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U.S. Department of Energy						      ORDER
     Washington, D.C.
								   DOE O 452.1C

								Approved: 9-20-05
								  Review: 9-20-07
													

SUBJECT:  NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE AND WEAPON SURETY PROGRAM

1.	OBJECTIVES.

	a.	To prevent accidents and inadvertent or unauthorized use of
		U.S. nuclear explosives (including nuclear weapons). The
		Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety
		(NEWS) Program is established for this and the subsequent
		objectives and is implemented through the following Orders:
		
		(1)	DOE O 452.2B, Safety of Nuclear Explosive Operations, dated
			8-7-01;
			
		(2)	DOE O 452.4A, Security and Control of Nuclear Explosives and
			Nuclear Weapons, dated 12-17-01; and

		(3)	DOE 5610.13, Joint Department of Energy)/Department of
			Defense Nuclear Weapon System Safety, Security, and Control
			Activities, dated 10-10-90.

	b.	In conjunction with the Department of Defense (DoD), to
		protect the public health and safety by providing dual-Agency
		judgment and responsibility for the safety, security, and control
		(surety) of nuclear weapons.
		
	c.	To establish nuclear explosive surety standards, nuclear
		weapon design surety requirements, and NEWS assessment
		requirements.

	d.	To address surety vulnerabilities during all phases of the
		nuclear weapon life cycle and to upgrade surety during weapon
		stockpile refurbishments and/or new weapon development.

	e.	To establish requirements and responsibilities for planned
		nuclear explosive operations (NEOs). [Responses to unplanned
		events (e.g., Accident Response Group activities) are addressed
		in the 5530-series Orders and DOE O 151.1B, Comprehensive
		Emergency Management System, dated 11-01-00.]

2.	CANCELLATION. DOE O 452.1B, Nuclear Explosive and Weapon 
	Surety Program,dated 8-06-01. Cancellation of this Order does not, 
	by itself, modify or otherwise affect any contractual
	obligation to comply with the Order. Canceled Orders that
	are incorporated by reference in a contract remain in effect
	until the contract is modified to delete the references to
	the requirements in the canceled Orders.
	
3.	APPLICABILITY.

	a.	DOE Elements. Except for the exclusion in paragraph 3c, 
		this Order applies to all those DOE elements that are 
		involved with NEWS management (see
		
		Attachment 1 for a complete list of DOE elements).
		This Order automatically applies to DOE elements
		created after it is issued.
		
		The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
		Administrator will assure that NNSA employees and
		contractors comply with their respective
		responsibilities under this Order.
		
	b.	Nuclear Weapons Complex Contractors.

		(1)	The Contractor Requirements Document (CRD), Attachment 2,
			applies to all DOE nuclear weapons complex contractors involved
			in the DOE NEWS Program whose contracts include the CRD.
			
		(2)	This CRD must be included in all nuclear weapons complex
			contracts that require or include involvement with the NEWS
			Program.

		(3)	This Order does not automatically apply to other than
			nuclear weapons complex contractors. Any application of
			requirements of this Order to other than nuclear weapons complex
			contractors will be communicated separately from the Order.

		(4)	As the laws, regulations, and DOE directives clause of
			nuclear weapons complex contracts states, regardless of the
			performer of the work, nuclear weapons complex contractors with a
			CRD incorporated into their contracts are responsible for
			compliance with the requirements of the CRD. Affected nuclear
			weapons complex contractors are responsible for flowing down the
			requirements of the CRD to subcontracts at any tier to the extent
			necessary to ensure the nuclear weapons complex contractors’
			compliance with the requirements.

	c.	Exclusions. All DOE elements except those listed in Attachment 1. 

4.	REQUIREMENTS.

	a.	Nuclear Explosive Surety Standards. All NEOs must meet 
		the following qualitative surety
		standards to prevent unintended nuclear detonation,
		fissile material dispersal from the pit, or loss of
		control. There must be controls to—
		
		(1)	minimize the possibility of accidents, inadvertent acts, or
			authorized activities that could lead to fire, high-explosive
			deflagration, or unintended high-explosive detonation;
			
		(2)	minimize the possibility of fire, high-explosive
			deflagration, or high-explosive detonation, given accidents or
			inadvertent acts;

		(3)	minimize the possibility of deliberate unauthorized acts
			that could lead to high-explosive deflagration or high-explosive
			detonation;

		(4)	ensure adequate security of nuclear explosives; and

		(5)	minimize the possibility of or delay unauthorized nuclear
			detonation.

	b.	Nuclear Explosive Safety (NES). Safety standards, 
		paragraphs 4a(1), 4a(2), and 4a(3) above,
		must be met for all NEOs conducted by and for the
		Department to ensure adequate NES. Additional
		requirements are specified in DOE O 452.2B.
		
	c.	Nuclear Explosive Security. NNSA implements Departmental  
		requirements in accordance with the 470-series Orders
 		and the provisions of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations 
		(CFR) 712, Human Reliability Program. Safeguards and 
		security measures must be documented in site safeguards 
		and security  plans. The security standard, paragraph 
		4a(4) above, must be met to ensure adequate nuclear explosive
		security for all NEOs conducted by the Department
		and/or its contractors. A NES evaluation must be

		performed to assess security operations for potential
		adverse NES impact.
		
	d.	Nuclear Explosive Use Control. Use control standards, 
		paragraphs 4a(3) and 4a(5) above,
		must be met for all NEOs conducted by the
		Department and/or its contractors. Additional
		requirements are specified in DOE O 452.4A. Use
		control measures must be evaluated in accordance
		with the provisions of DOE O 452.4A to ensure all
		objectives are achieved. A NES evaluation must be
		performed to assess use control measures for
		potential adverse NES impact.
		
	e.	Nuclear Weapon Surveillance Program. The stockpile will 
		be evaluated continually to ensure that safety and use 
		control devices and components meet specified
		requirements and are performing effectively.
		
	f.	Nuclear Weapon Quality Assurance Program. Surety 
		requirements must be addressed during
		all phases of the nuclear weapon life cycle.
		
	g.	Nuclear Weapon Design Surety must be an integral part 
		of the design and development of new
		weapons and the refurbishment of existing weapons.
		
