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69-006

110TH CONGRESS

REPORT

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

2d Session

110-665

--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009

MAY 21, 2008- Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. REYES, from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, submitted the following

R E P O R T

together with

MINORITY VIEWS

[To accompany H.R. 5959]

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

CONTENTS Page
H.R. 5959, as reported to House 1
Purpose 30
Overall Perspective on the Classified Annex and Committee Intent 31
Scope of Committee Review 31
Committee Statement and Views 31
Overview
31
Committee Review
32
The Legislation
32
Areas of Special Interest
34
Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative
34
Overreliance on Supplemental Funding
35
Human Intelligence Capability Throughout the World
35
Issues Regarding Committee Notification of Syria's Nuclear Program
36
Amendments to the National Security Act of 1947
36
Diversity in the Intelligence Community
37
Committee Investigation into the Destruction of Interrogation Videotapes by the Central Intelligence Agency
37
Creation of a National Applications Office in the Department of Homeland Security
38
Major Systems Acquisitions
38
Acquisition Program Performance Notification
39
Advanced Research and Development
39
Future Course for Overhead Architecture
40
Integration of the Counterintelligence Field Activity into the Defense Intelligence Agency
40
FBI's Use of National Security Letters
41
Global Climate Change
42
Committee Consideration and Roll Call Votes 42
Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation of the Amendment 46
Title I--Intelligence
46
Section 101--Authorization of appropriations
46
Section 102--Classified Schedule of Authorizations
46
Section 103--Personnel ceiling adjustments
46
Section 104--Intelligence Community Management Account
46
Section 105--Limitation on the use of covert action funds
47
Section 106--Prohibition on use of funds to implement `Five and Out' program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
47
Title II--Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System
47
Section 201--Authorization of appropriations 47
Section 202--Technical modification to mandatory retirement provision of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act
47
Title III--General Provisions
47
Section 301--Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law
47
Section 302--Enhanced flexibility in non-reimbursable details to elements of the Intelligence Community
47
Section 303--Multi-level security clearances
48
Section 304--Delegation of authority for travel on common carriers for intelligence collection personnel
48
Section 305--Annual personnel level assessments for the Intelligence Community
48
Section 306--Comprehensive report on intelligence community contractors
49
Section 307--Report on proposed pay-for-performance intelligence community personnel management system
50
Section 308--Report on plan to increase diversity within the Intelligence Community
50
Section 309--Report on security clearance determinations
51
Section 311--Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities
51
Section 312--Clarification of definition of Intelligence Community under the National Security Act of 1947
51
Section 313--Modification of availability of funds for different intelligence activities
51
Section 314--Protection of certain national security information
52
Section 315--Extension of authority to delete information about receipt and disposition of foreign gifts and decorations
52
Section 316--Report on compliance with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and related provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006
53
Section 317--Incorporation of reporting requirements
54
Section 318--Repeal of certain reporting requirements
54
Section 319--Enhancement of critical skills training program
54
Section 320--Comprehensive national cybersecurity initiative advisory panel
54
Title IV--Matters Relating To Elements of the Intelligence Community
54
Section 401--Clarification of limitation on co-location of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
54
Section 402--Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on the Transportation Security Oversight Board
55
Section 403--Additional duties of the Director of Science and Technology
55
Section 404--Leadership and location of certain offices and officials
55
Section 405--Plan to implement recommendations of the data center energy efficiency reports
55
Section 406--Semiannual reports on the nuclear programs of Iran, Syria, and North Korea
56
Section 407--Title of Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community
56
Section 408--Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
56
Section 409--Annual report on foreign language proficiency in the Intelligence Community
58
Section 410--Repeal of certain authorities relating to the office of the National Counterintelligence Executive
58
Section 411--National Intelligence Estimate on weapons of mass destruction in Syria
58
Section 412--Annual report on intelligence resources dedicated to Iraq and Afghanistan
59
Section 413--Ombudsman for intelligence community security clearances
59
Section 414--Security clearance reciprocity
59
Section 415--Report on international traffic in arms regulations
59
Section 416--Report on nuclear trafficking
59
Section 417--Study on revoking pensions of persons who commit unauthorized disclosures of classified information
60
Section 421--Review of covert action programs by Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency
60
Section 422--Inapplicability to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency of requirement for annual report on progress in auditable financial statements
60
Section 423--Technical amendments relating to titles of certain CIA positions
61
Section 424--Clarifying amendments relating to Section 105 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004
61
Section 425--Prohibition on the use of private contractors for interrogations involving person in the custody or control of the Central Intelligence Agency
61
Section 431--Integration of the Counterintelligence Field Activity into the Defense Intelligence Agency
61
Section 441--Clarification of inclusion of the Coast Guard and Drug Enforcement Administration as elements of the Intelligence Community
62
Section 442--Report on transformation of the intelligence capabilities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
62
Title V--Other Matters
63
Section 501--Extension of National Commission for Review of Research and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence Community
63
Section 502--Amendments to the National Security Act of 1947
63
Section 503--Report on financial intelligence on terrorist assets
63
Section 504--Notice of intelligence regarding North Korea and China
63
Section 505--Sense of Congress regarding use of intelligence resources
64
Section 511--Technical amendments to the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949
64
Section 512--Technical amendments to the multi-year National Intelligence Program
64
Section 513--Technical clarifications of certain references to Joint Military Intelligence Program and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities
64
Section 514--Technical Amendments to the National Security Act of 1947
64
Section 515--Technical amendments to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
64
Section 516--Technical amendments to the Executive Schedule
64
Section 517--Technical amendments relating to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
65
Correspondence with Other Committees Regarding Particular Provisions 65
Letter from Chairman Berman to Chairman Reyes 65
Letter from Chairman Reyes to Chairman Berman 65
Letter from Chairman Skelton to Chairman Reyes 66
Letter from Chairman Reyes to Chairman Skelton 67
Letter from Chairman Thompson to Chairman Reyes 67
Letter from Chairman Reyes to Chairman Thompson 68
Letter from Chairman Conyers to Chairman Reyes 68
Letter from Chairman Reyes to Chairman Conyers 69
Letter from Chairman Waxman to Chairman Reyes 69
Letter from Chairman Reyes to Chairman Waxman 70
Correspondence with Congressional Budget Office 71
Letter from Chairman Reyes to Mr. Peter Orszag, Director 71
Letter from Mr. Orszag to Chairman Reyes 71
Congressional Budget Office Estimate 71
Changes to Existing Law 73
Minority Views 114

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
TITLE I--BUDGET AND PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.
Sec. 105. Limitation on the use of covert action funds.
Sec. 106. Prohibition on use of funds to implement `5 and out' program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 202. Technical modification to mandatory retirement provision of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act.
TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Subtitle A--Personnel Matters
Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law.
Sec. 302. Enhanced flexibility in nonreimbursable details to elements of the intelligence community.
Sec. 303. Multi-level security clearances.
Sec. 304. Delegation of authority for travel on common carriers for intelligence collection personnel.
Sec. 305. Annual personnel level assessments for the intelligence community.
Sec. 306. Comprehensive report on intelligence community contractors.
Sec. 307. Report on proposed pay for performance intelligence community personnel management system.
Sec. 308. Report on plans to increase diversity within the intelligence community.
Sec. 309. Report on security clearance determinations.
Subtitle B--Other Matters
Sec. 311. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 312. Clarification of definition of intelligence community under the National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 313. Modification of availability of funds for different intelligence activities.
Sec. 314. Protection of certain national security information.
Sec. 315. Extension of authority to delete information about receipt and disposition of foreign gifts and decorations.
Sec. 316. Report on compliance with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and related provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006.
Sec. 317. Incorporation of reporting requirements.
Sec. 318. Repeal of certain reporting requirements.
Sec. 319. Enhancement of critical skills training program.
Sec. 320. Comprehensive national cybersecurity initiative advisory panel.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Sec. 401. Clarification of limitation on colocation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 402. Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on the Transportation Security Oversight Board.
Sec. 403. Additional duties of the Director of Science and Technology.
Sec. 404. Leadership and location of certain offices and officials.
Sec. 405. Plan to implement recommendations of the data center energy efficiency reports.
Sec. 406. Semiannual reports on nuclear programs of Iran, Syria, and North Korea.
Sec. 407. Title of Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community.
Sec. 408. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
Sec. 409. Annual report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence community.
Sec. 410. Repeal of certain authorities relating to the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive.
Sec. 411. National intelligence estimate on weapons of mass destruction in Syria.
Sec. 412. Report on intelligence resources dedicated to Iraq and Afghanistan.
Sec. 413. Ombudsman for intelligence community security clearances.
Sec. 414. Security clearance reciprocity.
Sec. 415. Report on international traffic in arms regulations.
Sec. 416. Report on nuclear trafficking.
Sec. 417. Study on revoking pensions of persons who commit unauthorized disclosures of classified information.
Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency
Sec. 421. Review of covert action programs by Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 422. Inapplicability to Director of the Central Intelligence Agency of requirement for annual report on progress in auditable financial statements.
Sec. 423. Technical amendments relating to titles of certain Central Intelligence Agency positions.
Sec. 424. Clarifying amendments relating to section 105 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004.
Sec. 425. Prohibition on the use of private contractors for interrogations involving persons in the custody or control of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Subtitle C--Defense Intelligence Components
Sec. 431. Integration of the Counterintelligence Field Activity into the Defense Intelligence Agency.
Subtitle D--Other Elements
Sec. 441. Clarification of inclusion of Coast Guard and Drug Enforcement Administration as elements of the intelligence community.
Sec. 442. Report on transformation of the intelligence capabilities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS
Subtitle A--General Intelligence Matters
Sec. 501. Extension of National Commission for the Review of the Research and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence Community.
Sec. 502. Amendments to the National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 503. Report on financial intelligence on terrorist assets.
Sec. 504. Notice of intelligence regarding North Korea and China.
Sec. 505. Sense of Congress regarding use of intelligence resources.
Subtitle B--Technical Amendments
Sec. 511. Technical amendment to the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.
Sec. 512. Technical amendments relating to the multiyear National Intelligence Program.
Sec. 513. Technical clarification of certain references to Joint Military Intelligence Program and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities.
Sec. 514. Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 515. Technical amendments to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.
Sec. 516. Technical amendments to the Executive Schedule.
Sec. 517. Technical amendments relating to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

TITLE I--BUDGET AND PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS

SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

SEC. 105. LIMITATION ON THE USE OF COVERT ACTION FUNDS.

SEC. 106. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS TO IMPLEMENT `5 AND OUT' PROGRAM OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

SEC. 202. TECHNICAL MODIFICATION TO MANDATORY RETIREMENT PROVISION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT ACT.

TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

Subtitle A--Personnel Matters

SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY LAW.

SEC. 302. ENHANCED FLEXIBILITY IN NONREIMBURSABLE DETAILS TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

SEC. 303. MULTI-LEVEL SECURITY CLEARANCES.

SEC. 304. DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY FOR TRAVEL ON COMMON CARRIERS FOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PERSONNEL.

SEC. 305. ANNUAL PERSONNEL LEVEL ASSESSMENTS FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

`ANNUAL PERSONNEL LEVEL ASSESSMENT FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

`Sec. 506B. Annual personnel level assessment for the intelligence community.'.

SEC. 306. COMPREHENSIVE REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRACTORS.

SEC. 307. REPORT ON PROPOSED PAY FOR PERFORMANCE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM.

SEC. 308. REPORT ON PLANS TO INCREASE DIVERSITY WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

SEC. 309. REPORT ON SECURITY CLEARANCE DETERMINATIONS.

`REPORT ON SECURITY CLEARANCE DETERMINATIONS

`Sec. 508. Report on security clearance determinations.'.

Subtitle B--Other Matters

SEC. 311. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

SEC. 312. CLARIFICATION OF DEFINITION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY UNDER THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.

SEC. 313. MODIFICATION OF AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR DIFFERENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

SEC. 314. PROTECTION OF CERTAIN NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION.

SEC. 315. EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY TO DELETE INFORMATION ABOUT RECEIPT AND DISPOSITION OF FOREIGN GIFTS AND DECORATIONS.

SEC. 316. REPORT ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE DETAINEE TREATMENT ACT OF 2005 AND RELATED PROVISIONS OF THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT OF 2006.

SEC. 317. INCORPORATION OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

SEC. 318. REPEAL OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

SEC. 319. ENHANCEMENT OF CRITICAL SKILLS TRAINING PROGRAM.

`INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ACQUISITION OF CRITICAL SKILLS

`Sec. 1022. Intelligence community acquisition of critical skills.'.

SEC. 320. COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY INITIATIVE ADVISORY PANEL.

TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence

SEC. 401. CLARIFICATION OF LIMITATION ON COLOCATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

SEC. 402. MEMBERSHIP OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ON THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT BOARD.

SEC. 403. ADDITIONAL DUTIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY.

SEC. 404. LEADERSHIP AND LOCATION OF CERTAIN OFFICES AND OFFICIALS.

SEC. 405. PLAN TO IMPLEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE DATA CENTER ENERGY EFFICIENCY REPORTS.

SEC. 406. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON NUCLEAR PROGRAMS OF IRAN, SYRIA, AND NORTH KOREA.

`SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON THE NUCLEAR PROGRAMS OF IRAN, SYRIA, AND NORTH KOREA

`Sec. 509. Semiannual reports on the nuclear programs of Iran, Syria, and North Korea.'.

SEC. 407. TITLE OF CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

SEC. 408. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

`INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

`Sec. 103H. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.'.

SEC. 409. ANNUAL REPORT ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

`REPORT ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

`Sec. 510. Report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence community.'.

SEC. 410. REPEAL OF CERTAIN AUTHORITIES RELATING TO THE OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE.

SEC. 411. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN SYRIA.

SEC. 412. REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES DEDICATED TO IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN.

SEC. 413. OMBUDSMAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SECURITY CLEARANCES.

`OMBUDSMAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SECURITY CLEARANCES

`Sec. 103I. Ombudsman for intelligence community security clearances.'.

SEC. 414. SECURITY CLEARANCE RECIPROCITY.

SEC. 415. REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS.

SEC. 416. REPORT ON NUCLEAR TRAFFICKING.

SEC. 417. STUDY ON REVOKING PENSIONS OF PERSONS WHO COMMIT UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency

SEC. 421. REVIEW OF COVERT ACTION PROGRAMS BY INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

SEC. 422. INAPPLICABILITY TO DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OF REQUIREMENT FOR ANNUAL REPORT ON PROGRESS IN AUDITABLE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.

SEC. 423. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO TITLES OF CERTAIN CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY POSITIONS.

SEC. 424. CLARIFYING AMENDMENTS RELATING TO SECTION 105 OF THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004.

SEC. 425. PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF PRIVATE CONTRACTORS FOR INTERROGATIONS INVOLVING PERSONS IN THE CUSTODY OR CONTROL OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

Subtitle C--Defense Intelligence Components

SEC. 431. INTEGRATION OF THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD ACTIVITY INTO THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

Subtitle D--Other Elements

SEC. 441. CLARIFICATION OF INCLUSION OF COAST GUARD AND DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION AS ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

SEC. 442. REPORT ON TRANSFORMATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS

Subtitle A--General Intelligence Matters

SEC. 501. EXTENSION OF NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

SEC. 502. AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.

