Operations security (OPSEC) for the DOE is described in CG-SS-2 as "a countermeasures program designed to disrupt or defeat the ability of foreign intelligence or other adversaries to exploit sensitive departmental activities or information and to secure against inadvertent release of such information outside established control procedures."
Some unclassified information contained in OPSEC documentation or resulting from OPSEC activities could be UCNI. See the other chapters in this guideline (e.g., Chapters 2 and 6)
Information determined to be unclassified by topics in Chapter 8 of CG-SS-2 (7/90) concerning OPSEC is NOT UCNI.
Some unclassified information revealed by activities or contained in documents concerning the subject matter of this chapter could be UCNI. See the other chapters of this guideline as appropriate (e.g., Chapters 2 and 6).
Except as may be authorized by an approved internal guideline, information determined by topics in Chapter 9 of CG-SS-2 (7/90) to be unclassified is NOT UCNI.
The malevolent dispersal of radioactive material could have a significant adverse effect on the common defense and security as an act of sabotage that could impact mission accomplishment and/or have a significant adverse impact on the health and safety of the public, depending on specifics of the dispersion.
Certain information concerning this subject is classified to increase the effort an adversary would need to expend to acquire information to plan and execute an act of sabotage involving a malevolent dispersal of radioactive material. This hopefully will reduce the likelihood or consequences of a successful dispersion attempt. Detailed, specific information which, if not controlled, would significantly enhance the probability of a highly significant malevolent dispersal with national security implications is classified. Local classification guides and CG-SS-2, Chapter 10, provide classification guidance.
Information that, if classified, would interfere with the safe operation of a facility, that cannot be protected as classified, or that is impractical to classify is unclassified. However, certain items of this unclassified information may require protection as UCNI because they could significantly assist a malefactor. This includes information concerning facility and equipment design and design-related operational information as described in Chapter 4 of this guideline and information concerning material control and accountability described in Chapter 7.
Unclassified information related to safety or environmental effects not revealing sensitive facility or security-related information is not controlled as UCNI, because such information does not qualify as UCNI (does not meet the adverse effect test and also is exempt from control by DOE Order 5650.3A). Safety analysis reports, environmental impact statements, and similar studies containing only generic unclassified information and maximum credible release information generally will not require protection as containing UCNI, but such studies should be reviewed by a Reviewing Official.
Except where information is determined to be UCNI by topics in this guideline, information determined by topics in Chapter 10 of CG-SS-2 (7/90) to be unclassified is NOT UCNI.
Information concerning this chapter determined by topics in Chapter 11 of CG-SS-2 (7/90) to be unclassified is NOT UCNI.
Information concerning this chapter determined by topics in Chapter 12 of CG-SS-2 (7/90) to be unclassified is NOT UCNI.
Compromise or suspicion of compromise of classified information or documents (i.e., missing/unaccounted for) is addressed by the classification guidance in CG-SS-2, Chapter 13.
This section concerns the actual or suspected unauthorized access to UCNI. The fact that documents or material which are, or will be, widely and irretrievably disseminated in the public domain contain information that would be controlled as UCNI if it were under Government control is itself UCNI (GG #8, the UCNI "NO COMMENT" policy).
The guideline topics in this section basically reflect GG #8 in that acquisition of UCNI by a person not authorized access to the UCNI must be assumed to lead to possible widespread dissemination in the public domain.
Except where information is determined to be UCNI by topics in this guideline, information determined by topics in Chapter 13 of CG-SS-2 (7/90) to be unclassified is NOT UCNI.
1310 That specified UCNI has been, or may have been, inadvertently disclosed to persons not authorized access to the UCNI (Basis: GG #8; ID No.: FSSS-59) . . . UCNI
1311 When or if it is reasonably certain that no unauthorized access has occurred . . . NO LONGER UCNI
1320 The fact that specified UCNI has been, or is to be, widely disseminated in an uncontrolled manner that would be controlled as UCNI if under Government control, or information which further identifies or points to a document containing the UCNI (Basis: GG #8; ID No.: FSSS-60) . . . UCNI
1330 The fact that an unauthorized dissemination of UCNI is under review . . . NOT UCNI
1340 The fact of, or details concerning, the possible violation of rules or procedures concerning the storage and protection of UCNI, marking of documents or material, etc., provided there is no significant indication of an actual unauthorized dissemination . . . NOT UCNI
This chapter addresses the information contained in notices concerning documents or material that are determined to contain UCNI. See CG-SS-2, Chapter 14, for guidance concerning document classification change notices.
