he moved substantially to
strengthen our participation there.
Senator Lausche. So you have Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy,
and Johnson of the belief that our security and safety is
involved in what happens in Southeast Asia.
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Lausche. And you have Acheson, Dulles, Herter--was
there any other Secretary of State----
Secretary Rusk. No, sir.
Senator Lausche. And yourself.
THE POSSIBILITY OF DETENTE
Now then, that goes back 15, 20 years ago, what has changed
since that time that should induce us to believe that our
nation's security and safety have no relationship to what
happens in Southeast Asia?
Secretary Rusk. I think the principal changes in this
regard have not yet been fully developed. But I would say there
are the beginnings of the possibility of a detente and peaceful
co-existence with the countries of Eastern Europe. That is one
element of the situation which affects the problem.
Secondly, the authorities in Peking are coming to the
watershed of the transfer of power to the next generation, and
have found that a policy of extreme militancy has isolated them
within the Communist world, and that has had its repercussions
inside China.
Third is the development of nuclear weapons by Peking and,
therefore, the increasing importance of stabilizing the
situation and trying to organize a peace in the Pacific and to
induce there some of the same prudence that we begin to see
with our relations toward Eastern Europe. Those are the
principal changes since that period.
UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES UNCHANGED
Senator Lausche. All right. But with those changes can you
take those changes as the basis of saying that all that was
declared in these treaties by the Senate and by the President
and the Secretaries of State was erroneous and that those
reasons no longer exist for our being in Southeast Asia?
Secretary Rusk. No, I do not think so. I think the
underlying principles remain the same. They would, over time,
Senator, be reduced in importance if there were some peace. In
other words, the way not to have an alliance to come into
operation is for nations to leave each other alone in
situations of this sort.
Senator Lausche. All right.
CHINA'S POLICY ON VIETNAM
Now I go to just one more question and then I will close. I
have the four points that have been submitted by Mao. Point
number four:
The internal affairs of South Vietnam should be settled by
the South Vietnamese people themselves in accordance with the
program of the NFLSV.
I suppose that is the National Liberation Front of South
Vietnam.
Secretary Rusk. Yes.
Senator Lausche. Has there been any yielding on that point
four by Mao?
Secretary Rusk. Senator, I think it might be avoiding
confusion if we referred to that as Ho Chi Minh's point three,
however it might have appeared there in what you have.
Senator Lausche. All right.
Secretary Rusk. We have not seen a revision of that, and if
I could say this off the tape----
[Discussion off the record.]
Senator Lausche. This final question.
Senator Mundt. Will you yield? What has happened?
Secretary Rusk. We have not had a reply on that particular
point. We have offered them alternative language, and we have
had no reply.
THE LAOTIAN AGREEMENT
Senator Lausche. Now, the Laos Treaty or protocol, whatever
you call it, was signed in 1962?
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Lausche. The agreement provided for the withdrawal
of all troops of all foreign nations?
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Lausche. Specific points were designated where the
departure was to be made so that the three countries, I assume
Canada----
Secretary Rusk. India and Poland.
Senator Lausche [continuing]. Poland and India would be
able to tell whether they had left.
Have United States troops left Laos?
Secretary Rusk. They left as soon as that agreement was
concluded, sir.
Senator Lausche. Have the Communists complied with that
agreement?
Secretary Rusk. No, sir. Our estimate is that the level of
North Vietnamese forces in Laos never dropped below 6,000.
Senator Lausche. That is all.
Senator Pell. May I just interpolate to clarify the record.
Aren't there still elements of American activity in Laos that
are not of a formal military nature, that would balance that
6,000?
Secretary Rusk. As a matter of fact, we now carry out
certain military operations in Laos, but the point is that we
complied with that agreement and would be prepared today to
comply with it 1,000 percent if we can get anybody else to.
The Chairman. Did you give the alternative language to
point three that the Senator asked you about?
Secretary Rusk. No, sir; I did not, and I would prefer not
to, Senator, if I may. As a matter of fact, what we suggested
was very much like----
[Discussion off the record.]
Secretary Rusk. I call your attention, Mr. Chairman, to
point six at the bottom of the first page where we have added
to the original point, ``We will be prepared to accept
preliminary discussions to reach agreement on a set of points
as a basis for negotiations.''
I think that is all we should say about that at the present
time in order to keep open the possibilities they just might
come back.
The Chairman. Senator Carlson?
WHEN THIS WAR IS OVER
Senator Carlson. Mr. Secretary, I shall be brief. I was
interested in your comments in response to Senator Aiken's
question about at the end of hostilities this war is over and
our boys are coming home; we are moving out of Southeast Asia.
Based on the past in Korea and Cuba, and our great investment
in this area where we have now probably the finest docking
facilities of any place in the Southeast Asia area except
Japan--we have great airfields; great air bases, do you think
the surrounding countries would permit us to move out any more
than they would permit us to move out now?
Secretary Rusk. The seven nations, Senator Carlson, which
have forces in South Vietnam, said in the Manila communique
that allied forces shall be withdrawn, after close
consultation, as the other side withdraws its forces to the
North, ceases infiltration, and the level of violence thus
subsides; that those forces will be withdrawn as soon as
possible and not later than six months after the above
conditions have been fulfilled.
We have since World War II, or including World War II, had
very large and important military facilities in connection with
various enterprises that we have gone into, and we have
demonstrated a capability of withdrawing from those facilities
at the end of the period when they were needed.
Our hope is that Cam Ranh Bay, for example, which is a
spectacularly effective and beautiful natural harbor, could
become a major port for the service of the upper two-thirds of
South Vietnam, and it should be converted to civilian,
industrial and trading purposes.
Mr. David Lilienthal is going to be helping us on
developing those plans. I think the seven nations who are most
directly involved in this situation have agreed among
themselves on this point.
Now, if at some time in the future the assault on South
Vietnam were renewed, then the governments at that time would
have to decide what to do about it. But we want to make it
clear that we are not after any special military position in
Southeast Asia as far as we are concerned.
MAINTAINING U.S. FORCES IN VIETNAM
Senator Carlson. With that last statement I fully agree,
and I can see that we are not. But also I can see, looking
further into the future, if we do not maintain substantial
forces in that area, what is there to prevent the Red Chinese
from going down and taking over the greatest facilities ever
constructed in that area, and they could do it very easily?
Secretary Rusk. The prospect that the United States would
once again meet its treaty commitments and would join with
others to prevent that occurring.
Senator Carlson. That is the point I am making. We do not
want to get committed to a position here where after a few
years, after terrific loss of life and great expenditures of
funds, we have to get back, and some day soon I trust we will
reach agreement when that war will end, and whenever it does
end, that decision is going to have to be made despite your
Manila agreement.
I think we have to look that one over because we have
invested men and material in this operation, and it just looks
to me, I think we are making a big mistake if we go out and
tell the people of the United States--I know it was made, I
read your Manila declaration--that we will soon move out of
there. I do not think we should do that.
Secretary Rusk. Under certain conditions.
Senator Carlson. Well, those conditions, I think, will
develop very rapidly after the conclusion of this war. I hope
they do not, but I think we have again assumed the
responsibility in Southeast Asia, I don't say whether we should
or should not, but I think we are going to have to meet that
issue, and I hope the administration and the government itself
does not lead our people to believe on the day this war is
over, six months after, the declaration says we are coming
home. I hope we do, but I can see another issue.
You know, I have been interested in the tone of the Hearst
publications on this war, and they have been in thorough
support of the President and in its operation. But in this last
issue--and I assume you may have read it--they said they were
fearful that world opinion is having too much influence on the
operation of this war.
U.S. INTERESTS IN AFRICA
I think there is some danger of world opinion, NATO--we
have discussed all these projects, NATO, Rhodesia--I think we
are in Rhodesia because of the African opinion, not because of
Great Britain. I do not think we are obligated. I think we made
a mistake, and I think if world opinion enters into this
Vietnam situation we will be caught in a bind. I hope we are
not.
I cannot help but bring it up this morning because I am
fearful of the future.
Secretary Rusk. Senator, perhaps what I said earlier was
too broad on the Rhodesian matter. I believe that in the U.S.
national interests and our own interests in the entire
continent of Africa, as to what happens in that country, I
think it was necessary for us to take a stand as we did on
Rhodesia. I did not want to----
Senator Carlson. I appreciate your position, Mr. Secretary,
but you and I and the Commerce Department have had about 14,
16, 18 months of discussion on some of our problems in South
Africa when it comes to selling airplanes. I know you are
familiar with it, selling planes for dollars to the Republic of
South Africa, and it was finally resolved in favor of the
United States, but only after, I would say, 18 months of
bickering and discussions, and it was resolved because Great
Britain was going to sell those planes and use U.S. engines.
I appreciate the Secretary's action in this. I think it was
right, but I know this situation, if we get involved and too
carried away by pressure from other countries and forget our
own nation, I do not like to say that, but we get carried away
in this world opinion matter. I shall conclude, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
NORTH VIETNAMESE CONDITIONS
I have two questions, Mr. Secretary. I thought I heard you
say that North Vietnamese had proposed three different sets of
conditions, unconditional with respect to the bombing,
unconditional and for good, unconditional and definitive, but
the third one escaped me.
Secretary Rusk. These were three different ways of what
appear to us to be saying the same thing, permanent,
definitively, and for good. Whether these are differences in
different translations of the same Vietnamese words I am not
quite sure. Harrison Salisbury said in an interview
unconditionally and for good. Another statement put in
definitively. But the word ``permanently'' is the most frequent
word they use in that regard. At all times they say
unconditional.
Senator Dodd. I see.
THE INDONESIAN SITUATION
The second question I would like to ask is with respect to
the Indonesian situation. I am not clear what your position is.
I understood you to say that you would not go so far as to say
our presence in Vietnam was decisive.
Secretary Rusk. Senator, I would quite frankly be very
comfortable about saying to you that what we are doing in
Vietnam was the decisive influence on the events in Indonesia.
I cannot in candor say that.
Senator Dodd. Would you say----
Secretary Rusk. But what I said was that I thought it had
some influence. How much I am not quite sure. I did say that
prominent officials of Indonesia said to us that it did have a
decisive influence, but it is hard to answer that question
accurately and specifically.
I did not want to be in a position of exaggerating that
particular point as far as we look at the situation. I have no
doubt that it had some influence, and it might have had even
more influence if the Chinese had attempted to send their own
armed forces by sea to reinforce the PKI during that period,
you see.
The fact that the Seventh Fleet was there and the British
Fleet was there, and so forth, this could have made quite a
difference, of course.
Senator Dodd. Would you say that a long term effort to help
Indonesia in our aid program, in, I assume, other respects
certainly helped those or, Ices in Indonesia to compel the
efforts to overturn the government?
Secretary Rusk. I think it proved in hindsight to have been
very useful for the United States over the years to keep some
sort of contact going and alive even though there were times
when it was painful to do so.
Senator Dodd. Yes, I was critical of it, so I am giving you
an opportunity to get even. But I take it that it did pay off
and that with our presence in South Vietnam.
Secretary Rusk. I think it is just not on the military
side, although that turned out to be useful, but our labor
unions have had very important and constructive relationships
with some of the labor unions in Indonesia, and our university
people in the same way. There were times when it was very
difficult to keep those going for reasons on both sides, some
of which you will remember.
But I think, on the whole, it has demonstrated that in that
instance certainly patience and a little persistence turned out
to be a good thing.
INFLUENCE OF VIETNAM WAR ON INDONESIA
Senator Dodd. I put it essentially that it seems to me our
policy with respect to Indonesia, and in continuing to try to
give them assistance in all of the respects you have mentioned
and others, and our presence in South Vietnam, did have a very
strong influence on the outcome of the struggle in Indonesia
between the Communist forces or pro-Communist forces, and those
other forces more friendly to the West, is that right?
Secretary Rusk. I think it has an important influence,
Senator.
I think it had an important influence.
Senator Dodd. It certainly did appear to the people in that
respect.
Secretary Rusk. I think I ought to say when the moment of
truth came in Indonesia, as it did, between these opposing
troops, we were not involved in that in any way. Maybe these
people would ask the question, ``If you were not, why weren't
you?'' But there was a wholly Indonesian problem here, and we
were not involved in it surreptitiously or otherwise, except
for these overt reasons, the public reasons, we were in Vietnam
and had maintained the contacts, and everybody would know we
would be sympathetic if the Indonesians found a way to fend off
the attempt of the PKI to seize power.
Senator Dodd. It certainly would be fair to say, would it
not, that all of the things we did do and tried to do in
Indonesia itself, and our presence in South Vietnam, certainly
influenced the thinking of the Indonesian people in this
critical hour.
Secretary Rusk. I think that is fair, sir.
Senator Dodd. That is all I have.
The Chairman. Senator Williams.
U.S. AND BRITISH POLICIES TOWARD RHODESIA
Senator Williams. Mr. Secretary, in general, I have been
supporting your positions that you have taken in South Vietnam.
It is a little hard for me to understand why we have just
joined Great Britain in imposing economic sanctions on
Rhodesia, but I noticed in the press the other day that Great
Britain is selling fertilizer and chemicals to Castro, going to
finance a plant, and also continuing to trade, as we
understand, with both North Vietnam and China. How can we
reconcile those two positions, particularly when Great Britain
itself is one of the members of SEATO?
Secretary Rusk. First, sir, on the Rhodesian matter, this
is not a matter which was purely bilateral between us and
Britain, a commitment by the United States in support of
Britain because it was Britain. We have, in fact, at times had
some margins of difference with Britain over the Rhodesian
question, both in the direction of pursuing the talks more and
in the direction of being careful about the general attitude of
the African countries.
We were acting in the Rhodesian thing as a matter of
national interest in respect of the total continent there, as a
factor over and above different from the attitude of Britain.
FLAGSHIPS OUT OF HONG KONG
Secondly, Britain is not itself trading with North Vietnam,
with the exception of an occasional flagship out of Hong Kong
controlled by a company in Hong Kong.
Senator Williams. Isn't that to a certain extent like some
of our American companies owning under a Panamanian flag?
Secretary Rusk. Yes, it is possible, sir. But they do not
feel they have the kind of control in that situation in the
colony there and, Senator, one reason, since this trade is
almost minuscule, one reason that I personally feel somewhat
relaxed about it, is I do not want to have the question put to
us if we do those things to Hong Kong which causes the people
on the mainland to go after Hong Kong, is the U.S. going to
help them in Hong Kong, and I do not want to have anything to
do with that problem.
Senator Williams. To the extent we understand, and I have
seen this excuse before, but Great Britain has control over the
ships going into Hong Kong.
Do I understand these same ships, using the flag from Hong
Kong, British-owned ships, can continue to trade with Rhodesia
and not be subject to this blockage and Great Britain has no
control over those companies and cannot stop them?
Secretary Rusk. No, I do not think so.
Senator Williams. It has stopped them in Rhodesia.
Secretary Rusk. That is correct.
Senator Williams. And they would stop them in North Vietnam
on the same basis if they wanted to, couldn't they?
Secretary Rusk. It would require legislation, I believe.
Senator Williams. It did not require legislation in
Rhodesia.
Secretary Rusk. I think, sir, it was an Order in Council
with respect to Rhodesia.
Senator Williams. Now, the fertilizer plant which she is
financing for Mr. Castro.
Secretary Rusk. We do not like that and other countries in
this hemisphere do not like it and have expressed our views
very strongly in London. Britain has a different policy than we
do on this, and we haven't been able to prevail. That is the
way it is. Here is a point in which we and they simply disagree
on.
CHINESE STEEL SHIPMENTS
Senator Williams. One final question. I notice it was first
reported in the London Observer, in which these steel shipments
to which another member referred----
Secretary Rusk. Right.
Senator Williams. I read that story and, as I read the
story, we gave the official explanation that this steel was in
short supply and that it had been purchased and we were going
to stop it. Did we----
Secretary Rusk. No.
Senator Williams. Did we completely deny there was any such
transaction at all and that story was false?
Secretary Rusk. When something like that comes in we first
try to find out what the facts are. We investigated this. The
Singapore Government has denied it and has accounted to us for
the steel shipments that they got out of China through Hong
Kong, and where that steel went, and the record shows that the
steel went to places other than Vietnam. So that my answer to
you today is, to the best of our ability to proceed to find
out, there was nothing in that story.
Senator Williams. And it did not ultimately end up in South
Vietnam at all?
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir. I am not suggesting
that all the trading that goes on there may not be some things
brought out of China through Hong Kong that may not turn up
anywhere, including this country, through a third or fourth
country trading. But we did look into the steel matter, and we
have been able to locate where that steel went. It did not go
to Vietnam.
Senator Williams. Thank you.
Secretary Rusk. I will get the committee the details.
Senator Aiken. It did not go to Wilmington.
Secretary Rusk. Not to Wilmington. [Laughter.]
The Chairman. Senator Clark.
THE ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE SITUATION
Senator Clark. Mr. Secretary, I would like to get your
comments on the antiballistic missile situation with respect to
the policy of the Department. Also, how much can you tell us
about what Ambassador Thompson is up to, what you and Mr.
Dobrynin have been able to achieve, and generally speaking
whether you have read Roswell Gilpatric's article in the New
York Times of yesterday, and whether you are generally in
sympathy with the point of view he expressed, which is we ought
to do everything feasible to prevent an escalation of the arms
race by either Russia or ourselves of the ballistic missiles.
Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, could we, perhaps, leave this
part of it off the tape?
[Discussion off the record.]
TAKING OVER THE WAR FROM THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE
Senator Clark. I would like to move into one more question.
What is the rationale, Mr. Secretary, behind or, perhaps, are
the press reports true, that we are committed to moving in
force into the Mekong Delta in order to take over the
responsibilities in that area that South Vietnam has hitherto
attempted to carry on? What is the rationale behind the search
and destroy massive maneuvers in the Iron Triangle? Are we
still committed to an increasing policy of taking over from the
South Vietnamese the conduct of the war in Vietnam, and what is
our own view as to whether this will not result in casualties
far beyond any productive results?
Secretary Rusk. First, on the Iron Triangle, this has been
an area near Saigon which has been a major Viet Cong
headquarters and supply center for a long time, and out of that
come raids and operations against communications as well as
against the city itself.
It is a relatively lightly populated area. As you know, we
are moving the civilians out as the operation proceeds. But as
far as the U.S. taking over the main battle is concerned, I
just noticed in the daily military report this morning that I
see every day, that the operations of battalion size or larger
going on yesterday, I have the figure here exactly, I think
there were 11 U.S., 2 allied, other allies, and something like
18 or 20 South Vietnamese.
The South Vietnamese are engaging in full operations. We
are trying to get them moved toward pacification, which is
something of a misleading term in this sense, that does not
mean the South Vietnamese are going to take fewer casualties.
This pacification effort is a very mean part of the war, but it
is something the South Vietnamese may be better able and fitted
to do than we in working in the villages and rooting out the
Viet Cong from the rest of the population.
The Mekong Delta, part of this is immediately adjacent to
Saigon. We are interested very much in securing the Saigon
area. The Delta is a source of rice and men for the Viet Cong
in Corps One, Two and Three. I think it is a tactical matter as
to which of the 43 provinces our forces operate in primarily,
and which are primarily for the South Vietnamese forces.
A 100 PERCENT AMERICAN WAR
Senator Clark. I would suggest, Mr. Secretary, it is much
more strategic than tactical, and it is another obvious
indication, if it is true we are moving in for the first time
in force in the Mekong Delta, that we are slowly but surely
making this a 100 percent American war, and I would like your
comments on that.
Secretary Rusk. Well, the record of operations, the record
of casualties, the missions performed just do not show it,
Senator. As I say, I have the figure here----
Senator Clark. Well, they certainly did a few months ago,
Mr. Secretary, when American casualties increased, and they
have drastically increased all through 1966, and the South
Vietnamese casualties for several weeks were less than ours.
I would find it a little surprising if you would deny that
we have been more and more involved in search and destroy
operations in South Vietnam with an ever-increasing list of
American casualties--that is true, is it not?
Secretary Rusk. I did not say that. I was saying yesterday
in operations of battalion size or larger there were 11 U.S.
and 22 South Vietnamese. They were carrying on twice as many
operations in numbers.
U.S. SUFFERING MORE CASUALTIES
Senator Clark. I do not want to get into an argument with
you. I have this map here. You remember the fuss I made about
this matter a year ago. It looks like we have not any more
ground, and we have suffered many casualties. The casualties
are what bother me. We talk an awful lot about the strategic
value. What gets me down is we are not really paying enough
attention to how many American boys are getting killed.
Secretary Rusk. Senator, you are not more concerned with
casualties than I am. I belong to that generation of young men
who were betrayed into World War II because the governments
refused to face the problem of organizing a peace in the world.
I hate these casualties just as much----
Senator Clark. Would you mind if I give my entire attention
to you, and let your staff assistant postpone his comments?
Secretary Rusk. I say you are not more concerned with
casualties than I am. I belong to that generation of young
people that was betrayed into World War II with tens of
millions of casualties all over the world because the
governments of that day, including the Government of the United
States, refused to face the problem of organizing a peace in
the world.
Now, we have taken 190,000 casualties since 1945 all over
the world, and it is bloody and difficult and burdensome, but
the effort has been, and is beginning to show some signs of
paying off that we can organize a peace before we let this go
down the chute-the-chute to World War III. This is what it is
all about, and these casualties being undertaken out there are
highly relevant to the question of whether we are going to
organize some peace, or whether most of the world is going to
go up in flames one of these days.
Senator Clark. Well, I think that is where you and I find
ourselves in disagreement, and I do not think it desirable, Mr.
Chairman, to pursue it any further at this point. I think we
can organize the peace without getting all these Americans
killed.
The Chairman. Is that all?
Senator Clark. Yes.
The Chairman. Senator Mundt.
NUCLEAR WARHEAD DELIVERY SYSTEMS
Senator Mundt. Did I understand you to say in this proposed
proliferation or non-proliferation treaty, it would not include
the delivery systems?
Secretary Rusk. It concentrates on the nuclear warheads and
does not try to deal with the question of delivery systems.
Sentor Mundt. Why not?
Secretary Rusk. Because the effect is to prevent the spread
of warheads, whereas delivery systems can be everything from
ordinary aircraft to artillery, to anything else, and it would
be awfully hard to combine a delivery system into a non-
proliferation treaty.
Senator Mundt. From our standpoint vis-a-vis, China isn't
there a problem of getting a delivery system? They have got the
bomb.
Secretary Rusk. Well, we would be interested in finding a
way to keep them out of the ICBM business or IRBM business. But
they have got delivery systems now, ordinary aircraft or the
most shortranged missiles or presumably they will eventually
develop atomic capability with artillery. So the delivery
problem is a different problem from that of the warhead.
Senator Mundt. The problem is they do not have a delivery
system from their standpoint, but they are going to get one.
Secretary Rusk. That is right.
Senator Mundt. And I think a non-proliferation treaty that
ignores that is good for others but no good for us.
Secretary Rusk. Well, I think the problem of delivery
systems is a special and, in some respects, a more complicated
question. For example, if you get into the delivery system
business, should we go back to the Baruch proposals or not?
This sounds these days like a rather wild idea, but would the
security of the United States be enhanced if the world went
completely conventional again? Now, if we say, no, we have got
to have missile deterrence ourselves, then getting some control
of these on the part of other countries is going to be
extremely difficult.
Senator Mundt. Don't you think we have to say yes to that
question?
Secretary Rusk. Well, I think we ought to think about it
more than we have thought about it in the last few years
because we sort of have taken it for granted that somehow we
have to have a nuclear force ourselves.
I think one of the great tragedies myself was--well, so
much has happened since--that the Baruch proposals were not
accepted.
Senator Mundt. I agree.
NO QUID PRO QUO WITH BRITAIN
Like most of others who have commented on Rhodesia, I am
rather completely disenchanted with the way we have been sucked
into the situation over there. Let me ask you this direct
question: Before we yielded so quickly to the persuasiveness of
Great Britain, as if we were still a colony of theirs as we
were before 1776, have we ever tried to make an agreement in
which we would obtain a quid pro quo with her relative to this
business in Cuba, with respect to the trouble in Vietnam?
Secretary Rusk. Well, we did not make a condition with
respect to a quid pro quo. We have discussed this in relation
to other questions where we would hope to get some more
cooperation from them, and one reason for it is there are
nineteen members of the Commonwealth involved in this, and the
general membership in the United Nations, so a quid pro quo by
a particular member would not be responsive to our national
interests in dealing with problems in Africa or our problems
relating to the very existence of the Commonwealth, or our
interests as expressed in the United Nations.
Senator Mundt. Except that they needed us for the sanctions
program.
Secretary Rusk. Senator, I think if we had taken the other
view on this that, perhaps, some of our friends in Britain
would have simply used that to say, ``Well, you see, we were
prepared to do this, but the Americans are not going to back us
up,'' and they would have used it to get them off the hook.
Senator Mundt. Do you really think in your own mind a
program of sanctions, short of a military blockade, can ever
bring Rhodesia to its knees?
Senator Mundt. Well, I think, sir, the problem is not so
much bringing them to their knees in that sense.
Senator Mundt. Trying to get them to do what we want.
Secretary Rusk. So much as bringing them into a discussion
where they would be willing to make more sense than they have
thus far.
