

**Advance Questions for Michael Vickers
Nominee for the Position of Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence**

1. Defense Reforms

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the Military Departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.

a. Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have endured for a generation. I do not see a need for any modifications at this time. If confirmed as the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), I will be alert to the need for any modifications.

b. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

2. Duties

a. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I))?

The USD(I)'s primary responsibility is to support the Secretary of Defense in discharging his intelligence-related responsibilities and authorities under Title 10 and Title 50 U.S.C. This includes: serving as the principal intelligence advisor to the Secretary of Defense; exercising authority, direction, and control on behalf of the Secretary of Defense over all intelligence organizations within the Department of Defense; ensuring that intelligence organizations in the Department of Defense are manned, organized, trained, and equipped to support the missions of the Department; ensuring that the DoD Components, which are also elements of the Intelligence Community, are responsive to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in the execution of the DNI's authorities; ensuring that the combatant forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the civilian leadership of the Department are provided with appropriate intelligence support; ensuring that counterintelligence activities in the Department are conducted and managed efficiently and effectively; ensuring that other sensitive activities which the Department conducts or supports are conducted and managed efficiently and effectively; overseeing Defense Department personnel, facility, and industrial security to ensure efficiency and effectiveness; serving as the Program Executive for the Military Intelligence Program, and ensuring that the

DoD Components funded by the National Intelligence Program are robust, balanced, and in compliance with the guidance and direction of the DNI; and ensuring that the Department provides the U.S. Congress with intelligence-related information sufficient to execute its oversight responsibilities.

b. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

If confirmed, I believe I have the background and experience to perform the duties of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. My qualifications include: my training, operational experience, duties, and accomplishments as a Special Forces soldier and officer, CIA Operations Officer, and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities (ASD SO/LIC&IC); my experience as a producer and consumer of intelligence at both the tactical/operational and national levels; my experience executing and overseeing clandestine operations and covert action programs; and my regular interaction and close relationships with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the leadership of the U.S. Intelligence Community, and the leadership of several key foreign intelligence services.

For the past three and a half years as ASD SO/LIC&IC, I have had responsibility for overseeing the global operations of the Department of Defense, including the war with al Qaeda, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and sensitive counter-proliferation and counter-narcotics operations. I have had responsibility for overseeing a wide-range of intelligence operations, spanning the full range of intelligence priorities and capabilities, and have had responsibility for overseeing and supporting the full-range of special activities conducted by other agencies of the U.S. Government. As a member of the Deputy's Advisory Working Group, I have participated in the major resource allocation decisions of the Department, including many involving national and military intelligence. I have had access to all of the Department's special access programs.

As a senior policy official, I have participated extensively in Deputies' Committee Meetings, and occasionally, Principals' Committee Meetings and meetings of the National Security Council chaired by the President, and through this experience, I have developed a keen appreciation for how intelligence supports policy. As a result of my oversight of global operations and the operational capabilities of the Department, I have developed a deep understanding of intelligence-driven operations and the Department's intelligence capabilities, including those in the cyber domain.

I am a graduate of the CIA's Career Training Program and a CIA-certified Operations Officer. I have served operationally in three CIA Divisions: Latin America, Special Activities, and Near East and South Asia. I have had extensive interaction and have a close relationship with the Director and Deputy Directors of the CIA, as well as the Chiefs of CIA Centers, Divisions, Offices, and Stations and Bases. I have had extensive interaction and have a close relationship with the DNI and the staff and components of ODNI. I have had extensive interaction with and have a deep understanding of the

intelligence organizations of the Department of Defense. I have had frequent interaction and have close relationships with the heads of several foreign intelligence services.

c. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the USD(I)?

If confirmed, I believe there are actions I would need to take to strengthen OUSD(I)'s oversight of the military intelligence program and clandestine activities and support for the national intelligence program. I also believe there are actions I could take that could achieve further efficiencies across the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.

d. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect that the Secretary of Defense would prescribe for you?

If confirmed, I believe the Secretary would expect me to discharge the duties and functions – both explicit and implicit – as outlined in 2a above. I believe the Secretary would expect me to ensure full intelligence support for ongoing operations; to ensure that intelligence operations conducted by the Department of Defense are effective and in compliance with all relevant statutes, authorities, directives, and policies; to ensure that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is postured to prevent strategic surprise; to ensure, without abrogating the Secretary's statutory responsibilities, that the DNI has visibility and oversight over the full range of intelligence activities in the Department; and to ensure that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is as efficient as possible. The Secretary may also assign me other duties as his priorities and my background and experience warrant.

3. Relationships

The Secretary of Defense

If confirmed as USD(I), I will provide my full support to the Secretary of Defense in carrying out my duties as his principal advisor on intelligence, counterintelligence, and security. I will keep him informed, seek his guidance and direction, exercise his oversight authority on intelligence, counterintelligence, and security-related matters throughout the Department, and attempt to relieve him of as many burdens in the intelligence domain as possible.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

If confirmed as USD(I), I will keep the Deputy Secretary fully informed of my activities and will afford him the same support provided the Secretary of Defense.

The Under Secretaries of Defense

Each of the Under Secretaries has vital functions to carry out. If confirmed as USD(I), I will work closely with each of them. A close relationship between the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the USD(I) is particularly important. In my current position as ASD SO/LIC&IC, I have worked to forge a close relationship between Defense Policy and Defense Intelligence and between Policy and the broader Intelligence Community. I have also worked closely with components of the IC on major collection systems. If confirmed as USD(I), I would to continue to build on these relationships.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Network and Information Integration/Successor Organization

ASD/NII has had oversight of enabling capabilities which are central to the conduct of intelligence and security-related activities. If confirmed, I will work closely with the successor organization to ASD/NII to ensure that this support remains robust.

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Policy

If confirmed, I will work closely with the DASD for Detainee Policy on the intelligence aspects of detainee policy and operations.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict & Interdependent Capabilities (ASD SOLIC&IC)

USD(I) and the ASD SO/LIC&IC interact on several important matters, and this interaction has grown substantially during my tenure ASD SO/LIC&IC . As the previous ASD SO/LIC&IC, I will be well placed, if confirmed, to ensure that this close interaction continues. If confirmed, I would seek to further expand the already close relationships that exist between Defense Intelligence and Special Operations Forces (SOF) and between the broader Intelligence Community and SOF.

The Service Secretaries and the Service Intelligence Directors

If confirmed as USD(I), as the Program Executive for the Military Intelligence Program, I will work with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Service Intelligence Directors to ensure their intelligence requirements are met, that the Military Departments and Services develop intelligence capabilities appropriate for the current and future security environment, and that the intelligence organizations contribute to meeting the intelligence needs of their respective Military Department/Service, the Joint Force, the Department, and the Nation.

The General Counsel of the Department of Defense (DOD)

As ASD SO/LIC&IC, I have worked very closely with the General Counsel and his staff. If confirmed as USD(I), I will continue to work closely with the General Counsel, and seek his advice on the myriad legal issues that impact USD(I)'s duties and functions.

The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

As ASD SO/LIC&IC, I have worked closely with the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a wide range of issues. If confirmed as USD(I), I would continue this close relationship to ensure that Defense Intelligence and the Intelligence Community meet the requirements of the Joint Staff and Combatant Commands.

The Commanders of the Combatant Commands, including U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and U.S. Cyber Command

As ASD SO/LIC&IC, I have had policy oversight of U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and U.S. Transportation Command. I was involved in the initial planning for the establishment of Cyber Command. I have had close relationships with all of the Geographic Combatant Commanders. If confirmed as USD(I), I will build on these relationships to ensure that the intelligence needs of the Commanders of the Combatant Commands are met.