SEC. 503. REPORT ON FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE ON TERRORIST ASSETS.

SEC. 504. NOTICE OF INTELLIGENCE REGARDING NORTH KOREA AND CHINA.

SEC. 505. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING USE OF INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES.

Subtitle B--Technical Amendments

SEC. 511. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949.

SEC. 512. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO THE MULTIYEAR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.

`SEC. 1403. MULTIYEAR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.'.

SEC. 513. TECHNICAL CLARIFICATION OF CERTAIN REFERENCES TO JOINT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM AND TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES.

SEC. 514. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.

SEC. 515. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004.

SEC. 516. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.

SEC. 517. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO THE NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

`1336. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: special publications.'.

PURPOSE

The purpose of H.R. 5959 is to authorize the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government for fiscal year 2009 in order to enhance the national security of the United States, to support and assist the armed forces of the United States, and to facilitate and oversee the execution of the foreign policy of the United States. The bill also clarifies certain intelligence community authorities and makes technical corrections to existing statutes.

CLASSIFIED ANNEX AND COMMITTEE INTENT

The classified annex to this report includes the classified Schedule of Authorizations and its associated explanatory language. The Committee views the classified annex as an integral part of this legislation. The classified annex contains a thorough discussion of the issues considered by the Committee underlying the funding authorizations found in the classified Schedule of Authorizations. The Committee intends that all intelligence programs discussed in the classified annex to this report be conducted in accordance with the guidance and limitations set forth as associated language therein. The classified Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated directly into this legislation by virtue of Section 102 of the bill. The classified annex is available for review by all Members of the House of Representatives, subject to the requirements of clause 13 of rule XXIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, and rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. In addition, Section 317 of the bill incorporates reporting requirements of the Classified Annex and any Joint Explanatory Statement into the Act.

SCOPE OF COMMITTEE REVIEW

The bill authorizes U.S. intelligence and intelligence-related activities under the jurisdiction of the Committee, including the National Intelligence Program (NIP), the Military Intelligence Program (MIP), and the Information System Security Program (ISSP). The NIP consists of all activities of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency, as well as intelligence and intelligence-related activities conducted by: (1) the Department of Defense; (2) the Defense Intelligence Agency; (3) the National Security Agency; (4) the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; (5) the Coast Guard; (6) the Department of State; (7) the Department of the Treasury; (8) the Department of Energy; (9) the Department of Justice; (10) the Federal Bureau of Investigation; (11) the Drug Enforcement Administration; (12) the National Reconnaissance Office; (13) the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and (14) the Department of Homeland Security. The Committee has legislative, authorizing, and oversight jurisdiction of these programs.

COMMITTEE STATEMENT AND VIEWS

A. OVERVIEW

In an era of asymmetric threats, intelligence continues to be one of the nation's most fundamental national security tools. A well-resourced, well-managed, and well-trained Intelligence Community is the nation's first line of defense against terrorists, proliferators of weapons of mass destruction, and other global actors who would do America harm.

The Committee strongly supports the brave women and men of America's intelligence agencies and appreciates the personal sacrifices, overseas deployments, and enormous risks they and their families undertake to preserve our freedom.

Most of the nation's intelligence successes, of which there are many, cannot be discussed in an unclassified report. So, too, some of the biggest intelligence gaps cannot be written about publicly. The Committee has conducted dozens of classified hearings, briefings, and site visits to understand the threats, assess our capabilities, and realign resources to match the threats properly.

The Committee's principal concern continues to be that al-Qaeda is stronger today than at any time since September 11, 2001. Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri remain at large, likely in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan. Al-Qaeda is not the only terrorist group to grow in strength over the past seven years. Hezbollah and Hamas have become more capable and more determined. Dangerous states, including Syria, continue to pursue nuclear capabilities. There is the possibility that one of these states could transfer fissile material to a terrorist group. The Committee is convinced that this must remain our foremost worry.

B. THE COMMITTEE REVIEW

The Committee completed its review of the President's fiscal year 2009 budget request, carrying out its annual responsibility to prepare an authorization based on close examination of the U.S. Government's intelligence programs and proposed expenditures.

Over the past two months, the Committee conducted 14 full committee-level budget hearings and briefings on numerous topics, including the following:

National Intelligence Program

Military Intelligence Program

Advanced Research and Development

Overhead Architecture

Human Intelligence

Covert Action

Human Capital

Cybersecurity

In addition to these events, committee members and staff have taken numerous budget-related briefings covering all intelligence programs within the National Intelligence Program, the Military Intelligence Program, and the Information System Security Program.

As always, the Committee's legislative and budgetary actions are based on more than these budget-specific hearings and briefings. The actions taken in this bill are the result of the Committee's ongoing, rigorous oversight of the U.S. Intelligence Community throughout the year. This oversight activity includes scores of committee and subcommittee hearings and briefings; site visits and fact-finding trips; reviews of congressionally-directed reports; and studies of intelligence capabilities, strategies, plans, and challenges.

C. THE LEGISLATION

The bill and accompanying classified Schedule of Authorizations includes the Committee's recommended authorizations for the Intelligence Community for fiscal year 2009. This includes an authorization for the intelligence portion of the fiscal year 2009 bridge supplemental request to fund counterterrorism operations as well as operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the time of consideration of H.R. 5959, the Committee had not received the Administration's full emergency supplemental funding request for fiscal year 2009. The Committee will consider that proposal at a later time.

H.R. 5959 improves U.S. intelligence capabilities in several important respects.

First, the bill invests in people, our most important resource. It adds funding to enhance human intelligence (HUMINT) collection and provides much-needed funds for other enduring and emerging global security issues, such as challenges faced in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

The bill continues the Committee's longstanding commitment to improving language capabilities in the Intelligence Community, adding both funding and reporting requirements in order to improve oversight of this perennial problem area.

The bill mandates implementation of security clearance reform to allow first and second generation Americans, many of whom may have critical language skills, to serve in the Intelligence Community with proper clearances. In many instances, the cumbersome security clearance process has delayed the entry of highly-skilled applicants, or dissuaded them from even seeking employment in the Intelligence Community. The Committee has addressed a number of these concerns to encourage the Community to hire the most qualified people.

Second, the bill enhances congressional oversight by ensuring that the Committee receives the information it needs to conduct its inherent oversight function. The Committee has borne witness to repeated failures by the Administration to comply with the National Security Act of 1947, which mandates that the Committee be `fully and currently informed' of all intelligence activities. These failures prompted the Committee to adopt two provisions to enhance reporting on intelligence activities to the full membership of the congressional intelligence committees. One provision would limit the use of covert action funds until the full membership of the intelligence committees are briefed on all covert actions in effect as of April 24, 2008. Another provision would restrict the Administration's attempts to limit information to only the Chairman and Ranking Member, and clarifies the information that must be reported to the full Committee.

Third, the bill authorizes much of the request for the foundational activities of the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI), while expressing the Committee's concern about potential policy, implementation, and governance issues. To that end, the bill also includes a legislative provision requesting a presidential report on creating a senior advisory panel composed of representatives from the executive branch, the legislative branch, and the private sector for the purposes of providing a vehicle to address issues of concern. The Committee has performed an extensive review of the proposed CNCI, which included holding three hearings and numerous briefings and roundtables.

Fourth, the Committee is also concerned that Congress does not have a full understanding of the magnitude of human and fiscal intelligence resources that have been devoted to Iraq, the expenditure of which often comes at the expense of fighting the war on terror. H.R. 5959 requires a detailed report to the Committee on this topic.

Fifth, the bill addresses a number of long-term technical challenges in the Intelligence Community. It does so by adding significant resources in both the National Intelligence Program and the Military Intelligence Program to modernize signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities and integrate them into a global SIGINT Enterprise.

Finally, despite the size of the budget request, the Administration did not include funds adequate to keep the U.S. Intelligence Community competitive in advanced technologies. Research and development funding is the nation's investment in retaining state of the art technologies. The bill adds funds to four agencies specifically for that purpose; and the Committee urges the executive branch to sustain, if not increase, this level of funding in future year requests.

The Committee adopted a number of amendments to H.R. 5959 offered by majority and minority members. The Committee is pleased that this bill passed with bipartisan support.

D. AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST

Comprehensive national cybersecurity initiative

The single largest request and the most important initiative of the President's fiscal year 2009 budget request was the CNCI. Since the announcement of the CNCI and the issuance of the National Security Presidential Directive 54/Homeland Security

Presidential Directive 23 in January 2008, the Committee has focused much time and effort on understanding the CNCI and its components.

At present, it would be fair to characterize the Committee's response to the CNCI as one of conditional support. The Committee finds a cybersecurity initiative worthwhile in principle, but the details of the CNCI remain vague and, thus, open to question. Until some of the governance, implementation, and policy issues are identified, debated, and resolved, the Committee believes that the funding request is excessive. Our conclusions are summarized in the following five points:

The Committee also notes that the federal government is not presently organized or equipped to negotiate the myriad issues and challenges presented by the implementation of the CNCI, especially those that cross organizational and jurisdictional boundaries. As the CNCI develops, it will be imperative that the government also take into account the interests and concerns of private citizens, the U.S. information technology industry, and other elements of the private sector. Indeed, the success of the CNCI will depend on the ability to develop and implement a well-defined, comprehensive model for public sector and private sector cooperation.

Many of the details of the CNCI are still evolving, and an endeavor of this magnitude will need to be undertaken over the course of many years. The Committee believes a mechanism should be created to review the Intelligence Community's progress toward refining and implementing the CNCI, as well as make policy recommendations to the executive and legislative branches in the areas of governance, privacy and civil liberties, and regulatory issues. As a result, the Committee has included a legislative provision requiring a report from the President on options for creating a high-level advisory body.

Overreliance on supplemental funding

The Committee wishes to express once again its unequivocal disapproval of the recurring practice of funding intelligence activities through emergency supplemental requests rather than within the parameters of the standard budgeting process. The supplemental funding process ensures significantly less scrutiny of funding requests, both within the executive branch and in Congress, and invites waste. It prevents authorizing committees from performing their functions of oversight and evaluation, often resulting in investment in ill-advised and unvetted programs. Many of these programs have out-year funding `tails' that, in an era of declining budgets, will necessitate funding within base appropriations once supplemental requests cease.

The practice of budgeting by supplemental is particularly egregious in the arena of intelligence activities, which by statute are supposed to receive a higher level of scrutiny than other federal funding. The Committee hopes that one of the first orders of business for the new Administration is to stop this fiscally irresponsible practice and to work with Congress to find funding solutions that do not bring the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community to a stand-still.

Human intelligence capability throughout the world

The maintenance of a robust HUMINT capability on a global basis is as much a mission priority as countering terrorism and supporting activity in the war theater. As world events continue to demonstrate, some of the greatest threats to the strategic interests of the United States emanate from sovereign nations, not from terrorist organizations or other non-state actors. The need for the National HUMINT Manager and other senior leadership in the Intelligence Community to devote sufficient personnel and financial resources to fulfill the global HUMINT mission has been a significant priority of Congress for many years.

The Committee remains concerned that identified, meritorious HUMINT initiatives are not being funded or adequately supported by the Administration. Accordingly, this bill provides additional, targeted HUMINT funding to enhance the nation's capability to ascertain the plans and intentions of those seeking to undermine the interests and security of the United States.

Issues regarding Committee notification of Syria's nuclear program

In April 2008, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) briefed the Committee on the construction of a covert nuclear facility in Syria and its subsequent destruction in September 2007.

Over the course of the preceding eight months, the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member had requested that the President brief the full membership of the Committee about these developments, which significantly impact U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East and North Korea.

Just hours before a highly-orchestrated public roll-out of the previously classified intelligence, the President finally sent briefers to the Committee. The delay was inexcusable and violated the National Security Act of 1947, which requires that the executive branch keep Congress `fully and currently informed' of all intelligence activities. Congress should be briefed on the threats to the United States in a timely manner, not simply when it is politically expedient.

The world is more dangerous today than at any time since 9/11. There are serious challenges to U.S. national and international security that require the Administration and Congress to work together. The Administration's clear disdain for the legitimate oversight role of Congress makes it difficult for Congress to do its part in meeting these challenges and keeping America secure.

Amendments to the National Security Act of 1947

The National Security Act of 1947 is the principal legislative source for the executive's requirement to keep the congressional intelligence committees informed of the nation's intelligence activities. As the Committee has noted, this obligation is absolutely critical to sound congressional oversight, which in turn is central to a well-functioning and effective Intelligence Community.

In recent years, the Administration has, on several occasions, ignored the plain language of the Act. In one case, the Administration refused, for an extended period of time, to brief the full Committee membership on the President's warrantless surveillance program, notwithstanding that it was not a covert action program. In another case, the Administration ignored months of requests for a briefing on Syria's nuclear program, despite the fact that the Administration was preparing to brief reporters on the same issue and had already briefed foreign nations on the issue.

This is unacceptable. For this reason, the Committee has included several amendments to the reporting requirements of the Act. These amendments are intended to clarify that the obligation to report to the committees is not negotiable. It is not an obligation that the President can ignore at his discretion. It is not an obligation that can be evaded by claiming that briefing the congressional intelligence committees will require other committees to be briefed. It is not an obligation that can be evaded by broad assertions of executive power.

Diversity in the intelligence community

The Committee is committed to increasing diversity in the Intelligence Community and notes with approval that the DNI identified treating `diversity as a strategic mission imperative' in his 100-day and 500-day plans. In particular, the DNI has stated that one of his goals is to improve the recruiting, hiring, and retention of first and second generation Americans. Indeed, across the community, minority hiring is at a five-year high. Despite this progress, the Intelligence Community overall is still substantially behind the civilian labor force and the federal workforce in minority and female representation. This gap is even more apparent in core mission areas and management positions, especially at the highest levels.

The Committee believes that the DNI's stated commitment should show measurable results. Unfortunately, several indicators within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) show a lack of attention and commitment to diversity. For example, the ODNI is below average in the Intelligence Community for minority representation, and is significantly below average in the Intelligence Community in its hiring of minorities. In particular, the DNI's Office of Equal Employment Opportunity and Diversity has suffered significant budget cuts over the past three years, despite taking on new mandates. The DNI's commitment to diversity can be most clearly shown in the composition of his own office. The Committee hopes that the ODNI will show an improvement in minority representation in the future, and urges the DNI to hold his office to the same standards that he expects from the rest of the Intelligence Community.

Committee investigation into the destruction of interrogation videotapes by the Central Intelligence Agency

On December 10, 2007, the Committee announced an investigation into the making, retention, and destruction of interrogation videotapes by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). That investigation, initiated as part of the Committee's oversight of the CIA, is intended to ascertain the facts regarding the destruction of the videotapes and failure to notify the Committee regarding the destruction.

The Committee's investigation is ongoing and has made substantial progress. The Committee has received hundreds of pages of documents in response to its document requests. The Committee has also held two hearings to take sworn testimony and has conducted several staff-level interviews.

While the sensitive nature of the investigation prevents extensive public discussion of the investigation, the Committee believes that it is critical to its oversight work. The Committee looks forward to completion of its investigation and plans to issue a report documenting its findings.