ROLE OF SOUTH AFRICA
Senator Mundt. It seems to me the most you can hope for if
our sanctions proceed is bringing a consolidation of South
Africa and Rhodesia into a compact or making them one country,
and then you magnify the problems.
[Discussion off the record.]
Secretary Rusk. I do not believe South Africa is going to
substitute itself for the rest of the world in Rhodesian trade.
This is a very serious problem for South Africa. I do not think
the Portuguese will do it. The Portuguese do say, if sanctions
are applied, that they must apply them at the source and not
try to use Portugal as the policeman simply because they have
an adjacent territory.
Senator Mundt. Do I interpret your statement that you
believe South Africa is not going to send oil to Rhodesia?
Secretary Rusk. The question is whether they will send oil
in quantities additional to the normal flow, which was not
particularly large, and that is the question.
We had hoped South Africa would stay out of this so there
cannot be raised the fairly serious problems of sanctions
against South Africa. We objected to those at the United
Nations.
Senator Mundt. Do you think South Africa is going to
continue or discontinue shipping oil?
Secretary Rusk. I would be surprised if they cut off the
oil below the levels which were going in before the sanctions
were applied. I would be somewhat surprised on that. What I do
not know the answer to is whether they would increase that
supply of oil.
Senator Mundt. If they continue at the same rate this is OK
with Rhodesia. They got by before this.
Secretary Rusk. Rhodesian oil is coming in through other
channels, Mozambique as well.
SOME REDUCTION IN TENSIONS
Senator Mundt. Let me ask you a hypothetical question. Just
how do you define, let us say we have got countries A and B--I
do not have to identify them--any particular countries who have
been quarreling and are suspicious of each other, and you have
a detente. What do you have?
Secretary Rusk. I got trapped on that one in a press
conference. They asked me that, and I said I did not think we
could see a detente, but I can see some reduction of tensions,
and one of the reporters looked it up in the dictionary and
said that detente means reduction of tensions.
But I think, in the first instance, the notion of detente--
to pull away from each other on those matters--that could mean
war. That is in connection with which it was intended, and I
think we are beginning to see some more prudent attitude in
Eastern Europe, and I am speaking of the thinking of the
smaller Eastern European countries, some.
It takes a good many swallows to make a summer, and you
have to probe this pretty carefully, but we would like to keep
up with the possibilities on our own side----
Senator Mundt. Let me put it this way: Suppose country A is
at war with country C, and we are trying to get a detente with
country B. Country B is hoping that country C defeats country A
or kills country A's boys. Can we conceivably have a detente
under those circumstances?
Secretary Rusk. Well, it is applying that specifically to
the Soviet Union and to North Vietnam----
Senator Mundt. Yes.
Secretary Rusk. And the United States.
Senator Mundt. And the United States.
Secretary Rusk. Because if, as I think it would be true--I
think the Soviet Union would be satisfied to see this South
Asian matter settled on the basis of the 1954 and 1962
agreements--then we have a more complicated situation than a
more harsh all-out--I hope myself that attitude on the part of
the Soviet Union can be translated into some effective
influence or effective international action to help to bring
this matter to a peaceful conclusion.
SOVIET AID TO NORTH VIETNAM
I do not think we ourselves on our side should say that
because the Soviet Union is giving assistance to North Vietnam
and----
Senator Mundt. She is supplying every sophisticated weapon
they use in Vietnam.
Secretary Rusk. Whatever sophisticated weapons they have,
such as SAM missiles and MIG 21, radar----
Senator Mundt. Yes.
Secretary Rusk [continuing]. Those things particularly. I
think it would be to our advantage not to let this get into a
completely black and white, implacable hostility kind of
situation and thereby reduce our room for some maneuver and,
indeed, some assistance when the time comes. When the time
comes----
Senator Mundt. You have got, on the one hand, the theory,
how well-grounded and how firm you never told us, that the
Russians would really like this thing settled on the basis of
the time before it started. That is the theory. How well-
documented it is I do not know.
But the fact that they are continuing to supply every
sophisticated weapon, that needs to be stubborn to the
fulfillment of that theory. If the theory is sound, it seems to
me, the Russians have it so easily available to sort of talk to
Hanoi saying, ``We are about fed up supplying all these
sophisticated weapons, we are going to reduce the supply or cut
it off,'' and I see no support for the theory in terms of the
action. I do not know where you get your theory. Maybe it is
whispered in your ear by some diplomat, maybe he is sincere and
maybe not. But I see no overt evidence at all.
Secretary Rusk. Well, it is hard to get the overt evidence,
Senator, and in dealing with these people one has to recognize
that you can be wrong tomorrow morning at nine o'clock on a
proposition like that.
But one of the questions to which we have not got a full
answer to is this pause in the cessation of bombing. If these
people cannot deliver Hanoi and say what Hanoi can do, perhaps
they can at least tell us what they can do, so it is in this
context that your question comes up, and we have not found out
what the answer to that is yet, but this is the kind of
question we are working on all the time.
DIVIDENDS FROM THE WAR IN VIETNAM
Senator Mundt. One other point. Speaking as a supporter of
the State Department's foreign policy, I have been a little bit
disappointed in your testimony today on two points. You have
sort of shot out of the saddle two of the justifications which
I have made publicly at home, which are in my own mind reasons
for supporting the foreign policy and the war in Vietnam, and I
was a little bit disappointed when you said that you did not
believe that one of the dividends from our efforts in Vietnam
was the rather salutary developments which have been occurring
in Indonesia. I have said I thought they were connected.
You have been very careful to point out you feel if there
is any relationship it is very remote.
The other disappointment is I supported reluctantly the
plea that you made when you came into the Senate and to the
House and said that Sukarno says, ``The hell with American
aid,'' and they voted against it in the House, and you came
here and said that we have to continue some of our aid to keep
certain government functions going if we were either to prevent
a Communist takeover from China or to get a good leader who
would be more neutral from the standpoint of isms, Americanism
and communism, if something happened to Sukarno and he died or
was replaced.
Now, you have told us that you do not believe that that aid
that you induced us to give you--the Senate wrote some nice
ambiguous language--could be continued.
Now you tell us you do not think that was very important in
building up the stable elements over there enabling them to
survive and get some kind of government which is not controlled
by Sukarno.
You shot out of the saddle two of the bases of my support.
I may not be as enthusiastic----
Secretary Rusk. There may be some misunderstanding on your
second point. I did not want to diminish the second point at
all. I did add the comment that it was not in the military
channels that these relations are productive, but through the
trade unions and the universities.
Senator Mundt. All of which could have gone on without your
coming here and pleading with us to override the House of
Representatives, that we were going to save the situation, we
had better support it, and we did.
Secretary Rusk. I had not supposed I had minimized in my
discussions----
Senator Mundt. I am sure you minimized it in my mind when
you put it to what the labor unions and the cultural exchanges
had done. You certainly minimized it to me.
A QUESTION OF EMPHASIS
Secretary Rusk. On the first question, there is a question
of emphasis. My own inclination on most of these questions is
to be a little moderate about claiming direct results from
particular things, particularly when the situation in Indonesia
was very complicated.
There was a connection. I am sure there was a connection. I
am sure the present Indonesian leaders felt there was a
connection. I just did not want to say to you that because--I
do not believe that our being in Vietnam played a decisive role
at the key time in Indonesia. There were good Indonesian
explanations for much of this. I am sure that had a
constructive and helpful influence, but at least as Secretary
of State I ought to feel that I ought not myself to exaggerate
this.
Now, look at the possibilities. Sukarno is still there. We
think that he is under control. We think that the new
government will remain in power, but if that should change----
Senator Mundt. Do you think our pulling out of Vietnam
would enhance or decrease Sukarno's chances?
Secretary Rusk. I think it would greatly enhance it; it
would enhance it. Let me go back to my mood of moderation.
Senator Mundt. That is all.
The Chairman. Senator Pell?
U.N. ROLE IN RHODESIAN SANCTIONS
Senator Pell. I think I sympathize with you when I see all
the foreign policies represented around the table here.
Is not our imposition of sanctions in Rhodesia basically
the result of our membership in the United Nations?
Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.
Senator Pell. I think this is a point which should be on
the record. We have received many benefits, including the
avoidance of civil wars through the U.N., and it involves
certain responsibilities, too.
I understand from press reports that a new Under Secretary
of State for Administration will be appointed, and I would like
to leave with you the thought, obviously in this executive
session it can be said but not in the open session, perhaps--
that I would hope that the appointment would be a man of very
broad gauge, not a professional administrator or a man in that
line, but a man who could give to whatever changes are
necessary the internal direction rather than relying for
external direction.
I did not know that that or if that would coincide with
your views. I realize it may be a little premature to discuss
this.
Secretary Rusk. This is a matter that is under
consideration by the President, and presumably a nomination
will be coming forward in due course.
Senator Pell. I would hope a broad gauge non-professional
administrator would be chosen.
RESULTS OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT
Next, if we get to the conference table in Vietnam and
reach an agreement with the North, and follow out our present,
which I think are correct, intentions, withdrawing from
Southeast Asia, would it not be a problem of fact that in
several years Vietnam would be unified, probably under a
nationalist, technically Communist leadership, and would that
not be the probable result through peaceful means?
Secretary Rusk. I would not think so, Senator.
Over this period of time, the last twenty years, North
Vietnam has become thoroughly consolidated as a Communist
system. South Vietnam has rejected the Communist system for
itself. You have the same problems in the two parts of Korea
and the two parts of Germany.
I think North Vietnam is not going to be interested in
reunification on a non-Communist basis and, by and large, I say
that may be an oversimplification, but I think that is true,
and I think South Vietnam is not going to be interested in
reunification on a Communist basis. These Buddhists and
Catholics and Montagnards and Cambodians and northern refugees,
apparently while disagreeing among themselves on many other
things, seem to agree on that. So if this is left to the free
choices of the people in the two parts of Vietnam, I think it
is rather unlikely that there will be reunification any time
soon.
LET PEOPLE DECIDE THROUGH ELECTIONS
Senator Pell. You would not think some sort of government
like that in Yugoslavia, where each side gives in the other
direction, would probably emerge, and to my mind it would not
be a bad thing from the viewpoint of American national
interest.
Secretary Rusk. Well, time factors, I can think if there is
moderation of Communist organization and techniques and peace
coexistence coming out of Mainland China and that sort of
thing, that in the longest run you may have some drawing
together, just as we hope that somehow the West Germans and the
East Germans can find ways to draw together despite these large
ideological conflicts. But I do not see that as anything that
is going to contribute to the settlement of this present
situation other than the willingness, as we have expressed it,
to let that question be decided by the people themselves in
their own way through free elections.
THE ADVANTAGE OF NEGOTIATING
Senator Pell. Then would you believe there is any validity
to the theory that the North Vietnamese really do not wish to
come to the conference table, that they would see the
possibility to achieving the objectives becoming, but that they
consider their achieving the results of world revolution better
by continuing the military level of activities, and it is to
our advantage to get them to the conference table more than
theirs?
Secretary Rusk. Well, clearly they do not see much
advantage to them in coming to the conference table because
they have had hundreds of chances to and have consistently said
no.
Senator Pell. Excuse me, and also at least in my own view,
the possibility of attaining success in coming to a conference
table, from what their overt objectives are?
Secretary Rusk. That is right. I do not believe they make
the judgment if they came to the conference table they would
get what they said they wanted to get in 1960. I think that is
right.
DANGEROUS SITUATION IN CHINA
Senator Pell. Do you believe the situation is extra
dangerous in Vietnam now where we see in China the opposing
forces struggling with the Mao forces, of an effort being made
to divert the attention of the Chinese people from internal
difficulties and to attempt external intervention such as they
did in India several years ago?
Secretary Rusk. This is a possibility one has to watch.
Quite frankly, we do not see the situation in China developing
that way at the present time, but we are keeping a very close
eye on it. We do not see troop movements. We do not see
statements from leaders, either privately or publicly,
indicating that that is what they have in mind. But it is
theoretically a possibility, and we are watching very closely.
NORTH VIETNAMESE MANPOWER
Senator Pell. What would be the present proportions of new
increments of manpower on the opposition side in South Vietnam
of local recruitment versus infiltration? Would it be about 60-
40 ratio?
Secretary Rusk. For the most recent three or four months, I
would have to check the figures on that. I would think that
probably 60-40 is not too far off.
Senator Pell. Sixty local, forty from the North?
Secretary Rusk. Probably.
Senator Pell. And the weapons we have captured, are they
divided up what percent between West and East?
Secretary Rusk. I would have to check the latest figures on
that. Most of the weapons we are getting now are Chinese
manufactured, but I would have to check that.
Senator Pell. The substantial majority would be, you say?
Secretary Rusk. That is right. You see, the Liberation
Front Forces and the North Vietnamese Forces unified their
weaponry about a year ago, went to the same caliber. It
happened to be caliber for which our ammunition is not
suitable, so they not only brought in the weapons buy they have
to continue to bring in the ammunition to keep them supplied.
These are submachine guns, the rifles, the carbines, light
machine guns, things of that sort.
CIVILIAN CASUALTIES
Senator Pell. As you know, we have had some interest for
some time in this question of civilian casualties, and I am
well aware of the horrible tortures, murders of our friends in
South Vietnam.
Why has it proved so difficult to get anywhere near so
general an estimate now for a year and a half, where we have
been sparring on this question, as to the real extent of the
civilian casualties in South Vietnam?
Secretary Rusk. Well, one of the problems is we do not have
exact information on who might be in a particular place when it
is struck. For example, on a POL dump, there are no houses
around it, and that kind of thing, who happens to be there at
the time.
Another problem is whom would you classify as civilians for
this purpose? The truck drivers in a convoy coming down the
road toward the South, a line of coolies bringing in packs on
their backs, coming into the--toward the--South? If you hit a
railway bridge and there are people there working on the
bridge, are they Chinese construction engineer soldiers or are
they civilians? There are some very difficult questions of
classification.
But I would comment, Senator, that I do not know that there
has ever been any struggle anywhere in which such extraordinary
efforts are made, both in the field and back here, to try to
minimize or eliminate what might be called innocent civilian
casualties.
Now, they have occurred. But on the fixed targets, that is
as compared with the route reconnaissance along the routes of
infiltration, the fixed targets have produced a surprisingly
small number of civilian casualties.
Senator Pell. I would agree with everything you have said,
but I think those of us who have been pressing this question
really wanted education.
COUNTERPRODUCTIVE ACTIONS
I noticed the latent hostility in Germany, what hostility
there is to the United States, which is based on the effect of
civilian casualties from raids, and it still remains a certain
amount. It is never expressed.
I am wondering if these casualties are large, as they would
seem to be, if, perhaps, some of our actions are
counterproductive, and to arrive at that, that we press for an
estimate, merely in terms of thousands. But when we get a
figure of 100 civilian casualties in a six-month period, there
is obviously something a little off.
Secretary Rusk. The only figure of that kind I heard was
identifiable civilian casualties inflicted by operations of our
own forces.
Senator Pell. In South Vietnam.
Secretary Rusk. In South Vietnam.
Senator Pell. Even that seems modest.
Secretary Rusk. That you can be somewhat more accurate
about than what is happening in North Vietnam.
Senator Pell. Thank you.
A REFERENDUM IN TAIWAN
One final question, trying to see a way out of our present
impasse in our relations with China: In your view, and you have
much knowledge in this area in the light of your previous
responsibilities and work--what would be the result of a
referendum in Formosa or Taiwan between--an open referendum
between--the Chiang Kai-shek government and some other
government?
Secretary Rusk. Some other government in Formosa?
Senator Pell. A local Taiwanese government, Taiwan
candidates. You know, the figures are about ten percent of the
Taiwanese are represented in the Parliament, whereas they make
up about 80 percent of the people, et cetera, 90 percent or 80
percent.
Secretary Rusk. I would think at some point such a
plebiscite might indicate that the Formosans would like to have
more of a Formosan control over their own affairs.
As you know, the theory of the present government there is
based upon the theory that it is a Mainland, an all-China
government, in which the Formosan Province is one of the
provinces.
But my impression is that the purely Formosan Nationalist
feeling, on the one side, and in its relation to the
Mainlanders, on the other, is somewhat more relaxed in the ten
years certainly than it was at the very beginning when there
were some pretty harsh feelings there.
I suppose about 80 to 90 percent of the enlisted personnel
of the present armed forces, the present army, of the Republic
of China are now Formosan personnel.
Senator Pell. Might not this be one of the eventual
approaches to getting us off our present wicket when the time
comes, and there is need for a change of administration there
anyway?
Secretary Rusk. I do not think it would make the slightest
difference to Peking.
Senator Pell. It would not?
Secretary Rusk. No. They want it and they just say, ``It is
ours and we have got to have it.'' There never has been any--
and they won't even renounce the use of force in the Straits of
Formosa. You remember the Eisenhower Administration in the mid-
fifties began talking with the Chinese and tried to get a
mutual declaration of the renunciation of force in the Straits
of Formosa. We continued that ever since. Never the slightest
indication of Peking that they would be interested in that
Senator Pell. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Case.
Senator Case. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
QUESTIONING THE CONTAINMENT OF CHINA
Mr. Secretary, following Senator Pell's suggestion implicit
in one of his questions as to whether the North Vietnamese and,
presumably, the Chinese might be quite uninterested in
negotiations because they expect to get more out of continuing
their current operation than through any negotiations. It seems
to me there is a relation between that possibility and the
possibility that I have not heard our policy contemplate, that
in the end it may not be what we hoped, Russia and the U.S.
against China, but rather Russia and China against the United
States, and that we are falling into, unfortunately--I am
thinking of the broadest terms now--maybe a trap, if you will,
maybe nothing as explicit as this, but this may be the
consequence, and I am not at all sure that we are right.
Even those liberals who say the ancient antagonisms between
China and Russia are going to make everything all right for us,
I am not at all sure that they are concerned about destroying
the only obstacle to world Communism, the United States of
America, that that may not override these things, at least in
the short run or in the middle time.
I wonder if you would just talk a little about this. Maybe
we, in our own interests, including, of course, the interests
of world peace, too, are on the wrong track here in thinking
that containment of China, which I have supported, as you know,
up to now, is a desirable thing, on the analogy to the position
in Western Europe, defense against--I mean standing, creating
the bulwark against expansion of Russia, believing as you have
suggested too, with you, if we had done something about Hitler
we would not have had World War II and all the rest of it.
I wonder if I am right about this, and whether we may not
be getting bogged down and trapped into doing a thing which is
going to take more and more of our strength and render us in a
position where we will be really vulnerable to this other
combination which we do not contemplate.
RECONCILIATION BETWEEN CHINA AND RUSSIA
Secretary Rusk. One of the real possibilities is an
eventual reconciliation between China and the Soviet Union.
Senator Case. I do not mean to just be happy with each
other, I mean they would be after us.
Secretary Rusk. I understand.
The key point would be on what general basis of policy
would that reconciliation occur. There are a good many in
Eastern Europe who insist it would not be possible because of
the dynamics between the Communist world for that
reconciliation to occur on the basis of the militancy of
Peking; that the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe would not and
could not move in that direction. I am not so sure of that.
That is a possibility.
The other would be a reconciliation on the basis of what
might be called the peaceful co-existence. Now, we just have no
way of knowing these things.
I do feel, Senator Case, that if Hanoi and Peking could
demonstrate to the Communist world that the policy of militancy
is the way to get ahead successfully with the world revolution,
that we are in greater danger of having the combined Communist
world getting together directly and fundamentally opposed to
the interests of the free world. That would be a very dangerous
situation.
No, I limited my own remarks to what I believe to be the
present attitude of the Soviet Union on Vietnam, and to a
somewhat moderately optimistic view as to the possibilities of
some further improvement of relations with Eastern Europe.
But these other possibilities are very much there and very
much in our minds.
It seems to me that the possibility of a combination that
is militantly hostile to the United States would be encouraged
by a demonstration by one or another of these members of the
Communist world that an aggression in the face of a security
treaty of the United States can successfully be carried out.
Senator Case. This is an effect.
Secretary Rusk. Yes, I know.
GETTING INVOLVED IN A PERIPHERAL AREA
Senator Case. I just wonder if we are taking into account
the other possibility sufficiently as to get ourselves more and
more involved in this particular area that is rather peripheral
to them and really not at all hurting them at all, not hurting
Russia one bit. They are not much involved.
Secretary Rusk. Well, we have had some of the same
considerations to deal with in connection with the Greek
guerrillas and the Berlin blockade and other such issues where
the combined weight of the Communist world posed a threat that
we had very much in mind at that time.
Senator Case. Indeed we have. But we never have gotten
ourselves involved with a half million men or whatever the
numbers.
ANTAGONISM WITH THE TWO COMMUNIST POWERS
The Chairman. Would the Senator yield there on that
question of their policy. Wouldn't the obvious reason be their
antagonism to us? That is the policy they could get together
on, not on one of these ideological reasons.
Senator Case. Yes indeed, and I think the Secretary
understood that was the thrust of my remarks.
Senator Hickenlooper. Will the Senator yield? Isn't their
antagonism toward us generated by their political philosophy,
that is, the international Communist philosophy? I do not think
it is a personal antagonism generated from anything except
their ideology.
Senator Case. This is my belief. This is my concern, based
on their desire to destroy the only real block in their way.
Secretary Rusk. You see, if all the countries lived between
us and these two Communist powers, were genuinely secure and
were not living under fear, and some of them have not been
subjected to attack by these countries, we would not have
anything to fight these two countries about. We are not going
to fight the Soviet Union over polar bears in the Arctic, and
we are not going to set off missiles against each other merely
because there are missiles over there.
The principal issues on which we and the Soviet Union could
get into a war under present circumstances have to do with the
security of Western Europe.
There are some in Western Europe who think they are somehow
part of a third world that unfortunately has been caught up in
a great controversy between us and the Soviet Union. To me,
this is a great misunderstanding of the situation.
If Western Europe were secure--Western Europe is the
issue--if Western Europe were secure we would not have put $900
billion in the defense budgets since 1947, and the same thing
will be true of Mainland China.
If Korea and Japan and the Philippines and these other
countries had a reasonable chance of living peacefully next
door to this giant there without being subjected to the
pressures of the world revolution, and they are there, I think
we ought not to decide prematurely that they are not there,
they could live peacefully there and then we have no problems
out in that part of the world except trade and other kinds of
relationships.
WORLD REVOLUTION
The Chairman. I get lost on that phrase ``world
revolution.'' You tried to describe detente. What is the world
revolution?
Secretary Rusk. The Communist doctrine that the world
should be and is going to be reorganized on a Communist basis
under the leadership of the dictatorship of the proletariat.
Now, you see a very primitive form of this out of Mao Tse-
Tung. It is getting to be more sophisticated in Eastern Europe,
but these fellows still are pretty serious about this business.
Now, this revolutionary force has lost, perhaps, some of
its clan in Eastern Europe. They are a little more middle-aged,
and have got more of a stake in what they have been able to
build up, and they may be getting a little tired with the more
military aspect of what they have been doing.
Senator Hickenlooper. You mean they have two pigs?
Secretary Rusk. They have two pigs. [Laughter.]
But this is not true of the others, apparently these
veterans of the Long March in China, although one would have to
take into account they have been more prudent in action than
they have been in their words and doctrine.
IS WORLD REVOLUTION ACTIVELY THREATENED?
The Chairman. What have they done to support your theory
that the world revolution is actively threatened? What do you
consider the Chinese have done? I do not wish to interrupt you,
I do not know----
Senator Case. I think we are probing really the same
purpose.
The Chairman. I am just trying to probe what this world
revolution is that you have in mind. Is there any doctrine or
any actions which have been taken in support?
Senator Case. I would not want to take a chance that there
is not. Frankly, I think there is. In general, I have a
somewhat different view than you do as to the desirability of
protecting ourselves about a Russian treaty.
The Chairman. It is not what you are thinking about it, but
it is what the Secretary is thinking about it.
Secretary Rusk. You are not asking questions about the
doctrine, at the moment, I mean----
The Chairman. If I understood you, the world revolution
here is a major reason for our involvement, that is the way the
Senator put it. I was very intrigued by the way the Senator put
It. We might be falling into a trap. This has occurred to us
when we saw that article out of China some time ago in which it
was said, ``We are very obliged to the U.S. for bringing their
men and treasure. We couldn't get at them if they stayed at
home. It is the only way we can get at them, their coming here
and getting bogged down. We should be very appreciative to the
government of the United States for giving us the opportunity
to destroy it.''
That is what reminded me of what the Senator said.
Secretary Rusk. Is this Hanoi or Peking?
The Chairman. That came out of Peking. It was a very long
article which came out a couple of months ago. You saw it?
Senator Pell. No, I did not. Who wrote it?
The Chairman. It came out of People's Daily. It was picked
up in the usual way. Don't you have that, Mr. Marcy? Anyway, I
know we can find it.
Senator Pell. I would like to see it. This is exactly the
theory I was advancing.
The Chairman. It was picked up from the People's Daily and
reprinted in the New York Times. I thought that is exactly what
you had in mind.
Senator Case. I had this in mind.
AMERICAN OVERCOMMITMENT
The Chairman. It has occurred to me. Are we being drawn
into one place where we can be destroyed? This is what some of
our witnesses said last year. Are we becoming overcommitted to
where our great wealth and manpower are being bogged down in an
area which, as the Senator so well said, is not costing the
opposition any substantial manpower or money? It is a very
serious question.