The Directors of the Defense intelligence agencies

As ASD SO/LIC&IC, I have worked closely with the Directors of the Defense intelligence agencies. If confirmed as USD(I), I will exercise the Secretary of Defense's authority, direction, and control over NSA, NGA, NRO, and DIA. In this capacity, I will provide planning, policy, and strategic oversight over the intelligence, counterintelligence, and security policy, plans, and programs they execute. I will work with the Office of the DNI to ensure clear and unambiguous guidance is provided to the Defense intelligence agencies.

The Director of National Intelligence

As ASD SO/LIC&IC, I have worked closely with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and its components, and have worked closely with the Director. If confirmed as USD(I), I intend to fully support the DNI in his goal of greater Intelligence Community integration. Dual-hatted as the DNI's Director of Defense Intelligence, if confirmed, I will advise the DNI on defense intelligence capabilities. I will exercise the Secretary of Defense's authority, direction, and control over the Directors of NSA, NGA, NRO and DIA, and I will consult with the DNI regarding national intelligence and related matters as appropriate.

The Director of Central Intelligence

As ASD SO/LIC&IC, I have worked to forge a particularly close relationship between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department. If confirmed as USD(I), I will strive to forge an even closer relationship with the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and will fully support him in his role as National Manager for Human Intelligence.

The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center

As ASD SO/LIC&IC, I have worked very closely with the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center. If confirmed as USD(I), I will build on this already close relationship, and provide policy, oversight, and guidance for all Defense intelligence, counterintelligence, and security support provided to the National Counterterrorism Center.

The Deputy and Assistant Directors of National Intelligence

If confirmed as USD(I), I will fully support the Deputy and Assistant Directors of National Intelligence to ensure unity of effort in the direction and oversight of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.

Officials in the Department of Homeland Security with intelligence responsibilities

If confirmed as USD(I), I will serve as the Secretary of Defense's focal point for intelligence, counterintelligence, and security matters for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). I will work with DHS to expand our intelligence and law enforcement information sharing initiatives with state and local authorities.

4. Major Challenges and Problems

a. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the USD(I)?

The major challenges that, in my view, will confront the next USD(I) are the continued unprecedented scope and pace of global operations and unmet demand for intelligence in an era of intelligence-driven operations; the need to adapt to a rapidly changing intelligence environment; the need to address longer-term challenges to prevent strategic surprise while fully supporting ongoing operations; and the need to do all this in a more constrained fiscal environment. Additionally, we must do a better job of protecting intelligence sources and methods and preventing unauthorized disclosure of information.

b. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

If I am confirmed, given the importance of intelligence to ongoing operations, I would do my best to ensure that sufficient resources are devoted to the Defense Intelligence

Enterprise, and that intelligence is shared as widely as possible while also ensuring that it is properly protected. I would also ensure that the clear priorities are established, that actions are taken to mitigate strategic risk, and that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is as efficient and adaptive as possible.

c. What do you anticipate will be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the USD(I)?

One of the most serious problems currently confronting the USD(I) is the unauthorized disclosure of classified information. The spate of unauthorized disclosures of very sensitive information places our forces, our military operations, and our foreign relations at risk. It threatens to undermine senior leaders' confidence in the confidentiality of their deliberations, and the confidence our foreign partners have that classified information they share with us will be protected.

d. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?

The Office of the USD(I) (OUSD(I)) recently led a comprehensive review of information security policy. If confirmed, I will work with the DoD Chief Information Officer to facilitate immediate implementation of the review's recommendations, as appropriate, and will take additional actions as required.

5. Priorities

As ASD/SOLIC&IC, you were quoted as saying: "I spend about 95 percent of my time on operations" leaving the rest of your time for "service secretary-like" activities including policy, personnel, organizational, and development and acquisition decisions impacting special operations forces.

a. Do you believe that division of time was appropriate in your position as ASD/SOLIC&IC?

I have been assigned a very broad set of responsibilities during my tenure as ASD SO/LIC&IC. Per the statutory obligations of ASD SO/LIC&IC, I have oversight of Special Operations Forces. I also serve as the Secretary's principal advisor on Irregular Warfare matters across the Department. I help provide oversight of the Department's global operations, including the war with al Qa'ida and its affiliates and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and have shared oversight of the Department's clandestine operations and sensitive activities, including several which have involved the collection of intelligence. I have regularly participated in the national security policy decision-making process at Deputies' Committee meetings, and serve as the Secretary's principal advisor on special activities conducted by other agencies of the U.S. Government. In my Interdependent Capabilities role, I have had oversight of the Department's strategic and conventional forces, in addition to the Department's Special Operations Forces. I also help oversee the Department's special access programs. I have oversight of the

Department counter-narcotics and counter-threat finance activities, stability operations, partnership strategy, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and was recently assigned responsibility for overseeing additional aspects of the Department's information operations.

The time I have personally devoted to each of these areas has varied, consistent with their importance to the Department's mission and the degree to which I could delegate oversight to my Principal Deputy. During the first eighteen months of my tenure, I spent substantial amounts of time on capability and resource allocation decisions across strategic, conventional and Special Operations Forces. During the 2009-2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, I focused intensely on the Special Operations and Irregular Warfare capabilities of the Department. The unprecedented scale and scope of operations in which U.S. forces are involved, and the strategic importance of and oversight required for sensitive activities conducted by the U.S. have required increasing amounts of my time since mid-2008. With the war with al Qa'ida and its affiliates, the war in Afghanistan, and other sensitive operations for which I have oversight responsibilities, the preponderance of my time in 2010 has been devoted to oversight of operations. This has been in line with the President's and Secretary's priorities. Throughout my tenure as ASD SO/LIC&IC, blessed with my exceptionally capable and willing partner in Admiral Eric Olson, I believe that I have provided the strong oversight of and advocacy for Special Operations Forces that the Congress intended when it established the position of ASD SO/LIC. I likewise believe I have been effective in fulfilling my duties across my entire portfolio. Accordingly, I believe that the allocation of my time has been appropriate.

b. How would you anticipate dividing your time as the USD(I)?

Although there is some overlap, the duties and functions assigned to USD(I) are very different from those I currently have as ASD SO/LIC&IC. That said, if confirmed, I would use similar approach to allocating my time: focusing on the President's and Secretary's top priorities and on the most difficult challenges, and delegating other responsibilities where I can to my Principal Deputy or other senior staff. I would anticipate dividing my time broadly between oversight of intelligence operations, the development of intelligence capabilities, and other duties as the Secretary and the DNI may assign.

c. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of issues which must be addressed by the USD(I)?

If confirmed as USD(I), I would establish the following broad priorities: (1) ensuring that the full weight of Defense intelligence capabilities are brought to bear to achieve the President's objective of disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al Qa'ida, creating and sustaining stability in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq, and supporting other ongoing operations in which the Department is engaged or may be engaged; (2) ensuring that intelligence operations conducted by the Department of Defense are effective and in compliance with all relevant statutes, authorities, directives, and policies; (3) ensuring

that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is postured to prevent strategic surprise and fully exploit emerging opportunities; and (4) ensuring that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is as efficient as possible. I would expect to pay particular attention to ensuring that we have the right collection and analytical priorities, that we have a robust ISR architecture (both space and airborne), today and in the future, that the Department's clandestine operations are fully integrated with those of the CIA and National Clandestine Service, that the President's highest priority intelligence programs are fully resourced, that analysis addresses policy makers and operational commanders' needs, that intelligence is timely, accessible and protected, and, where appropriate, that we aggressively exploit advances in technology to improve our intelligence capabilities.

6. Combating Terrorism

a. What is your understanding and assessment of the Department's comprehensive strategy for combating terrorism, both at home and abroad?

