NHB 1620.3C NASA Security Handbook
NASA NHB 1620.3C, (PART 1)
HANDBOOK Effective Date February 1, 1993
_________________________________________________________________
Responsible Office: JL
Subject: NASA Security Handbook (PART 1 of 5)
PREFACE
CHAPTER 1: PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION
100 DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY
Directors of NASA Field Installations and the Associate
Administrator for Management Systems and Facilities are
authorized to grant or deny the following clearances:
1. Grant security clearances to employees under their
jurisdiction subject to the eligibility standards set
forth in this Handbook and based realistically on the
access requirement imposed upon the person concerned.
This authority may be delegated to the Installation
Chief of Security, who, in turn, may delegate this
authority to a personnel security specialist. However,
the personnel security specialist must be a civil
servant who has successfully passed the DOD Personnel
Security Adjudication Course, as well as attended the
Suitability and Security Adjudication course provided
by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). All
personnel security adjudicators will be certified by
the NASA Security Office. Refresher adjudication
training must be taken every 5 years.
2. Deny, suspend or remove an employee's security
clearance (except under 5 U.S.C. 7532). See NMI 1600.2
"NASA Security Program," and NMI 1610.3 "Suspension,
Revocation, and Denial of NASA Personnel Security
Clearances." Refer to Appendices A, B, C and D of this
Handbook for additional information.
101 PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAM OVERSIGHT
1. Internal NASA Administrative Surveys. As part of its
responsibility for the functional management of the
NASA Security Program, the NASA Security Office will
include personnel security matters in its periodic
security surveys of NASA Installations. The purpose of
such surveys is to ensure that the personnel security
program is administered in a manner consistent with
Agency policies and procedures, and associated
implementing regulations and guidelines; that all
personnel security processing is initiated promptly and
completed expeditiously; and that the rights of
individuals are protected, consistent with the interest
of national security.
2. OPM Security Appraisals
a. OPM is responsible for a continuing study or
appraisal of each agency's personnel security
program. The purpose of the appraisal is to
ensure the effectiveness of an agency program by
identifying any deficiencies in the program that
do not conform to or weaken the interest of
national security or the safeguards of individual
rights.
b. OPM may conduct its appraisals at NASA
Headquarters or NASA Field Installations.
Normally the appraisal is completed at NASA
Headquarters and includes a review of a
representative number of personnel security cases
from each Field Installation.
102 REPORTS TO OPM
When OPM forwards reports of investigations or if final
determination is based on results of investigations
received from sources other than OPM, the Installation
Chief of Security must report the action taken on the
case within 90 days after the final investigative
report is received.
CHAPTER 2: NATIONAL SECURITY POSITION SENSITIVITY LEVELS
200 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
All positions that have national security duties must be
designated at national security sensitivity levels to ensure
appropriate screening under Executive Order (EO) 10450 (as
amended). Sensitivity designation is based on an assessment
of the degree of damage that an individual, by virtue of the
occupancy of a position, could cause to the national
security. The required investigation is conducted to
provide a basis for ensuring that employment of the
individual is clearly consistent with the interests of the
national security.
201 SENSITIVITY LEVELS
The three sensitivity levels for designating national
security-related positions and the degree of risk associated
with each are as follows:
Special-Sensitive (SS)* Potential for inestimable
damage to the national
security.
Critical-Sensitive (CS) Potential for exceptionally
grave damage to the national
security.
Noncritical-Sensitive (NCS) Potential for some damage to
serious damage to the national
security.
* NSD63 standardizes the scope and coverage for all
investigations conducted for access to Collateral Top
Secret/National Security Information, and Sensitive
Compartmented Information.
202 GENERAL DEFINITIONS OF SENSITIVITY LEVELS
1. Special-Sensitive. EO 10450. Includes any position
that the head of the Agency determines to be in a level
higher than Critical-Sensitive because of (l) the
greater degree of damage that an individual, by virtue
of occupancy of the position, could cause to the
national security, or (2) investigative requirements
concerning the position under authority other than EO
10450 (e.g., NSD63).
2. Critical-Sensitive. EO 10450. Includes any position
involving access to Top Secret information.
Investigative requirements concerning the position are
covered under NSD63.
3. Noncritical-Sensitive. EO 10450. Includes any
position involving access to Secret or Confidential
information.
203 AUTHORITY TO DESIGNATE POSITIONS IN TERMS OF THEIR NATIONAL
SECURITY SENSITIVITY
1. The Directors of NASA Field Installations and the
Associate Administrator for Management Systems and
Facilities, NASA Headquarters, have been delegated the
authority to designate the sensitivity of positions
under their jurisdiction.