Secretary Rusk. Senator, when one looks back to some of
these other crises, when the guerrillas were thirty miles from
Athens in great strength from Athens, Greece, and the winter
weather fell in on the Berlin airlift, and we were in that tiny
perimeter in Pusan or even in the first week of the Cuban
missile crisis, the situation is more manageable.
Senator Case. It was said we only won that one because
Yugoslavia took a turn.
Secretary Rusk. Well, it took a turn. Maybe this one is
going to be influenced by the presence of the problems in
Mainland China.
The Chairman. It did not take a turn by bombing but for
entirely different reasons.
Senator Case. I know. This is the only reason firmness
suggests. I must profess that I am for all this. I want to be
reassured we are not getting in so deep that we are in a bog.
The Chairman. Well, you asked a very pertinent question.
Secretary Rusk. I do not believe Peking is glad to see us
in Southeast Asia. I do not believe that for a minute.
Senator Case. In one sense, no.
NOT HAVE TREATIES DISRUPTED BY A BLUFF
The Chairman. I am sure in one sense, no. But if they must
have it out this is the way. If they are convinced we are going
to attack them any way, this is a good way.
Senator Case. I am sure what you did, Mr. Secretary, in
answering this man from South Dakota, upset this man, and it
upset me, too. I have regarded what we have done as pretty
important to our success in holding the line all over the
world, taking a stand here and making your position more
credible with the Russians and with everybody else, and also in
having some rather specific effects and giving tone to the
whole free effort in an effort to keep the world free in
Southeast Asia.
Secretary Rusk. I hope I did not detract at all from that
view. I certainly----
Senator Case. Say it again because, you know, if you did
detract.
Secretary Rusk. No. I was commenting specifically about its
relation to Indonesia.
Senator Case. You mean just cause and effect, one, two,
like that?
Secretary Rusk. No. On the larger question as to what these
great security treaties mean in terms of keeping the peace, to
me the greatest danger in the world would be to have these
treaties be interpreted by the other side as a bluff, because
we have been tested at times when had they judged we were
bluffing great catastrophe would have resulted. The Berlin
crisis of 1961-1962, the Cuban missile crisis were two recent
examples of this.
The most utter dangers are involved in that problem, and we
are all--we all have to approach them, it seems to me, on our
knees because it is awfully hard to be absolutely certain on
such questions.
Senator Case. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Cooper?
Senator Cooper. Am I allowed to ask questions?
The Chairman. Yes, sir.
NORTH VIETNAM'S TERMS ON BOMBING CESSATION
Senator Cooper. Mr. Secretary, my question goes to the
declaration of North Vietnam that there must be a cessation of
bombing of North Vietnam. I am not clear as to the exact
wording of the declaration, if it is an exact wording. Did
North Vietnam expressly state that there must be a permanent
cessation of bombing or did it just state that there must be a
cessation of bombing without the fixing of any limits upon the
cessation of bombing?
Secretary Rusk. The most--the usual phrase there is
unconditional and permanent. Now in the phraseology that you
get in different ways, public and private, the permanent part--
unconditional was always there. The permanent has been
described another way as definitively which, I suppose, is
permanent; and, as Harrison Salisbury in his interview put it,
for good, which is the same thing, I suppose, as permanent. In
other words, this framing of the issue has been put to us as
unconditional permanent, and this is coupled with the excuses
that were given to us when the thirty-seven-day pause was
finished earlier this year, when nothing happened, when we
paused for twice as long, as had been suggested to us that we
pause.
They said, ``Well, a suspension is an ultimatum. You can't
expect people to pick up the question of peace under an
ultimatum of that sort,'' and the general attitude now on the
other side seems to be that unless it is unconditional and
permanent, anything less than that as a stoppage of the bombing
would be interpreted as an ultimatum.
Now, of course, one can look at the question as to whether
you simply stop without saying, but they would either insist
upon a clarification of that point or would interpret for
themselves as unconditional and permanent, and then if we found
we had to resume the bombing for military reasons, then we
could carry the burden of having acted in breach of faith, you
see.
So we feel that these are issues of such importance that we
ought to have some indications on the other side as to what
would happen if we stopped the bombing, and thus far we have
not been able to get any.
VIETNAMESE REUNIFICATION BY ELECTION
Senator Cooper. I will be brief on this question because I
am sure you have developed it in sessions at which, of course,
I was not present. But, as I understand it, the United States
has said it would accept this basis of negotiation, the
adherence to the 1954 Geneva Accords.
As I remember, those accords called for general elections
throughout all Vietnam two years later and, I assume, with the
idea that a government would be established for all Vietnam.
Beginning with the French and then with the United States,
it seems to me, our course has been to establish a separate
government for South Vietnam, and for many reasons. But how
would the United States resolve that question when it now
states that it would not adhere to the Geneva Accords? How
would it resolve the question of the government for all of the
South Vietnamese as distinguished from what would seem to have
been our policy and the French policy before to establish a
government in South Vietnam?
Secretary Rusk. I think we have two elements there. First,
we have said the South Vietnamese ought to have a chance in
free elections to determine what their own government should
be, and that the question of reunification should be decided by
the peoples of the two parts of Vietnam through free elections
or free choice.
The 1954 agreements, by providing for elections on that
issue, presumably meant that this was to be by consent of the
peoples concerned.
The same issue arises both in Korea and in Germany, where
you have other divided countries.
I do not myself think, Senator, that in terms of settling
the problem that we now have in Vietnam that the question of
reunification by peaceful means is likely to be the great
obstacle to a possible settlement. The problem is whether we
can get the other side to hold its hand in trying to bring
about reunification by force.
Senator Cooper. That is all.
The Chairman. I have one or two questions.
THE QUAKERS IN CANADA
Do you know, Mr. Secretary, about a case that was sent to
me involving the Quakers in Canada, that the Treasury of the
United States issued a circular to all the banks in the United
States directing them not to honor a check payable to the
Quakers of Canada? Are you familiar with that?
Secretary Rusk. No sir; I am not. I had not heard of it
before.
The Chairman. Well, it came to me with a photostat of the
order, and I wondered if there is any authority for such an
order from the Treasury.
Secretary Rusk. It sounds to me as though this might be one
of the foreign assets control problems. If the Quakers were
using these funds to send assistance to North Vietnam----
The Chairman. That is correct. Is there such authority that
the Quakers--well, the Quakers state they are sending it North
and South. They do this--they are not involved in this
political thing. They are doing humanitarian work, and a friend
sent me the letter. I don't have the letter anyway. I forgot
how it went--I wrote a letter to the Treasury, but have had no
response. Is that as far as you know, within the power, the
authority of the Treasury?
Secretary Rusk. I would think so, sir, under the foreign
assets control legislation.
Sentor Hickenlooper. What kind of a check?
The Chairman. I did not send a check. Anyway this person,
an American citizen, writes a check on the First National Bank
of Washington, sends it to the Quakers in Canada, and the bank
here is directed by the Treasury not to honor a check payable
to the Quakers of Canada.
Secretary Rusk. I would have to look into the specific case
because I just am not informed about it.
The Chairman. I was a little surprised that we had that
authority. I thought you could donate money to the Quakers.
Secretary Rusk. I believe donations outside the United
States are not income tax deductible in the usual case.
Senator Pell. That is absolutely correct.
The Chairman. Well, they are to Israel, aren't they?
Secretary Rusk. That is a legal sense, that is to the
organized charities organized in this country under the laws of
this country.
DRAWING THE U.S. INTO A LAND WAR IN ASIA
The Chairman. In response to Senator Case's question--he
has disappeared--but the staff just handed me an article \2\
which I had not seen, from the War/Peace Report of October 1966
which says:
\2\ ``Peking and the U.S. Are Both Winning.''
It is frightening as well as paradoxical that almost
identical political assessments are being made in Peking and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Washington concerning the war in Vietnam.
I won't read it all. It says:
On the other side, well-informed U.N. Eastern European
diplomats report the perception of the same reality is quite
different when viewed from Peking. These observers state Maoist
Peking has had, from the beginning, a three-fold strategy based
upon the assumption of an ultimate inevitable war with American
imperialism: First to draw the U.S. into a major land
engagement in Asia, preferably not on Chinese soil (these
observers believe Korea was China's, not the Soviet's
initiative); second, to shift the American-Chinese
confrontation to an American-Soviet confrontation; third, to
use Vietnam and the underdeveloped world as a vehicle to change
Russian foreign policy, or failing that, to discredit it.
I had not seen it but it is on all fours with this other
idea that this----
Secretary Rusk. They said that Korea was on China's
initiative and not the Soviets'?
The Chairman. Just the opposite.
Secretary Rusk. These observers believe----
The Chairman. Yes, the observers believe that Korea was
China's not the Soviets' initiative. I also had thought it was
the Soviets'.
Secretary Rusk. I do not believe that at all.
The Chairman. But in any case, the first point, they feel
since a conflict is inevitable, this is the best thing for them
on the same theory as the Senator from New Jersey advanced.
DULLES ON SEATO
The Chairman. I want to come back to one thing, one very
interesting thing, you said. But before I do that I want to
read a very short statement of Mr. Dulles.
You had, and the administration, correctly I think from its
point of view, is now dwelling upon SEATO, but this is what
Secretary Dulles said to us, and it has some bearing on our
interpretation of it, and I think the way you should use it now
is saying what the Senate did. Here is a quote from Secretary
Dulles.
Secretary Rusk. Is that from your committee report?
The Chairman. That is right.
Secretary Rusk. What page?
The Chairman. Page 8.
We do not intend to dedicate any major elements of the
United States military establishment to form an arm of defense
in this area.
He is speaking about SEATO.
We rely primarily upon the deterrent of our mobile striking
power. That we made clear to our associates in the treaty and
that is our policy.
It would involve in the opinion of our military advisers an
injudicious over-extension of our military power if we were to
try to build up that kind of an organization in Southeast Asia.
We do not have the adequate forces to do it, and I believe
that if there should be open armed attack in that area the most
effective step would be to strike at the source of aggression
rather than to try to rush American manpower into the area to
try to fight a ground war.
I always put it in the record to show that some of us who
were here and voted for those treaties voted for them in view
of the interpretation given to us by the Secretary of State at
that time which, I thought, and I know others must have been
influenced by the idea, that it was not an engagement to put in
a land army in a big war on the land. This was about the same
time that some of our leading military authorities were also
saying, such as Gen. Douglas MacArthur, that the last thing we
ought to do is mount a big land war on the Continent of Asia.
So I would submit that the conditions are very different
today in what we are doing from what many of us legitimately
understood was involved in that treaty.
ALTERNATIVE TO MASSIVE RETALIATION
Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, may I comment briefly on
this?
Mr. Chairman. Yes, you may. I was just trying to put
another point of view, but go ahead. You may comment.
Secretary Rusk. Well, that discussion, it seems to me, goes
to the point as to whether, as in NATO, it was proposed in
SEATO to build up standing forces of the alliance in the area
in time of peace, and it was pointed out not.
Secondly, I would point out that at that time the
alternative defense notion was massive retaliation, and had
that been explored more fully at the time, I would suspect that
the alternative Mr. Dulles had in mind as to the kind of thing
we were doing here was massive retaliation, which we have
stayed away from in this present situation.
The Chairman. That may be, but the point is to me that
those of us who were here in voting for this, our judgment, I
feel, certainly mine, was influenced by the representations as
to what we were engaged in, what undertaking we were actually
making.
COMPARISON TO TONKIN GULF RESOLUTION
I would say the same way with the Tonkin Gulf thing. I
think the changes, as today, the circumstances are very
different from what they were then. We had a very small group.
Today we have nearly approaching, I guess, 400,000 to 500,000
men in the area. It is costing $20, $25 billion, and so forth.
I think the change in the circumstances today as of the time of
the Tonkin Gulf are very dramatic indeed, and I, for one--I
have already confessed my error--was influenced very greatly by
the political situation at the time, and I was supporting the
President, who was the then candidate for 1964, and that he was
then advocating a policy of not enlarging the war and,
therefore, I supported his recommendation on the Tonkin Bay.
You are legitimately correct in saying, yes, you supported
it. It is legitimate to respond that I certainly did not
anticipate doing what we are doing. I do not particularly like
to have this always thrown up, ``Well, look, you voted for
this.'' I do not consider we did vote for what we are doing now
at all. The circumstances were very, very different.
U.S. TROOPS TO NATO
Senator Hickenlooper. If the Senator will yield to me, I
will call his attention to the fact when we were considering
the NATO organization we were told very emphatically, and the
word ``emphatically'' was used in the testimony, that we were
not going to send any troops to Europe or anything like that.
The Chairman. I think that is correct.
Senator Hickenlooper. Within four months, we had four
divisions on the way.
The Chairman. Yes. But we did right after that, the very
question of whether we should send additional forces was
submitted to the Senate, and the Senate had a long and thorough
and acrimonious debate on the subject and specifically
authorized it. You remember that.
Senator Hickenlooper. After the troops went.
The Chairman. Well, they at least paid some attention to
the constitutional idea that we participate in these things.
Senator Hickenlooper. I am just saying these things happen
at times.
PRESIDENT JOHNSON DID THE OPPOSITE OF WHAT WAS EXPECTED
The Chairman. I do not particularly like the Tonkin Bay
being thrown up at this time that that is the authority for you
to do what you are now doing. In fact, I thought in supporting
the President as of that date in August of 1964, that I was
supporting a man who was going to do exactly the opposite. Now
he is doing precisely what his opponent said he would do, and
this is a very curious turn of fate. There is not much I can do
about it publicly, at least, but anyway that is a fact of the
matter.
Secretary Rusk. One of the key elements, of course, in that
problem is what the other side is doing all the time. These
fellows keep marching down from the North. At some point
somebody has to make a decision that ``You get out of the
way,'' or you shoot them.
A GENERATION BETRAYED BY WORLD WAR II
The Chairman. These are interesting subjects you brought
up. I think the one Senator Case brought up is very interesting
and worth further thought. Here is one you make. I think this
is what you said a moment ago. You belong to a generation that
was betrayed into World War I----
Secretary Rusk. World War II.
The Chairman. World War II, I am sorry, because the
governments refused to organize the peace of the world.
The question, however, it seems to me, is, the big
question, does this war, as we are now prosecuting it, does it
obstruct or does it promote the organizing of peace. You assume
that this war is an essential and important part that is
designed to organize the peace of the world. Well, my own
feeling is in view of developments that were beginning to take
place when this war got really hot, that it more likely would
prove in the light of history to obstruct the detente that you
mentioned, certainly with the Russians, and detente generally
in Europe as between Western Europe and the Russians, not just
between us, and the very question is, you assume it, I think
the question at issue is, does this war, as we now prosecute
it, does it help organize the peace.
You say the reason you are so interested in pursuing this
is you felt betrayed, and you do not want to do that again. I
think you are assuming the question at issue.
Secretary Rusk. I do not think it is an assumption that was
just pulled out of the air. In 1961, Chairman Khrushchev said
to President Kennedy, in effect, ``Get your troops out of
Berlin or there will be war,'' and President Kennedy had to say
to him, ``Well, Mr. Chairman, then there will be war,'' and it
was extremely important that Mr. Khrushchev believe the
President of the United States on that point, otherwise we
might well have had war.
The same thing at the time of the Cuban missile crisis
where it was necessary to say to Chairman Khrushchev, ``The
missiles will have to go, Mr. Chairman. We hope they can go by
peaceful means, but they must go.''
If the Chairman, if Chairman Khrushchev had not believed
President Kennedy in that situation, we could have had an even
greater catastrophe than in the Berlin matter.
Now, it is a very serious thing to create the impression
that our mutual security treaties are bluffs.
HOW ARE CUBA AND BERLIN RELEVANT TO VIETNAM?
The Chairman. But there are two cases that I think most of
us--I never did question your correctness in both cases because
there was a valid reason for it. Now, go ahead, here is South
Vietnam. Why is it relevant? Why is what you did in Berlin
relevant as to the case in Vietnam? I do not see the relevancy.
I believe they do not believe you because you are in there on a
false basis. They respected what you said in Cuba and in
Berlin. Why is it they do not do it in Vietnam?
Secretary Rusk. The relevance, the first instance, it seems
to me, Mr. Chairman, that if you make a commitment like the
SEATO Treaty, and then demonstrate that it is a bluff, there is
a great risk that they will consider as bluffs your attitude in
these other crises.
The Chairman. You see, you are assuming the question at
issue again. The Senator from Oregon and myself and a lot of
other people do not believe the SEATO Treaty covers this case,
and neither did you until the last two years.
Secretary Rusk. Mr. Chairman, I beg your pardon. If you
want the full record on this----
The Chairman. Well, the State Department did not. I just
gave you the reference.
Secretary Rusk. I am talking about what was said at every
SEATO Ministers meeting since I have been Secretary of State
and the communiques of the SEATO Ministers and the statements
made by President Kennedy. I have not looked at that memorandum
that you referred to of March 1965.
The Chairman. This is a State Department memorandum, not
mine.
Secretary Rusk. I understand. There were a good many other
memoranda in which the SEATO Treaty was talked about along the
way and in public statements and in communiques, and in press
conferences of President Kennedy, and so forth, and there was
certainly no possibility of doubt that in the case----
CLIENT STATES IN SEATO
The Chairman. Isn't it odd that the other SEATO Members do
not agree with you as to its applicability here? None of them
have felt obliged because of this SEATO Treaty to come and
discharge their duties. Are we the only people who have respect
for our international----
Secretary Rusk. Five of them are there, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I admit outside of our clients, I mean the
independent countries.
Secretary Rusk. If you call the clients those that agree
with us, and non-clients those that do not agree with us----
The Chairman. I call a client the ones you put so much
money in them that you dominate their policies and they will do
anything to continue to get enormous aid from you, that you
buy. That is what I call a client.
Secretary Rusk. We have not bought Australia and New
Zealand. They are not client states.
The Chairman. They are not paid very much either. I am
talking about Korea in which you paid vast sums, and I am
speaking of the Philippines in which you not only gave them
very large commitments but I was told two days ago you are now
coming up for a new item for the Philippines in the AID program
and, of course, Thailand, in which you are simply covering them
up with gold. Those are the client states, and they are the
ones that are doing most of the burden.
Secretary Rusk. But they are also the states that live
under the gun of danger out here and have the greatest interest
in resisting what is being done there by Hanoi.
The Chairman. I suppose India and Japan are not interested.
They are not in danger, if there is a danger.
Senator Aiken. I do not understand why you call them
clients. They do not pay us for our services. We pay them. I
would say they are beneficiaries instead of clients.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. Well, it is both ways. They dominate our
policy, I guess. We are the captives of the government of the
Philippines, Thailand and Formosa.
HOW TO ORGANIZE THE PEACE
Well, I wanted to get to--I got diverted--what is your idea
of how to organize the peace today?
Secretary Rusk. Well, that is a very long subject, but in
essence I would say look at Article I of the United Nations
Charter where it talks about the necessity for suppressing acts
of aggression and breaches of the peace, settling disputes by
peaceful means. Article II, the next paragraph, goes on to talk
about self-determination. Surely, if we draw anything at all
from our experience in the last decade, it is that those who
start a process of aggression develop the momentum of
aggression if it is not checked. And no one has been able to
demonstrate to me that the things which these events have in
common are irrelevant.
Now, everyone knows that every human action has its unique
aspects. One burglar is John Doe, and another burglar is
Richard Roe, and each action is unique in some respects. But it
is what they have in common that puts them in prison.
The Chairman. I was hoping you would say the U.N., and I
would hope that we would rely on the U.N. But what we are
really doing is going on our own. These are our own programs.
It is not the U.N. The U.N. has nothing to do with it. This is
a big difference between this and Korea.
One reason, I think, there was little dissent about Korea
is that it was a collective action. It is true we furnished
most of the sinews because we had it, but we had the support
and approval of the United Nations. That is the only idea I
have about organizing the peace is the U.N. But this does not
seem to be in accord with that policy. That is one of the
things why I asked that question.
Secretary Rusk. Well, again the Korean matter was unique in
the U.N. system because of the accident that the Soviet Union
was absent from--they were absent from the Security Council
when the decisive decisions were taken there.
The Chairman. But the Soviet Union has not vetoed any
action here.
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SEATO AND NATO
Secretary Rusk. But NATO is not subject to formal action by
the United Nations. If there is an attack on a member of NATO--
--
The Chairman. But, Secretary Rusk, Mr. Dulles specifically
distinguished this from NATO. He said it is not like NATO.
Secretary Rusk. But not in every respect. It was
distinguished from NATO in the formulation that was used for
these later treaties, and I think you will find in the record
that he says that the differences are insignificant; that the
difference in the wording arose out of the issue raised, I
think, by Senator Taft and others as to whether the language of
the NATO treaty itself would, in effect, repeal the
constitutional processes here, that an attack on one is an
attack on all, and in order not to have that occur, they went
to the formulation, which Senator Lausche read in these other
treaties, which was somewhat different from the NATO language.
But Secretary Dulles in one of these hearings indicated that
the difference was insubstantial.
The Chairman. Well, I will stop with one last thing. I
wondered, because I am always asked this, and I am always asked
by the press, what is the response to the question, are you
optimistic or pessimistic about the situation? They will ask
it. They always do, nearly the first question, when they say
was the Secretary optimistic or pessimistic. How did he feel
about this?
Secretary Rusk. Usually at press conferences when that
question is put to me I usually do not answer it in those
terms.
The Chairman. What do you say?
Secretary Rusk. Because it is much too complicated a
situation altogether.
A REQUEST FOR PUBLIC INFORMATION
Senator Morse. I have one question and one request for
information and, Mr. Secretary, it may involve a matter of
policy and, as you know, if it does I follow your decision on
policy.
Before I make the request, we can certainly have it on a
secret basis, I would like to get it on a public basis, if
possible, because we cannot avoid the fact that in public
discussion among our people in this country these days great
concern is expressed over whether this is becoming
predominantly an American or an Asian war. In fact, there are
certain political points of view within the ranks of the
Republican Party that it ought to be turned over to the Asians.
I have not taken that position completely, but I do think
the American people are entitled to the information that I now
would like to have you supply for public discussion, but if you
decide after consultation with the administration that it
cannot be supplied publicly, at least I would like to have it
made a part of this record, and I would like to use it for the
public, if possible.
STATISTICS ON CASUALTIES
What were the Vietnamese casualties in 1964, 1965 and 1966,
including their fatalities and their wounded?
What were the U.S. casualties during the last three years?
Supply the number of Vietnam infiltrating in 1964, 1965,
1966.
Four, the number of Viet Cong recruited in South Vietnam in
1964, 1965, and 1966.
Five, the desertion rates from the South Vietnamese army in
1964, 1965, and 1966, compared with the Viet Cong's desertion
rates.
Now, we have some of these figures provided to the
committee by the Defense Department, but they are classified.
They show that in 1966, and this is the point Senator Clark was
talking about, that the number of Americans killed in action
quadrupled while the number of Vietnamese killed in action was
less by way of 20 percent, and that despite bombing North
Vietnam infiltration almost tripled in 1966.
Of course, these figures also have to be compared in
relationship to the number of personnel in the American forces
and the South Vietnamese forces, and what is known about the
number of personnel in the Viet Cong forces.
The thrust of my request is obvious. I would like to have
the statistical material bearing on the question of great
public concern these days as to whether or not the United
States is taking over the war and the South Vietnamese, as far
as fighting is concerned, are being let out more and more of
responsibility, because if we are going to have a drive for the
war to be taken over by Asians, an all-Asian conference, as has
been proposed by some, I think the American people ought to
have the statistical material that I asked for.
Secretary Rusk. We will see what we can do on that. I think
we have much harder information on certain of those points than
we have on the others. For example, on the defections from the
Viet Cong, we can count somewhat more than 20,000 in 1966 who
come in to get their cards in the Chiu Hoi program and go on to
get resettled and get jobs.
They tell us for every one who comes over officially, maybe
three or four others simply go off to their farms, and the
desertions are not desertions from the South Vietnamese to the
Viet Cong, but simply people who go back to their farms,
people, like people in this country during the Civil War at
frequent intervals. But we will try our best to get you the
figures and see whether we can make them public. I think a good
many of these figures can be made public. Some of them are
public, but I will try to pull them together for you.
THE U.N. AND RHODESIA
Senator Mundt. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question: If I
understand when we were talking about Rhodesia you were stating
that was not a bilateral action, that we were pulled into
Rhodesia because of our obligations under the U.N. charter; is
that right?
Secretary Rusk. I said it was not just a bilateral matter,
that we had important national interests of our own involved in
this question under the charter in relation to the United
Nations structure, in relation to our own interests in Africa,
as well as our interests in the Commonwealth.
Senator Mundt. How do you respond to Dean Acheson's
statement--I know you have read this--in which he said that
such a situation in the U.N. charter is plain. Chapter I,
Article II, paragraph 7 applies unequivocally that the United
Nations shall not intervene in matters which are within the
internal jurisdiction of any state.
Secretary Rusk. I gave--did I give you that, Mr. Marcy--
that memorandum on the legal--I think the key point here is
that Article II, paragraph 7, the charter provision does not
brand as illegal intervention. The action of the Security
Council taken at the request of a member state concerned, in
this case the United Kingdom--from a legal point of view, the
responsibilities for Rhodesia continue to rest with the United
Kingdom. No one has recognized Rhodesia. I do not think any
country in the world including South Africa has recognized
Rhodesia as an independent state, and Article II, paragraph 7--
--
Senator Mundt. It says any member state or does he say any
state?