The Department's counterterrorism strategy directly supports the President's stated goal to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its affiliates, first operationally and regionally, and then strategically and globally. Operationally defeating al Qaeda and its affiliates requires actions that render the organization incapable of planning and conducting attacks. Doing this requires, among other things, that the relationship between al Qaeda and groups that support al Qaeda and provide it sanctuary be severed. Strategically defeating al Qaeda requires preventing AQ's resurgence. Achieving these aims requires a sustained global CT campaign involving several mutually reinforcing direct and indirect lines of operation. These include preventing the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups, conducting operations to disrupt, dismantle and defeat terrorist organizations and deny them sanctuary, building the capacity of our partners, and countering radicalization. Within zones of hostilities, the Department has a lead role, along with our international partners. Outside such zones and those areas where named operations authorized by the President are being conducted, the Department plays a supporting role. While al Qaeda and its affiliates remain the most dangerous threat to the United States, my assessment is that we – the Department, the U.S. Government, and our international partners -- have the correct strategy, and it is increasingly working, particularly since mid-2008.

b. If confirmed, how would you fulfill your responsibilities related to combating terrorism?

If confirmed, I will build on the work of my predecessors to ensure that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise is fully engaged and supportive of all efforts to defeat al Qaeda and combat terrorism. I will work closely with the Military Departments and Services, the Defense intelligence agencies, the Combatant Commanders, the Intelligence Community, and our international partners to ensure that we have the intelligence capabilities we need to achieve our CT objectives.

c. How can the Department best structure itself to ensure that all forms of terrorism are effectively confronted?

During my tenure as the ASD SO/LIC&IC, it has become increasingly clear to me that close collaboration among U.S. departments and agencies and with our international partners is essential to CT success. Within DoD, we have restructured our organization to ensure full interagency contributions to the fight, through the establishment, for example, of Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATFs). We have forged an extremely close operational partnership with CIA and the Intelligence Community, and we have substantially strengthened our international capacity building efforts. We have also given top priority to the rapid development of CT and COIN capabilities. I believe these actions posture the Department to effectively combat terrorism.

d. Are there steps the Department should take to better coordinate its efforts to combat terrorism with those of other federal agencies?

During my tenure as ASD SO/LIC&IC, we have worked hard to achieve unity of effort in CT operations across the U.S. national and homeland security establishment. This has included significant efforts to improve coordination of operations and interagency concurrence. If confirmed as USD(I), I would seek to build on this by moving, for example, from coordination of intelligence operations to integration.

7. Section 1208 Operations

As ASD/SOLIC&IC, you had oversight of all “Section 1208” activities by special operations forces to provide support (including training, funding, and equipment) to foreign regular forces, irregular forces, and individuals supporting or facilitating military operations to combat terrorism.

a. What is your assessment of this authority?

Since its enactment in 2005, Section 1208 has been a critical authority for the war with al Qaeda and for counterterrorism and related counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the specific details of Section 1208 use are classified, it has enabled important human intelligence operations, operational preparation of the environment, advance force operations, unconventional warfare operations, and partnered CT operations.

b. Do you believe changes to the authority and/or funding restrictions are needed?

I support the current request for additional funding authority, raising the annual funding level restriction from \$40M to \$50M, and I support extending the authority for the duration of named counterterrorist operations and for other contingencies.

8. Special Operations Missions

During your time as ASD/SOLIC&IC, special operations forces expanded their role in a number of areas important to countering violent extremist organizations, including those related to information and military intelligence operations. Some have advocated significant changes to USSOCOM's Title 10 missions to make them better reflect the activities special operations forces are carrying out around the world.

a. What changes, if any, would you recommend to USSOCOM's Title 10 missions?

The list of special operations activities in Section 167 of Title 10, United States Code could be updated to reflect USSOCOM's current list of core tasks and the missions assigned to it in the Unified Command Plan. The language in Section 167 of Title 10, United States Code also includes "such other activities as may be specified by the President or the Secretary of Defense," which provides the President and the Secretary the flexibility they need to meet changing circumstances.

b. What do you believe is the appropriate role of special operations forces in the Department's information operations?

Information operations are a core SOF task. They are a vital instrument in countering violent extremism and other trans-national threats. They can greatly enable unconventional warfare operations. Information operations support special operations from the combatant command level to the tactical battlefield.

c. In your view, how are intelligence operations carried out by special operations personnel different from those carried out by others in the intelligence community?

Some intelligence operations conducted by special operations personnel have unique attributes which are a function of the background, training, and experience of special operators, the missions assigned to their organizations, the intelligence targets they pursue, and the collection methods they employ. Special operations intelligence activities primarily support SOF intelligence requirements. However, when directed, SOF intelligence operations also support Intelligence Community and Combatant Commander requirements. For certain national collection missions, SOF personnel receive the same training as officers in national intelligence organizations.

d. If confirmed, how would you ensure intelligence activities carried out by special operations forces are adequately coordinated with other activities carried out by those in the intelligence community?

Special Operations Forces coordinate their intelligence activities with the Intelligence Community as required by applicable law, policy, and agreements, including Intelligence Community Directive Number 304 and the Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency Concerning Operational

Activities, July 20, 2005. If confirmed, I would further the operational integration between SOF and the Intelligence Community that has progressively been put in place during my tenure as ASD SO/LIC&IC.

9. Military Information Support Operations

a. If confirmed, what role, if any, would you have with respect to military information support operations?

The Defense Intelligence Enterprise plays a crucial role in support of military information support operations. Collecting and analyzing the information required to understand complex foreign human environments is the foundation for effective information operations. Additionally, if confirmed, I will ensure that military information operations are properly coordinated and operationally integrated with the information operations of other organizations within the Intelligence Community.

The Department of Defense recently announced that it was discontinuing use of the term “psychological operations” in favor of the term “military information support operations.”

b. Why do you believe such a terminology change was necessary?

Psychological operations as a term had become increasingly anachronistic, and had taken on avoidable, negative connotations. Military information support operations is a more accurate description of the purpose of these operations.

c. What operational and doctrinal impacts do you believe such a change will have?

I believe it will have positive operational and doctrinal impacts.

d. In your experience as ASD/SOLIC&IC, do you believe the Armed Forces have sufficient personnel and other assets to conduct the range of military information support missions being asked of them?

As ASD SOLIC&IC, and as a senior advisor to the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review before that, I strongly supported significant growth in our psychological operations/military information support operations force structure. MISO forces remain in high demand across our Combatant Commands. Military information support operations require specially trained personnel and unique capabilities, and such personnel are important assets not only for the Department, but for other departments and agencies of the U.S. Government as well. Given the rapid rate of change in the information environment and the diverse character of this environment, sustained modernization and a diverse portfolio of capabilities is required. Our long-term goal is measured growth and significant quality improvements for this force.

10. Countering Violent Extremism

Over the past few years, the Department of Defense has funded a growing number of psychological operations and influence programs under the rubric of strategic communications programs. While the Department does not have any separate documentation outlining these activities, the Government Accountability Office reports that DOD "spent hundreds of millions of dollars each year" to support these operations, including initiatives funded by the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization and the geographic combatant commands. Many of these programs support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but Military Information Support Teams (MISTs) from USSOCOM are also deploying to U.S. embassies in countries of particular interest around the globe to bolster the efforts of the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development. In your capacity as ASD/SOLIC&IC, you had limited oversight of a number of these programs. In the position for which you have been nominated, you will continue to play a role in these programs.

What are your views on DOD's strategic communications, psychological operations and influence programs and their integration into overall U.S. foreign policy objectives?

The effectiveness of Department information operations in the rapidly evolving global information environment is an increasingly important determinant of our ability to achieve U.S. military objectives. DoD has an important role in information operations, particularly, but by no means exclusively, in zones of armed conflict. DoD information operations must be integrated with other U.S. Government efforts – those by the Department of State and other government agencies -- to shape information environments to our advantage. They must also reduce our adversaries' abilities to do the same.

