DOE Order 452.1C: Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program

U.S. Department of Energy ORDER
Washington, D.C.
DOE O 452.1C

Approved: 9-20-05
Review: 9-20-07

SUBJECT: NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE AND WEAPON SURETY PROGRAM

1. OBJECTIVES.

a. To prevent accidents and inadvertent or unauthorized use of
U.S. nuclear explosives (including nuclear weapons). The
Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety
(NEWS) Program is established for this and the subsequent
objectives and is implemented through the following Orders:

(1) DOE O 452.2B, Safety of Nuclear Explosive Operations, dated
8-7-01;

(2) DOE O 452.4A, Security and Control of Nuclear Explosives and
Nuclear Weapons, dated 12-17-01; and

(3) DOE 5610.13, Joint Department of Energy)/Department of
Defense Nuclear Weapon System Safety, Security, and Control
Activities, dated 10-10-90.

b. In conjunction with the Department of Defense (DoD), to
protect the public health and safety by providing dual-Agency
judgment and responsibility for the safety, security, and control
(surety) of nuclear weapons.

c. To establish nuclear explosive surety standards, nuclear
weapon design surety requirements, and NEWS assessment
requirements.

d. To address surety vulnerabilities during all phases of the
nuclear weapon life cycle and to upgrade surety during weapon
stockpile refurbishments and/or new weapon development.

e. To establish requirements and responsibilities for planned
nuclear explosive operations (NEOs). [Responses to unplanned
events (e.g., Accident Response Group activities) are addressed
in the 5530-series Orders and DOE O 151.1B, Comprehensive
Emergency Management System, dated 11-01-00.]

2. CANCELLATION. DOE O 452.1B, Nuclear Explosive and Weapon
Surety Program,dated 8-06-01. Cancellation of this Order does not,
by itself, modify or otherwise affect any contractual
obligation to comply with the Order. Canceled Orders that
are incorporated by reference in a contract remain in effect
until the contract is modified to delete the references to
the requirements in the canceled Orders.

3. APPLICABILITY.

a. DOE Elements. Except for the exclusion in paragraph 3c,
this Order applies to all those DOE elements that are
involved with NEWS management (see

Attachment 1 for a complete list of DOE elements).
This Order automatically applies to DOE elements
created after it is issued.

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
Administrator will assure that NNSA employees and
contractors comply with their respective
responsibilities under this Order.

b. Nuclear Weapons Complex Contractors.

(1) The Contractor Requirements Document (CRD), Attachment 2,
applies to all DOE nuclear weapons complex contractors involved
in the DOE NEWS Program whose contracts include the CRD.

(2) This CRD must be included in all nuclear weapons complex
contracts that require or include involvement with the NEWS
Program.

(3) This Order does not automatically apply to other than
nuclear weapons complex contractors. Any application of
requirements of this Order to other than nuclear weapons complex
contractors will be communicated separately from the Order.

(4) As the laws, regulations, and DOE directives clause of
nuclear weapons complex contracts states, regardless of the
performer of the work, nuclear weapons complex contractors with a
CRD incorporated into their contracts are responsible for
compliance with the requirements of the CRD. Affected nuclear
weapons complex contractors are responsible for flowing down the
requirements of the CRD to subcontracts at any tier to the extent
necessary to ensure the nuclear weapons complex contractors’
compliance with the requirements.

c. Exclusions. All DOE elements except those listed in Attachment 1.

4. REQUIREMENTS.

a. Nuclear Explosive Surety Standards. All NEOs must meet
the following qualitative surety
standards to prevent unintended nuclear detonation,
fissile material dispersal from the pit, or loss of
control. There must be controls to—

(1) minimize the possibility of accidents, inadvertent acts, or
authorized activities that could lead to fire, high-explosive
deflagration, or unintended high-explosive detonation;

(2) minimize the possibility of fire, high-explosive
deflagration, or high-explosive detonation, given accidents or
inadvertent acts;

(3) minimize the possibility of deliberate unauthorized acts
that could lead to high-explosive deflagration or high-explosive
detonation;

(4) ensure adequate security of nuclear explosives; and

(5) minimize the possibility of or delay unauthorized nuclear
detonation.

b. Nuclear Explosive Safety (NES). Safety standards,
paragraphs 4a(1), 4a(2), and 4a(3) above,
must be met for all NEOs conducted by and for the
Department to ensure adequate NES. Additional
requirements are specified in DOE O 452.2B.

c. Nuclear Explosive Security. NNSA implements Departmental
requirements in accordance with the 470-series Orders
and the provisions of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR) 712, Human Reliability Program. Safeguards and
security measures must be documented in site safeguards
and security plans. The security standard, paragraph
4a(4) above, must be met to ensure adequate nuclear explosive
security for all NEOs conducted by the Department
and/or its contractors. A NES evaluation must be

performed to assess security operations for potential
adverse NES impact.

