CHAPTER 8
HIGH ALTITUDE NUCLEAR WEAPONS EFFECTS INFORMATION

This chapter is for the use of personnel certified by DOE to declassify DOE National Security Information (NSI) of permanent historical value originating prior to 1976 concerning high altitude nuclear weapons effects information. Documents containing Restricted Data (RD) or Formerly Restricted Data (FRD) are not addressed by this document and retain present classification.

BACKGROUND

This chapter provides the guidance for declassification of DOE National Security Information (NSI) contained in documents originated prior to 1976 pertaining to high altitude nuclear weapons effects. These documents are exempted from automatic declassification procedures as outlined in Executive Order (E.O.) 12958. The authority for exemption to automatic declassification is section 3.4(b)(2) of E.O. 12958 which reads:

"(b) An agency head may exempt from automatic declassification . . . , specific information, the release of which should be expected to: . . .

(2) reveal information that would assist in the development or use of weapons of mass destruction."

High altitude phenomenology refers to effects of weapons detonated above 100,000 feet which is outside or largely outside the atmosphere. With no air to interact with the radiation to form the radiation opaque fireball or to attenuate radiative outputs, the radiation can travel great distances while remaining at significant energy levels. One result can be widespread radio and radar blackout.

Measurements of empirical data from full-scale tests as well as the related analysis and calculations are excluded from automatic declassification even when they do not directly reveal Restricted Data (RD) or Formerly Restricted Data (FRD).

BROAD GUIDANCE

Classification of high altitude phenomenology is governed by resulting classified information which could be revealed through disclosure. Theoretical or generic information about this phenomenology, including the radio frequency (RF) blackout phenomena, is already unclassified and has been provided to the general public. Future as well as past analyses of actual classified data on RF blackout and other high altitude effects, obtained from the few such events conducted in 1958 and 1962, must be classified the same as the data. For an unclassified treatment of the results of these events, see Glasstone's book, "The Effects of Nuclear Weapons," an unclassified publication.

Most generic weapon effects information has already been released for civil defense or scientific purposes. In the relatively infrequent instances where effects information is classified, the overriding reason is the risk of coincidentally revealing classified nuclear weapon design (RD), outputs, yield (FRD), or vulnerability/hardness information about a specific weapon. Some information about high altitude phenomenology and RF blackout is kept classified NSI because empirical data from the few nuclear tests where such data was obtained are sparse. There is no opportunity to obtain additional data without a high altitude nuclear test, and the conduct of such tests is prohibitively expensive. Therefore, data which may encourage the development of nuclear weapons is denied potential proliferators.

Any DOE NSI originated prior to 1976 containing information concerning high altitude nuclear weapons effects not delineated in specific guidance listed below is unclassified. This does not include information classified by the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, as amended. RD and FRD shall be handled, protected, classified, downgraded, and declassified in conformity with the provisions of the AEA and regulations issued under that Act.

The Appendix of this guide discusses how to determine if a document being reviewed contains potential RD and FRD information. Reviewers who are not authorized by DOE to declassify such documents should not attempt final determinations. Refer to the Appendix for additional instructions on how to deal with potential RD and FRD.

SPECIFIC GUIDANCE

8.1 Empirical data from full scale tests conducted at heights of 100,000 feet or above	Retain Classification [25x2; EO 12958]
8.2 Results of test conducted at height of burst above 100,000 feet	Retain Classification [25x2; EO 12958]
DECLASSIFICATION DATE OR EVENT (DDE)	SUBJECT
Can only be declassified by official disclosure of specific data or results. No details beyond the official disclosure may be declassified.	Data and results

CHAPTER 9
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

This chapter is for use of personnel certified by DOE to declassify DOE National Security Information (NSI) of permanent historical value originating prior to 1976 concerning DOE nuclear nonproliferation information. Documents containing Restricted Data (RD) and Formerly Restricted Data (FRD) are not addressed by this document and retain present classification.

BACKGROUND

This chapter provides the guidance for declassification of DOE National Security Information (NSI) contained in documents originated prior to 1976 pertaining to DOE nuclear nonproliferation information. These documents are exempted from automatic declassification provisions outlined in Executive Order (E.O.) 12958. The authority for exemption of DOE nuclear nonproliferation information from automatic declassification is section 3.4(b)(2) and (9) of E.O. 12958 which reads:

"(b) An agency head may exempt from automatic declassification . . . , specific information, the release of which is expected to: . . .

(2) reveal information that would assist in the development or use of weapons of mass destruction, and . . .

(9) violate a statute, treaty, or international agreement."