In 2005, Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qa'ida's second-in-command, declared that "We are in a battle, and more than half of it is taking place in the battlefield of the media." Earlier this year, a non-partisan study highlighted the lack of a U.S. strategy to counter radical ideologies that foment violence (e.g. Islamism or Salafist-Jihadism).

b. As ASD/SOLIC&IC, what did you do to further DOD's strategic appreciation of the ideological basis of al-Qa'ida and its affiliates?

DoD fully recognizes the importance of al-Qa'ida's ideology and the extent to which it underpins the al-Qa'ida movement. As ASD SO/LIC&IC, I worked to advance this strategic appreciation within DoD and across the interagency. I have strongly advocated for programs and activities, many of which are conducted by other Departments and Agencies of the U.S. Government, to deal with the ideological challenge posed by al Qa'ida and its affiliates. In the unclassified realm, my office was recently involved in the establishment of the Department of State-led Center for Strategic Counterterrorism

Communications, which will serve as the interagency focal point for USG counter-radicalization efforts.

c. In your view, how do we counter radical ideologies that foment violence?

The most effective counter will be within the affected population and the radical groups themselves.

d. What do you understand to be the role of the intelligence community, as opposed to the Department of Defense and the State Department?

The Intelligence Community has special authorities and capabilities that can be brought to bear. Intelligence collection and analysis informs all information operations.

e. If confirmed, how would you plan to utilize the results of research being conducted by DOD's Minerva and Human Social Cultural Behavioral Modeling programs?

Research from the Minerva program and the applications developed as part of Human Social Cultural Behavioral (HSCB) Modeling program are components of the overall Defense Intelligence effort to improve socio-cultural information. As currently envisioned by OUSD(I), the socio-cultural analytic effort will integrate social science research, all-source analysis and regional expertise into fused intelligence products. The modeling capabilities in HSCB will help analysts manage and visualize large volumes of data on economics, infrastructure, demographics, etc. Insights developed as a result of enhanced capabilities could also improve the Intelligence Community's ability to provide warning on emerging crises.

11. Information Operations

Information operations, as currently defined by DOD, includes electronic warfare, operational security, computer network operations, psychological operations, and military deception -- each of these lines of operations is unique and complex, and, in some cases, interwoven.

a. What do you understand to be the roles of the OUSD(I) in overseeing DOD information operations?

The roles and missions for Information Operations are being addressed by a Front End Assessment. I would expect that the OUSD(I) will continue to play an appropriate role in the oversight of several of these areas.

b. What are your views on the roles assigned to USD(I) and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy with respect to information operations, and particularly offensive computer network operations? If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you consider recommending to the Secretary of Defense?

The Front End Assessment is addressing this question. Some aspects of IO, as currently defined, will likely migrate to Policy, while others will likely remain in USD(I). I would expect that the USD(I) will continue to play an important role in overseeing computer network operations.

c. Given the formation of a separate U.S. Cyber Command, what are your views on retaining computer network operations as a core competency with information operations?

“Information Operations,” as currently defined, refers to the integration of various information activities to achieve effects across the information environment, which includes the cyber domain. The formation of U.S. Cyber Command will not change the relationship of computer network operations to the other capabilities necessary for DoD to conduct information and cyber-related operations. It will, however, enhance our ability to conduct information operations in the cyber domain. As noted above, oversight of IO and its components, as currently defined, is being addressed in a Front End Assessment.

12. Counter Threat Finance

A number of officials in DOD and the Intelligence Community (IC) have called for applying significantly more resources and attention to identifying, tracking, and halting the flow of money associated with the terrorist networks and the illegal narcotics trade. Comparable efforts have been undertaken by the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization against the flow of money and components supporting the construction and employment of improvised explosive devices.

a. What are your views on efforts to invest additional resources into identifying and tracking the flow of money associated with terrorism and narcotics, especially in Afghanistan?

Engaging all USG tools to track and halt the flow of money associated with terrorist networks, the illegal narcotics trade, and other threats to the U.S. Government is critical. The narco-insurgent nexus is a key enabler, for example, of the insurgency in Afghanistan. While DoD is not the USG lead in counter threat finance, it does have a role to play. We are in the process of building an appropriate CTF capability within DoD, and will be alert to the need for additional resources.

b. As ASD/SOLIC&IC, you were responsible for a portion of the counter threat finance duties in the Department. What is your assessment of DOD’s current counter threat finance organizational structure?

DoD's threat finance structure is still developing, but it is headed in the right direction. In August 2009, Deputy Secretary Lynn approved the DoD Directive on Counter Threat Finance Policy, which formalizes CTF as a DoD mission. CTF Interagency Task Forces

are making important contributions to our counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan. A critical element of success in the CTF area will be DoD's ability to support the Department of Treasury, which has the counter-threat finance lead for the U.S. Government. The ODNI is also working to strengthen the Treasury Department's capabilities with respect to counter-threat finance intelligence.

13. Information Sharing

There are still strong barriers to sharing, or allowing access to, the mass of raw intelligence data that has not been included in finished reports or analyses and approved for dissemination within the intelligence community. As long as these barriers exist, DNI Clapper's vision of an integrated repository with analytic tools able to "connect-the-dots" cannot be achieved. The implication is that the Nation will remain more vulnerable to terrorist attacks than it could be. The reasons cited to justify these information access barriers are the need to protect sources and methods and the privacy of U.S. persons.

a. What are your views about whether it is possible to provide greater access to counterterrorism data to analysts and Special Forces while adequately protecting intelligence sources and properly minimizing exposure of U.S. persons information?

I believe it is possible to provide greater access to counterterrorism data to analysts and Special Forces while adequately protecting intelligence sources and properly minimizing exposure of U.S. persons information. While cognizant of the problem we face with respect to the unauthorized disclosure of classified information, if confirmed, I will seek, in concert with the DNI, to enable better, faster, and deeper sharing of counterterrorism data. We have already made significant progress in this area. Until very recently, multiple U.S. military, civil and coalition networks in Afghanistan were unable to communicate with one another. We have moved to a common, integrated network – the Afghan Mission Network -- and one common database – Combined Information Data Network Exchange -- that supports intelligence, military operations, command and control and logistics across all U.S. entities and 46 partner nations. This approach of establishing a common network and common database has allowed us to ensure that all releasable national, tactical and commercially available data from across the DoD and IC is available and discoverable.

b. Do you agree with DNI Clapper that these barriers are mainly "cultural" in nature?

Yes, I agree with the DNI. Reflecting upon my own operational experiences and the intelligence support I have received over the years, it is clear that the IC has produced multiple generations of intelligence analysts and leaders inculcated with the philosophy that "need to know" had to be proven before information could be shared. Under that approach, the first and foremost rule was to protect sources and methods, or the result would be loss of sensitive capabilities and lives. While protecting sources and methods must remain a critical concern and "need to share" cannot trump "need to know," there

can be an even greater risk to mission or potential loss of life if information is not shared between government agencies and with our allies. As USDI, Mr. Clapper initiated and, if confirmed, I will continue to foster policy changes and make investments in training and capability development that will make “Responsibility to Provide” the mind set for the entire DoD enterprise. This is already underway in our schoolhouses where “Write for Release” is part of the curriculum, and in our acquisition programs where federated information sharing via common protocols is an integral part of all fielding efforts at the enterprise intelligence architecture level, the Combatant Commands and the Military Departments.

c. What role do you expect to play in addressing this issue if confirmed to be USD(I)?

If confirmed, I will work closely with the ODNI to ensure that as we build out our information sharing capability, we do it in full synchronization with the IC. I will also ensure that we have appropriate controls in place to prevent unauthorized disclosure of information.