d. Nuclear Explosive Use Control. Use control standards,
paragraphs 4a(3) and 4a(5) above,
must be met for all NEOs conducted by the
Department and/or its contractors. Additional
requirements are specified in DOE O 452.4A. Use
control measures must be evaluated in accordance
with the provisions of DOE O 452.4A to ensure all
objectives are achieved. A NES evaluation must be
performed to assess use control measures for
potential adverse NES impact.

e. Nuclear Weapon Surveillance Program. The stockpile will
be evaluated continually to ensure that safety and use
control devices and components meet specified
requirements and are performing effectively.

f. Nuclear Weapon Quality Assurance Program. Surety
requirements must be addressed during
all phases of the nuclear weapon life cycle.

g. Nuclear Weapon Design Surety must be an integral part
of the design and development of new
weapons and the refurbishment of existing weapons.

(1) Documented consideration of surety must begin at the
conception phase and continue throughout all weapon program
phases.

(2) Surety-related surveillance program information must be
explicitly considered in nuclear weapon design and development
activities.

(3) New or refurbished nuclear weapon designs must meet
subsequent surety design requirements unless there are overriding
reasons for not doing so and explicitly documented agreements to
this effect are reached between the Secretary of Energy and the
Secretary of Defense. The following must be incorporated in new
or refurbished nuclear weapon designs.

(a) Nuclear Detonation Safety. Nuclear weapons must
incorporate design features that minimize the
possibility of accidental and/or
inadvertent nuclear detonation. The
following are design requirements for nuclear
weapons delivered to DoD.

1 Normal Environment. Prior to receipt of the enabling
input signals and the arming signal,
the probability of a premature nuclear
detonation must not exceed one in a
billion (1E-09) per nuclear weapon
lifetime.

2 Abnormal Environment. Prior to receipt of the
enabling input signals, the
probability of a premature nuclear
detonation must not exceed one in a
million (1E-06) per credible nuclear
weapon accident or exposure to abnormal
environments.

3 One-Point Safety. The probability of achieving
a nuclear yield greater than 4
pounds of TNT equivalent in the event of
a one-point initiation of the weapon’s
high explosive must not exceed one in a
million (1E-06).

(b) Fissile Material Dispersal Safety. Nuclear weapons
will incorporate design features for reducing
fissile material dispersal from the pit under
credible abnormal environments unless there
are overriding reasons for not doing so and
the responsible military service requests and
adequately justifies an exception approved by
the Secretary of Energy.

(c) Use Control. Nuclear weapons must incorporate
use control design features
that allow timely authorized use of a nuclear
weapon while precluding or delaying
unauthorized nuclear detonation. The
following are requirements for nuclear
weapons delivered to DoD.

1 The protection of nuclear weapons shall include a
combination of administrative (e.g., personnel security) and
technical measures (e.g., physical security and use control)
designed to prevent deliberate unauthorized nuclear detonation.
These measures shall be consistent with DoD operational
requirements and shall continually be assessed against existing
and emerging threats as well as technological opportunities for
improvement.

2 Use control capabilities will be upgraded for all warheads
during weapon refurbishment.

(d) Inadvertent Criticality. Design nuclear weapons that will not inadvertently go
critical in both normal and abnormal environments as verified by
the design agency.

(e) Multipoint Initiation in abnormal environments must be evaluated as part of the
design process.

(4) Surety Research and Development (R&D).

(a) Conduct R&D on a broad range of safety and control methods
and devices to improve the surety of nuclear weapons and nuclear
weapon systems significantly.

1 Identify and characterize physical processes that can lead
to unacceptable nuclear explosive response.

2 Identify and address safety issues.

3 Identify areas to improve safety.

(b) Provide use control options with delay or denial capability
that, at a minimum, are equivalent to that associated with
current nonviolent disablement systems.

h. NEO Authorization. Before a NEO can begin, the following documentation and
activities must be completed and approved. Normally
these activities should be completed in sequence, and
the authorization agreement must be last.

(1) A documented safety analysis as defined in 10 CFR 830.

(2) An operation hazard analysis report (HAR) in compliance with
10 CFR 830.

(3) A system for the implementation of documented controls to
ensure acceptably safe NEOs and associated activities.

(4) A readiness review in accordance with the requirements of
DOE O 425.1C, Startup and Restart of Nuclear Facilities, dated
3-13-03.

(5) A nuclear explosive safety study report.

(6) A certification that all nuclear explosive surety standards
have been met.

(7) An approved site safeguards and security plan.

(8) An approved human reliability program implementation plan.

(9) An authorization agreement.

i. Training and Qualification of Personnel. Each organization responsible for and/or
involved in NEOs and activities that may affect the safety and use control of a
nuclear explosive or nuclear weapon must implement training and
qualification programs for personnel.

