Refer to DOE 5650.3A, Identification of Unclassified
Controlled Nuclear Information (UCNI), for policy and procedures for
identifying UCNI and
for reviewing and marking documents and material containing UCNI.
This General Guideline is the basis for:
- 1. Identification as to what broad areas of information are, are not,
or are no
longer UCNI.
- 2. Topical Guidelines and Internal Guidelines.
- 3. Preliminary Review Determinations by any Reviewing Official in any
subject
area where no Topical or Internal Guideline exists.
- 4. Final Review Determinations by the Office of Classification (SA-20), DOE
Field Office or contractor Classification Officers in any subject area where no
Topical or
Internal Guideline exists.
- 5. Denial Determinations by any Denying Official in any subject area where
no
Topical or Internal Guideline exists.
This document supersedes GG-2, Unclassified Controlled
Nuclear Information General Guidelines, of August 1989.
Topics in this General Guideline may
identify information as being UCNI that, under certain conditions, would be
classified. In
such instances, the information should be classified and not controlled as
UCNI. Therefore,
any information under consideration for protection as UCNI first must be
reviewed to insure
that it is and should be unclassified and eligible for control as UCNI.
Return to Chapter V.
Return to
Chapter VI.
Return to
Chapter VII.
Return to
Chapter VIII.
Any user of this
General Guideline may recommend to the Office of Classification
(SA-20) new subject areas, new topics, or revisions to existing topics for
inclusion in it.
SA-20 shall review these recommendations and, if appropriate, initiate the
formal process to
revise these general guidelines based on such recommendations.
These guidelines are approved and issued
by SA-20. Comments and recommendations concerning these guidelines should be
sent to
SA-20. Requests to be added to or removed from the distribution list for these
guidelines
should be sent to SA-20.
These guidelines are to be used only
by DOE Classification Officers, Contractor Classification Officers, Reviewing
Officials,
Denying Officials, and originators or possessors of documents who think an
unclassified
document or other matter he or she originates or possesses may contain UCNI.
- 1. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2011 et
seq.), which
is the statutory basis for the control of UCNI.
- 2. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552), which establishes
policies
and procedures concerning the release of information in Government documents
and materials
to the public.
- 3. 10 CFR Part 1017, "Identification and Protection of Unclassified
Controlled Nuclear
Information," which implements section 148 (42 U.S.C. 2168) of the Atomic
Energy Act of
1954, as amended.
- 4. DOE 1700.1, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION PROGRAM, of 11-19-79, which
establishes guidelines and procedures for the processing of requests made to
the DOE under
the FOIA.
- 5. DOE 5632.1A, PROTECTION PROGRAM OPERATIONS, of 2-9-88, which
establishes DOE policies for the physical protection of security interests and
baseline physical
protection standards.
- 6. DOE 5633.3, CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF NUCLEAR
MATERIALS, of 2-3-88, which prescribes the minimum requirements and procedures
for
control and accountability of nuclear materials.
- 7. DOE 5635.4, PROTECTION OF UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED
NUCLEAR INFORMATION, of 2-3-88, which establishes policy and procedures for the
protection of UCNI.
- 8. DOE 5650.3A, IDENTIFICATION OF UNCLASSIFIED CONTROLLED
NUCLEAR INFORMATION, of 6-8-92, which establishes policy and procedures for
identification of UCNI, including the review and marking of documents and
materials
containing UCNI.
- 9. CG-SS-2, Safeguards and Security Classification Guide, of July 1990,
which
provides classification guidance concerning nuclear safeguards and various
aspects of
security.
The following table cross-references GG
identification numbers to be cited in topical or internal guidelines to the
corresponding topic
numbers used in these general guidelines. Use of these numbers allows for the
identification
of the general guidelines topics which are the basis for topical or internal
guidelines topics.
