

Joint Publication 3-26



Counterterrorism



24 October 2014



PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides joint doctrine for planning, executing, and assessing counterterrorism operations across the range of military operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared by the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint counterterrorism operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military coordination with other US Government departments and agencies during operations and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective.

3. Application

a. The doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflict arises between this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:



DAVID L. GOLDFEIN, Lt Gen, USAF
Director, Joint Staff

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**SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-26
DATED 13 NOVEMBER 2009**

- **Narrows the definition of counterterrorism (CT) to actions and activities to neutralize terrorists, their organizations, and networks; removes countering root causes and desired regional end states from the definition.**
- **Differentiates CT activities from counterinsurgency, security cooperation, and stability operations activities.**
- **Updates current special operations considerations in accordance with the recently published JP 3-05, *Special Operations*.**
- **Updates CT joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment procedures and considerations.**
- **Describes CT activities that occur between the operational and strategic levels of warfare.**
- **Describes the activities of the global special operations network as it relates to CT.**
- **Adds numerous vignettes throughout the publication.**
- **Modifies, adds, and removes multiple terms and definitions from JP 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.**

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- Provides the Strategic Context for Terrorism
 - Presents the Fundamentals of Counterterrorism
 - Describes Organizing for Counterterrorism
 - Discusses Command, Planning, and Assessment
 - Explains Counterterrorism Operations
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Strategic Context

Strategic Security Environment

The strategic security environment is impacted by three dominant strategic themes: globalization and cyberspace technology; political instability; and terrorism and transnational organized crime.

The strategic security environment has become more threatening to US interests due to global access, communications, and finance. Additionally, the rise in sectarian and ethnic conflict has increased hostilities within countries and terrorism is becoming commonplace. Combatant commanders (CCDRs) and chiefs of missions (COMs) must plan to join with key partners and allies to develop regional strategies, and theater campaign plans that serve to promote US interests and protect US security interests in a common security framework. By working with and through the committed institutions, commanders create unity of effort, increasing military engagements of partners, sharing financial burdens, and enhancing legitimate counterterrorism (CT) efforts.

The Nature of Warfare and Terrorism

Warfare is the mechanism, method, or modality of armed conflict against an enemy. Terrorism is principally a tool of irregular warfare, but it is seen in unlawful actions of state and non-state actors during traditional warfare. **Terrorism** is the unlawful use of violence or threat of violence, often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs, to instill fear and coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are usually political. **CT activities and operations are taken to neutralize terrorists, their organizations, and networks in order to render them incapable of using violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve their goals.**

Fundamentals of Counterterrorism

Principles, Activities, and Operations

The principles of joint operations apply to CT activities and operations, but of particular importance are legitimacy and objective. Legitimate CT operations strengthen support for the goals and activities of CT and help isolate terrorists from the public. Objectives direct operations toward a clearly defined, decisive, and achievable goal. Clearly defined goals enable effective collaboration and unity of effort, which focuses CT operations to use scarce resources efficiently.

Counterterrorism and Types of Activities and Operations

There are three broad types of CT activities: advise and assist activities; overseas CT activities; and support to civil authorities activities. **Advise and assist activities** are all US military efforts to improve other nations' ability to provide security for its citizens, govern, provide services, prevent terrorists from using the nation's territory as a safe haven, and promote long-term regional stability. Some of the **overseas CT activities** include: offense, defense, and stability operations; counterinsurgency operations; peace operations; and counterdrug operations. **Defense support of civil authorities** includes support to prepare, prevent, protect, respond, and recover from domestic incidents including terrorist attacks, major disasters both natural and man-made, and domestic special events.

Organizing for Counterterrorism

National Security Council

The National Security Council is the key integrator of the President's whole-of-government CT policy and strategies, which requires interagency coordination at the Principals Committee, Deputies Committee, and supporting interagency policy committees, and the efforts of the National Security Council Staff. The key interagency policy committee of CT is the Counterterrorist Security Group.

United States Government Counterterrorism Roles

The **Department of Homeland Security** leads the unified national effort to secure the United States. Key among its strategic goals is to prevent, protect, respond, and recover from acts of terrorism. Within the **Department of State (DOS)**, the **Secretary of State** is the President's principal advisor on foreign policy and the person chiefly responsible for US representation abroad, except for CT within regions where the responsibility lies with the military commander as designated by the President. The **COM** is the personal

representative of the President and the official United States Government (USG) representative in the host country. COM concurrence is required prior to execution, unless otherwise directed by the President.

The mission of the **National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)** is to analyze terrorist threats, share information with partner nations (PNs), and integrate all instruments of national power to ensure unity of effort. NCTC also provides assistance to the operational elements of the USG that disrupt, isolate, and dismantle terrorist organizations and prevent future attacks.

The **National Joint Terrorism Task Force** is an interagency coordination organization that provides liaison from Federal Bureau of Investigation Headquarters to local joint terrorism task forces and participating agencies and serves as a conduit for information on threats and leads.

Department of Defense

Within **Department of Defense (DOD)**, CT activities and operations are normally executed by geographic combatant commanders (GCCs), subordinate theater special operations command commanders, and other joint force commanders (JFCs).

Partner Nations

DOD works together with DOS and other interagency elements through the GCCs to implement US CT strategy. The GCC's CT operations are coordinated with allies and integrated into developing foreign partner special operations forces (SOF) and conventional forces, and focus on mutual threats to United States and partner sovereignty.

Indigenous and Surrogate Entities

Indigenous and surrogate forces may be employed to support or conduct CT operations. Generally, when SOF conduct CT with or through indigenous or surrogate elements, they team with members of the regular armed forces, police forces, or other internal security forces of a PN.

Command, Planning, and Assessment

Command

The nature of terrorist threats requires Secretary of Defense, Commander, United States Special Operations Command, GCCs, and JFCs to establish flexible and often complex command relationships to ensure CT forces have the required agility to coordinate with all DOD, interagency, and foreign partners, and to pursue terrorists

across military and governmental boundaries. In complex operational environments, the JFC may use the support command relationship to provide the organizational agility necessary for CT operations.

Planning

The operational approach uses elements of operational design—termination criteria, military end state, objectives, effects, center of gravity, approaches, lines of operation and lines of effort (LOEs), CT defeat mechanism, etc.—to provide details and facilitate detailed planning. The CT operational approach generally involves five LOEs, which are: terrorist organization, transregional supporting networks, weapons of mass destruction and associated materials, host-nation CT forces, and regional CT coordination center. Each LOE applies specific CT defeat mechanisms—disrupt, isolate, dismantle, and enable—to achieve the objectives supported by the LOE and create desired conditions by changing the physical or behavioral political, military, economic, social, informational, and infrastructure environment.

Assessment

The JFC assesses operations continuously to determine when to adjust operations—such as shifting priority of effort or transitioning to another phase—in order to ensure the joint force achieves its objectives and attains the military end state.

Counterterrorism Operations

Nature of Counterterrorism Operations

Effective CT requires the sustained global CT effort of all relevant USG departments and agencies and PNs, each with unique capabilities, perspectives, and authorities. Over time, by locating and defeating terrorist organizations and networks, they will be rendered incapable or unwilling to use terrorism to achieve their goals.

Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, and Analyze Process

CT forces use the find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate process to plan for and execute all CT operations against terrorists and terrorist organizations and networks. This process analyzes a terrorist organization's structure, capabilities, and intentions to help develop courses of action to eliminate its capability to commit terrorist acts.

Information Operations

Information-related capabilities such as electronic warfare, cyberspace operations, military information support operations, and military deception should be applied to CT

operations as a means to influence extremists, their supporters, and the mainstream populace.

Counter Threat Finance

Counter threat finance is an interagency effort to detect, counter, contain, disrupt, deter, or dismantle the transnational financing of state and non-state adversaries threatening US national security.

Legal Considerations

In domestic situations, the Constitution, federal law, and Department of Defense policy limit the scope and nature of military actions.

The JFC responsible for CT should determine early in the planning stage what the required rules of engagement/rules for the use of force should be, including anticipating the need for serial changes based on the need for escalation of force, changing phases of an operation, branches/sequels to a plan, etc. CT operations may result in detainees. Proper handling of detainees is essential not only for possible exploitation purposes, but also for prevention of violations of the law (civil or military).

Logistics Support Considerations

The GCCs and their Service component commands may have significant distribution challenges as the JFC conducting CT operations may have tactical units widespread across an operational area or an area of responsibility. Each supported CCDR should produce a logistic supportability analysis based on assigned/attached force structure, operational areas, and specific mission requirements for their CT operations.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides joint doctrine for planning, executing, and assessing CT operations across the range of military operations.

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CHAPTER I STRATEGIC CONTEXT

“For the foreseeable future, the United States will continue to take an active approach to countering these [terrorist] threats worldwide, working with allies and partners to establish control over ungoverned territories, and directly striking the most dangerous groups and individuals when necessary.”

***Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century Defense
January 5, 2012***

1. Introduction

a. This publication is designed to guide joint force commanders’ (JFCs’) application of Department of Defense (DOD) counterterrorism (CT) capabilities in planning, executing, and assessing CT operations. CT is part of the broader construct of combating terrorism, which includes actions such as antiterrorism and CT, taken to fight terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum.

b. The Secretary of Homeland Security is the principal federal official for domestic incident management. The Secretary of Homeland Security coordinates federal operations within the United States to anticipate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks. The Attorney General of the United States, generally acting through the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), leads law enforcement response to, and criminal investigations of, terrorist acts or threats within the United States and its territories. The Secretary of Defense (SecDef) may, at the request of the Attorney General, support domestic CT activities and operations. If a terrorist incident exceeds the FBI’s capacity, the President may direct DOD to provide domestic CT assistance within Constitutional and statutory limits.

c. Terrorists use many forms of unlawful violence or threats of violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies to further a variety of political, social, criminal, economic, and religious ideologies. Terrorists threaten the national power, sovereignty, and interests of the United States and our allies. Terrorists organize and operate in a number of ways. Some operate within transnational networks, others operate as small independent groups, and others operate alone. The terrorist threat is amplified by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their potential use by terrorists. The United States strives to enlist the support of the international community, adapts alliances, and creates new partnerships to facilitate regional solutions that contain and defeat terrorists, their organizations, and networks.

2. Strategic Security Environment

The strategic security environment has become more threatening to US interests due to global access, communications, and finance. Additionally, the rise in sectarian and ethnic conflict has increased hostilities within countries and terrorism is becoming commonplace. Information and communications technology and other advanced technologies such as the

increased use of space and the proliferation of high-tech weapons are used by a wide range of state and non-state actors. As a result, the strategic security environment has become more complex and more menacing as nation states and non-state actors compete for strategic influence and access.

a. The United States by itself cannot eliminate every terrorist or terrorist organization that threatens its safety, security, or interests. Combatant commanders (CCDRs) and chiefs of missions (COMs) must plan to join with key partners and allies to develop regional strategies, and theater campaign plans that serve to promote US interests and protect US security interests in a common security framework. This approach deepens and broadens the international multilateral CT framework. US forces work through unified action to draw on commitments and resources to strengthen the activities of multilateral institutions at the international, regional, and sub-regional levels, countering violent extremists around the globe. By working with and through the committed institutions, commanders create unity of effort, increasing military engagements of partners, sharing financial burdens, and enhancing legitimate CT efforts.

b. The strategic security environment is impacted by three dominant strategic themes: globalization and cyberspace technology; political instability; and terrorism and transnational organized crime.

(1) **Globalization and Cyberspace Technology**

(a) **Globalization.** Globalization is the reduction of barriers to transnational movement of information, ideas, money, people, goods, and services. Technologies that enable globalization also facilitate the spread of ideas and beliefs, including extremist messages and propaganda.

(b) **Cyberspace Technology.** Cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers. Enemies and adversaries clearly understand the military potential of cyberspace and its power. Terrorists employ the Internet for recruiting, training, motivating, and synchronizing their followers. The enemy frequently operates essentially unrestrained and is free to innovate and exploit its potential. Cyberspace provides new and important means and methods to collect and process large amounts of information on the local populace and insurgents.

(2) **Political Instability**

(a) Political instability can be described as the condition, process, and consequences of stress in a sovereign state or other governing system stemming from the system's inability or refusal to satisfy the political, social, economic, religious, or security wants and needs of its population. It often stems from or leads to a loss of authority or control over persons, territory, or interests. Politically unstable states and ungoverned spaces generate local and regional conflict and humanitarian crises. These areas are vulnerable to exploitation by other states and transnational groups. Various nongovernmental

organizations (NGOs) and networks may exploit voids left by politically unstable governments. Such voids allow terrorists, hostile states, opposing parties, and criminal organizations the opportunity to provide humanitarian assistance and quasi-governmental services in contested or ungoverned areas, thereby winning popular support and creating legitimacy by addressing the local population's immediate needs. Weak or nonfunctioning states may be unwilling or incapable of performing even basic government functions in contested areas. Additionally, religious, ethnic, and tribal conflicts are common sources of friction that foster patronage and corruption and undermine nation-states. Ultimately, corruption undermines the legitimacy of governments. Patronage can also perpetuate deep-seated animosities and generate tension that can lead to instability.

(b) Demographic trends such as high birthrates in less developed regions, aging populations, and reduced mortality rates in more developed regions, and increased urbanization, migration, and high unemployment among military aged males directly contribute to economic upheaval and local and regional instability. Economic expansion in historically undeveloped regions creates greater competition for strategic resources, particularly energy, food, and water. This competition disproportionately affects the poorest and most disenfranchised populations. Sustained increases in commodity prices will likely further entrench, corrupt, or otherwise adversely affect ill-equipped governments in many regions, which will diminish prospects for democratic and market-based reforms, and increase the likelihood of terrorist exploitation.

