
This chapter primarily provides UCNI guideline topics for design and design-related operational information concerning sensitive facilities and equipment. In addition, guidance is provided at the end of this section concerning facility and site studies and reports such as safety analysis reports (SARs), environmental impact statements (EISs), probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs), or occurrence reports (ORs). Information concerning site, facility, or security area physical security measures and physical security system design is covered in Chapter 1. This chapter concerns those aspects of design information that would assist in selecting a specific target (or targets) at a site, facility, or security area in an attempt at theft, diversion, or sabotage (including dispersal of radioactive or other hazardous material, damage/destruction of equipment, injury to personnel or the public, or any other act which would adversely affect safe and efficient operation or safe shutdown under normal or abnormal conditions). It includes information that could assist an adversary in analyzing and selecting entry and egress routes within a sensitive facility or security area (e.g., internal layout of a building) or in executing an attack.
Unclassified information concerning site, facility, or security area layout which is observable from uncontrolled areas, such as site or facility plans showing locations of roads, buildings, exterior guard stations, above-ground routing of power or other lines, drainage ditches, general external features of buildings, building numbers, etc., is NOT UCNI.
Unclassified information concerning facility design for a facility that is not a sensitive facility is NOT UCNI.
Unclassified information concerning a sensitive site, facility, or security area that would not significantly assist a malefactor in selecting a target or in planning and executing an attack is NOT UCNI. This includes design information concerning nonsensitive areas of a building such as the design of change rooms or restrooms, offices, or lunch or cafeteria areas, and design information concerning utilities for such areas.
Except where information is determined to be UCNI by topics in TG-FSSS-1, other topical guidelines, or this guideline, information determined to be unclassified in Chapter 4 of CG-SS-2 (July 1990) is NOT UCNI.
NOTE: Except as indicated below, internal guidelines may specify which nuclear material, radioactive material, or hazardous process material storage areas are UCNI and which are NOT UCNI.

Information pertaining to security measures for atomic energy defense-related facilities that reveals deficiencies or vulnerabilities can significantly assist malefactors in selecting a target and planning and executing a malevolent act. Information that reveals either the existence of a vulnerability or details concerning a vulnerability is classified. See CG-SS-2, Chapter 6.
It is particularly important to note that CG-SS-2 points out that when terms other than vulnerability, such as inadequacy or deficiency, are used synonymously with the term vulnerability as defined in CG-SS-2, the determination that the information is classified or unclassified must conform to the classification guidance topics concerning "vulnerabilities." In no case shall this guideline be used to determine information is UCNI (or unclassified and NOT UCNI) when classification of information concerning security vulnerabilities is appropriate. In this guideline, the term "deficiency" is not used synonymously with "vulnerability" as used in CG-SS-2.
Although not as sensitive as classified information concerning a vulnerability, certain unclassified information concerning deficiencies could significantly assist a potential malefactor. Such unclassified information is UCNI as specified in this chapter.

Except where information is determined to be UCNI by topics in TG-FSSS-1, other topical guidelines, or this guideline, information determined to be unclassified by topics in Chapter 6 of CG-SS-2 (July 1990) is NOT UCNI.
310 Unclassified information revealing details of a deficiency
(as defined in this guideline) concerning security measures
for a specified sensitive site, facility, or security area
(Basis: FSSS #51; ID No.: FSR #23) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . UCNI
320 Unclassified information revealing details of minor discrepancies or inadequacies of no substantial impact (e.g., the fact that equipment calibration is overdue, that security-related personnel information is not current, that erosion at a fence is minor, etc.) . . . . . . NOT UCNI

This chapter addresses information concerning control and accountability of nuclear materials related to atomic energy defense programs facilities, or activities. In addition to guidance concerning unclassified information related to SNM, guidance is also included concerning other nuclear material (i.e., tritium, thorium, lithium-6, etc.). DOE Order 5633.3A defines safeguard category quantities of nuclear materials. Information extracted from this order concerning nuclear material safeguard categories also appears in CG-SS-2 and the UCNI General Guideline document, GG-3.
Chapter 7 of CG-SS-2 contains guidance concerning control and accountability of SNM. Other guides such as the Joint DOE/DOD Topical Classification Guide, Materials for the Nuclear Weapon Complex, TCG-WM-1; program guides; and local guides also contain classification guidance concerning materials, including the association of certain materials with a classified program.
Unclassified information concerning material control and accountability that is not related to atomic energy defense programs activities or facilities is exempt from control as UCNI. Also, general or non substantive information that does concern atomic energy defense programs activities or facilities, but that would not assist a malefactor (such as revealing a minor administrative inadequacy), is NOT UCNI.