(1) Training and qualification requirements must be commensurate
with the particular responsibilities assigned.

(2) NEWS training must include specific training on the specific
nuclear explosive and weapon hazards and controls for the
responsibilities assigned.

(3) Training and qualification programs, as a minimum, must be
based on the following.

(a) 10 CFR Part 712, “Human Reliability Program,” final rule.

(b) DOE O 360.1B, Federal Employee Training, dated 10-11-01.

(c) DOE 5480.20A, Personnel Selection, Qualification, and
Training Requirements for DOE Nuclear Facilities, dated 11-15-94,
except Chapters II and III.

(d) DOE P 426.1, Federal Technical Capability Policy for Defense
Nuclear Facilities, dated 12-10-98.

(e) DOE M 426.1-1A, Federal Technical Capability Manual, dated
5-18-04.

(f) DOE M 473.2-2, Protective Force Program Manual, dated
6-30-00.

j. Records. Records (documentation) must be maintained in accordance with
National Archives and Records Administration-approved
DOE or site-specific records retention and disposition
schedules per DOE O 200.1, Information Management
Program, dated 9-30-96.

k. Implementation Requirements.

(1) This revision does not involve substantive administrative
and programmatic changes from the previous directive, DOE O
452.1B, and an implementation plan is not required.

(2) This revision is effective upon issue.

5. RESPONSIBILITIES.

a. Secretary of Energy is responsible for establishing and implementing the
NEWS program.

b. NNSA Administrator.

(1) Is responsible for the surety of all NEOs conducted by and
fo rNNSA.

(2) Serves as a member of the Joint Nuclear Weapons Council
under Title 10 United States Code (U.S.C.) Section 179.

(3) Exercises dual-Agency responsibility with DoD for the surety
of nuclear weapons in DoD custody in accordance with both the
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Between DoD and DOE on
“Objectives and Responsibilities for Joint Nuclear Weapon
Activities” and the “Joint Policy Statement on Nuclear Weapons
Surety.”

c. Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs.

(1) Serves as lead program Secretarial Office for environment,
safety, and health (ES&H) matters at NNSA-owned facilities and
has all the authorities delegated by order of the Secretary to
cognizant and program Secretarial Offices.

(2) Implements DOE policy for the NEWS Program, including those
aspects of the program related to public and worker health and
safety and protection of the environment.

(3) Reviews and concurs or does not concur on DoD-proposed
nuclear weapon system safety rules.

(4) Coordinates with the Assistant Secretary for Environment,
Safety and Health to ensure that appropriate ES&H requirements
are integrated with NEWS requirements and that divergence between
ES&H and NEWS programs does not occur.

(5) Ensures that this Order applies once an emergency for
nuclear weapons in a damaged or abnormal state (or improvised
nuclear device) has been terminated in accordance with the
provisions of the DOE 5530- and DOE 150-series directives.
(6) Develops, in coordination with the Chief of Defense Nuclear
Safety, a prioritized list of necessary safety-related research
needs, including nuclear explosive safety research needs, to be
incorporated into the annual budget and planning cycle.

d. Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety and Health.

(1) Assists the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs in
ES&H matters.

(2) Coordinates with the Deputy Administrator for Defense
Programs on ES&H requirements to ensure that divergence between
ES&H and NEWS programs does not occur.

e. Assistant Deputy Administrator for Military Application and
Stockpile Operations.

(1) Serves as the focal point for DOE’s dual-Agency
responsibility with DoD for nuclear weapon surety, administers
DOE’s participation in the DoD nuclear weapon system safety
program, and assists in the processing of DoD safety rules as
described in the MOU Between DoD and DOE on “Objectives and
Responsibilities for Joint Nuclear Weapon Activities” and the
“Joint Policy Statement on Nuclear Weapons Surety” in accordance
with DOE 5610.13.

(2) Develops NEWS Program directives.

(3) Provides overall NEWS Program management and direction
(including stop work authority) and implements surety policies.

(4) Ensures an active and continuous review of the nuclear
stockpile to identify surety concerns and ensures a program to
provide for stockpile improvement or controls to address
identified concerns.

(5) Ensures all nuclear-weapon-related surety actions requiring
joint DOE-DoD concurrence are thoroughly analyzed from a surety
viewpoint by qualified experts.
(6) Coordinates NES, nuclear explosive security, and nuclear
explosive use control policies to ensure balance and consistency
with the nuclear explosive surety standards.
(7) Conducts annual nuclear explosive use control program
reviews.
(8) Conducts annual NEWS appraisals.

f. Assistant Deputy Administrator for Research, Development and
Simulation.

(1) Conducts R&D on a broad range of safety and control methods
and devices for nuclear warheads and weapon systems, including
use control, and delay and denial capabilities.

(a) Identifies and characterizes physical processes that can
lead to unacceptable nuclear explosive response.