2. The authority to designate positions according to their
national security sensitivity has in turn been
redelegated to the Chiefs of Security at NASA Field
Installations and to the Chief, Headquarters Security
Branch. To ensure that the proper level of personnel
investigation is initiated, coordination must occur
among personnel officials responsible for position
-sensitive determinations, supervisory officials, and
computer security personnel as appropriate. This
collaborative approach is essential if NASA is to
comply with the position-sensitive requirements
outlined in Chapters 731 and 732 of the Federal
Personnel Manual.
204 LIMITATIONS ON THE GRANTING OR RETENTION OF A SECURITY
CLEARANCE
1. EO 12356, "National Security Information," clearly
emphasizes the need to establish procedures to prevent
unnecessary access to classified information, including
procedures that require that a demonstrable need for
access to classified information be established prior
to the initiation of administrative clearance
procedures, and that the number of persons granted
access to classified information be limited to the
minimum consistent with operational and security
requirements. Chapter 732 of the Federal Personnel
Manual also states that when such access is no longer
required, it should be cancelled. Access to national
security information will not be requested or granted
solely to permit entry to, or ease of movement within,
controlled areas when the individual involved has no
need for access to classified information, and such
access may be reasonably prevented. Security clearances
will not be requested or granted based merely on a
speculative need for access. Also, granting for
contingency purposes in excess of actual official
requirements is prohibited. The level at which access
is requested and granted will be limited, and will
relate directly to the level of classified information
to which access is clearly justified in the performance
of official duties. No individual is deemed eligible
for access merely by reason of right or privilege, or
as a result of any particular title, grade, position,
or affiliation.
2. NASA Form 1630 will be used to document the
justification for every personnel security clearance
request. It must be prepared and certified by the
employee's immediate supervisor, reviewed by line
supervision through the Division Director or higher
depending on the applicant's organizational position,
and approved by the cognizant Installation Chief of
Security (ICS). A security clearance recertification
must be conducted whenever a person changes position
or, at a minimum, once every year.
205 EXCEPTION TO PERSONNEL SECURITY INVESTIGATIVE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE GRANTING OF A CONFIDENTIAL OR SECRET SECURITY
CLEARANCE
1. Occasionally a NASA employee may require a Confidential
or Secret clearance on what appears to be an infrequent
occurrence of short duration. This normally includes
attendance at a brief meeting or conference, or a
technician who may need to do some emergency repair
work in a security area for several days. On occasion
a project could, for the purpose of this guidance,
extend up to 60 calendar days.
2. It is also recognized that on occasion NASA travelers
on official business cannot gain access to certain
non-NASA facilities if they do not possess a
Confidential or Secret security clearance even though
they do not require access to classified information.
If the facility's security office at the site to be
visited is unwilling to accept the certification that
the NASA employee is considered trustworthy based on
our records (the employee must have been, at a minimum,
the subject of a completed National Agencies Check and
Inquiries (NACI)), then the required Confidential or
Secret security clearance may be granted for the
duration of the visit to the facility. The type of
visit envisioned should be limited to not more than
three visits per year by the NASA employee. When the
number exceeds three visits per year and/or the
required need for the security clearance continues to
occur into a second year, then a Limited Background
Investigation should be conducted, even though the
security clearance would continue to be
administratively withdrawn after each short-term use.
3. Any granting of a security clearance taken under this
guidance should be documented on NASA FORM 346,
"Notification of Completion of Investigation Under EO
10450," and/or a Certificate of Clearance. This form
should then be placed only in the employee's security
file, not in the Official Personnel File. Normally
only item 16 will reflect this exception to the
Personnel Security Investigative Requirements and any
limitations placed by the Center's Security Officer.
(For example, "This confidential security clearance is
only appropriate for the employee's visit to the XYZ
conference on December 18, 1987.")
206 CODING OF POSITION SENSITIVITY ON PERSONNEL DOCUMENTS
The coding of position sensitivity under this Chapter is
required on Optional Form 8, Position Description, or
equivalent agency form, and optional on Standard Forms 50
and 52 (see FPM Supplement 296-33). Agencies must use the
following codes whenever they code position sensitivity:
Sensitivity Level Code
Special-Sensitive 4
Critical-Sensitive 3
Noncritical-Sensitive 2
Non-Sensitive 1
CHAPTER 3: TYPES AND SCOPE OF PERSONNEL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS
300 GENERAL
NASA utilizes the investigative services of the Office of
Personnel Management (OPM) to satisfy a majority of its
various investigative requirements. OPM conducts a range of
background investigations that are appropriate for positions
at the four position sensitivity levels. The types and
scope of all authorized personnel security investigations
are described below.