		(1)	Documented consideration of surety must begin at the
			conception phase and continue throughout all weapon program
			phases.
			
		(2)	Surety-related surveillance program information must be
			explicitly considered in nuclear weapon design and development
			activities.

		(3)	New or refurbished nuclear weapon designs must meet
			subsequent surety design requirements unless there are overriding
			reasons for not doing so and explicitly documented agreements to
			this effect are reached between the Secretary of Energy and the
			Secretary of Defense. The following must be incorporated in new
			or refurbished nuclear weapon designs.
			
			(a)	Nuclear Detonation Safety. Nuclear weapons must  
				incorporate design features that minimize the
				possibility of accidental and/or
				inadvertent nuclear detonation. The
				following are design requirements for nuclear
				weapons delivered to DoD.
				
				1	Normal Environment. Prior to receipt of the enabling
					input signals and the arming signal,
					the probability of a premature nuclear
					detonation must not exceed one in a
					billion (1E-09) per nuclear weapon
					lifetime.
					
				2	Abnormal Environment. Prior to receipt of the 
					enabling input signals, the
					probability of a premature nuclear
					detonation must not exceed one in a
					million (1E-06) per credible nuclear
					weapon accident or exposure to abnormal
					environments.
					
				3	One-Point Safety. The probability of achieving 
					a nuclear yield greater than 4
					pounds of TNT equivalent in the event of
					a one-point initiation of the weapon’s
					high explosive must not exceed one in a
					million (1E-06).
					
			(b)	Fissile Material Dispersal Safety. Nuclear weapons 
				will incorporate design features for reducing
				fissile material dispersal from the pit under
				credible abnormal environments unless there
				are overriding reasons for not doing so and
				the responsible military service requests and
				adequately justifies an exception approved by
				the Secretary of Energy.
				
			(c)	Use Control. Nuclear weapons must incorporate 
				use control design features
				that allow timely authorized use of a nuclear
				weapon while precluding or delaying
				unauthorized nuclear detonation. The
				following are requirements for nuclear
				weapons delivered to DoD.
				
				1	The protection of nuclear weapons shall include a
					combination of administrative (e.g., personnel security) and
					technical measures (e.g., physical security and use control)
					designed to prevent deliberate unauthorized nuclear detonation.
					These measures shall be consistent with DoD operational
					requirements and shall continually be assessed against existing
					and emerging threats as well as technological opportunities for
					improvement.
					
				2	Use control capabilities will be upgraded for all warheads
					during weapon refurbishment.
					
			(d)	Inadvertent Criticality. Design nuclear weapons that will not inadvertently go
				critical in both normal and abnormal environments as verified by
				the design agency.
				
			(e)	Multipoint Initiation in abnormal environments must be evaluated as part of the
				design process.
				
		(4)	Surety Research and Development (R&D).
			
			(a)	Conduct R&D on a broad range of safety and control methods
				and devices to improve the surety of nuclear weapons and nuclear
				weapon systems significantly.
				
				1	Identify and characterize physical processes that can lead
					to unacceptable nuclear explosive response.
					
				2	 Identify and address safety issues.

				3	 Identify areas to improve safety.

			(b)	Provide use control options with delay or denial capability
				that, at a minimum, are equivalent to that associated with
				current nonviolent disablement systems.
				
			(c)	Pursue technologies that render the unauthorized use of U.S.
				nuclear weapons impossible without their remanufacture.

	h. 	NEO Authorization. Before a NEO can begin, the following documentation and
		activities must be completed and approved. Normally
		these activities should be completed in sequence, and
		the authorization agreement must be last.
		
		(1)	A documented safety analysis as defined in 10 CFR 830.
			
		(2)	An operation hazard analysis report (HAR) in compliance with
			10 CFR 830.

		(3)	A system for the implementation of documented controls to
			ensure acceptably safe NEOs and associated activities.

		(4)	A readiness review in accordance with the requirements of
			DOE O 425.1C, Startup and Restart of Nuclear Facilities, dated
			3-13-03.

		(5)	A nuclear explosive safety study report.

		(6)	A certification that all nuclear explosive surety standards
			have been met.
			
		(7)	An approved site safeguards and security plan.
			
		(8)	An approved human reliability program implementation plan.

		(9)	An authorization agreement.

	i.	Training and Qualification of Personnel. Each organization responsible for and/or 
		involved in NEOs and activities that may affect the safety and use control of a
		nuclear explosive or nuclear weapon must implement training and
		qualification programs for personnel.
		
		(1)	Training and qualification requirements must be commensurate
			with the particular responsibilities assigned.
			
		(2)	NEWS training must include specific training on the specific
			nuclear explosive and weapon hazards and controls for the
			responsibilities assigned.

		(3)	Training and qualification programs, as a minimum, must be
			based on the following.

			(a)	10 CFR Part 712, “Human Reliability Program,” final rule.
				
			(b)	DOE O 360.1B, Federal Employee Training, dated 10-11-01.

			(c)	DOE 5480.20A, Personnel Selection, Qualification, and
				Training Requirements for DOE Nuclear Facilities, dated 11-15-94,
				except Chapters II and III.

			(d)	DOE P 426.1, Federal Technical Capability Policy for Defense
				Nuclear Facilities, dated 12-10-98.

			(e)	DOE M 426.1-1A, Federal Technical Capability Manual, dated
				5-18-04.

			(f)	DOE M 473.2-2, Protective Force Program Manual, dated
				6-30-00.

	j.	Records. Records (documentation) must be maintained in accordance with
		National Archives and Records Administration-approved
		DOE or site-specific records retention and disposition
		schedules per DOE O 200.1, Information Management
		Program, dated 9-30-96.
		
	k.	Implementation Requirements.