Except where information is determined to be UCNI by topics in this guideline, information determined by topics in Chapter 14 of CG-SS-2 (7/90) to be unclassified is NOT UCNI.
1410 Information in notices indicating that a specified document or material not marked as containing (or may contain) UCNI is determined to contain UCNI (Basis: GG #8; ID No.: FSSS-61) . . . UCNI
NOTE: If reasonably certain that no unauthorized access has occurred, the information in the notice is NO LONGER UCNI after sufficient time has elapsed to notify all holders of the document and allow for proper marking, normally 90 days.
1420 Information in notices that a document marked "May Contain UCNI" does not contain UCNI, or that a document marked as containing UCNI has been determined to not contain UCNI or is NO LONGER UCNI . . . NOT UCNI
Knowledge of techniques used and results achieved in handling and analyzing threat messages can assist malefactors in achieving their goal by helping to make threat messages more credible.
Information concerning evaluation methods of assessing nuclear threat messages is, in general, classified. Guidance on classification of threat messages is found in CG-SS-2, Chapter 15, and guidance documents such as the classification guide and topical UCNI guideline for Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) activities, and local guides.
Information related to threat messages that do not involve the threat of release of nuclear energy is generally, but not always, unclassified. In addition, certain other information concerning threat messages is unclassified.
Except where information is determined to be UCNI by topics in this guideline, information determined by topics in Chapter 15 of CG-SS-2 (7/90) to be unclassified is NOT UCNI.
1510 Nonnuclear threat messages
1511 Unclassified information about a nonnuclear threat message . . . NOT UCNI
NOTE: In situations involving the NEST, the NEST guidance applies. Also, if a request is made by a directly affected organization (e.g., a municipality) that no comment be made, such requests will be honored.
1520 Nuclear threat messages
1521 Fact that a nuclear threat message has been received, if not received by the DOE or another cleared agency . . . NOT UCNI
NOTE: In situations involving the NEST, the NEST guidance applies. A request by the directly affected organization (e.g., a municipality) that the Federal Government make no comment on the existence of the threat message will be honored.
1522 Unclassified text of the nuclear threat message . . . See NOTE
NOTE: In situations involving the NEST, the NEST guidance applies. Determine whether unclassified information in the threat message is UCNI or NOT UCNI based on the information revealed.
Information concerning technical surveillance countermeasures is generally classified as indicated in CG-SS-2. This guide also specifies that all unclassified information in this area is Official Use Only (OUO) subject to exemption 2 of the Freedom of Information Act. This is because the information in this area is under the cognizance of another Government agency.
UCNI does not apply to this subject area. All information concerning this chapter determined by topics in Chapter 16 of CG-SS-2 (7/90) to be unclassified is NOT UCNI.
The source or basis of the following definitions as used in this guideline is indicated in parentheses after the defined term. Refer to the list of references in Introduction section H for the full citation. If no source or basis is indicated, the definition is the definition for the defined term for the purpose of this guideline.
B. Controlled Area. (Safeguards and Security Definitions Guide) Any area to which entry is subject to restrictions or control for security reasons.
C. Controlling Official. (DOE 5650.3A) An individual who may make a determination that specific Government information is, is not, or is no longer UCNI under the procedures in DOE 5650.3A.
D. Deficiency. A weakness, discrepancy, problem, or inadequacy in a system which, if exploited by an adversary, would reasonably be expected to result in a significant adverse effect on the health and safety of the public or to significantly increase the probability of an attack being attempted. Information concerning a deficiency would not, by itself, be reasonably expected to result in a successful attack causing damage to the national security if exploited by an adversary. (See Vulnerability)
E. Denying Official. (DOE 5650.3A) An individual who denies under the procedures in DOE 5650.3A any request made under statute (e.g., the Freedom of Information Act) or Executive order for all or any portion of a document or material containing UCNI.
F. Facility. (Safeguards and Security Definitions Guide) An educational institution, manufacturing plant, laboratory, office building, or complex of buildings located on the same site that is operated and protected as one unit by the Department or its contractor(s).
G. Fixed-Site Safeguards and Security. The security of an established, well- defined site involved in activities concerning atomic energy defense programs. This includes protection of the site and its auxiliary external components, its internal components, and material in storage or in transit within its boundaries.