Except where information is determined to be UCNI by topics in TG-FSSS-1, other topical guidelines, or this guideline, information determined by topics in Chapter 7 of CG-SS-2 (July 1990) to be unclassified is NOT UCNI.

The malevolent dispersal of radioactive material could have a significant adverse effect on the common defense and security as an act of sabotage that could impact mission accomplishment and/or have a significant adverse impact on the health and safety of the public, depending on specifics of the dispersion.
Certain information concerning this subject is classified to increase the effort an adversary would need to expend in acquiring information for planning and executing an act of sabotage involving a malevolent dispersal of radioactive material. This is intended to reduce the likelihood or consequences of a successful dispersion attempt. Detailed, specific information which, if not controlled, would significantly enhance the probability of a highly significant malevolent dispersal with national security implications is classified. Local classification guides and CG-SS-2, Chapter 10, provide classification guidance.
Information that, if classified, would interfere with the safe operation of a facility, that cannot be protected as classified, or that is impractical to classify is unclassified. However, certain items of this unclassified information may require protection as UCNI because they could significantly assist a malefactor. This includes information concerning facility and equipment design and design-related operational information as described in Chapter 2 of this guideline and information concerning material control and accountability described in Chapter 4.
Unclassified information related to safety or environmental effects not revealing sensitive facility or security-related information is not controlled as UCNI, because such information does not qualify as UCNI (does not meet the adverse effect test and also is exempt from control by DOE Order 5650.3A). Safety analysis reports, environmental impact statements, and similar studies containing only generic unclassified information and maximum credible release information generally will not require protection as UCNI, but such studies should be reviewed by a Reviewing Official.

Except where information is determined to be UCNI by topics in TG-FSSS-1, other topical guidelines, or this guideline, information determined by topics in Chapter 10 of CG-SS-2 (July 1990) to be unclassified is NOT UCNI.

Unclassified information concerning the identity, quantity, radioactivity, physical form, and other characteristics, per se, of nuclear and hazardous materials emitted at DOE facilities is usually not controlled as UCNI. Nor are the pathways, in a very general sense, through which these materials reach the environment considered to be UCNI.
However, what can be UCNI are official summaries, statements, evaluations, assessments, and other documentation in which information that meets the adverse effect test (see Section B.2, page 6) concerning handling, treatment, processing, and dispersal of these materials or detailed descriptions of pathways is clearly and gratuitously revealed.
Information concerning DOE facilities identified in this chapter as UCNI must not be included in documentation intended for unrestricted public release. Such information is usually not germane and has little or no influence on conclusions reached in technical assessments of nuclear and hazardous material emissions at the facility.

Except where information is determined to be UCNI by topics in TG-FSSS-1, other topical guidelines, or this guideline, information determined by topics in CG-SS-2 (July 1990) to be unclassified is NOT UCNI.
NOTE: See Chapters 1 through 5 and TG-FSSS-1 for issues not covered specifically by the following topics.

Unclassified information concerning methods, objectives, schedules, identity and disposition of contaminants and/or facility equipment, or results of the decontamination and/or decommissioning of DOE facilities, i.e., production facilities, research reactors, RDT&E facilities, or storage sites is not UCNI.
However, what can be UCNI are official summaries, statements, evaluations, assessments, and other documentation in which information that meets the adverse effect test (see Section B.2, page 6) concerning decontamination and/or decommissioning activities is clearly and gratuitously revealed.
Information concerning DOE facilities identified in this chapter as UCNI must not be included in documentation intended for unrestricted public release. Such information is usually not germane and has little or no influence on conclusions reached in technical assessments of decontamination and decommissioning activities at the facility.