Secretary Rusk. Article II, paragraph 7--do you have a copy
of the Charter--expressly provides that the principle of non-
intervention contained in that article shall not prejudice the
application of enforcement measures under chapter 7. So from
the Charter point of view there seems to be little doubt about
that, but I will leave this memorandum for you to study,
Senator. You may not agree with all of it.
Senator Mundt. I hate to see student and teacher disagree.
Secretary Rusk. Well, it is a matter of some pain to me,
Senator.
Senator Mundt. Probably more to you than to me. It has
raised a lot of questions in my correspondence, but I cannot
answer them.
The Chairman. Any other question?
Senator Mundt. No.
Secretary Rusk. I am talking about the last sentence.
The Chairman. I guess that is all.
INDONESIAN VIEWS ON BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM
One thing I did have, I do not know whether it is
important. Maybe you can clear it very quickly. You mentioned a
prominent official of Indonesia. Did he express himself on the
bombing in the north? What was it you said about him?
Secretary Rusk. It had to do with whether our being in
Vietnam had any bearing on the situation in Indonesia.
The Chairman. You said he did.
Secretary Rusk. He said it was a very important thing.
The Chairman. Didn't I see where he thought it would be
very wise to suspend the bombing in the North? Is that correct
or not? I thought he did.
Secretary Rusk. It is possible. I have not noted what he
said.
The Chairman. He denied that he said it. It was reported,
was it not, in the press?
Secretary Rusk. Could we check that point, Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. That is all, unless you have anything further
to say.
Secretary Rusk. No, sir.
The Chairman. All right.
I believe you are scheduled to come in open session next
week, Monday, is that right?
Secretary Rusk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen.
The Chairman. All right. The committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:35 o'clock p.m., the committee was
adjourned.]
SUBCOMMITTEES AND HEARINGS PROCEDURES
----------
Tuesday, January 24, 1967
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 12:00 noon, in
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse,
Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, Clark, Pell, McCarthy,
Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Mundt, Case, and Cooper.
Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Holt, and Mr.
Lowenstein of the committee staff.
CONFIRMATION OF NOMINATIONS
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
First, is there any motion on the people we just heard,\1\
that is----
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Committee heard in open session the following nominations:
Clarence A. Boonstra to be Ambassador to Costa Rica; John F. Henning to
be Ambassador to New Zealand; David S. King to be Ambassador to the
Malagasy Republic; Robert L. Payton to be Ambassador to the Federal
Republic of Cameroon; William B. Buffum to be Deputy Representative to
the U.N.; and Arthur E. Goldschmidt to be Representative to the
Economic and Social Council of the U.N.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, I move that from small a to
small f inclusive be recommended for confirmation.
Senator Morse. Second it.
The Chairman. You heard the motion and the second. Is there
any discussion? Any questions? All in favor of the motion say
``aye.''
[Chorus of ``aye.'']
The Chairman. Opposed, ``no.''
[No response.]
The Chairman. The ``ayes'' have it.
As I said, we will take the other two tomorrow. We have Mr.
William S. Gaud. I will announce that the committee will meet
tomorrow at 10:30. We do not think it will take too long, but
we had already agreed. Mr. Gaud has a matter to present to the
committee.
There are two or three other matters.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE STAFF AND EXPENSES
First, on the committee.
Mr. Marcy, will you present the bill. It has to be approved
and get on its way to go through the procedures.
Mr. Marcy. Yes.
Normally at this time of the year the committee approves a
sum for additional staff and expenses for the balance of this
year.
Last year, the committee approved and the Senate approved
$200,000 for committee expenses. Of that $200,000, the
committee spent $144,289, so we have a balance of $55,000 left.
This would mean that the committee could get along next
year on the same amount, $200,000, but if there is any
inclination for special kinds of activities to be undertaken,
the committee might want to request $250,000.
The Chairman. The reason for that was the discussion that
took place at the last meeting where there were several people
who desired that we try to find some extra staff members. They
do not have to spend it, but if you want to leave it, I mean
make available an amount we could use, and if we possibly can
find somebody, why, we will.
Senator Lausche. Carl, was the full appropriation for the
whole fiscal year $200,000?
Mr. Marcy. That is correct.
Senator Lausche. And we got along with $200,000?
Mr. Marcy. That is correct.
Senator Lausche. Now you say we can get along the next year
unless we expand our staff and services.
Mr. Marcy. That is correct.
Senator Mundt. Did I misunderstand your word, Carl, I
thought you said we got along with $160,000.
Mr. Marcy. That is correct. We have $55,000 unexpended at
the end of the year.
Senator Lausche. Where do you get the money for the next
six months of the fiscal year?
Mr. Marcy. We do not operate on a fiscal year.
Senator Sparkman. We are on a calendar year, January 30 to
January 30.
Senator Lausche. You have $50,000 left?
Mr. Marcy. That is correct.
MONEY TO HIRE ADDITIONAL STAFF
Senator Church. You mean by that, Carl, there is room in
the present budget to hire additional staff people without
enlarging it over the amount we spent last year?
The Chairman. It depends on the hearings and the travel. It
was lower last year than usual, but there was such vigorous
complaint the other day that I said if the committee means what
it said we would give them some leeway. We do not spend it
anyway. Mr. Marcy, I think, has been extremely careful. I do
not know of any major committee that spent as little as this
one.
Senator Morse. Mr. Chairman, could I raise two questions?
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Morse. Carl stated we had some left. We do not have
any left, do we? Didn't that revert?
Mr. Marcy. That reverts.
The Chairman. That reverts. What he meant is we did not
expend it. That is correct.
Senator Lausche. Mr. Chairman, there is going to be an
effort----
The Chairman. Senator Morse. He was about to say something.
EXPANDING THE SUBCOMMITTEES
Senator Morse. I want the attention of Senator Clark and
some others who expressed to me an interest in expanding the
programs of some of our subcommittees.
I have pending--I won't have time to take it up this
morning--my first draft of a proposal for doing some work on
the Subcommittee on Latin America that I think we have got to
do or we are going to be open to two problems.
One, you have got other committees of the Congress doing
it; you have got a jurisdictional problem here. I do not want
to go into that now, but we have some other committees in the
Congress that, in my judgment, are invading the prerogatives of
the Foreign Relations Committee in Latin America; and, second,
I think we ought to do it as a matter of Senate duty.
I do not think you can let this Latin American area go
without more interest being expressed in it by the Foreign
Relations Committee, and I certainly would not favor our
spending any money that we do not need to spend.
On the other hand, whatever you ask for now is the maximum
that you are probably going to get. I do not think we ought to
come in later supplementarily, and asking for more money, and I
would suggest that to play safe we ask for $250,000.
The Chairman. It does not commit us to spend it. We have
not spent it for last year or any year previously, but if we
need it, it is there. There is no commitment that you have to
spend it.
Senator Morse. No.
A REASONABLE PRESENTATION TO THE RULES COMMITTEE
Senator Clark. Mr. Chairman, Senator Pell and I are on the
Rules Committee, and these money appropriations come up there.
Senator Pell. Senator Cooper also.
Senator Clark. Yes, Senator Cooper. I thoroughly agree with
Senator Morse, but before we go in for $250,000, which we may
not spend, Carl ought to have a reasonable presentation to the
Rules Committee as to how we spend it, otherwise there will be
criticisms.
Senator Morse. My only feeling is we can probably do it on
$200,000 in view of what we did not spend last year. We
probably could do it on $200,000.
At the same time, I would not want to ask for $200,000 and
then in the next few meetings of this committee, the committee
agrees there ought to be increased staff of the subcommittees.
Senator Clark. would like to see Mr. Marcy make up a
presentation which can be presented to the Rules Committee.
Senator Marcy. I do have such a budget here, but it will
not deal with the particular investigation. For example, last
year of the full amount of $200,000, the committee budget
showed $163,000 for salaries; employee contributions $21,000;
reimbursement payments to agencies $4,000; travel $6,000;
witnesses for hearings $6,000; office expenses $4,600; and
another amount of $3,000.
That was for the full amount of $200,000.
Now, actually, the way the amounts were expended, I will
just give you a few illustrative amounts here. While we asked
for $163,000 for salaries, we spent $118,000. While we asked
for $6,000 for travel, we actually spent $17,000. That was
because at the time that the committee appropriated the funds
or authorized the amounts last year, the committee had not
decided to hold hearings on Vietnam, NATO, and China.
AREAS FOR INVESTIGATION
Senator Clark. Of course, Mr. Chairman, we really ought to
make the basic decision as to what we want to do with the
committee this year before we prepare the bill, which is
probably going to be impossible to do in this meeting in ten
minutes.
I would certainly like to strongly endorse the position of
the Senator from Oregon that we ought to have a pretty
comprehensive look at Latin America. I believe Senator Gore,
the chairman of the Disarmament Subcommittee, and I certainly
agree with him, think we ought to take a good hard look at the
Disarmament Agency, and I have no doubt there are other areas
of countries as a result of my trip to Eastern Europe and the
Middle East. Some Senators will feel we ought to be conducting
much more effective oversight than we do at present. But my own
point is we ought to make this policy decision and then ask
Carl to make up a budget. We have the cart before the horse,
and since we have to do it this way, I would rather see us ask
for $250,000, and if we do not have to spend it, we will not
spend it.
Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, may I say just this: It may
be the cart is before the horse, but it is just something that
cannot very well be avoided because this present fund expires
January 30, and we need to get action before the end of the
month.
Senator Lausche. Mr. Chairman.
CAREFUL HANDLING OF FUNDS
Senator Sparkman. Wait a minute.
Now, the experience of this committee in the past, I think,
and Carl will bear me out on this, has been one of very good
husbanding of the funds that we have gotten. I think it will
show that some years we have turned back a very large amount.
Other years it has been a lesser amount. You cannot predict it
with any precision. But what we do not spend goes back into the
Treasury, so it seems to me that certainly we can trust the
careful handling of the funds, but that we ought to allow
ourselves elbow room so that we can do what we decide we ought
to do in this committee and, therefore, I would recommend the
larger amount. If it is in order, I would like to make a motion
to agree on that.
The Chairman. Senator Lausche.
SUBSTITUTE MOTION
Senator Lausche. I offer a substitute, and that is that the
amount be kept at $200,000. We are faced with the
responsibility of answering to the people of the United States
whether we are going to keep expenses at present levels or
reduce them, on the one hand; or extend them, on the other, and
impose new taxes.
When the time comes for imposing new taxes, the probability
is that there will be a wave of opposition to it. My belief is
that we ought to begin with the committee's indicating that we
are exerting every effort possible to escape the obligation of
imposing new taxes, or if we have to do so, impose them in the
least amounts possible.
We had $200,000 last year; we spent $150,000. That would
indicate to me that there is a latitude of $50,000 with which
to do the work that might be in excess of what was done last
year.
I make this proposal also because it has become thoroughly
apparent that if there has been neglect, and I am not saying
that it prevails in this committee, because another committee
on which I serve has increased its amount by $200,000 in the
last three years. We should begin here, and that is where I
propose to begin.
The Chairman. You heard the motion. The substitute motion
is to ask for $200,000. Is there any further discussion?
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS COMMITTEE
Senator Mundt. Mr. Chairman, I was late for this committee
because I was detained in the committee presided over by your
distinguished colleague from Arkansas, Mr. John McClellan.\2\
The staff had prepared a proposed spending program, and by
unanimous action our committee there, operating pretty much on
the philosophy that Frank Lausche has mentioned, cut it down.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Government Operations Committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Morse. How much is the total?
Senator Mundt. It is a big committee, a quarter of a
million dollars. They asked for about $1,250,000, and we cut it
down.
Senator Morse. It is the very committee, may I say most
respectfully, which, in my judgment, is planning some work in
Latin America that ought to be subordinated to the Foreign
Relations Committee.
Senator Mundt. Not that I know of. They never mentioned it.
You are thinking of Vietnam.
Senator Morse. You have the Judiciary Committee with
$2,600,000 plus, with some of the subcommittees with $500,000.
Senator Mundt. I am talking about Government Operations.
Senator Morse. I know, but I also bring in the other
Committees.
Senator Mundt. So far as I know, they are not talking about
Latin America. There is a possibility of investigating AID in
Vietnam.
WHOSE OX IS BEING GORED
Senator Cooper. Mr. Chairman, you remember--I am rather
reluctant to give my views on this--but serving on the Rules
Committee we do have this experience: when the committee
chairmen come in for additional funds, if they are supported by
a plan of what is intended to do, I think the Rules Committee
is very generous in approving their request. But I think if
some budget is not made out, there will be a tendency to cut it
out somewhat, and that has been our practice in the Rules
Committee. So I would say if you are going to ask for $250,000,
it ought to be supported by some plan.
The Chairman. May I ask you members of the Rules Committee,
are you likely to cut back? If he only asked for $200,000, are
you going to cut it back along with everybody?
Senator Cooper. Not $200,000.
The Chairman. Because this committee asked for very little.
For example, the committee he mentioned was $1,000,000.
Senator Clark. I would like to say something about the
tactics, if you do not mind. It depends on whose ox is being
gored. There are certain committees which are absolutely
sacrosanct, and they get whatever they want, and other
committees do not get what they want. This does not represent
my philosophy, but it does that of the Rules Committee. I think
this committee's requests are extremely modest.
The Chairman. I think so, too. The Judiciary Committee is
$2,670,000. And they have subcommittees: the Subcommittee on
Antitrust and Monopoly asks for $560,000; Constitutional
Rights, $205,000; Internal Security, $437,000; Juvenile
Delinquency, $260,000.
Senator Clark. Which is not within their jurisdiction.
The Chairman. They total $2,670,000. I do not want to do
anything outrageous.
CONDEMNING OTHER COMMITTEES' EXTRAVAGANCES
Senator Lausche. The weakness of our position is that in
this room we condemn this, but when we go to the floor nobody
utters a word. I think that we can justifiably and honestly
defend our position. I think that that expenditure is
completely unjustified, and it sort of corroborates the
extravagance in the committees.
Senator Pell. No one had the gumption to say so.
Senator Lausche. No one complains. We consider each
committee sacrosanct. Allen Ellender goes up on the floor and
makes the argument, and only the walls listen to him.
Senator Church. Mr. Chairman, the question here is how much
money should this committee have. I think that it is perfectly
clear that we did not have the kind of staff help we could
efficiently use in the various subcommittees, and we are not
getting the job done that we should get done. I mean there is
no reason why we should limit ourselves with a staff that is
inadequate.
The Chairman. If the committee will have order. I was sorry
to arouse such a big controversy. I did not know there would be
such a big row. We did not spend the $200,000. Obviously we
have room there. If people feel so strongly about it, I would
rather go on $200,000, and if we need it, why, we can ask for a
supplemental. I think the Rules Committee people--I am
perfectly willing to abide by what your advice is because we
can ask for more. I have asked the staff to try to follow out
what was suggested here the other day to look for some people
and see--we have already appointed two new subcommittees, and
we are going to try to staff them and get some people. We are
moving in that direction. If you think this is outrageous, I am
perfectly willing to stay with it.
Senator Clark. Mr. Chairman, let us vote.
The Chairman. All right, let us vote.
SUBCOMMITTEES NEED A COMMITMENT FROM THE FULL COMMITTEE
Senator Morse. One minute, before you vote. I would like to
have one minute.
We have started a discussion, and a very fruitful
discussion in this committee about expanding the work of the
subcommittees.
The Chairman. That is right.
Senator Morse. Because we feel they ought to be expanded.
You cannot expand the work of the subcommittees unless the
chairman of the subcommittees can get some commitment from this
full committee as to what the budget is going to allow them.
You are not going to be able to do that on the basis of the old
judgment, in my opinion, because your $153,000 expenditure last
year was low for the reason we did not undertake the type of
program in the subcommittees that ought to have been
undertaken. I certainly think that if you just ask for $200,000
you are going to encourage encroachments upon the jurisdiction
of this committee from other committees, and I think we ought
to ask for $250,000 or $225,000. You ought to go before that
committee and make the case before the Rules Committee. This is
what we intend to do that we have not been doing, and that
ought to be done. If you do not do that, you are going to be in
a position where they would be justified in cutting back on
your budget.
If you say you were going to ask for no more money, and we
are going to do a larger program, the Rules Committee would
have a basis for cutting back. I think you ought to ask for the
$250,000 and make your case before the committee.
DEFEAT OF THE SUBSTITUTE MOTION
The Chairman. All right, let us vote on it.
Senator Cooper. Let me say this, if I can.
I am on both committees. If this committee does appear and
sustain its request for $250,000, of course, I will vote for it
today. I just will say that.
The Chairman. Do you want to call the roll?
Senator Pell. What are we voting on exactly?
The Chairman. The substitute of the Senator from Ohio. He
wishes to stay at $200,000.
Senator Pell. If you want it $250,000, you vote no.
The Chairman. You vote no.
Senator Pell. Thank you.
Senator Lausche. And when you do that you are mistaken.
Senator Pell. I often am.
The Chairman. Call the roll.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Sparkman.
Senator Sparkman. No.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Mansfield.
Mr. Morse.
Senator Morse. No.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Gore.
Mr. Lausche.
Senator Lausche. Aye.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Church.
Senator Church. No.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Symington.
The Chairman. I will vote Symington no. He did leave his
proxy.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Dodd.
Mr. Clark.
Senator Clark. No.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Pell.
Senator Pell. No.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. McCarthy.
Mr. Hickenlooper.
Senator Hickenlooper. Aye.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Aiken.
Senator Hickenlooper. Aye.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Carlson.
Senator Carlson. No.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Williams.
Mr. Mundt.
Senator Mundt. Aye.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Case.
Senator Case. No.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Cooper.
Senator Cooper. No.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. No.
Mr. Kuhl. Ten nays and four ayes.
The Chairman. The substitute failed.
ADOPTION OF THE MOTION
Now can we vote. Do we need a roll call or can we go by a
voice vote?
Senator Lausche. I wanted to be registered as voting no.
Senator Carlson. Mr. Chairman, in view of my vote, I want
to state this. The Post Office and Civil Service Committee,
which really is a small committee, and I am a member of it, is
asking for $225,000, and I just could not conceive that this
committee should get less.
The Chairman. We won't spend it unless we need it.
Senator Lausche. Will you assign someone to work for me
especially with this extra $50,000 as the chairman of the
Southeast Asia Subcommittee, a very important one?
Senator Morse. You bet it is.
The Chairman. I have some other questions here now.
Ambassador Goldberg----
Senator Clark. We did not vote.
The Chairman. All in favor of the motion of the Senator
from Alabama say aye.
[Chorus of ``aye.'']
The Chairman. Opposed, no.
Senator Lausche. No.
Senator Hickenlooper. No.
The Chairman. The record will show the Senator from Ohio
votes no.
INVITATION FOR THE COMMITTEE TO VISIT THE U.N.
Ambassador Goldberg--let me go back. Mr. U Thant sent me an
invitation inviting the committee to come to New York and have
lunch with him, and so on.
Goldberg came here right after that and we had a
conversation about it. He strongly recommends that it be
enlarged rather than just go for a luncheon with U Thant. He
would like for the committee to agree to come up there and he,
if I understood him correctly, offered to make the arrangements
for transportation, and to spend a day and to meet with a
series of delegations or people from various parts; in other
words, perhaps two or three from Western Europe, and two or
three or more.
He is going to undertake to set this up, if we agree. He is
going to manage this for us, with the idea of giving us an
opportunity to hear the views and exchange views with people
from various parts of the world. Latin America would be a
group; one from Western Europe; one from Eastern Europe; the
Middle East, and so on. I cannot give you all the details.
What I wanted to do today is to find out whether or not the
committee is interested. It would entail going up and spending
the day, all day, in these various meetings, among other
things, as I understand it, a luncheon with Mr. U Thant.
The suggested period would be--and this has got to be
subject, of course, to negotiation, but I could not be very
specific because I had not had an opportunity to ask you--March
15th to 16th or the 22nd and 23rd. I just wanted to know
whether the committee is interested or not. I do not want to
get out on a limb and say we are, and not have but one or two
go.
What is the sentiment of the committee?
Senator Morse. I think we ought to have the advice of Case
and Church first.
The Chairman. It is purely for our information.
A USEFUL TRIP
Senator Church. I am strongly, I am very favorably,
disposed. I think that the more this committee can learn as a
committee about the situation in New York, the more familiar we
are with the U.N. and with our own mission, and with the
Secretariat and with U Thant, with the views that are so
pervasive there on matters that are critical to our own
national interest, the better. Since I think this is the most
appropriate way to do it and the most effective way to do it, I
would hope that the committee would be interested in Goldberg's
invitation.
I have told Goldberg I am strongly in favor of this. I
would hope that as many members of the committee as possible
would go. I think it would be useful.
The Chairman. I sort of felt that unless as many as ten
wanted to go it would not look right. If as many as ten wanted
to go--not everybody has to go.
Senator Clark. I wonder if we would not want to ask the
members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee also.
The Chairman. Then you get too many if they all went.
Senator Case. They will take care of that.
The Chairman. What do you think about the idea? Do you wish
me to work out a day, and would you say as many as ten would
go?
I would like all of them to go, but I do not want to just
have three or four go and have all this sort of trouble.
INVITATION FROM U THANT
Senator Lausche. From whom is the principal invitation? Is
it from U Thant?
The Chairman. It started with U Thant. I had a letter over
there. It came some time ago. He would be glad to have a
luncheon, invite us all to luncheon, and this kind of grew out
of it.
Senator Lausche. I do not want to dignify U Thant, and
especially on the basis of what Senator Morse said the other
day, of his statements around the world, and if we are going to
go----
Senator Morse. What statements?
Senator Lausche. The other day in our discussions you
pointed out that U Thant is our choice and he was making
attacks upon us.
Senator Hickenlooper. I cannot hear what you are saying,
Frank.
Senator Case. He is everybody's choice, Frank, is what you
are saying.
Senator Lausche. U Thant has been making statements that
are not helpful to our cause in the world as it stands today,
and I do not want to dignify him by going to New York with him
being the principal inviter. I look upon it differently if the
principal invitation comes from Goldberg.
Senator Church. May I say something on that?
My understanding on that is the principal invitation comes
from our Ambassador to us.
Senator Lausche. If we go there we ought to put U Thant in
the background.
Senator Church. Yes. During the fall, a group of
Congressmen did come up at Goldberg's invitation. They did come
to the American Mission for briefings. They then lunched with U
Thant, and went through the Secretariat and visited the
principal U.N. buildings, and this is what Goldberg has in
mind.
The Chairman. That is my understanding, that it would be
one of a whole series of meetings that would take place
practically all day. My guess would be we would want to leave,
we will say, around 8:00 or 8:30. We would come back that
night. We do not spend the night there. You do not have to
register in hotels or anything else is the way I understand it
is to be done.
Senator Mundt. Mr. Chairman, I have to leave. I am in favor
of the idea, and I will go.
Senator Pell. So am I.
The Chairman. Let me have a show of hands of who would be
willing to go who are here.
[There was a showing of hands.]
Senator Case. Could I just say one thing. I suggest we keep
down the social side of it.
Senator Mundt. You are going to have to adjust to the
Senate schedule.
THE TEN-MINUTE RULE FOR QUESTIONING
Senator Lausche. Mr. Chairman, I move that in the open
public hearings that there be applied the ten-minute rule. I
will not discuss the issue, and let this whole body act upon
it.
The Chairman. Of course, I am perfectly willing for the
committee to act on it. We tried it last year and we have also
had two meetings this year without it, and in my view it worked
better without it than it did with it. Yesterday the total time
consumed was less than an average of ten minutes for everybody
there. Now practically everybody was there yesterday, and I
would prefer to try it without it. If it becomes intolerable,
why, we can revert to it.
We also tried it when the Secretary was here and it went
very smoothly, which is the normal way. But if you wish----
Senator Lausche. What did you mean yesterday when you said
to me in private that you had so many complaints about the
application of the ten-minute rule----
The Chairman. You were one who complained last year about
how unsatisfactory it is in circumstances that you only have
ten minutes.
Senator Lausche. No, I never complained about that.
The Chairman. Last year you did and so did others.
Senator Lausche. No, I did not.
The Chairman. But anyway if you wish to vote on it----
Senator Morse. I think we ought to have discussion on it. I
am a great believer in self-discipline.
The Chairman. That is what we tried yesterday, and I would
prefer to go that way.
THE MINORITY NEEDS MORE TIME
Senator Case. I think, as a matter of fact, Frank, you
spoke to me about this before. There are times when you are in
the minority and you would need and require more than the ten
minutes that would be attributable to one member to present
that minority position fairly, and I think this is a good idea.
Senator Lausche. I will not argue the matter. Each one
knows how he has--the juniors how much they sit back and
finally leave the meeting because they never get to them.
Senator Case. Sometimes we ought to start at the bottom.
That is the only change.
Senator Pell. Maybe we could have a compromise. The
chairman could present a little bell to us and ring it after
ten minutes. We do not have to stop, but at least we would not
forget that ten minutes had gone by.
The Chairman. I thought yesterday everybody was very,
very----
Senator Lausche. Yesterday there was self-imposed adherence
to the rule.
The Chairman. That is right. So was their----
Senator Lausche. Are you recommending a substitute?