Creation of a National Applications Office in the Department of Homeland Security

Last year, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced the creation of the National Applications Office (NAO) under the Office of Intelligence and Analysis to facilitate access by non-traditional users to national technical means-derived intelligence. This new office currently has the authority to process imagery, measurement and

signatures, and electronic intelligence requests for civil applications and homeland security purposes.

The Committee notes the apparent care with which the DHS is approaching the establishment of the NAO. Pursuant to congressional mandate, the Committee has received several documents outlining the legal authorities under which NAO will operate. The Committee, however, remains concerned with the planned use of national technical means for law enforcement purposes, as opposed to homeland security purposes. Such use is unprecedented and raises significant constitutional issues. Therefore, the Committee looks forward to reviewing the results of the statutorily-mandated Government Accountability Office review of the Secretary's certification that NAO activities comply with all existing laws, including all applicable privacy and civil liberties standards.

The NAO charter also requires an interagency legal working group to resolve any privacy, civil liberties, and policy issues surrounding the use of national technical means for the purposes of law enforcement. The Committee expects to be kept apprised of the group's work on these issues and on the development of legal parameters and guidance on the functioning of the law enforcement domain within the NAO.

Major systems acquisitions

The Committee notes with concern the continued cost overruns and schedule delays affecting the acquisition of many major intelligence community systems. At the same time, the Committee acknowledges the effort entailed in preparing the DNI's 2007 Annual Report to Congress on Intelligence Community Program Management Plans, which compares the performance of all National Intelligence Program acquisition programs against a DNI-established baseline. The Committee is also pleased that one goal of the DNI's 500 Day Plan is to build acquisition excellence within the Intelligence Community. With Intelligence Community Directive 105 and Intelligence Community Program Guidance 105.1, the DNI is requiring practices that will increase the likelihood of successful acquisitions. Finally, the Committee applauds the DNI's recommended greater use of experienced systems engineers during the acquisition process.

The Committee encourages the DNI to issue a formal policy establishing a procedure by which the Intelligence Community would be empowered to withhold incentives from companies with poor contract performance. Such a policy would forcefully demonstrate the expectations for contractor performance. Despite coverage of this topic in the Federal Acquisition Regulation, practices are not standard across the Intelligence Community, even within directorates of individual agencies. The Committee believes that standardization of policy would restore meaning to the use of award incentives and benefit the entire Intelligence Community.

The Committee notes that the continuing consolidation of industry is impacting the government's ability to contract with independent companies when conducting major systems acquisitions. Specifically, the Committee is concerned about cases in which a single parent company has a contract for engineering technical assistance in support of a source selection and also intends to compete for the system development contract. The Committee urges the Deputy DNI for Acquisition to consider whether established firewalls are sufficient to prevent any potential conflict of interest in such cases.

Acquisition program performance notification

The Committee is concerned that delays in informing Congress that major acquisition programs for the Intelligence Community are over cost, behind schedule, or failing to adhere to milestones serves to undermine good oversight. In many cases, the Committee has learned of a program failure only after millions of dollars have been wasted.

To remedy this problem, the Committee urges the DNI to develop, in consultation with the Committee, a standard for program notification to keep the Committee fully informed of program issues. The Nunn-McCurdy Amendment to the Department of Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1982 provides an example of such a standard. The guidance should, for example, ensure congressional notification at the end of each quarter of total acquisition costs per unit for each major intelligence program. It should also require notification if an agency head has reason to believe a program will exceed the authorized funding by a specific percentage.

Advanced research and development

Advanced Research and Development (R&D) is critical to the ability of the Intelligence Community to accomplish its missions. Intelligence officers must remain several steps ahead of their targets and adversaries. Technical innovation is often the key to accomplishing this goal. The Committee believes that the Intelligence Community's investment in R&D is insufficient to enable the elements of the Intelligence Community to keep up with both current and future challenges. The elements of the Intelligence Community must be encouraged and allowed to invest more resources in Advanced R&D.

The fiscal year 2009 budget presents an example of the R&D challenge. As often happens in the Intelligence Community, the research budgets were held steady, or cut, to fund the higher, near-term priorities of Intelligence Community. The Committee feels that these decisions were short-sighted. For this reason, the Committee has increased funding for Advanced R&D above the Administration's request. In the future, the Committee encourages the DNI to ensure the allocation of necessary funding and personnel resources to enhance the Intelligence Community's R&D efforts.

The DNI must also provide adequate resources for the newly-created Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA). IARPA was created to address long-term research challenges from the perspective of the greater Intelligence Community, rather than from an individual agency's more operationally-focused vantage point. While the Committee had initial concerns about IARPA's creation and the impact it would have

on the research programs of the individual elements of the Intelligence Community, the Committee is pleased that the ODNI has taken the first required steps for success. IARPA will benefit greatly from the selection of a Director and the stability of a dedicated location for its activities. The Committee looks forward to observing how the ODNI nurtures this organization as it develops new and innovative long-term research programs.

Future course for overhead architecture

The Committee remains concerned that neither the DNI nor the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence [USD(I)] is showing an appropriate sense of urgency in charting a viable future course for the overhead constellation. The classified annex to the bill contains guidance to the Intelligence Community to focus on lower-risk and presumably less-expensive solutions to current architectural problems. The Committee urges the Intelligence Community to pursue evolutionary upgrades to existing designs as a way to reduce near-term risk, while at the same time exhorting the DNI to make more progress in defining the next-generation designs. The Committee does not prescribe specific technical solutions, but it does seek to ensure that all available technologies and existing capabilities are being given full and careful consideration before the executive branch embarks on formal acquisitions. The Committee also seeks to ensure that any acquisition undertaken is part of a clear path towards a future capability or architecture.

While there is no clear consensus on the specifics of the way ahead, there is widespread agreement that the DNI and USD(I) have yet to deliver an architecture sufficiently compelling to win the support of Congress. The Committee urges the DNI and the USD(I) to develop a cohesive and comprehensive strategy prior to the submission of the fiscal year 2010 budget request.

Integration of the Counterintelligence Field Activity into the Defense Intelligence Agency

The Committee has recently learned that the Secretary of Defense approved the dissolution of the Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA) and the integration of its functional elements into the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). As part of this integration, the USD(I) is seeking to amend DIA's charter in order to, among other things, designate DIA as a law enforcement activity.

The Committee is concerned about DIA's suitability to engage in law enforcement activities that are designed to investigate non-DIA personnel. DIA's stated mission is to collect, analyze, and manage foreign military intelligence for war fighters. The Agency has no experience with managing, overseeing, and leading criminal investigations of non-DIA personnel, even investigations that have a counterintelligence nexus.

The Committee will continue to follow this issue closely, including through reports required elsewhere in this Act.

FBI's use of national security letters

The Committee has been, and remains, extremely concerned by the reports from the Department of Justice Inspector General (DOJ/IG), which found that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) abused its statutory authority with respect to National Security Letters (NSLs) from 2003 through 2006.

An NSL is a demand letter used by the FBI to obtain, usually from businesses, the records and data related to telephone and electronic communications, financial transactions, and credit reports. Unlike search warrants, they require no probable cause and involve no judicial oversight unless challenged, which is difficult to do, as 97 percent of NSLs impose non-disclosure and confidentiality restraints on the recipients.

In a March 2007 report examining FBI activities from 2003 through 2005 and a March 2008 report examining activities in 2006, the DOJ/IG detailed a complete breakdown in FBI oversight and internal controls over these intrusive investigative tools, including:

These abuses are made more worrisome because of the enormous growth in the FBI's requests to use NSLs, including those which seek information related to U.S. persons.

Committee members and staff have been provided information about a series of corrective measures that the FBI has put in place since the release of the March 2007 report. The Committee agrees with the DOJ/IG that the FBI has made significant progress toward rectifying its many failures; and the Committee commends the Bureau's senior leaders for their personal involvement in these improvements. Among the changes are (1) new comprehensive guidance on the proper use of NSLs, accompanied by detailed training for agents nationwide; (2) the establishment of a new Office of Integrity and Compliance; and (3) the establishment of an NSL-tracking database to ensure proper authorizations are received and accurate reports are provided to Congress.

In spite of these measures, the Committee is concerned that no one has been held accountable for the myriad failures of leadership, oversight, training, or quality control, particularly regarding the egregious issuance of `exigent letters' that demanded information by inaccurately promising that an NSL or grand jury subpoena would be forthcoming.

Furthermore, the Committee agrees with the DOJ/IG's conclusion that it is too early to see if these corrective measures will mitigate the full range of problems and abuses. In particular, the Committee notes the DOJ/IG's finding that mechanisms established by the FBI still inadequately guarantee appropriate privacy safeguards or minimize the FBI's retention of NSL-derived information. The Committee urges the FBI to ensure that a proper balance is reached between protecting the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. persons and the FBI's genuine investigative needs. The Committee intends to remain fully engaged in future NSL-related developments and attentive to any accountability reviews conducted by the Department of Justice.

Global climate change

The Committee continues to acknowledge the critical impact of climate change on our national security and the inherent intelligence challenges of developing analytically-sound indicators with which to gauge the rates and types of global change and the likely impact on migrations, ethnic and international tensions, and the capacities and intentions of nations.

Several reports in 2007 and 2008 projected the security implications of various rates of climate change, and some also called for more robust intelligence capacities to address these scenarios. For example, a report by eleven retired U.S. generals and admirals, published by the Center for Naval Analysis in April 2007, found that `projected climate change poses a serious threat to America's national security' and recommended that `the national security consequences of climate change should be fully integrated into national security and national defense strategies.'

In the near term, the prospect of a catastrophic climate-related national security crisis may seem remote. However, the Committee recalls a time when people thought that the prospect of a catastrophic terrorist attack on U.S. soil was remote.

To better ensure that the nation is well-positioned to deal with such a crisis, the Committee has authorized additional funds for the purpose of enhancing the Intelligence Community's collaboration efforts with the scientific community to address these challenges and to build relationships with international and national sources of expertise. The Committee urges the executive branch to use these resources as a catalyst for innovative, forward-looking efforts to build the capacity of the Intelligence Community to provide warning and strategic analysis in the context of global climate change.

The Committee is pleased that the National Intelligence Council (NIC) is addressing the security implications of climate change through a National Intelligence Assessment (NIA). The Committee is optimistic that publication of the NIA and its associated research will encourage intelligence analysts and managers to take climate change-related factors into account in their ongoing assessment of many intelligence issues.

COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION AND ROLLCALL VOTES

On May 8, 2008, the Committee met in open and closed session and ordered the bill H.R. 5959 favorably reported, as amended.

OPEN SESSION

In open session, the Committee considered the text of the bill H.R. 5959.

Chairman Reyes offered an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 5959. The contents of the amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended, are described in the Section-by-Section analysis and the Explanation of Amendment. The Committee considered the following amendments to the amendment in the nature of a substitute:

Mr. Hoekstra offered an amendment to limit the use of funds authorized by the bill for purposes of prohibiting or discouraging the use of certain words or phrases within the Intelligence Community or the Federal Government. It was not agreed to by a record vote of 9 ayes to 12 noes:

Voting aye: Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Ms. Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Issa.

Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Boswell, Mr. Cramer, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff.

Mr. Hoekstra offered an amendment to require the DNI to produce a new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the Iranian nuclear program, to include a reassessment of past intelligence relating to the program. Mr. Hoekstra's amendment failed on voice vote.

Ms. Schakowsky offered an amendment to prohibit the use of private contractors for interrogation of persons in the custody or control of the Federal Government. Mr. Rogers offered a second degree amendment to Ms. Schakowsky's amendment, authorizing the DNI to issue waivers to the prohibition. Ms. Schakowsky withdrew her amendment.

Mr. Holt offered an amendment to require the video recording of interrogations of persons in the custody of or under the effective control of the Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. Holt withdrew his amendment.

Mr. Hoekstra requested unanimous consent to offer three amendments en bloc: (1) an amendment to require the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to complete a report on transformation of the Agency; (2) an amendment to require the

Director of National Intelligence to complete a feasibility study on revoking the pensions of persons who commit unauthorized disclosures of classified information; and (3) an amendment stating that it is the sense of Congress that resources authorized by the bill should not be diverted from human intelligence collection or other intelligence programs designed to combat al-Qaeda in order to study global climate change.

Each amendment en bloc was agreed to by voice vote.

The Committee then recessed for House floor votes and reconvened in open session for business two hours later.

OPEN SESSION

Ms. Schakowsky offered an amendment to prohibit the use of private contractors for interrogations involving persons in the custody or control of the CIA unless a written waiver is granted by the DNI. It was agreed to by voice vote.

Mr. Hoekstra offered an amendment to eliminate all earmarks from H.R. 5959 and to strike the provision authorizing the transfer of $39 million to the Department of Justice for the operation of the National Drug Intelligence Center. The amendment was agreed to by a record vote of 17 ayes to 4 noes:

Voting aye: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Boswell, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Issa.

Voting no: Mr. Cramer, Mr. Holt, Ms. Wilson, Mr. Tiahrt.

Mr. Hoekstra offered an amendment to eliminate the provision establishing an independent Inspector General of the Intelligence Community within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The amendment was not agreed to by voice vote.

Ms. Schakowsky offered an amendment to limit interrogation techniques to those proscribed by the United States Army Field Manual on Human Intelligence Collector Operations. Discussion of the amendment was deferred because national security would be endangered if the matters to be considered were disclosed. Later, the amendment was not agreed to by a record vote of 9 ayes to 12 noes.

Voting aye: Mr. Boswell, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff.

Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Cramer, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Ms. Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Issa.

Ms. Wilson of New Mexico offered an amendment to amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. The amendment was not agreed to by a record vote of 10 ayes to 11 noes.

Voting aye: Mr. Boswell, Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Ms. Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Issa.

Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Cramer, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff.

Mr. Rogers of Michigan offered an amendment to prohibit the use of funds authorized in the bill for purposes of implementing the FBI's mandatory reassignment of a supervisor after serving in a management position for 5 years. The amendment was agreed to by a record vote of 21 ayes to 0 noes.

Voting aye: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Boswell, Mr. Cramer, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Ms. Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Issa.

Voting no: None.

Mr. McHugh offered an amendment to the National Security Act of 1947 to clarify that reporting regarding North Korea and China must be provided to the Committee before being provided to those nations. The amendment was agreed to by a record vote of 17 ayes and 4 noes.

Voting aye: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Boswell, Mr. Cramer, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Ms. Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Issa.

Voting no: Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney.

Ms. Schakowsky offered an amendment to establish rules for rendition by elements of the Intelligence Community in order to prevent harsh treatment by third nations, and to encourage timely legal proceedings against the rendered party.

CLOSED SESSION

Mr. Everett moved to close the meeting because national security would be endangered if the matters to be considered were disclosed. The motion was agreed to by a record vote of 19 ayes to 0 noes:

Voting aye: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Boswell, Mr. Cramer, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Ms. Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Issa.

Voting no: None.

OPEN SESSION

After debate, the Committee returned to open session. The Schakowsky amendment was not agreed to by a record vote of 10 ayes to 11 noes:

Voting aye: Mr. Boswell, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff.

Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Cramer, Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Ms. Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Issa.

By voice vote, the Committee then adopted the Chairman's amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended.