14. Homeland Defense

With the establishment of the positions of USD(I), the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs, and the Commander of U.S. Northern Command, the DOD has been fundamentally reorganized to better address the critical homeland defense mission.

a. In your view, what challenges lie ahead in integrating the intelligence capabilities of the DOD with those of the Department of Homeland Security and other associated Federal, State, and local agencies?

Two of the long-standing challenges to integrating the intelligence capabilities of DoD with those of the Department of Homeland Security and other associated Federal, State, and local agencies have been IT compatibility and guidance on sharing classified information. With the issuance of Executive Order 13549, Classified National Security Information Program for State, Local, Tribal and Private Sector (SLTPS) Entities, we have made significant progress in the latter. The Executive Order establishes the right balance between sharing classified information with SLTPS entities in support of homeland defense, while ensuring proper safeguards are in place for protecting information from unauthorized disclosure. OUSD(I) is currently assisting DHS and other agencies in the development of implementation policy, and will have an ongoing role in supporting an integrated approach.

b. Does the DOD’s existing requirements setting process adequately support the establishment of intelligence requirements for the homeland defense mission?

The technical solutions needed to inject homeland defense intelligence requirements into the overall DoD requirements setting process now exist or are in development. Dividing

finite resources among existing DoD intelligence requirements, while ensuring adequate support for requirements unique to the homeland defense mission will present a significant challenge. Adequate intelligence support must be provided, however. Al Qaeda continues to pose a grave threat to the American homeland, and for at least a decade, intelligence professionals have recognized that the foreign-domestic divide has been shattered by trans-national terrorist groups.

15. Effectiveness of USD(I)

The Secretary of Defense took the extraordinary step of establishing an independent ISR Task Force in early 2008 to rectify major shortfalls in support to ongoing military and counterterrorism operations. The Secretary determined that the military services had not sufficiently deployed innovative solutions to meet the requirements of combatant commanders. Responsibility for this problem lay not only with the military services but also the functional manager for intelligence – the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)).

Do you believe that the Secretary’s initiative suggests that the OUSD(I) lacks expertise, initiative, or clout, or some combination thereof, or do you think that other factors prevented appropriate action?

The ISR Task Force was established by Secretary Gates to assess and propose options for maximizing and optimizing deployed ISR capabilities in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. It has been led by an OUSD(I) Deputy Under Secretary, and is primarily staffed by OUSD(I) personnel, though it is also comprised of personnel from OSD (AT&L), the Services, Joint Staff and Combat Support Agencies. The establishment of the ISR Task Force does not reflect a unique shortfall within OUSD(I). Rather, gaps exist in the ability of the Department to quickly meet the urgent near-term needs of our warfighters, particularly when facing a rapidly evolving threat. This gap is not just confined to ISR or intelligence. The same extraordinary process was required, for example, to rapidly procure Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAPs) and develop additional counter-IED capabilities for Afghanistan. The establishment of the ISR Task Force provided the focus and resources necessary to pursue rapid acquisition of ISR assets. Its efforts are part of a larger Departmental effort to expand and institutionalize a rapid acquisition capability led by the USD (AT&L). As a result of the ISR Task Force’s success, it was determined that there is an enduring need for the focus and effectiveness the Task Force has brought to integrating ISR systems into Joint Operations. Accordingly, the Secretary notified Congress on September 16, 2010, that he was institutionalizing the responsibilities of the ISR Task Force within the OUSD(I).

16. Dual Hat as Director of Defense Intelligence

In May 2007, Secretary Gates and DNI McConnell signed a Memorandum of Agreement designating the USD(I) as the Director of Defense Intelligence under the DNI.

a. What is your understanding of the authorities and responsibilities of this office under the DNI?

The position of the Director of Defense Intelligence (DDI) was established within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) to assist the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in the execution of DNI responsibilities for the oversight of Defense intelligence matters. As the principal advisor to the DNI and ODNI for defense intelligence, the DDI is responsible for: requirements, intelligence activities, and advice and assistance. This includes:

- Overseeing the development of DoD's national intelligence requirements on behalf of the DNI;
- Facilitating alignment, coordination, and deconfliction between National and Defense Intelligence activities; and
- Advising and assisting the DNI by synchronizing and integrating Defense intelligence functions with other IC elements.

By creating this "dual-hat" arrangement, the DDI can exercise authority on behalf of the DNI, while the USD(I) exercises authorities delegated to him by the Secretary of Defense.

b. What is your assessment of the relevance or importance of this dual designation, and whether it should be continued?

I believe strongly in the DDI/USD(I) dual-hat arrangement, and strongly support its continuation. I believe it is the most effective way to serve the defense intelligence needs of both the Secretary of Defense and the DNI, and it is a key instrument for achieving greater integration of U.S. intelligence. The DDI/USD(I), attends all National Intelligence Boards, all DNI Executive Committee meetings, and, all senior ODNI staff meetings. The DDI/USD(I) meets weekly with the DNI in a one-on-one session. A full-time senior liaison officer resides in each staff in an effort to enhance communication and coordination. If confirmed, I would plan to build on, and expand the collaboration between the OUSD(I) and ODNI staffs through this arrangement.

17. USD(I) Role in Intelligence Personnel, Acquisition, and Policy

DOD senior leaders include Under Secretaries responsible for personnel, policy, and acquisition matters, yet the OUSD(I) includes staff with responsibilities for each of these areas as they apply to the intelligence mission.

a. In your view, should the OUSD(I) staff continue to duplicate the functions and resources of these other Under Secretaries? If so, why?

I do not view the OUSD(I) staff functions as duplicative, but rather complementary. The Intelligence components of the Department operate under the authority of the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) in Title 10 of the U.S. Code. In coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)), the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), and the DNI, the OUSD(I) staff provides oversight on behalf of the USD(I) to ensure these programs are aligned both within the Department and the broader Intelligence Community. The USD(I) is uniquely positioned to provide oversight of sensitive DoD programs that are integral to the Intelligence Community, including those exercised clandestinely, and to ensure that those programs complement the activities of the entire Department and the DNI. These efforts ensure maximum effectiveness and efficiency of the consolidated National Intelligence and Defense Intelligence programs.

The USD(I) is the Principal Staff Assistant responsible for promulgation of intelligence policies within the DoD (DODD 5143.01). In this capacity, the USD(I) exercises the authorities to ensure efficient use of resources for the intelligence mission set. DoD routinely interacts with the Intelligence Community, and those interactions require special consideration in order to preserve the necessary division between national and military intelligence activities. The USD(I) provides oversight of training, education and career development for all Defense intelligence personnel. This oversight enables the Department to develop a cadre of well rounded and experienced intelligence experts and to horizontally integrate existing and new capabilities for warfighters. Without this focused oversight, the efficiency and effectiveness of the DoD Intelligence Enterprise would be put at risk. The Department also has responsibility to provide specialized oversight of all Military Intelligence Program funding. Congress has recognized the importance of this oversight in the areas of acquisition, security, personnel, and resources.

OUSD(I) provides advice and assistance to OUSD(AT&L) concerning acquisition programs and processes that significantly affect Defense intelligence, counterintelligence, and security components. Additionally, OUSD(I) works closely with OUSD(AT&L) and ODNI on programs that are funded by the National Intelligence Program and executed in the Department. This advice and assistance is integral to OUSD(I)'s Military Intelligence Program oversight and Battlespace Awareness Capability Portfolio Management responsibilities.

b. What is your understanding and view of the military departments' initiatives with respect to their tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence collection and analysis force structure and technologies?