(b) Identifies and addresses safety issues.

(2) Pursues technologies that render the unauthorized use of
nuclear weapons impossible without their remanufacture.

g. Associate Administrator for Defense Nuclear Security.

(1) Directs and manages overall safeguards and security programs
at NNSA facilities.

(2) Serves as NNSA security authority.

(3) Provides, engineering, technical, operational and
administrative support to both line management and field elements
to ensure effective security at NNSA facilities, including the
physical security, personnel, materials control and accounting,
classified and sensitive information protection, and technical
security programs.

h. Director of the Office of Security and Safety Performance
Assurance.

(1) Provides safeguards and security inspection reports related
to the NEWS Program to the NNSA Administrator, the Assistant
Deputy Administrator for Military Application and Stockpile
Operations, and the managers of cognizant site offices.

(2) Develops safeguards and security policy.

i. Chief of Defense Nuclear Safety.

(1) Provides an independent source of information to assure the
Administrator that site office managers are effectively meeting
their responsibilities in the area of nuclear safety.

(2) Develops in coordination with the Deputy Administrator for
Defense Programs a prioritized list of necessary safety-related
research needs, including nuclear explosive safety research
needs, to be incorporated into the annual budget and planning
cycle.

j. Site Office Managers are responsible to the Assistant Deputy Administrator for
Military Application and Stockpile Operations for
performing the following duties.

(1) Implementing the provisions of this and related Orders.

(2) Ensuring that NEWS Program responsibilities are assigned to
site office organizations, laboratories, contractors, and
subcontractors.

(3) Developing and publishing site office directives to
implement this and related Orders.

(4) Ensuring that identified contractors are responsible for
compliance with the requirements of this Order, regardless of the
performer of the work.

(5) Monitoring/overseeing contractor implementation of the NEWS
Program.

(6) Telling contracting officers which nuclear weapons complex
contractors are affected by this Order.

k. Contracting Officers, once notified by site office managers, ensure that this Order’s
CRD is incorporated into the contracts of affected
nuclear weapons complex contractors involved with NEOs.

l. Pantex Site Office and Nevada Site Office Managers. In addition to the
responsibilities listed in paragraph 5j,
each manager is responsible to the Assistant Deputy
Administrator for Military Application and Stockpile
Operations for the following duties at his/her site.

(1) Conducting all operational aspects of the NEWS Program and
specifically operational aspects of the NEWS Program for onsite
transportation activities.

(2) Approving facility safety analysis reports (SARs) and
Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) for NEOs.

(3) Approving NEO HARs.

(4) Approving readiness reviews for NEOs.

(5) Certifying that each NEO under his/her purview meets nuclear
explosive surety standards.

(6) Preparing and approving NEO authorization agreements.

(7) Approving site safeguards and security plans and the human
reliability program implementation plans.

m. Assistant Deputy Administrator for Secure Transportation is responsible
to the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs
for the following duties specifically related to the
Office for Secure Transportation (OST).

(1) Implementing the provisions of this and related Orders.

(2) Ensuring that NEWS Program responsibilities are assigned to
OST organizations.

(3) Developing and publishing OST directives to implement this
and related Orders.

(4) Conducting operational aspects of the NEWS Program for
offsite transportation activities.

(5) Approving SARs and TSRs for NEOs.

(6) Approving readiness reviews for NEOs.

(7) Certifying that each NEO under his/her purview meets the
nuclear explosive surety standards.

(8) Preparing and approving NEO authorization agreements.

(9) Approving the site safeguards and security plan and the
human reliability program implementation plan.

6. DEFINITIONS. See Attachment 3, Definitions.

7. REFERENCES.

a. DOE O 151.1B, Comprehensive Emergency Management System,
dated 11-01-00, provides the framework for development,
coordination, control, and direction of all emergency planning,
preparedness, readiness assurance, response, and recovery
actions.

b. DOE O 200.1, Information Management Program, dated 9-30-96,
provides a framework for managing information and National
Archives and Records Administration approved DOE or site-specific
records schedules.

c. DOE O 414.1C, Quality Assurance, dated 6-17-05, requires the
implementation of quality assurance criteria.

d. DOE G 414.1-1A, Management Assessment and Independent
Assessment Guide, dated 5-31-01, provides guidance concerning the
establishment and implementation of effective assessment
processes.

e. DOE G 414.1-2A, Quality Assurance Management System Guide
for Use with 10 CFR 830.120 and DOE O 414.1, dated 6-17-05,
provides guidance concerning the establishment and implementation
of an effective quality assurance program or quality management
systems and ensures the integrated approach required by DOE
P 450.4 (cited below).

f. DOE O 425.1C, Startup and Restart of Nuclear Facilities,
dated 3-13-03, establishes the requirements for startup of new
nuclear facilities and for the restart of existing nuclear
facilities that have been shut down.