		(1)	This revision does not involve substantive administrative
			and programmatic changes from the previous directive, DOE O
			452.1B, and an implementation plan is not required.
			
		(2)	This revision is effective upon issue.

5.	RESPONSIBILITIES.

	a.	Secretary of Energy is responsible for establishing and implementing the
		NEWS program.
		
	b.	NNSA Administrator.

		(1)	Is responsible for the surety of all NEOs conducted by and
			fo rNNSA.
			
		(2)	Serves as a member of the Joint Nuclear Weapons Council
			under Title 10 United States Code (U.S.C.) Section 179.

		(3)	Exercises dual-Agency responsibility with DoD for the surety
			of nuclear weapons in DoD custody in accordance with both the
			Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Between DoD and DOE on
			“Objectives and Responsibilities for Joint Nuclear Weapon
			Activities” and the “Joint Policy Statement on Nuclear Weapons
			Surety.”
			
	c.	Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs.

		(1)	Serves as lead program Secretarial Office for environment,
			safety, and health (ES&H) matters at NNSA-owned facilities and
			has all the authorities delegated by order of the Secretary to
			cognizant and program Secretarial Offices.
			
		(2)	Implements DOE policy for the NEWS Program, including those
			aspects of the program related to public and worker health and
			safety and protection of the environment.

		(3)	Reviews and concurs or does not concur on DoD-proposed
			nuclear weapon system safety rules.

		(4)	Coordinates with the Assistant Secretary for Environment,
			Safety and Health to ensure that appropriate ES&H requirements
			are integrated with NEWS requirements and that divergence between
			ES&H and NEWS programs does not occur.

		(5)	Ensures that this Order applies once an emergency for
			nuclear weapons in a damaged or abnormal state (or improvised
			nuclear device) has been terminated in accordance with the
			provisions of the DOE 5530- and DOE 150-series directives.
		(6)	Develops, in coordination with the Chief of Defense Nuclear
			Safety, a prioritized list of necessary safety-related research
			needs, including nuclear explosive safety research needs, to be
			incorporated into the annual budget and planning cycle.

	d.	Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety and Health.

		(1)	Assists the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs in
			ES&H matters.
			
		(2)	Coordinates with the Deputy Administrator for Defense
			Programs on ES&H requirements to ensure that divergence between
			ES&H and NEWS programs does not occur.

	e.	Assistant Deputy Administrator for Military Application and
		Stockpile Operations.

		(1)	Serves as the focal point for DOE’s dual-Agency
			responsibility with DoD for nuclear weapon surety, administers
			DOE’s participation in the DoD nuclear weapon system safety
			program, and assists in the processing of DoD safety rules as
			described in the MOU Between DoD and DOE on “Objectives and
			Responsibilities for Joint Nuclear Weapon Activities” and the
			“Joint Policy Statement on Nuclear Weapons Surety” in accordance
			with DOE 5610.13.
			
		(2)	Develops NEWS Program directives.

		(3)	Provides overall NEWS Program management and direction
			(including stop work authority) and implements surety policies.

		(4)	Ensures an active and continuous review of the nuclear
			stockpile to identify surety concerns and ensures a program to
			provide for stockpile improvement or controls to address
			identified concerns.

		(5)	Ensures all nuclear-weapon-related surety actions requiring
			joint DOE-DoD concurrence are thoroughly analyzed from a surety
			viewpoint by qualified experts.
		(6)	Coordinates NES, nuclear explosive security, and nuclear
			explosive use control policies to ensure balance and consistency
			with the nuclear explosive surety standards.
		(7)	Conducts annual nuclear explosive use control program
			reviews.
		(8)	Conducts annual NEWS appraisals.

	f.	Assistant Deputy Administrator for Research, Development and
		Simulation.

		(1)	Conducts R&D on a broad range of safety and control methods
			and devices for nuclear warheads and weapon systems, including
			use control, and delay and denial capabilities.
			
			(a)	Identifies and characterizes physical processes that can
				lead to unacceptable nuclear explosive response.
				
			(b)	Identifies and addresses safety issues.

			(c)	Identifies areas to improve safety.

		(2)	Pursues technologies that render the unauthorized use of
			nuclear weapons impossible without their remanufacture.
			
	g.	Associate Administrator for Defense Nuclear Security.

		(1)	Directs and manages overall safeguards and security programs
			at NNSA facilities.
			
		(2)	Serves as NNSA security authority.

		(3)	Provides, engineering, technical, operational and
			administrative support to both line management and field elements
			to ensure effective security at NNSA facilities, including the
			physical security, personnel, materials control and accounting,
			classified and sensitive information protection, and technical
			security programs.

	h.	Director of the Office of Security and Safety Performance
		Assurance.

		(1)	Provides safeguards and security inspection reports related
			to the NEWS Program to the NNSA Administrator, the Assistant
			Deputy Administrator for Military Application and Stockpile
			Operations, and the managers of cognizant site offices.
			
		(2)	Develops safeguards and security policy.

	i.	Chief of Defense Nuclear Safety.

		(1)	Provides an independent source of information to assure the
			Administrator that site office managers are effectively meeting
			their responsibilities in the area of nuclear safety.
			
		(2)	Develops in coordination with the Deputy Administrator for
			Defense Programs a prioritized list of necessary safety-related
			research needs, including nuclear explosive safety research
			needs, to be incorporated into the annual budget and planning
			cycle.

	j.	Site Office Managers are responsible to the Assistant Deputy Administrator for
		Military Application and Stockpile Operations for
		performing the following duties.
		
		(1)	Implementing the provisions of this and related Orders.
			
		(2)	Ensuring that NEWS Program responsibilities are assigned to
			site office organizations, laboratories, contractors, and
			subcontractors.

		(3)	Developing and publishing site office directives to
			implement this and related Orders.
			
		(4)	Ensuring that identified contractors are responsible for
			compliance with the requirements of this Order, regardless of the
			performer of the work.

		(5)	Monitoring/overseeing contractor implementation of the NEWS
			Program.