Senator Pell. No. I was being flip.
Senator McCarthy. What is the substitute?
Senator Lausche. Let us have the question.
Senator Pell. Do you want a vote, really?
TABLE THE MOTION
Senator Case. I move the motion be tabled for the time
being.
The Chairman. The Senator moves it be tabled for the time
being.
Senator Morse. Second.
The Chairman. All in favor of the tabling say ``aye.''
(Chorus of ``aye.'')
The Chairman. Call the roll, Mr. Kuhl.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Sparkman.
Senator Sparkman. Aye.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Mansfield.
Mr. Morse.
Senator Morse. Aye.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Gore.
Mr. Lausche.
Senator Lausche. No.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Church.
Senator Church. No.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Symington.
The Chairman. No--aye, I mean.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Dodd.
Mr. Clark.
Mr. Pell.
Senator Pell. No.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. McCarthy.
Senator McCarthy. Aye.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Hickenlooper.
Senator Hickenlooper. Aye.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Aiken.
Mr. Carlson.
Senator Carlson. No.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Williams.
Mr. Mundt.
Senator Mundt. No.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Case.
Senator Case. Aye.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Cooper.
Senator Cooper. Aye.
Mr. Kuhl. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Aye.
Mr. Kuhl. Eight yeas and five nays.
The Chairman. The motion is tabled.
Senator Lausche. All right, you poor junior, weep.
INVITATION TO JOURNALISTS TO TESTIFY
The Chairman. I want to ask the guidance of the committee
on this.
There have been two members who raised this question, and I
have raised it, too, about having some witnesses in Executive
Session.
What would be the committee's view about asking one or more
of the three Americans, Harrison Salisbury, Harry S. Ashmore
and William C. Baggs, who have been in North Vietnam, to come
to executive session and answer questions and brief the
committee?
Are you interested or not? I can have them with coffee,
without it, or does the committee wish to have it as an
informal executive session without any publicity?
Senator Pell. As one member I would strongly support it.
Senator Hickenlooper. Who are the three?
The Chairman. The three who have been there--Salisbury,
Baggs and Ashmore. One is a former editor who is now working
for the center, but Baggs is the editor of a Florida paper.
Salisbury is on the New York Times. Ashmore has been on various
papers, but is not presently on a paper. They are all
newspapermen.
Senator Lausche. Why do you want them in executive session?
Senator Morse. Why in executive session?
The Chairman. I do not care, but if you want it in open----
Senator Morse. If you want them in executive session for
security reasons, that is something else.
The Chairman. I was personally curious to hear their
reports and details, and minor details that they have not had
in their reports. I have read what has been in the paper, but
these are the only Americans of this caliber--there have been
Women's Strikes for Peace, and so on, that I thought they might
not have quite the same attitude.
Senator Cooper. A minister.
The Chairman. These people are trained observers.
Regardless that their views may be on policy, they are
observers, and I would be interested in hearing them. I want to
know if the whole committee is interested, and should I ask for
a--I can have either kind, whatever the committee wishes.
WITNESSES SCHEDULED TO APPEAR
Senator Lausche. May I ask what witnesses you have
scheduled to appear.
The Chairman. In open?
Senator Lausche. There are certain witnesses that will take
one side. Those names I have seen scheduled. Now, what
witnesses do you have other than the State Department
representatives who will take the side affirming what is being
done in South Vietnam now?
The Chairman. Well, I don't know what side these people are
going to take on that. The only two that are firmly set are for
next Monday and Tuesday, Kennan and Reischauer.
Senator Case. George Kennan?
The Chairman. George Kennan, and former Ambassador
Reischauer. They are both former ambassadors.
Senator Lausche. Outside of the State witnesses.
The Chairman. We have asked the Secretary of Defense, and
the Secretary of State agreed to come yesterday, but then, you
know about that, he wrote a letter and requested it be changed
from that hearing to the one we had. He still is in the
position of coming at a later date, and McNamara has asked to
be delayed until after he had finished his other hearing.
Senator Lausche. That is not an answer to my question. You
have outsiders. Kennan, I know how he will testify.
The Chairman. Well, I do not.
DO THEY SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION?
Senator Lausche. But what outsiders are there that you can
know in advance they are supporting the government's position?
We have not----
The Chairman. I do not ask them, any of them, are they
going to support the government's position. In fact, Mr.
Reischauer is not testifying directly. I cannot control what he
testifies to because I cannot control the committee's
questions, but it is generally on our relations with the Far
East, Japan and--well, the Far East. He has been a long-time
scholar of China.
Senator Lausche. Bill, may I suggest that you hold this
over until tomorrow's meeting, the decision on these three men.
The Chairman. On Salisbury, Ashmore and Baggs?
Senator Lausche. Yes. I may want to offer other names to
come in.
The Chairman. Well, this is certainly not intended to be
exclusive. These are just people who have been there.
Senator Lausche. We can decide the whole thing tomorrow.
The Chairman. Of course, these other hearings, there are
several other names that are under consideration that have not
been invited yet.
Senator Lausche. Who are they?
The Chairman. Mr. Alf Landon is one of them who I think
might be----
Senator Hickenlooper. When did Alf come back from South
Vietnam?
A BROADER SERIES OF HEARINGS THAN VIETNAM
The Chairman. This is not on South Vietnam alone. These
hearings, as I have tried to make very plain in the paper, are
not just hearings on South Vietnam. They are on the overall
general position of the United States in the present world.
Now, some of them will be asked questions about Vietnam.
But yesterday, much to my surprise, nobody asked the Secretary
of State any questions on Vietnam, and it might be the same
with other witnesses, but it is much broader, a much broader
series of hearings than just Vietnam.
But, as I say, I cannot guarantee that people won't ask
about Vietnam. If they want to they can ask anything they like.
Senator Lausche. I think it was a good thing nobody opened
the thing up.
The Chairman. It was all right with me. But when you say
Vietnam, the subject matter with Kennan is not Vietnam. Now,
you may ask him about Vietnam. The subject matter is the
relations of this country with the Communist world. He has long
experience in this area, and if you want to ask him about
Vietnam, all right. But you do not have to.
My main interest with Kennan is what is his attitude about
how our relations with Russia, in particular, and the Communist
world in general as they are developing, and what is our
policy. Is it promoting it or not.
OTHER WITNESSES
Senator Lausche. You mentioned Alf Landon. Who else?
The Chairman. He is one who Senator Carlson----
Senator Carlson. I want to say this for Alf Landon. We had
a lecture series started under his name at Kansas University.
We are going to have some outstanding people following him in
the last two or three months. Alf made an excellent statement,
and some day I want to put it in the record.
The Chairman. I read it, and I want to endorse what you are
saying. I thought it was a remarkably intelligent piece.
Senator Carlson. I have asked Governor Landon about coming
back here, and he called me just before I came back to
Washington that he has had a bad back problem. I hope the
Chairman won't invite him until later.
The Chairman. Of course it would have to be at his
convenience.
Senator Case. I would like to ask for one more. I would
like to hear McGeorge Bundy.
Senator Pell. How about General Curtis Le May, to get
another view, and an extreme view. I think it might be
interesting.
Senator Hickenlooper. He is no more extreme on his side
than some of these people.
Senator Pell. That is what I am saying.
Senator Hickenlooper. We are asking a bunch of extremists
to come in here.
The Chairman. I sent a letter the other day asking the
ranking minority member for suggestions of who he wanted for
witnesses.
Senator Lausche. Who else?
FORMER CIA AGENT
The Chairman. There is another who came to see me. This is
in the Executive record--I would just throw it out for your
consideration. An unusual fellow as far as I am concerned, and
I never heard of him before, but he was born in Korea. He came
here in 1930. He is a naturalized American, and he spent 20
years as a CIA agent largely in research, but he is in the CIA,
or he was in the CIA, from 1946 to 1965. I have never before
run into a man with this kind of particular experience, and he
is a Korean by birth, but an American by naturalization.
I was going to raise him just because I thought you would
find him interesting; I did, because I never had seen a fellow
with this kind of experience.
Senator McCarthy. Can former CIA members talk to this
committee?
The Chairman. I asked about this. He asked to see me; I
never heard of the fellow. He wrote me a letter a month ago and
asked to come and talk to me. His name is Chowe.
Senator Lausche. What is his name?
The Chairman. Chowe. Anyway, there are a number of people
of this kind. I think the fellow was very interesting. He can
give you a different slant on many different things. He does
not undertake to say you are right or wrong in Vietnam. I did
not ask him about that. I asked him about a lot of other
things. He volunteered them. As a matter of fact, he came and
volunteered the story about a great deal of information I had
never heard about in the CIA.
Senator Lausche. Hold these over until tomorrow.
The Chairman. These are not final decisions. I am asking
for guidance. What I really wanted to know is, because the
staff has to get in contact, whether the committee generally is
interested in Salisbury because, if not, I do not want to
invite him to the committee. If we have him at all I will have
him to tea or lunch or something of that kind. That is all in
the world I want to know. If you want him in open session and
the committee feels that way, that is also possible.
Senator Sparkman. Mr. Chairman, I move that we have these
witnesses that the chairman has mentioned, and that the
chairman and Senator Hickenlooper do as they did last year,
serve as a screening committee for any additional witnesses
that anyone may suggest, and that you two decide on the type of
people to have and set the time.
The Chairman. It is not exclusive. If you want someone
else, all you need to do is suggest him, Frank.
Senator Lausche. I challenge the right to act on this at
this time. We do not have a quorum.
The Chairman. I do not know if that takes action, but that
is all right. I was simply seeking the sentiment of the
committee on these people.
[Whereupon, the committee adjourned.]
MINUTES
----------
TUESDAY, JANUARY 24, 1967
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Latin American Affairs
of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met in executive session at 4:04 p.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Senators Morse (subcommittee chairman), Fulbright,
Sparkman, Mansfield, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Cooper.
The meeting was held to discuss proposed amendments to the
OAS charter and the current treaty negotiations with Panama,
and also to discuss the prospects for the OAS summit meeting.
Lincoln Gordon, Assistant Secretary for American Republics
Affairs, accompanied by John N. Irwin, Special Ambassador for
negotiation of Panama Canal Treaty; Sol Linowitz, Ambassador to
the OAS; and Robert F. Woodward, Assistant to Ambassador Irwin,
appeared before the group.
For a record of the proceeding, see the official
transcript.
[The subcommittee adjourned at 5:55 p.m.]
MINUTES
----------
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 25, 1967
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met in executive session at 12:30 p.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Morse, Gore,
Lausche, Church, Symington, Dodd, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken,
Carlson, Williams, Mundt, Case, and Cooper.
The committee discussed whether to hold further hearings on
Ex. D. 88/2, the Consular Convention with the Soviet Union. It
was agreed that Mr. J. Edgar Hoover would be asked to come
before the committee and also that time would be set aside to
hear public witnesses.
William S. Gaud, Administrator of AID, accompanied by
Daniel Steiner, William C. Gibbons, and Charles D. Paolitto,
testified on the subject: ``Presidential determination to
increase the number of countries receiving development and
technical assistance.''
For a record of the proceedings, see the official
transcript.
[The committee adjourned at 1:30 p.m.]
MINUTES
----------
THURSDAY, JANUARY 26, 1967
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Disarmament
of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met in executive session at 10:30 a.m. in
room S-116, the Capitol.
Present: Senators Gore (chairman of the subcommittee),
Clark, Pell, and Aiken.
The subcommittee discussed the content of hearings to be
held and possible witnesses.
For a record of the proceedings, see the official
transcript.
[The subcommittee adjourned at 10:55 p.m.]
THE SITUATION IN INDONESIA
----------
Monday, January 30, 1967
[Editor's Note.--On September 30, 1965, junior level
military officers staged a coup against the Indonesian high
command, killing five generals and wounding the chief of staff,
Gen. Abul Haris Nasution. Other military forces under Gen.
Suharto suppressed the coup, blamed the uprising on the
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), and set about eliminating it
in a bloody counter-coup. President Achmed Sukarno, who had
ruled Indonesia since 1945, remained in office following these
events, but in January 1967, the Armed Forces Information
Center published an article accusing Sukarno of complicity with
the Communist plotters. The Provisional People's Consultative
Congress investigated the charges and on March 12, 1967 removed
Sukarno's executive and ceremonial powers, making Gen. Suharto
the acting president.]
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Far Eastern Affairs
of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:05 p.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Frank Lausche (chairman of the
subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Lausche, Fulbright, Sparkman, Mansfield,
Gore, Pell, McCarthy, Aiken, Carlson, Mundt, and Case.
Also Present: Senator McGee.
Carl Marcy and Norvill Jones of the committee staff.
Senator Lausche. I think we might as well get started.
Mr. Green, this is a meeting of the members of the
Subcommittee on Far Eastern Affairs, and such other senators
who will appear.
We want to hear from you your observations on what the
conditions are in Indonesia. If you will proceed with the
presentation of your views, and later open yourself to
questions, we will appreciate it.
STATEMENT OF HONORABLE MARSHALL GREEN, UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR
TO INDONESIA; ACCOMPANIED BY H.G. TORBERT, DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS
Ambassador Green. Thank you very much, Senator. I
understand I am speaking in closed session or executive
session.
Senator Carlson. Yes.
Ambassador Green. Because I want to speak with candor.
Well, I think as Senator McGee will testify--he has just
been out there--there has been a tremendous change around in
the past year. I was confirmed in the next room here in June,
1965. I went out there the next month and at that time the
whole country was slipping towards the Red camp. Some people
thought it already had joined the Red camp.
Senator Lausche. When was that?
Ambassador Green. That was July 21st that I arrived in
Jakarta.
This was a time when they were stoning our consulates and
Embassy and we were harassed at every turn. The communist power
was growing. Sukarno on August 17, 1965, spoke about the
Jakarta-Peking-Pyongyang-Hanoi axis. That is how far this thing
had gone.
GREAT CHANGE IN ONE YEAR
Well, the whole situation, of course, as you know, has
changed in the course of this past year due to events which I
will come back to, and today the Communist Party in Indonesia
has been banned. The relations with Peking are almost at a
breaking point. In other words, they share our assessment of
Peking's menace to that part of the world. They have ended the
confrontation. They have rejoined the United Nations. They have
rejoined all of these specialized agencies of the United
Nations. They are participating actively in the new regional
community in Southeast Asia and they are looking for good
relations with all the countries that can help them.
Now, that means Eastern European countries as well as, of
course, the Western countries and Japan. This has not been very
easy in terms of their relations with the Soviet Union because
they have banned the Communist Party. But the Soviets have
helped them in the past, particularly in military assistance,
and they hope to receive that assistance.
So this has been the great change that has taken place in
one year.
I suppose that there is no place in the world in modern
times where there has been such an abrupt shift around as there
has been in Indonesia in the last year and a half. Certainly I
say that on the basis of 23 years of working in the Far East.
Now, the big event that changed all this, as you know, was
the abortive coup that was launched by the Communists and some
of their friends on September 30, 1965.
COMMUNIST ALLIES
Senator Lausche. When you say by some of the Communists,
whom do you mean?
Ambassador Green. By the Communist Party, and I said some
of their friends who were working on the outside.
Senator Lausche. Who were they?
Ambassador Green. Well, for example, Subandrio, who is not
a declared member of the Communist Party but, according to the
trials that have taken place now, he was involved in this plot.
Senator Lausche. Were there any other outside nations
involved?
Ambassador Green. No. Well, Communist China may well have
been involved. We have not proved it, But there is
circumstantial evidence that points to involvement.
ABORTIVE COUP
Now, what happened in this abortive coup was that the PKI,
which is the Communist Party, moved swiftly in an effort to
kill the top seven generals. They succeeded in killing five of
them two of them escaped, General Nasution and General Suharto.
That was a mighty lucky thing because these two surviving
generals moved fast and brought in the Siliwangi Division which
is the local division up there in Bandung, and they suppressed
the coup in the Jakarta area within a matter of days.
They then faced a tremendous task of how to move against
the Communists who were all over the country. It was an
enormously powerful party, as you know, the largest in the
world outside of the Communist bloc or the Sino-Soviet
countries, with the possible exception of Italy.
They face an enormous task, but they have proven themselves
capable of meeting that challenge.
Now, in the course of the next month, month and a half,
there now appears to have been a very bloody aftermath to this
abortive coup. The pictures of the killed generals and how they
were killed; the accounts of how they were tortured by the
Women's Communist Organization; how their bodies had been
heaved into the crocodile hole, which is up near the air base.
These bodies then being exhumed. They were photographed and the
photographs were sent all around the country and this touched
off a very sharp wave of reaction in the local communities.
BLOODY AFTERMATH OF THE COUP
As a result of this, the Moslems and others moved against
the local Communist organization, the farm levels and villages,
not so much in the cities and towns. This all happened in the
countryside and I estimated when I came back here in February
that 300,000 people had been killed in this bloody aftermath,
which had been many times the number that have been killed in
South Vietnam since the war started. Since that time, I think
we would up that estimate to perhaps close to 500,000 people
that have been killed in this aftermath. Of course, nobody
knows. We merely judge it by whole villages that have been
depopulated.
The Island of Bali, for example, which is a small island,
4,000 square miles, there were about perhaps 100,000 people
that were killed there alone. There was something of a holy war
reaction. In the case of Bali, it is not Moslem. It is Hindu.
But they had a religious way of life. The Communists tried to
secularize it and this was the reaction of the people once they
realized the Communists were on the run and the army was on
their side.
In the case of East Java, it was the reaction of the
Moslems more than any other religious group that resulted in
this decimation. So the military had definitely gained the
upper hand. It squashed the Communist coup effort and by
November and December they were really in a position to take
over the reins of government.
THE PROBLEM OF SUKARNO
However, they had counted on President Sukarno moving over
either on to their side or keeping quiet, moving into the
background. But Sukarno at that time more or less thumbed his
nose in their face and has been doing it ever since. So they
were then faced with the problem, are we going to move against
Sukarno and all the people that support Sukarno--you know, he
has been called the George Washington of Indonesia--or are we
going to move against him with all the consequences that might
be entailed in a civil war?
They decided they would not do so. They still hoped that
the President could be brought around. Well, he wasn't. And the
minute that Sukarno realized that Nasution and Suharto were not
going to move against him, he was then emboldened to come back
and begin to get back some more of his friends into the top
places of government. As a matter of fact, in February of 1966,
he dismissed Gene Suharto and he named one of the worst
cabinets in Indonesia. Of course, there are no Communists, but
it is nevertheless one of the worst cabinets that has ever been
named in Indonesia. This started off, touched off, the large
scale student demonstrations. Where there have been hundreds
and thousands before, you know, there were tens thousands that
were out on the street and that atmosphere.
SUHARTO GIVEN SPECIAL POWERS
Then Suharto went to President Sukarno and said: I cannot
be held responsible for the security of this country unless you
give me broad responsibilities for handling all security
matters in this country. He was given those special powers by
Sukarno who had no choice.
Since that time, Suharto has broadly interpreted these
powers to run the country and he has done it just that way. The
only thing he hasn't done is that he has not moved abruptly
against President Sukarno. He has pressured him. He has reduced
his powers. He has chipped away his power base and he has done
it very successfully, but he hasn't totally eliminated it.
Well, we are faced today with I would say two principal
problems, one on the political side and one on the economic
side.
POWER STRUGGLE CONTINUES
On the political side is this power struggle that
continues, or you could rephrase it, the problem of what to do
with President Sukarno. His power is going down and down and I
just saw a news ticker that indicates that the palace is
surrounded with students at this moment. What they are going to
do, I don't know. They apparently have switched the guards.
This may be for the President's own protection rather than they
are going to take any sudden movement against him. I do not
think that General Suharto will move abruptly against the
President, to arrest him or to exile him or to shoot him or
anything like that. I think he will continue to pursue what he
calls the constitutional course of action to get the MPRS,
which is their super Parliament, to pass some kind of law
against the President or to take some action against the
President by impeachment, but he is not going to act outside
the constitutional framework.
The reason I think partly is because he wants to avoid
civil strife. He doesn't want to start a tradition of coups and
counter-coups. He wants to establish as far as possible the
constitutional base and preserve that tradition in his country.
SUKARNO IS A COMMON TARGET
But also I think that Suharto has been very wily. He
realizes that as long as the President is around, that he
becomes the target of the students, of their army, of the
intelligentsia, of the commercial groups. He is the common
target and this keeps the new order, as we might call the group
around General Suharto--it keeps them together with a common
focus. He can also make a scapegoat of the President. As long
as he is around, everybody is critical of Sukarno for being
responsible for the economic chaos of the country and this, of
course, has happened. So he has his reasons for handling the
job the way he does.
In any event, the retention of Sukarno, although it does
involve a number of problems, has not prevented the new
government from moving ahead and doing the things that are
required in the circumstances. He has been a drag. He has
pulled the clock back sometimes, but the clock nevertheless has
moved forward and a lot of things have been changed in
Indonesia, almost all of them for the better.
QUESTION OF STABILIZATION
This raises the second major problem that is facing
Indonesia today, and that is the question of stabilization. The
economic chaos left by 10 or 15 years of Sukarno's jingoism was
one of the worst that I know of in modern history. They were
left with a debt of $2.7 billion, about half of that owed to
the Soviet Union, about $200 million or so owed to the United
States.
Of course, there are a lot of other creditor countries as
well. The infrastructure of the country had deteriorated during
this time. The roads, railroads, airlines are in miserable
shape. Only about 30 percent of the shipping tonnage is
operable today. Meanwhile, the cost of living has shot way up
under runaway inflation.
Between mid-1965 and mid-1966 the cost of living went up 20
times, 2,000 percent.
Senator Lausche. Since when?
Ambassador Green. In that one year's time, between the
middle of 1965 and the middle of 1966, the cost of living went
up 20 times. The money inflated in that same period by 7\1/2\
times. The exports which had been $800 million a year back in
1965 had all slumped down to about $500 million a year in 1965,
over that 10-year span. Everything was running downhill. It was
one of the few countries in the Far East, that and Burma, I
guess, where there has been a deterioration in the per capita
or GNP over the last 10 years.
So this is the situation that General Suharto inherited.
Now, he had the wisdom to turn to a group of first-rate
economists who worked in the University of Indonesia. All of
them I would say had been trained in the United States, three
of them at the University of California, one at Harvard--he
overcame that handicap. I went to Yale. And one from MIT.
Now, these men are all first-rate economists. They gave him
sound advice on how to approach the problem. One of the things
they urged was that Indonesia should rejoin the International
Monetary Fund and IBRD. They should get a team of IMF men out
there to help out with their problems. This would be a sure way
to restoring some confidence in Indonesia in the international
banking and governmental circles.
So Suharto turned to these people. They drew up a
stabilization plan and I say that plan has been a first-rate
plan in every sense of the word.
STABILIZATION MEANS HARDSHIP
Now, this is not easy to accomplish because stabilization
means hardship. It means stringencies and it always is
accompanied by a certain political risk, particularly with
Sukarno around, where he might be able to take advantage of the
objections and feelings of the people and their political
leaders. But that has not happened. The stabilization plan that
calls for a balanced budget in calendar 1967 has passed the
Parliament without any objections. They have instituted the
plan now and, as a result of it, prices of foodstuffs have been
level for the last 3\1/2\ months, even though----
Senator Lausche. I think we had better go upstairs.
Senator Sparkman. This is a roll call. We will be back in
just a few minutes.
[A short recess was taken.]
WILL SUKARNO BE TRIED?
Senator Sparkman. Is there any likelihood that Sukarno will
be tried?
Ambassador Green. He will be tried in a certain sense. He
may be tried in a certain sense by the MPRS which is sort of
the super parliament, constituent assembly, in March. Whether,
as I say, it will be impeachment proceedings or censure,
whether it will be calling for the resignation of the
President, whether it will be a call for his exile or not, no
one knows. Nobody knows what action will be taken.
A SOUND PLAN FOR STABILIZATION
Senator Lausche. You were discussing the economic
situation, I think when we left.
Amssador Green. Yes, I am not sure exactly at what point I
broke off, but I was describing the fact that General Suharto
had turned to a group of good economists as well as to the
International Monetary Fund for advice. They came up with a
sound plan for stabilization. They moved ahead with their plan,
as a result of which the cost of food has stabilized. The cost
of textiles has actually gone down. Some other costs have gone
up. But that was anticipated because they were withdrawing
subsidies--electricity, transportation--and, of course, that
was passed on to the consumer. That was all part of the
stabilization plan.
Anyway, we think they are doing very well on this plan,
moving ahead in a determined way, and obviously this relates
very directly to whether or not other countries are going to be
able to assist Indonesia, because people do not want to put
money into any economy where it just goes down the rat hole of
inflation.
INDONESIANS NEED DEBT RELIEF
Now, assuming that the Indonesians continue to manage their
economy well and there is the right managerial follow-through,
which is always uncertain, they are still going to be dependent
upon whether or not they can get adequate debt relief because,
as I said, they built up this huge debt of $2.7 billion. If you
service that debt in one year, that would be almost as much as
their total foreign exchange earnings for that year. Therefore,
they obviously have got to reschedule the whole debt.
They have had meetings now, in Tokyo, in Paris, another one
in Amsterdam. There seems to be general agreement among the
Western creditors' group--that includes the United States,
Japan, Holland, Germany, France, Italy, a number of other
countries--that Indonesia should be given rather sweeping,
almost standstill debt relief this coming year.