(3) **Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime**

“Transnational organized crime refers to those self-perpetuating associations of individuals who operate transnationally for the purpose of obtaining power, influence, monetary and/or commercial gains, wholly or in part by illegal means....”

Source: Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, July 2011

(a) **Overview.** The terrorist threat to both regional and international security may be substantially increased by unchecked activities of transnational organized crime and their support to terrorists, terrorist organizations, and networks.

(b) **Organized Crime.** Transnational organized crime may support terrorist organizations and operations solely to exploit resultant instability, lawlessness, and violence; and/or for their own gain and without regard to future consequences. As documented in the *Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime*, transnational organized crime has expanded in size, scope, and influence and represents a significant threat to national and international security. Transnational organized criminals are diversifying their activities and represent a threat to public safety, public health, democratic institutions, and economic stability. Transnational organized crime networks pose a strategic threat to US interests in key regions of the world. Transnational organized crime, like violent extremist organizations (VEOs), thrive in developing countries or failed states with weak rule of law by penetrating government institutions and businesses and increasing corruption, further weakening governance. Terrorists and insurgents are turning to criminal networks to generate funds and facilitate logistic support.

(c) **Terrorists.** Transnational political movements that use unlawful violence to advance their objectives are referred to as VEOs and are de facto terrorists. VEOs may initially start as adherents of a localized or transnational political movement, bound together by ethnicity, religious belief, caste affiliation, or common goal. While these groups tend to be motivated by real or imagined unjust treatment from a government (or governments), these VEOs may turn to transnational organized crime to provide financial, material, or personnel support, despite a purported abhorrence for criminal or immoral activity. The al-Qa'ida reliance on the Haqqani criminal network in Afghanistan and Pakistan is an example. Additionally, many criminal and terrorist organizations have developed political branches to offer legal protection, obfuscation, and a means to develop the trappings of a state, e.g., Lebanese Hezbollah.

3. Applying Counterterrorism Tenets and Capabilities

a. **Pursuing a Whole-of-Government Effort.** In order to succeed at the tactical through the strategic levels, commanders and civilian leadership should develop a rapid, coordinated, and effective CT effort that reflects and leverages the full capabilities and resources of the entire United States Government (USG). This approach integrates the capabilities and authorities of each department and agency, ensuring the right tools are applied at the right time for the right situation in a manner that is consistent with US law and supports USG objectives.

b. **Balancing Near- and Long-Term CT Considerations.** CT operations should be planned and executed to support US diplomatic or informational initiatives. Certain tactical successes can have unintended strategic consequences. For example, if a lethal strike kills a known terrorist but also causes unintended casualties, which lead to greater recruitment of terrorist operatives, the near-term success might have a detrimental effect on long-term goals. The use of deadly force must be exercised in a thoughtful, reasoned, and proportionate way that both enhances US security and discredits terrorists. Certain tactical successes can have unintended strategic consequences.

c. **Goals.** With core tenets as the foundation of all CT efforts, the United States aims to achieve eight overarching near-term CT goals. Taken together, these goals articulate a framework for the success of the US global CT mission. These goals are:

- (1) Protect the American people, homeland, and American interests, along with those of our allies and partners.
- (2) Identify, locate, disrupt, degrade, dismantle, and defeat extremist organizations and networks along with their affiliates and adherents.
- (3) Prevent terrorist development, acquisition, and use of WMD.
- (4) Eliminate terrorist safe havens.
- (5) Build enduring CT partnerships and capabilities.

(6) Degrade links between terrorist organizations, networks, and their affiliates and adherents (attack the network).

(7) Counter violent extremist ideology and its resonance; diminish the specific drivers of violence that it exploits.

(8) Deprive terrorists of their enabling resources and functions: money, personnel, and weapons.

d. While there will never be a complete eradication of terrorism, the *National Strategy for Counterterrorism* reflects the reality that success will only come through the sustained, steadfast, and systematic application of all elements of national power simultaneously across the globe. The United States must use all means to defend against terrorist attacks on the United States, its citizens, and its interests around the world. It is imperative not only to forge a diverse and powerful coalition to combat terrorism today, but also to work with our international partners to build lasting mechanisms for combating terrorism while fostering trust, coordination, and cooperation.

4. The Nature of Warfare and Terrorism

a. **Warfare.** Warfare is the mechanism, method, or modality of armed conflict against an enemy. It is the “how” of waging war. The US military recognizes two basic forms of warfare: traditional and irregular. Terrorism is principally a tool of irregular warfare, but it is seen in unlawful actions of state and non-state actors during traditional warfare.

For more information, see Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.

b. **Terrorism.** Terrorism is the unlawful use of violence or threat of violence, often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs, to instill fear and coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are usually political. Non-state actors use unlawful violence to influence states or populations to achieve their goals, and state actors may use unlawful acts of violence to create effects when lawful conflict between nations does not exist. Terrorism is not in and of itself an ideology or a form of war. Terrorism is a tactic used by organizations trying to achieve specific goals. Terrorist tactics are used by a wide variety of actors, including insurgents such as al-Qa’ida in Iraq’s effort to replace what they identified as a Shia-led government; nationalists such as Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Tayyiba’s efforts to eliminate the influence of a foreign power; armed separatists such as the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna in Spain; or a state attempting to influence another by the murder, kidnapping, or hostage taking of another state’s diplomats or citizenry. The defeat of terrorism is therefore better understood through the prism of terrorists’ goals rather than their acts of terrorism.

c. CT

(1) **Description.** CT activities and operations are taken to neutralize terrorists, their organizations, and networks in order to render them incapable of using violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve their goals.

(2) **Purpose.** The purpose of CT is to disrupt, isolate, and dismantle terrorist organizations and networks to render them incapable of striking the homeland, US facilities and personnel, or US interests abroad. CT also includes crisis response operations to respond to imminent terrorist threats or incidents when preemption and preclusion are not successful.

(3) Successful CT campaigns require geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) and other JFCs to apply the tenets of other joint doctrine: counterinsurgency (COIN), stability operations, security cooperation, and foreign internal defense (FID). These other activities are specifically designed to change political, social, economic, and other factors that comprise the environment from which terrorists emanate and sustain themselves. Depending on the operational environment, a GCC may support CT through stability operations, COIN, counterdrug, counter WMD, information operations, military information support operations (MISO), FID, security force assistance (SFA), and other joint activities and operations.

d. **Historical Perspective**

(1) Modern technology enables terrorists to plan and operate worldwide as never before. Advanced telecommunications enable terrorists and terrorist organizations to surreptitiously coordinate their actions among dispersed cells. Terrorists operate more efficiently through links with like-minded individuals and organizations around the globe. If terrorists gain access to WMD they have the potential to exponentially increase the damage and impact of their operations.

(2) Over the past 150 years, many motivations have led to the use of terrorist tactics. Figure I-1 shows some of the disparate groups and causes, stretching from anarchists of the 1800s to religious extremists of today.

(3) Historically, individuals and groups have used terrorism for political, military, economic, social, or religious ideological ends. These individuals and groups often rationalize their brutal behavior by claiming their actions are necessary to attain a greater ideological, religious, political, or social end. These ends may concern religious beliefs, rectification of perceived grievances or injustices, or enlightenment of the masses to the need for radical social change. Additionally, some terrorists may be driven by criminal motives.

e. **Examples of Terrorists and Terrorist Organizations**

(1) **The Independent Group.** An independent group tends to have a narrow or regionally contained objective: independence of a region or state, expulsion of foreign influences, or a desire to fight a perceived corrupt government. Not all of these organizations are terrorist entities; however, throughout history, many have employed terrorist tactics.

Historical Examples of Terrorism					
Group/Event	Focus	Primary Strategy	Target Identity	Precipitant	Special Characteristics
Russian Civil War	Anarchists 1870-1920s	Elite assassinations, bank robberies	Primary European states	Failure, slowness of political reforms	Developed basic terrorism strategies and rationales
Palestine Liberation Organization, Irish Republican Army nationalists	Nationalists 1920s-1960s	Guerrilla attacks on police and military	European empires	Post-1919 delegitimization of empire	Increased international support
1960s radicals (Symbionese Liberation Army)	New Left/Marxist 1960s-1980s	Hijackings, kidnappings, and assassinations	Governments in general; increasing focus on the United States	Viet Cong successes	Increased international training, cooperation, and sponsorship
Al-Qa'ida	Religious 1970s-present	Bombings (suicide, truck, plane, improvised explosive devices)	United States, Israel, and secular regimes with Muslim populations	Iranian Revolution, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan	Casualty escalation, Jihad basis

Figure I-1. Historical Examples of Terrorism

(2) **The Lone Actor.** The actions of an individual commonly referred to as a lone-wolf can have broad strategic and psychological impact. Individual autonomous terrorists may have warped or irrational motivations. These individuals pose a particularly hard-to-detect threat in that they rarely belong to large organizations.

(3) **The Transnational Network.** Transnational networks of terrorist groups are generally the most well-known, complex, and persistent adversaries. Usually connected by common ideology, they blend within global civilian populations to conceal their nefarious activities. These networks are able to leverage personnel, information, and resources to achieve their goals.

THE INDEPENDENT GROUP

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is a Marxist-Leninist organization opposed to the Colombian Government and US influence in Colombia. The FARC is a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization. Typically, the FARC uses kidnapping, narcotics distribution, and other criminal activities to finance terrorist operations. Human Rights Watch accuses the FARC of assassinations, recruiting children as combatants, and employing landmines against civilians. Some estimate that FARC related violence has displaced over 80,000 civilians in Colombia.

Various Sources

THE LONE ACTOR, AUTONOMOUS ACTOR, OR INDEPENDENT ACTOR

Theodore “Ted” Kaczynski, also known as the “Unabomber.” An American mathematician, social critic, and multiple murderer. Between 1978 and 1995, Kaczynski engaged in a nationwide bombing campaign against people involved with modern technology, planting or mailing numerous home-made bombs, ultimately killing a total of three people and injuring 23 others. He has been designated a domestic terrorist by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Various Sources

THE TRANSNATIONAL NETWORK

Linked by radicalized interpretations of Islam, the most well-known network is al-Qa’ida, responsible for the attacks on September 11, 2001. Al-Qa’ida ideologues envision a complete break from all foreign influences in Muslim countries, and the creation of a new worldwide Islamic caliphate. Characteristic techniques employed by al-Qa’ida include suicide attacks and simultaneous bombings of different targets. To this day, al-Qa’ida and its affiliates remain a cohesive organization and threat to global stability.

Various Sources

CHAPTER II FUNDAMENTALS OF COUNTERTERRORISM

“There is an international disease which feeds on the notion that if you have a cause to defend, you can use any means to further your cause, since the end justifies the means. As an international community, we must oppose this notion, whether it be in Canada, in the United States, or anywhere else. No cause justifies violence as long as the system provides for change by peaceful means.”

**Richard Nixon, 37th President of the United States,
Speech, October 1970**

1. Principles, Activities, and Operations

a. The principles of joint operations are formed around the traditional nine principles of war—objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity. To these, joint doctrine adds three principles based on operations over the last few decades—restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy. The principles of joint operations apply to CT activities and operations, but of particular importance are legitimacy and objective.

(1) **Legitimacy.** Legitimacy is a condition based upon the perception by specific audiences of the legality, morality, or rightness of a set of actions, and of the propriety of the authority of the individuals or organizations in taking them. Legitimate CT operations strengthen support for the goals and activities of CT and help isolate terrorists from the public. Legitimacy can be decisive in addressing enduring terrorist threats.

(2) **Objective.** Objectives direct operations toward a clearly defined, decisive, and achievable goal. Clearly defined goals enable effective collaboration and unity of effort, which focuses CT operations to use scarce resources efficiently. Finally, by identifying and pursuing appropriate goals, CT may enhance legitimacy and earn enduring support.

b. In addition to the traditional tenets, CT requires collaboration, balance, and precision.

(1) **Collaboration.** Collaboration between USG departments and agencies, partner nations (PNs), and allies is necessary to ensure unity of effort through ongoing coordination, cooperation, and information sharing. CT operations include interagency and multinational partners during both planning and execution. Collaboration creates a common and increased understanding of the operational environment, and must be managed in order to preserve the precision and capabilities of forces conducting CT operations.

(2) **Balance.** The purpose of balanced action is to provide the appropriate type and scale of operations and activities to create desired effects. Balance is critical to CT operations as overly offensive or aggressive action risks eroding the legitimacy and support. Conversely, overly defensive action cedes the initiative to the terrorists and provides them the time and space to potentially grow into strategic threats.

(3) **Precision.** The purpose of precision is to limit unnecessary collateral damage. CT operations must be scalable in application and effect to address everything from individual actions by small groups of terrorists to enduring operations as part of a campaign to dismantle large terrorist networks. Precision helps preserve legitimacy by limiting unnecessary collateral damage.

2. Counterterrorism Across the Range of Military Operations

a. JFCs use CT capabilities in a wide variety of combat and noncombat situations to build a cohesive CT operation or support the theater campaign plan. Activities and operations are normally performed by forces with regional expertise, long-term relations, and specific CT equipment and training. GCC CT operations and campaigns may take place across the range of military operations from the activities of engaging local CT forces and governments, developing indigenous CT security capabilities, deterring terrorist threats; to crisis response operations to counter terrorist incidents or limited CT contingencies; and when required, CT operations in support of major operations and campaigns to counter local, regional, or global terrorist threats.

b. **Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence Activities.** The primary purpose of military engagement and security cooperation activities, which may include CT activities, is to enable the GCC to build indigenous capabilities that deter terrorist acts and shape the operational environment to a desired set of conditions that facilitate stability and future operations. Shaping activities include development of PN and friendly military capabilities, information exchange and intelligence sharing, intelligence operations, identification and development of infrastructure and logistics capabilities, interagency coordination, and other efforts to ensure access to critical regions across the globe.