		(6)	Telling contracting officers which nuclear weapons complex
			contractors are affected by this Order.

	k.	Contracting Officers, once notified by site office managers, ensure that this Order’s
		CRD is incorporated into the contracts of affected
		nuclear weapons complex contractors involved with NEOs.
		
	l.	Pantex Site Office and Nevada Site Office Managers. In addition to the
		responsibilities listed in paragraph 5j,
		each manager is responsible to the Assistant Deputy
		Administrator for Military Application and Stockpile
		Operations for the following duties at his/her site.
		
		(1)	Conducting all operational aspects of the NEWS Program and
			specifically operational aspects of the NEWS Program for onsite
			transportation activities.
			
		(2)	Approving facility safety analysis reports (SARs) and
			Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) for NEOs.

		(3)	Approving NEO HARs.

		(4)	Approving readiness reviews for NEOs.

		(5)	Certifying that each NEO under his/her purview meets nuclear
			explosive surety standards.

		(6)	Preparing and approving NEO authorization agreements.

		(7)	Approving site safeguards and security plans and the human
			reliability program implementation plans.

	m.	Assistant Deputy Administrator for Secure Transportation is responsible 
		to the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs
		for the following duties specifically related to the
		Office for Secure Transportation (OST).
		
		(1)	Implementing the provisions of this and related Orders.
			
		(2)	Ensuring that NEWS Program responsibilities are assigned to
			OST organizations.
			
		(3)	Developing and publishing OST directives to implement this
			and related Orders.

		(4)	Conducting operational aspects of the NEWS Program for
			offsite transportation activities.

		(5)	Approving SARs and TSRs for NEOs.

		(6)	Approving readiness reviews for NEOs.

		(7)	Certifying that each NEO under his/her purview meets the
			nuclear explosive surety standards.

		(8)	Preparing and approving NEO authorization agreements.

		(9)	Approving the site safeguards and security plan and the
			human reliability program implementation plan.

6.	DEFINITIONS. See Attachment 3, Definitions.
	
7.	REFERENCES.
	
	a.	DOE O 151.1B, Comprehensive Emergency Management System,
		dated 11-01-00, provides the framework for development,
		coordination, control, and direction of all emergency planning,
		preparedness, readiness assurance, response, and recovery
		actions.
		
	b.	DOE O 200.1, Information Management Program, dated 9-30-96,
		provides a framework for managing information and National
		Archives and Records Administration approved DOE or site-specific
		records schedules.

	c.	DOE O 414.1C, Quality Assurance, dated 6-17-05, requires the
		implementation of quality assurance criteria.

	d.	DOE G 414.1-1A, Management Assessment and Independent
		Assessment Guide, dated 5-31-01, provides guidance concerning the
		establishment and implementation of effective assessment
		processes.

	e.	DOE G 414.1-2A, Quality Assurance Management System Guide
		for Use with 10 CFR 830.120 and DOE O 414.1, dated 6-17-05,
		provides guidance concerning the establishment and implementation
		of an effective quality assurance program or quality management
		systems and ensures the integrated approach required by DOE
		P 450.4 (cited below).

	f.	DOE O 425.1C, Startup and Restart of Nuclear Facilities,
		dated 3-13-03, establishes the requirements for startup of new
		nuclear facilities and for the restart of existing nuclear
		facilities that have been shut down.

	g.	DOE P 450.4, Safety Management System Policy, dated 10-15-
		96, describes DOE’s commitment that safety management systems be
		used to integrate safety into management and work practices at
		all levels so that missions are accomplished while protecting the
		public, the worker, and the environment.

	h.	DOE P 450.5, Line Environment, Safety and Health Oversight,
		dated 6-26-97, sets forth DOE’s expectations for line management
		ES&H oversight and for the use of contractor self-assessment
		programs as the cornerstone of this oversight.

	i.	DOE O 452.2B, Safety of Nuclear Explosive Operations, dated
		08-7-01, establishes requirements and responsibilities for
		ensuring the safety of both routine and planned DOE NEOs.

	j.	DOE O 452.4A, Security and Control of Nuclear Explosives and
		Nuclear Weapons, dated 12-17-01, establishes DOE requirements and
		responsibilities to prevent the deliberate unauthorized use of
		U.S. nuclear explosives and weapons.

	k.	DOE O 461.1A, Packaging and Transfer or Transportation of
		Materials of National Security Interest, dated 4-26-04,
		establishes DOE requirements and responsibilities for the
		Transportation Safeguards System Program.

	l.	DOE O 470.1, Safeguards and Security Program, dated 9-28-95,
		establishes the DOE Safeguards and Security Program.

	m.	DOE O 470.2B, Independent Oversight and Performance
		Assurance Program, dated 10-31-02, establishes requirements and
		responsibilities for the DOE Independent Oversight and
		Performance Assurance Program that provides DOE and contractor
		managers, Congress, and other stakeholders with an independent
		evaluation of the adequacy of DOE policy and the effectiveness of
		line management performance in safeguards and security and other
		critical functions.

	n.	DOE O 473.1, Physical Protection Program, dated 12-23-02,
		establishes objectives, requirements, and responsibilities for
		the physical protection of safeguards and security interests.

	o.	DOE 5530.1A, Accident Response Group, dated 9-20-91,
		establishes DOE policy for response to accidents and significant
		incidents involving nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon components.
		
	p.	DOE 5610.13, Joint Department of Energy/Department of
		Defense Nuclear Weapon System Safety, Security, and
		Control Activities, dated 10-10-90, establishes DOE
		policy, procedures, authorities, and responsibilities
		for addressing joint nuclear weapon and nuclear weapon
		system safety, security, and control activities in
		conjunction with DoD.
		
	q.	DoD-DOE “Joint Policy Statement on Nuclear Weapons Surety,”
		dated 6-27-91. [Document is available from the Office of Nuclear
		Weapon Surety and Quality (NA-121).]
		
	r.	MOU between DoD and DOE on “Objectives and Responsibilities
		for Joint Nuclear Weapon Activities,” dated 1-17-83. [Document
		is available from the Office of Nuclear Weapon Surety and Quality
		(NA-121).]
		
	s.	10 CFR 712, “Human Reliability Program.”

	t.	10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Management.

	u.	10 U.S.C. 179, “Nuclear Weapons Council.”

	v.	DOE-STD-3015-2004, Nuclear Explosive Safety Evaluation
		Process, dated November 2004, provides requirements and guidance
		for NES studies, operational safety reviews, and nuclear
		explosive safety change evaluations.

	w.	Title XXXII of P.L. 106-65, National Nuclear Security
		Administration Act, as amended, establishes the National Nuclear
		Security Administration.

	x.	National Security Presidential Directive–28, dated June 20,
		2003.