GG Identification Topic Number GG Identification Topic Number
(ID) Number (ID) Number
1 V.A.1. 18 VIII.A.1.
2 V.A.2. 19 VIII.B.2.
3 V.A.3. 20 VIII.C.1.
4 V.B.1. 21 V.D.3.
5A V.B.2. 22 V.D.4.
6 V.C.1.; 23 V.D.5.
6 VI.A.1.; 24 VI.A.4.
6 VII.A.1. 25 VI.A.5.
7 V.C.2.; 26 VII.A.4.
7 VI.A.2.; 27 VIII.C.3.
7 VII.2. 28 VIII.C.2.
8 IX.A.1. 29 V.E.1.
9 IX.A.2. 30 V.E.2.
10 VI.A.3.; 31 V.E.3.
10 VII.A.3.; 32 V.E.4.
10 VIII.B.1. 33 V.E.5.
11 V.C.3. 34 V.E.6.
12 VI.A.2.a. 35 V.E.7.
13 VI.A.2.b. 36 V.E.8.
14 VII.A.3.a. 37 VIII.B.3.
15 V.D.1. 38 VIII.B.4.
16 V.C.4. 39 VIII.B.5.
17 V.D.2.
- 1. Topical Guidelines. A topic in topical guidelines should
have a
parenthetical
notation at the end of its text which cites the general guidelines topic on
which it is based and
provides an identification number unique to the specific topical guidelines
document of which
it is a part. A topical guideline topic may be based on a topic in another
topical guideline; in
such a case, the citation should be to the other topical guideline topic and
not to a general
guideline topic. For example:
- 1.3 This is a simulated topical guidelines topic followed by a
citation to its
general guidelines basic topic and a unique identification number which allows
recognition of
the guide (in this case TG-XYZ-1) which it represents
(Basis: GG #99; ID No.: XYZ #2). . . . . . . . . .UCNI
- A cross-reference list similar to that for GG identification numbers will
be
maintained in each topical guidelines document.
- 2. Internal Guidelines. A topic in internal guidelines should have
a
parenthetical
notation at the end of its text which cites as its basis the topical guidelines
identification
number or, in the absence of an appropriate topical guideline, the general
guidelines
identification number on which it is based. For example:
- 3.4 This is a simulated internal guidelines topic followed by a
citation to
its topical guidelines basic topic (Basis: XYZ #14) [or, in the absence of a
topical guideline
basis]
(Basis: GG #99). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .UCNI
- NOTE: Topical or internal guidelines that specify what is not
UCNI
should cite
the appropriate basic topic when one exists.
AL - DOE Albuquerque Field Office
AVLIS - Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation
DOE - Department of Energy
DP-20 - Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military Application, DOE Headquarters
DP-63 - Office of Processing and Reactors Facilities (DP-63)
FOIA - Freedom of Information Act
FY-xx/n - The nth quarter of fiscal year 19xx
GG #xx - General Guideline Number
GG-2 - Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information General Guidelines,
superseded by
GG-3
ID - DOE Idaho Field Office
NP-1 - Office of New Production Reactors
NE-35 - Office of Advanced Technology Projects and Technology Transfers
NEST - Nuclear Emergency Search Team
NPR - New Production Reactor
OEMP - Operational Emergency Management Team
OUO - Official Ise Only
QR - Quarterly Report
RL - DOE Richland Field Office
SA-1 - Director of Security Affairs, DOE Headquarters
SA-10 - Office of Safeguards and Security, DOE Headquarters
SA-20 - Office of Classification, DOE Headquarters
SF - DOE San Francisco Field Office
SNM - Special Nuclear Material
SR - DOE Savannah River Field Office
SRD - Secret Restricted Data
UCNI - Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
The source or basis of the following definitions is indicated in parentheses
after the
defined term. Refer to the list of references in Chapter I
for the full
citation. If no source or
basis is indicated, the definition is the primary definition for the defined
term.