g. DOE P 450.4, Safety Management System Policy, dated 10-15-
96, describes DOE’s commitment that safety management systems be
used to integrate safety into management and work practices at
all levels so that missions are accomplished while protecting the
public, the worker, and the environment.

h. DOE P 450.5, Line Environment, Safety and Health Oversight,
dated 6-26-97, sets forth DOE’s expectations for line management
ES&H oversight and for the use of contractor self-assessment
programs as the cornerstone of this oversight.

i. DOE O 452.2B, Safety of Nuclear Explosive Operations, dated
08-7-01, establishes requirements and responsibilities for
ensuring the safety of both routine and planned DOE NEOs.

j. DOE O 452.4A, Security and Control of Nuclear Explosives and
Nuclear Weapons, dated 12-17-01, establishes DOE requirements and
responsibilities to prevent the deliberate unauthorized use of
U.S. nuclear explosives and weapons.

k. DOE O 461.1A, Packaging and Transfer or Transportation of
Materials of National Security Interest, dated 4-26-04,
establishes DOE requirements and responsibilities for the
Transportation Safeguards System Program.

l. DOE O 470.1, Safeguards and Security Program, dated 9-28-95,
establishes the DOE Safeguards and Security Program.

m. DOE O 470.2B, Independent Oversight and Performance
Assurance Program, dated 10-31-02, establishes requirements and
responsibilities for the DOE Independent Oversight and
Performance Assurance Program that provides DOE and contractor
managers, Congress, and other stakeholders with an independent
evaluation of the adequacy of DOE policy and the effectiveness of
line management performance in safeguards and security and other
critical functions.

n. DOE O 473.1, Physical Protection Program, dated 12-23-02,
establishes objectives, requirements, and responsibilities for
the physical protection of safeguards and security interests.

o. DOE 5530.1A, Accident Response Group, dated 9-20-91,
establishes DOE policy for response to accidents and significant
incidents involving nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon components.

p. DOE 5610.13, Joint Department of Energy/Department of
Defense Nuclear Weapon System Safety, Security, and
Control Activities, dated 10-10-90, establishes DOE
policy, procedures, authorities, and responsibilities
for addressing joint nuclear weapon and nuclear weapon
system safety, security, and control activities in
conjunction with DoD.

q. DoD-DOE “Joint Policy Statement on Nuclear Weapons Surety,”
dated 6-27-91. [Document is available from the Office of Nuclear
Weapon Surety and Quality (NA-121).]

r. MOU between DoD and DOE on “Objectives and Responsibilities
for Joint Nuclear Weapon Activities,” dated 1-17-83. [Document
is available from the Office of Nuclear Weapon Surety and Quality
(NA-121).]

s. 10 CFR 712, “Human Reliability Program.”

t. 10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Management.

u. 10 U.S.C. 179, “Nuclear Weapons Council.”

v. DOE-STD-3015-2004, Nuclear Explosive Safety Evaluation
Process, dated November 2004, provides requirements and guidance
for NES studies, operational safety reviews, and nuclear
explosive safety change evaluations.

w. Title XXXII of P.L. 106-65, National Nuclear Security
Administration Act, as amended, establishes the National Nuclear
Security Administration.

x. National Security Presidential Directive–28, dated June 20,
2003.

8. CONTACT. Questions concerning this Order should be addressed to
the Assistant Deputy Administrator for Military Application and
Stockpile Operations, Office of Nuclear Weapon Surety and
Quality, 202-586-5624.

SAMUEL W. BODMAN
Secretary of Energy

ATTACHMENT 1. DOE ELEMENTS TO WHICH DOE O 452.1C IS APPLICABLE

Office of the Secretary
Departmental Representative to the Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board
National Nuclear Security Administration
Office of Chief Financial Officer
Office of Chief Information Officer
Office of Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs
Office of Environment, Safety and Health
Office of General Counsel
Office of Hearings and Appeals
Office of Human Capital Management
Office of Management
Office of Public Affairs
Office of the Inspector General
Secretary of Energy Advisory Board

ATTACHMENT 2. CONTRACTOR REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT
DOE O 452.1C, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE AND WEAPON SURETY PROGRAM

Nuclear Weapons Complex contractors, including National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA) contractors that conduct
Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety
(NEWS) Program activities must comply with the requirements in
this Contractor Requirements Document (CRD). Regardless of the
performer of the work, contractors are responsible for
compliance with the requirements of this CRD. Contractors are
responsible for flowing down the requirements of this CRD to
subcontracts at any tier to the extent necessary to ensure the
contractors’ compliance with the requirements. Contractors
must not flow down requirements to subcontractors unnecessarily
or imprudently. That is, contractors will ensure that they and
their subcontractors comply with the requirements of the CRD
and incur only those costs that would be incurred by a prudent
person in the conduct of competitive business.