CLOSED SESSION

Mr. Hoekstra moved to close the meeting because national security would be endangered if the matters to be considered were disclosed. The motion was agreed to by a record vote of 21 ayes to 0 noes:

Voting aye: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Boswell, Mr. Cramer, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Ms. Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Issa.

Voting no: None.

Ms. Wilson offered an amendment to modify the classified annex to accompany the classified Schedule of Authorizations.

Mr. Rogers of Michigan offered an amendment to reduce the number of positions and funding for the Community Management Account.

OPEN SESSION

After debate, the Committee returned to open session. The Wilson amendment was not agreed to by a record vote of 9 ayes to 12 noes:

Voting aye: Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Ms. Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Issa.

Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Boswell, Mr. Cramer, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff.

The Rogers amendment was agreed to by a voice vote.

By voice vote, the Committee adopted the Schedule of Authorizations, as amended.

By voice vote, the Committee adopted a motion by the Chairman to favorably report the bill to the House, as amended, including by reference the classified schedule of authorizations.

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS AND EXPLANATION OF THE AMENDMENT

TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Section 101. Authorization of appropriations

Section 101 of the Committee report authorizes appropriations for fiscal year 2009 for the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of a list of United States Government departments, agencies, and other elements.

Section 102. Classified schedule of authorizations

Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts authorized to be appropriated under Section 101 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities for fiscal year 2009, and (subject to Section 103) the personnel ceilings authorized for fiscal year 2009, are contained in the classified Schedule of Authorizations. The Schedule of Authorizations will be made available to the committees on appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives, and to the President.

Section 102 also contains language indicating that no earmarks are authorized in this Act.

Section 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments

Section 103 provides procedures to enhance the flexibility of the DNI to manage the personnel levels of the Intelligence Community.

This section allows the DNI, with the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), to authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized under Section 102 by an amount not to exceed three percent of the total limit applicable to each element of the Intelligence Community. The DNI must determine that the action is necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions and must notify the congressional intelligence committees prior to the increase.

It also requires the DNI to notify the congressional intelligence committees of the exercise of authority under this section.

Section 104. Intelligence Community Management Account

Section 104 authorizes the sum of $648,842,000 in fiscal year 2009 for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the DNI. The Intelligence Community Management Account is part of the Community Management Account. The section authorizes 772 full-time, or full-time equivalent, personnel for the Intelligence Community Management Account, who may be either permanent employees or individuals detailed from other elements of the United States Government. Section 104 also authorizes additional funds and personnel in the classified Schedule of Authorizations for the Community Management Account.

Under Section 104, the DNI may use the authorities in Section 103 to adjust personnel levels in elements within the Intelligence Community Management Account, subject to the limitations in that section.

Section 105. Limitation on the use of covert action funds

Section 105 limits the obligation or expenditure of covert action funds to no more than 25 percent until such time as each member of the congressional intelligence committees has been briefed on all authorizations for covert actions in effect on April 24, 2008.

Section 106. Prohibition on use of funds to implement `Five and Out' program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

Section 106 bars the use of funds authorized under the Act to implement a program (commonly referred to as the `Five and Out' program) requiring the mandatory reassignment of a supervisor of the FBI after such supervisor serves in a management position for five years.

TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Section 201. Authorization of appropriations

Section 201 authorizes appropriations of $279,200,000 for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund.

Section 202. Technical modification to mandatory retirement provision of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act

Section 202 updates the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act to reflect the use of pay levels within the Senior Intelligence Service program, rather than pay grades, by the CIA.

TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

SUBTITLE A--PERSONNEL MATTERS

Section 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law

Section 301 provides that funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for federal employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.

Section 302. Enhanced flexibility in non-reimbursable details to elements of the Intelligence Community

Section 302 expands from one year to two years the maximum length of time that United States Government personnel may be detailed to the ODNI on a reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis, in which case, the employee continues to be paid by the home agency. To utilize this authority, the joint agreement of the DNI and head of the detailing element is required. The DNI had requested authority to expand the permitted duration of details from one year to three years. The Committee believes that two years strikes an appropriate balance between the needs of the DNI and the needs of the elements of the Intelligence Community.

Section 303. Multi-level security clearances

Section 303 amends section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1), which sets forth the responsibilities and authorities of the DNI, to require the DNI to ensure that the elements of the Intelligence Community adopt a multi-level approach to security clearances. This approach will help ensure that the security clearance system is flexible enough to allow the elements of the Intelligence Community to leverage the skills and expertise of persons with cultural, linguistic or other subject matter expertise critical to national security.

Section 303 also requires the DNI to establish guidelines implementing the requirements of this section.

Section 304. Delegation of authority for travel on common carriers for intelligence collection personnel

Section 116 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404k(b)) allows the DNI to authorize travel on any common carrier when it is consistent with Intelligence Community mission requirements or, more specifically, is required for cover purposes, operational needs, or other exceptional circumstances. Currently, the DNI may only delegate this authority to the Principal Deputy DNI or, with respect to CIA employees, to the Director of the CIA.

Section 304 provides that the DNI may delegate the authority in section 116(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 to the head of any element. This expansion is consistent with the view that the DNI should be able to delegate authority throughout the Intelligence Community when such delegation serves the overall interests of the Intelligence Community.

Section 304 also provides that the head of an element of the Intelligence Community, to which travel authority has been delegated, is empowered to assign such authority to senior officials within the element, as specified in guidelines issued by the DNI. This allows for administrative flexibility consistent with the guidance of the DNI

for the entire Intelligence Community. To facilitate oversight, the DNI shall submit the guidelines to the congressional intelligence committees.

Section 305. Annual personnel level assessments for the Intelligence Community.

Section 305 requires the DNI, in consultation with the head of the element of the Intelligence Community concerned, to prepare an annual assessment of the personnel and contractor levels for each element of the Intelligence Community for the subsequent fiscal year. Section 305 is a new mechanism to allow both the executive branch and Congress to oversee personnel growth in the Intelligence Community.

The assessment required by Section 305 seeks information about budgeted personnel and contractor costs and levels, a comparison of this information to current fiscal year data and data from the previous five fiscal years, and a justification for the requested personnel and contractor levels. The assessment also requires the DNI to state that, based on current and projected funding, the element will have sufficient internal infrastructure and training resources to support the requested personnel and contractor levels, and sufficient funding to support the administrative and operational activities of the requested personnel levels.

Section 305 also requires that the assessment contain information about intelligence collectors and analysts employed or contracted by each element of the Intelligence Community and contractors who are the subjects of any Inspector General investigations. The assessment must be submitted to congressional intelligence committees concurrent with the submission of the President's budget request.

The Committee believes that the personnel level assessment required by Section 305 will provide information necessary for the executive branch and Congress to understand the consequences of modifying the Intelligence Community's personnel levels. Section 305, therefore, recognizes that personnel growth must be better planned in the future to accomplish the goals of strengthening intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination. In addition, the Administration must adequately fund its personnel growth plan and structure its resources to ensure that personnel growth does not compromise the implementation and execution of other programs.

With regard to historical contractor levels to be included in the annual assessments, the DNI has expressed concern that there was no comprehensive effort, prior to the ODNI's contractor inventory initiated in June 2006, to capture information on the number and costs of contractors throughout the Intelligence Community. In light of the concerns outlined by the DNI, the Committee understands that information about contractor levels prior to June 2006 may need to be reported as a best estimate.

The Committee is also concerned about the Intelligence Community's increasing reliance on contractors to meet mission requirements. The Intelligence Community employs a significant number of `core' contractors who provide direct support to intelligence mission areas and are generally indistinguishable from the U.S. Government personnel whose mission they support. Given the cost disparity between employing a civilian federal government employee, estimated at an average of $126,500 annually in fiscal year 2006, and a core contractor, estimated at an average of over $250,000 annually in fiscal year 2006, the Committee believes that the Intelligence Community should strive to reduce its dependence on contractors. The personnel assessment required in Section 305 should assist the DNI and the congressional intelligence committees in determining the appropriate balance of contractors and permanent government employees.

Section 306. Comprehensive report on intelligence community contractors.

Section 306 requires the DNI to provide a one-time report by November 1, 2008, describing the personnel services activities performed by contractors across the Intelligence Community, the impact of contractors on the Intelligence Community, and the accountability mechanisms governing contractors.

The reporting requirements of this section are designed to address three primary concerns. First, leaders in the Intelligence Community do not have sufficient factual documentation regarding the size and use of its large contractor workforce. Second, the Intelligence Community lacks a clear definition of the functions that may be appropriately performed by contractors and, as a result, whether contractors and government employees are duplicating similar functions. Third, the Intelligence Community does not have procedures for overseeing contractors and ensuring the recognition of criminal violations or the prevention and redress of financial waste, fraud, or other abuses by contractors. The report is intended to aid both the Intelligence Community and the congressional intelligence committees in conducting oversight and devising appropriate policy solutions.

Section 307. Report on proposed pay-for-performance Intelligence Community personnel management system.

Section 307 prohibits the implementation of pay-for-performance compensation reform within an element of the Intelligence Community until 45 days after the DNI submits to the Congress a report for each element of the Intelligence Community, that describes, for each element, a proposed employee advisory group, a plan for ensuring diversity in that employee advisory group, a certification that all managers involved in a pay-for-performance system have been sufficiently trained on the implementing guidance for that system, and a description of a mechanism for employees to appeal pay decisions to someone outside the management chain of each element.

The Committee remains concerned that the DNI is moving forward with a major overhaul of compensation reform without seeking sufficient employee input. The employees in the Intelligence Community should be able to make recommendations and advise senior managers on the creation and implementation of such a program. Such advisory groups should also represent racial, ethnic, and gender diversity. In addition, the transition to this new system will require greater attention and effort on the part of managers in the intelligence community. Managers should be trained on the new system

so that they know what will be expected of them, and how to implement the system fairly. Finally, because this new system leaves much more to the discretion of managers in setting performance expectations and rating their employees than ever before, the system is potentially vulnerable to arbitrariness, discrimination or abuse. The Committee seeks to ensure employees are adequately protected from such inappropriate actions and have adequate mechanisms to contest or appeal adverse decisions.

Section 308. Report on plan to increase diversity within the Intelligence Community

Section 308 requires the DNI, in coordination with the heads of the elements of the Intelligence Community, to submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the plans of each element of the Intelligence Community, including the ODNI, to increase diversity within that element. The report shall include the specific implementation plans to increase diversity.

To ensure that the report is submitted in a timely fashion, Section 308 requires the DNI to submit the report by no later than November 1, 2008.

Section 309. Report on security clearance determinations

Section 309 requires the Director of the OMB to submit to Congress a report on those security clearance determinations that have taken longer than one year to complete, including the agencies requesting such determinations and reasons for the delay. The Committee welcomes improvements that have been made in improving the timeliness of security clearance processing, but is concerned that the processing of some security clearances, particularly for industry, continue to take far too long. The report will contribute needed data for ongoing management by the executive branch as well as for congressional oversight.

SUBTITLE B--OTHER MATTERS

Section 311. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities

Section 311 provides that the authorization of appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution and the laws of the United States.

Section 312. Clarification of definition of Intelligence Community under the National Security Act of 1947

Section 312 amends Section 3(4)(L) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)(L)) to permit the designation as `element of the Intelligence Community' of elements of departments and agencies of the United States Government whether or not those departments and agencies are listed in Section 3(4).

Section 313. Modification of availability of funds for different intelligence activities

Section 313 conforms the text of Section 504(a)(3)(B) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)(B) (governing the funding of intelligence activities)) with the text of Section 102A(d)(5)(A)(ii) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403-1(d)(5)(A)(ii)), as amended by Section 1011(a) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458 (Dec. 17, 2004) (`IRTPA') (governing the transfer and reprogramming by the DNI of certain intelligence funding).

This amendment to the National Security Act replaces the `unforeseen requirements' standard in Section 504(a)(3)(B) with a more flexible standard to govern reprogramming and transfers of funds authorized for a different intelligence or intelligence-related activity. Under the new standard, reprogramming or transfer authority may be sought if, in addition to the other requirements of Section 504(a)(3), the new use of funds `supports an emergent need, improves program effectiveness, or increases efficiency.' This modification brings the standard for reprogramming and transfers of intelligence funding into conformity with the standards applicable to reprogramming and transfers under Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947. The modification preserves congressional oversight of proposed reprogramming and transfers while enhancing the Intelligence Community's ability to carry out missions and functions vital to national security.

Section 314. Protection of certain national security information

Section 314 amends Section 601 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 421) to increase the criminal penalties for an individual with authorized access to classified information who intentionally discloses any information identifying a covert agent, if that individual knows the United States is taking affirmative measures to conceal the covert agent's intelligence relationship to the United States.

Currently, the maximum sentence for disclosure by someone who has had `authorized access to classified information that identifies a covert agent' is ten years. This provision increases that maximum sentence to 15 years. Currently, the maximum sentence for disclosure by someone who `as a result of having authorized access to classified information, learns the identity of a covert agent and intentionally discloses any information identifying such covert agent' is five years. This provision increases that maximum sentence to ten years.

Section 314amends Section 603(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 423(a)) to provide that the annual report from the President on the protection of identities of certain United States undercover intelligence officers, agents, informants, and sources, also include an assessment of the need for any modification for the purpose of improving legal protections for covert agents.

Section 315. Extension of authority to delete information about receipt and disposition of foreign gifts and decorations

Current law (5 U.S.C. 7342) requires certain federal employees, spouses, dependents, and others, to file reports with their employing agency regarding receipt of gifts or decorations from foreign governments. Following compilation of these reports, the employing agency is required to file annually with the Secretary of State detailed information about the receipt of foreign gifts and decorations by its employees, including the source of the gift. The Secretary of State is required to publish a comprehensive list of such agency reports in the Federal Register.

With respect to intelligence activities, the public disclosure of gifts or decorations for personnel and certain contractors in the Intelligence Community has the potential to compromise intelligence sources or confirm intelligence relationships with foreign governments and, consequently, undermine national security. Recognizing this concern, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was granted a limited exemption from reporting certain information about such foreign gifts or decorations where the publication of the information could adversely affect United States intelligence sources. Section 1079 of the IRTPA extended a similar exemption to the DNI and applied the existing exemption to the Director of the CIA.

Section 315 provides to the heads of each element of the Intelligence Community the same limited exemption from the specified public reporting requirements currently authorized for the DNI and Director of the CIA. The national security concerns that prompt those exemptions apply equally to other elements of the Intelligence Community. Section 315 mandates that information not provided to the Secretary of State be provided to the DNI to ensure continued independent oversight of the receipt of foreign gifts or decorations by personnel of the elements of the Intelligence Community.

Gifts received in the course of ordinary contact between senior officials of elements of the Intelligence Community and their foreign counterparts should not be excluded under the provisions of Section 315 unless there is a serious concern that such contacts and gifts would adversely affect United States intelligence sources or methods.

Section 316. Report on compliance with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and related provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006

Section 316 requires the DNI to submit a classified, comprehensive report to the congressional intelligence committees on all measures taken by the ODNI, and by any other element of the Intelligence Community with relevant responsibilities, on compliance with the detention and interrogation provisions of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and of the Military Commissions Act of 2006. The report is to be submitted no later than 45 days after enactment of this Act.