8.	CONTACT. Questions concerning this Order should be addressed to
	the Assistant Deputy Administrator for Military Application and
	Stockpile Operations, Office of Nuclear Weapon Surety and
	Quality, 202-586-5624.


						SAMUEL W. BODMAN
						Secretary of Energy

						  

	 ATTACHMENT 1.  DOE ELEMENTS TO WHICH DOE O 452.1C IS APPLICABLE

Office of the Secretary
Departmental Representative to the Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board
National Nuclear Security Administration
Office of Chief Financial Officer
Office of Chief Information Officer
Office of Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs
Office of Environment, Safety and Health
Office of General Counsel
Office of Hearings and Appeals
Office of Human Capital Management
Office of Management
Office of Public Affairs
Office of the Inspector General
Secretary of Energy Advisory Board

	ATTACHMENT 2. CONTRACTOR REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT
    DOE O 452.1C, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE AND WEAPON SURETY PROGRAM

Nuclear Weapons Complex contractors, including National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA) contractors that conduct
Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety
(NEWS) Program activities must comply with the requirements in
this Contractor Requirements Document (CRD). Regardless of the
performer of the work, contractors are responsible for
compliance with the requirements of this CRD. Contractors are
responsible for flowing down the requirements of this CRD to
subcontracts at any tier to the extent necessary to ensure the
contractors’ compliance with the requirements. Contractors
must not flow down requirements to subcontractors unnecessarily
or imprudently. That is, contractors will ensure that they and
their subcontractors comply with the requirements of the CRD
and incur only those costs that would be incurred by a prudent
person in the conduct of competitive business.

1.	Ensure that hazards and security vulnerabilities associated
	with nuclear explosive operations (NEOs) are identified,
	mitigated, and/or controlled to prevent unintended nuclear
	detonation, fissile material dispersal from the pit, or loss of
	control. Ensure that all NEOs meet the following surety
	standards.
	
	a.	Minimize the possibility of accidents, inadvertent acts, or
		authorized activities that could lead to fire, high-explosive
		deflagration, or unintended high-explosive detonation.
		
	b.	Minimize the possibility of fire, high-explosive
		deflagration, or high-explosive detonation, given accidents or
		inadvertent acts.

	c.	Minimize the possibility of deliberate unauthorized acts
		that could lead to high-explosive deflagration or high-explosive
		detonation.

	d.	Ensure adequate security of nuclear explosives.

	e.	Minimize the possibility of or delay unauthorized nuclear
		detonation.
		
2.	Before a NEO can begin, the following documentation and
	activities must be completed and approved. These requirements
	and relevant sources are compiled in the list below. Normally
	these activities should be completed in sequence, and the
	authorization agreement must be last.
	
	a.	A documented safety analysis as defined in 10 CFR 830.
		
	b.	An operation hazard analysis report (HAR) in compliance with
		10 CFR 830.

	c.	A system for the implementation of documented controls to
		ensure acceptably safe NEOs and associated activities.

	d.	A readiness review in accordance with the requirements of
		DOE O 425.1C, Startup and Restart of Nuclear Facilities, dated
		3-13-03.
		
	e.	A nuclear explosive safety study report.

	f.	A certification that all nuclear explosive surety standards
		have been met.

	g.	An approved site safeguards and security plan.

	h.	An approved human reliability program implementation plan.

	i.	An authorization agreement.

3.	Provide qualified personnel to participate in readiness
	reviews and preparation and/or reviews of NEOs hazards analysis
	reports, safety analysis reports, military Nuclear Weapon System
	Safety Groups, nuclear weapon surveillance program, nuclear
	explosive safety evaluation activities, and nuclear explosive
	safety change evaluation process, and provide other specialized
	nuclear explosive technical support and assistance.
	
4.	For nuclear weapons delivered to the Department of Defense
	(DoD), ensure the following.

	a.	Positive measures are consistent with DoD operational
		requirements.
		
	b.	Positive measures are continually assessed against existing
		and emerging threats as well as technological opportunities for
		improvement.

	c.	Surety capabilities are enhanced during weapon
		refurbishment.
		
5.	National laboratories with design responsibilities will do
	the following.
	
	a.	Incorporate use control design features that allow timely
		authorized use of a nuclear weapon while precluding or delaying
		unauthorized nuclear detonation.
		
	b.	Conduct research and development on a broad range of safety
		and control methods and devices to significantly improve the
		surety of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon systems.

	c.	Pursue technologies that render the unauthorized use of U.S.
		nuclear weapons impossible without their remanufacture.

	d.	Evaluate the criticality safety of a nuclear weapon in both
		normal and abnormal environments to document the intrinsic safety
		of the design.

	e.	Ensure that the surety standards are met during Joint
		DoD/DOE field operations.

6.	Provide inputs when required to the applicable site office
	manager to assist updating an implementation plan.
	
7.	Ensure that an assessment program is developed and updated
	annually. Incorporation of the quality assurance program (QAP)
	required by 10 CFR 830; DOE O 414.1B, Quality Assurance, dated 4-
	29-04; or DOE/AL QC-1, Quality Criteria is preferred. If
	included in the QAP, the NEWS-based assessment requirements must
	be specifically addressed in the QAP and subsequent QAP updates.
	If a NEWS-based assessment program will be developed separately
	from the QAP, ensure approval by the Office of the Deputy
	Administrator for Defense Programs, unless approval authority is
	delegated to another organization, and updated annually.
	
	a.	NEWS requirements must be included in the self, management,
		and independent assessments required by 10 CFR 830, DOE 414.1B,
		or QC-1.
		