Senator Aiken. Private creditors, too?
Ambassador Green. The private credit has not yet been
resolved, but presumably it will be along the same lines. Then
at the end of this year, calendar 1967, there will be another
meeting to see whether or not it has to be extended. It
probably will. Meanwhile they will resolve the future long-
range debt by rescheduling over a longer period of time.
Now, no one knows what the East European group will do, but
it looks as though they will be giving them liberal debt relief
as well. Therefore, if all goes according to Hoyle, as it seems
to be going, that problem will be satisfactorily resolved.
In addition to that, even if they get virtually total debt
relief this year, this calendar year, they are going to need
something between $170 million and $300 million--let us say
$225 million of new net foreign aid in order to balance their
budget. And our approach to this problem is that we want to be
sure, first of all, that there is a liberal debt relief and,
secondly, with regard to net aid, that other countries do their
fair share.
Now, what fair share is I don't know. But we will be
talking in Amsterdam at the end of February about the general
principles of future assistance. We will not probably go into a
pledging session with them, but we will talk about the general
principles that will guide us.
So those are the two main problems--the political and the
economic problems.
THE COMMUNIST MENACE IN ASIA
I think sometimes that our focus is so much on the
immediate problem, let us say on the Communist menace in some
countries, or in the case of Asia, how you deal with Sukarno,
that if you were to remove that immediate problem you would
have beyond it another range of mountains. It would be a big
and vast one and, in the case of Indonesia, once this problem
of Sukarno is out of the way and stabilization programs move
ahead satisfactorily, there will still be a lot of problems.
The whole question of how you bring a traditional society
into the modern age is involved here, problems of corruption
and nepotism, what we call baptism, which is the adulation of a
man like Sukarno, a charismatic personality.
The problem of how to reach agreement--mushiwara--people
talking back and forth and reaching a consensus, which is fine
in the village council, but in the modern state is a rather
painstaking, lengthy process. All those problems.
THE CIVILIAN-MILITARY MIX
How is the new government going to establish a political
base when two or three of the major parties now outlawed--how
are they going to get back on the political scene? Will they
become a part of the political base of this new government
under General Suharto? The problems of how--what kind of a mix
between civilians and military should you have in the
government? These are all parts of this overall problem of
moving from the traditional into a modern state.
Now, if I could just touch on one of those problems, the
problem of the civilian-military mix, this is a military
government in many ways. General Suharto is the First Minister
and he is obviously calling the signals. But he is drawing on
the advice, as I just pointed out, now in the economic field of
these economic specialists at the University of Indonesia and
on outside consultants.
General Suharto also turns to Adam Malik who is the Foreign
Minister and head of the political section of the government.
Adam Malik is in my opinion one of the outstanding leaders in
East Asia today. There are other good civilian leaders, too.
So what we have today is the best carburetorization between
the civilian and military, just about the right mix, because
the military are just enough involved in the government--it is
not a junta government--just enough involved so that they take
a responsible attitude towards the total operations of the
government. Yet they are not so far in the government that they
have taken it over and monopolized it themselves and have
excluded good civilians which, of course, would lose for them
the support of the students, the intellectuals, and some of the
commercial types.
Now, there are nevertheless problems, of course, for a
government made up of civilians and military this way when you
run into difficulties in the economic front, or when some of
the politicians talk out of turn that oppose you. There is a
natural temptation for military leaders to try to suppress the
civilian segments. I don't think that General Suharto will do
that. I think he recognizes the importance of maintaining this
kind of mix that I just referred to now. So far these three
leading men--we call them the Triumvirate--made up of General
Suharto, General Nasution and Adam Malik, and the Sultan of
Djogjakarta, make a good team indeed and General Suharto has
the wide respect as a leader. Malik commands widespread
admiration for his tactical brilliance and for how to get
things done as well as for his general views and philosophy. I
think the Sultan of Djogjakarta is widely liked if not beloved
because he comes from central Java where indeed most of the
resistance to the modernization takes place and where President
Sukarno has most of his strength.
Senator Aiken. He speaks for industry.
Ambassador Green. He does, indeed, and he is a very nice
gentleman and I think anyone here would agree. Together they
make up a very good team, I think.
QUALITIES OF THE NEW LEADERS
As far as our overall--I must just say one more thing about
this team. One of the qualities that seems to me that they all
have in common is that they are working for the country and not
for themselves. In general, President Sukarno, if he is ever
held up in the judgment of history, it will seem to me his
greatest failing was that he was out for his own glory, a
policy of self-glorification, and the people were the victims
of this policy. These people are approaching their tasks not
for their own personal gain, but for the gain of the country.
Another thing about them is determination. Because there
had been so many people killed in this last year or two in
Indonesia, and because in a way there is a terrible retribution
if the Communists or their friends ever get back again, they
are more determined that they have to succeed. Human survival
is at stake here.
Another quality it seems to me is moderation, pragmatism. I
have seen the same thing throughout East Asia in the last few
years. It has been the movement from the ideological attachment
of the first generation of revolutionary leaders to the
modernists who are basically pragmatists and are concerned with
the problems of modernization and development as opposed to the
problems of a country winning its independence. This country
has gained its independence now.
These are qualities of leadership and to me they are very
important ones. They are men we can talk with and deal with
reasonably.
U.S. POLICIES TOWARD INDONESIA
Now, as far as our own policies towards Indonesia are
concerned, basically we believe exactly what the Indonesian
leadership believes in. We believe in the unity of Indonesia. I
started right out with that because there has been some
question in the past. We believe in the unity. We believe in
the progress and stability, political-economic stability, of
Indonesia. These are basic policies. Those, of course, are the
policies of the new government, too, and when we say why do
Indonesians and Americans get along, it seems to me one of the
basic reasons we get along with the new government is we are
basically attached to the same objectives and principles.
I think if I may say so, as a matter of personal judgment,
very privately, of course, I think they appreciate what we are
doing in Vietnam. Certainly they are deadly opposed to the
Communists and they are opposed to Peking's policies. As far as
the policies for carrying out these broad objectives are
concerned, obviously they need assistance badly as I have just
said.
It falls principally in the economic sector. And also I
think certain civic actions support, not with lethal weapons,
but for certain spare parts and other things to help them get
with the civic action program. These are going to be involved.
Now, we have a great opportunity in Indonesia because we
started with the tabula rasa--all the aid was practically wound
up--of trying to approach our problems on as broad a
multilateral basis as possible. This may not be possible the
first year or the second year, but because we are already
talking with these other creditor group countries in Tokyo,
Paris, now Amsterdam, and since you have to approach the whole
problem of the debt rescheduling and further assistance, really
it is one single problem. We are getting more and more
agreement on the principles involved in assistance to Indonesia
and we want Indonesia to come up with the help of the
International Monetary Fund, again part, you might say, of a
multilateral approach, with what are indeed their most urgent
needs, have these things carefully reviewed by the INF, and
then these things put up to the other countries so they can
decide in what ways they can assist Indonesia in the most
meaningful way possible.
I am very hopeful that this approach will work. If we do, I
think we can avoid lots of the troubles and pitfalls of the
past.
A SENSE OF MISSION
I mentioned specific action just now. It seems to me that
there is particular relevance to the needs for civil action
programs in Indonesia because the military have all this
knowhow. They have all this equipment, and, of course, they
have the authority as well.
Meanwhile they have ended confrontation. They had to
mothball almost all this fleet they have got from the Soviet
Union and a result of all that is that a lot of officers are
without jobs. It is important that they have a sense of mission
and that the mission relates the needs of the people, and they
have turned to us and asked us for help in that regard. I have
discussed this thing in Washington. I think there is increasing
recognition of the importance of helping them out on a low-
cost, high-impact program, especially in central and Eastern
Java where most of the people live.
I might say that 70 percent of the Indonesian people live
on the island of Java which you can see is but a small slice of
the geography of the vast sprawling country, larger than the
rest of Southeast Asia put together. And I think that we will
have other advantages as well, tactical advantages, in our
personal relationships with the military and of helping
preserve the same kinds of approach and attitude.
Well, if I could just wind up because I know you have lots
of questions, Senator. I just wanted to end up by saying, as I
said to you in the beginning before some of your colleagues
arrived, it has been a tremendous year and a half of transition
and the transition in my opinion has been almost uniformly for
the good: the confrontation over; the rejoining of the United
Nations; the launching of what so far has been an effective
stabilization program; the banning of communism from Indo-China
and, of course, it has problems, as I said, with their
relations with the Soviet Union and for the overall; the new
leadership and qualities of the new leaders; for those things I
think we have much to be thankful. I think we have a good group
we can work with. I don't think there is any group we can
expect on the present scene or in the predictable future that
will be as good as this one. I hope we will be able to give
them the requisite help, along with other countries, doing it
as much as possible with this multilateral approach that I know
you have discussed in this committee.
AMBASSADOR'S ARRIVAL IN INDONESIA
Senator Lausche. Thank you. I just want to put a few
questions to inform those members who were not present when you
began to testify about what you said.
What is the significance of July 21st that you mentioned?
Ambassador Green. That is simply the date I arrived in
Indonesia, having been confirmed in the next room.
Senator Case. What could be more pertinent?
Senator Lausche. Now, then, you stated there was a
tremendous and miraculous change between what you saw when you
came and what the condition is now.
Ambassador Green. For which I bear no responsibility.
CHINESE-INDONESIAN AXIS
Senator Lausche. Now, then, you spoke about an axis. The
Peking-Hanoi----
Ambassador Green. Pyongyang-Jakarta axis.
Senator Lausche. And that was in the making.
Ambassador Green. Sukarno announced this on August 17,
1965. He said that we had this axis. I am not sure it was ever
worked out in any formal way, but he was boasting that there
was such an axis.
Senator Lausche. Peking-Hanoi,----
Ambassador Green. The axis actually had five countries
involved. Indonesia, China, Red China, North Vietnam, North
Korea, and Cambodia. But I might say he never consulted
Cambodia and Monsignor was quite angry when he heard about it.
Senator Lausche. That was the axis that was being
discussed.
Ambassador Green. He announced it when Chen Yi was there as
his distinguished advisor.
INDONESIAN COUP
Senator Lausche. When did the coup occur?
Ambassador Green. September 30, in the wee hours of the
morning. Actually, October 1st.
Senator Lausche. And the object of the coup was to
eliminate the seven military leaders.
Ambassador Green. That is right.
Senator Lausche. They eliminated five, but two survived?
Ambassador Green. Correct.
Senator Lausche. And the survival of the two produced this
encouraging situation that now prevails.
Ambassador Green. If two generals had not survived,
Nasution and Suharto, it is possible that no one would have
moved rapidly and quashed the coup.
Senator Lausche. Now, then, after that they took pictures
of the hideous brutalities that were committed upon these five.
Ambassador Green. Yes, sir.
Senator Lausche. And the nation became informed about it
and with that there was seething indignation and a purpose to
eliminate the Communists. You estimate 300,000 were killed. The
present calculation is that there were 500,000.
Ambassador Green. Some people think there were 500,000.
Some think there were more. Some think less. But I would up my
estimate from 300,000.
Senator Lausche. Now, there was economic chaos produced by
Sukarno leaving a debt of $2,700 million.
Ambassador Green. Right.
Senator Lausche. The nations who are creditors have
extended the time of the payment of debts, but in addition to
that, there is need of $225 million of new foreign aid.
Ambassador Green. That is right.
Senator Lausche. And it is a purpose that that foreign aid
may be provided by us and other nations of the world.
Now, all right. Mike?
Senator Mansfield. I have no questions.
U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO INDONESIA
Senator Sparkman. Just a question. Is there any military
included in that request? Military assistance?
Ambassador Green. In that figure of $225 million? No, sir.
Senator Sparkman. Does Indonesia look for military
assistance?
Ambassador Green. It does.
Senator Sparkman. Ought we to give it?
Ambassador Green. Now, I must correct my statement. When I
said $225 million, if you are including in that figure
assistance from the Soviet Union as well, which I believe it
would be, the Indonesians would like to get some spare parts
for military equipment that they had already received from the
Soviet bloc. So that would be part of it. But not a major part,
a small part.
Senator Sparkman. Now, let me ask you----
Senator Case. In this $225 million calculation--is that
overall or just for----
Ambassador Green. That is overall. And that $225 million,
as I say, I was hitting between two outside figures of $160
million to $300 million, something in that range. But $225
million would be acceptable.
ROLE OF GEN. NASUTION
Senator Sparkman. We used to hear a good bit about a man
named Nasution.
Ambassador Green. Yes.
Senator Sparkman. What has happened to him?
Ambassador Green. General Nasution, who was one of the two
surviving generals----.
Senator Sparkman. Is he one that you named?
Ambassador Green. That is right.
Senator Sparkman. He and Suharto were the two that
survived.
Ambassador Green. That is right. But Suharto has moved out
into the No. 1 position and General Nasution is the president
of this MPRS, constituent assembly, or super Parliament,
whatever you want to call it.
Senator Lausche. John, may I ask him to redescribe what
they showed to the people of the country that infuriated them
into taking the lives of these 300,000. You spoke about the
bodies and the alligator pits and so on.
Ambassador Green. Yes. What had happened was that these
murdered generals--there were five of them--one or two had been
shot and killed right at the beginning, but three of them at
least were not dead when they picked them up. They took them up
to the Halim Air Base and there these three surviving generals
were tortured to death, slashed slowly to death by Gerwani,
which is the Communist women's organization. When their
lacerated bodies, which meanwhile had been dumped into the
crocodile hole which is the name of sort of a pit down there,
when they had been exhumed three or four days later, the army
saw to it that pictures of this grisly scene were widely
publicized all around the country. Meanwhile, in the
countryside where the village folk had been living under the
increasing pressures of the Communists, the atmosphere was
already one of dry tinder and this was the spark that lit the
whole thing and sent it into such violent conflagration.
Senator Sparkman. Some of General Nasution's children were
killed.
Ambassador Green. His daughter was killed, and this is very
material, Senator, because this produced something of an
emotional reaction. This little girl was an innocent victim,
shot to death.
Senator Lausche. Frank?
FOREIGN AID TO INDONESIA
Senator Carlson. Just one or two questions. How much
foreign aid are we giving now, if any?
Ambassador Green. We are.
Senator Carlson. Grants in aid and loans?
Ambassador Green. We are giving the Indonesians about $48
million or $49 million in P.L. 480, Title V assistance. These
are dollar sales.
This represents mostly cotton, 225,000 bales plus 100,000
tons of rice. This already has been agreed to. All of it hasn't
arrived yet, but most of it is there by now.
In addition to that, there is $10 million in a spare parts
loan again, to be repaid in 20 years, I believe.
In addition to that, maybe there is a million dollars or so
in grant assistance for educational purposes as well as for a
food-for-work program which is really grant in aid, although it
is provided in the form of cracked corn and vegetable oil.
REASONS FOR SOVIET AID
Senator Carlson. In view of the fact that so many of the
Communists were killed during the blood bath, how can we expect
the Soviet Union to give aid or continue to give aid?
Ambassador Green. Because they have put such a tremendous
investment in Asia I suppose they want it covered. It is a
terribly important country, the fifth largest in the world.
Some people say the third richest in the world. And the Soviets
have, as I pointed out, invested $1.4 billion in aid. They want
to cover that.
Also I think they are hopeful that in the long run there
will be a recovery of the Communist Party. Meanwhile they damn
the Chinese for having driven the Communist Party in this
direction and they sort of damn us in a very faint way for
being imperialists, and maybe we are getting in too close with
the new government. They keep making rumbles on this from
Moscow, but I think if I were in the Soviet position, I would
be acting very much the way they do.
Now, they are obviously deeply perplexed. It is not easy
for them to give assistance to Indonesia when Indonesia is
banning the Communist Party.
FOREIGN INVESTMENT WELCOME
One thing I would like to mention, Mr. Chairman, is that
one of the things the new government is welcoming is foreign
investment. This is another 180 degree change in policy. The
first conversation I had with General Suharto on May 27, 1966,
he raised the question of how they were going to develop the
outer islands. I said I felt private investment, foreign
investment, was the soundest way. There wasn't that kind of
money. The government didnt have that kind of money. Well, not
as a result of that, but I merely mention it, this was the
first time the subject was discussed with the General. Now they
have changed their foreign investment policy to attract foreign
capital investment, as a result of which the Hotel Indonesia is
jam packed with potential foreign investors out there looking
into the possibilities.
Meanwhile, the law has been changed to favor foreign
investment and protect foreign investors, and they have
discovered, they think, oil in the Java Sea, no point deeper
than 180 feet, and if this oil finding turns out to be what
they think it is, maybe a second Gulf of Mexico.
Senator Lausche. Mike.
Senator Mansfield. Nothing.
Senator Lausche. Karl?
RELATIONS BETWEEN SUHARTO AND NASUTION
Senator Mundt. Curiously enough, of all places, we have a
lot of South Dakota businessmen out in Indonesia. How they ever
found it I don't know, but I have been in close touch with them
and they are pretty high on this Nasution. They seem to feel
that if elections were held, he might wind up as the President,
as the best counter against the Communists rather than Suharto,
a fine fellow and honest, but who doesn't seem to have the
outgoing personality that appeals to the masses.
Would you comment on that?
Ambassador Green. General Nasution has a bit of this
charisma quality maybe, and certainly Mrs. Nasution does, too.
They are both highly popular. But I think there is no question
that General Suharto is very much the man the people are
looking to these days for leadership, that General Nasution has
been in charge of the army many years and he is senior in the
army ranks. The relation between Suharto and Nasution is good.
Nasution comes from Sumatro for one thing, and Suharto comes
from Java. Since 70 percent of the people come from Java, this
is an important factor.
I would hope very much that Nasution and Suharto could
continue their harmonious relationship. It is productive,
helpful. One thing Nasution has lost a bit of standing with
students for is because in November-December, 1965, when he was
in charge, he stood back from facing down Sukarno. Then Sukarno
dismissed him in the cabinet shift of February 23, 1966, and
that was quite a blow to his prestige. He recovered a good deal
of that prestige. He is more outspoken in his opposition to
Sukarno than is Suharto.
COULD SUKARNO RETURN TO POWER
Senator Mundt. Can you envision any contingency whereby
Sukarno might get back into power?
Ambassador Green. Oh, I could. It is conceivable that he
could come back if their whole stabilization program should go
on the rocks and they couldn't make a go of things, and if the
new order, as they call the group around General Suharto, was
not able to maintain the unity, which is terribly important. If
things began to slip up, then Sukarno might look pretty good in
retrospect. So that there is a possibility of coming back.
I think the chances are definitely against him, but I don't
think we should rule it out.
Senator Lausche. Will you tell Senator Mundt what you
stated a moment ago about there being a bit of craftiness in
the operation of Suharto in allowing Sukarno to still remain in
the picture.
Ambassador Green. Yes. His reason for keeping Sukarno on is
partly this. He doesn't want to risk civil war, although I
don't think that that would be the result of moving sharply
against Sukarno today. Nevertheless, that has been one reason,
partly because Sukarno was the old commander-in-chief, the
George Washington of Indonesia, as they always say.
But I think it is also because he wanted to use Sukarno as
a scapegoat, to have him there so that he could be the focus of
resentment. After all, he is the man who is responsible for
this mess. Leave him on and people are reminded of that fact.
If he goes in exile, by this time people might be criticizing
the new government for some of the problems which really are
described as Sukarno's folly.
Also you maintain better unity in what you call the new
order, which is made up of rather disparate forces like the
military and the students, the business community, if they have
a common target and they are all against Sukarno, most of them.
This helps to make unity.
So I think in his rather clever Javanese way Suharto has
handled this thing quite well. But, you know, you can't go on
playing that game forever. There comes a time when your
administration can suffer, you might say almost from tired--
when you have to spend so much time putting out the fire
Sukarno lights, hand-holding, going to palace functions which
are interminable, and also because students begin to get pretty
angry if you haven't moved against him in a final way.
It is also confusing to the outside world--I have been
around the country just now talking with a lot of people--that
Sukarno is lingering on this way. It does confuse a lot of
people as to what the new Indonesia adds up to.
Senator Mundt. That is all.
Senator Lausche. Al.
STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS
Senator Gore. Well, Mr. Ambassador, you speak of the
students in the sense of organization, of unity. Is this a
rabble or is there some organization in this?
Ambassador Green. The students are extremely well
organized, not throughout the country but in the West Java area
and some of the other main population centers of Indonesia.
They are very well organized. There are two principal
organizations, the Kami--not our kind of Commies--these are the
university students, and the Kappi which are the high school
students.
These two groups are very violently anti-Sukarno and anti-
Communist, and so forth. You will find slogans put out by the
students that are the same throughout the country on the same
day, which shows you how well they are organized.
They are in close touch with General Suharto and the
military. They have been working very closely with him. They
haven't always agreed. Sometimes they are restrictive, but I
would say they had acted in a very responsible way so far. They
haven't been a rabble.
Now, there are other students that aren't members of these
groups, particularly in a place like Surabia, Eastern Java,
that are under the domination of other elements that are
against the Kami. But the Kami and Kappi, these two huge
student organizations, nevertheless represent the increasing
view of the student population of Indonesia and today command
good slice of the student population's support.
A VOLATILE ELEMENT
Senator Gore. The reason I asked the question, we see ``the
students'' in many parts of the world being propagandized and
utilized. It seems to be a very volatile element and might be a
source of danger as well as strength.
Ambassador Green. Suharto recognizes that very point. He
doesn't want to have Parliament in the streets. He recognizes
the students' feelings, on the other hand. This is one of the
reasons why Suharto has wanted to move in a constitutional way.
This is a very important consideration, that he wants to have
enough forward motion against Sukarno and his ilk to chip away
from their power and debase them eventually, but he wants to do
it in a constitutional way, partly so that the students don't
get the idea that this is the way to change governments.
Senator Gore. Of course, we see another example of
students, youth, in the Red Guard in Red China. Now, they can
be put to evil as well as good purposes.
About two or three years ago, Mr. Ambassador, we were told
in executive session that we had continued small amounts of
military aid to the military leaders largely to keep liaison
with them, that several of this group that were liquidated had
received their military education in the United States, and
that this aid at the proper and crucial time might prove to
have been very valuable to us.
Can you shed any light on that now?
PARTICIPANTS TRAINING PROGRAM
Ambassador Green. I think our Participants Training Program
in the past has been very useful. There were about, oh, I
guess, 8,000 or so Indonesian students in the United States,
and this included several thousand of the military. And I do
think this had a very important result. As I look back over our
old aid program, it wasn't so bad after all. In fact, we did a
pretty good job, I think. And there were some scatteration
projects and all that kind of stuff. But one area where we did
the best of all is in the human resources field, training of
people.
Senator Sparkman. One of those----
Ambassador Green. This would be the Participants Training
Program bringing people under either our AID program, or under
the State Department Cultural Program, or under the Military
Assistance Program.
Senator Sparkman. One of those hangover programs was also
one of communications which I believe served a good end with
the Armed Forces.
Ambassador Green. Yes, that is right.
Senator Sparkman. During the revolution.
PHILCO COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM
Senator Lausche. Speak on that because they came before us
specially in this room----
Senator Sparkman. To continue it.
Senator Lausche [continuing]. Urging that we provide them
with money to install a communications system which was
presented to us as being essential to keeping a line in
Indonesia. You know of what I speak?
Ambassador Green. I know exactly what you are referring to.
You are referring--you are talking about the Philco
Troposcatter System. Well, this system--I am not enough of a
specialist to judge this one. This is up to the Indonesians to
judge on their own account.
The trouble with Philco was it was very expensive and it
would take a long, long time to build it. There may be cheaper
and better ways of building a communications network for
Indonesia. I grant that the building of a good communications
network is essential and it is true that the link that was
already established under Philco between Jakarta and Bandung
was a fairly important factor in the quick reaction of these
two surviving generals.
Senator Lausche. That is the point.
Senator Gore. Yes. So overall you say----
Ambassador Green. But I think you have to be careful on
this one because there are other kinds of communications
networks. Some of them may be considerably cheaper and more
within the means of the Indonesians to support.
CONTINUATION OF U.S. AID
Senator Gore. To come back to the overall question of aid,
is it your conclusion that the continuation of U.S. aid
programs even in miniscule amounts had considerable
significance ultimately in the showdown?
Ambassador Green. I think that the aid program which we had
of $800 million of U.S. assistance--maybe in the 10 or 12 year
period up until 1965--I think it was a good aid program by and
large. There were some things that obviously weren't as good,
but by and large it was a good aid program. The Indonesians
knew it and today in retrospect it looks darn good because out
of the $800 million that we gave Indonesia at that time, only
29 percent of it was repayable in dollars. So that we didn't
leave them saddled with a debt the way the Soviet Union did,
for example.
Therefore, that is one factor.
Our training program, as I said before, left a long term
good result. The turnkey plus projects we had for helping to
build a factory with another one of our loans, and then we saw
to it that that factory was managed by our people until they
were prepared to take it over. Then they took it over, and when
they took it over, they were able to operate it as indeed they
are today.
The two big projects that we helped them with in fertilizer
and cement are operating at almost 100 percent capacity and
they are the only two big factories in the country of that size
operating anywhere near 100 percent capacity because of the way
this thing was handled.
MULTILATERAL AID
Senator Case. Mr. Ambassador, I don't know whether I missed
something coming in late or not, but have you laid out a
specific program or is this general background on the role of
foreign aid?