The Detainee Treatment Act provides that no individual in the custody or under the physical control of the United States, regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. Congress reaffirmed this mandate in Section 6 of the Military Commissions Act, adding an implementation mechanism that requires the President to take action to ensure compliance, including through administrative rules and procedures. Section 6 provides not only that grave breaches of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions are war crimes under Title 18 of the United States Code, but also that the President has authority for the United States to promulgate higher standards and administrative regulations for violations of U.S. treaty obligations. It requires the President to issue those interpretations by Executive Order published in the Federal Register.

The report required by Section 316 must include a description of the detention or interrogation methods that have been determined to comply with the prohibitions of the Detainee Treatment Act and the Military Commissions Act or have been discontinued pursuant to them.

The Detainee Treatment Act also provides for the protection against civil or criminal liability for United States Government personnel who engaged in officially authorized interrogations that were determined to be lawful at the time. Section 316 requires the DNI to report on actions taken to implement that provision.

The report shall also include an appendix containing all guidelines on the application of the Detainee Treatment Act and the Military Commissions Act to the detention or interrogation activities, if any, of all elements of the Intelligence Community engaging in such activities. The appendix shall also include the legal justifications of any office of the Department of Justice about the meaning of the Acts, with respect to detention or interrogation activities, if any, of any element of the Intelligence Community.

To the extent that the report required by Section 316 addresses an element of the Intelligence Community within the DOD, that portion of the report, and associated material that is necessary to make that portion understandable, shall also be submitted by the DNI to the congressional armed services committees.

Section 317. Incorporation of reporting requirements

Section 317 incorporates into the Act, by reference, each requirement contained in the classified annex of this Act to submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees.

Because the classified information in the annex cannot be included in the text of the bill, incorporating the reporting provisions of the classified annex is the only available mechanism to give these reporting requirements the force of law. The Committee, therefore, chooses to include Section 317 to reflect the importance of the reporting requirements in the classified annex.

Section 318. Repeal of certain reporting requirements

Section 318 eliminates certain reporting requirements that were considered particularly burdensome to the Intelligence Community in cases where the usefulness of

the report, or section thereof, has diminished either because of changing events or because the information contained in those reports is duplicative of information already obtained through other avenues.

Section 319. Enhancement of critical skills training program

Section 319 allows the head of any element of the Intelligence Community to establish an undergraduate training program for civilian employees. This is an authority similar to that granted to the Secretary of Defense under section 16 of the National Security Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) for civilian employees of the National Security Agency (NSA).

Section 320. Comprehensive national cybersecurity initiative advisory panel

Section 320 requires the President to submit a report to Congress outlining options for the creation of an advisory panel to make policy recommendations on the development of the CNCI. The report is to be submitted to Congress not later than February 1, 2009.

TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

SUBTITLE A--OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Section 401. Clarification of limitation on co-location of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Section 103(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(e)), as added by the IRTPA, provides that commencing on October 1, 2008, the ODNI may not be co-located with any other element of the Intelligence Community. Section 401 clarifies that this ban applies only to the co-location of the headquarters of the ODNI with the headquarters of any other element of the Intelligence Community. Accordingly, the ODNI may be co-located with non-headquarters units of elements of the Intelligence Community.

Section 402. Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on the Transportation Security Oversight Board

Section 402 substitutes the DNI as a member of the Transportation Security Oversight Board established under section 115(b)(1) of Title 49, United States Code, in place of the Director of the CIA or the Director's designee. The Transportation Security Oversight Board is responsible for, among other things, coordinating intelligence, security, and law enforcement activities relating to transportation and facilitating the sharing of intelligence, security, and law enforcement information relating to transportation among federal agencies.

Section 403. Additional duties of the Director of Science and Technology

Section 403 clarifies the responsibilities and duties of the Director of Science and Technology within the ODNI and the DNI's Science and Technology Committee to ensure that, across the Intelligence Community, there is uniformity in the definitions of basic, applied, and advanced research goals and improved prioritization and coordination of science and technology. This section further requires the DNI to submit to Congress an annual report outlining the strategy for the development and use of technology in the Intelligence Community, demonstrating how applied resources map to the outlined goals.

Section 404. Leadership and location of certain offices and officials

Section 404 confirms in statute that certain officers in the Intelligence Community are established within the ODNI. These are (1) the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community (as renamed by Section 407); (2) the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (as created by Section 408); (3) the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC); and (4) the Director of the National Counter Proliferation Center (NCPC). Section 404 also expressly provides that the DNI shall appoint the Director of the NCPC. Section 119A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404o-1) previously provided that the President could establish the NCPC. In doing so, the President delegated to the DNI the authority to name the Director. Section 404 codifies that delegation.

Section 405. Plan to implement recommendations of the data center energy efficiency reports

Section 405 requires the DNI to develop a plan to implement the recommendations of the Environmental Protection Agency (`EPA') report on data center energy efficiency submitted to Congress under Section 1 of P.L. 109-431. A brief report submitted by the DNI in February 2008 failed to address the recommendations of the EPA report and did not constitute an actual plan. This requirement is intended to encourage the Intelligence Community to develop a plan to reduce consumption of resources such as power and water by community data centers.

Section 406. Semiannual reports on the nuclear programs of Iran, Syria, and North Korea

Section 406 provides that not less than once during the remainder of this fiscal year and semiannually thereafter, the DNI shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees individual classified reports on the nuclear intentions and capabilities of Iran, Syria, and North Korea. An NIE may count as one such report for each country. The Committee encourages the DNI to make these reports available to other congressional committees with oversight jurisdiction to the extent consistent with the protection of sources and methods.

Section 407. Title of Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community

Section 407 expressly designates the position of Chief Information Officer of the ODNI as Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community. The modification to the title is consistent with the position's overall responsibilities as outlined in section 103G of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3g).

Section 408. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community

Section 1078 of the IRTPA authorized the DNI to establish an Office of Inspector General if the DNI determined that an Inspector General would be beneficial to improving the operations and effectiveness of the ODNI. It further provided that the DNI could grant to the Inspector General any of the duties, responsibilities, and authorities set forth in the Inspector General Act of 1978. The DNI has appointed an Intelligence Community Inspector General (IC/IG) and has granted certain authorities pursuant to DNI Instruction No. 2005-10 (Sept. 7, 2005).

A strong IC/IG is vital to achieving the goal, set forth in the IRTPA, of improving the operations and effectiveness of the Intelligence Community. It is also vital to achieving the broader goal of identifying problems and deficiencies wherever they may be found in the Intelligence Community with respect to matters within the responsibility and authority of the DNI, especially the manner in which elements of the Intelligence Community interact with each other in providing access to information and undertaking joint or cooperative activities. This section establishes an IC/IG in order to provide to the DNI and, through reports, to Congress, the benefits of an Inspector General with full statutory authorities and the requisite independence.

The IC/IG will keep both the DNI and the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies in programs and operations in the Intelligence Community and the need for corrective actions. The IC/IG will be appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, and will report directly to the DNI. To bolster the IC/IG's independence within the Intelligence Community, the IC/IG may be removed only by the President, who must communicate the reasons for the removal to the congressional intelligence committees.

The DNI may prohibit the IC/IG from conducting an investigation, inspection, or audit if the DNI determines that it is necessary to protect vital national security interests. If the DNI exercises the authority to prohibit an investigation, the DNI must provide the reasons to the congressional intelligence committees within seven days. The IC/IG may provide a response to the committees, including views on the denied investigation.

The IC/IG will have direct and prompt access to the DNI and any employee of the Intelligence Community or employee of a contractor whose testimony is needed. The IC/IG will also have direct and prompt access to all records that relate to programs and activities for which the IC/IG has oversight responsibility. Failure to cooperate will be grounds for appropriate administrative action.

The IC/IG will have subpoena authority. However, information within the possession of the United States Government must be obtained through other procedures. Subject to the DNI's concurrence, the IC/IG may request information from any department, agency, or element of the U.S. Government. Such information must be provided to the IC/IG insofar as practicable and not in violation of law or regulation.

The IC/IG must submit semiannual reports to the DNI that include a description of significant problems relating to the programs and operations of the Intelligence Community and to the relationships between the elements of the Intelligence Community. The reports must include a description of IC/IG recommendations and a statement as to whether corrective action has been completed. The IC/IG shall provide any portion of the report involving a component of a department of the U.S. Government to the head of that department simultaneously with submission of the report to the DNI. Within 30 days of receipt, the DNI must submit each semiannual report to Congress as transmitted by the IC/IG.

The IC/IG must report immediately to the DNI particularly serious or flagrant violations of law. Within seven days, the DNI must transmit those reports to the congressional intelligence committees together with any comments. In the event the IC/IG is unable to resolve differences with the DNI, the IC/IG is authorized to report a serious or flagrant violation of law directly to the congressional intelligence committees. Reports to the congressional intelligence committees are also required with respect to investigations concerning high-ranking officials in the Intelligence Community.

Employees of the Intelligence Community or employees of contractors who intend to report to Congress an `urgent concern,' such as a violation of law or Executive Order, a false statement to Congress, or a willful withholding from Congress, may report such complaints and supporting information to the IC/IG. Following a review by the IC/IG to determine the credibility of the complaint or information, the IC/IG must transmit such complaint and information to the DNI. On receiving the complaints or information from the IC/IG together with the IC/IG's credibility determination, the DNI must transmit the complaint or information to the congressional intelligence committees. If the IC/IG does not find a complaint or information to be credible, the reporting individual may submit the matter directly to the congressional intelligence committees by following appropriate security practices outlined by the DNI. Reprisals or threats of reprisal against reporting individuals constitute reportable `urgent concerns.'

In providing this channel for whistleblower communications to Congress, Section 408 does not disturb, and the Committee intends to retain, the authoritative guidance for analogous provisions of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-272 (October 20, 1998) as set forth in the findings in paragraphs (1) through (6) of section 701(b) of that Act, the Senate committee report for the legislation, S. Rep. No. 105-185, at 25-27, and particularly the conference report, H.R. Rep. 105-780, at 33-34, which emphasized that a disclosure to the Inspector General `is not the exclusive process by which an intelligence community employee may make a report to Congress.'

For matters within the jurisdiction of both the IC/IG and an Inspector General for another intelligence community element, the Inspectors General (IGs) shall resolve, expeditiously, who will undertake an investigation, inspection, or audit. In resolving that question, under an extensive subsection entitled `Coordination Among Inspectors General of Intelligence Community,' the IGs may request the assistance of the Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum, a presently existing informal body whose existence is codified by this section. In the event that the IGs are still unable to resolve the question, they shall submit it for resolution to the DNI and the head of the department in which an Inspector General with jurisdiction concurrent to that of the IC/IG is located. This basic limitation addresses the concern raised by the DNI about the preservation of the authority of heads of departments and agencies over their respective departments.

Within Congress, mutuality of oversight is assured by the requirement that Inspector General reports concerning intelligence committee elements within departments are shared with committees that have jurisdiction over those departments.

Section 409. Annual report on foreign language proficiency in the Intelligence Community

Section 409 provides for an annual report by the DNI on the proficiency of each element of the Intelligence Community in foreign languages and, if appropriate, in foreign dialects. The section also requires the DNI to report on foreign language training. The Intelligence Community has an increasing need for fluency in difficult-to-master languages and for expertise in foreign cultures. The information required by the report will allow the congressional intelligence committees to better assess the Intelligence Community's ability to manage language resources.

Section 410. Repeal of certain authorities relating to the office of the National Counterintelligence Executive

Section 410 amends the authorities and structures of the National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) to eliminate certain independent administrative authorities that had been vested in the NCIX when that official was appointed by and reported to the President. Those authorities are unnecessary now that the NCIX is appointed by and under the authority of the DNI.

Section 411. National Intelligence Estimate on weapons of mass destruction in Syria

Section 411 provides that the DNI shall submit to Congress an NIE on the history, status, and projected development of any weapons of mass destruction program undertaken by Syria. This requirement is intended to encourage the Intelligence Community to focus attention on Syria's efforts to develop nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Section 411 also provides that the NIE be submitted within 180 days after the enactment of this Act and that it may be submitted in classified form.

Section 412. Annual report on intelligence resources dedicated to Iraq and Afghanistan

Section 412 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional intelligence committees an annual report on the intelligence resources dedicated to Iraq and Afghanistan during the preceding year.

Section 413. Ombudsman for intelligence community security clearances

Section 413 requires the DNI to appoint an ombudsman for security clearances in the Intelligence Community. The Committee has learned that persons experiencing delays in their security clearances typically do not know where to turn for information or help. The lack of communication is especially frustrating for applicants who may seek other employment in the absence of notice about the process. A security clearance ombudsman will ensure that cases such as these will receive timely attention, and serve as a clearinghouse for customer concerns in the security clearance process.

The provision requires the heads of each element of the Intelligence Community to provide contact information for the ombudsman to those applying for security clearances, and requires the ombudsman to make an annual report to the congressional intelligence committees addressing the concerns, complaints, and questions received over the preceding 12 months. Nothing in the Section 413 prevents the ombudsman from having other duties.

Section 414. Security clearance reciprocity

Section 414 requires the IC/IG to conduct an audit of the reciprocity of security clearances in the Intelligence Community and to report to the congressional intelligence committees on the results of that audit. The Committee is concerned that lack of full reciprocity among agencies is an indicator of concern within the Intelligence Community about the quality of security clearances. The delay resulting from `re-clearing' previously-cleared personnel is disruptive to the operations of the Intelligence Community, costly to contractors, and a source of great frustration for the individuals and organizations involved. In creating a joint, collaborative, efficient Intelligence Community, people must be able to transition efficiently between agencies and from industry to government.

Section 415. Report on international traffic in arms regulations

Section 415 requires the DNI to report to the congressional intelligence committees assessing the threat to national security presented by the efforts of foreign countries to acquire sensitive equipment and technology and the sufficiency of U.S. export controls in preventing such acquisitions.

Section 416. Report on nuclear trafficking

Section 416 requires the DNI to report to certain congressional committees on the illicit trade of nuclear and radiological material and equipment. The report must include details of all cases of illicit sale, transfer, brokering or transport of nuclear material or nuclear explosive devices, an assessment of the countries that pose the greatest risk of nuclear trafficking, and a discussion of any dissents, caveats, gaps, or other information that would reduce confidence in the assessment of the countries that pose the greatest risk of nuclear trafficking.

Section 417. Study on revoking pensions of persons who commit unauthorized disclosures of classified information

Section 417 requires the DNI to conduct a study on the feasibility of revoking the pensions of personnel in the Intelligence Community who commit unauthorized disclosures of classified information and to report the results of that study to the congressional intelligence committees.

SUBTITLE B--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Section 421. Review of covert action programs by Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency

Title V of the National Security Act of 1947, entitled `Accountability for Intelligence Activities,' sets forth the Act's basic requirements on executive branch obligations to keep the congressional intelligence committees fully informed about intelligence activities. Section 503 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413b) is specifically devoted to presidential findings and congressional notification on covert actions. Section 421 of this bill augments the oversight of covert actions by requiring that the CIA Inspector General (CIA/IG) conduct an audit of each covert action at least once every three years and submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing the audit results within 60 days of completing the audit. To a considerable extent, this requirement confirms in statute existing practice and assures its regularity.