1. Ensure that hazards and security vulnerabilities associated
with nuclear explosive operations (NEOs) are identified,
mitigated, and/or controlled to prevent unintended nuclear
detonation, fissile material dispersal from the pit, or loss of
control. Ensure that all NEOs meet the following surety
standards.

a. Minimize the possibility of accidents, inadvertent acts, or
authorized activities that could lead to fire, high-explosive
deflagration, or unintended high-explosive detonation.

b. Minimize the possibility of fire, high-explosive
deflagration, or high-explosive detonation, given accidents or
inadvertent acts.

c. Minimize the possibility of deliberate unauthorized acts
that could lead to high-explosive deflagration or high-explosive
detonation.

d. Ensure adequate security of nuclear explosives.

e. Minimize the possibility of or delay unauthorized nuclear
detonation.

2. Before a NEO can begin, the following documentation and
activities must be completed and approved. These requirements
and relevant sources are compiled in the list below. Normally
these activities should be completed in sequence, and the
authorization agreement must be last.

a. A documented safety analysis as defined in 10 CFR 830.

b. An operation hazard analysis report (HAR) in compliance with
10 CFR 830.

c. A system for the implementation of documented controls to
ensure acceptably safe NEOs and associated activities.

d. A readiness review in accordance with the requirements of
DOE O 425.1C, Startup and Restart of Nuclear Facilities, dated
3-13-03.

e. A nuclear explosive safety study report.

f. A certification that all nuclear explosive surety standards
have been met.

g. An approved site safeguards and security plan.

h. An approved human reliability program implementation plan.

i. An authorization agreement.

3. Provide qualified personnel to participate in readiness
reviews and preparation and/or reviews of NEOs hazards analysis
reports, safety analysis reports, military Nuclear Weapon System
Safety Groups, nuclear weapon surveillance program, nuclear
explosive safety evaluation activities, and nuclear explosive
safety change evaluation process, and provide other specialized
nuclear explosive technical support and assistance.

4. For nuclear weapons delivered to the Department of Defense
(DoD), ensure the following.

a. Positive measures are consistent with DoD operational
requirements.

b. Positive measures are continually assessed against existing
and emerging threats as well as technological opportunities for
improvement.

c. Surety capabilities are enhanced during weapon
refurbishment.

5. National laboratories with design responsibilities will do
the following.

a. Incorporate use control design features that allow timely
authorized use of a nuclear weapon while precluding or delaying
unauthorized nuclear detonation.

b. Conduct research and development on a broad range of safety
and control methods and devices to significantly improve the
surety of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon systems.

c. Pursue technologies that render the unauthorized use of U.S.
nuclear weapons impossible without their remanufacture.

d. Evaluate the criticality safety of a nuclear weapon in both
normal and abnormal environments to document the intrinsic safety
of the design.

e. Ensure that the surety standards are met during Joint
DoD/DOE field operations.

6. Provide inputs when required to the applicable site office
manager to assist updating an implementation plan.

7. Ensure that an assessment program is developed and updated
annually. Incorporation of the quality assurance program (QAP)
required by 10 CFR 830; DOE O 414.1B, Quality Assurance, dated 4-
29-04; or DOE/AL QC-1, Quality Criteria is preferred. If
included in the QAP, the NEWS-based assessment requirements must
be specifically addressed in the QAP and subsequent QAP updates.
If a NEWS-based assessment program will be developed separately
from the QAP, ensure approval by the Office of the Deputy
Administrator for Defense Programs, unless approval authority is
delegated to another organization, and updated annually.

a. NEWS requirements must be included in the self, management,
and independent assessments required by 10 CFR 830, DOE 414.1B,
or QC-1.

(1) The results of these assessments must be made available to
support assessments conducted by DOE/NNSA upon request.

(2) NEWS assessment results must be analyzed and acted upon.

b. NEWS nonconformance must be noted and tracked to closure.
Good practices must be noted and disseminated using the DOE/NNSA
lessons learned process (Society for Effective Lessons Learned
Sharing).

c. NEWS assessment results, nonconformance, and closures must
be maintained as quality records.

8. Each organization responsible for and/or involved in NEOs
and activities that may affect the safety and use control of a
nuclear explosive or nuclear weapon must implement training and
qualification programs for its personnel.

a. Training and qualification requirements must be commensurate
with the particular responsibilities assigned.

b. NEWS training must include specific training on the specific
nuclear explosive and weapon hazards and controls for the
responsibilities assigned.

9. Definitions. See Appendix A, Definitions.

ATTACHMENT 2, APPENDIX A. DEFINITIONS

This attachment provides definitions pertinent to the Contractor
Requirements Document in DOE O 452.1C, Nuclear Explosive and
Weapon Surety Program, dated 9-20-05.