Activities,
equipment, and facilities of the DOE or other Government agencies utilized or
engaged in
support of the --
- 1. Development, production, testing, sampling, maintenance, repair,
modification, assembly, utilization, transportation, or retirement of nuclear
weapons or
components of nuclear weapons;
- 2. Production, utilization, or transportation of nuclear material for
military
applications; or
- 3. Safeguarding of activities, equipment, or facilities which support the
above
functions, including the protection of nuclear weapons, components of nuclear
weapons, or
nuclear material for military applications at a fixed facility or in
transit.
A categorization of special nuclear
material (SNM) types and compositions which reflect the difficulty of
processing and
handling required to convert material to a nuclear explosive device.
- 1. Radioactive material other than SNM yielded in or made
radioactive by
exposure to the radiation incident to the process of producing or utilizing
SNM.
- 2. The tailings or wastes produced by the extraction or concentration of
uranium
or thorium from any ore processed primarily for its source material
content.
- 1. Department of Energy Classification Officer. One
appointed by
SA-20, or by the Head of a Field Element with SA-20 approval, to administer its
classification program and oversee or monitor the classification programs of
contractor
organizations under its jurisdiction.
- 2. Contractor Classification Officer. One appointed by the head of a
contractor
organization, with Field Element and SA-20 approval, to administer a
contractor's
classification program and oversee or monitor the classification programs of
subcontractor
organizations under its jurisdiction.
An individual who may make a
determination that specific Government information is, is not, or is no longer
UCNI under the
procedures in DOE 5650.3.
An individual who denies under the
procedures in DOE 5650.3 any request made under statute (e.g., the Freedom of
Information
Act) or Executive order for all or any portion of a document or material
containing UCNI.
The physical medium on or in
which information is recorded, or a product or substance which contains or
reveals
information, regardless of its physical form or characteristics.
Any fact or concept regardless of the
physical form or characteristics of the medium on or in which it is recorded,
contained, or
revealed.
See "Document or Material."
SNM, byproduct material,
and source material as defined in the Atomic Energy Act, and any other material
used in the
production, testing, utilization, or assembly of nuclear weapons or components
of nuclear
weapons that is determined to be nuclear material under the procedures in DOE
5650.3. For
the purposes of this program, the detailed list of nuclear material in DOE
5633.3 applies.
An individual who may make a
determination under the procedures in DOE 5650.3 that a document or material
contains, does
not contain, or no longer contains UCNI.
An integrated system of physical protection,
material accounting, and material control measures designed to deter, prevent,
detect, and
respond to unauthorized possession, use, or sabotage of SNM. Safeguards
include the timely
indication of possible diversion and credible assurance that no diversion has
occurred.
Unclassified
information concerning equipment or components of sensitive production or
utilization
facilities which if sabotaged or tampered with could prevent safe or effective
operation under
normal conditions or effective actions under abnormal conditions, or which
reveals details that
could significantly assist in the design,
construction, or operation of facilities or equipment for producing,
processing, separating, or
otherwise utilizing nuclear materials for military applications.
A facility which performs a sensitive function.
A function in support of atomic energy defense
programs whose disruption could reasonably be expected to have a significant
adverse effect
on the health and safety of the public or the common defense and security.
Refer to Chapter
XI, paragraph A, for a list of sensitive functions.
(DOE 5633.3)
(DOE 5633.3)
(DOE 5650.3A) Certain
unclassified information concerning atomic energy defense programs whose
unauthorized
dissemination is prohibited under section 148 of the Atomic Energy Act as
determined by a
Controlling Official under the procedures in DOE 5650.3A. Such information
pertains to:
- 1. The design of nuclear production or utilization facilities;
- 2. Security measures for such facilities or for nuclear material
contained in such
facilities, or in transit; or
- 3. The design, manufacture, or utilization of any nuclear weapon or
component if
the information in question was declassified or removed from the Restricted
Data category
pursuant to section 142 of the Atomic Energy Act.