H. Government Information. (DOE 5650.3A) Any information that is (1) owned by, (2) produced by or for, or (3) otherwise controlled by the U.S. Government.
I. Information. (DOE 5650.3A) Any fact or concept regardless of the physical form or characteristics of the medium on or in which it is recorded, contained, or revealed.
J. Nuclear Material. (DOE 5650.3A) Special nuclear material, by-product material, and source material as defined in the Atomic Energy Act, and other materials used in the production, testing, utilization, or assembly of nuclear weapons or components of nuclear weapons that are determined to be nuclear materials by the Secretary of Energy pursuant to 10 CFR Part 1017.
K. Protected Area. (Safeguards and Security Definitions Guide) A type of security area defined by physical barriers (i.e., walls or fences) used to contain a material access area (Category I nuclear materials) and to protect Category II nuclear materials and vital areas.
L. Restricted Data. (Atomic Energy Act) All data concerning (1) design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; (2) the production of SNM; or (3) the use of SNM in the production of energy, but not including data declassified or removed from the Restricted Data category pursuant to section 142 of the Atomic Energy Act.
M. Reviewing Official. (DOE 5650.3A) An individual who may make a determination under the procedures in DOE 5650.3A that a document or material contains, does not contain, or no longer contains UCNI.
N. Security Area. (Safeguards and Security Definitions Guide) A physical space which has been designated as an area containing safeguards and security interests which dictate the need for the imposition of physical protection measures, as a minimum entailing control of access to and from the designated area, in order to protect DOE interests. The types of security areas used within DOE include: Property Protection Areas, Limited Areas, Exclusion Areas, Protected Areas, Material Access Areas, and functionally specialized security areas, such as Special (SCIFs) Compartmented Information Facility, Classified Computer Facilities and Secure Communications Centers. Safeguards and Security measures applicable to each type of security area are tailored to the protection needs of the security interests contained therein.
O. Sensitive Facility. (The General Guideline document, GG-2) A facility which performs a sensitive function.
P. Sensitive Function. (The General Guideline document, GG-2) A function in support of atomic energy defense programs whose disruption could reasonably be expected to have a significant adverse effect on the health and safety of the public or the common defense and security.
Q. Significant Dispersal of Radioactive Material. A dispersal/release of less than the 10 CFR 100 criteria, but more than 5 percent of the criteria.
R. Site. (Safeguards and Security Definitions Guide) A geographical area where one or more facilities are located.
S. Specific Location. A location described in sufficient detail to allow a person to determine readily the precise area or point indicated. The term may mean a room when describing such information as locations of equipment or for material storage, or a cabinet or position in an equipment rack for small items such as electrical relays, etc.
T. Unauthorized Access. For UCNI, acquisition of UCNI by a person not authorized access to the UCNI.
U. Uncontrolled Area. An area in which general members of the public have unrestricted access.
V. Vulnerability. (Safeguards and Security Definitions Guide) An exploitable capability or an exploitable security weakness or deficiency at a facility of national security interest. Exploitable capabilities or weaknesses are those inherent in the design (or layout) of the facility and its protection, or those existing because of the failure to meet (or maintain) prescribed safeguards and security standards when evaluated against DOE requirements for defined threats. (NOTE: CG-SS-2 goes on to add to the definition of vulnerability that "If the vulnerability were detected and exploited by an adversary, then it would reasonably be expected to result in a successful attack causing damage to the national security.")
ADP Automated Data Processing CCTV Closed Circuit Television COMSEC Communications Security DOE Department of Energy DOD Department of Defense DOT Department of Transportation DP-1 Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs, DOE Headquarters EIS Environmental Impact Statement EOC Emergency Operations Center FOIA Freedom of Information Act FSSS Fixed-Site Safeguards and Security GG UCNI General Guideline NEST Nuclear Emergency Search Team OPSEC Operations Security OR Occurrence Report OUO Official Use Only PIDAS Perimeter Intrusion Detection and Assessment System PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment RD Restricted Data RDD Radiation Dispersal Device SA-10 Director, Office of Safeguards and Security, DOE Headquarters SA-20 Director, Office of Classification, DOE Headquarters SAR Safety Analysis Report SCIF Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility SNM Special Nuclear Material TSS Transportation Safeguards System UCNI Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information WIPP Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
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