(1) CT as a part of military engagement is a noncombat activity conducted by CT forces. GCCs conduct routine military engagements to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, maintain influence, build defense relationships, and develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations. CT forces engage with nations' military or civilian security forces and authorities.

(2) Security cooperation that involves interaction with PN or host nation (HN) CT defense forces builds relationships that promote US CT interests and develops indigenous and PN CT capabilities and capacities. These activities provide US CT forces with peacetime and contingency access to critical regions around the world. Security cooperation includes activities such as FID, SFA, combined training and exercises, and similar noncombat activities.

(3) Deterrence prevents terrorist acts by presenting a credible threat of specific counteraction that would deny the success of an organization's use of terrorism and/or degrade its legitimacy or capabilities and influence over a population. Deterrence of an adversary who uses terrorism to achieve objectives is a difficult task. Military engagement and security cooperation activities can help deter future terrorist acts by presenting a credible threat that US and regional partner CT action would render the organization ineffective.

Deterrence in one region may force terrorists to move to another, which may deter or disrupt the organization temporarily.

For more information, see JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism.

c. Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations

(1) **Crisis Response.** The President and SecDef can respond to imminent terrorist threats or actual acts of terrorism by executing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or GCC's CT crisis response plans. CT crisis response operations are rapid, relatively small-scale, of limited duration, and may involve multiple threat locations.

(a) The Secretary of State has responsibility for matters involving protection of US citizens and interests and protection of all USG personnel on official duty abroad, other than personnel under command of a GCC. During a military crisis response, the President may direct the application of CT capabilities to resolve threats and incidents. This requires significant coordination and support from the National Security Council, Department of State (DOS), COM, and the country team, other USG departments and agencies, PNs for basing and/or forces, and the HN government and security forces. DOS employs its emergency action plans or post plans to highlight roles and responsibilities during potential hostage situations which could impact CT planning and CT activities.

(b) In US domestic territory, crisis response is led by the Director of the FBI for the Attorney General. The Attorney General may request support from SecDef if a crisis exceeds the FBI's capacities. DOD support to the FBI/Department of Justice (DOJ) will require a Presidential proclamation or executive order if the joint force is likely to use deadly force.

(2) **Limited Contingency Operations.** A crisis response or limited contingency operation can be a single small-scale, limited-duration operation or a significant part of a major operation of extended duration involving combat. The associated general strategic and operational objectives are to protect US interests and prevent surprise attack or further conflict. Included are operations to ensure the safety of American citizens and US interests while maintaining and improving US ability to operate with multinational partners to deter the hostile ambitions of potential aggressors. CT activities during limited contingencies may include intelligence operations to identify terrorists and gain insights into terrorist organizations identified as an imminent threat to a US mission abroad. After terrorists and their organizations are located, CT forces may conduct strikes or raids to neutralize or reduce the threats, and other operations as directed by SecDef or GCC to protect US interests.

d. Major Operations and Campaigns. When required to achieve national strategic objectives or protect national interests, the US national leadership may decide to conduct a major operation or campaign involving large-scale combat. The JFC may employ CT forces in support of all phases of operations to attack adversary state and non-state actors' use of unlawful violence. CT operations in support of major operations and campaigns are sustained and may occur simultaneously in multiple operational areas.

3. Counterterrorism and Types of Activities and Operations

Joint doctrine characterizes the employment of US military by types of activities and operations in order to describe the nature of the effort, tasks, tactics, and other aspects to inform future operations, training, and professional education—CT is a type of operation. There are three broad types of CT activities: advise and assist activities; overseas CT activities; and support to civil authorities activities.

a. **Advise and Assist Activities.** Advise and assist activities are all US military efforts to improve other nations' ability to provide security for its citizens, govern, provide services, prevent terrorists from using the nation's territory as a safe haven, and promote long-term regional stability. They include:

(1) **Nation Assistance.** Nation assistance is a broad term for civil or military assistance, other than foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation's territory based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance includes security assistance, FID, and other programs.

(a) Security assistance refers to a group of programs by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services to foreign nations by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales. Security assistance equips, trains, and develops capabilities and capacities in foreign CT forces. A GCC theater campaign plan may include activities to provide security assistance to a nation's military and, when authorized, civilian CT forces, and may be combined with similar security assistance to neighboring countries to develop a regional CT capability to address cross-border terrorist threats and act in a coordinated effort.

(b) **FID.** FID programs encompass the diplomatic, economic, informational, and military support provided to another nation to assist its fight against subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security. US military support to FID focuses on the operational assistance to HN personnel and collaborative planning with interorganizational and HN authorities to anticipate, preclude, and counter threats. FID supports HN internal defense and development programs. US military involvement in FID has historically been focused on helping a nation defeat an organized movement attempting to overthrow its lawful government. US FID programs may address other threats to the internal stability of an HN, such as civil disorder, illicit drug trafficking, and terrorism. While FID is a legislatively mandated core activity of special operations forces (SOF), conventional forces (CF) also contain and employ organic capabilities to conduct these activities.

For further guidance on FID, see JP 3-22.1, Foreign Internal Defense.

(2) **FHA.** FHA consists of DOD activities, normally in support of the US Agency for International Development or DOS, conducted outside of the United States and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. The assistance provided supplements or complements the efforts of the HN civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance.

DOD's operational reach, command and control (C2), logistics, and mobility assets provide rapid and robust response capabilities. DOD's FHA missions may include security to establish and maintain conditions for the provision of FHA by DOD or other organizations. When FHA occurs in environments where terrorist threats exist, the JFC needs to consider application of CT capabilities to preempt terrorist acts against the FHA effort to contribute to successful FHA activities and leverage the opportunity and access FHA may provide.

For additional information on FHA, see JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

(3) **SFA.** SFA consists of DOD activities that contribute to unified action by the USG to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. Foreign security forces are duly constituted military, paramilitary, police, and constabulary forces of a state. Foreign security forces consist of civilian and military organizations, to include law enforcement, border security, intelligence, SOF, and CF. SFA and foreign security forces are integral to successful FID, COIN, and stability operations. SFA may provide US CT force information, intelligence, and access to the HN.

b. Overseas CT Activities

(1) Offense, Defense, and Stability Operations

(a) Combat operations vary widely depending on the context of the operation and the objective. Major operations and campaigns, whether or not they involve large-scale combat, will normally include some level of offense, defense, and stability operations. Although defense may be the stronger force posture, it is the offense that is normally decisive in combat. In striving to achieve military strategic objectives quickly and at the least cost, JFCs will normally seek the earliest opportunity to conduct decisive offensive operations. Nevertheless, during sustained offensive operations, selected elements of the joint force may need to pause, defend, resupply, or reconstitute, while other forces continue the attack. Transitioning between offense and defense requires agility. Simultaneously, in many combat operations, the JFC will conduct stability operations to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, or humanitarian relief. The JFC may need to conduct a broad spectrum of CT operations to help secure the population during offensive, defensive, and stability operations.

(b) Stability operations are military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States, in coordination with other government agencies to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and to provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. The JFC integrates and synchronizes stability operations with other operations within each major operation or campaign phase. Stability operations support USG stabilization efforts and contribute to USG initiatives to build partnerships. These initiatives set the conditions for interaction with multinational partners, competitors, adversary leaders, military forces, and relevant populations by developing and presenting information and conducting activities that affect their perceptions, will, behavior, and capabilities. The JFC will likely conduct them in

coordination with interorganizational partners and the private sector in support of HN authorities. The JFC may need to conduct a broad spectrum of CT activities and operations from improving the capabilities of HN CT forces to conducting strikes and raids on terrorist organizations.

See JP 3-07, Stability Operations, for more information.

(2) **COIN.** An insurgency may devolve into organizations merely focused on terrorism because of many factors, such as lack of popular support, loss of leadership, or desperation. An insurgent applies military power against military forces, a terrorist unlawfully uses violence against civilians. Thus, a JFC may be simultaneously conducting COIN operations and CT.

See JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency, for more information.

(3) **Peace Operations (PO).** The diplomatic, information, economic, and military efforts to return a nation to stability and legitimate governance may be spoiled by terrorist actions. The JFC should assess the requirement for CT activities and operations during PO. The POs' fundamental requirement for impartiality requires the JFC to act on behalf of the peace process and not show preference for any faction or group over another and also applies to belligerents. Impartiality does not apply to possible spoilers such as terrorists. The JFC, within the command and operational framework of the specific PO, should determine if actors hostile to the peace process use terrorist tactics and design CT activities and operations with USG, HN, and PO partners.

See JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations, for more information.

(4) **Counterdrug Operations.** Counterdrug operations are civil or military actions taken to reduce or eliminate illicit drug trafficking. Counterdrug activities are provided by DOD to support foreign military forces and law enforcement agencies to detect, monitor, and counter the production and distribution of illegal drugs. DOD policy recognizes that illicit drug traffickers and terrorists often use the same methods, and that in many cases, traffickers and terrorists are one and the same. Narcoterrorism is terrorism that is linked to illicit drug trafficking. It may take the form of drug traffickers using terrorist tactics to protect and further illicit drug production or trade. Insurgents can also use illicit drug production or trade to fund their operations. Both narco-driven and narco-funded terrorists may be countered by CT operations.

See JP 3-07.4, Counterdrug Operations, for more information.

(5) **Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO).** NEOs are conducted to assist DOS in evacuating US citizens, DOD civilian personnel, and designated HN and third country nationals whose lives are in danger from locations in a foreign nation to an appropriate safe haven due to events that may have been caused by terrorists. Within the country, the ambassador is designated as the responsible authority for the NEO. Subject to the overall authority of the ambassador, responsibility for the conduct of military operations in support of an evacuation and security of personnel, equipment, and installations within the designated operational area is vested with the JFC. NEOs usually involve swift insertion of a

force, temporary occupation of an objective, and a planned withdrawal upon completion of the mission. The JFC should prepare to preempt hostile actions during NEOs by proactive military measures, including CT activities and operations, whether in permissive, uncertain, or hostile environments. JFC's NEO responsibilities include advance planning for evacuation of DOD noncombatant personnel within the operational area.

For further guidance on NEOs, see JP 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.

(6) **Countering WMD.** The intersection of states, state-sponsored terrorism, non-state terrorists, and WMD proliferation represents one of the greatest security challenges facing the United States. Terrorists have the ability to use chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and even toxic industrial materials to conduct attacks that can cause catastrophic mass casualties and panic in support of any terrorist aim. DOD has an array of options for countering WMD, including the ability to locate and secure WMD and WMD-related components; interdict them on land, on sea, or in the air; and render them safe. A JFC employing CT forces to counter terrorists intending to use WMD will have to understand the operational environment, CBRN threats and hazards, and vulnerabilities; support security cooperation with PNs; deter the proliferation and use of WMD; and if deterrence fails, interdict or eliminate the WMD programs and their associated means of delivery; safeguard the force if WMD are used; and manage the consequences of CBRN hazards. While not solely a CT mission, if the situation requires a JFC may interdict the transit of WMD and related materials, technologies, and expertise by employing CT forces to track, intercept, search, divert, seize, or otherwise stop suspect shipments. CT forces may be used to disrupt, neutralize, or destroy a WMD threat before it can be used or defeat an active attack by diverting, neutralizing, or destroying WMD. Technical CBRN forces may be required when conducting any of these activities. A JFC may also employ these forces, especially those with location capabilities, to systematically locate, characterize, secure, and disable or destroy WMD programs and associated delivery systems. Disabling or destroying WMD programs requires specialized technical CBRN forces with capabilities unique to DOD.

See JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, for more information.

(7) **MISO.** MISO attempt to change the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the JFC. MISO are integral to CT approaches to counter the terrorists' ideology, support moderate alternatives, establish an information capability with HNs, build HN CT capacities, and attack VEOs and their infrastructure and networks.

See JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations, for more information.

c. **Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA).** DSCA is support provided by US Armed Forces, DOD civilians, DOD contract personnel, DOD component assets, and National Guard forces (when SecDef, in coordination with the governors of the affected states, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, United States Code [USC] status), or when federalized in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying

entities for special events. DSCA includes support to prepare, prevent, protect, respond, and recover from domestic incidents including terrorist attacks, major disasters both natural and man-made, and domestic special events. DSCA is provided in response to requests from civil authorities and upon approval from appropriate authorities.

See JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, for more information.

4. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment

a. The joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) process is used to characterize the operational environment and provide a disciplined methodology for applying a holistic view to the analysis of adversary capabilities and intentions. During CT operations JIPOE places far greater emphasis on understanding the civil population and critical infrastructure. Additionally, JIPOE helps combat terrorism by supporting force protection measures, counterintelligence, and other security-related activities. The JIPOE process consists of four basic steps that ensure the systematic analysis of all relevant aspects of the operational environment. The process is both continuous and cyclical in that JIPOE is conducted both prior to and during CT operations as well as during planning for follow-on missions. All joint staff headquarters sections, not just the intelligence section, are involved in the JIPOE process.

b. The four steps of the JIPOE process are define the operational environment; describe the impact of the operational environment; evaluate the adversary and other relevant actors; and determine potential courses of action of the adversary and other relevant actors.

c. **Critical Factors Analysis.** Critical factors analysis for CT starts by analyzing the centers of gravity (COGs) of terrorist organizations and their networks and then determining their critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities. This allows the JIPOE team to recognize decisive points and what shaping operations are necessary to successfully execute CT operations. Figure II-1 graphically represents elements of the CT analytical framework.

For more information, see JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.




Figure II-1. Counterterrorism Analytical Framework

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CHAPTER III ORGANIZING FOR COUNTERTERRORISM

“US CT [counterterrorism] efforts require a multidepartmental and multinational effort that goes beyond traditional intelligence, military, and law enforcement functions. We are engaged in a broad, sustained, and integrated campaign that harnesses every tool of American power—military, civilian, and the power of our values—together with the concerted efforts of allies, partners, and multilateral institutions.”

