U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE CENTER & FH                         TS4LBI
Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613-7000                          February 1995     

                                          
                                               
                  INDICATORS IN OOTW



1.  OBJECTIVES:  On completion of this block of instruction you will 
be able to:

    a.  Describe the role of and employ the Indications and Warning 
(I&W) system in indicator development.

    b.  Identify the role of the S-2 in indicator and specific 
information requirements (SIR) development.

    c.  Develop the three types of Operations Other Than War (OOTW) 
indicators.

    d.  Develop specific information requirements (SIR) from generic 
indicators.

    e.  Identify and apply basic rules of indicator analysis.

2.  NATIONAL INDICATIONS AND WARNING SYSTEM:  Indications and 
Warning (I&W) involves the strategic monitoring of world military, 
economic and political events to ensure that they are not the 
precursor to hostile or other activities which are contrary to US 
interests.  With the new US focus worldwide, the National I&W system 
will be responding to OOTW situations.  This Global focus will put 
regional issues into perspective.  The National system will be able 
to monitor inter-regional activities such a weapons and technology 
transfer, personnel movement between states, money transfers and 
drug trade, to name a few.

3.  INDICATORS:  Indicators are observable or discernible actions 
that confirm or deny enemy capabilities and intentions.  The ability 
to find and interpret these indicators will directly affect the 
analysts' predictions of threat intent.  It is this key, prediction, 
which distinguishes from just reporting the facts to assisting the 
commander in the decision making process.  Indicators are not 
fool-proof, however, and in OOTW, have been refined into three types 
in order to better collect and analyze them.  They are:

    a.  IMMINENT/IMMEDIATE  THREAT INDICATORS:  

        (1)  Imminent indicators. are those which reflect threat 
actions of an immediate nature, both violent and non-violent.  These 
are highly perishable and the emphasis on force protection makes 
finding and interpreting imminent indicators critical to the 
intelligence analyst so that he can warn the commander of impending 
threats to his troops.  Examples of imminent indicators can include 
the following:

             (a)  VIOLENT:  Heavily armed reconnaissance; weapons 
caches near targets; insurgents near rally points in the vicinity of 
targets; infiltration of target areas.

             (b)  NON-VIOLENT:  Demonstrations, propaganda posters, 
radio/TV announcements.

        (2)  It is very likely that imminent threat indicators can 
also be categorized as preparatory or secondary in nature.  
Categorizing after the fact is not necessary in OOTW indicator 
analysis.  What is important is deciding before what reflects an 
immediate, sudden threat to US interests (including US personnel) in 
order to avoid harm and in order to plan for quick reaction.

    b.  PREPARATORY THREAT INDICATORS:  Preparatory indicators are 
those which reflect threat planning which must be done before 
executing an attack (or other mission).  They usually include 
training, logistics compilation,. recruiting, movement to an 
assembly area, planning and coordination meetings and communications 
activities.  Preparatory indicators not only tell the analysts that 
the threat is up to something, but by knowing specifically what is 
being trained or what equipment the threat is being trained to use, 
the analyst can predict the threat targets, timetables, capabilities 
and vulnerabilities.  The national system is excellent for examining 
training and logistics support across international lines and can 
link related developments in different parts of the world, for 
example, weapons sales.

    c.  SECONDARY THREAT INDICATORS:  Secondary or circumstantial 
threat indicators are those which reflect threat activity among the 
population or the environment.  This includes such actions as the 
disappearance of males from the population in a given area to 
unexplained affluence among the population to man made pollution of 
streams.  Secondary indicators are also intangibles such as fear or 
joy among the population.  However, the major problem with the 
analysis of secondary indicators is that it requires in-depth 
knowledge of the local culture, habits and customs and must also 
take into consideration history, society, geography and climate to 
fully understand their importance or value.  For example, a sudden 
increase of wealth among the population could be from illegal or 
legal sources such as mining for gems.  A loss of food among the 
population could be due to famine as well an pillaging by the 
threat.  Patterns over time also will help in evaluating secondary 
indicators.  With the increase in threats which are not human in 
nature, i.e. natural disasters, secondary indicators will come from 
nature, climate, weather, geographic and wildlife as well as from 
the population.