The Military Departments understand that we are operating in a resource-constrained environment, and they are developing initiatives and strategies to field comprehensive

capabilities providing optimized intelligence to full-spectrum operations. If I am confirmed as USD(I), they will have my full support. These strategies provide a range of investment options to realign and reinvest in existing capabilities, while still providing timely, fused, and actionable intelligence to the Joint Force. I support the SECDEF's effort to maximize production of ISR capabilities in support of U.S. forces in combat, as evidenced by the ISR Task Force Initiative. If confirmed, I will work with the Intelligence Community, the Military Departments, and the Combat Support Agencies to ensure an integrated effort. I will meet with the Service Intelligence Chiefs, the Joint Staff J2, the Combat Support Agency Directors, and the Combatant Commands to ensure I have a clear understanding of their highest priority initiatives.

c. If confirmed, what would be your priorities among these initiatives and how would you propose to provide policy and program oversight and support them with appropriate resources?

If confirmed, my priorities would be nested with the SECDEF's Planning Guidance and the Director of National Intelligence's National Intelligence Strategy. I would ensure that the initiatives and strategies of the Military Departments were also nested with SECDEF priorities, and through my office of Joint & Coalition Warfighter Support, would provide the necessary oversight of their plans and programs. My top priority is to support our forces engaged in combat operations with the best intelligence available. To do that, we need to balance our capabilities at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war. We would improve innovation and pursue technological advances in support of information sharing – from policy to hardware to analysts; improving collection and exploitation, countering current and emerging threats, strengthening counterintelligence, and improving our security processes.

18. Efficiencies Issues

The Secretary of Defense has announced his intention to eliminate the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration (NII) and the J-6 from the Joint Staff on the grounds that other organizations in the Department perform similar functions, particularly the Defense Information Systems Agency and U.S. Cyber Command. Similarly, the Department has a number of combat support defense agencies that are totally engaged in intelligence – such as NSA, DIA, NGA, and the NRO. There is also the DNI who manages intelligence, including all the national intelligence agencies within the Department. Each military service has an intelligence chief as well. Cyber Command, Strategic Command, and each of the other combatant commands have major intelligence components and missions.

a. In your view, does the logic that led to the decision to eliminate NII and the J-6 imply that USD(I) and the J-2 should also be eliminated in view of the role played by DIA, NSA, NGA, NRO, Cyber Command, and STRATCOM? Why or why not?

The Secretary of Defense is examining the Department's intelligence organization, responsibilities and authorities as part of his efficiency effort. That endeavor is ongoing, and at this point the Secretary has not made any final decisions. Key members of the OUSD(I) staff are participating in the efficiency effort to inform the larger efficiency team about the intricacies of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise. In my view, there is a radical difference between streamlining oversight and management of command, control, and communications functions and those of a diverse intelligence enterprise. The USD(I), on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, coordinates, oversees and orchestrates the multidiscipline components of the global Defense intelligence enterprise and its interaction with the Intelligence Community. I believe the creation of the position of USD(I) was a major step forward in the oversight of defense intelligence, and that the dual-hatting of USD(I) as the DNI Director of Defense Intelligence ensures that Defense Intelligence is fully integrated into the U.S. Intelligence Community. I would not support its elimination. I likewise believe that the J-2 provides critical intelligence support to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Unified Combatant Commands.

b. Do you see an opportunity for the elimination of redundant layers of bureaucracy and greater efficiency in the operation and management of the defense intelligence community, including the combatant commands and the service component commands?

The Secretary of Defense initiated an efficiency effort that includes the review of the organizations and functions of Defense intelligence enterprise components to identify overlaps and inefficiencies. This effort includes a review of the entire enterprise to include the Defense intelligence agencies, Service intelligence components, and all of the Combatant Command Joint Intelligence Operations Centers. I anticipate that the efficiency effort will identify some redundancies, and if confirmed, I will work to carry out any decisions made by the Secretary.

19. National Intelligence Program Consolidation

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 is the most recent legislative attempt to calibrate the need to centralize management of intelligence across the federal government with the need to sustain the benefits of departmental intelligence answerable to cabinet secretaries. General Clapper, while serving as USD(I), initiated a proposal to separate out the National Intelligence Program (NIP) portion of the Defense budget, establish a new appropriations account within the 050 Defense Function, and expand the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) comptroller function to enable ODNI to execute these funds independent of the DOD Comptroller organization.

a. Does this proposal weaken the authority of the Secretary of Defense over the intelligence components of the DOD?

This proposal should not weaken the authority of the Secretary of Defense over the intelligence components of the Department of Defense (DoD). Separation of the NIP portion of the Defense budget, as conceptually proposed, is an administrative action. Thus, it will not affect the Secretary of Defense's "authority, direction, and control over the Department of Defense." 10 U.S.C. sec. 113(b). It will not affect how the Secretary "prescribe[s] regulations for the government of his department, the conduct of its employees, [and] the distribution and performance of its business." 5 U.S.C. sec. 301.

b. Is this proposal consistent with the Secretary's efficiencies initiative, which seeks to avoid duplication and to reduce the overhead burden, by creating a second large financial control system operating within the Department?

The proposal to separate the NIP portion of the Defense budget was not intended to be an efficiency initiative, but to provide greater visibility and oversight of NIP resources, as well as improve NIP financial management practices. ODNI is leading a collaborative study effort to determine the feasibility of the conceptual proposal, with DoD stakeholders participating. The study team is still assessing possible approaches and implications. No final decisions have been made on removing the NIP from the DoD budget. If approved, I believe the proposal to separate the NIP portion of the Defense budget would not be incompatible with the Secretary's efficiencies initiative.

20. Support for Counterinsurgency

In late 2009, Major General Michael T. Flynn, USA, who was serving as Chief, CJ2, International Security Assistance Force and US Forces – Afghanistan, published an article that criticized the intelligence community broadly for focusing excessively on support for kinetic operations against adversary forces in Afghanistan and failing to devote sufficient attention to the counterinsurgency strategy and its emphasis on population protection, tribal dynamics, cultural insight, the rule of law, and the like.

a. Do you think that General Flynn's criticism was accurate and, if so, has this imbalance been corrected?

MG Flynn was correct in his assessment that in a counterinsurgency environment, focusing our intelligence assets solely on the insurgent forces is not effective. A comprehensive understanding of the socio-cultural environment is absolutely critical to developing and implementing effective strategies to separate the insurgency from any viable base of support in the general population. Developing this comprehensive understanding is clearly an intelligence responsibility as laid out in Service and Joint doctrine within the Department. Mobilizing the local population in rural areas for village stability operations has become a critical element of our strategy in Afghanistan, one that is already showing major gains on the battlefield. Tribal engagement is increasingly central to U.S. strategy in other countries as well. Thus, a detailed understanding of tribal dynamics is a critical intelligence task, and will likely remain so for the foreseeable future.

The Intelligence Community has worked hard to implement MG Flynn's recommendations. The Stability Operations Information Centers he called for have been created and manned by the Defense Intelligence Agency and Service intelligence analysts who are doing the integration and analysis work necessary to generate the comprehensive District Assessment reports that were the cornerstone of MG Flynn's approach. Significant challenges remain in developing the integrated information sharing environment envisioned by MG Flynn, but the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Task Force and the U.S. Central Command have been doing tremendous work in this area as well. Additionally, the former USD(I) commissioned the Intelligence Task Force of the Defense Science Board in March 2010 to evaluate how intelligence can most effectively support counterinsurgency operations. The Board is currently compiling its findings and recommendations and is scheduled to brief the results in the first quarter of CY11.

I believe the Intelligence Community has responded well to the challenges laid out by MG Flynn. One of my first actions, if confirmed, will be to confer with BG Fogarty, who has replaced MG Flynn, to get his assessment of the support currently being provided by the Defense Intelligence Enterprise and the Intelligence Community to determine if additional enhancements are required.

b. In your opinion, has the intelligence community devoted enough resources to provide policy makers and combatant commanders with the information on the cultural, social, political, and economic dynamics needed to formulate sound strategies for other critical regions, like Yemen and Somalia?