301 BASIC INVESTIGATIONS
1. National Agency Check (NAC). The NAC is part of all
other background investigations and consists of
searches of the OPM Security/Suitability Investigations
Index (SII); the Defense Central Index of
Investigations (DCII); the FBI Identification Division,
fingerprint name file and fingerprint chart; and the
FBI Records Management Division files. The SF 85P or
SF 86 is needed. An NAC is not conducted from the SF
85.
2. National Agency Check and Inquiries (NACI). The NACI
consists of an NAC, written inquiries, and record
searches covering specific areas of a subject's
background during the past 5 years. The SF 85 is
needed.
3. Minimum Background Investigation (MBI). The MBI
consists of an NAC, a credit search, written inquiries,
and record searches covering specific areas of a
subject's background during the past 5 years. Telephone
inquiries are made on selected employments, and
whenever initial inquiries are not returned and
information is needed to resolve an issue(s). The
SF 85P or SF 86 is needed.
4. Limited Background Investigation (LBI). The LBI
consists of an NAC, a credit search, personal
interviews of subject and sources, written inquiries of
selected sources covering specific areas of the
subject's background during the past 3 years. The SF
85P or SF 86 is needed.
5. Background Investigation (BI). The BI consists of an
NAC, a credit search, personal interviews of subject
and sources, written inquiries, record searches
covering specific areas of the subject's background
during the past 5 years. The SF 85P or SF 86 is
needed.
6. Single Scope Background Investigation (SBI). The SBI
consists of an NAC, a credit search, personal
interviews of subject and sources, written inquiries,
and record searches covering specific areas of the
subject's background during the past 10 years. The SF
86 is needed.
7. Reimbursable Suitability/Security Investigation (RSI).
The RSI consists of a concentrated investigation to
provide additional information to resolve a suitability
issue(s) from an SF 85 or SF 85P investigation or to
resolve any suitability or security issue(s) from an SF
86 investigation, or from issue(s) developed on an
employee or contractor employee.
8. Periodic Reinvestigation. The Periodic Reinvestigation
consists of an NAC, a credit search, personal interview
of the subject, and selected record searches used for
required updates under FPM Chapter 731 with an SF 85P.
9. Upgrade Investigation (SGI, BGI, AND LGI). The Upgrade
Investigation consists of an NAC, a credit search,
personal interview of the subject and selected sources,
and record searches covering specific areas of the
subject's background since the last background
investigation. The investigation covers the proposed
upward movement in sensitivity arising within 13 to 60
months of the previous investigation's closing date
(e.g., LGI-MBI to LBI, BGI-LBI to BI, and SGI-BI to
SBI). The SF 85P or SF 86 is needed.
10. Update Investigation (SDI, BDI, LDI, AND MDI). The
Update Investigation consists of the same type of case
and the previous investigation (MBI, LBI, BI, and SBI)
arising within 13 to 60 months of the previous
investigation's closing date (e.g., updated LBI-LDI,
updated BI-BDI, and updated SBI-SDI). The SF 85P or SF
86 is needed.
11. Special Agreement Check (SAC). OPM conducts SAC's to
meet Agency needs for a single or combination of record
searches by special agreement.
302 CREDIT SEARCHES
Credit searches are conducted as part of MBI, LBI, BI, SBI,
PRI, Upgrade, and Update cases. When requested, they are
also conducted in conjunction with an NACI, NAC, and an SAC.
303 PERSONAL SUBJECT INTERVIEW
A personal subject interview will be conducted under oath,
affirmation, or unsworn declaration in all LBI, BI, SBI,
PRI, Upgrade, and Update cases, and as requested on other
cases. Additional subject contacts may be made to obtain
additional information or specific releases.
304 INVESTIGATIVE COVERAGE
1. Minimum Coverage. All single scope background
investigations will cover a minimum of 10 years but
will not normally extend back beyond the subject's 18th
birthday unless this is necessary to obtain a minimum
of 2 years' coverage or to resolve issue(s) as
stipulated by National Security Directive 63.
2. Expanded Coverage. All personnel investigations will
be expanded in both scope and coverage as necessary to
resolve a suitability issue.