4.  SPECIFIC INTELLIGENCE/INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS:  

    a.  SIRs to translate general and generic indicators into orders 
for collection agencies to follow.  Intelligence analysts at all 
echelons face declining resources and capabilities due to sheer 
volume of needs.  In order to focus these assets most efficiently in 
time and space, analysts take indicators and decide the most likely 
time and place of occurrence so that they aren't wasting collection 
efforts.  NAIs are then determined based on SIRS.  For example:

          PIR:  Will insurgent forces conduct terrorist attacks 
against targets at Culican air base in the next three months?

          Indicator:  Large cache of explosives and mines located in 
mosques in city  near air base.

         SIR: Is there increased movement of insurgent mule convoys 
into the southern insurgent held villages near air base during 
increased air campaign operations (June-July-August).

        NAI:  Mari Habi villages 35370ON453500E, 01 June 1993-31 
August 1993; mule and camel convoys moving on the trail from the 
border east to villages/convoys with 10-20 mules.

        PIR:  Will North Korean elements conduct terrorist 
operations in the ROK during the August nuclear discussions?

          Indicators:  Unusual foreign travel by Korean personnel.

           SIR: Are there any Koreans traveling on non-Korean 
passports on US or ROK owned airlines in the next six weeks?

          NAI:  Middle East, Far East during periods preceeding 
diplomatic exchanges between North Korea and the ROK.

    b.  The above examples show how to narrow down in order to 
concentrate collection and analytical efforts to the most likely 
periods for the indicators to occur.  They also eliminate collecting 
indicators which are circumstantial, such as reporting all travel of 
Koreans which could be due to tourism or movement of mule convoys 
during periods of harvest or nomadic migration in an agricultural 
society.

    c.  In some cases, SIRs will have to be further defined and 
refined for specific intelligence collection agencies and collection 
disciplines.  For example, a radio intercept unit could be directed 
to monitor and report on traffic emanating from emitters in a 
geographic area centered on a training camp, while IMINT could be 
directed to report tracks of wheeled vehicles or government building 
mock-ups in the training camp.

                        NOTE:

PIR

-Must ask one question
-Be situational (contain where and when)
-Provide intel which enables Cdr to make a single decision

SIR

-Incorporates indicator
-In the form of a question
-Very specific

SOR

-In the form of a directive
-Incorporates NAI
-A bit more general than an SIR

5.  RULES FOR INDICATOR ANALYSIS:  Once you have developed your 
indicators and tasked the appropriate agency and source, you must 
then analyze the results.  You must evaluate the results of you SIRs 
and adjust them if necessary.  Here are several rules which should 
guide your mental processes:

    a.  Always consider all possible threat courses of action when 
developing indicators.

   b.  Consider all available indicators and current intelligence 
before making a determination as to their significance.
        
    c.  Never attempt to predict threat activity based solely on 
past activity.
        
   d.  Always look at every possible examination or meaning for each 
individual indicators such as cultural factors.
               
    e.  Do not forget to use investigative technology to detect 
indicators.  A simple water test for example can be used to 
determine if pollution is part of nature or if it is a chemical 
precursor for drug manufacture.
               
    f.  Make your best estimate. You will never have all the data 
but must make a call and continue to refine it as time goes on and 
more information is obtained.


6.  INDICATOR MATRICES:  Generic indicators can be developed prior 
to deployment or even prior to receiving a mission.  An example of 
such a list is attached.  It is an extract from a OOTW instability 
indicators study done by the Army-Air Force Center for OOTW.  The 
purpose was to give analysts not familiar with what happens in OOTW 
environments an idea of what they might see. 547 generic indicators 
were developed and placed on a matrix which graphically illustrates 
during which type of operations a particular indicator might or 
might not be found.  It is essentially an initial scrub of 
indicators to help the analyst begin his search for the most likely 
indicators.
                      