As noted above, tribal engagement is an increasingly critical tool in U.S. irregular warfare strategy. It was a central to our success in overthrowing the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan in 2001, it has been a major factor in our success in Iraq (Anbar Awakening), it is again becoming a critical element of our counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, and it offers U.S. policy makers important options in other countries of concern. Information on cultural, social, political and economic dynamics is likewise needed for effective information operations, as well as enhanced options to deal with power brokers in urban areas. I believe we have made good progress regarding intelligence support in this area, but additional improvements are required. A key part of the required investment is the development of operators – within both the intelligence and the special operations communities -- with the requisite language skills. Effectiveness in this area also requires intelligence analysts with very different backgrounds. If confirmed, I would engage the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the relevant components of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise, and the Commander of US Special Operations Command to ensure that we continue to develop the required capabilities.

c. Is collection and analysis on these subjects in these geographical areas a tier one priority for the intelligence community or is it classified as lower-priority general background intelligence information? Do you agree with this prioritization?

As the Committee is aware, our National Intelligence Priorities are classified. As noted above, however, intelligence support in this area is increasingly central to effective strategy and operations. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that it is accorded appropriate priority within both the Intelligence Community and the Defense Intelligence Enterprise.

21. Need for Independent Intelligence Analysis

Intelligence analysis should be independent and free of political pressure that it reach a certain conclusion, including a conclusion that fits a particular policy preference.

a. If confirmed, how would you ensure that all intelligence analysts within the DOD, including those who may be seconded to offices that are not part of the defense intelligence structure, are free from such pressure?

In my experience, I have found the intelligence analysis that holds up best under scrutiny are those assessments that were reached impartially and independently, using all sources of information available, and which highlight the intelligence gaps that limit the judgments that can be reached by current analysis. Intelligence analysts are inculcated with the importance of “speaking truth to power.” As ASD SO/LIC&IC, I have interacted regularly with intelligence analysts across the Intelligence Community, and have found them to be professionals who apply rigorous tradecraft standards to their products. The quality of analysis provided to policy makers today, in my judgment, is substantially better than it was in the Cold War. I have spoken to analysts as they attend their career training programs about the importance of what they do, and the need for objectivity and independence. If confirmed, I would reaffirm the importance of objective and independent analysis from the front-line analyst, to the Directors of analytical organizations, to senior policy makers. There will be zero tolerance for political pressure on analysts to reach certain conclusions.

b. Under what circumstances, if any, do you think intelligence officers and analysts should be able to testify to Congress on their professional conclusions regarding a substantive intelligence issue even if those views conflict with administration positions?

If Congress requires testimony on a substantive intelligence issue, it should be provided, whether or not it conflicts with an administration position.

22. Control of Intelligence Agencies Within the DOD

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 granted the DNI control over the preparation and execution of the National Intelligence Program budget and tasking of national intelligence operations. However, IRTPA also contained language asserting that nothing in the Act should be construed so as to impair the authorities of secretaries of cabinet departments, and the Secretary of Defense has delegated “direction, control, and authority” – the highest form of authority in the executive branch -- over the national intelligence organizations within the DOD to the USD(I).

a. What are your views on the balance of authorities accorded in IRTPA to the DNI and to cabinet secretaries, particularly the Secretary of Defense?

IRTPA struck a proper balance of authorities, in my view, in that it gave the DNI strong authority over core intelligence functions for the National Intelligence Program, such as setting requirements and budgets, as well as determining priorities for and managing the analysis and dissemination of national intelligence, while leaving the responsibility for execution of DoD intelligence activities to SECDEF, and assigning primary responsibility for leadership and management functions such as inspector general activities, personnel, information technology, financial management systems, and acquisition within the IC elements outside of ODNI and CIA to the heads of the departments in which those elements are located. The recently-enacted FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act significantly increased the authorities of ODNI over leadership and management functions in the IC elements, and I expect that DoD and the DNI will together devote considerable time and attention to implementing these new ODNI authorities in a manner that gives full effect to the Act while avoiding unnecessary duplication of effort and preserving SECDEF’s ability to execute his statutory responsibilities over DoD’s intelligence components.

b. What are your views on the extent of the grant of “direction, control, and authority” to the USD(I) over DOD national intelligence organizations?

Statutory provisions in both Title 10 and Title 50 of the United States Code assign authority, direction and control to SECDEF over DIA, NSA, NGA, and NRO as components of the Department, consistent with the statutory authorities of the DNI. In my view, this balance of authorities is appropriate.

c. What type of relationship would you strive to establish, if you are confirmed, with the DNI to ensure that DOD interests in national intelligence are satisfied, that DOD adequately assists the DNI in discharging his responsibilities, and that the defense intelligence agencies are properly managed?

With the former USD(I) now in place as the DNI, with his extensive experience in both DoD and the Intelligence Community, with the close personal partnership we have forged during my tenure as ASD SO/LIC&IC, and with the close relationships we both have

with the SECDEF and with the leaders of the Intelligence Community, I believe there is an unprecedented opportunity to further strengthen the relationship between DoD and the DNI. If confirmed, I expect that together we will look for additional ways to build on the arrangement established by SECDEF and the DNI under which the USD(I) serves as the Director of Defense Intelligence within ODNI.

d. Do you believe that the relationships, authorities, processes, and structures in place between the DOD and the DNI provide sufficient influence for the DOD to ensure that the intelligence capabilities DOD will need in the future to prepare for and conduct military operations will be developed and acquired through the National Intelligence Program?

Yes, I believe that current relationships, authorities, processes and structures in place between DoD and the DNI have produced highly effective support by NIP resources for military operations.

23. Role in Acquiring Space Systems

If confirmed, what role do you anticipate you would have in the requirements process for, and in oversight of the acquisition of, space systems, including space systems for which milestone decision authority rests with either the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics or the DOD Executive Agent for Space?

If confirmed as USD(I), as the principal staff assistant to the Secretary of Defense for all intelligence matters, my role in space system acquisition will be to ensure the Defense Intelligence Enterprise meets national and Department requirements. I will ensure that we've balanced our investments towards delivering the right mix of intelligence capabilities to support the Combatant Commanders to accomplish their missions. Department of Defense (DoD) space systems are one component of a broader architecture of sensors, systems and capabilities.

As the DoD Program Executive for the Military Intelligence Program (MIP), the USD(I) role is to ensure all parts of the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) architecture, to include space, air and ground, are integrated into an overall architecture optimized to meet the warfighter needs. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to ensure that the DoD intelligence architecture, including space intelligence capabilities, is integrated with the national architecture, and that we have a mission-focused space enterprise that is affordable, responsive, efficient, flexible, and fully supportive of military operations and national security needs.

As the Battlespace Awareness Capability Portfolio Manager, if confirmed, I will participate in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) requirements and acquisition oversight process by providing intelligence input into the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) requirements process, the Functional Capabilities Board (FCB), the Joint Capabilities Board (JCB) and the Joint Requirements Oversight

Council (JROC), as well as provide input into the DoD acquisition process on the Defense Acquisition Board.

24. DOD Intelligence Interrogations Policy

DOD Directive Number 3115.09 assigns the USD(I) responsibility for providing oversight of intelligence operations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning, and ensuring overall development, coordination, approval and promulgation of DOD policies and implementation of plans related to intelligence interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning.

a. Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Yes, I fully support this policy.

b. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2-22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?

Yes, I fully support these standards.

c. If confirmed, will you ensure that all DOD policies promulgated and plans implemented related to intelligence interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning comply with the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and the Army Field Manual on Interrogations?

If confirmed, I will ensure that all relevant DoD policies and plans comply with applicable U.S. law and international obligations, including Common Article 3.

d. Do you share the view that standards for detainee treatment must be based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that we must always keep in mind the risk that the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S. Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen or Marines are treated, should they be captured in future conflicts?