President Barack Obama
National Strategy for Counterterrorism
June 28, 2011

1. National Security Council

The National Security Council manages the interagency process with respect to CT and all national security-related issues and certain selected actions. The interagency process is designed to advance the President’s policy priorities and to serve the national interest by ensuring that all agencies and perspectives that can contribute to achieving these priorities participate in making and implementing policy. Thus, the National Security Council is the key integrator of the President’s whole-of-government CT policy and strategies, which requires interagency coordination at the Principals Committee, Deputies Committee, and supporting interagency policy committees, and the efforts of the National Security Council Staff. The key interagency policy committee of CT is the Counterterrorist Security Group, which is led by the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism.

2. United States Government Counterterrorism Roles

a. **Department of Homeland Security (DHS).** DHS leads the unified national effort to secure the United States. Key among its strategic goals is to prevent, protect, respond, and recover from acts of terrorism.

b. **DOS**

(1) As the lead US foreign affairs agency, DOS formulates, represents, and implements the President’s foreign policy. The Secretary of State is the President’s principal advisor on foreign policy and the person chiefly responsible for US representation abroad, except for CT within regions where the responsibility lies with the military commander as designated by the President.

(2) DOS has six regional bureaus that address foreign policy considerations on a regional basis. The assistant secretaries of the regional bureaus are key actors in CT activities and operations policy in their assigned regions. Furthermore, the DOS Bureau of Counterterrorism publishes an annual country report on terrorism and manages US policy for a whole-of-government approach to CT. The DOS Bureau of Counterterrorism maintains the Foreign Terrorist Organizations List that provides justification for the President to block or freeze tangible property and freeze financial accounts of individuals or terrorist

organizations pursuant to Executive Order 13224, *Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism*. This tool is designed to sever terrorists' organizations logistics and resources. These efforts are worked through PNs where the United States maintains country teams under the leadership of COMs.

(3) **COM.** The COM is the personal representative of the President and the official USG representative in the host country. The COM is responsible for the conduct of relations with the host government and is the primary channel for communications with that government. The COM directs, coordinates, and supervises all USG executive branch employees in that effort, except those under the command of a US military commander. CT activities and operations conducted by DOD and other USG departments and agencies require COM concurrence prior to execution, unless otherwise directed by the President.

c. **DOJ.** The Attorney General investigates acts or incidents that may constitute a violation of federal laws related to acts of terrorism or the use or threatened use of WMD. This authority is exercised through the FBI. The Attorney General, generally acting through the FBI, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the COM, will assume lead responsibility for the law enforcement investigation of terrorist or WMD incidents abroad. The FBI's tasks may include taking custody of suspected terrorists, lawful transfer of custody of suspected terrorists, forensic examination of material collected of possible intelligence or criminal prosecution value, and hostage negotiation support.

d. **The Department of the Treasury (TREAS).** TREAS's role in CT is to lead the USG efforts to locate, track, and seize suspected terrorist financial assets. TREAS may use a variety of Presidential, statutory, and regulatory authorities, including economic and financial sanctions. For threats not responsive to diplomatic outreach and not suitable for military action, TREAS economic and financial capabilities often provide unique tools to contribute to achievement of the President's CT policy and strategies.

e. **National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)**

(1) The mission of NCTC is to analyze terrorist threats, share information with PNs, and integrate all instruments of national power to ensure unity of effort. NCTC also provides assistance to the operational elements of the USG that disrupt, isolate, and dismantle terrorist organizations and prevent future attacks.

(2) NCTC is staffed by personnel from multiple USG departments and agencies. NCTC serves as the primary organization in the USG to integrate and analyze all intelligence pertaining to CT, except for information pertaining exclusively to domestic terrorism. It serves as the USG's central and shared database on known and suspected terrorists and international terrorist groups. NCTC also provides USG departments and agencies with terrorism intelligence analysis and other information.

(3) NCTC conducts strategic operational planning for CT activities across the USG, integrating all instruments of national power to ensure unity of effort. NCTC ensures

effective integration of CT plans and synchronization of operations across more than 20 USG departments and agencies engaged in CT efforts.

(4) As part of NCTC's mission, it maintains the authoritative database of all known or suspected terrorist identifiers maintained by the USG. The Defense Combating Terrorism Center gathers, evaluates, and nominates all known or suspected terrorist identifiers collected by DOD to NCTC for inclusion on the National Known or Suspected Terrorist Watch List maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center, and dissemination to front-line screening organizations, like Customs and Border Patrol, Consular Affairs, and state and local law enforcement. Complete and accurate collection of identity data (biometric, biographic, and behavioral attributes) and derogatory information related to individuals encountered in the operational area is critical to supporting these nominations.

f. **National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF).** The NJTTF is an interagency coordination organization that provides liaison from FBI Headquarters to local joint terrorism task forces and participating agencies and serves as a conduit for information on threats and leads. It is located in the NCTC, where it also works with NCTC personnel to analyze data and plan antiterrorism strategies. The NJTTF shares information among its 80 members—officers, agents, and analysts—who then pass the information onto the 48 different agencies they represent. Those agencies—from the law enforcement, intelligence, homeland security, defense, diplomatic, and public safety sectors—include the DHS, the US military, and federal, state, and local partners. Men and women from the US Secret Service, Federal Air Marshals, New York City Police Department, DOD counterintelligence organizations (Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, and Army Counterintelligence), Federal Bureau of Prisons, Amtrak Police, and dozens of other organizations work together every day to counter terrorist planning and operations.

3. Department of Defense

Within DOD, CT activities and operations are normally executed by GCCs, subordinate theater special operations command (TSOC) commanders, and other JFCs. CF and SOF each bring certain competencies to CT efforts. CF and SOF skills and capabilities complement each other. The scope, intensity, and duration of each specific operation will dictate the missions to be accomplished, and the JFCs must determine the right joint force mix to employ. CF and SOF each possess unique capabilities that can produce even greater warfighting potential for the JFCs when integrated into a holistic global CT campaign with numerous theater CT operations. Flexible C2, specific mission-generation processes, clear mission approval levels, and integration of all appropriate partners at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels improves the CT effectiveness of both CF and SOF. CT is a core task of SOF, but global demand for CT activities and the varied conditions under which the broad range of CT activities occur dictate that SOF cannot be the sole force engaged in CT operations.

a. GCCs

(1) The principal JFC responsible for CT activities and operations is the GCC. The GCC detects, deters, and prevents attacks against the United States, its territories, and bases, and employs appropriate force to defend the nation should deterrence fail. The GCC is also the single point of contact for military matters within the assigned area of responsibility (AOR), excluding areas within the United States.

(2) **TSOC.** A TSOC is a subordinate unified command of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). It is the primary theater special operations organization capable of performing synchronized, continuous CT activities and operations. It is the organization through which a GCC exercises C2 of attached SOF as designated. SecDef has delegated operational control (OPCON) of TSOCs and attached SOF tactical units to their respective GCCs via the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance. A GCC normally exercises OPCON of attached SOF through the commander, theater special operations command (CDRTSOC). The GCC may exercise OPCON of subordinate forces directly from the TSOC or through a special operations command-forward (SOC-FWD), which is a small, scalable, operational-level headquarters that provides a forward-deployed, persistent presence, C2 capability. If conditions warrant greater SOF engagement, a SOC-FWD can transition to a joint task force. The SOC-FWD develops a close working relationship with members of the country team and PN armed forces and those of the HN, and helps the TSOC commander execute the role as a JFC and theater special operations advisor.

b. USSOCOM

(1) USSOCOM is a functional combatant commander (FCC) with transregional responsibilities. The Commander, United States Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM) synchronizes plans for global operations against terrorist networks, in coordination with other combatant commands (CCMDs), the Services, and, as directed, appropriate USG departments and agencies. During the conduct of CT activities and operations, CDRUSSOCOM is normally a supporting commander to the GCC in whose AOR the CT effort occurs.

(2) The Joint Special Operations Command, a subordinate unified command of USSOCOM, has assigned and attached subordinate units and may deploy to support GCC's training, exercises, activities, and operations.

See JP 3-05, Special Operations, for a detailed description of SOF core activities.

(3) In addition to the responsibilities assigned in Title 10, USC, Section 167, the President has assigned CDRUSSOCOM responsibility for preparing forces to conduct CT activities and operations in support of SecDef-directed and GCC activities and operations, as well as the following tasks:

(a) Integrate DOD strategy, plans, and intelligence priorities for operations against terrorist networks designated by SecDef.

(b) Plan campaigns against designated terrorist networks.

(c) Provide military representation to US national agencies and international agencies for matters related to global operations against terrorist networks.

(d) Integrate theater security cooperation activities, deployments, and capabilities that support campaigns against designated terrorist networks in coordination with GCCs and make priority recommendations to SecDef.

(e) Plan operational preparation of the environment (OPE) and, as directed, execute OPE or synchronizing execution of OPE in coordination with GCCs.

(f) Execute global operations against terrorist networks as directed.

4. Global Nature of Counterterrorism Operations

a. **Global SOF Network.** All SOF CT forces, whether based in the continental United States (CONUS) or forward-stationed, are part of the global SOF network where all SOF coordinate, exchange information and intelligence, and otherwise synchronize their efforts in support of the GCCs. They are able to connect with cross-functional, multiorganizational entities in CONUS and around the world allowing global collaboration to counter transregional and regional terrorist threats. The key CT organization in each AOR is the TSOC and its subordinate assigned and attached organizations and supporting forces.

b. Terrorist networks operate in a transnational environment that is not confined by boundaries, borders, or regions. To defeat this type of organization, USSOCOM provides continuous threat monitoring, 24/7 planning and reaction, as directed, and global capabilities that are not confined by department or agency geographic regions.

5. Partner Nations

a. DOS engages US partners through the regional levels with regional teams or the sub-regional level with country teams. DOD works together with DOS and other interagency elements through the GCCs to implement US CT strategy. US strategy against terrorist organizations and individuals associated with terrorist organizations are a mixture of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic options as stated above. The GCC's CT operations are coordinated with allies and integrated into developing foreign partner SOF and CF, and focus on mutual threats to United States and partner sovereignty. PNs' strategies focus on regional threats or adversaries and improving security. Military engagement planning occurs at the country team levels and the CCMD level to support US regional security interests and mitigate PN security concerns.

b. **US CT Strategy with Foreign Partners.** US strategy against terrorist organizations and individuals associated with terrorist organizations are a mixture of diplomatic and security options. The US DOD CT enterprise, coordinated with allies and integrated into developing PN SOF, focuses on mutual threats to United States and partner sovereignty (see Figure III-1).




Figure III-1. Partner Nation Contributions

c. Military engagement with partners and advising and assisting them to develop CT capabilities are key tools in US CT strategy and leverages SOF regional orientation and expertise that creates an enduring CT partner in the region and often elsewhere.

6. Indigenous and Surrogate Entities

Indigenous and surrogate forces may be employed to support or conduct CT operations. These indigenous forces may resemble those used during unconventional warfare operations or campaigns. Generally, SOF work with and through irregular forces in unconventional warfare, which are armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces. See JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, for more information. Generally, when SOF conduct CT with or through indigenous or surrogate elements, they team with members of the regular armed forces, police forces, or other internal security forces of a PN. For example, violent extremists often seek safe harbor among the civilian populace of a sovereign nation without the consent of local authorities or the national government. A PN may have the national will to apprehend or expel terrorists from inside their borders, but lack the CT

resources and expertise to act. Using USG assets to remove terrorists unilaterally from the civilian populace on behalf of a foreign government may present collateral diplomatic, political, and legal risks. In these circumstances, pursuing terrorists with or through regular indigenous forces or surrogates offers several advantages. They generally speak the local language, are sensitive to local culture, and have personal knowledge of the civilian populace. More importantly, they may be legally empowered by their national or local governments to conduct military or law enforcement operations within national borders to impose national will.

GRUPA REAGOWNIA OPERACYJNO-MANEWROWEGO (GROM) OPERATIONAL MANEUVER RESPONSE GROUP

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1992, United States European Command (USEUCOM) began an enduring engagement with various former Soviet and Warsaw Pact countries to develop partner capacity. USEUCOM and Special Operations Command Europe began a series of special operations forces (SOF), foreign internal defense, and security force assistance engagements to build regional security and stabilize criminal activity and terrorist threats. One of the best examples is the Polish SOF unit, GROM. The GROM started as an engagement to defend Poland from internal criminal activity and external terrorist threats, and now is a partner with US SOF addressing global threats to both nations.

Beginning in 1992, USEUCOM started an engagement strategy with the military liaison teams (MLTs) with several former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries to rebuild their Ministry of Defense, strengthen security in the region, and build a pathway for joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance. Many of the MLTs have special forces noncommissioned officers assigned to assess and guide US SOF foreign engagements. Internally, Poland developed the GROM to mitigate Palestinian terrorist groups. Poland believed that the enemies of Israel would target Poland for its role in the secret mass migration of Jews from Europe to Israel post World War II, in 1946-1947. Through the MLT program 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group (A) began training with the GROM to help build the counterterrorism capability of Poland. As the GROM and US SOF relationship matured into a SOF interoperability capability, Poland politically and militarily began to directly support US strategic efforts. Poland joined NATO in 1997 and the GROM began to support various strategic missions with the US, starting with GROM during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti, as the unit conducted personal security with US Special Forces advisors. The GROM also sent elements to support US Special Operations Command conducting person indicted for war crimes intelligence and capture operations in the Balkans. In 2003, the GROM supported US operations as Operation IRAQI FREEDOM began using their maritime assets to capture coastal objectives. Later in Afghanistan the GROM established a task force in Ghazni Province to support counterinsurgency in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Internally, Poland has reorganized GROM into a functional command, similar to US Special Operations Command, under the Polish ministry of defense. The success of the development of the GROM from a regional strategic partner to a global strategic partner supporting both NATO and US operations has set a benchmark for future SOF security cooperation efforts.