The DNI has expressed concern that this audit requirement, and several other provisions on intelligence community reports, raises concerns with respect to the President's authority to control access to national security information. To allay any such concern regarding the covert action audit requirement, the Committee has drafted Section 421 to state that the requirement is subject to the longstanding provisions of section 17(b)(3) and (4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(b)(3) and (4)) that empower the Director of the CIA to prohibit the CIA/IG from initiating, carrying out, or completing an audit if the Director determines that the prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security interests of the United States, provided that the Director report the reasons to the congressional intelligence committees.

Section 422. Inapplicability to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency of requirement for annual report on progress in auditable financial statements

Section 422 relieves the Director of the CIA from the requirement in section 114A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404i-1) to submit to the congressional intelligence committees an annual report describing the activities being taken to ensure that financial statements of the CIA can be audited in accordance with applicable law and the requirements of OMB. Although the Committee remains concerned that CIA does not expect to be auditable until 2011, two years later than previously projected, the report required by Section 114A is unnecessary as CIA is now submitting audited financial statements. The requirements of Section 114A continue to apply to the Directors of NSA, DIA, and NGA.

Section 423. Technical amendments relating to titles of certain CIA positions

Section 423 replaces out-of-date titles for CIA positions with the current titles of the successors of those positions in a provision in section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q) that establishes the obligation of the CIA/IG to notify the congressional intelligence committees about investigations, inspections, or audits concerning high-ranking CIA officials.

Section 424. Clarifying amendments relating to Section 105 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004

Section 424 changes the reference to the Director of Central Intelligence to the Director of National Intelligence to clarify that the establishment of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis within the Department of the Treasury (section 105 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Pub. L. No. 108-177 (Dec. 13, 2003)), and its reorganization within the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (section 222 of the Transportation, Treasury, Independent Agencies, and General Government Appropriations Act, 2005 (Division H, Pub. L. No. 108-447 (Dec. 8, 2004)), do not affect the authorities and responsibilities of the DNI with respect to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis as an element of the Intelligence Community.

Section 425. Prohibition on the use of private contractors for interrogations involving persons in the custody or control of the Central Intelligence Agency

Section 425 prohibits the obligation or expenditure of any funds for payment to any contractor to conduct the interrogation of a detainee in the custody of the CIA. The DNI may, however, grant a waiver if the Director of the CIA determines that no employee of the federal government is capable and available to conduct the interrogation, and that the interrogation is in the national interest of the United States. Section 425 also provides that contractors conducting interrogations pursuant to a waiver by the DNI shall be governed by the same laws that would apply if the interrogation were conducted by an employee of the federal government.

SUBTITLE C--DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS

Section 431. Integration of the Counterintelligence Field Activity into the Defense Intelligence Agency

Section 431 requires the USD(I) to submit to the congressional intelligence and defense committees a report describing the nature of any law enforcement authorities to be delegated to the DIA; the legal authority under which the Secretary of Defense is empowered to delegate a law enforcement function to the DIA; and the guidelines for the implementation of any law enforcement authorities delegated to the DIA should such a delegation occur.

The Secretary of Defense recently approved the integration of CIFA into the DIA. CIFA is, in part, a law enforcement organization with certain law enforcement authorities. As a result of this impending integration, the DIA is now considering a change to its charter in order to absorb CIFA's law enforcement role. The change would designate the DIA as a law enforcement agency. Unlike CIFA, which is headed by a civilian director, the DIA is directed by a military officer.

The Committee has several concerns regarding the Department of Defense's pursuit of this course of action. First, the DIA's stated mission is to collect, analyze, and manage foreign military intelligence for war fighters; it has no experience with managing, overseeing, and leading criminal investigations, even those investigations that have a counterintelligence nexus. Second, while there are operational efficiencies associated with absorbing CIFA's law enforcement capabilities into the DIA, those operational efficiencies must be balanced properly against the concerns associated with military services conducting law enforcement activities that could implicate civilians. The Committee seeks to ensure that the decision to absorb CIFA's law enforcement authorities into the DIA undergoes a thorough and exhaustive legal review and that, should the DIA's charter be amended to absorb the authorities, the amendments include important boundaries to ensure that civil liberties are adequately protected.

SUBTITLE D--OTHER ELEMENTS

Section 441. Clarification of inclusion of the Coast Guard and Drug Enforcement Administration as elements of the Intelligence Community

Section 441 restores, with respect to the United States Coast Guard, the prior definition of `intelligence community' in the National Security Act of 1947 applicable to that service, See (50 U.S.C. 401a). Section 1073 of the IRTPA modified the definition of `intelligence community,' inadvertently limiting the Coast Guard's inclusion in the Intelligence Community to the Office of Intelligence or those portions of the Coast Guard concerned with the analysis of intelligence. Section 441 clarifies that all of the Coast Guard's intelligence elements are included within the definition of the `intelligence community.'

Section 441 also codifies the joint decision of the DNI and Attorney General that the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) should be within the Intelligence Community.

Section 442. Report on transformation of the intelligence capabilities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

Section 442 requires the Director of the FBI to report to the congressional intelligence committees on the Director's long-term vision for transforming the intelligence capabilities of the Bureau and the progress of the internal reforms of the Bureau intended to achieve that vision.

TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS

SUBTITLE A--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Section 501. Extension of National Commission for Review of Research and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence Community

The National Commission for Review of Research and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence Community was authorized in the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 and lapsed on September 1, 2004. Section 501 renews authority for this Commission by extending the reporting deadline to December 31, 2009, and requiring that new members be appointed to the Commission. This section also authorizes $2 million for the Commission from the Intelligence Community Management Account.

Section 502. Amendments to the National Security Act of 1947

Section 502 amends the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413) in three ways to clarify the executive branch's obligations to notify Congress of intelligence activities.

First, Section 502 requires that, in meeting the President's statutory obligation to keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities of the United States, the President must provide to the congressional intelligence committees all information necessary to assess the lawfulness, effectiveness, cost, benefit, intelligence gain, budgetary authority, and risk of intelligence activities.

Second, Section 502 clarifies that for all intelligence activities other than covert actions, the DNI's obligation to keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed is an obligation to keep the entire membership of the congressional intelligence committees informed, rather than a subset of members of the committees. Section 502 allows reporting to less than the full membership of the congressional intelligence committees where the Chair and Ranking Minority Member of a

congressional intelligence committee jointly determine to agree to a written request by the President for reporting to less than the full membership of the committees.

Third, Section 502 defines `significant undertaking,' as that term is used in 50 U.S.C. 413b(d) to clarify when the President is required to ensure that the congressional intelligence committees are notified with respect to covert action.

Section 503. Report on financial intelligence on terrorist assets

Section 503 amends a reporting requirement for the United States Department of the Treasury. Section 503 makes annual a report which had previously been required semiannually and eliminates certain data requirements from that report.

Section 504. Notice of intelligence regarding North Korea and China

Section 504 amends the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413) to clarify that notification to the congressional intelligence committees of intelligence information relating to North Korea or China after all or part of the information has been communicated to the governments of North Korea or China does not fulfill the National Security Act's requirement to keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of the intelligence activities of the United States.

Section 505. Sense of Congress regarding use of intelligence resources

Section 505 expresses the sense of Congress that resources under the Act shall not be directed from human intelligence collection and other programs intended to combat al-Qaeda to study global climate change.

SUBTITLE B--TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS

Section 511. Technical amendments to the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949

Section 511 amends the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 by updating references to the National Security Act of 1947 to reflect amendments made by the IRTPA.

Section 512. Technical amendments to the multi-year National Intelligence Program

Section 512 updates the `multiyear national intelligence program' to incorporate organizational and nomenclatural changes made by the IRTPA.

Section 513. Technical clarifications of certain references to Joint Military Intelligence Program and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities

Section 513 makes technical clarifications to the National Security Act of 1947 to reflect the consolidation of the Joint Military Intelligence Program and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities program into the Military Intelligence Program. This section preserves the requirement that the DNI participate in the development of the annual budget and be consulted prior to the transfer or reprogramming of funds for the Military Intelligence Program.

Section 514. Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947

Section 514 makes a number of technical corrections to the National Security Act of 1947 arising from enactment of the IRTPA.

Section 515. Technical amendments to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004

Section 515 makes a number of technical and conforming amendments to the IRTPA.

Section 516. Technical amendments to the Executive Schedule

Section 516 makes technical amendments to the Executive Schedule to correct outdated and incorrect references to `Director of Central Intelligence,' `Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence,' and `General Counsel to the National Intelligence Director.'

Section 517. Technical amendments relating to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

Section 517 makes technical amendments to Titles 5 and 44 of the United States Code, and Section 201 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, by replacing references to `National Imagery and Mapping Agency' with `National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.'

CORRESPONDENCE WITH OTHER COMMITTEES REGARDING PARTICULAR PROVISIONS

Committee on Foreign Affairs,

House of Representatives,

Washington, DC, May 15, 2008.

Hon. SILVESTRE REYES,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am writing to you concerning the bill H.R. 5959, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009. There are certain provisions in the legislation which fall within the Rule X jurisdiction of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

In the interest of permitting your committee to proceed expeditiously to floor consideration of this important bill, I am willing to waive this committee's right to sequential referral. I do so with the understanding that, by waiving consideration of the bill, the Committee on Foreign Affairs does not waive any future jurisdictional claim over the subject matters contained in the bill which fall within its Rule X jurisdiction. I request that you urge the Speaker of the House of Representatives to appoint members of this committee to any conference committee which is named to consider such provisions.

Please place this letter into the committee report on H.R. 5959 and into the Congressional Record during consideration of the measure on the House floor. Thank you for the cooperative spirit in which you have worked regarding this matter and others between our respective committees.

Sincerely,

Howard L. Berman,

Chairman.

-

House of Representatives,

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,

Washington, DC, May 15, 2008.

Hon. HOWARD L. BERMAN,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R. 5959, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009.

I appreciate your willingness to work cooperatively on this legislation. I recognize that this bill contains amendments to provisions of law related to matters that tall within the Title X jurisdiction of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. In addition. I acknowledge that the Committee on Foreign Affairs will not seek a sequential referral of this legislation and that your decision to forgo a sequential referral on this bill does not waive any future jurisdictional claim of the subject matters which fall under your committee's Rule X jurisdiction.

Further, I recognize that your committee reserves the right to seek appointment of conferees on the bill for the portions of the bill that are within your jurisdiction, and I agree to support such a request.

I will ensure that this exchange of letters in included in the Committee's report on H.R. 5959 and in the Congressional Record during floor consideration of this measure on the House floor. I look forward to working with you on this legislation and other matters of great importance to this nation.

Sincerely,

Silvestre Reyes,

Chairman.

-

House Committee on Armed Services,

House of Representatives,

Washington, DC, May 8, 2008.

Hon. SILVESTRE REYES,
Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
United States Capitol, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I write to confirm our mutual understanding regarding H.R. 5959, authorizing appropriations for fiscal year 2009 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes. This legislation contains subject matter within the jurisdiction of the House Committee on Armed Services.

Our Committee recognizes the importance of H.R. 5959 and the need for the legislation to move expeditiously. Therefore, while we have a valid claim to jurisdiction over this legislation, the Committee on Armed Services will waive further consideration of H.R. 5959. I do so with the understanding that by waiving further consideration of the bill, the Committee does not waive any future jurisdictional claims over similar measures. In the event of a conference with the Senate on this bill, the Committee on Armed Services reserves the right to seek the appointment of conferees.

I would appreciate the inclusion of this letter and a copy of the response in your Committee's report on H.R. 5959 and in the Congressional Record during consideration of the measure on the House floor.

Very truly yours,

Ike Skelton,

Chairman.

-

House of Representatives,

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,

Washington, DC, May 15, 2008.

Hon. IKE SKELTON,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R. 5959, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009.

I appreciate your willingness to work cooperatively on this legislation. I recognize that this bill contains amendments to provisions of law related to matters that fall under the jurisdiction of the Committee on Armed Services. In addition. I acknowledge that the Committee on Armed Services will not seek a sequential referral of this legislation and that your decision to forgo a sequential referral on this bill does not waive, alter, or otherwise affect the jurisdiction of the Committee on Armed Services.

Further, I recognize that your committee reserves the right to seek appointment of conferees on the bill for the portions of the bill that are within your jurisdiction, and I agree to support such a request.

I will ensure that this exchange of letters in included in the Committee's report on H.R. 5959 and in the Congressional Record during floor consideration of H.R. 5959. I look forward to working with you on this legislation and other matters of great importance to this nation.

Sincerely,

Silvestre Reyes,

Chairman.

-

House of Representatives,

Committee on Homeland Security,

Washington, DC, May 15, 2008.

Hon. Silvestre Reyes,
Chairman, House Select Committee on Intelligence,
The Capitol, Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN REYES: I am writing to you regarding H.R. 5959, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, a bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2009 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government.

H.R. 5959 contains provisions that fall within the House Rule X jurisdiction of the Committee on Homeland Security. I recognize and appreciate your desire to bring this bill to the full House expeditiously. Accordingly, I will not seek a sequential referral of the bill. However, this decision to waive consideration of H.R. 5959 should not be construed as the Committee on Homeland Security waiving, altering, or diminishing its jurisdiction over this or similar legislation.

Additionally, the Committee on Homeland Security reserves the right to seek the appointment of conferees during any House-Senate conference convened on this legislation or on similar legislation that is within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Homeland Security. I ask for your commitment to support any such request by the Committee on Homeland Security for the appointment of conferees on H.R. 5959 or similar legislation. Finally, I respectfully ask that you place a copy of your letter and this letter in the Committee Report on H.R. 5959 and in the Congressional Record during floor consideration of H.R. 5959.

Thank you for your timely consideration of my request. I look forward to working with you as we prepare to pass this important national security legislation.

Sincerely,

Bennie G. Thompson,

Chairman.

-

House of Representatives,

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,

Washington, DC, May 15, 2008.

Hon. Bennie G. Thompson,
Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R. 5959, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009.

I appreciate your willingness to work cooperatively on this legislation. I recognize that this bill contains amendments to provisions of law related to matters that fall under the jurisdiction of the Committee on Homeland Security. In addition, I acknowledge that the Committee on Homeland Security will not seek a sequential referral of this legislation and that your decision to forgo a sequential referral on this bill does not waive, alter, or otherwise affect the jurisdiction of the Committee on Homeland Security.

Further, I recognize that your committee reserves the right to seek appointment of conferees on the bill for the portions of the bill that are within your jurisdiction. and I agree to support such a request.

I will ensure that this exchange of letters is included in the Committee's report on H.R. 5959 and in the Congressional Record during floor consideration of H.R. 5959. I look forward to working with you on this legislation and other matters of great importance to this nation.

Sincerely,

Silvestre Reyes,

Chairman.

-

House of Representatives,

Committee on the Judiciary,

Washington, DC, May 19, 2008.

Hon. SILVESTRE REYES,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN REYES: In recognition of the desire to expedite consideration of H.R. 5959, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, the Committee on the Judiciary agrees to waive formal consideration of the bill as to provisions that fall within the Committee's rule X jurisdiction.