This information may be controlled only if it is determined that its
unauthorized
dissemination could reasonably be expected to have a significant adverse effect
on the health
and safety of the public or the common defense and security by significantly
increasing the
likelihood of the illegal production of nuclear weapons or the theft,
diversion, or sabotage of
nuclear materials, equipment, or facilities. (Note: Production or manufacture
of a nuclear
weapon in violation of either domestic or international law is "illegal
production" and meets
the adverse effect test.)
Certain topics in this chapter use the term "sensitive function" or "sensitive
facility."
These generic topics apply to a specific function if that function is listed in
Chapter XI. If
the concept of "sensitive facilities" is used in topics in an organization's
internal
implementation, such sensitive facilities must be listed in Chapter XI.
Proposed additions,
revisions, or deletions to these lists should be submitted to SA-20 for
consideration and
approval. Internal guidelines (refer to Chapter
X) may
include site-specific
applications of
the following generic topics and should be consulted whenever they exist.
- 1. The fact that a specified function is a sensitive
function
(GG #1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .NOT UCNI
- 2. A list of sensitive functions performed at a specified or unspecified
facility or
site
(GG #2). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .NOT UCNI
- 3. The association of a specified sensitive function with a
specified sensitive facility
(GG #3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .NOT UCNI
- 1. The indirect implication or direct statement that a specified
facility is an
UCNI sensitive facility
(GG #4). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .NOT UCNI
- 2. A complete list of sensitive facilities at a site
(Basis: GG #5A; determined to be no longer UCNI on 5/2/94)NOT UCNI
- 1. Sensitive design information concerning a specified
sensitive facility which is not readily observable from a
public area
(Basis: QR FY-87/3; ID No.: GG #6). . . . . . . . .UCNI
- 2. The fact that specified equipment is critical to the
performance of a specified or unspecified sensitive
function
(Basis: QR FY-87/4; ID No.: GG #7) . . . . . . . . . . UCNI
- 3. Sensitive design or design-related operational information concerning
critical
equipment or components of sensitive facilities which if sabotaged could
prevent operation or
safe shutdown under normal or abnormal conditions, or could be of significant
assistance in
planning or executing an act of theft, diversion, or dispersion of nuclear
material
(Basis: QR FY-89/1 and QR FY-89/4; ID No.: GG #11).UCNI
- 4. Sensitive information concerning security equipment for the protection
of
production or utilization facilities, nuclear material contained in such
facilities, or nuclear
material in transit
(Basis: QR FY-88/4, ID No.: GG #16) . . . . UCNI
- NOTE: Much information concerning security vulnerabilities is
classified in
accordance with CG-SS-2 and pertinent local guides. Therefore, information
related to
security topics in these guidelines must first be checked to assure it is
unclassified. In this
regard, as noted in CG-SS-2, "the mere existence of a 'problem' does not
necessarily reveal a
vulnerability." Also, even though a deficiency may exist at a site or facility,
security
measures may be available to adequately address the situation and
classification may not be
appropriate. Unclassified information determined to be UCNI under these
guidelines shall be
protected from unauthorized dissemination.
- 1. Sensitive information concerning security plans and
procedures for production or utilization facilities,
nuclear material contained in such facilities, or nuclear
material in transit, provided this information cannot be
obtained by casual observation from uncontrolled areas
(Basis: QR FY-88/4, ID No.: GG #15). . . . . . . .UCNI
- 2. Sensitive information revealing capabilities, deficiencies,
or vulnerabilities of a specified security plan, procedure,
or system
(Basis: QR FY-88/4, ID No.: GG #17). . .UCNI
- 3. The fact that a specified sensitive facility or activity
has an unspecified security vulnerability
(GG #21) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .NOT UCNI
- 4. The fact that an unspecified facility or activity at a
specified or unspecified site has a specified or
unspecified security vulnerability
(GG #22). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .NOT UCNI
- 5. Information concerning a security vulnerability at an
unspecified sensitive facility or activity at a specified
or unspecified site which does not reveal in any way
the identity of the sensitive facility or activity
(GG #23) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .NOT UCNI
The DOE established the Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) using highly
skilled experts from the national laboratories, other DOE contractors, and
various Government
agencies to provide a capability to:
- search for and aid in the recovery of a lost or stolen nuclear
weapon, and
- aid the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the event of a crime
involving the theft or alleged theft of a nuclear weapon or SNM; a
threat to detonate a stolen nuclear weapon, improvised nuclear
device, or a radiation dispersal device; or to commit any other
crimes involving nuclear weapons, explosives, devices, or nuclear
materials.