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CHAPTER IV COMMAND, PLANNING, AND ASSESSMENT

“Now, make no mistake, our nation is still threatened by terrorists... But we have to recognize that the threat has shifted and evolved from the one that came to our shores on 9/11. With a decade of experience now to draw from, this is the moment to ask ourselves hard questions—about the nature of today’s threats and how we should confront them.”

**President Barack Obama
National Defense University
May 23, 2013**

SECTION A. COMMAND OF COUNTERTERRORIST OPERATIONS

1. General Tenets

a. **Command.** Command is the exercise of authorities, as specified by SecDef or delegated by a superior JFC, by a properly designated commander over forces assigned or attached to the command. The JP-1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, command framework applies to command of CT forces, but because of the unbounded nature of terrorist organizations that operate within and astride GCCs’ boundaries, creating a CT command structure that maintains unity of command and achieves unity of action and effort is challenging.

b. **Unity of Command.** Unity of command means all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose, and no two commanders may exercise the same command relationship over the same force at any one time. The diverse nature of SOF component capabilities and missions, the small size of numerous operational elements that often cross geographically large operations areas, and working with HN forces and/or among indigenous populations make SOF unity of command difficult. The guiding principle is to place all SOF forces under a single JFC with the requisite command authorities and relationships to coordinate special operations among all supporting and supported units. Unless otherwise directed by the President or SecDef, a special operations activity or mission is conducted under the command of the GCC in whose AOR the activity or mission is to be conducted. A GCC normally achieves unity of command of SOF through the CDRTSOC. A commander, joint special operations task force normally provides SOF unity of command for a JFC subordinate to a GCC. CDRTSOC or commander, joint special operations task force, may also be designated the joint force special operations component commander under a JFC.

(1) Also, CDRUSSOCOM must maintain the capability to exercise command of a selected special operations mission if directed by the President or SecDef with the approval of the President.

(2) SecDef may create unity of command across multiple GCC AORs by establishing simultaneous command relationships, such as OPCON, between a CT JFC and multiple GCCs. Each GCC exercises OPCON of the JFC and those CT forces operating in

EXAMPLE OF COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS IN COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS

During Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, Commander, United States Central Command (CDRUSCENTCOM) employed a joint task force (JTF) with the mission to counter insurgents who used terrorism to achieve their goals, typified by Abu Mus'ab Zarqawi in Iraq, whose terrorism campaign turned a Sunni insurgency into brutal sectarian violence that almost destroyed the nascent Iraqi government. The command of this JTF was a complex challenge because of the need to maintain unity of counterterrorism (CT) command and effort while addressing terrorist organizations in both Iraq and Afghanistan, each commanded by a four star joint force commander, as well as countering terrorists operating in Commander, United States Africa Command's area of responsibility (AOR).

The JTF's mission was to defeat the most dangerous terrorist organizations as a complementing effort to the stability and counterinsurgency operations of Multinational Force Iraq (MNF-I) and International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan. The Secretary of Defense (SecDef) created unity of command by placing CT forces under the operational control (OPCON) of CDRUSCENTCOM, who delegated tactical control (TACON) of the CT forces operating in Iraq to Commander, MNF-I, and TACON to Commander, United States Forces Afghanistan (USFA) of JTF forces operating in Afghanistan. Furthermore, SecDef placed additional JTF forces under OPCON of a bordering geographic combatant commander (GCC) for operations against other terrorist organizations.

Placing the same JTF under concurrent OPCON of two GCCs and simultaneous TACON of Commander, MNF-I and Commander, USFA provided each the required command authorities and was an effective means to create unity of CT command, effort, and action because it enabled a single CT enterprise to address interrelated terrorist networks across the two GCCs' AORs, able to coordinate, shape the environment, and strike at critical points throughout the AORs to counter equally distributed terrorist networks.

It should be noted that this did not violate the command relationships of Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, since each commander having OPCON or TACON only controlled and directed those forces in their AOR or operational area.

Various Sources

the GCC's AOR; the OPCON does not apply to the JFC's CT forces operating in other GCCs' AORs. This maintains unity of command because no GCC exercises OPCON of the same forces, only those forces within the GCC's AOR. Furthermore, SecDef, CDRUSSOCOM, or the GCC may enhance unity of command by creating a support command relationship between a supporting CT JFC, not assigned or apportioned to the GCC, and the supported TSOC commander.

c. **Unity of Effort and Unified Action.** Unity of effort is the coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, as a result of unified action even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization. Unified action is the synchronized, coordinated, and integrated activities of government and nongovernment entities with those of the military to achieve common objectives. Through unified action CT forces are often employed as part of a whole-of-government effort, operating with other joint forces, various interagency partners, and multinational partners, intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, and HN forces and organizations. This requires the SOF commanders to coordinate and synchronize special operations with other efforts. Unity of effort is an essential complement to unity of command.

2. Command Relationships and Authorities for Counterterrorist Activities and Operations

Title 10, USC, Section 164, is the statutory authority for combatant command (command authority). SecDef, FCCs, GCCs, JFCs, and tactical commanders delegate requisite authorities to subordinate commanders at all levels by establishing command relationships. JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, delineates and describes the types of command authority.

See JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, for a complete discussion of command authorities, relationships, transfer of forces, and C2.

a. **Command Relationships.** The nature of terrorist threats requires SecDef, CDRUSSOCOM, GCCs, and JFCs to establish flexible and often complex command relationships to ensure CT forces have the required agility to coordinate with all DOD, interagency, and foreign partners, and to pursue terrorists across military and governmental boundaries. Following is an overview of these authorities and their use in CT activities and operations.

b. **Combatant Command (Command Authority).** Title 10, USC, Section 167, lists CT as a special operations activity of USSOCOM, which has forces specifically trained and equipped to conduct CT activities and operations. Special operations activities and missions are normally conducted under the OPCON of a specific GCC.

(1) **OPCON.** Unless otherwise directed by SecDef, when USSOCOM CT forces are transferred to a GCC, the gaining GCC exercises OPCON over those CT forces. In addition to USSOCOM provided CT forces, the gaining GCC has OPCON over permanently forward-stationed CT forces. In both cases—forces provided by CDRUSSOCOM and those permanently under a GCC's OPCON—the GCC normally exercises OPCON through the TSOC commander, unless otherwise directed by SecDef.

(2) **Tactical Control.** A GCC or TSOC commander may delegate tactical control to subordinate commanders to direct CT activities and operations, and control assigned or attached forces or designated forces made available for tasking.

(3) **Support**

(a) Support is a command relationship especially useful for JFCs employing CT forces that must operate across multiple commands and operational areas because it creates flexibility for the JFC. A support relationship is established when a CT force must operate in another organization's operational area or across multiple GCCs' AORs to effectively coordinate and pursue terrorists. Thus, a supporting CT force commander may be in support of two or more GCCs/JFCs simultaneously to effectively address cross-boundary threats. The support relationship enables CT forces to address terrorist threats thereby complementing forces conducting other operations, such as stability, COIN, FID, offense, defense, etc.

(b) SecDef or common superior commander assigns roles and responsibilities and grants authorities to the supporting and supported commanders in an establishing directive or order that creates the command relationship. An establishing directive is essential to ensure unity of effort. The support command relationship is used by SecDef to establish and prioritize CT support between and among CCDRs, and to create command relationships for national CT forces with CCMDs and TSOCs to address terrorist threats within and that transcend GCCs' AORs.

(c) Effective employment of CT forces may require a JFC to be a supporting commander to two or more supported commanders simultaneously. When there is a conflict over prioritization between component commanders, SecDef or common superior commander will have final adjudication. When the supporting commander cannot fulfill the needs of the supported commander, either the supported or supporting commander will notify the establishing authority. The establishing authority will provide a solution.

c. Counterterrorist Support Command Relationships Establishing Directives

(1) Unless limited by the establishing directive, the supported commander will have the authority to exercise general direction of the supporting effort, including designation and prioritization of targets or objectives, timing and duration of the supporting action, and other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency.

(2) Unless limited by the establishing directive, the supporting commander has the responsibility to ascertain the needs of the supported commander and take action to fulfill them within existing capabilities, consistent with priorities and requirements of other assigned tasks. The supporting commander determines the forces, tactics, methods, procedures, and communications to be employed in providing this support. The supporting commander will advise and coordinate with the supported commander on matters concerning the employment and limitations (e.g., logistics) of such support, assist in planning for the integration of such support into the supported commander's effort as a whole, and ensure that support requirements are appropriately communicated within the supporting commander's organization.

See JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, for details on establishing directives.

3. Command Relationships and Assignment and Transfer of Counterterrorist Forces

a. When a force is assigned, reassigned, or attached, SecDef will specify the command relationship the gaining CCDR will exercise and the losing commander will relinquish. Forces, not command relationships, are transferred between commands. Forces assigned or attached to a CCMD may be further assigned or attached within the CCMD by the CCDR, who will also delegate the appropriate command relationship.

b. In support of Title 10, USC, Section 167, and delineated through the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance, SecDef assigns all CONUS-based CT forces to USSOCOM and attaches permanently forward-stationed CT forces to the respective GCC, who exercises OPCON over them. SecDef may direct CDRUSSOCOM to temporarily transfer CONUS-based CT forces, attach them to a GCC and delegate OPCON or tactical control, and establish support command relationships with each TSOC in order to facilitate employment of CT forces within and astride GCC AORs and coordinate and pursue transregional terrorist threats. SecDef may authorize CDRUSSOCOM to establish support command relationships where CT forces simultaneously support one or more TSOCs. The support command relationships are set up through the affected GCCs.

4. Command and Control of Counterterrorist Forces

The C2 fundamentals and processes described in JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, apply to CT activities and operations. Of special concern to the JFC conducting CT activities and operations is the need to create a flexible and responsive C2 structure, one that enables coordination at all appropriate levels, rapid decision making and approval, and timely action, and maintains unity of effort. In complex operational environments, the JFC may use the support command relationship to provide the organizational agility necessary for CT operations. In all cases, commanders exercising command authority over SOF should:

a. Provide for a clear and unambiguous CT chain of command to create unity of command with the requisite authority to accomplish assigned tasks.

b. Establish clear command relationships to achieve unity of effort. Clearly define authorities, roles, and relationships and ensure subordinate commanders, staff principals, and leaders of C2 nodes and liaisons understand their authorities and role in decision making and controlling, and their relationships with others.

c. Provide for sufficient CT staff experience and expertise to plan, conduct, support, and assess operations.

d. Ensure that requisite CT liaisons are in place and know their roles, responsibilities, and authorities.

SECTION B. JOINT OPERATIONS PLANNING FOR COUNTERTERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS

5. Elements of Operational Design for Counterterrorism Planning

Joint operation planning integrates military action and capabilities with those of other instruments of national power in time, space, and purpose in unified action to achieve the JFC's objectives.

a. **Operational Approach.** The purpose of joint operation planning is to integrate military activities and operations with those of other instruments of national power in time, space, and purpose in unified action to create effects that achieve the JFC's objectives and attain the end state.

(1) A JFC uses the operational approach to understand the operational environment and the problem while describing the visualization of a broad approach for attaining the desired end state. The operational approach uses elements of operational design—termination criteria, military end state, objectives, effects, COG, approaches, lines of operation (LOOs) and lines of effort (LOEs), CT defeat mechanism, etc.—to provide details and facilitate detailed planning.

(2) Figure IV-1 illustrates the operational approach concept to CT operational planning. The figure shows five LOEs, each of which applies specific CT defeat mechanisms—disrupt, isolate, dismantle, and enable—to achieve the objectives supported by the LOE and create desired conditions by changing the physical or behavioral political, military, economic, social, informational, and infrastructure environment.

b. Termination Criteria

(1) The JFC derives CT termination criteria from national policy and strategy to establish the end state and conditions required to end military operations. The JFC must know the national strategic end state and conditions, understand the US policy nuances among different terrorist organizations, and maintain contact with the national leadership for potential changes during the planning and execution of CT operations.

(2) Terrorist organizations often operate in and receive support from many countries. This means CT planning termination criteria are normally organization-based rather than country-based, except perhaps where a country is a sponsor of terrorism. The JFC's understanding of national strategic end state and conditions develops termination criteria for joint CT operations against terrorist organizations as the starting point for operational design because they enable development of the military end state, conditions, and objectives. The following examples of CT termination criteria conditions support the national end state of defeating terrorist organization X.




Figure IV-1. Counterterrorism Operational Approach—Example

c. **Military End State.** Military end state is the set of required conditions that defines achievement of all military objectives. It normally represents a point in time and/or circumstances beyond which the President does not require the military instrument of national power as the means to achieve remaining national objectives. CT activities and operations are seldom the primary military effort in a whole-of government CT effort, but they are often a major complementing effort. In any situation, military CT activities and operations may be only one of many USG instruments of national power employed. The JFC developing plans for employment of CT forces may find that the military end state closely mirrors the national CT strategic end state because of the strategy's individual approach to individual counterterrorist organizations and the detail and depth of policy for each. See Figure IV-1 for examples of desired end state and conditions.

**EXAMPLES OF COUNTERTERRORISM TERMINATION CRITERIA
(CONDITIONS)**

Terrorist organization X lacks the capability to plan, conduct, or support operations that threaten countries within the region where it operates, other countries, and the US homeland and its interests abroad.

Countries where terrorist organization X operates are willing and able to disrupt attack planning, facilitation, and operations against countries in the region and the US homeland and interests abroad and safe havens are eliminated.

Countries where terrorist organization X operates have secured their weapons of mass destruction.

