In recent years, the pace of world change has dramatically accelerated with the breakup of the former Soviet Union, the increased threat of proliferation (e.g., by Iraq, Iran, North Korea), and other major changes in political, military, and economic conditions. The Department of Energy is responding to changes in world conditions in many ways, while continuing to emphasize nonproliferation as a paramount objective.
One of the most important efforts of the Department of Energy (DOE) is the Secretary's Openness Initiative announced on December 7, 1993. It is designed to gain public trust through greater accountability, informing the public about all of the Department's activities, with particular emphasis on environment, safety, and health matters. The Openness Initiative also directly addresses nonproliferation objectives by identifying and improving protection for truly sensitive information and by promoting increased openness, or "transparency", for nonsensitive parts of nuclear programs, worldwide. As a part of the Openness Initiative, this document provides to the public a description of current Department of Energy policy concerning the classification of information for national security reasons. (Appendix 1, "Glossary", provides definitions of "national security" and other terms in common use to describe DOE classification issues.)
Nuclear weapons have played an overwhelming role in world affairs since their development in 1945. Most people would agree that it would be unwise to help potential proliferants, adversaries, or terrorists by providing them with nuclear weapons, special nuclear materials, military reactors, or information that significantly assists in their acquisition. These concerns have resulted in restrictions embodied in a system of national laws and regulations and in treaties and other international commitments.
Making such information available, whether generally or to particular nations, requires the most serious and responsible consideration of the national interest.
These considerations are clearly reflected in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 and were continued in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA). The AEA defines the controls to be placed on defense nuclear information, and is the basis of the current Department of Energy classification system (see Appendix 2). Protection of sensitive information concerning nuclear weapons and other military applications of nuclear energy (called "Restricted Data") is strictly mandated by the AEA. While dissemination of scientific and technical information to provide the free interchange of ideas and criticism essential to public understanding and scientific and industrial progress is strongly encouraged, it must, by law, always be subordinate to assuring the common defense and security. Restricted Data must be continually reviewed for declassification whenever it is clearly determined that it can be published without "undue risk to the common defense and security."
Over the years, the Department of Energy has developed a system to identify what specific information in its areas of responsibility can be released without undue risk, i.e., "declassified." Within the Department, the Office of Declassification has the responsibility of providing expert technical and policy advice to help the Director, Office of Security Affairs, determine whether declassification is appropriate. The Director makes this decision based on an evaluation of the nature and the degree of risk to national security of dissemination and any possible countervailing benefits to other national goals.
During World War II, nearly everything about military or civil applications of nuclear energy was highly classified. Shortly after the war, most basic scientific and technical information, (including that concerning environment, safety, and health matters) and the most rudimentary general concepts of nuclear weapons and nuclear reactors were declassified.
The intervening years have seen a large number of declassifications, some of them involving whole areas, like the declassification of the complete technology of the civil nuclear fuel cycle, but most of them were far less sweeping. The reasons for these declassifications have included technical, political, and economic changes affecting both risks and benefits. Technology is independently developed or made available and world conditions change. An increasing volume of relevant information is being openly published. (Indeed, many people say classification is misguided, "its all out!" Such statements generally require very careful evaluation of what, exactly, is credibly "out.") Although a determined would-be proliferant might be able to develop a nuclear weapons capability independently, continued classification can delay proliferation and make it more costly and less certain. Delay also makes detection more likely, and gives time for countermeasures.
Today, relatively little information remains Restricted Data except sensitive technical details of nuclear weapons, naval reactors, and production of fissile materials. This information is described in a hierarchy of classification guides. Most of these guides are necessarily classified, since they must identify precisely what information needs to be protected.
This document is intended to describe, in as much detail as possible in a public document, what information is still classified and what is not. It should be clearly noted that there are a number of instances where it is not possible to be sufficiently precise without revealing significant sensitive information.
Further, it should be noted that DOE classification policy, and thus this guideline, is likely to change significantly over the next year. An ongoing comprehensive Fundamental Review of DOE information is being carried out to determine what information must continue to be protected for national security reasons in today's changed world. The information that no longer needs protection will be promptly declassified and made available to the public.
The primary purpose of this document is to provide the public with an unclassified overview of classification policy for the Department of Energy's (DOE's) programs.
These Guidelines summarize basic Department of Energy policy for the classification and declassification of nuclear energy information. Such classified nuclear energy information is designated as either Restricted Data (RD) or Formerly Restricted Data (FRD) in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA). Information Control provisions of the AEA are given in Appendix 2. Restricted Data (RD) is defined in section 11y of the AEA:
Formerly Restricted Data (FRD) is not defined by name in the AEA, but is described in section 142.d as information covered by the definition of Restricted Data that relates primarily to the military utilization of nuclear weapons. FRD does not mean declassified information that was once RD.
These Public Guidelines identify: (1) the types of Department of Energy information which must remain classified for reasons of national security; and (2) the information which falls within areas that the DOE (or any of its predecessor agencies) has declassified. Information concerning the procedural aspects of classification is contained in DOE Order 5650.2B, "Identification of Classified Information." A general description of the historical and current DOE classification program is given in the "Classification Policy Study," Office of Declassification, U.S. Department of Energy (July 1992). For additional references, see Appendix 3, "Bibliography".