              Generic Indicator Sampling


1.  INFORMANTS FAIL TO PASS ACCURATE INFORMATION

2.  ATTACKS ON MISSION FORCE (E.G., RAIDS/AMBUSHES)

3.  HARASSMENT OF MISSION FORCE PERSONNEL

4.  JAILING/EXPULSION OF MISSION FORCE PERSONNEL

5.  OPPOSITION FORCES TARGET GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL

6.  MEMBERS OF GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY ATTEMPT TO SABOTAGE OFFICIAL 
GOVERNMENT POLICIES OR PROGRAMS

7.  ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS OF LEADING OPPOSITION PARTY CANDIDATES

8.  ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS AGAINST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

9.  ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS AGAINST PROMINENT, NON-GOVERNMENT LEADER

10.  ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS ON MILITARY LEADERS

11.  KIDNAPING OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

12.  EXECUTION OF PROMINENT, NON-GOVERNMENT LEADERS/OFFICIALS

13.  KIDNAPING OF PROMINENT BUSINESSMEN/NON-GOVERNMENT 
OFFICIALS/LEADERS

14.  KILLING OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

15.  KILLING OF PROMINENT, NON-GOVERNMENT LEADERS

16.  ASSAULTS ON POLICE AND MILITARY PERSONNEL

17.  ASSAULTS ON MISSION FORCE PERSONNEL, (E.G., MUGGING)

18.  ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS

19.  HOSTAGE TAKING

20.  USE OF FEAR TACTICS TO COERCE SUPPORT FOR OPPOSITION FORCE

21.  USE OF FEAR TACTICS TO CONTROL LOCAL POPULACE

22.  USE OF FEAR TACTICS TO CONTROL GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY

23.  LABOR STRIKES

24.  THEFT OR ALTERATION OF GOVERNMENT IDENTIFICATION CARDS

25.  EVIDENCE OF FORGED PASSPORTS

26.  HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

27.  USE OF MILITARY/GOVERNMENT EQUIPMENT IN ILLICIT OPERATIONS

28.  EVACUATION OF CIVILIAN POPULATION FROM REGION OR AREA OF 
CONFLICT

29.  MASS URBAN-RURAL MIGRATION OR VICE VERSA

30.  EXODUS/MIGRATION FROM CONTESTED AREAS

31.  ARMED CONFRONTATION BY OPPOSITION FORCE WITHIN THE COUNTRY

32.  MASSING OF OPPOSITION COMBATANTS

33.  MEASURES TAKEN TO REMOVE GOVERNMENT LEADERS

34.  REPEATED INCURSIONS OF OPPOSITION FORCE PERSONNEL INTO MISSION 
FORCE AREA

35.  RETALIATORY ACTIONS BY LOCAL POPULACE IN RESPONSE TO 
ACTUAL/PERCEIVED MISSION FORCE TRANSGRESSIONS

36.  WITHDRAWAL OF SPONSOR SUPPORT FOR MISSION FORCE REQUIREMENTS

37.  CHANGES IN OPPOSITION FORCE OPERATING AREAS

38.  SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN OPERATIONAL ROUTINE AMONG OPPOSITION FORCE

39.  GENERAL NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD MISSION FORCE PRESENCE

40.  ACTIONS DESIGNED TO FORCE GOVERNMENT INTO TAKING MEASURES TO
DESTABILIZE THE SECURITY SITUATION

41.  LOOTING

42.  MASS DEMONSTRATIONS

43.  RIOTING

44.  EFFORTS TO INCITE RIOTS

45.  RALLIES TO HONOR MARTYRED OPPOSITION LEADER OR REVOLUTIONARY 
HEROES

46.  PAID AND/OR ARMED DEMONSTRATORS IN RIOTS