US and foreign partners are positioned to maintain situational awareness and able to identify potential use of terrorism in order to preempt re-emergence of terrorists.

d. **Objectives.** An objective is a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every military operation should be directed. The purpose of CT operations is to achieve military objectives that change conditions and attain the end state. Because national CT strategy and guidance may provide national strategic end state and objectives individually for each terrorist operation and organization of importance to the defense of the homeland, they may be useful without significant additional guidance at the theater and operational levels. Military objectives are the basis for identifying the military tasks that have to be accomplished in order to achieve an objective and change conditions. See Figure IV-1 for example CT objectives.

e. **Effects.** An effect is a physical and/or behavioral change in the state of a system resulting from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. The use of desired effects in planning can help a commander and staff determine the operational tasks required to achieve objectives and clarify the relationship among COGs, decisive points, LOOs, LOEs, objectives, military end state, and termination criteria. During execution of CT operations in complex situations the proximate cause of effects can be difficult to predict. While effects may be created by the conduct of missions at the tactical level, their contribution to achieving an objective is measured at the operational and higher levels. Sufficient intelligence is required to predict direct effects reliably, and indirect effects are difficult to foresee. JFCs must appreciate that unpredictable third-party action, unintended consequences of friendly operations, and the fog and friction of conflict will contribute to the uncertainty of effect assessments.

For more information on effects and the systems perspective, refer to JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

EXAMPLES OF COUNTERTERRORISM EFFECTS

Terrorist organization X is incapable of conducting attacks within countries from which it operates, in other countries, or US against persons or facilities.

Links between terrorist organization X and violent extremist organizations are severed and the development of new links is prevented.

Countries in which terrorist organization X operates have trained and equipped civilian or military forces able to independently conduct effective counterterrorism (CT) operations.

Countries in which terrorist organization X operates participate in a US and foreign partner regional CT coordination center to maintain situational awareness of terrorist organization X, and coordinate and take action to preempt terrorist acts.

f. COG

(1) An objective is always linked to a COG. The JFC needs to identify and analyze friendly and enemy COGs during planning. In CT planning, there may be different COGs at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, especially when addressing terrorist movements that have transregional or global participants. Terrorist organizations may coalesce around a strategic COG in a global or transregional effort to change political, military, economic, or social conditions. The JFC's analysis of COGs at all levels is important because it guides the application of military capabilities and is exceedingly dependent upon detailed and continuous joint and interagency intelligence and analysts with long-term focus.

(2) The JFC must determine the COG(s) at each level and apply CT capabilities appropriately in order to efficiently and effectively use CT resources and achieve the CT objectives, as the JFC continuously analyzes and refines COGs to adjust to friendly and terrorist actions. Furthermore, the JFC must recognize that CT operations are normally complementing efforts to other military and USG actions to protect a foreign country and the homeland from terrorist acts. As such, COGs associated with terrorist organizations may also be addressed by stability operations, COIN, FID, and other military and civilian efforts to change the environment within the country or region so that terrorists do not have the support of the population and lack the legitimacy required for continued support within and outside of the country and region.

(3) The JFC further analyzes each COG to determine its critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities. The JFC must have sufficient CT capabilities, authorities, and approvals, to include interagency and often HN approvals, to take advantage of a terrorist's critical vulnerabilities.

(4) A JFC should focus efforts against critical vulnerabilities that will do the most decisive or significant damage to a terrorist's COG. In selecting the vulnerabilities for attack, the JFC must analyze the vulnerability for its accessibility, redundancy, ability to

recuperate, and impact on the civilian populace, and balance those factors against friendly capabilities to affect those vulnerabilities. In CT operations, the freedom of action for CT forces is essential and may be reduced substantially when vulnerability factors are not balanced properly, especially the effect CT forces' actions may have on the civilian population. Additionally, critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities may change as the JFC applies CT capabilities and the terrorists react and modify their strategy (see Figure IV-2).




Figure IV-2. Counterterrorist Operational Level Center of Gravity Analysis—Example

g. **Direct and Indirect Approaches and Decisive Points.** A direct approach attacks the enemy's COG by applying combat power directly against it. An indirect approach attacks the enemy's COG by applying combat power against a series of decisive points that lead to the defeat of the COG. Understanding the relationship among a COG's critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities can illuminate direct and indirect approaches to the COG. Most critical factors will be decisive points. When dealing with terrorists, the JFC must consider how actions against decisive points will affect not only the enemy but also the relevant population and their behavior and relationships with the terrorist and friendly forces. A CT campaign or operation is normally a sustained indirect approach to defeat a terrorist organization and its support networks. A JFC employing CT forces must selectively focus a series of actions against terrorists' critical vulnerabilities until the cumulative effects lead to achieving the objectives and attaining the end state determined by the President and SecDef. National policy does not always require defeat of terrorist organizations; it may direct the containment of the threat, monitoring it, and be prepared to take action if required.

h. **LOOs and LOEs**

(1) **LOOs.** A LOO defines the interior or exterior orientation of a friendly force in relationship to an enemy force that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and space to an objective(s). Interior lines refer to a force operating from a central position allowing it to mass combat power against a specific portion of an enemy force. Exterior lines mean a force converges on an enemy force, offering opportunities for encirclement. Major operations are typically designed using LOOs to tie offensive, defensive, and stability tasks to the geographic and opposing force-oriented objectives.

(2) **LOEs.** A LOE links multiple tasks and missions using the logic of purpose—cause and effect—to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions. LOEs are used when COGs and decisive points do not involve friendly force orientation toward an enemy force as seen in LOOs. CT planning uses LOEs to link tasks, effects, and decisive points to objectives to achieve the desired conditions and attain the end state, and are particularly useful when CT force orientation at the operational and strategic levels has little relevance. CT force orientation at the tactical level may involve LOOs, or a combination of LOOs and LOEs. Furthermore, the JFC planning CT operations may combine CT LOEs with those of corresponding DOS, FBI, and other interagency CT partners, which brings to bear capabilities, expertise, and authorities of multiple elements of the USG and facilitates unity of effort when addressing complex CT problems (see Figure IV-3).

(3) **Counterterrorist Defeat Mechanism.** The defeat mechanism complements the understanding achieved by a COG analysis of a problem by suggesting means to solve it. It is a useful tool to describe the main effects a commander wants to create along a LOO or LOE. The defeat mechanism is to identify, disrupt, isolate, and dismantle terrorist organizations, plus enable HN and PN CT forces that lead to the organization's defeat. Terrorists often reside in remote or inaccessible areas, avoid presenting their organizations to direct attack, blend with populations, and hide their activities until ready to take action. Defeating terrorist organizations requires the application of persistent pressure, eroding their




Figure IV-3. Counterterrorism Operational Level Lines of Effort—Example

ability to operate, and denying them the ability to instill fear or coerce populations and governments through violence. This requires enduring activities targeting both a terrorist organization’s operational capability and its capacity to gain and employ resources. Attacking terrorist organizations requires specifically trained and equipped CT forces, working with interagency partners and independently or with HNs and PNs.

(a) **Disrupt.** CT disruption is the direct attack of terrorist nodes that are identified during the JIPOE process. All source analysis conducted by specialized intelligence organizations, integrating intelligence provided by USG and PNs, facilitates the identification and targeting of key network nodes. Disruption contributes to degrading terrorist capabilities by eliminating or temporarily neutralizing organizational nodes. Terrorists do not normally mass their forces for engagement, thus CT disruption attacks

terrorist nodes to capture or kill terrorists, destroy communications, capture resources, and neutralize materiel required for terrorist acts. The effect of disruption is degradation of the organization's ability to commit acts of terrorism. For additional information, see the *Commanders Handbook on Attack the Network*.

(b) **Isolate.** Isolation limits a terrorist organization's ability to organize, train, plan, or conduct operations effectively by denying communications, resources, recruits, and access to supporting population(s) and/or governments. The effect of isolation is a diminished organization, unable to grow or maintain its size, cutting off logistic support, and eliminating its ability to publicize its cause.

(c) **Dismantle.** Dismantling exploits the effects of disruption and isolation that further expose the organization to attack. Dismantling may include capturing or killing of remaining key personnel and neutralizing materiel essential to the organization's terrorist capabilities. The effect of dismantling may include dislocation, a shift of terrorist acts to another region or multiple dispersed locations, terrorists unable to acquire recruits or funding to maintain its organization, or members leave the organization for other pursuits.

(d) **Enable.** Enabling is the advise and assist activities made by US CT forces to ensure HN and PN military and civilian CT forces have sufficient capabilities and capacities to contain or defeat organizations that commit acts of terrorism to further their goals. In addition to providing equipment, training, and operational support, enabling may include sustained military engagement with HN and PN in regional CT coordination centers to maintain situational awareness and to preempt terrorists before they can strike.

For more information on the remaining elements of operations design (anticipation, operational reach, culmination, arranging operation, operational pause, and forces and functions), refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

6. Assessment

a. Assessment is the process to measure progress toward achieving objectives, attaining the desired end state and associated conditions, or performing tasks. The JFC assesses operations continuously to determine when to adjust operations—such as shifting priority of effort or transitioning to another phase—in order to ensure the joint force achieves its objectives and attains the military end state.

b. The assessment criteria of measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of performance (MOPs) play key roles in determining a commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs). The CCIRs consist of priority intelligence requirements that focus on the adversary and operational environment, and friendly force information requirements, which address the status of friendly forces and supporting capabilities. Both may include MOEs and MOPs and assessment indicators associated with them in the form of information requirements.

Refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, for a complete discussion of the CCIR process, MOEs, MOPs, and assessment.

c. The assessment process is a continuous cycle that begins during mission analysis when the JFC and staff consider what to measure and how to measure it to determine progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective to attain the desired end state. The JFC and staff determine relevant assessment actions and measures during planning to help guide operational design because these considerations can affect the sequence and type of actions along LOOs and LOEs. During execution the JFC and staff continually monitor progress toward accomplishing tasks, creating an effect, achieving an objective, attaining conditions relevant to the end state, or attaining the end state.

d. The assessment process consists of a continuous cycle to monitor, evaluate, and direct action for improvement (see Figure IV-4).

e. Following is an example of one of many CT objectives that would support one of several desired conditions, achievement of which attains the end state. Shown are two of many MOEs and a few associated indicators used to gather changes in the condition of the operational environment.




Figure IV-4. Assessment Process

EXAMPLES OF A COUNTERTERRORISM END STATE, OBJECTIVE, MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS, AND ASSOCIATED INDICATORS

END STATE: Strategic defeat of terrorist organization X.

OBJECTIVE: Render terrorist organization X incapable of conducting in-country or external attacks against US persons, facilities, and interests.

Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) #1. Decrease in number and effectiveness of terrorist acts.

Indicator #1. Number of terrorist acts attempted or executed.

Indicator #2. Amount of military and civilian damage done.

Indicator #3. Number of attempted attacks thwarted.

MOE #2. Degree to which links between terrorist organization X and administrative and logistic supporting organizations and individuals are severed.

Indicator #1. Number of munitions caches found.

Indicator #2. Number of media postings.

Indicator #3. Amount of training conducted in training camps.

Indicator #4. Number of materiel—weapons, funds, etc.,—interdicted.

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CHAPTER V COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS

“It takes a network to defeat a network...an effective network involves much more than relaying data. A true network starts with robust communications connectivity, but also leverages physical and cultural proximity, shared purpose, established decision-making processes, personal relationships, and trust. Ultimately, a network is defined by how well it allows its members to see, decide, and effectively act.”

Stanley McChrystal, General, United States Army (Retired)
“It Takes a Network,” *Foreign Policy*, February 22, 2011

1. Nature of Counterterrorism Operations

a. Effective CT requires the sustained global CT effort of all relevant USG departments and agencies and PNs, each with unique capabilities, perspectives, and authorities. Over time, by locating and defeating terrorist organizations and networks, they will be rendered incapable or unwilling to use terrorism to achieve their goals. CT activities and operations may support COIN operations, stability operations, or other major operations and campaigns. CT activities and operations are especially useful in irregular warfare to bring military and civilian capabilities to bear in a focused manner against state and non-state actors who use terrorism.

b. The DOD core of a global CT enterprise is forces specifically trained and equipped to conduct CT operations against transregional terrorists. An effective CT enterprise is founded upon trust between its members and the ability to work as a team to counter terrorist recruitment, logistics, actions, and planning. The CT enterprise can be decisive when it maintains a sustained look at a terrorist organization globally, uninhibited by USG regional boundaries, rapidly obtains decisions at the national level, and takes action at the tactical level with a speed greater than that of the terrorists. The CT enterprise may take action using a variety of capabilities and authorities, ranging from customs inspection and confiscation, unmanned aerial vehicle strikes, indictment, arrests, and diplomatic consultation to HN action or other USG and foreign efforts.

c. The ends of CT operations are the elimination of a terrorist’s ability or willingness to conduct terrorist acts against the homeland/US facilities and interests abroad or facilitate other terrorist organizations to act against the United States. The ways of CT operations are to capture, kill, or otherwise neutralize terrorist leadership and key subordinates, isolate terrorists from their supporting administrative and logistic infrastructure, and dismantle their capabilities and bases. The means of CT operations are the application of whole-of-government and multinational CT capabilities operating seamlessly through the levels of warfare to disrupt, isolate, and dismantle the nation’s most dangerous and difficult terrorist organizations. Additionally, means include influencing relevant populations and impacting the operational environment.