1. Abnormal Environment.

a. In Department of Energy operations, an environment that is
not expected to occur during nuclear explosive operations and
associated activities.

b. In Department of Defense operations, as defined in a
weapon’s stockpile-to-target sequence and military
characteristics, those environments in which the weapon is not
expected to retain full operational reliability.

2. Authorization Agreement. The formal DOE-contractor
agreement documenting the conditions of operation for a nuclear
explosive operation. As a minimum, authorization agreements—

a. define the scope of operations;

b. list the applicable authorization basis documents;

c. list other documents that support the decision to authorize
operations such as standards/requirements identification
documents, applicable readiness review reports, nuclear explosive
safety reports, National Environmental Policy Act documents, and
certifications that all nuclear explosive surety standards are
met; and

d. define any other terms and conditions.

3. Collocation. Pit and main charge high explosives are
collocated when detonation or deflagration of the high explosive
could result in fissile material dispersal.

4. Cognizant Secretarial Officers. Departmental senior outlay
program officials.

5. Controls. Design features, safety rules, Technical Safety
Requirements, procedures, or other positive measures that
individually or collectively contribute to nuclear explosive
surety.

6. Deflagration. A rapid chemical reaction in which the output
of heat is sufficient to enable the reaction to proceed and
accelerate without input of heat from another source.
Deflagration is a surface phenomenon, with the reaction products
flowing away from the unreacted material along the surface at
subsonic velocity. The effect of a true deflagration under
confinement is an explosion. Confinement of the reaction
increases pressure, rate of reaction, and temperature and may
cause transition into a detonation.

7. Deliberate Unauthorized Use. A deliberate malevolent act
that could lead to unauthorized nuclear detonation, high-
explosive detonation, high-explosive deflagration, or theft of a
nuclear explosive or weapon.

8. Documents. Recorded information that describes, specifies,
reports, certifies, requires, or provides data or results. A
document is not considered a record until it meets the definition
of a record per 10 CFR 830.

9. Environment, Safety, and Health (ES&H). The application of
risk reduction measures to control or mitigate the possibility of
exposing the public, workers, and environment to hazardous
materials or hazardous energy. This includes, for example,
environmental protection, nuclear safety, criticality safety,
occupational safety, fire protection, industrial hygiene, health
physics, occupational medicine, industrial safety, and
radioactive and hazardous waste management.

10. Functional Audit. An independent review, performed on a
required basis, that is detailed and technical in nature and
evaluates a specific area (e.g., tester operations or training
and qualifications). The audit team is specialized and includes
operations/area office personnel.

11. Hazard Analysis Report. A report that documents the
systematic evaluation of hazards to workers, the public, and the
environment for a specific nuclear explosive operation and its
associated activities.

12. High-Explosive Detonation. A violent chemical reaction
within a chemical compound or mechanical mixture evolving heat
and pressure. A detonation is a reaction that proceeds through
the reacted material toward the unreacted material at a
supersonic velocity. The result of the chemical reaction is
exertion of extremely high pressure on the surrounding medium,
forming a propagation shock wave that is originally of supersonic
velocity.

13. Normal Environment.

a. In Department of Energy operations, the environment in which
nuclear explosive operations and associated activities are
expected to be performed.

b. In Department of Defense operations, the expected logistical
and operational environments, as defined in a weapon’s stockpile-
to-target sequence and military characteristics, that the weapon
is required to survive without degradation in operational
reliability.

14. Nuclear Detonation. An energy release through a nuclear
process, during a period of time on the order of 1 microsecond,
in an amount equivalent to the energy released by detonating 4 or
more pounds of trinitrotoluene (TNT).

15. Nuclear Explosive. An assembly containing fissionable
and/or fusionable materials and main charge high-explosive parts
or propellants capable of producing a nuclear detonation (e.g., a
nuclear weapon or test device).

16. Nuclear Explosive Area. An area that contains a nuclear
explosive or collocated pit and main charge high-explosive parts.

17. Nuclear Explosive-Like Assembly (NELA). An assembly that is
not a nuclear explosive but represents a nuclear explosive in its
basic configuration (main charge high explosive and pit) and any
subsequent level of assembly up to its final configuration or
represents a weaponized nuclear explosive such as a warhead,
bomb, reentry vehicle, or artillery shell. A NELA does not
contain an arrangement of high-explosive and fissile material
capable of producing a nuclear detonation.

18. Nuclear Explosive Operation. Any activity involving a
nuclear explosive including activities in which main charge high-
explosive parts and pit are collocated.

19. Nuclear Explosive Operation Associated Activities.

Activities directly associated with a specific nuclear explosive
operation in a nuclear explosive area, such as work on a bomb
nose or tail subassembly, even when physically separated from the
bomb’s nuclear explosive subassembly.

20. Nuclear Explosive Safety. The application of positive
measures or controls to prevent or mitigate the possibility of
unintended or unauthorized nuclear detonation or fissile material
dispersal from the pit in a nuclear explosive area.