Detection of proliferation involves detection of activities related to the acquisition of weapon grade plutonium or uranium (e.g., isotope separation, chemical separation processing), to nuclear weapons research and development, or to nuclear weapons manufacturing. The identity of detection technologies selected for use, as well as the vulnerabilities of such technologies, could be exploited for proliferation purposes.

Proliferation studies, analyses, or evaluations often contain information that could be exploited for proliferation purposes. Regarding the potential operability of a nuclear explosive, statements (including references to articles in the open literature) or evaluations by a person who has (or has had) access to classified weapon information would lend credibility to information that otherwise should be considered speculative. These would provide beneficial guidance to adversaries in their development of nuclear weapons. Regarding the nuclear weapon program indicators of a particular nonnuclear weapon state (NNWS) that are of interest in proliferation detection, such knowledge could lead that NNWS to more assiduously conceal its nuclear weapons related activities.

DOE NSI is exempt from automatic declassification if the specific information concerns DOE nuclear nonproliferation information, particularly proliferation detection components or systems and methods for spoofing and tampering, that could assist potential proliferators, hostile nations, and potential adversaries to develop, improve, or use nuclear weapons.

BROAD GUIDANCE

Sometimes the identification of details of proliferation detection technologies, components, or systems with certain weapon design or performance information or with a sensitive negotiation is classified to protect Restricted Data (RD) or Formerly Restricted Data (FRD). Knowledge of weaknesses, shortcomings, or deficiencies of specific proliferation detection components or systems such as weaknesses in tamper resistant designs, spoofing possibilities, or unexpected, diminished capabilities, could assist, encourage, or embolden a proliferator. Damage to national security could occur if the vulnerability were discovered and exploited by an adversary. This could lead to a successful deception, thereby enhancing the adversary's military advantage and possibly violating a treaty.

DOE proliferation studies, analyses, or evaluations that reveal sensitive nuclear weapon information are classified to prevent dissemination of such information. These would provide beneficial guidance to adversaries in their development of nuclear weapons. Some of these are classified because they would lend credibility to information in the open literature that otherwise would be considered speculative.

Basic research and development in proliferation detection technologies, components, or systems is unclassified. Vulnerabilities of specific proliferation detection components or systems, such as weaknesses in tamper-proof designs and spoofing possibilities, are classified. Weaknesses, shortcomings, or deficiencies that are obvious or may be obtained from open literature sources or simple basic research are unclassified. Methods that could successfully disguise concealment of proliferation preparations are classified.

Any DOE NSI originated prior to 1976 containing DOE nuclear nonproliferation information in not delineated specific guidance listed below is unclassified. This does not include information classified by statute, such as, the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, as amended. RD and FRD shall be handled, protected, classified, downgraded, and declassified in conformity with the provisions of the AEA and regulations issued under that Act.

Appendix of this guide discusses how to determine if a document being reviewed contains potential RD and FRD information. Reviewers who are not authorized by DOE to declassify such documents should not attempt final determinations. Refer to Appendix for additional instructions on how to deal with potential RD and FRD.

SPECIFIC GUIDANCE

9.1 Chemical separation technology specifically directed toward clandestine reprocessing efforts or bypassing sound engineering practice to enhance such efforts			Retain classification [25x2&9; EO 12958]
9.2 Nuclear weapons proliferation detection technologies
	9.2.1 Names or short descriptive titles of design of proliferation detection technologies, components, or systems, if not revelatory of an ongoing lassified U.S. nonproliferation objective		Unclassified
	9.2.2 The above identified as part of a specific U.S. Government nonproliferation negotiation with elaboration of a negotiation strategy or position		Retain classification [25x2&9; EO 12958]
	9.2.3 Weaknesses, shortcomings, or deficiencies of specific proliferation detection components or systems, if Components or systems are no longer in use		Unclassified
9.3 Proliferation studies, analyses, or evaluations:
	9.3.1 Statements or evaluations by a person who has (or has had) access to classified weapon information, or by government supported contractor, regarding the potential operability of a nuclear explosive		Retain classification [25x2&9; EO 12958]
	9.3.2 Information which provides useful insights fo successful pursuits of a program for the separation of practical quantities of special nuclear material (SNM), or a program for fabricating a nuclear weapon		Retain classification [25x2&9; EO 12958]
	9.3.3 Concealment of proliferation preparations:
		9.3.3.1 Government evaluation of methods of concealing the telltale signs of proliferation activities whenever such evaluations reveal methods which could successfully disguise such signs	Retain classification [25x2&9; EO 12958]
		9.3.3.2 Theoretical discussions of concealment of proliferation activities	Unclassified
		9.3.3.3 Description of technology used to reduce the effects of nuclear activities on the environment	Unclassified
DECLASSIFICATION OF DATE OR EVENT (DDE)			SUBJECT
Declassified by official disclosure of specific technology. No details beyond those contained in the official disclosure have been made.			Clandestine SNM separations technology
Declassified when technology (as opposed to equipment) is no longer in use and official disclosure has been made.			Proliferation detection technology
Declassified when specific method is no longer useful. Currently, no classified detection avoidance schemes have been declassified.			Proliferation detection avoidance schemes and/or official evaluations of them