		(1)	The results of these assessments must be made available to
			support assessments conducted by DOE/NNSA upon request.
			
		(2)	NEWS assessment results must be analyzed and acted upon.

	b.	NEWS nonconformance must be noted and tracked to closure.
		Good practices must be noted and disseminated using the DOE/NNSA
		lessons learned process (Society for Effective Lessons Learned
		Sharing).
		
	c.	NEWS assessment results, nonconformance, and closures must
		be maintained as quality records.
		
8.	Each organization responsible for and/or involved in NEOs
	and activities that may affect the safety and use control of a
	nuclear explosive or nuclear weapon must implement training and
	qualification programs for its personnel.
	
	a.	Training and qualification requirements must be commensurate
		with the particular responsibilities assigned.
		
	b.	NEWS training must include specific training on the specific
		nuclear explosive and weapon hazards and controls for the
		responsibilities assigned.

9.	Definitions. See Appendix A, Definitions.
	

	ATTACHMENT 2, APPENDIX A.  DEFINITIONS
						  
This attachment provides definitions pertinent to the Contractor
Requirements Document in DOE O 452.1C, Nuclear Explosive and
Weapon Surety Program, dated 9-20-05.

1.	Abnormal Environment.
	
	a.	In Department of Energy operations, an environment that is
		not expected to occur during nuclear explosive operations and
		associated activities.
		
	b.	In Department of Defense operations, as defined in a
		weapon’s stockpile-to-target sequence and military
		characteristics, those environments in which the weapon is not
		expected to retain full operational reliability.

2.	Authorization Agreement. The formal DOE-contractor
	agreement documenting the conditions of operation for a nuclear
	explosive operation. As a minimum, authorization agreements—
	
	a.	define the scope of operations;
		
	b.	list the applicable authorization basis documents;

	c.	list other documents that support the decision to authorize
		operations such as standards/requirements identification
		documents, applicable readiness review reports, nuclear explosive
		safety reports, National Environmental Policy Act documents, and
		certifications that all nuclear explosive surety standards are
		met; and

	d.	define any other terms and conditions.

3.	Collocation. Pit and main charge high explosives are
	collocated when detonation or deflagration of the high explosive
	could result in fissile material dispersal.
	
4.	Cognizant Secretarial Officers. Departmental senior outlay
	program officials.

5.	Controls. Design features, safety rules, Technical Safety
	Requirements, procedures, or other positive measures that
	individually or collectively contribute to nuclear explosive
	surety.

6.	Deflagration. A rapid chemical reaction in which the output
	of heat is sufficient to enable the reaction to proceed and
	accelerate without input of heat from another source.
	Deflagration is a surface phenomenon, with the reaction products
	flowing away from the unreacted material along the surface at
	subsonic velocity. The effect of a true deflagration under
	confinement is an explosion. Confinement of the reaction
	increases pressure, rate of reaction, and temperature and may
	cause transition into a detonation.

7.	Deliberate Unauthorized Use. A deliberate malevolent act
	that could lead to unauthorized nuclear detonation, high-
	explosive detonation, high-explosive deflagration, or theft of a
	nuclear explosive or weapon.

8.	Documents. Recorded information that describes, specifies,
	reports, certifies, requires, or provides data or results. A
	document is not considered a record until it meets the definition
	of a record per 10 CFR 830.

9.	Environment, Safety, and Health (ES&H). The application of
	risk reduction measures to control or mitigate the possibility of
	exposing the public, workers, and environment to hazardous
	materials or hazardous energy. This includes, for example,
	environmental protection, nuclear safety, criticality safety,
	occupational safety, fire protection, industrial hygiene, health
	physics, occupational medicine, industrial safety, and
	radioactive and hazardous waste management.

10.	Functional Audit. An independent review, performed on a
	required basis, that is detailed and technical in nature and
	evaluates a specific area (e.g., tester operations or training
	and qualifications). The audit team is specialized and includes
	operations/area office personnel.

11.	Hazard Analysis Report. A report that documents the
	systematic evaluation of hazards to workers, the public, and the
	environment for a specific nuclear explosive operation and its
	associated activities.

12.	High-Explosive Detonation. A violent chemical reaction
	within a chemical compound or mechanical mixture evolving heat
	and pressure. A detonation is a reaction that proceeds through
	the reacted material toward the unreacted material at a
	supersonic velocity. The result of the chemical reaction is
	exertion of extremely high pressure on the surrounding medium,
	forming a propagation shock wave that is originally of supersonic
	velocity.

13.	Normal Environment.
	
	a.	In Department of Energy operations, the environment in which
		nuclear explosive operations and associated activities are
		expected to be performed.
		
	b.	In Department of Defense operations, the expected logistical
		and operational environments, as defined in a weapon’s stockpile-
		to-target sequence and military characteristics, that the weapon
		is required to survive without degradation in operational
		reliability.

14.	Nuclear Detonation. An energy release through a nuclear
	process, during a period of time on the order of 1 microsecond,
	in an amount equivalent to the energy released by detonating 4 or
	more pounds of trinitrotoluene (TNT).
	
15.	Nuclear Explosive. An assembly containing fissionable
	and/or fusionable materials and main charge high-explosive parts
	or propellants capable of producing a nuclear detonation (e.g., a
	nuclear weapon or test device).
	
16.	Nuclear Explosive Area. An area that contains a nuclear
	explosive or collocated pit and main charge high-explosive parts.

17.	Nuclear Explosive-Like Assembly (NELA). An assembly that is
	not a nuclear explosive but represents a nuclear explosive in its
	basic configuration (main charge high explosive and pit) and any
	subsequent level of assembly up to its final configuration or
	represents a weaponized nuclear explosive such as a warhead,
	bomb, reentry vehicle, or artillery shell. A NELA does not
	contain an arrangement of high-explosive and fissile material
	capable of producing a nuclear detonation.