The Committee takes this action with the mutual understanding that by foregoing consideration of H.R. 5959 at this time, the Committee on the Judiciary does not waive any jurisdiction over subject matter contained in this or similar legislation. The Committee also reserves the right to seek appointment of an appropriate number of conferees to any House-Senate conference involving this legislation, and requests your support if such a request is made.

I would appreciate your including this letter in the committee report on the bill, or in the Congressional Record during consideration of the bill on the House floor.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

John Conyers, Jr.,

Chairman.

-

House of Representatives,

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,

Washington, DC, May 20, 2008.

Hon. JOHN CONYERS, Jr.,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R. 5959, the Intelligence Authorization Act tier Fiscal Year 2009.

I appreciate your willingness to work cooperatively on this legislation. I recognize that this bill contains amendments to provisions of law related to matters that fall within the rule X jurisdiction of the Committee on the Judiciary. In addition, I acknowledge that the Committee on the Judiciary will not seek a sequential referral of this legislation and that your decision to forgo a sequential referral on this bill does not waive any future jurisdictional claim of the subject matters which fall under your committee's rule X jurisdiction.

Further, I recognize that your committee reserves the right to seek appointment of conferees on the bill for the portions of the bill that are within your jurisdiction, and I agree to support such a request.

I will ensure that this exchange of letters is included in the Committee's report on H.R. 5959 and in the Congressional Record during floor consideration of this measure on the House floor. I look forward to working with you on this legislation and other matters of great importance to this nation.

Sincerely,

Silvestre Reyes,

Chairman.

-

House of Representatives,

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,

Washington, DC, May 13, 2008.

Hon. SILVESTRE REYES,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR CHAIRMAN REYES: I am writing about H.R. 5959, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, which the Select Committee on Intelligence plans to markup on May 15, 2008.

I appreciate your effort to consult with the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform regarding those provisions of H.R. 5959 that fall within the Oversight Committee's jurisdiction. These provisions include Inspectors General, federal civil service and personnel matters, and the disclosure of certain information regarding the receipt and disposition of foreign gifts and decorations.

In the interest of expediting consideration of H.R. 5959, the Oversight Committee will not request a sequential referral of this bill. I would, however, request your support for the appointment of conferees from the Oversight Committee should H.R. 5959 or a similar Senate bill be considered in conference with the Senate.

This letter should not be construed as a waiver of the Oversight Committee's legislative jurisdiction over subjects addressed in H.R. 5959 that fall within the jurisdiction of the Oversight Committee.

Finally, I request that you include our exchange of letters on this matter in the Intelligence Committee Report on H.R. 5959 and in the Congressional Record during consideration of this legislation on the House floor.

Thank you for your attention to these matters.

Sincerely,

Henry A. Waxman,

Chairman.

-

House of Representatives,

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,

Washington, DC, May 15, 2008.

Hon. HENRY A. WAXMAN,
Chairman, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R. 5959, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009.

I appreciate your willingness to work cooperatively on this legislation. I recognize that this bill contains amendments to provisions of law related to matters that fall within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. In addition, I acknowledge that the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform will not seek a sequential referral of this legislation and that your decision to forgo a sequential referral on this bill does not waive any future jurisdictional claim over the subjects which fall under your committee's jurisdiction.

Further, I recognize that your committee reserves the right to seek appointment of conferees on the bill for the portions of the bill that are within your jurisdiction, and I agree to support such a request.

I will ensure that this exchange of letters in included in the Committee's report on H.R. 5959 and in the Congressional Record during consideration of this measure on the House floor. I look forward to working with you on this legislation and other matters of great importance to this nation.

Sincerely,

Silvestre Reyes,

Chairman.

CORRESPONDENCE WITH CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE

House of Representatives,

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,

Washington, DC, May 8, 2008.

Mr. PETER R. ORSZAG,
Director, Congressional Budget Office,
Ford House Office Building, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. ORSZAG: In compliance with clause 3 of Rule XIII of the Rules of the House of Representatives, I am writing to request a cost estimate of H.R. 5959, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, pursuant to sections 308 and 403 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. I have attached a copy of the bill as approved by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

I hope to bring this legislation to the House floor as soon as possible, and I would very much appreciate an expedited response to this request. Should you have any questions related to this request, please contact Caryn Wagner, the Committee's Budget Director, at 202-225-7690.

Thank you in advance for your assistance.

Sincerely,

Silvestre Reyes,

Chairman.

-

U.S. Congress,

Congressional Budget Office,

Washington, DC, May 19, 2008.

Hon. SILVESTRE REYES,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 5959, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009.

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Jason Wheelock.

Sincerely,

Peter R. Orszag,

Director.

Enclosure.

H.R. 5959--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009

Summary: H.R. 5959 would authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2009 for intelligence activities of the U.S. government, for the Intelligence Community Management Account, and for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System (CIARDS).

This estimate addresses only the unclassified portion of the bill. On that limited basis, CBO estimates that implementing certain provisions of the bill would cost $325 million in 2009 and $642 million over the 2009-2013 period, assuming appropriation of the authorized funds. Enacting H.R. 5959 would not affect direct spending or revenues.

The bill includes new subpoena authority that would impose intergovernmental and private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA), but CBO expects the cost of complying with those mandates would be small and well below the annual thresholds established in that act ($68 million for intergovernmental mandates and $136 million for private-sector mandates in 2008, adjusted annually for inflation.)

Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated budgetary impact of H.R. 5959 is shown in the following table. The costs of this legislation fall within budget function 050 (national defense).


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                             By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--                     
                                                                                 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION                                                              
Intelligence Community Management Account:                                                                
Authorization Level                                                               649    0    0    0    0 
Estimated Outlays                                                                 325  292   19    6    0 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Basis of estimate: Section 104 would authorize the appropriation of $649 million for the Intelligence Community Management Account, which provides the principal source of funding for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and provides resources for coordination of programs, budget oversight, and management of the intelligence agencies. CBO estimates that implementing this provision would cost $325 million in 2009 and $642 million over the 2009-2013 period, assuming appropriation of the specified amount.

Section 201 would authorize the appropriation of $279 million to CIARDS to cover retirement costs attributable to military service and various unfunded liabilities. The appropriation to CIARDS is considered mandatory, and the authorization under this bill would be the same as the amount assumed in the CBO baseline. Thus, this estimate does not ascribe any additional cost to that provision.

Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: The bill contains intergovernmental and private-sector mandates as defined in UMRA. Section 408 would establish an Inspector General of the Intelligence Community with subpoena authority. Section 501 would extend the National Commission for the Review of Research and Development Programs of the U.S. Intelligence Community, and the subpoena authority of that commission. Entities in the public and private sectors, if subpoenaed, would be required to provide testimony, documents, or other evidence. CBO expects that the Inspector General and the commission would likely issue subpoenas sparingly, and that the costs to comply with a subpoena would not be significant. Thus, CBO estimates that the total costs of the mandates would be small and well below the annual thresholds established in UMRA ($68 million for intergovernmental mandates and $136 million for private-sector mandates in 2008, adjusted annual for inflation).

The remaining unclassified provisions of the bill contain no mandates as defined in UMRA.

Estimate prepared by: Federal costs: Jason Wheelock; Impact on state, local, and tribal governments: Neil Hood; Impact on the private sector: Dan Frisk.

Estimate approved by: Peter H. Fontaine, Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.

CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT ACT

* * * * * * *

TITLE II--THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

* * * * * * *

Part D--Benefits Accruing to Certain Participants

* * * * * * *

SEC. 235. MANDATORY RETIREMENT.

* * * * * * *

-

NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947

SHORT TITLE

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Sec. 2. Declaration of policy.
* * * * * * *
Title I--Coordination for National Security
Sec. 101. National Security Council.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 103H. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
Sec. 103I. Ombudsman for intelligence community security clearances.
* * * * * * *
Title V--Accountability for Intelligence Activities
* * * * * * *
Sec. 506B. Annual personnel level assessment for the intelligence community.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 508. Report on security clearance determinations.
Sec. 509. Semiannual reports on the nuclear programs of Iran, Syria, and North Korea.
Sec. 510. Report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence community.
* * * * * * *
TITLE X--EDUCATION IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
* * * * * * *
Subtitle C--Additional Education Provisions
* * * * * * *
Sec. 1022. Intelligence community acquisition of critical skills.

* * * * * * *

DEFINITIONS

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

TITLE I--COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

* * * * * * *

RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER

* * * * * * *

-

INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

OMBUDSMAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SECURITY CLEARANCES

* * * * * * *

ANNUAL REPORT ON IMPROVEMENT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR AUDITING PURPOSES

* * * * * * *

TRAVEL ON ANY COMMON CARRIER FOR CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PERSONNEL

* * * * * * *

[Struck out->][ SEMIANNUAL ][<-Struck out] ANNUAL REPORT ON FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE ON TERRORIST ASSETS

* * * * * * *

NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

NATIONAL COUNTER PROLIFERATION CENTER

* * * * * * *

TITLE V--ACCOUNTABILITY FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

GENERAL CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PROVISIONS

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

REPORTING OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN COVERT ACTIONS

* * * * * * *

PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL AND REPORTING OF COVERT ACTIONS

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

FUNDING OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

ANNUAL PERSONNEL LEVEL ASSESSMENT FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

DATES FOR SUBMITTAL OF VARIOUS ANNUAL AND SEMIANNUAL REPORTS TO THE CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

-

REPORT ON SECURITY CLEARANCE DETERMINATIONS

SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON THE NUCLEAR PROGRAMS OF IRAN, SYRIA, AND NORTH KOREA

REPORT ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

-

TITLE VI--PROTECTION OF CERTAIN NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

PROTECTION OF IDENTITIES OF CERTAIN UNITED STATES UNDERCOVER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, AGENTS, INFORMANTS, AND SOURCES

* * * * * * *

REPORT

* * * * * * *

TITLE VII--PROTECTION OF OPERATIONAL FILES

* * * * * * *

OPERATIONAL FILES OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

TITLE X--EDUCATION IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

* * * * * * *

SUBTITLE C--ADDITIONAL EDUCATION PROVISIONS

* * * * * * *

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ACQUISITION OF CRITICAL SKILLS

TITLE XI--ADDITIONAL MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

* * * * * * *

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES

* * * * * * *

-

TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE

* * * * * * *

PART III--EMPLOYEES

* * * * * * *

SUBPART A--GENERAL PROVISIONS

* * * * * * *

CHAPTER 23--MERIT SYSTEM PRINCIPLES

* * * * * * *

Sec. 2302. Prohibited personnel practices

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

SUBPART C--EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE

* * * * * * *

CHAPTER 43--PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL

* * * * * * *

SUBCHAPTER I--GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 4301. Definitions

* * * * * * *

CHAPTER 47--PERSONNEL RESEARCH PROGRAMS AND DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS

* * * * * * *

Sec. 4701. Definitions

* * * * * * *

SUBPART D--PAY AND ALLOWANCES

CHAPTER 51--CLASSIFICATION

* * * * * * *

Sec. 5102. Definitions; application

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

CHAPTER 53--PAY RATES AND SYSTEMS

* * * * * * *

SUBCHAPTER II--EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE PAY RATES

* * * * * * *

Sec. 5313. Positions at level II

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

Sec. 5314. Positions at level III

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

Sec. 5315. Positions at level IV

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

SUBCHAPTER IV--PREVAILING RATE SYSTEMS

* * * * * * *

Sec. 5342. Definitions; application

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

SUBPART E--ATTENDANCE AND LEAVE

* * * * * * *

CHAPTER 63--LEAVE

* * * * * * *

SUBCHAPTER III--VOLUNTARY TRANSFERS OF LEAVE

* * * * * * *

Sec. 6339. Additional leave transfer programs

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

SUBPART F--LABOR-MANAGEMENT AND EMPLOYEE RELATIONS

* * * * * * *

CHAPTER 73--SUITABILITY, SECURITY, AND CONDUCT

* * * * * * *

SUBCHAPTER III--POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

* * * * * * *

Sec. 7323. Political activity authorized; prohibitions

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

SUBCHAPTER IV--FOREIGN GIFTS AND DECORATIONS

* * * * * * *

Sec. 7342. Receipt and disposition of foreign gifts and decorations

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

-

INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003

* * * * * * *

TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

* * * * * * *

Subtitle E--Terrorism

* * * * * * *

SEC. 343. TERRORIST IDENTIFICATION CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM.

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

* * * * * * *

TITLE VIII--REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

* * * * * * *

Subtitle C--Recurring Annual Reports

* * * * * * *

[Struck out->][ SEC. 826. ANNUAL REPORT ON COUNTERDRUG INTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ][<-Struck out]

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TITLE X--NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR REVIEW OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

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SEC. 1002. NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

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SEC. 1007. FINAL REPORT; TERMINATION.

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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY ACT OF 1959

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SECTION 115 OF TITLE 49, UNITED STATES CODE

Sec. 115. Transportation Security Oversight Board

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INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT OF 1978

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[Struck out->][ AUTHORITY TO ESTABLISH INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ][<-Struck out]

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COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 2002

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TITLE IX--COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

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SEC. 904. OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949

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GENERAL AUTHORITIES

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SEC. 17. INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE AGENCY.

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INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004

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TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

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SEC. 105. OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY.

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SECTION 1403 OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1991

[Struck out->][ SEC. 1403. MULTIYEAR NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM ][<-Struck out]

SEC. 1403. MULTIYEAR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.

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NATIONAL SECURITY INTELLIGENCE REFORM ACT OF 2004

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TITLE I--REFORM OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

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Subtitle A--Establishment of Director of National Intelligence

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SEC. 1016. INFORMATION SHARING.

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Subtitle G--Conforming and Other Amendments

SEC. 1071. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS RELATING TO ROLES OF DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

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SEC. 1072. OTHER CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

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INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004

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TITLE II--FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SEC. 2001. IMPROVEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

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SEC. 2006. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION USE OF TRANSLATORS.

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CHAPTER 13 OF TITLE 44, UNITED STATES CODE

CHAPTER 13--PARTICULAR REPORTS AND DOCUMENTS

Sec.
1301. Agriculture, Department of: report of Secretary.
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[Struck out->][ 1336. National Imagery and Mapping Agency: special publications. ][<-Struck out]
1336. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: special publications.

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Sec. 1336. [Struck out->][ National Imagery and Mapping Agency ][<-Struck out] National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: special publications

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HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002

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TITLE II--INFORMATION ANALYSIS AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

Subtitle A--Information and Analysis and Infrastructure Protection; Access to Information

SEC. 201. INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION.

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MINORITY VIEWS

The annual Intelligence Authorization Act is one of the most important bills that the House passes each year. It provides and allocates resources to critical national security programs that are the front lines of America's defense and foreign policies and, most critically, work to detect, prevent, and disrupt potential terrorist attacks on the American people. The bill also is essential to ensure close and effective congressional oversight of the intelligence community.

Although we have concerns with issues that we believe must continue to be addressed and resolved as the legislative process continues, we are encouraged that this bill avoids many of the contentious items that have recently prevented the enactment of an intelligence authorization bill and that it reflects areas of bipartisan consensus on critical national security issues. We also believe that the bill was significantly improved by seven Republican amendments that were adopted on a bipartisan basis to address important issues facing the intelligence community.