3. Extra Coverage
a. Extra Coverage may be requested to cover the
following factors:
(1) Managerial/Supervisory attributes should
include the ability to speak and write
clearly and concisely; the scope, quality and
extent of supervisory experience; the ability
to get people to work together effectively;
the ability to cooperate with coworkers,
supervisors, and subordinates; and the
ability to identify possible conflicts of
interests (SF 85P or SF 86 investigations).
Other attributes include resourcefulness,
initiative, adaptability, judgment, and
discretion.
(2) Public control attributes should include the
ability to meet and deal with all types of
people, diplomacy, tact, personal appearance,
and speaking ability (SF 85P or SF 86
investigation).
(3) Law enforcement attributes should include the
ability to react to emergencies and
conditions of stress, maturity, stability,
judgment, and discretion (SF 85P or SF 86
investigation).
(4) Outside the U.S.A. subject and spouse
attributes should include the ability to
represent the Government favorably; ability
to meet with, to deal successfully in, and to
adjust to a foreign environment; and the
absence of any prejudices, defects in
judgment, personal problems, or traits of
weaknesses that might discredit the United
States (SF 85P or SF 86 investigation).
(5) Additional data on citizenship, persons
sharing living quarters, and spouse NAC with
the use of an OFI Form 36 may be required by
agencies requesting SBI for SCI or special
access needs. The SF 86 is required.
(6) Other special factors as appropriate.
b. Extra coverage should be requested only in
response to a specific request by Installation
management or Program Office management in
consultation with the cognizant personnel office.
Any request for special-factor coverage, under
subparagraph a(6) above, for a group or class of
employees must be submitted in writing to the
Chief, NASA Security Office, for appropriate
coordination with OPM.
CHAPTER 4: PERSONNEL SECURITY INVESTIGATIVE REQUIREMENTS
400 GENERAL
Required investigations for National Security Positions are
listed below.
401 SPECIAL-SENSITIVE (SS)
A Single Scope Background Investigation (SBI) will be
completed favorably prior to appointment or reassignment to
an SS position. No exception to the preappointment
investigative requirement is authorized for appointments or
reassignments to SS positions.
402 CRITICAL-SENSITIVE (CS)
An SBI will be completed favorably prior to appointment or
reassignment to a CS position. Exceptions to the
preappointment investigative requirement may only be made as
provided for in paragraph 404 of this Chapter.
403 NONCRITICAL-SENSITIVE (NCS)
1. A Limited Background Investigation (LBI) will be
completed favorably prior to appointment or
reassignment to an NCS position.
2. Exceptions to the preappointment investigative
requirement may be made only as provided for in
paragraph 404 of this Chapter.
404 WAIVER OF PREAPPOINTMENT INVESTIGATION
1. The preappointment investigation requirement may NOT be
waived for positions designated SS.
2. Directors of NASA Field Installations and the Associate
Administrator for Management Systems and Facilities are
authorized to approve an emergency appointment or
reassignment to a CS position prior to the completion
of the required preappointment investigation. The
following checks, while not mandatory, are strongly
recommended before waiving preappointment investigative
requirements for positions at this level. Most checks
for CS positions should require no more than 5 workdays
to complete, and all checks a total of no more than 30
workdays. The certification of the Director of a NASA
Field Installation or the Associate Administrator for
Management Systems and Facilities should reflect what
decision was made regarding completing the checks
before waiver authorization was granted. The
certification should state which of the following
applies: (1) the nature of the emergency that
precluded the opportunity for a 5-day delay, (2) the
agency was not able to obtain all the responses in the
5-day period; or (3) the following sources have been
checked with favorable results:
a. Review of subject's Standard Form 86 by the
Installation Chief of Security (ICS).
b. Subject interview by the ICS or qualified
designee. (If a subject interview is to be
conducted as part of the SBI, the ICS may forego
the subject interview as part of the
preappointment check.)
c. Preplacement National Agency Check. (Office of
Personnel Management (OPM) will conduct without
fingerprints.)
d. Past employment interview with most recent former
employer. (May be satisfied by the telephonic
inquiry of the Installation Chief of Personnel
Officer, or other hiring official.)
e. Check with former employing agency's Security
Office. (For current or former Federal employees
only.)
f. Credit Record Check.
3. Processing Requests for Waivers
a. Senior Management Officials may request approval
of emergency appointment to CS or Sensitive
positions when they determine that the services of
the individual for the period during which the
required investigation is pending are so clearly
essential that the taking of a calculated risk is
acceptable in light of the following:
(1) The fact that the best interest of the
national security may be adversely affected
by information yet to be disclosed by a
complete investigation.