18.	Nuclear Explosive Operation. Any activity involving a
	nuclear explosive including activities in which main charge high-
	explosive parts and pit are collocated.

19.	Nuclear Explosive Operation Associated Activities.

	Activities directly associated with a specific nuclear explosive
	operation in a nuclear explosive area, such as work on a bomb
	nose or tail subassembly, even when physically separated from the
	bomb’s nuclear explosive subassembly.

20.	Nuclear Explosive Safety. The application of positive
	measures or controls to prevent or mitigate the possibility of
	unintended or unauthorized nuclear detonation or fissile material
	dispersal from the pit in a nuclear explosive area.

21.	Nuclear Explosive Safety Study. A formal evaluation of the
	adequacy of controls to meet the DOE/nuclear explosive safety
	standards.

22.	Nuclear Weapon. A nuclear explosive configured for
	Department of Defense use.

23.	Nuclear Weapons Complex. The collection of DOE
	laboratories, Nevada Test Site, production plants, and processing
	facilities involved in the design, production, and testing of
	nuclear weapons.

24.	Nuclear Yield. The nuclear energy released in the
	detonation of a nuclear explosive measured in terms of the weight
	of trinitrotoluene (TNT) required to produce the same amount of
	energy release.

25.	Pit (Live). A fissile component or set of fissile
	components designed to fit in the central cavity of an implosion
	system.

26.	Plutonium Dispersal. The aerosolization and transport of
	plutonium by a driving force, such as fire, high-explosive
	deflagration, or high-explosive detonation.

27.	Positive Measures. Design features, safety rules,
	procedures, or other controls used individually or collectively
	to provide nuclear explosive surety. Positive measures are
	intended to ensure a safe response in applicable operations.
	Some examples of positive measures are strong-link switches;
	other safety devices; administrative procedures and controls;
	general and specific nuclear explosive safety rules; design
	control of electrical equipment and mechanical tooling; and
	physical, electrical, and mechanical restraints incorporated in
	facilities and transport equipment.

28.	Program Secretarial Officers (PSOs). Heads of major
	Headquarters line organizations—Assistant Secretaries, office
	directors, or NNSA Deputy Administrators. In the context of
	field operations, a PSO funds work at a particular site,
	facility, or laboratory and is a “customer” of the field office.

29.	Refurbishment. Any nuclear weapon alterations or
	modifications including life extension, modernization, and
	revised military requirements. Refurbishments will be assigned a
	new alteration or modification number for stockpile management
	purposes.

30.	Safety Analysis Report. A report that documents the results
	of safety analysis to ensure that a facility can be constructed,
	operated, maintained, shut down, and decommissioned safely and in
	compliance with applicable laws and regulations.

31.	Safety Controls Document. A document that fulfills the
	requirement to define the conditions, safe boundaries, and
	management or administrative controls necessary to ensure that a
	nuclear activity is conducted safely and to reduce the potential
	risk to the public and workers from uncontrolled releases of
	radioactive materials or from radiation exposure due to
	inadvertent criticality. Safety controls documents should
	include operating limits, surveillance requirements,
	administrative controls, use and application instructions, and
	the bases for each of these.

32.	Site. A geographical area consisting of a DOE-controlled
	land area including DOE-owned facilities (e.g., the Nevada Test
	Site, etc.)

33.	Surety. Safety, security, and use control of nuclear
	explosives.

34.	Use Control. The application of systems, devices, or
	procedures that allow timely authorized use of a nuclear
	explosive while precluding or delaying unauthorized nuclear
	detonation.



		  ATTACHMENT 3. DEFINITIONS

This attachment provides definitions pertinent to DOE O 452.1C,
Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program, dated 9-20-05.

1.	Abnormal Environment.
	
	a.	In Department of Energy operations, an environment that is
		not expected to occur during nuclear explosive operations and
		associated activities.
		
	b.	In Department of Defense operations, as defined in a
		weapon’s stockpile-to-target sequence and military
		characteristics, those environments in which the weapon is not
		expected to retain full operational reliability.

2.	Authorization Agreement. The formal DOE-contractor
	agreement documenting the conditions of operation for a nuclear
	explosive operation. As a minimum, authorization agreements—
	
	a.	define the scope of operations;
		
	b.	list the applicable authorization basis documents;

	c.	list other documents that support the decision to authorize
		operations such as standards/requirements identification
		documents, applicable readiness review reports, nuclear explosive
		safety reports, National Environmental Policy Act documents, and
		certifications that all nuclear explosive surety standards are
		met; and

	d.	define any other terms and conditions.

3.	Collocation. Pit and main charge high explosives are
	collocated when detonation or deflagration of the high explosive
	could result in fissile material dispersal.
	
4.	Cognizant Secretarial Officers. Departmental senior outlay
	program officials.

5.	Controls. Design features, safety rules, Technical Safety
	Requirements, procedures, or other positive measures that
	individually or collectively contribute to nuclear explosive
	surety.

6.	Deflagration. A rapid chemical reaction in which the output
	of heat is sufficient to enable the reaction to proceed and
	accelerate without input of heat from another source.
	Deflagration is a surface phenomenon, with the reaction products
	flowing away from the unreacted material along the surface at
	subsonic velocity. The effect of a true deflagration under
	confinement is an explosion. Confinement of the reaction
	increases pressure, rate of reaction, and temperature and may
	cause transition into a detonation.

7.	Deliberate Unauthorized Use. A deliberate malevolent act
	that could lead to unauthorized nuclear detonation, high-
	explosive detonation, high-explosive deflagration, or theft of a
	nuclear explosive or weapon.
	
8.	Documents. Recorded information that describes, specifies,
	reports, certifies, requires, or provides data or results. A
	document is not considered a record until it meets the definition
	of a record per 10 CFR 830.