Ambassador Green. What I was talking of was in just general
terms, but we haven't reached a point of setting out
specifically what we will do in this calendar year of this next
fiscal year. We are talking about it still in the Department,
but as you can see from my remarks, I think it is very
important that we lend a helping hand to Indonesia, but we do
it as far as possible in consultation with other countries,
other creditors, and that we do our share, but we see to it
that other countries do theirs as well.
Senator Case. This is an ideal time, isn't it, to get
multilateral operations going because we are doing nothing now.
Ambassador Green. Yes, it is. To the extent that it is
possible to do.
Senator Case. We have to realize----
Ambassador Green. We are already discussing these things
with other creditors and we don't want, for example, a country
to give Indonesia short term credit because that is just going
to compound the problems of the debt rescheduling two or three
years from now. We want to be sure that the terms of assistance
other countries give to Indonesia comports with their overall
debt problem and rescheduling problem and our own assistance,
and we are hopeful that the Soviet bloc will give Indonesia the
kind of debt relief that we are giving. I think they will from
what I have heard.
Senator Mundt. If they don't, are you going to change your
mind about giving relief?
Ambassador Green. Well, I think this is going to raise a
very serious problem obviously, and I think the Indonesians
know that.
INDONESIAN SELF-SUFFICIENCY
Senator Case. How close are they to being self-sufficient
in food?
Ambassador Green. Well----
Senator Case. Is this one of the----
Ambassador Green. The growing population of Java is the
reason why they are in a food deficit position today. The
population increases there over 2\1/2\ percent every year. It
is one of the most overcrowded bits of real estate in the world
today. And they live in the illusion that people can move to
these outlying islands. They don't figure the tremendous cost
of resettlement which makes this prohibitive. Also people that
go to these islands find it forbidding and they tend to come
back.
Senator Case. You mean cold?
Ambassador Green. No. They find that there is no rice--
other kinds of food. They miss their old homestead, rather
typical.
Now, as the population of Java increases, it has moved from
a position of at one time exporting rice to the outlying areas
to a position where it exports nothing except officials and
problems. And obviously there is a major problem in facing up
to family planning, or whatever you want to call it.
The Indonesians are too preoccupied with other questions
right now that they really haven't done much in this field.
Senator Case. This is a good time to get going on that,
too.
Ambassador Green. That is right.
Senator Case. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lausche. Senator Cooper?
COMMUNISTS KILLED DURING COUNTER-COUP
Senator Cooper. You said an estimate of 300,000 to 500,000
were killed. Is it correct that 25 percent of the population in
Indonesia is Communist?
Ambassador Green. You could argue that at one point there
were as many as 25 percent of the Indonesians who in one way or
another supported either the Communist Party or one of its
front groups.
Senator Cooper. The Communist Party at one time did have
support of many peasants, people in the countryside, also the
army.
Ambassador Green. The Communist Party itself had 3 million
at one time. It now appears that some of those members weren't
very strong members, but anyway, it had 3 million membership,
and then outside that 3 million, there were about 22 million or
so who supported these different front activities.
Senator Cooper. Java was one of the chief seats of
Communist strength.
Ambassador Green. Yes, sir.
SUKARNO IS DISCREDITED
Senator Cooper. What you said a while ago, they couldn't
hold up the fact that Sukarno still had some strength, that
plus the large number of Communists remaining--would you say
there is still some danger of a return of Sukarno?
Ambassador Green. I doubt the danger of Sukarno's return is
very great. I would say that the odds were almost overwhelming
against Sukarno getting back on the scene again. He is very
widely discredited and the very fact that things were so bad in
the past--he let things run so badly down hill and they are
suffering so much as a result. It has tended to discredit his
image even further.
He has refused to denounce the Communists and this, of
course, has affected him even more.
Now, these 25 million people who supported the Communists
one way or another, a lot of those were people just sort of
being on the bandwagon for their own safety. They were
anticipating a slide into the Communist camp and they wanted to
protect themselves come the events.
PROBLEMS WITH MALAYSIA
Senator Cooper. Has the problem with Malaysia been settled?
Ambassador Green. I think it has been settled. There are
somethings, loose ends that have to be tied up. They don't have
normal diplomatic relations now with Malaysia, but the
relationships between Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur are I must say
very, very close indeed. They are fellow Moslem countries and
in a way they are two brothers who have discovered the folly of
their having been at each other's throats for so long.
Senator Cooper. You think the present government is making
progress economically and in a fiscal way to give some strength
to Indonesia.
Ambassador Green. Yes.
Senator Cooper. To correct some of the chaos that you
described.
Ambassador Green. Very definitely. And better than I would
have anticipated three or four months ago.
Senator Lausche. Do you have another question?
DEFINING INDONESIAN COMMUNISM
Senator Case. Just one question. You used--you use it all
the time--what do you mean by Communist? I am not being funny.
I really mean when you say this you have a specific thing in
your mind. Are you talking about the influence of China, the
influence of Russia?
Ambassador Green. Well, each time I use it it might be in a
little different context, but when I was talking about PKI, the
efforts to seize power, I was referring to the organization,
the leaders. The leaders in Indonesia, but operating I think
with the aid and comfort and fiscal support in some ways from
Communist China.
Senator Case. Pretty much Chinese? Is Russia in there at
all?
Ambassador Green. No, I do think Russia has been
disillusioned, became increasingly disillusioned with the PKI,
the Communist Party of Indonesia, because it came very
definitely under Peking's influence and Russia therefore moved
from a position of supporting the PKI to a position of
supporting the Indonesian government. This happened in about
1963, 1964, 1965, in that period.
Senator Case. Was Russia involved in the coup?
Ambassador Green. No, in no way.
Senator Case. Thank you.
WAS THE U.S. INVOLVED IN THE COUP?
Senator Fulbright. Were we involved in the coup?
Ambassador Green. No, sir.
Senator Fulbright. Were we involved in the previous attempt
at a coup about four years ago?
Ambassador Green. No. I don't think so.
Senator Fulbright. CIA played no part in it?
Ambassador Green. You mean 1958?
Senator Fulbright. Yes.
Ambassador Green. Well, I think there was definitely some
sympathy for the break-away group.
Senator Fulbright. We had no part in that?
Ambassador Green. I was not involved in the events and I am
afraid I cannot answer.
Senator Fulbright. You don't know about it. You haven't
heard about it?
Ambassador Green. I don't know for sure what happened.
Senator Fulbright. They don't tell you about any of the
past history in these places when you are assigned to a
country?
Ambassador Green. Well, I can glean a number of things,
Senator.
Senator Fulbright. You don't know whether CIA was involved
or not. And we were not involved in this coup.
Ambassador Green. No, sir. Definitely not.
Senator Fulbright. We have been told that this would not
have taken place had we not been doing what we were doing in
Vietnam. Is that correct?
Ambassador Green. Oh, I wouldn't say it is correct to say
it wouldn't have taken place. I think that as I was saying
perhaps before you came in----
Senator Fulbright. I'm sorry I was late. I had another
engagement and I couldn't be in on time.
A FORWARD FLOW OF A RED TIDE
Ambassador Green. I think when these two surviving generals
faced this tremendous Communist menace, several days after the
abortive coup, that they had a tremendous problem because not
only did you have this important Communist Party and all these
sympathizers we were just talking about here, too but the
Communists had infiltrated into the armed forces. As a matter
of fact, one of the first things that the military had to do
was to relieve several battalions in central Java and put them
into obscure locations where they couldn't be in harm's way.
And, of course, the air force commander was involved in the
coup. And so was all of that, and Sukarno's feelings being what
they were suspected of being, sympathetic to the Communists,
the new emerging government, Suharto and Nasution, were faced,
as I say, with a tremendous problem. Had there been at that
point a forward flow of a Red tide which might have been the
result of our not being firm in Vietnam, then I think events
could have developed in a somewhat different way.
I think for one thing the generals might not have been so
determined and I think the Communists might have been more
emboldened to resist.
Senator Fulbright. What do you mean by the forward flow of
the Red tide? That is very colorful language. What is the Red
tide?
Senator Case. You have to write books if you are going to
use language like that.
CHINA AND RUSSIA IN VIETNAM
Ambassador Green. I don't write books, but what I meant was
that if there hadn't been any interposition of American
strength between the Communist pressures from the north and
Indonesia itself, if the Indonesian leadership had felt that
there was no protection and in fact China was the wave of the
future and that there was a threat from the north----
Senator Fulbright. Is it China you believe that is
occupying Vietnam?
Ambassador Green. I don't think it is occupying Vietnam,
but I think it is supporting North Vietnam.
Senator Fulbright. Yes, it is. And so is Russia. Russia is
supporting them more than China now, isn't it?
Ambassador Green. I don't know.
Senator Fulbright. Wouldn't you say the Russian support
today is greater, more valuable to Vietnam than the Chinese?
Ambassador Green. I don't know the answer to that.
Senator Fulbright. You said a moment ago the Russians had
shifted from supporting the Chinese in Indonesia to supporting
the government, is that right? Didn't you say a moment ago that
the Russians had shifted their position from support of the PKI
to the support of the government?
Ambassador Green. That is right.
Senator Fulbright. Or did I misunderstand?
Ambassador Green. That is correct.
CHINESE OBJECTIVES IN ASIA
Senator Fulbright. Don't you consider the Russians part of
the Red tide, or is it only the Chinese?
Ambassador Green. Not the way I was using the words Red
tide then--figuratively.
Senator Fulbright. Are only the Chinese Communists bad and
not the Russians?
Ambassador Green. I look upon the Russian and the Chinese
objectives in this part of the world as quite different. I look
upon the Chinese purposes as more expansionist than Russia in
this part of the world.
Senator Fulbright. Why do you?
Ambassador Green. Because I don't see any evidence that the
Russians are on the move to take over any of this part of the
world.
Senator Fulbright. Well, what is the evidence that the
Chinese are moving to take it over?
Ambassador Green. I think that they are supporting directly
or indirectly, for example, the troubles in the Northeast
Thailand front and their broadcasts and statements are all of
an incendiary nature to support the so-called wars of
liberation in this part of the world.
Senator Fulbright. Do you think that broadcasting
statements are in themselves aggression?
Ambassador Green. Well, if they say it and if they appear
to mean it, why wouldn't it be so, particularly since they are
giving aid and comfort to the so-called Thai liberation
movement?
Senator Fulbright. The Thai liberation. You shifted to the
Thais. How many Chinese do they have in Thailand in this
attack?
Ambassador Green. I don't know of any Chinese that they
have.
Senator Fulbright. No.
Ambassador Green. But this is the question of giving
support by radio broadcasts, propaganda, and I don't know what
kind of agents they have operating down there. It is because
this Thai--this group that they have in Hunan Province, the
Thai liberation group there, that has been under the Chinese
Communist wing for some time now and have intentions for taking
over Thailand.
NO USE OF CHINESE TROOPS
Senator Fulbright. Do you know of any Chinese troops that
are outside of their border in this area?
Ambassador Green. No.
Senator Fulbright. Outside of their border in any area?
Ambassador Green. Well, they have been in the case of India
but they came down----
Senator Fulbright. Presently?
Ambassador Green. At present, I don't know of any Chinese.
Senator Fulbright. Well, I don't know what you mean by the
Red tide is slowing over their area.
Ambassador Green. Well, I didn't say that the Red tide was
just China. I said that the Red tide was Hanoi, Peking. I
didn't--I said I didn't think it was Russia.
IS VIETNAM A THREAT TO INDONESIA?
Senator Fulbright. Well, then, leaving out China and
Russia, do you think that Vietnam as such, either North or
South, is a threat to Indonesian security?
Ambassador Green. Indirectly. I think if North Vietnam were
to take over by force South Vietnam, have success in that
endeavor, that it would have an impact upon----
Senator Fulbright. What would----
Ambassador Green.--Indonesians.
Senator Fulbright. Do you think there would be a threat to
Indonesia?
Ambassador Green. Well, it is hard to say. It is a
speculative situation.
Senator Fulbright. Well, if you can't say----
Ambassador Green. I can't say in exactly what way.
Senator Fulbright. I can't either, but you leave the
impression that there is a great threat. I am just trying to
develop why you think so. Do they have any navy or air force?
Could they attack Indonesia?
Ambassador Green. I think if they succeed in their
aggressive efforts and take over South Vietnam, if this is the
condition which you propose to me, if they get away with it, I
think that other countries in the area will feel that much less
secure, that is all. They will not act with the same degree of
determination that in the case of Indonesia your Communists,
pro-Communist groups there, would be the more emboldened and it
will have a certain sapping affect.
BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL AID
Senator Fulbright. On the aid, you are advocating a
bilateral program with Indonesia? Direct aid from the United
States?
Ambassador Green. I said I believed that to the maximum
extent possible we should approach this problem on a
multilateral basis. I didn't think we would be able to achieve
that maybe this year or even the next, but we should make every
effort to do so. I therefore thought this year we would have to
approach it on a bilateral basis, but to pursue a policy of
maximum coordination of our information; disclosure of what we
intend to do and other countries are intending to do, and to
try to bring multilateral organizations like the Asian
Development Bank, the IMF, into the act as far as possible.
Senator Fulbright. How much are you advocating? Do you know
what they are asking for?
Ambassador Green. They haven't asked us for a specific
figure, but I said that their requirements might run in the
range, let us say, of $225 million in net new foreign aid this
calendar year and that I thought we should do our fair share,
and I didn't attempt to say what that would be. And we should
approach the problem in such a way to try to maximize foreign
contributions.
Senator Fulbright. How much military aid? Is that economic
or both?
Ambassador Green. I was talking there about economic aid. I
am not recommending any military hardware; that is to say, any
lethal weapons, but I do think a modest support of their civic
action program would be desirable.
Senator Fulbright. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lausche. Any other questions?
REIMBURSEMENT OF AMERICANS FOR PROPERTY
Senator Aiken. I would like to ask one question.
To what extent has Indonesia reimbursed Americans for
expropriated property?
Ambassador Green. Well, there has been no reimbursement of
expropriated property simply because they haven't claimed to
have expropriated any property. There were certain American
companies that were forced out and in the case of the rubber
companies actually they bought those assets of Goodyear and
U.S. Rubber. They forced Goodyear out of the Bogor tire
factory, but now Goodyear is talking about resuming management
of the factory.
They have established a board, interagency board, to
discuss claims of any American investor who claims that his
property has been forced out of his hands either with a view to
compensation or with a view to restoration.
Senator Aiken. Is the oil finding a ready market? Does what
oil they produce find a ready market now?
Ambassador Green. Yes, it does.
Senator Aiken. Produced by American companies for the
Indonesian government?
Ambassador Green. That is right.
Senator Aiken. What do the oil people mean when they say
they felt they could handle that business better than the
government could?
Ambassador Green. Well, the American oil companies--there
are two big ones, Caltex and Stanback--they have been studying
operations now although they were almost forced out of business
the year before last, and they are operating as a private
company. They give the Indonesians 60 percent of the profits.
Senator Aiken. And they are quite optimistic about not
extending any serious loss, aren't they, in the long run?
Ambassador Green. That is right. I think they were very
worried at one time, one of our principal problems.
USE OF U.S. AID
Senator Aiken. I was just wondering if we give the
government their material aid, cash aid, whether that would be
used to pay off, to pay for some of the expropriated property.
Ambassador Green. No. I think that----
Senator Aiken. You think it wouldn't. Not even the rubber
people.
Ambassador Green. No.
SUKARNO'S PLAN FOR AN AXIS
Senator Lausche. To get the record complete, you began to
state earlier the statements made by Sukarno about this axis of
Indonesia, Hanoi and Cambodia, Peking and a fifth.
Ambassador Green. Pyongyang, North Korea.
Senator Lausche. What did Sukarno say on that subject? Did
you say that he had made a statement?
Ambassador Green. Oh, yes. He made it on August 17th. He
merely announced where the country was going and that now they
are establishing this axis. He mentioned those five capitals as
being partners working together. He said it in the presence of
hundreds of thousands of people, tens of thousands, in the
physical presence, and over the radio and television to the
whole country.
Senator Lausche. That was a statement made----
Ambassador Green. By him.
Senator Lausche. Over the radio to all of the people of his
country.
Ambassador Green. Yes.
Senator Lausche. That this axis was established.
Ambassador Green. That is right.
Senator Lausche. Identify the countries again in the axis.
Ambassador Green. Communist China, North Korea, North
Vietnam, Indonesia, Cambodia.
Senator Lausche. Five countries.
Ambassador Green. But he did it without ever asking
Cambodia.
Senator Lausche. Anything further?
Senator Cooper. No. I think it was very fine to hear from
you, so clear, so helpful.
Senator Lausche. Thanks. Thanks very much for a very
thorough report, and I am grateful to you.
U.S. POSITION IN VIETNAM
I would like to put this question. In your opinion, would
our position in Southeast Asia, if we pulled out of south
Vietnam, be as formidable as it is now in Indonesia, Malaysia,
Thailand, Taiwan and Japan?
Ambassador Green. I think that it would be. Our strong
stand in South Vietnam has provided a kind of shield behind
which these countries have felt capable, emboldened to move
ahead with trying to put their houses in order the way in fact
this happened in Indonesia. Had there not been this
interposition of American strength--people may not like this
term--the Red tide, but I still do, I do not think that it is
likely that the Indonesian leaders, the new military leaders,
would have acted in as determined a way as they did.
Now, I think it is very important that we not say this
publicly because Indonesia wants to take credit for its own
actions. We don't want to look as though we are always taking
credit. That is why we haven't said it, but that is the way I
feel.
Senator Lausche. Yes, and I think you have exactly stated
the position that we are in. But to me it seems that to claim
that our presence did not give courage and strength to those
people is absurd and cannot be maintained.
Thanks very much.
[Whereupon, at 5:35 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
BACKGROUND BRIEFING ON DISARMAMENT PROBLEMS
----------
Friday, February 3, 1967
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Disarmament
of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:45 p.m., in
room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Albert Gore (chairman of the
subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Gore (presiding), Fulbright (chairman of
the full committee), Sparkman, Mansfield, Symington, Dodd,
Clark, Pell, McCarthy, Aiken, and Cooper.
Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl and Mr. Bader, of the
committee staff.
Senator Gore. The committee will come to order.
This afternoon the Subcommittee on Disarmament begins a
series of hearings on the current disarmament and armament
problems. It would appear that we have come to a critical
moment in this general area. The country has before it
enormously important decisions affecting not only our national
security and allocation of our resources, but the whole
organization of our economic and national life. I refer
specifically to the immediate anti-ballistic missile question,
but there are also important issues developing in the
nonproliferation area as well as the sale of conventional arms.
Chairman Fulbright shares the belief of the subcommittee
that the subjects I have mentioned are of great importance and
that it might be useful for the subcommittee to hold hearings.
Because these issues are extremely complex, I believe it
would be useful to explore the question of what we know--that
is, what our government knows and what we do not know about
what others are doing as a necessary background of knowledge to
an examination of the policy implications of the decisions now
under consideration. In order to ensure that we have a sound
and accurate base of information on which to base our
discussions and possible judgments, I have invited Mr. Helms of
the Central Intelligence Agency to give to the subcommittee a
thorough briefing.
Mr. Helms, we are pleased to have you here this afternoon.
Please be assured that we appreciate the sensitivity of the
information you bring. Please proceed in your own way.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD HELMS, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE,
ACCOMPANIED BY CARL E. DUCKETT, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY, AND JOHN S. WARNER, LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL
Mr. Helms. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
introduce Mr. Carl Duckett, who is the Deputy Director for
Science and Technology in the Central Intelligence Agency, who
has come with me in the event you desire to ask me any highly
technical questions about missiles and weapons and so forth.
Senator Gore. Maybe for the sake of the record, he should
give his full name and title.
Mr. Duckett. Yes, sir. Mr. Carl Ernest Duckett, and I am
the Deputy Director for Science and Technology of the CIA.
Senator Clark. D-u-c-k-e-t-t?
Mr. Duckett. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Helms. Mr. Chairman, I understand you wish me to
discuss today the military threat posed by the Soviet Union and
Communist China, touching on the related economic and political
considerations. I would also like to cover in very brief form
some of the problems of nuclear proliferation in other
countries.
I want to give the general thrust of the present situation
and also to cover what we believe to be the future trends.
Now, we all recognize that we could spend an entire day on
a detailed discussion of the strengths and the hardware of the
Russian and Chinese military establishments. So I will attempt
to cover this in the briefest compass I can and I hope will
give it enough information so that it will enable you to ask
the kinds of questions that will be of interest to you.
SOVIET STRATEGIC ATTACK FORCES
First, I would like to cover the Soviet strategic attack
forces.
ICBM's
I. The new Soviet ICBM's--which we call the third
generation--are coming into operational status now at a rapid
rate.
A. At this time last year, the count had been stable at
about 225 for a good year and a half.
1. The Soviets at that point had completed their
deployment of the first and second generation missiles.
2. In 1964, however, they began their new program,
comprising two new missile systems.
B. One of these, we call the SS-9. It is a large and
accurate missile which can carry a [deleted] megaton warhead
5,000 miles, or a [deleted] megaton warhead about 7,000 miles.
C. The other, the SS-11, is less accurate and smaller. We
estimate the maximum yield of its warhead at [deleted]
megatons.
II. The silos for these new ICBM's become operational, at
present rate of construction, two years or little more after
they are started. As a result, the estimated number of
operational launchers has already moved up from that plateau of
225, which I just mentioned, to about 385.
A. Our current National Intelligence Estimate, issued about
60 days ago, concludes that by the middle of this year the
Soviet Union will have about 425 to 485 ICBM's ready to launch.
By mid-1968, the figure should be 670 to 765.
1. These short-term estimates, of course, can be
based on the number of silos already under
construction, making allowance for acceleration or
delay in the pace of completion.
B. At longer range, we estimate that the Soviet ICBM force
will have somewhere between 800 and 1,100 operational launchers
four years from now, in mid-1971 to be specific.
CHANGING CHARACTER OF SOVIET ICBM FORCE
III. The numbers, however, do not tell the whole story. The
present deployment is also changing the character of the Soviet
ICBM force.
A. First, it is going to be harder to knock out. All of the
new launchers are in hardened silos with each silo at least
three miles from its nearest neighbor.
1. Two-thirds of the first and second generation
ICBM's were exposed on launching pads. [deleted]
The new mix means that by the middle of next year,
about 80 percent of the operational launchers will be
hardened, and there will be [deleted]
B. Secondly, the main emphasis of the new deployment is on
the SS-11 system. By mid-1968, there may be as many as 400 of
these, making up more than half of the Soviet force.
1. The SS-9 system has the accuracy and the big
warhead needed to attack hardened military targets.
2. The contrast, the SS-11, with less accuracy and a
much smaller warhead yield, is more suitable for large,
soft targets. In other words, it has been referred to
as a city buster.
The Soviets, by putting their missile force in silos
and concentrating on the SS-11, are working for what we
call ``assured destruction''--that is, the capability
to destroy a significant portion of the population and
resources of the United States even if U.S. missiles
should strike first.
IV. This improvement of strategic attack capabilities is
bound to give the Soviet leaders greatly increased confidence
that they have achieved a sufficient ``assured destruction''
capability to serve as a deterrent.
A. We do not believe, however, that between now and the
mid-1970s the Soviets themselves expect to be strong enough to
consider the deliberate initiation of a war against the United
States.
SOVIET CAPABILITY FOR ATTACK
V. Let me review briefly the status of the remainder of the
Soviet capability for strategic attack.
First, Medium Range and Intermediate Range Ballistic
Missiles:
A. There have been no major changes during the past year in
the Soviet Intermediate-range and Medium-range ballistic
missile force.
1. There are about 100 intermediate and 600 medium-
range operational launchers.
2. About 90 percent of the sites are in the Western
USSR, constituting a massive threat to Europe.
3. We do not expect much change over the next 10
years in the size of the MRBM/IRBM force, but, again,
the character will probably change.
4. As the existing systems become obsolete, launchers
on soft pads will be phased out. Present research and
development also suggests that the Soviets are working
for mobile systems, and solid fuel. They have paraded
prototypes of mobile missiles, including one which they
called a mobile ICBM, and they have tested a solid-
fueled missile to about 3,000 miles, which is right on
the borderline between Intermediate and
Intercontinental range.
Now, for the Soviet Submarine Force:
B. It has a growing missile capability.
1. A nuclear-powered submarine now under construction
is the first unit of a new class which will apparently
carry eight or more tubes for submerged launch of a new
missile with a range of 1,000 to 2,000 miles, and this
is a brand new submarine.
Senator Gore. Is this single head or multiple head?
Mr. Helms. Single head. We know of no multiple
warheads in the Soviet Union inventory.
2. A few operational submarines have been converted
to fire a 700-mile ballistic missile while submerged.
3. The rest of the missile units have to launch from
the surface.
4. There are 36 submarines, with about 100 launchers
altogether for ballistic missiles, in the Soviet
submarine inventory. Most or these missiles have a
range of 350 miles.
5. Another 47 submarines carry a total of about 250
cruise missiles, with the primary mission of attacking
naval task forces. This missile has a range of about
450 miles.
6. About 45 of the 360 Soviet submarines are nuclear-
powered. The power plants are noisier than ours, and
Soviet skippers slow down to less than 10 knots they
want to try to avoid detection.