(2) The possibility that otherwise avoidable
management problems and embarrassing
situations may be encountered.
(3) The fact that management is denied advance
information concerning qualifications,
general suitability, and fitness which would
constitute a positive basis for
discriminating judgment in the selection and
placement of personnel.
b. Requests for approval of emergency appointments or
reassignments to sensitive positions will be
submitted in writing to the approving officials.
Such requests must include sufficient information
to provide the approving official with the basis
for an informed judgment as to the need for the
emergency appointment or reassignment, in addition
to the following information:
(1) Name and date of birth of the applicant.
(2) Proposed date of appointment or reassignment.
(3) Functional and organization title of position
and grade level.
(4) The adverse consequences that will ensue if
an emergency appointment or reassignment is
not authorized.
(5) A statement that the preliminary checks
required by paragraph 2 have been completed
with favorable results, or that it was not
possible to obtain all the responses in the
5-day period.
c. The required investigation will be initiated
within 14 days of the appointment or reassignment.
d. Upon notification that the approving official has
authorized an emergency appointment or
reassignment to a sensitive position, NASA Form
346, "Notification of Completion of Investigation
under EO 10450 and/or Certificate of Clearance,"
will be completed in duplicate. The original of
the form will be forwarded to the cognizant
Personnel Office for retention in the appointee's
Official Personnel Folder (OPF).
405 UPDATING REINVESTIGATIONS
1. Incumbents of positions designated SS or CS, shall be
subject to Updating Reinvestigations 5 years after
placement, and at least once after each succeeding 5
years.
2. Incumbents of positions designated NCS are subject to
updating reinvestigation 10 years after placement and
at least once after each succeeding 10 years.
3. NASA employees in positions subject to periodic
reinvestigations are responsible for promptly
furnishing to the ICS, upon his or her request,
appropriate documentation for use in the
reinvestigation.
4. To meet SBI requirements, an SGI must be initiated on
all BI update investigations. SBI update
investigations will still require SDI.
406 ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION BY ALIENS
An immigrant alien will be appointed to a sensitive position
only under exceptional circumstances. No such appointment
will be made until a preappointment background investigation
has been satisfactorily completed and evaluated. An alien,
other than an immigrant alien, generally is not eligible for
security clearance. The Chief, NASA Security Office, may
authorize the granting of a security clearance to a
nonimmigrant alien when it has been determined that the
alien's employment, involving duties which require access to
certain classified information, is necessary.
407 ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED CRYPTOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
A NASA employee who is a U.S. citizen may be authorized
access to classified cryptographic information on the basis
of a security clearance granted in accordance with the
investigative requirements contained in this Handbook.
Prior to authorizing the individual access to classified
cryptographic information, a written determination that an
individual has the need-to-know and meets the eligibility
requirements must be made by an official authorized to grant
security clearances.
CHAPTER 5: ACCEPTANCE OF PRIOR INVESTIGATIONS AND PERSONNEL
SECURITY DETERMINATIONS
500 GENERAL
Previously conducted investigations and previously rendered
personnel security determinations will be accepted by NASA
Installations in accordance with the guidelines set forth
below.
501 PRIOR INVESTIGATIONS CONDUCTED FOR OTHER AGENCIES
1. Normally, prior investigations conducted in connection
with actual or contemplated prior Federal service
(civilian or military), the granting of a clearance by
the Department of Energy (DOE) or the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) for access to Restricted
Data, or the granting of a security clearance under the
Department of Defense (DOD) Industrial Security Program
will be accepted as meeting the investigative
requirements prescribed herein providing the following
conditions are met:
a. The investigation was completed within the past 3
years and there has been no break in service in
excess of 12 months; and
b. The prior investigation meets the required scope
and coverage standards and is compatible with the
sensitivity of the position; and
c. The prior investigation discloses no unresolved
information that reflects adversely on the
applicant's eligibility for a security clearance.
2. If it is determined that prior investigation does not
meet the provisions of subparagraph 1 above, an
appropriate update or upgrade investigation will be
requested to bring the total combined investigative
effort up to standard.
502 PRIOR PERSONNEL SECURITY DETERMINATIONS BY NASA AUTHORITIES
Personnel security clearances granted by designated NASA
authorities will be mutually and reciprocally accepted by
all NASA Installations without requiring additional
investigation, unless there has been a break in the
individual's employment in excess of 12 months or unless
derogatory information that occurred subsequent to the last
prior security determination becomes known.