Yes, I strongly hold the view that the manner in which the United States treats detainees may well impact how captured U.S. Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines are treated in future conflicts. I believe it has broader national security and foreign policy ramifications as well.

Under DOD Directive Number 3115.09, the USD(I) is responsible for developing policies and procedures, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, the DOD General Counsel, and the appropriate DOD Components, to ensure that all contracts in support of intelligence interrogation operations include the obligation to comply with the standards of DOD Directive Number 3115.09 and exclude performance of inherently governmental functions in accordance with DOD Directive 1100.4 and that all contractor employees are properly trained.

e. What do you believe is the proper role of contractors in intelligence interrogation operations?

Consistent with Section 1038 of Public Law 111-84, "The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010," October 28, 2009, I believe that in areas where adequate security is available and is expected to continue, contractor personnel with proper training and security clearances may be used as linguists, interpreters, report writers, information technology technicians, and other employees filling ancillary positions (including as trainers of, and advisors to, interrogators) in the interrogation of individuals who are in the custody or under the effective control of the Department of Defense or otherwise under detention in a DoD facilities.

Contractors may be used as interrogators only if the Secretary of Defense determines that it is in the interests of the national security to do so and grants a waiver for a 60-day period, and for an additional 30 days if a renewal is approved. If a waiver is granted, contract interrogators must be properly trained and certified to DoD standards, and they must be supervised and closely monitored by properly trained and certified DoD military and/or DoD civilian interrogators to ensure that the contract interrogators do not deviate from the government-approved interrogation plans or otherwise perform any inherently governmental function.

f. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that intelligence interrogation operations are performed in a manner consistent with the requirements of the manpower mix and that contractors involved in such operations do not perform inherently governmental functions?

If confirmed, I will ensure that all relevant DoD policies and plans comply with Section 1038 of Public Law 111-84, "The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010," October 28, 2009, which delineates the functions that contractors may perform in support of intelligence interrogations. If the Secretary of Defense grants a waiver permitting the use of contractors as interrogators, I will ensure that they are properly trained and certified to DoD standards, and that they are supervised and closely monitored by properly trained and certified DoD military and/or DoD civilian interrogators to make certain that the contract interrogators do not deviate from the government-approved interrogation plans or otherwise perform any inherently governmental function.

25. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Support

Over the last 5 years or so, the approved requirement for 24-hour orbits of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft has grown from approximately 10 to 65. U.S. Central Command, and specifically the Iraq and Afghanistan areas of operation, has received the overwhelming share of these assets. The other combatant commands, as well as such critically important regions as Yemen and the Horn of Africa, have received little or no additional assets. Even within Central Command, demand exceeds supply.

Secretary Gates established the independent ISR Task Force partly because the normal requirements and acquisition processes in the Department favored long-term investments in capabilities for waging conventional military operations rather than the needs of deployed forces engaged in irregular warfare.

a. In your view, is DOD allocating sufficient resources to airborne ISR to protect long-term force modernization preferences?

I believe the Department is now allocating sufficient resources to airborne ISR. Working closely with the Congress, the Department has greatly expanded airborne ISR capabilities during Secretary Gates' tenure. As ASD SO/LIC&IC, I have consistently and strongly advocated for additional Predator/Reaper CAPs (orbits). These assets are absolutely critical to U.S. strategy in several areas, and demand continues to exceed supply. This is why in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Secretary made the decision to expand the authorized USAF force structure goal further by another 15 CAPs/orbits (from 50 to 65). We continue to upgrade the capabilities of our airborne ISR systems as well. The introduction of high definition video capabilities, for example, provides resolution that was not possible just five years ago. Combining this capability with recently developed SIGINT capabilities has dramatically improved the effectiveness of our ISR orbits. Other airborne ISR systems are having an equally dramatic impact on the battlefield.

The Secretary has provided very clear guidance. His first defense strategy objective is to "Prevail in Today's Wars," and that is where the preponderance of our attention and effort is focused. His strategy also makes it clear that we must continue to "Prevent Future Conflict" and "Prepare to Succeed in a Wide Range of Contingencies." Maintaining an appropriate balance between winning today and preparing for the future requires tough choices, but they are being made. The President's Budget for 2011 has the balance right, in my view.

b. Is the current focus an appropriate one?

Yes.

26. Reporting of Cyber Operations in the Clandestine Quarterly Report

The USD(I) coordinates preparation of the quarterly report on clandestine military operations (Clandestine Quarterly Report) to Congress. In discussions with the Department about actions to establish the United States Cyber Command, it became apparent that the Department may have failed to report certain cyber activities in the Quarterly Report that should have been included, since they would legitimately fit the accepted definition of clandestine military activities.

a. What is your understanding of whether the Department failed to report these activities in the regular Clandestine Quarterly Reports, and why?

It is my understanding that the Congressional language directing provision of the Clandestine Quarterly Report specifically calls for reporting on clandestine HUMINT activity. Former USD(I) Clapper, in an effort to keep Congress better apprised of activities within his purview, expanded the report to routinely include a wide range of activities that exceeded the Congressional reporting requirements. I fully support this expanded approach, and, if confirmed, will review the status and process for reporting DoD cyber activities. I am committed to appropriate reporting of all intelligence and intelligence-related activities to Congress.

b. Setting aside the issue of advance notice of certain significant cyber activities, what is your view on the appropriateness of reporting cyber activities that fit the definition of a clandestine military operation in the Clandestine Quarterly Report?

The USD(I) is charged with keeping the appropriate committees of Congress fully and currently informed on all DoD intelligence and intelligence related activities. It would be my intent, if confirmed, to fully comply with that responsibility, to include cyber activities.

27. Science and Technology

a. What technical challenges does the intelligence community face that in your opinion are currently not being addressed adequately by DOD science and technology efforts?

I believe an “Intelligence Revolution” has been underway for some time, and that technological change is the principal driver of this revolution. This revolution has already posed, and will continue to pose, significant challenges as well as opportunities for the U.S. Intelligence Community. I believe that DoD science and technology programs are enabling the IC to keep ahead of the rapidly-changing intelligence environment.

One challenge that we continue to face is making the best use of existing and planned sensors and then exploiting data coming from those sensors. Although we are continuing to push the envelope on new and better sensing technologies, the real challenge has

shifted towards integrating data from platforms and sensors into a common framework. Related technical challenges include layering the data, developing advanced analytical tools that make sense of the data, and developing tools that automatically alert analysts or cross-cue other sensors to focus on unique and potentially dangerous activity. Other challenges include the protection of critical space systems and data networks.

Recently, the DOD has been exploring a wide range of airship-related technologies for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) purposes, including those for long-duration, high-altitude flight.

b. What are your views on the specific missions, concepts of operation, technical viability and affordability of airships as long-duration, high altitude ISR sensor platforms?

I believe these technologies will have an immediate, positive impact on our operations in Afghanistan, and could play an even greater role in future operations as the capability continues to evolve. An “unblinking eye and ear” is central to our ISR strategy for the modern battlefield. Over the last decade, the Department has significantly expanded our ability to dwell over the battlefield with ISR platforms. We have done this predominantly through procurement of aircraft systems and sensors. With the advent of long-endurance platforms, the Department is expanding the paradigm of battlefield dwell by developing "game-changing" persistent capabilities that enable satellite-like endurance at a much lower cost and have the flexibility to reposition anywhere in the world. These developments will greatly increase the amount of valuable information available to the warfighter. The development of long-endurance airborne capabilities, I would add, is much broader than just airships. DoD is also pursuing other long-endurance fixed-wing medium- and high-altitude capabilities that can linger for weeks and even months at a time.

28. Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

a. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

Yes.

b. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence?

Yes.

c. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

Yes.

d. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted Committee, or to consult with the Committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Yes.