21. Nuclear Explosive Safety Study. A formal evaluation of the
adequacy of controls to meet the DOE/nuclear explosive safety
standards.

22. Nuclear Weapon. A nuclear explosive configured for
Department of Defense use.

23. Nuclear Weapons Complex. The collection of DOE
laboratories, Nevada Test Site, production plants, and processing
facilities involved in the design, production, and testing of
nuclear weapons.

24. Nuclear Yield. The nuclear energy released in the
detonation of a nuclear explosive measured in terms of the weight
of trinitrotoluene (TNT) required to produce the same amount of
energy release.

25. Pit (Live). A fissile component or set of fissile
components designed to fit in the central cavity of an implosion
system.

26. Plutonium Dispersal. The aerosolization and transport of
plutonium by a driving force, such as fire, high-explosive
deflagration, or high-explosive detonation.

27. Positive Measures. Design features, safety rules,
procedures, or other controls used individually or collectively
to provide nuclear explosive surety. Positive measures are
intended to ensure a safe response in applicable operations.
Some examples of positive measures are strong-link switches;
other safety devices; administrative procedures and controls;
general and specific nuclear explosive safety rules; design
control of electrical equipment and mechanical tooling; and
physical, electrical, and mechanical restraints incorporated in
facilities and transport equipment.

28. Program Secretarial Officers (PSOs). Heads of major
Headquarters line organizations—Assistant Secretaries, office
directors, or NNSA Deputy Administrators. In the context of
field operations, a PSO funds work at a particular site,
facility, or laboratory and is a “customer” of the field office.

29. Refurbishment. Any nuclear weapon alterations or
modifications including life extension, modernization, and
revised military requirements. Refurbishments will be assigned a
new alteration or modification number for stockpile management
purposes.

30. Safety Analysis Report. A report that documents the results
of safety analysis to ensure that a facility can be constructed,
operated, maintained, shut down, and decommissioned safely and in
compliance with applicable laws and regulations.

31. Safety Controls Document. A document that fulfills the
requirement to define the conditions, safe boundaries, and
management or administrative controls necessary to ensure that a
nuclear activity is conducted safely and to reduce the potential
risk to the public and workers from uncontrolled releases of
radioactive materials or from radiation exposure due to
inadvertent criticality. Safety controls documents should
include operating limits, surveillance requirements,
administrative controls, use and application instructions, and
the bases for each of these.

32. Site. A geographical area consisting of a DOE-controlled
land area including DOE-owned facilities (e.g., the Nevada Test
Site, etc.)

33. Surety. Safety, security, and use control of nuclear
explosives.

34. Use Control. The application of systems, devices, or
procedures that allow timely authorized use of a nuclear
explosive while precluding or delaying unauthorized nuclear
detonation.

ATTACHMENT 3. DEFINITIONS

This attachment provides definitions pertinent to DOE O 452.1C,
Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety Program, dated 9-20-05.

1. Abnormal Environment.

a. In Department of Energy operations, an environment that is
not expected to occur during nuclear explosive operations and
associated activities.

2. Authorization Agreement. The formal DOE-contractor
agreement documenting the conditions of operation for a nuclear
explosive operation. As a minimum, authorization agreements—

a. define the scope of operations;

b. list the applicable authorization basis documents;

d. define any other terms and conditions.

3. Collocation. Pit and main charge high explosives are
collocated when detonation or deflagration of the high explosive
could result in fissile material dispersal.

4. Cognizant Secretarial Officers. Departmental senior outlay
program officials.

5. Controls. Design features, safety rules, Technical Safety
Requirements, procedures, or other positive measures that
individually or collectively contribute to nuclear explosive
surety.

13. Normal Environment.

a. In Department of Energy operations, the environment in which
nuclear explosive operations and associated activities are
expected to be performed.

16. Nuclear Explosive Area. An area that contains a nuclear
explosive or collocated pit and main charge high-explosive parts.
17. Nuclear Explosive-Like Assembly (NELA). An assembly that is
not a nuclear explosive but represents a nuclear explosive in its
basic configuration (main charge high explosive and pit) and any
subsequent level of assembly up to its final configuration or
represents a weaponized nuclear explosive such as a warhead,
bomb, reentry vehicle, or artillery shell. A NELA does not
contain an arrangement of high-explosive and fissile material
capable of producing a nuclear detonation.

18. Nuclear Explosive Operation. Any activity involving a
nuclear explosive including activities in which main charge high-
explosive parts and pit are collocated.

19. Nuclear Explosive Operation Associated Activities.
Activities directly associated with a specific nuclear explosive
operation in a nuclear explosive area, such as work on a bomb
nose or tail subassembly, even when physically separated from the
bomb’s nuclear explosive subassembly.