Much information concerning NEST is classified and appropriate
classification
guidance must first be checked to assure information concerning NEST is
unclassified before
determining whether the information is subject to control as UCNI. Because
certain
unclassified information could provide potential adversaries with invaluable
information about
NEST operations, capabilities, and limitations regarding possible threats to
DOE facilities, or
threats concerning nuclear materials or explosives, such information must be
controlled as
UCNI based on the following General Guidelines. Information concerning
possible use of
NEST capabilities for non-DOE incidents may also require control as UCNI,
because such
information reveals NEST methods and capabilities that would be employed in
threats to
DOE facilities or threats concerning U.S. nuclear materials or explosives.
- 1. That NEST assets have been or are being employed on a
particular operational mission or exercise; the scenario
or threat involved; the date(s) and/or locations concerned;
and sensitive information concerning organizations and
individuals involved unless otherwise determined to be
releasable by the Operational Emergency Management Team
(OEMT), the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Military
Application (DP-20), higher authority, or a person
specifically authorized by the foregoing in certain cases
(Basis: QR FY-90/4; ID No. GG #29). . . . . .UCNI
- 2. Sensitive information revealing procedures, techniques, capabilities,
assets
utilized, and results concerning
assessment of communicated threats
(Basis: QR FY-90/4; ID No.: GG #30). . . . . . . .UCNI
- 3. Sensitive information related to plans, procedures, methods logistics,
operations, capabilities, limitations, and results in responding to threats,
evaluating threat
devices or materials
(actual, purported, or exercise related), and actions taken concerning such
devices or
materials
(Basis: QR FY-90/4; ID No.:) GG #31). . . . . . . .UCNI
- 4. Sensitive information concerning equipment related to NEST activities,
including information about types and quantity, availability, design,
deployment, employment,
capabilities, limitations/deficiencies, operation and data gathered
(Basis: QR FY-90/4; ID No.: GG #32). . . . . . . .UCNI
- 5. Information concerning equipment available to NEST as used
in activities not related to NEST (e.g., in support of a
response to an accidental release of radioactive material),
when such information is not associated explicitly with NEST
and does not reveal sensitive NEST related procedures,
methods, capabilities, etc.
(GG #33) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .NOT UCNI
- 6. General statement of the NEST mission, that NEST uses highly skilled
experts from the national laboratories, other DOE contractors, and various
Government
agencies and specialized equipment, and that NEST is managed and directed by
the DOE
Nevada Field Office on authority of DP-20
(GG #34) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .NOT UCNI
- 7. Budget data and information related to NEST not revealing
sensitive information concerning operations, tactics,
procedures, equipment, capabilities, or limitations/
deficiencies (merely stating that a capability is to be or
is being improved does not reveal a deficiency exists)
(GG #35) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .NOT UCNI
- 8. Information determined by DP-20, OEMT, higher authority,
or a person delegated authority by the foregoing, concerning
a NEST operation or exercise to be essential to release to
the public for public health and safety reasons or to be in
the public interest to release
(GG #36) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .NOT UCNI
NOTE: Planned public releases are Official Use Only prior to release.
*Reference Chapter I, Paragraph D
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