2. Levels of Warfare and Counterterrorism

The three levels of warfare are: strategic, operational, and tactical (see Figure V-1).

a. At the strategic level, a nation articulates the national (or multinational in the case of an alliance or coalition) guidance that addresses strategic objectives in support of strategic end states and develops and uses national resources to achieve them. The President, aided by the National Security Council Staff, establishes CT policy and national strategic objectives in the National Strategy for Counterterrorism that includes national goals and end states as well as establishing the interagency framework for achieving them. At the strategic level, SecDef translates national CT strategic objectives into military strategic objectives that facilitate theater planning. Theater planning links national strategic policy, strategy, objectives, and end states that address global and transregional adversaries to DOD global objectives and end states, as established in the Guidance for Employment of the Force. DOD then develops global campaign plans to address inherently global and transregional threats that exceed the authority of a single GCC. The CCDRs along with the combat support agencies participate in development of global campaign plans that inform their regional efforts.

b. The operational level links the national and military CT strategic objectives and end states to the tactical level by design and execution of theater campaign plans with day-to-day activities and developing plans for contingency operations that may occur within the AORs. The CT enterprise is where interagency capabilities and authorities coalesce into unified whole-of-government action. It operates across all levels of warfare but is centered between




Figure V-1. Levels of Warfare

the strategic and operational levels close to national decision makers and with the intelligence and operations elements at the regional operational and tactical levels in order to make timely decisions. At this level, the GCCs develop and execute theater campaigns in support of the global campaigns and execute operations at the tactical level to achieve theater military objectives and the global CT objectives and activities.

c. The tactical level of warfare is where battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. SOF contain units dedicated to CT operations and should be a JFC's first choice. When SOF CT forces are not available, the most appropriate and available force may be used. GCCs normally rely on TSOCs to execute OPCODE over CT operations within their AOR.

3. Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, and Analyze Process

CT forces use the find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate (F3EAD) process to plan for and execute all CT operations against terrorists and terrorist organizations and networks (see Figure V-2). The F3EAD is a continuous analytical and operational process where the analytical effort underpins all portions of the process and is conducted concurrently and continuously. This process analyzes a terrorist organization's structure, capabilities, and intentions to help develop courses of action to eliminate its capability to commit terrorist acts. CT planners identify COGs and decisive points where application of CT capabilities will produce desired effects. This process involves all members of the CT enterprise. For those not in the CT enterprise, dissemination is required to inform those who may require the information. At the tactical and operational level, this process serves as a continuous cycle to prosecute known CT targets and discover and identify future targets. The cycle also serves to focus resources on strategic CT priorities.

a. The purpose of "find" is to locate a specific node, preferably a COG or decisive point, in a terrorist organization that, if found and neutralized, would reduce its ability to commit terrorist acts. A node may be an individual, communications and Internet, weapons, destructive devices, and other material used for or that supports acts of terrorism. Finding is a complex analytical effort that requires tenacity among a broad set of intelligence at all decisive CT levels of warfare and use of authorities unique to individual departments, agencies, or organizations. Find requires multiskilled intelligence professionals, seamlessly wedded with operation planners and executors with interagency cooperation and coordination.

b. The purpose of "fix" is to predict the location of a target with sufficient specificity that tactical operational elements can engage the target. When the find phase culminates in sufficient intelligence, the analysts continue their efforts and are joined by more tactical-focused analytical and operations personnel for the fix phase to produce actionable intelligence and operation plans. Fixing a target is a complex process that requires rapid integration of information, intelligence, and assets in close and continuous partnerships with the CT enterprise partners. The information derived from the exploitation of a fix facilitates the selection of appropriate follow-on actions in the subsequent finish phase.




Figure V-2. Counterterrorism Targeting Cycle

c. The purpose of “finish” is to neutralize a node in a terrorist organization by capturing, killing, or otherwise rendering the node ineffective and incapable of continuing its

role in the terrorist organization. The finished concept of operations is dependent on the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civilian presence and may entail use of a variety of platforms or any combination of infiltration and exfiltration methods. Finish may also employ standoff strikes, or low-visibility capabilities. US finish operations require approval by a JFC, as authorized by the President and SecDef. HN military or civilian forces, partners, and USG law enforcement or other agencies may often be the preferred finish capabilities. During finishing operations, intelligence and other capabilities maintain focus on the node for situational awareness for tactical operators and involve commanders and staffs before, during, and after the operations.

d. The purpose of “exploit” is to optimize the value of the finish operation through questioning and screening individuals found at the finish site, collecting all material that may contain useful intelligence and information, analyzing it on site, and movement to another location for thorough examination. Exploitation is obtaining detailed information from technical and forensic examination of documents, cell phones, computers, biometric information, weapons, bomb making and other materials. The on-site screening and questioning of persons and analysis may lead to immediate follow-on finish operations, or at least contribute to the total intelligence and information picture obtained from the operation. Exploited information may assist in subsequent legal proceedings. Site exploitation teams normally conduct the on-site collection and immediate analysis, including the questioning of persons found on site and determine their value for detaining them for future interrogations. Exploitation is a continuous process; a steady build of information on the selected target(s) activities further refining the analysts’ understanding of the network’s operations, key nodes, and COGs. Successful exploitation requires a supporting dissemination architecture that provides the developed intelligence to the operations participants to facilitate planning and execution.

e. The purpose of “analyze” is to place the intelligence and information obtained from finish operations into the greater body of knowledge about the terrorist organization in order to further disrupt it. DOD’s multiple intelligence agencies cannot by themselves provide a complete intelligence context. Rather it requires all USG departments and agencies. The analyze phase occurs across the levels of warfare and involves processing digital media, documents, clothing, weapons, and equipment on site and forwarding material beyond the analysts’ capabilities to other members of the CT enterprises for timely analysis. The analyze phase is the foundation of the F3EAD process. It continuously expands the understanding of terrorist organizations and informs all other phases of F3EAD. It is in the analyze process that the unique capabilities of the different USG departments and agencies come together.

f. **Identity Intelligence (I2).** I2, which supports the find, fix, exploit, and analyze phases of the F3EAD process, results from the fusion of identity attributes (biologic, biographic, behavioral, and reputational information related to individuals) and other information and intelligence collected across all intelligence disciplines. I2 utilizes enabling intelligence activities, like biometrics-enabled intelligence, forensics-enabled intelligence, and document and media exploitation, to discover the existence of unknown potential threat actors by connecting individuals to other persons, places, events, or materials; analyzing patterns of life; and characterizing their level of potential threats to US interests. I2 supports

the identification of key adversary personnel, persons of interest, and their support and facilitation networks. I2 operations combine the synchronized application of biometrics, forensics, and document and media exploitation capabilities with intelligence and identity management processes to establish identity, affiliations, and authorizations in order to deny anonymity to the adversary and protect US/PN assets, facilities, and forces. The I2 operations process results in discovery of true identities; links identities to events, locations, and networks; and reveals hostile intent. These outputs enable tasks, missions, and actions that span the range of military operations. Additionally, biometrics-enabled intelligence and corresponding I2 products support the persistent identification and targeting of adversaries, which enables a range of military and civilian functions.

For more information on I2, see JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.

g. **Weapons Technical Intelligence (WTI).** WTI is particularly suited for CT and provides a fuller understanding of the operational environment through the technical and forensic exploitation of improvised weapons. WTI uses information derived from the exploitation of weapons to link and identify associations between people, places, and things leading to identification of suspected terrorists and threat networks that employ or source those weapons. Synchronizing this information and products with I2 and the intelligence disciplines ensures that the threat is more fully understood in order to take appropriate actions. Commanders may concentrate these exploitation functions in an element of the intelligence directorate of a joint staff to synchronize the unique planning considerations and requirements, such as force protection and specialized skills, posed by the improvised weapons threat. The effects of WTI are amplified through information sharing throughout DOD, interagency partners, and PNs.

For more information on WTI, see JP 3-15.1, Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations; JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment; and the Weapons Technical Intelligence Handbook.

4. Information Operations

Information operations can create and/or sustain desired and measurable effects on terrorist organizations and networks while protecting and defending the JFC's own forces' actions, information, and information systems. Information-related capabilities such as electronic warfare, cyberspace operations, MISO, and military deception should be applied to CT operations as a means to influence extremists, their supporters, and the mainstream populace. Within an operational area there will be a number of target audiences and there will likely be multiple synchronized themes, messages, and means of delivery required for each. The timing, method, and speed of message delivery will affect which side will gain the upper hand in public opinion. In order to be most effective, narratives and messages should be coordinated among the interagency partners, PNs, and intergovernmental organizations, and should consider NGOs and private sector entities in the operational area.

For a more detailed discussion, refer to JP 3-13, Information Operations. For a more detailed discussion of cyberspace operations, refer to JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations.

5. Counter Threat Finance Planning

Counter threat finance (CTF) is an interagency effort to detect, counter, contain, disrupt, deter, or dismantle the transnational financing of state and non-state adversaries threatening US national security. This includes persons and entities that provide financial and material support to terrorists and their networks, including WMD.

a. In accordance with Title 10, USC, Section 113, Department of Defense Directive 5205.14, *DOD Counter Threat Finance (CTF) Policy*, establishes DOD policy and assigns DOD responsibilities for the conduct of CTF. CTF is a consideration in all steps of the integrated financial operations process and is a primary concern in evaluation of projects, selection of conduits or implementers, and assessment.

b. Threat finance intelligence collection, exploitation, analysis, and dissemination of financial information is an essential intelligence support element of CTF activities. Effective CTF requires a global effort. CTF activities include, but are not limited to, countering narcotics trafficking, proliferation activities, WMD networks, trafficking in persons, weapons trafficking, precursor chemical smuggling, terrorist revenue and logistics, anti-corruption, and other such activities that generate revenue through illicit networks. It is critical for those conducting CTF to maintain a strong link with financial execution elements. CTF operators must coordinate and share information with those executing integrated financial operations before contracts are approved and funded.

c. CTF operations allow the JFC to deny adversaries access to vital funding streams by identifying the sources and conduits of funding along with identifying those terrorists who utilize them. Examples of data sharing that CTF entities could provide to the JFC are information on possible front companies and individuals and financial organizations with both legitimate and illegitimate business interests to ensure funds are not unwittingly being used to finance the terrorists or their organizations. Those who are executing funds, such as contracting commands, collect information, including vendor databases, audit information on specific companies, and vendor employee lists, which would likely be of value to the CTF stakeholders in their efforts to disrupt terrorist financial networks.

6. Legal Considerations

a. **Application of the Law of War.** It is DOD policy that members of the DOD components comply with the law of war during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and in all other military operations. Law of war is that part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. It encompasses all international law for the conduct of hostilities binding on the United States or its individual citizens, including treaties and international agreements to which the United States is a party, and applicable customary international law. The law of war rests on fundamental principles of military necessity, unnecessary suffering, proportionality, and distinction (discrimination). JFCs must ensure CT operations in numerous locations across the globe comply with these legal requirements where an armed conflict exists.

b. **Legal Basis for Use of Force.** Nearly every military decision and action has potential legal considerations and implications. A legal basis must exist for every decision to use military force. In a general sense, under customary international law as reflected in the United Nations Charter and elsewhere, the United States has the inherent right of self-defense against hostile acts or demonstrations of hostile intent toward the United States or its citizens, including the use of force in anticipatory self-defense. Additionally, US forces may be acting under a United Nations Security Council resolution to take action to restore international peace and security in a particular area. Actions within the sovereign territory of another state should be based on either the consent of that state, a United Nations Security Council resolution, or a Presidential determination that such action is necessary either in response to an armed attack or in anticipation of an imminent threat to the security of the United States. Normally, for a given operation, the JFC has approved rules of engagement (ROE) for overseas operations or rules for the use of force (RUF) for operations within the homeland or while conducting official DOD security functions outside US territory. These ROE/RUF govern the use of military force and were developed based on the legal and operational considerations for the situation.

For further guidance on the law of war, refer to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 5810.01, Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program. For detailed information and guidance on legal support, refer to JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations.

c. **ROE and RUF.** For operations, the responsibility and authority for using military force is generally delegated from the President through SecDef to the supported CCDR/JFC in the form of approved plans/orders with either ROE for operations overseas or RUF for DSCA within the homeland or while conducting official DOD security functions outside US territory. When compared to major combat operations, ROE for some smaller-scale operations (i.e., some CT operations) may be more restrictive and detailed, especially in an urban environment, due to national policy concerns for the impact on civilians, their culture, values, and infrastructure. A JFC may begin operations with different ROE/RUF for each type of mission, and especially for CT operations. The JFC responsible for CT should determine early in the planning stage what the required ROE/RUF should be, including anticipating the need for serial changes based on the need for escalation of force, changing phases of an operation, branches/sequels to a plan, etc. Dependent upon the required level of approval for any changes, that JFC must take anticipatory action if the serial changes are to be timely enough for effective operations. When conducting multinational CT operations, the use of military force may be influenced by the differences between United States and HN or PN ROE/RUF. Commanders at all levels must take proactive steps to ensure an understanding of ROE by the individual Service member because a single errant act could cause significant adverse political consequences.

For more detailed discussion on restraint (a joint operations principle) and ROE/RUF, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

d. **Detainee Operations.** CT operations may result in detainees. Proper handling of detainees is essential not only for possible exploitation purposes, but also for prevention of violations of the law (civil or military). Improper handling of detainees may undermine the

legitimacy of US CT operations. However, regardless of the detainees' legal status, US forces must treat all detainees humanely and be prepared to properly control, maintain, protect, and account for detainees in accordance with applicable US law, the law of war, and applicable US policy. Inhumane treatment of detainees is prohibited by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, domestic and international law, and DOD policy. Accordingly, the stress of combat operations, the need for intelligence, or provocations by captured or detained personnel does not justify deviation from this obligation. The challenges of today's security environment and the nature of the enemy require clear operational and strategic guidance for detainee operations during CT operations.

For more detailed information regarding detainee operations, see JP 3-63, Detainee Operations.

e. **Domestic Military CT Operations.** Domestic CT operations are considered part of homeland security under the lead of DHS. DHS is considered primary for coordinating Executive Branch efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks within the United States. DOJ supports DHS for CT, but could also be the primary federal agency for some situations. If tasked to support the primary agency for domestic CT operations, DOD would be in a supporting role, which would include any support for law enforcement purposes.