Our views follow with respect to a number of important issues. We are pleased that many of them have been addressed in the bill, and disappointed that others remain unresolved. We look forward to continuing the Committee's efforts to move a bipartisan, consensus bill to enactment.

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT MODERNIZATION

This bill is still missing the most significant and most critically needed consensus legislation on intelligence currently pending before Congress--the bipartisan compromise legislation to modernize the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that passed the Senate by a vote of 68-29 and is supported by a majority of the House. With the expiration of the Protect America Act on February 17, 2008, the Intelligence Community lost critical authorities to react with speed and agility to potential terrorist threats around the world. The problem will soon be even further compounded when authority under existing certifications expires.

It is irresponsible for the Democratic leadership of the House to continue to abuse its power to block vital national security legislation that the Senate passed on an overwhelming bipartisan basis, that a majority of the House has indicated that it will support on a bipartisan basis, and that the President has indicated that he will sign. Congresswoman Heather Wilson offered an amendment to include this vitally needed legislation in the bill. The amendment received bipartisan support but was not adopted by a vote of 10-11.

The remarks of two Democratic members of the Committee during the markup recognizing the importance of FISA modernization to our national security and the urgency of completing action only reinforce the consensus that this issue must be dealt with immediately. We will continue to work with our colleagues on a bipartisan basis to enact the compromise legislation passed by the Senate at the earliest opportunity.

EARMARKS

Last year, the House adopted a motion by Ranking Republican Pete Hoekstra to instruct House conferees on the Fiscal Year 2008 Intelligence Authorization to remove all earmarks from the bill by a bipartisan vote of 249-160. Those instructions were nonetheless disregarded by House conferees. This year, the Committee--by a bipartisan vote of 17-4--adopted an amendment by Congressman Hoekstra to remove all earmarks, including an earmark in the bill text for the National Drug Intelligence Center.

As a number of incidents have illustrated in previous years up to last year, our intelligence programs should be based on only one primary consideration--what best ensures that the intelligence community is able to do its job in the interest of the national security of the United States. Our priority should be those programs that the members of this Committee have collectively taken a careful look at, debated, and determined where money should be spent with input from the intelligence community--not member projects which all too often can be directed to parochial interests or wasteful spending rather than the national interest.

The Committee's bipartisan vote to remove earmarks from this year's bill is an unprecedented step that we hope will set an example for this Committee as well as other legislation moving forward.

NATIONAL SECURITY ACT AMENDMENTS

It is likely that there is no single current issue on which there is a stronger bipartisan consensus than our shared deep concern that the Administration is not fulfilling its statutory duty to keep each member of the Committee fully and currently informed with respect to certain intelligence matters. In the past year alone, Chairman Reyes and Ranking Member Hoekstra jointly called on the President to brief the Members of the Committee with respect to intelligence regarding the al Kibar facility in Syria, which was subsequently disclosed to the public on the same afternoon that Committee members were finally briefed, several months later. With respect to another matter, the Administration refuses to brief all Members of the Committee even though it has briefed five members of the Committee staff. This follows other incidents in which no member of the Committee was briefed in a timely fashion, if at all, with respect to critical and sensitive matters within the scope of the statutory duty to report. It is clear that reforms are necessary.

Section 502 of the bill makes amendments to certain congressional notification procedures of the National Security Act of 1947. It is the product of bipartisan discussion and agreement between Chairman Reyes and Ranking Member Hoekstra and includes language suggested by both. The provision expressly provides that information briefed to the Committee reporting on activities other than covert actions shall be made available to

each member of the Committee, unless the President requests in writing that access to the information be limited and details extraordinary circumstances justifying the request. In the event of such a request to limit access, the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Committee may jointly determine whether and how to limit access to the material within the Committee. Absent such an agreement, access to the information or material will be limited.

In our view, this provision does two critical things. First, it sets forth a statutory presumption that information briefed to the Committee should be made available to each member of the Committee rather than restricted to the Chairman and Ranking Member. Second, it provides a mechanism to permit exceptions when legitimate extraordinary circumstances arise impacting national security. We believe that this provision reflects a better balance than the current practice. It respects the Constitutional duty of the President to protect national security information by providing a mechanism to request that access to the information be limited. It also respects the Constitutional authority of the House to organize itself and to determine how to share information within the Committee. Ultimately, these interests are balanced and resolved by requiring a clear bipartisan consensus to override any request by the President to limit access to information.

We are concerned that the new enhanced reporting requirements provided for in paragraph (a) of Section 502 of the bill are too prescriptive and burdensome and may not be practically workable. We hope that these provisions can be perfected as the bill moves forward in the legislative process. On the whole, however, this provision is a significant step forward to strengthen congressional oversight of intelligence activities in a manner consistent with the Constitution.

Additionally, the Committee adopted by a bipartisan vote of 17-4 an amendment by Congressman John McHugh clarifying that the statutory duty to `fully and currently' inform the intelligence committees with respect to intelligence information relating to North Korea or China is not fulfilled if a Committee is briefed after the information has been communicated to the governments of those countries. We are extremely disappointed that this clarification is necessary.

It should be emphasized that this amendment is not intended to apply outside the scope of notifications understood to be required under Section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947, and is not intended to preclude communicating information to the Governments of North Korea or China in emergency or exigent circumstances.

NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE SYSTEMS

We are disappointed with certain provisions of the classified annex with respect to national security space systems. National security space systems have been and will continue to be a cornerstone of the nation's intelligence collection capability. However, the current bill lacks a sense of urgency with regard to making decisions on overhead architecture and fails to address critical architectural shortfalls. It does not adequately fund critical national security space systems and is overly prescriptive in certain areas mandating technical solutions without complete analysis. Despite these shortcomings, however, we believe the bill authorizes a minimally acceptable level of funding for these systems.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION MATTERS

The Intelligence Community continues to move forward with a number of reform initiatives in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. Perhaps none of these initiatives is more important than the transformation of the intelligence elements of the Federal Bureau of Investigation from a culture of law enforcement and prosecution to one directed at detecting and preventing potential terrorist attacks in the United States. While the FBI has a number of initiatives in place underway with respect to its intelligence components, we remain significantly concerned at the Bureau's failure to communicate a high-level strategic vision for its transformation, and that the process simply isn't moving fast enough to implement fundamental change. In addition, the Committee remains concerned--without determining responsibility--with respect to specific instances where the working relationship between the Bureau, other elements of the intelligence community, and state and local governments has been strained. At the same time, however, the Committee's oversight efforts have repeatedly suggested that the FBI is the most appropriate federal agency to lead domestic counterterrorism and counterintelligence matters, and that the Bureau should be given time to make its reforms work before more radical alternatives are considered.

The Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment by Congressman Mike Rogers to require the Director of the FBI to submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees describing his long term, strategic, vision for transforming the intelligence capabilities of the Bureau and the progress of the internal reforms intended to achieve that vision. It is important to stress that this report is intended to be a high-level strategic report in which the Director describes the fundamental principles underlying his view of the transformation, the desired FBI capabilities and doctrinal approach at the end of the transformation, and the way to get there. The Committee has already received numerous reports and briefings detailing specific organizational changes and initiatives, but none have satisfactorily communicated a comprehensive, cohesive strategic vision for the overall transformation.

In addition, the Committee adopted, by a unanimous vote of 21-0, an amendment by Congressman Rogers to prohibit any funds authorized in the bill from being used to implement the mandatory reassignment of a supervisor of the Bureau after five years of service in a management position, commonly known as the `five and out' policy. We believe that this policy has hampered optimum counterterrorism capability, just as similar mandatory reassignment and rotation policies have adversely impacted other elements of the Intelligence Community. A substantial portion of FBI funding is authorized in this bill. We believe this personnel policy is counterproductive and unwise and do not support authorizing funds to further implement it.

SIZE OF THE OFFICE OF DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

The Committee shares a bipartisan consensus that the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, just three years old, has already grown in size and scope well beyond the intentions of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act that created it. By voice vote, the Committee adopted an amendment to the classified Schedule of Authorizations by Congressman Mike Rogers to stop further growth and limit the size of the ODNI. In particular, we are dismayed at efforts by the ODNI to justify further growth by attempting to omit personnel from the National Counterterrorism Center from its personnel count, despite the express statutory provision that the NCTC is part of the ODNI.

The Committee on a bipartisan basis had made clear that it views the ODNI as a coordinator, not a doer of functions. Our effort is about making ODNI an effective coordinator, not another layer of bureaucracy that stifles the speed, agility and creativity necessary in today's intelligence environment. During the Committee's oversight efforts, intelligence community personnel have indicated that they are spending increasing amounts of time responding to taskings and requests from the ODNI bureaucracy with little apparent benefit. Rather than attempt to rationalize further bureaucratic growth, we hope that the ODNI will carefully revisit how to accomplish its core coordinating goals within the authorized personnel strength.

UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

As we have emphasized repeatedly in the past, the problem of unauthorized disclosure remains a grave one. Such disclosures harm national security, place American citizens and intelligence community personnel at increased risk, and inevitably result in substantial consequences to the United States--both tangible and intangible. We are disappointed that the Committee has held no hearings and conducted little to no substantial oversight on this issue during this Congress. In addition, we are concerned that the issue is becoming increasingly politicized, sometimes under the false premise that there are `good leaks' and `bad leaks'. The Committee should take a firm and clear position that no unauthorized disclosures of classified information should be tolerated.

Oversight efforts during the previous Congress clearly established that prosecution under current laws relating to unauthorized disclosure has not been an effective deterrent tool. The Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment offered by Congressman Mac Thornberry that requires the DNI to review whether current law or administrative authorities enable the revocation of pensions of intelligence community personnel who commit unauthorized disclosures of classified information. This provision is identical to one included by the House in the Fiscal Year 2007 Intelligence Authorization Act. We hope that it will be enacted and that the DNI will carefully review this matter and other options in an effort to provide a more effective deterrent to unauthorized disclosures of classified information.

INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

We have significant concerns with Section 408 of the bill, which would create a new Inspector General of the Intelligence Community. While we do not oppose either enhanced oversight of the Intelligence Community or a capability to review cross-cutting issues within the Intelligence Community, we are concerned that this provision--which is almost a quarter of the entire bill--duplicates efforts of Department and Agency inspectors general, is unnecessarily complex and unwieldy, and threatens to further grow the size and bureaucracy of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Committee Republicans offered an amendment to strike this provision, which failed by a voice vote. We hope to work with our colleagues toward a more limited and rational resolution of this issue.

JIHADISTS

Over the last few months, the National Counterterrorism Center, the State Department, and the Department of Homeland Security issued memos instructing their employees to not use several terms related to Islam and radical Jihadism, including `jihadist,' `jihad,' `Mujahadeen,' `caliphate,' `Islamist,' `Islamo-fascist,' and `Wahhabi.' These memos also recommend using the term `mainstream Muslims' instead of `moderate Muslims.' This new policy reportedly reflected advice from unnamed American Muslim leaders on avoiding rhetoric that could offend Muslim audiences or bolster the cause of radical Jihadist groups like al Qaeda.

During Committee consideration of the bill, Ranking Member Hoekstra offered an amendment to prohibit the use of any funds authorized by the bill from being used to prohibit or discourage the use of those terms. The amendment should not have been controversial, yet it was defeated by a party-line vote. We do not believe that free speech should be controversial, nor should candid, accurate, and fair discussion of the self-professed nature and goals of enemies who have attacked the United States, sworn to kill more Americans, and regularly seek to violently stifle the slightest criticism of their activities and intentions. It is more than ironic that some who have complained about alleged politicization of the Intelligence Community opposed this amendment, which simply would have ensured free speech and open, objective analysis, and it is unfortunate that they refuse to acknowledge the nature of the threats posed by our enemies.

It is important to emphasize that we do not support any form of religious discrimination, bigotry, or hatred, or U.S. officials making statements that insult Muslims or any other religious or ethnic group. However, this new `speech code' is in line with other efforts by U.S. Muslim leaders sympathetic to radical Jihadist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah to stifle open debate about radical Islam by banning important terms that describe their efforts. For example, since Hizballah, Hamas, and al Qaeda routinely describe their terrorist activities as a `Jihad' against the West, one cannot sensibly discuss their activities without using this word. Similarly, Osama bin Ladin claims his terrorist efforts are intended to recreate a `caliphate,' in an area stretching from Morocco

to Indonesia that was under Muslim rule in medieval times. It is impossible to have an honest discussion of bin Laden's philosophy without using the word caliphate.

We hope that common sense and free speech will prevail with respect to this issue, and will continue to pursue solutions through close and continuing oversight efforts.

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON IRAN

Recent revelations with respect to the al Kibar facility in Syria have suggested the need for close and careful reassessment of previous intelligence and assessments with respect to other nations. Ranking Member Hoekstra offered an amendment to require a revised and updated National Intelligence Estimate with regard to the Iranian nuclear program, which would have specifically required a reassessment of prior estimates in light of the experience with al Kibar, as well as a review of how that incident affects the confidence level of the Director of National Intelligence in current assessments of the Iran nuclear program. The amendment failed by voice vote.

We continue to believe, however, that the November 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran was so poorly drafted and so seriously undermined by subsequent developments and intelligence--especially the Syrian nuclear facility--that it is necessary for the DNI to go back to the drawing board and start over. We will continue to monitor this issue closely and seek the necessary review and reassessment through the oversight process.

DIVERSION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY RESOURCES TO STUDY GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE

The Committee adopted by voice vote a Republican amendment making clear the sense of Congress that resources should not be diverted from human intelligence collection and other intelligence programs designed to combat al Qaeda in order to study global climate change. Despite the existence of numerous more appropriate government programs and initiatives to study this issue, pressure to use intelligence resources in inappropriate and nonproductive ways relative to global climate change continues. This provision makes clear that intelligence resources should not be diverted from al Qaeda for this purpose.

LIMITATION ON INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES

The Committee defeated--by a bipartisan vote of 9-12--an amendment that would have limited all elements of the intelligence community to the interrogation techniques authorized by the United States Army Field Manual on Human Intelligence Collector Operations. We think it is important to highlight this vote by the Committee. Despite vigorous debate and comment by other Members of Congress and the public at large (often based on inaccurate information or supposition) we want to reiterate our strong view that the congressional intelligence committees continue to be in the best position to review this issue.

The Committee's bipartisan vote emphasizes some critical points. First, the United States does not torture, and the intelligence community conducts itself in accordance with the law, including the treaty obligations of the United States. The Committee has been briefed on the interrogation techniques currently being used by the Intelligence Community, and has conducted intensive oversight of both the underlying policy and its application. Second, it is critical not to provide al Qaeda or other potential adversaries with an enumeration and explanation of those techniques. To do so would severely undermine the capabilities of the Intelligence Community to collect information, sometimes in critical circumstances, and accordingly the security of the United States.

While we fully recognize the importance of the underlying issues, we believe the better solution for the substantially more limited programs of the intelligence community is continued close and careful oversight, as provided for in the amendment adopted by the Committee on a bipartisan basis to prohibit the use of contractors in interrogations by the intelligence community, and several provisions of the classified annex to the bill.
Peter Hoekstra.
Terry Everett.
Elton Gallegly.
Mac Thornberry.
John M. McHugh.
Todd Tiahrt.
Mike Rogers.
Darrell Issa.