Except where information is determined to be UCNI by topics in TG-FSSS-1 or this guideline, information determined by topics in CG-SS-2 (July 1990) to be unclassified is NOT UCNI.
NOTE: See Chapters 1 through 5 and TG-FSSS-1 for issues not covered specifically by the following topics.

Unclassified information concerning clean-up methods, objectives, schedules, identity and disposition of contaminants or contaminated equipment, containment techniques, and results of the restoration process at a DOE facility as well as a complete description of waste streams and the ultimate neutralization and/or containment of wastes at a DOE facility or waste disposal site is not UCNI.
However, what can be UCNI are official summaries, statements, evaluations, assessments, and other documentation in which information that meets the adverse effect test (see Section B.2) concerning environmental restoration and waste management activities at DOE facilities is clearly and gratuitously revealed.
Information concerning DOE facilities identified in this chapter as UCNI must not be included in documentation intended for unrestricted public release. Such information is usually not germane and has little or no influence on conclusions reached in technical assessments of environmental restoration or waste management activities at a DOE facility or disposal site.

Except where information is determined to be UCNI by topics in TG-FSSS-1 or this guideline, information determined by topics in CG-SS-2 (July 1990) to be unclassified is NOT UCNI.
NOTE: See Chapters 1 through 5 and TG-FSSS-1 for issues not covered specifically by the following topics.

Certain unclassified information (See B.2, page 6) expected to have a significant adverse effect on the health and safety of the public or the common defense and security by significantly increasing the likelihood of the illegal production of nuclear weapons is UCNI. The "illegal production" in this sense is not only production by criminals or sub-national groups but includes production by non-nuclear-weapon states whether or not they are signers of Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which entered into force March 5, 1970.
Classified proliferation information is covered in CG-NP-3, Classification Guide for Non-Proliferation of Weapons Information [to be published] and UCNI concerning weapons is covered in a broad sense in TG-NNP-1, Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information Topical Guideline for Nuclear Non-Proliferation [to be published].
DOE work in the following technologies is of particular interest to a proliferator: fissile materials enrichment, nuclear materials processing, nuclear-related materials, fission reactors, nuclear explosives, and fusion.
This chapter provides UCNI guideline topics specifically for information that may be encountered in DOE facility and site reviews and, if revealed, could be of assistance to a proliferator for the illegal production of nuclear weapons.