(1) If a CT situation should formally transcend into a matter of homeland defense (HD), then DOD is the lead for action and interagency coordination for HD. Domestic CT operations raise additional legal concerns due to the likely intersection with civil authorities and US persons. When participating in domestic CT operations JFCs must be particularly aware of the status of their forces, the legal basis for their use of force, the authority for conducting the operation and any specific limitations, and the characterization, treatment, and authorized activities regarding all persons and property encountered in their operations.

(2) SecDef retains the authority to approve use of DOD resources for DSCA where it is unlikely that use of military force will be required. The Joint Staff Joint Director of Military Support validates requests for assistance, determines what DOD capabilities are available to fulfill the requests, coordinates for SecDef approval to use DOD assets, and allocates forces to the CCDR with responsibility for that area of the United States.

(3) In domestic situations, the Constitution, federal law, and DOD policy limit the scope and nature of military actions. The President has the authority to direct the use of the military against terrorist groups and individuals in the United States for other than law enforcement actions (i.e., national defense, emergency protection of life and property, and to restore order). The National Guard has a unique role in domestic military operations. Under control of the respective states, National Guard units in Title 32, USC, and state active duty status can support a variety of tasks for HD and DSCA. National Guard forces in state active duty or Title 32, USC, status can perform direct law enforcement tasks that Title 10, USC, forces cannot perform due to constraints in the Posse Comitatus Act. In its maritime law enforcement role under DHS, the United States Coast Guard (USCG), as a Service under DHS, has jurisdiction in both US territorial waters and on the high seas as prescribed in law.

(4) Memoranda of agreement between DOD and DHS/USCG exist to facilitate the rapid transfer of forces between DOD and the USCG for support of homeland security, HD, and other defense operations. Therefore, the military response to extraordinary events that requires DSCA will likely be a coordinated effort between the National Guard (in state active duty or Title 32, USC, status) and the Armed Services (Title 10 and Title 14, USC).

(5) Domestic CT activities may involve other civil authorities including state, territorial, local, or tribal governments.

For more information on homeland security, HD, DSCA, and the coordination of associated interagency activities supporting those missions, see the National Strategy for Homeland Security, the National Response Framework, JP 3-27, Homeland Defense, and JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

7. Logistics Support Considerations

a. **General.** The GCCs and their Service component commands may have significant distribution challenges as the JFC conducting CT operations may have tactical units widespread across an operational area or an AOR. The directive authority for logistics (DAFL) of both supported and supporting CCDRs necessitates a coordinated effort between them and among their Service component commands. CDRUSSOCOM has DAFL for SOF unique items.

b. **Assumptions and Planning Factors.** The following are significant and generally apply to CT operations.

(1) CT operations may receive priority over existing operations, and the transnational terrorist threat can require multiple CT operations within and across AORs. Specific intertheater lift and material prioritization decisions will occur that ensure execution of priority CT operations.

(2) CDRUSSOCOM is generally responsible for the synchronization and coordination of logistics for SOF when executing across multiple AORs.

(3) Supporting GCCs will establish initial theater staging bases at designated locations, as required for deploying CT forces.

(4) Supporting GCCs will provide early access to aerial ports of embarkation, seaports of embarkation, aerial ports of debarkation (APODs), seaports of debarkation (SPODs), and intermediate staging bases. Alternate APODs and SPODs should be identified in anticipation of an area denial event such as a WMD attack and contamination or some other major force protection issues at the primary port.

(5) Supporting GCCs will coordinate HN support and ensure HN support agreements established by the United States and PNs are in effect.

(6) Supporting GCCs will coordinate contract support.

(7) Supporting GCCs will ensure their Service component commanders provide common item and service unique support, and designate the lead Service for common user support within their AORs. Common support to other US Services, USG departments and agencies, PNs, and multinational forces may be necessary.

(8) CCDRs/JFC ensure lines of communications (LOCs) will remain open throughout the CT operations.

(9) Supporting GCCs will focus on strategic and operational combat service support (CSS), to include introducing C2 into the theater early, early entry CSS, and theater level distribution management. Deploying forces will include planning for combat support and CSS for bare-base locations.

(10) Supporting GCCs will phase operational logistics to coincide with operations, with initial logistic support inserted with operational forces.

(11) Supporting Service components will identify logistic shortfalls and limiting factors with their proposed resolutions to their GCC and the supported CCDR.

(12) Supporting GCCs may provide a joint deployment and distribution operations center that will provide movement control, including trace, track, and expediting on proposed theater supply routes. The logistics directorate of a joint staff at the CCMD will coordinate distribution requirements with the supporting joint deployment and distribution operations center, which will in turn coordinate with the US Transportation Command Deployment and Distribution Operations Center.

(13) Regional governments will provide base access (to include overflight rights), transit authority, and other PN support.

(14) CT plans/orders will set the number of days the deploying forces must be self-sustaining.

(15) Supporting GCCs will coordinate additional logistic requirements with Service component commands, theater support activities, and national providers.

(16) Supporting GCCs will be prepared to provide operational logistics beyond combat operations, to include support to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations and additional MISO and civil affairs operations, as required by the operation plan/order.

(17) The supporting GCCs and CDRUSSOCOM will establish appropriate logistic coordination and reporting procedures between their staffs and among their Service component commands.

(18) The legal considerations of globally distributive logistic efforts for the CT effort requires that CCDRs involve a judge advocate or legal counsel in logistic planning, including their review of all supporting plans to ensure compliance with various international, US, and HN laws, and applicable treaties, status-of-forces agreements,

status of mission agreements, acquisition and cross-servicing agreements (ACSAs), memoranda of understanding, and memoranda of agreements.

(19) Logistic support agreements/contracts will provide the authority to obtain necessary logistic support from the HN and PNs. Established logistic support will be based on existing authorities and agreements (such as ACSAs) or newly obtained authorities and international agreements. All contracting support efforts will be conducted in accordance with all established regulatory guidance and directives.

c. Concept of Logistic Support

(1) Each supported CCDR should produce a logistic supportability analysis based on assigned/attached force structure, operational areas, and specific mission requirements for their CT operations. This analysis should consider the potential for a terrorist attack using WMD and operations in CBRN environments.

(2) Logistic support for US forces is fundamentally a Service responsibility (except USSOCOM for special operations items). Services will arrange for logistic support in accordance with current Service directives and the CCDR's plans/orders. The GCC may assign a TSOC the responsibility for reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of CT forces in support of the GCC. USSOCOM coordinates through the GCC for SOF CT common sustainment and supply. Due to the short duration and high operating tempo of CT operations, deploying CT forces provide a statement of requirements to the TSOC for coordination with the GCC's subordinate commands.

(3) CCDRs exercising their DAFL will plan for and establish administrative and logistic systems, including sustainment and distribution that most effectively support the globally distributed CT mission requirements.

(4) The United States and PNs are responsible for providing sufficient logistic and contracting capability necessary to provide any logistic support, supplies, and/or services that are beyond the CCDRs capabilities. Whenever possible, ACSAs with eligible PNs and cooperative security locations will be negotiated in advance so as to increase the flexibility and timeliness of mutual logistic support.

(5) Logistic distribution and allocation issues that cannot be resolved among/between Services and CCDRs should be forwarded to Joint Staff J-4 [Logistics Directorate] for consideration by the Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board.

(6) If a warning order or execute order is issued pertaining to a concept or operation plan, a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff project code will normally be issued to expedite supply actions. However, this may increase visibility of an operation, so operations security must be considered prior to assigning any project code.

d. Priorities

Multiple CT operations around the globe, utilizing various elements of United States and PN instruments of national power, require continuing assessment and prioritization of actions/support. Some general statements of priorities affecting logistics include:

(1) Priority of Support: intermediate staging bases, aerial ports of embarkation/APODs, build-up of sustainment, and LOCs.

(2) Priority of Sustainment: ammunition, fuel, food/water, and base support.

(3) Priority of Movement: deploying forces and sustainment.

(4) Priority of Engineer Effort: force protection, LOC, APOD, and SPOD maintenance.

Basic logistics policy and guidance are provided in JP 4-0, Joint Logistics, and CJCSI 3110.03, Logistics Supplement to the Joint Strategies Capabilities Plan (JSCP).

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APPENDIX A REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-26 is based upon the following primary references:

1. General

- a. *Unified Command Plan.*
- b. *National Security Strategy of the United States of America.*
- c. *National Strategy for Counterterrorism.*
- d. Executive Order 13224, *Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism.*
- e. USSOCOM Concept Plan 7500, *Department of Defense Global Campaign Plan for Counterterrorism* (classified).

2. Department of Defense Publications

- a. *Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace.*
- b. *Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense.*

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications

- a. CJCSI 3110.03D, *Logistics Supplement to the Joint Strategies Capabilities Plan (JSCP).*
- b. CJCSI 3121.01B, *Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces.*
- c. CJCSI 5120.02C, *Joint Doctrine Development System.*
- d. CJCSI 5810.01D, *Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program.*
- e. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 5120.01, *Joint Doctrine Development Process.*
- f. JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.*
- g. JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.*
- h. JP 1-04, *Legal Support to Military Operations.*
- i. JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence.*
- j. JP 2-01, *Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations.*

- k. JP 2-01.3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*.
- l. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*.
- m. JP 3-05, *Special Operations*.
- n. JP 3-07.2, *Antiterrorism*.
- o. JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*.
- p. JP 3-10, *Joint Security Operations in Theater*.
- q. JP 3-12, *Cyberspace Operations*.
- r. JP 3-13, *Information Operations*.
- s. JP 3-13.2, *Military Information Support Operations*.
- t. JP 3-15.1, *Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations*.
- u. JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations*.
- v. JP 3-22.1, *Foreign Internal Defense*.
- w. JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*.
- x. JP 3-27, *Homeland Defense*.
- y. JP 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*.
- z. JP 3-30, *Command and Control of Joint Air Operations*.
- aa. JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*.
- bb. JP 3-40, *Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction*.
- cc. JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*.
- dd. JP 3-60, *Joint Targeting*.
- ee. JP 3-63, *Detainee Operations*.
- ff. JP 3-68, *Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*.
- gg. JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics*.
- hh. JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*.
- ii. JP 6-0, *Joint Communications System*.

4. Other Publications

a. USSOCOM Publication 1, *Doctrine for Special Operations*.

b. Field Manual 6-05/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-36.1/Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-05.19/Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 3-2.73/USSOCOM Publication 3-33, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Integration, Interoperability, and Interdependence*.

c. *Weapons Technical Intelligence (WTI) Handbook*.

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APPENDIX B ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Joint Staff J-7, Deputy Director, Joint Education and Doctrine, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Analysis Division, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the United States Special Operations Command (FMD, J9-D). The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-26, *Counterterrorism*, 13 November 2009.

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JED//

b. Routine changes should be submitted electronically to the Deputy Director, Joint Education and Doctrine, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Analysis Division, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697, and info the lead agent and the Director for Joint Force Development, J-7/JED.

c. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

5. Distribution of Publications

Local reproduction is authorized, and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified JPs must be IAW DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 1, *DOD Information Security Program: Overview, Classification, and Declassification*, and DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 3, *DOD Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information*.

6. Distribution of Electronic Publications

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution. Electronic versions are available on JDEIS Joint Electronic Library Plus (JEL+) at <https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp> (NIPRNET) and <http://jdeis.js.smil.mil/jdeis/index.jsp> (SIPRNET), and on the JEL at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine> (NIPRNET).

b. Only approved JPs are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified JP to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA, Defense Foreign Liaison PO-FL, Room 1E811, 7400 Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400.

c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development community member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current JPs. This JEL CD-ROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can be locally reproduced for use within the combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies.

GLOSSARY

PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACSA	acquisition and cross-servicing agreement
AOR	area of responsibility
APOD	aerial port of debarkation
C2	command and control
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCDR	combatant commander
CCIR	commander's critical information requirement
CCMD	combatant command
CDRTSOC	commander, theater special operations command
CDRUSSOCOM	Commander, United States Special Operations Command
CF	conventional forces
CJCSI	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
COG	center of gravity
COIN	counterinsurgency
COM	chief of mission
CONUS	continental United States
CSS	combat service support
CT	counterterrorism
CTF	counter threat finance
DAFL	directive authority for logistics
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOD	Department of Defense
DOJ	Department of Justice
DOS	Department of State
DSCA	defense support of civil authorities
F3EAD	find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation (DOJ)
FCC	functional combatant commander
FHA	foreign humanitarian assistance
FID	foreign internal defense
GCC	geographic combatant commander
HD	homeland defense
HN	host nation
I2	identity intelligence
JFC	joint force commander
JIPOE	joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment

JP	joint publication
LOC	line of communications
LOE	line of effort
LOO	line of operation
MISO	military information support operations
MOE	measure of effectiveness
MOP	measure of performance
NCTC	National Counterterrorism Center
NEO	noncombatant evacuation operation
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NJTTF	National Joint Terrorism Task Force
OPCON	operational control
OPE	operational preparation of the environment
PN	partner nation
PO	peace operations
ROE	rules of engagement
RUF	rules for the use of force
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
SFA	security force assistance
SOC-FWD	special operations command-forward
SOF	special operations forces
SPOD	seaport of debarkation
TREAS	Department of the Treasury
TSOC	theater special operations command
USC	United States Code
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USG	United States Government
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
VEO	violent extremist organization
WMD	weapons of mass destruction
WTI	weapons technical intelligence

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS


combating terrorism. Actions, including antiterrorism and counterterrorism, taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. Also called **CbT**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-26)

counterterrorism. Activities and operations taken to neutralize terrorists and their organizations and networks in order to render them incapable of using violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve their goals. Also called **CT**. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

transnational threat. Any activity, individual, or group not tied to a particular country or region that operates across international boundaries and threatens United States national security or interests. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-26)

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JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY



All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Publication (JP) 3-26** is in the **Operations** series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