This document also outlines DOE policy for the classification and declassification of safeguards and security information for nuclear materials and facilities and for arms control information. Such information is classified because it has been determined by DOE to require protection as National Security Information (NSI) in accordance with Executive Order (EO) 12356, which defines classification of information other than RD/FRD, i.e., non-nuclear military, foreign relations, and intelligence information. Intelligence information is not covered in this document since classification policy in this area is the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence and not DOE.
The principle underlying classification and declassification policy for nuclear energy information is to satisfy both of the two , sometimes contradictory, objectives of assuring the common defense and security, and promoting the dissemination of scientific and technical information relating to the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. However, the Atomic Energy Act states that the paramount objective of protecting the common defense and security must be observed. A determination on the declassification of information can proceed only after a careful evaluation of the degree of risk to the common defense and security compared to the benefits to other national objectives of the proposed action. It is particularly important to avoid revealing information that may contribute to the nuclear capabilities of potential adversaries, proliferants, or terrorists. In such a risk-benefit analysis, the overall credibility of the DOE classification program itself is one of the factors which must be considered, since it directly affects the ability to protect classified information.
DOE classification policy is implemented through a hierarchy of classification guides, including an overall Policy Guide, an extensive series of Program Guides, and approximately 800 Local Guides. The Policy Guide describes overall DOE classification policy. Program Guides indicate the classification of information within specific programs. Based on these Program Guides, Local Guides are developed to provide more detailed site-specific classification guidance. Note that most classification guides contain sensitive information and so are not publicly available. In addition, certain guides are developed jointly with the Department of Defense or other Government agencies and, in some cases, with foreign governments to provide consistent classification policies on an interagency and international basis.
Unauthorized public disclosure of classified information is not a basis for automatically declassifying the information, nor is public disclosure necessarily a basis for making the information unclassifiable. The criterion continues to be an official decision that the information may be published without undue risk to national security.
Authoritative comments confirming or denying statements that appear in the open literature on classified subjects tend to enhance the credibility of otherwise possibly speculative information and could, in effect, divulge classified information. Consequently, cleared personnel are prohibited from confirmation, denial, or expansion upon public statements covering classified information.
RD, FRD, and NSI may be transmitted only to persons having both an appropriate clearance and a valid "need-to-know" that specific information in performing their duties. RD or FRD may be transmitted to a foreign nation or a regional defense organization only if there is a formal agreement for cooperation between the receiving party and the U.S., entered into in accordance with the provisions of section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
It should be noted that information officially determined to be unclassified is not automatically approved for release to the public. Unclassified information may still be subject to a number of limitations on its distribution. Examples include proprietary information, export controlled information (ECI), patent review clearance, unclassified Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information (NNPI), Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (UCNI), and other exemptions under the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act (Official Use Only, or OUO). An UCNI General Guideline and an extensive set of Topical Guidelines have been developed to define UCNI control policy. Review of all applicable regulations and orders is necessary prior to the release of unclassified information.
In reviewing information for possible declassification, the following considerations are typical of those which must be evaluated in determining whether publication would present "undue risk to the common defense and security":
1. The benefit to be realized by the U.S. program from the declassification action, including any significant technology commercialization potential.
2. The extent to which the information would assist in the development of a nuclear weapon capability in nonnuclear weapon states or in improvements to the weapons in a nuclear weapon state.
3. The cost in terms of time and money in acquiring the information.
4. The extent to which the information would assist in the production of Special Nuclear Material (if applicable).
5. The published state of the art for the information in both the U.S. and in other countries.
6. The cost to the U.S. program by the continued classification of the information
7. Any detrimental (or beneficial) effect release of the information might have on U.S. foreign relations, arms control negotiations, or treaty obligations.
8. Any other national security impact or significance (e.g., the extent to which the information would assist an adversary nation to assess or counter the U.S. capabilities and limitations).
9. Any impact on the credibility of the DOE classification program by the continued classification of the information.
This document has been divided into separate columns for unclassified and classified information. The left column provides a general description of information which has been declassified in a given subject area, while the right denotes that which remains classified. In order to achieve an overall view of the classification policy in a given subject area, it is important that the entire section be read. This document is necessarily general in nature. However, an effort has been made to include as much detail as possible in order to provide the public with the basis for an understanding of the general classification policy in each subject area.
Whenever possible, it is in the interest of scientific and industrial progress to conduct research and development work in basic science, such as chemistry, physics, mathematics, and the properties of materials, on an unclassified basis. However, some aspects of applied research and development in the fields of isotope separation, nuclear explosive devices, and classified nuclear reactors must remain classified to the extent that they could provide substantial assistance to potential adversaries, proliferants, or terrorists.
1a. Unclassified. General basic physics, mathematics, chemistry, metallurgy, and engineering
1b. Classified. Special manufacturing techniques of particular importance to classified programs or devices.
2a. Unclassified. Preparation, properties, or uses of metals, alloys, ceramics, cermets, or other materials, when not specifically connected to weapons or other classified programs. (But see topic 1b and 2b).
2b. Classified. Materials selection, composition, or properties revealing information of importance to classified programs or devices.
3a. Unclassified. Properties of uranium and plutonium, their alloys and compounds, except for certain weapons-specific alloys.
3b. Classified. Certain weapons-specific alloys and their properties.
4a. Unclassified. The nonnuclear material properties of elements. (But see topic 4b.)
4b. Classified. Information on nonnuclear material properties of elements that are of special importance to weapon design, e.g., equations of state and opacities. (Also see Section 3.4.A).
5a. Unclassified. Nuclear properties of isotopes: cross sections, reaction rates, etc.
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