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The source or basis of the following definitions as used in this guideline is indicated in parentheses after the defined term. Refer to the list of references in Introduction section H for the full citation. If no source or basis is indicated, the definition given is for the purpose of this guideline only.
B. Controlled Area. (Safeguards and Security Definitions Guide) Any area to which entry is subject to restrictions or control for security reasons.
C. Controlling Official. (DOE Order 5650.3A) An individual who may make a determination that specific Government information is, is not, or is no longer UCNI under the procedures in DOE Order 5650.3A.
D. Deficiency. (TG-FSSS-1) A weakness, discrepancy, problem, or inadequacy in a system which, if exploited by an adversary, would reasonably be expected to result in a significant adverse effect on the health and safety of the public or to significantly increase the probability of an attack being attempted. Information concerning a deficiency would not, by itself, be reasonably expected to result in a successful attack causing damage to the national security if exploited by an adversary. (See Vulnerability)
E. Denying Official. (DOE Order 5650.3A) An individual who denies under the procedures in DOE 5650.3A any request made under statute (e.g., the FOIA) or Executive order for all or any portion of a document or material containing UCNI.
F. Facility. (Safeguards and Security Definitions Guide) An educational institution, manufacturing plant, laboratory, office building, or complex of buildings located on the same site that is operated and protected as one unit by the Department or its contractor(s).
G. Fixed-Site Safeguards and Security. The security of an established, well- defined site involved in activities concerning atomic energy defense programs. This includes protection of the site and its auxiliary external components, its internal components, and material in storage or in transit within its boundaries.
H. Government Information. (DOE Order 5650.3A) Any information that is (1) owned by, (2) produced by or for, or (3) otherwise controlled by the U.S. Government.
I. Information. (DOE Order 5650.3A) Any fact or concept regardless of the physical form or characteristics of the medium on or in which it is recorded, contained, or revealed.
J. Nuclear Material. (DOE Order 5650.3A) Special nuclear material, by- product material, and source material as defined in the Atomic Energy Act, and other materials used in the production, testing, utilization, or assembly of nuclear weapons or components of nuclear weapons that are determined to be nuclear materials by the Secretary of Energy pursuant to 10 CFR Part 1017.
K. Practical Quantity. (Reserved. See TG-PUP-1)
L. Protected Area. (Safeguards and Security Definitions Guide) A type of security area defined by physical barriers (i.e., walls or fences) used to contain a material access area (Category I nuclear materials) and to protect Category II nuclear materials and vital areas.
M. Restricted Data. (Atomic Energy Act) All data concerning (1) design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; (2) the production of SNM; or (3) the use of SNM in the production of energy, but not including data declassified or removed from the Restricted Data category pursuant to section 142 of the Atomic Energy Act.
N. Reviewing Official. (DOE Order 5650.3A) An individual who may make a determination under the procedures in DOE 5650.3A that a document or material contains, does not contain, or no longer contains UCNI.
O. Security Area. (Safeguards and Security Definitions Guide) A physical space which has been designated as an area containing safeguards and security interests which dictate the need for the imposition of physical protection measures, as a minimum entailing control of access to and from the designated area, in order to protect DOE interests. The types of security areas used within DOE include: Property Protection Areas, Limited Areas, Exclusion Areas, Protected Areas, Material Access Areas, and functionally specialized security areas, such as Special (SCIFs) Compartmented Information Facility, Classified Computer Facilities and Secure Communications Centers. Safeguards and Security measures applicable to each type of security area are tailored to the protection needs of the security interests contained therein.
P. Sensitive Facility. (The General Guideline document, GG-3) A facility which performs a sensitive function.
Q. Sensitive Function. (The General Guideline document, GG-3) A function in support of atomic energy defense programs whose disruption could reasonably be expected to have a significant adverse effect on the health and safety of the public or the common defense and security.
R. Significant Dispersal of Radioactive Material. A dispersal/release of less than the 10 CFR 100 criteria, but more than 5 percent of the criteria.
S. Site. (Safeguards and Security Definitions Guide) A geographical area where one or more facilities are located.
T. Special Nuclear Material. (Safeguards and Security Definitions Guide) Plutonium, uranium-233, or uranium enriched in the isotope 235, and any other material which, pursuant to the provisions of Section 51 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, has been determined to be special nuclear material, but which does not include source material; or it also includes any material artificially enriched by any of the foregoing, not including source material.
U. Specific Location. A location described in sufficient detail to allow a person to determine readily the precise area or point indicated. The term may mean a room when describing such information as locations of equipment or for material storage, or a cabinet or position in an equipment rack for small items such as electrical relays, etc.
V. Unauthorized Access. For UCNI, acquisition of UCNI by a person not authorized access to the UCNI.
W. Uncontrolled Area. An area in which general members of the public have unrestricted access.
X. Vulnerability. (Safeguards and Security Definitions Guide) An exploitable capability or an exploitable security weakness or deficiency at a facility of national security interest. Exploitable capabilities or weaknesses are those inherent in the design (or layout) of the facility and its protection, or those existing because of the failure to meet (or maintain) prescribed safeguards and security standards when evaluated against DOE requirements for defined threats. (NOTE: CG-SS-2 goes on to add to the definition of vulnerability that "If the vulnerability were detected and exploited by an adversary, then it would reasonably be expected to result in a successful attack causing damage to the national security.")


CCTV Closed Circuit Television
DOE Department of Energy
DOD Department of Defense
DOT Department of Transportation
EA Environmental Assessment
EIS Environmental Impact Statement
EOC Emergency Operations Center
ES&H Environment, Safety, and Health
FOIA Freedom of Information Act
FSSS Fixed-Site Safeguards and Security
GG UCNI General Guideline
NEST Nuclear Emergency Search Team
OR Occurrence Report
OUO Official Use Only
PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment
RD Restricted Data
RDD Radiation Dispersal Device
SA-10 Director, Office of Safeguards and Security, DOE
Headquarters
SA-20 Director, Office of Classification, DOE Headquarters
SAR Safety Analysis Report
SNM Special Nuclear Material
TSS Transportation Safeguards System
UCNI Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
WIPP Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
Table of
Contents