9.	Environment, Safety, and Health (ES&H). The application of
	risk reduction measures to control or mitigate the possibility of
	exposing the public, workers, and environment to hazardous
	materials or hazardous energy. This includes, for example,
	environmental protection, nuclear safety, criticality safety,
	occupational safety, fire protection, industrial hygiene, health
	physics, occupational medicine, industrial safety, and
	radioactive and hazardous waste management.

10.	Functional Audit. An independent review, performed on a
	required basis, that is detailed and technical in nature and
	evaluates a specific area (e.g., tester operations or training
	and qualifications). The audit team is specialized and includes
	operations/area office personnel.

11.	Hazard Analysis Report. A report that documents the
	systematic evaluation of hazards to workers, the public, and the
	environment for a specific nuclear explosive operation and its
	associated activities.

12.	High-Explosive Detonation. A violent chemical reaction
	within a chemical compound or mechanical mixture evolving heat
	and pressure. A detonation is a reaction that proceeds through
	the reacted material toward the unreacted material at a
	supersonic velocity. The result of the chemical reaction is
	exertion of extremely high pressure on the surrounding medium,
	forming a propagation shock wave that is originally of supersonic
	velocity.

13.	Normal Environment.

	a.	In Department of Energy operations, the environment in which
		nuclear explosive operations and associated activities are
		expected to be performed.
		
	b.	In Department of Defense operations, the expected logistical
		and operational environments, as defined in a weapon’s stockpile-
		to-target sequence and military characteristics, that the weapon
		is required to survive without degradation in operational
		reliability.

14.	Nuclear Detonation. An energy release through a nuclear
	process, during a period of time on the order of 1 microsecond,
	in an amount equivalent to the energy released by detonating 4 or
	more pounds of trinitrotoluene (TNT).
	
15.	Nuclear Explosive. An assembly containing fissionable
	and/or fusionable materials and main charge high-explosive parts
	or propellants capable of producing a nuclear detonation (e.g., a
	nuclear weapon or test device).
	
16.	Nuclear Explosive Area. An area that contains a nuclear
	explosive or collocated pit and main charge high-explosive parts.
17.	Nuclear Explosive-Like Assembly (NELA). An assembly that is
	not a nuclear explosive but represents a nuclear explosive in its
	basic configuration (main charge high explosive and pit) and any
	subsequent level of assembly up to its final configuration or
	represents a weaponized nuclear explosive such as a warhead,
	bomb, reentry vehicle, or artillery shell. A NELA does not
	contain an arrangement of high-explosive and fissile material
	capable of producing a nuclear detonation.

18.	Nuclear Explosive Operation. Any activity involving a
	nuclear explosive including activities in which main charge high-
	explosive parts and pit are collocated.

19.	Nuclear Explosive Operation Associated Activities.
	Activities directly associated with a specific nuclear explosive
	operation in a nuclear explosive area, such as work on a bomb
	nose or tail subassembly, even when physically separated from the
	bomb’s nuclear explosive subassembly.

20.	Nuclear Explosive Safety. The application of positive
	measures or controls to prevent or mitigate the possibility of
	unintended or unauthorized nuclear detonation or fissile material
	dispersal from the pit in a nuclear explosive area.

21.	Nuclear Explosive Safety Study. A formal evaluation of the
	adequacy of controls to meet the DOE/nuclear explosive safety
	standards.

22.	Nuclear Weapon. A nuclear explosive configured for
	Department of Defense use.

23.	Nuclear Weapons Complex. The collection of DOE
	laboratories, Nevada Test Site, production plants, and processing
	facilities involved in the design, production, and testing of
	nuclear weapons.

24.	Nuclear Yield. The nuclear energy released in the
	detonation of a nuclear explosive measured in terms of the weight
	of trinitrotoluene (TNT) required to produce the same amount of
	energy release.

25.	Pit (Live). A fissile component or set of fissile
	components designed to fit in the central cavity of an implosion
	system.

26.	Plutonium Dispersal. The aerosolization and transport of
	plutonium by a driving force, such as fire, high-explosive
	deflagration, or high-explosive detonation.

27.	Positive Measures. Design features, safety rules,
	procedures, or other controls used individually or collectively
	to provide nuclear explosive surety. Positive measures are
	intended to ensure a safe response in applicable operations.
	Some examples of positive measures are strong-link switches;
	other safety devices; administrative procedures and controls;
	general and specific nuclear explosive safety rules; design
	control of electrical equipment and mechanical tooling; and
	physical, electrical, and mechanical restraints incorporated in
	facilities and transport equipment.

28.	Program Secretarial Officers (PSOs). Heads of major
	Headquarters line organizations—Assistant Secretaries, office
	directors, or NNSA Deputy Administrators. In the context of
	field operations, a PSO funds work at a particular site,
	facility, or laboratory and is a “customer” of the field office.

29.	Refurbishment. Any nuclear weapon alterations or
	modifications including life extension, modernization, and
	revised military requirements. Refurbishments will be assigned a
	new alteration or modification number for stockpile management
	purposes.

30.	Safety Analysis Report. A report that documents the results
	of safety analysis to ensure that a facility can be constructed,
	operated, maintained, shut down, and decommissioned safely and in
	compliance with applicable laws and regulations.

31.	Safety Controls Document. A document that fulfills the
	requirement to define the conditions, safe boundaries, and
	management or administrative controls necessary to ensure that a
	nuclear activity is conducted safely and to reduce the potential
	risk to the public and workers from uncontrolled releases of
	radioactive materials or from radiation exposure due to
	inadvertent criticality. Safety controls documents should
	include operating limits, surveillance requirements,
	administrative controls, use and application instructions, and
	the bases for each of these.

32.	Site. A geographical area consisting of a DOE-controlled
	land area including DOE-owned facilities (e.g., the Nevada Test
	Site, etc.)

33.	Surety. Safety, security, and use control of nuclear
	explosives.

34.	Use Control. The application of systems, devices, or
	procedures that allow timely authorized use of a nuclear
	explosive while precluding or delaying unauthorized nuclear
	detonation.