CHAPTER 10
INTELLIGENCE AND CRYPTOLOGY

This chapter is for use of personnel certified by DOE to declassify DOE National Security Information (NSI) of permanent historical value originating prior to 1976 concerning DOE intelligence and cryptology information. Documents containing Restricted Data (RD) and Formerly Restricted Data (FRD) are not addressed by this document and retain present classification.

BACKGROUND

This chapter provides the guidance for declassification of DOE National Security Information (NSI) contained in documents originated prior to 1976 pertaining to DOE intelligence and cryptology information. These documents are exempted from automatic declassification provisions outlined in Executive Order (E.O.) 12958. The authority for exemption of DOE intelligence and cryptology information from automatic declassification is sections 3.4(b)(1) and (2) of E.O. 12958 which read:

" (b) An agency head may exempt from automatic declassification . . . , specific information, the release of which is expected to:

(1) reveal the identity of a confidential human source, or reveal information about the application of intelligence source or method, or reveal the identity of a human intelligence source when the unauthorized disclosure of that source would clearly and demonstrably damage the national security interests of the United States;

(2) reveal information that would assist in the development or use of weapons of mass destruction;"

DOE NSI is exempt from automatic declassification if the specific information concerns intelligence information, intelligence sources, or cryptology which is still being used and may reveal sensitive information related to the DOE nuclear weapons program.

BROAD GUIDANCE

Most foreign intelligence and terrorist information is generated and reviewed for classification by agencies outside of DOE. This includes information that would reveal intelligence sources, methods, procedures, or equipment that have been or may be used to acquire foreign and terrorist intelligence. Some of this information reveals classified information related to the DOE nuclear weapons program or provides the means to discover such information.

Under section 142e of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, as amended, certain foreign atomic energy program information, including nuclear weapon design, was transclassified from Restricted Data (RD) to NSI. Any comments or evaluation by the U.S., the United Kingdom (U.K.), or Canada on the merit of such NSI is RD or FRD and exempt from E.O. 12958.

Cryptology involves the encryption of information for secure transmission and its subsequent decryption by the recipient. On many occasions, classified information related to the DOE nuclear weapons program has been encrypted and transmitted electronically. There is a high probability that a hostile intelligence service have probably recorded some of these transmissions, but is still unable to decrypt them because their cryptanalysis capability is incomplete. Release of a formerly encrypted document may allow an adversary the needed information to analyze and/or decipher the encryption procedures.

Any DOE NSI originated prior to 1976 containing information concerning DOE intelligence and cryptology information not delineated in specific guidance listed below is unclassified. This does not include information classified by statute, such as, the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954, as amended. RD and FRD shall be handled, protected, classified, downgraded, and declassified in conformity with the provisions of the AEA and regulations issued under that Act.

The Appendix of this guide discusses how to determine if a document being reviewed contains potential RD and FRD information. Reviewers who are not authorized by DOE to declassify such documents should not attempt final determinations. Refer to the Appendix for additional instructions on how to deal with potential RD and FRD.

SPECIFIC GUIDANCE

10.1 Information obtained by DOE from a public forum (e.g., meeting presentations, news media, speeches, etc.)	Unclassified
10.2 Information on the design of foreign nuclear devices obtained from confidential intelligence sources	Retain Classification [25x1&2; EO 12958]
10.3 Information revealing the source of the intelligence information	Retain Classification [25x1&2; EO 12958]
10.4 Information on the total production of nuclear weapon materials by a specified or unspecified foreign facility	Retain Classification [25x1&2; EO 12958]
10.5 Cryptoprinciples	Retain Classification [25x1&2; EO 12958]
10.6 Decryption or cryptanalysis information	Retain Classification [25x1&2; EO 12958]
10.7 Foreign atomic energy program (e.g., weapons, production of materials, and military utilization) information obtained by our intelligence services	Retain Classification [25x1&2; EO 12958]
DECLASSIFICATION DATE OR EVENT (DDE)	SUBJECT
Declassified by official U.S. Government disclosure on a case-by-case basis. No details beyond those in official disclosures are declassified.	Intelligence sources or methods and/or foreign nuclear programs
Declassified on a case-by-case basis by Director, National Security Agency (NSA). No details beyond those in official disclosures are declassified.	Cryptology information

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