SOVIET BOMBER PROGRAM
Long Range Aviation:
C. As for strategic air threat, Soviet Long Range Aviation
now consists of 950 to 1,000 bomber and tanker aircraft. The
number is declining slowly, and there has been no evidence of
any new Soviet heavy bomber program.
1. The Soviets have about 200 heavy bombers, some of
which are used as tankers. We estimate that they could
mount a strike of about 100 aircraft on two-way
missions against the United States.
2. The rest of Long Range Aviation consists of
medium-range aircraft, featuring the super-sonic-dash
BLINDER medium bomber. We expect the mediums would be
used primarily to attack U.S. and allied targets on the
Eurasian landmass.
3. The Air Force, however, has two major
reservations--that is our Air Force. One is that we
believe that long range aviation is likely to have a
new heavy bomber in the next few years. The other is
the Air Force calculation that in all-out war, 300
medium bombers could be used to supplement the 100
heavies in an attack on targets in the United States.
I cite this because this is an Air Force disagreement
in the intelligence estimates, and I wanted you to be
aware of it.
4. The Soviets have developed air-to-surface missiles
to extend the operational usefulness of manned
aircraft. They appear to be having trouble, however,
with the missiles designed for the BLINDER. The
principal operational missile at present delivers a
nuclear warhead about 350 miles, with a terminal speed
approaching twice the speed of sound.
SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE
Now, may I turn to Soviet strategic defense.
I. The status of Soviet strategic defense is the subject of
a sharp difference of opinion in the intelligence community
over Soviet anti-missile capability. So that we can have a
clear understanding of the controversy, let me point out that
it involves two separate missile systems.
The first system is referred to as the Moscow System.
A. Around Moscow, the Soviets are indeed deploying an array
of missiles and radars conclusively demonstrated to be an ABM
system.
B. Part of the system should be operational this year and
the entire complex by about 1970.
C. When it is finished, Moscow will be protected by about
100 solid-fuel missiles that can reach out several hundred
miles and explode a nuclear warhead above the atmosphere.
1. We think the system would have a good capability
against a limited number of existing missiles, but it
doesn't have what it takes to cope with a major attack,
or with the penetration aids that incoming missiles
will have in the future.
2. The intelligence community is agreed on this
evaluation of the Moscow System.
EARLY WARNING RADARS
D. The system starts with early warning radars in
northwestern Russia that cover the avenues of approach for
missiles coming from the continental United States. They can
probably detect a missile as much as 1,600 miles away.
1. These radars are now being calibrated, and should
be operational this year or early in 1968.
E. Nearer Moscow, there is a big radar which acquires the
incoming missile from the early warning facilities, tracks it,
and probably assigns targets if there are a number of them
coming in.
F. Finally, at a dozen sites forming a ring about 50 miles
from the center of Moscow, are the engagement radars, which aim
the missiles on their nearby launchers and track them to the
target.
G. We have recently calculated that this system--including
all of the radars but not the developing and testing--will have
cost the Soviets the equivalent of about three billion U.S.
dollars, from the start of construction through 1970.
H. This system I have just described is unique to Moscow.
You only have to think for a minute about what Moscow has meant
in Russian history to realize that the Soviets will defend
Moscow with any system that might help, regardless of cost,
effectiveness, or feasibility.
I. We have seen no indication that this system will be used
anywhere else in the Soviet Union.
THE TALLINN SYSTEM
Now, let us leave Moscow and look at the other defensive
missile deployment.
This one is being deployed extensively. We call it the
Tallinn System after the city in Estonia where the first such
complex was built.
The Tallinn System is the object of controversy that I have
just mentioned because so far there just isn't enough hard
evidence to be positive of its purpose.
A. CIA believes that this system is more likely to be a
defense against high-flying, high-speed aircraft and other
aerodynamic vehicles. This is the conclusion of the current
estimate.
B. The other view is that the weapon is basically an anti-
ballistic missile, with a secondary mission against aerodynamic
vehicles. This is the view of DIA, the Army, and the Air Force.
Senator Gore. Would you read that sentence again?
Mr. Helms. Yes, sir.
The other view is that the weapon is basically an anti-
ballistic missile with a secondary mission against aerodynamic
vehicles.
This is the view of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Army
Intelligence, and, Air Force Intelligence.
C. Both views rely on inferences drawn from deployment
patterns, the nature of associated radars, Soviet requirements,
and, other similar factors.
1. Neither side can line up enough evidence to
disprove the other view.
II. So far we have evidence of 26 complexes for the Tallinn
System. Some of them form a forward defense against the
northwestern Soviet Union, while others are situated for local
defense of specific targets.
We think that more than 20 of these complexes can be
operational this year. At the present pace of deployment, the
Soviet Union would have about 75 of them by 1972--I say could
have.
A. Most of the complexes have three sites, with six
launchers at each site. The 26 complexes now under construction
will apparently have a total of about 550 launchers.
B. On the basis of the evidence at hand we believe the
Tallinn System missile will probably reach to a ceiling of
about 100,000 feet, with a slant range of as much as 100
nautical miles.
It could engage manned aircraft flying at three-and-a-half
times the speed of sound.
Further, some of the Tallinn System locations do not have
the early warning and long range radar coverage that an
effective antiballistic missile system would have to have.
REST OF THE SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE PICTURE
III. The rest of the Soviet strategic defense picture is
relatively static.
A. New jet fighter aircraft which are now becoming
operational will give the Soviet Union improved all-weather
capability, and greater interceptor range.
B. There are about 1,000 sites in the Soviet Union for the
SA-2 surface-to-air missile system. Performance in North
Vietnam has not been particularly impressive--more than 1,500
missiles have been fired to bring down a maximum of 44 manned,
American aircraft. The SA-2 has an inherent blind spot against
aircraft operating below 1,000 feet.
C. The SA-3 system is supposed to be more effective at low
altitudes, but the Soviets have deployed it to only about 110
sites in the Soviet Union. This suggests that it has not come
up to expectations.
General Purpose Forces:
About two thirds of Soviet military manpower--some 2
million men--are in what we call general purpose forces: the
ground forces, tactical air, and tactical navy.
A. The number of divisions has remained fairly constant.
There are 109 divisions almost completely equipped and ready
for early commitment to battle.
1. Their manning ranges from about 60 percent of
wartime levels in the Soviet interior, to 90 percent in
Eastern Europe
2. Another 32 cadre divisions have only about 20
percent of full strength.
B. The Soviets are gradually but steadily improving the
ground forces weapons.
C. They are also making a start in developing strike forces
which they could use for action at distant points--a Soviet
shortcoming until now.
1. Airlift is being improved, a marine corps has been
created, and there has been an increase in airborne and
amphibious maneuvers.
D. The Soviets continue to help the modernization and
improvement of the East European satellite forces. The East
Europeans can now contribute about one million men in 42
divisions for Warsaw Pact needs.
SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTING
I. [deleted]
A. The Soviets have run their underground test program at a
leisurely pace--slightly over one shot a month over the past
two years. [deleted]
C. In early 1965, the Soviets conducted the first test in a
program to investigate peaceful uses of nuclear explosions.
1. This test, the most spectacular of the series, was
a [deleted] explosion which dammed the Shagan River
near the Semipalatinsk test site.
D. [Deleted.]
E. There were underground shots at Ufa, just west of the
Urals, in 1965, and at Azgir, north of the Caspian, in 1966,
which probably tested a technique for stimulating the flow from
oil and gas deposits.
II. [Deleted.]
Senator Dodd. Mr. Chairman, is it orderly to ask a
question?
Senator Gore. Yes, sir.
Senator Dodd. Should we wait until the end?
Senator Gore. I believe it might be better to wait until
the end.
Senator Dodd. I did not want to make notes because then I
will forget.
Senator Gore. I think it might be well to make notes with
the understanding of the staff that the notes will be destroyed
after the briefing.
Proceed.
PROBLEMS OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY
Mr. Helms. The Soviet Economy.
I. The Soviet economy continues to have problems, notably
with the allocation of critical resources. Over the next few
years we do not expect that the growth of the Soviet GNP will
match the performance of the 1950's.
A. The Soviet GNP and total Soviet industrial production
are each a little less than half of ours,
B. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union virtually matches our
defense effort, mainly because the Soviet consumer is way down
in the pecking order when it comes to allocating output.
C. Military and space spending remained fairly constant
between 1962 and 1965, but we estimate that outlays in 1966
were up about 7 percent.
1. The state budget for 1967 includes an admitted
increase of 1.1 billion rubles for defense, and hidden
allocations elsewhere in the budget may make the actual
increase considerably larger.
D. For our purposes today, let me just say that we conclude
that the Soviet economy will come up with whatever expenditures
are considered desirable for defense, no matter what the
condition of the rest of the economy.
SOVIET POLICY
I. In the Kremlin today, the General Secretary of the
Party, Leonid Brezhnev, seems to have the most important voice
in making key assignments, and he is getting more and more of
the spotlight.
A. The Soviet leadership, however, was brought into power
in reaction to Khrushchev's erratic personal leadership, and it
is still functioning by and large as a collective government.
B. That means that it is a relatively cautious government,
not given to radical departures from established policies and
procedures.
C. The present leadership stands better with the military,
as far as we can judge, and this is largely because it has
dropped Khrushchev's attempts to cut back on military spending.
II. Domestic pre-occupation centers on the economy. It has
been so hard to reach decisions on resource allocations that
the Soviets are in the second year of their present Five-Year
Plan, and the plan itself has not received final approval yet.
SOVIET DISPUTE WITH CHINA
III. In foreign affairs, the overriding concern right now
is the dispute with Communist China.
A. Tension between Moscow and Peking has intensified
markedly in recent months, as you all have seen in the
newspapers. The Soviets feel they have gotten the upper hand in
the world Communist movement, and they are beginning to behave
somewhat more boldly.
1. For instance, they are again trying to convoke an
international meeting to condemn the Chinese.
2. The Soviets have exploited Peking's rejection of
appeals for united Communist action in support of North
Vietnam.
3. Peking's retort has been that Moscow is secretly
conspiring with the United States against the Asian
Communists.
4. Moscow, to avoid giving any substance to the
Chinese charges, has been taking the line publicly that
there can be little advance in U.S.-Soviet relations
until the Vietnam conflict is settled.
B. The Kremlin has made it clear in private, however, that
the Soviet Union wants to keep lines of communication with
Washington open, despite the strains and constraints imposed by
the Vietnamese fighting and sensitivity to charges of Soviet-
U.S. collusion.
1. If it were not for Vietnam, the Soviet leaders
would probably prefer to resume the dialogue with
Washington on matters which are of greater concern to
Soviet national interests, such as European security,
arms control, and East-West trade.
2. The agreements recently reached on civil air
routes and the peaceful use of outer space showed that
limited cooperation is still possible.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks on the Soviet
weapons systems, on their economy and political approach, and I
would now go over to China.
CHINESE COMMUNISTS' NUCLEAR WEAPONS
I would first like to talk about Chinese Communist advanced
weapons.
I. The Chinese Communists are making a concerted effort--on
their own and with overriding priorities--to develop modern
weapons for strategic attack. They are devoting increasing
resources to missiles and nuclear weapons.
A. [Deleted.]
B. We estimate that they could begin to deploy a medium-
range ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead this year, and
their first crude ICBM's in the early 1970s.
II. [Deleted.]
C. The tests indicate that the Chinese can manufacture
nuclear bombs which can be carried by their medium bombers--
about a dozen old TU-4 BULLS similar to our B-29, and two TU-16
BADGER jet bombers.
1. [Deleted.]
2. Their likely immediate goals, however, are
probably warheads for short- and medium-range missiles,
and possibly a weapon for the IL-28 BEAGLE light jet
bomber. The Chinese have about 250 of these aircraft,
which have a better chance of reaching a defended
target than the BULLS.
D. In the present state of Chinese technology, any weapons
they might make now would be crude and inefficient by our
standards. By Far Eastern standards, however, they are a
significant addition to Chinese military prestige.
CHINESE MISSILE DEVELOPMENT
III. The Chinese probably started their missile development
by test-firing Soviet MRBM's given them before the Sino-Soviet
split in 1960.
A. They may have begun testing their own native versions as
early as 1963.
B. Now they are apparently working on several surface-to-
surface missile programs.
1. The pace of activity at Shuang-cheng-tzu has
increased sharply since the fall of 1965. They
apparently are conducting more MRBM firings, and they
recently built a new launch complex, possibly for
training troops in the launching procedures.
C. During the past year they have also built a very large
launch complex, which we call Complex B. The reports we have on
the size of the facilities indicate that this complex is for a
large missile, probably an ICBM. This missile could also be
used as a space booster.
1. Complex B probably will be ready for firings by
the latter part of 1967, but we have no evidence that
the Chinese have any ICBM components so far. Therefore,
we cannot say whether an ICBM vehicle will be ready for
test flights that soon.
2. If the Chinese inaugurate a reasonably successful
flight test program, within the next year or so, they
probably could have a few ICBMs deployed by the early
1970s.
3. These probably would be inferior in reliability
and accuracy by U.S. standards, and also by Soviet
standards, but they could--in Chinese eyes--constitute
a limited inter-continental deterrent.
D. The Chinese Communists have built one copy of the Soviet
G-class submarine. In the Soviet fleet, this class is armed
with three ballistic missiles 350-mile range. We have to assume
that the Chinese are working on a missile to fit the submarine.
CHINESE CONVENTIONAL FORCES
I would like now to turn to Chinese conventional military
forces.
I. Despite Chinese progress in advanced weapons, the
military power of Communist China for some years to come will
derive primarily from the numerical strength of its enormous
ground forces--about 2,300,000 men--and great reserves of
manpower.
II. There are more than 100 infantry divisions and about a
dozen armor and artillery divisions in the Chinese Communist
Army, concentrated in the heavily populated regions of eastern
China.
A. The Chinese Army has the capability to overrun any of
its mainland neighbors in short order, provided it does not run
into significant opposition from a major power.
1. It has demonstrated its ability to move and fight
with primitive transportation and rudimentary logistic
support.
2. If it should come to all-out war, however, the
Chinese will be badly hampered by shortages of armor,
heavy ordnance, mechanized transport, and fuel.
III. The Chinese Air Force and Navy are oriented primarily
toward defensive missions.
A. The bomber force at present consists of 250 jet light
bombers, which I mentioned a few moments ago as BEAGLES. We
believe the Chinese will start producing BADGER jet mediums
about 1968.
B. The bulk of the jet fighters consist of about 1,900 MIG-
15s and MIG-17s, obtained 10 or more years ago.
1. Over the past two years, the Chinese have begun
assembling supersonic MIG-19s in an aircraft plant at
Shen-yang, known better as Mukden, in Manchuria which
was provided by the Soviets before 1960. The Chinese
inventory of MIG-19s has risen from 150 to about 350,
and they have been able to supply another 50 to
Pakistan in 1966.
2. The Chinese have about 35 of the Mach-two, delta-
wing MIG-21s, supplied by the Soviet Union in the early
1960s.
IV. Peking's Navy is the weakest element of the Chinese
armed forces.
A. It has the world's fourth largest undersea fleet, with
34 submarines, most of them medium-range torpedo attack boats.
They have no experience in extended operations, however, and
most of their training appears to take place within 20 miles of
the coast.
B. The Chinese are building submarines, destroyer escorts,
and guided-missile patrol boats. They have four obsolete
destroyers, six new DEs, and 11 patrol boats.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA
I would like now to turn to Chinese political developments.
I. Communist China is being racked by the greatest
political convulsions since Mao Tse-tung took control in 1949.
A. Mao, at 73, is aging, sick, and more and more
inflexible.
1. He is clearly concerned that his Communist Party
is losing the revolutionary zeal of its early days, and
cannot be relied on to keep China on the right track
after he is gone.
2. The teenaged millions of the Red Guard are
supposed to rekindle that zeal with their youthful and
unbridled enthusiasm.
3. When Mao reappeared last summer after a protracted
absence from public view, he passed over the men who
had been the heads of the party hierarchy and named
Defense Minister Lin Piao as Number Two Man--in effect,
Mao's designated successor.
B. To Mao Tse-tung, the cultural revolution is probably
primarily a drive to reshape the Communist Party, or replace it
with a more reliable, more fanatical, and younger version.
C. But for the men who aspire to succeed Mao, it has become
a naked struggle for power and for survival.
II. It is difficult to determine from day to day where the
cultural revolution stands, who is on which side, or who is
going to come out on top. The struggle seems to have entered a
critical phase in January.
A. The most dramatic development has been Mao's call for
the Red Army to back up the Red Guards and eliminate resistance
to the cultural revolution.
1. We had been speculating when the resistance first
developed that the army would have been called in even
earlier if there had been no doubts about its
reliability.
2. Now there is evidence that the armed forces are
considerably less than monolithic in their loyalty to
Mao and Lin.
III. When and how will the turmoil in Peking finally be
resolved?
A. We have no idea. The opposing forces, judging by the
protracted struggle, must be quite evenly matched. If the clash
between workers and Red Guards spread--particularly if the
army's loyalties are divided--then we may soon see something
for which there is no other term but Civil War.
1. Some days, it looks as though the opposing
elements are digging in for a long winter of political
trench warfare.
2. The next day, a war of movement and a showdown
appears imminent.
3. I would say it is still too early to speculate
usefully on the outcome.
B. There are two points, however, which we can make.
1. First, as long as China's leaders are pre-occupied
with this internal wrangling, they will find it
difficult to reach agreement on any new policy lines.
So, we do not expect any radical departures from
existing policies.
2. Second, whoever wins, we can see no reason for
suspecting that there will be any dilution of Peking's
implacable hostility to the United States.
CHINA'S ECONOMY
I would like to now turn to the Chinese economy.
A. China has regained only part of the ground lost when the
Great Leap Forward collapsed in 1960 and Soviet aid was
withdrawn.
1. Prospects to regain the momentum of the 1950's
appear remote, even without the disruption of the
``cultural revolution.''
2. The longer the political upheaval lasts, the
greater the likelihood of severe damage to the economy.
3. There have already been extensive strikes,
shutdowns, and disruption of transportation.
B. It has taken an overriding priority on defense to permit
the progress China has made in advanced weapons.
1. One of the ministries hard hit by the waves of
political purges and poster denunciations has been a
ministry directly related to the missile effort.
C. Stagnation in agriculture remains the chief obstacle to
a resumption of adequate economic growth.
1. Peking claims a record harvest in 1966, but actual
grain production was somewhat lower in 1966 than in
1955.
2. It was not much above the level of 10 years ago,
when there were almost 150 million fewer people to
feed.
3. There were localized ration cuts, and it was only
thanks to grain imports that the average ration could
be kept above the lean levels of the poor year of 1960.
4. China imported more than 5 million tons of grain
from the Free World in 1966, and will probably have to
import substantially more this year.
I now would like to turn, Mr. Chairman, to the subject of
nuclear proliferation.
[Deleted.]
INDIA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD NUCLEAR WEAPONS
II. The Indian attitude toward development of nuclear
weapons has been complicated by Peking's nuclear capability.
A. Prime Minister Gandhi has maintained the government's
``no bomb'' nuclear policy despite criticisms in Parliament.
1. Both the Prime Minister and the new Chairman of
the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, Dr. Sarabhai, have
stated that India's present economic and industrial
position does not permit launching a nuclear weapons
project, particularly from the viewpoint of developing
delivery systems.
B. [Deleted.]
1. An agreement with Canada, however, stipulates that
plutonium produced in the one reactor now operational
will be used only for peaceful purposes.
2. Two other reactors which will be operational in
1969 and 1970 are covered by safeguards.
Other Countries:
ISOTOPE SEPARATION
III. I would like to end the discussion of proliferation
with a brief mention of isotope separation.
A. [Deleted.]
B. U.S. experience has shown that for the production of
moderate quantities of uranium-235, the centrifuge process is
economically attractive in comparison with the gaseous
diffusion process.
C. [Deleted.]
D. We believe however, that none of the countries working
on the process has yet developed a centrifuge to the point
where an economical plant of production size could be built.
CHINA'S SUPPORT OF NORTH VIETNAM
Mr. Chairman, I have, or I am prepared, to discuss two
other matters, if you choose, these having to do with the
Chinese contribution to North Vietnam and the possibility of
Chinese intervention in North Vietnam, It is not strictly the
topic that we have agreed that I would discuss, but if you had
any interest in this, I would be glad to cover it.
Senator Gore. What is the pleasure of the committee?
I would like to hear it. Yes, we would.
Mr. Helms. We estimate that there are 26,000 to 48,000
Chinese Communist military personnel in North Vietnam.
Senator Gore. What is the figure?
Mr. Helms. 26,000 to 48,000. There is a wide spread there
because we have no way of actually counting the number of
individual Chinese. We simply know the units that are there and
what the units are for, and these units are of a kind that do
not have a very specific table of organization and personnel.
They can be larger or smaller, depending on how you want to use
them. And we have been trying to narrow this figure, but the
only thing we can say now is that the range is between 26,000
and 48,000.
Senator Symington. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question in
context?
Senator Gore. Yes.
Senator Symington. Are they, Mr. Helms, logistic or combat
troops or both?
Mr. Helms. No, sir. This is what I wanted to cover, Senator
Symington.
Senator Symington. I am sorry.
Mr. Helms. Thank you.
Senator Symington. Thank you.
Mr. Helms. As far as we can determine, there are no ground
combat formations.
B. Evidence shows that there are two antiaircraft artillery
divisions and possibly elements of two more, manning the 85-
millimeter and 100-millimeter guns defending some of the key
targets.
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT
C. The rest of the Chinese personnel are mainly railway,
engineer, and logistic units, building airfields, bridges, and
the like, laying track, and keeping the supplies moving. In
other words, there are no combat personnel, I repeat.
Senator Gore. You would not regard the manning of anti-
aircraft guns as combat?
Mr. Helms. Well, not in the sense that it is used in the
military technology.
Senator Gore. I understand.
Mr. Helms. In other words, these are not fellows manning
guns shooting at other soldiers.They are fellows manning anti-
aircraft guns.
Senator Gore. Shooting Americans down.
Mr. Helms. That is the idea, but they are not combat forces
in the way the military uses the terms.
EFFECTIVENESS OF SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES
Senator Aiken. Our witness stated yesterday, that what he
could learn from the time he was there, Russian SAM's are
comparatively ineffective, and most of our planes are brought
down by conventional weapons.
Mr. Helms. That is correct.
Senator Aiken. If that is correct, I have to reverse my
opinion.
Mr. Helms. The reason for this, Senator Aiken, if I may
take just a moment, is that by having a mix of surface-to-air
missiles and antiaircraft guns, the surface-to-air missiles are
quite effective at certain altitudes. Therefore, our planes, to
avoid them, go in on the deck, and in that way they just run
into the antiaircraft fire. And there is enough of it so there
is just no way of missing it, and this is why so many have been
brought down by AA rather than surface-to-air missiles.
Senator Aiken. But you do not think I am too far wrong in
not crediting the Russians for their firing.
Mr. Helms. I do not.
Senator Gore. It is for the purpose of avoiding the SAM
fire that they come in on the deck, so to speak.
Mr. Helms. That is right. So, I think the question comes
down as to who is manning the antiaircraft guns, and they are
being manned by a variety of personnel.
POSSIBILITY OF CHINESE INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM
Now, may I discuss just a moment our beliefs about the
possibility of Chinese intervention in Vietnam.
VI. We believe that there are three situations in which
Peking would feel obliged to intervene in force in the
Vietnamese fighting.
A. One of these would arise from U.S. air strikes against
targets in China. In May 1965, Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi
asked the British Charge in Peking to pass along a warning to
this effect.
B. The second circumstance which would trigger Chinese
intervention would be a major U.S. invasion of North Vietnam.
Chinese leaders passed this word to a visiting delegation from
Ghana, shortly before Chen Yi talked with the British.
C. In addition, if the collapse of the Hanoi Government
should seem imminent, China might probably move into North
Vietnam to ``restore order.''
VII. It is always dangerous to assume that the Chinese are
going to be guided by rational decisions, but we believe that
Peking is bound to feel that the domestic political turmoil and
the intensification of the dispute with Moscow leaves China
less ready than it might otherwise be to engage in direct
hostilities with the United States.
A. Another factor which would contribute to increased
Chinese caution would be a growing belief in Peking that the
United States is determined to persevere, over the short run at
least, in the Vietnamese war.
THRESHOLD OF SENSITIVITY HAS BEEN RAISED
B. We think, therefore, that the threshold of sensitivity--
the level at which Peking would feel forced to fight--has
probably been raised a degree or two.
1. For example, a shallow incursion by U.S. troops
into the Demilitarized Zone between North and South
Vietnam might be less likely today to trigger a Chinese
reaction than it would have in 1965.
C. Chinese statements concerning the ``inevitability'' of
war with the U.S. now appear only infrequently.
1. Peking has made no mention of ``volunteers'' for
Vietnam since the fall of 1965, except for brief
flurries last summer and again in December, after
bombings in the area of Hanoi and Haiphong.
2. Peking has always said that the Vietnamese must
bear the primary responsibility for fighting; in recent
months this theme has been given additional emphasis.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gore. Thank you very much, Mr. Helms.
SOVIET ADVANTAGES IN ANTI-MISSILE DEVELOPMENT
Beginning where you began, with a few questions, will you
or your assis