CHAPTER 6: INITIATION OF PERSONNEL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS
600 GENERAL
All investigations are conducted by the OPM on a
reimbursable basis. ICS's may initiate such investigations,
subject to the guidelines set forth herein, by direct
communication with OPM only when it has been confirmed that
funds have been made available by the Chief, NASA Security
Office.
601 INFORMATION REQUIRED FROM SUBJECT OF INVESTIGATION
1. It is incumbent upon the subject of each personnel
security investigation to provide, upon request of the
ICS, the personal information required for initiation
of the investigation. At a minimum, the individual
will complete the appropriate investigative forms,
provide fingerprints of a quality acceptable to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and execute a
signed release, as necessary, authorizing custodians of
police, credit, education, employment, and medical
records to provide relevant information to OPM.
2. Refusal to provide or permit access to the relevant
information required for the satisfactory completion of
an investigation may result in the termination of
further processing and the administrative termination
of any security clearance that has been previously
granted. Should one of these situations arise, it is
important to remember that caution should be exercised
to ensure that any applicable procedural and/or
constitutional rights are observed.
602 INITIATION PROCEDURES
To ensure the effective completion of required personnel
security investigations, all requests for investigations
will be processed in accordance with the guidelines
contained in the Federal Personnel Manual (FPM), Chapter
736, Appendix A.6.
603 FURNISHING INFORMATION TO OPM
Any information concerning the person to be investigated
that is developed by NASA through written inquiries or other
means must be forwarded to OPM with the request for
investigation. FBI reports and NASA-prepared summaries of
investigative agencies should not be forwarded to OPM.
However, OPM should be advised of the date of completion and
the name of investigative agency that conducted any prior
background investigation.
604 ACCESS TO RESTRICTED DATA
1. Access to Restricted Data outside the scope of
aeronautical and space activities requires clearance by
the Department of Energy (DOE) or the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC). If such access is
required solely for the performance of service for
another agency, that agency normally will initiate the
required investigation. In such a case, the OPM
reimbursable investigation required for the occupant of
a sensitive position should not be initiated. NASA
will assist the other agency by obtaining and providing
the required security documents.
2. When access to Restricted Data outside the scope of
aeronautical and space activities is required in the
performance of NASA duties, a request for either a DOE
or an NRC clearance will be initiated by the ICS, who
will forward the necessary documents to the appropriate
agency.
605 SUPPLEMENTAL INVESTIGATIONS
If the results of an investigation are inadequate in terms
of scope or coverage, or a supplemental investigation would
assist in resolving outstanding issues, or the Personnel
Officer requests expansion of the investigation to develop
information pertinent to his or her area of responsibility,
a supplemental investigation may be initiated as follows:
1. If OPM conducted the investigation, or if the FBI
conducted the investigation on a referral from OPM,
request OPM to initiate the necessary supplemental
investigation. Such requests should outline
specifically and in detail the desired supplemental
investigation and the agency (OPM or FBI) asked to
conduct the investigation.
2. Supplemental investigation by the ICS should be made
where it appears that pertinent information might be
obtained without extensive effort and expense and
without intruding upon the investigative jurisdiction
of another agency. Such investigation normally should
be restricted to interviews of the individual's
coworkers, or supervisor, and local neighbors, or
record checks at the local police department, credit
agencies, and educational institutions with the results
of such investigations adequately documented.
606 SUBJECT INTERVIEWS
1. A person being considered for appointment or assignment
to a sensitive position should, whenever derogatory
information is disclosed concerning the individual, be
afforded an opportunity to explain, refute, or mitigate
objectionable security information before being
rejected or not selected. An interview must be
conducted for this purpose unless the derogatory
information is of such a minor character as to make an
interview unnecessary or inadvisable. Otherwise,
persons may be unjustly rejected or not selected on
security grounds because mitigating circumstances were
not known to the prospective employer.
2. In conducting the subject interview, care must be taken
not to interject improper matters into the interview
and to limit the scope of the interview to matters
having relevance to a security determination.
Religious beliefs and affiliations, beliefs and
opinions regarding racial matters, political beliefs
and affiliations of a nonsubversive nature, opinions
regarding the constitutionality of legislative
policies, and affiliations with labor unions and
fraternal organizations are not proper subjects for
inquiry. (See Chapter 736, Sections 2-5, of the FPM).
The constitutional right of each person must be
carefully observed during the interview.
607 REFERRALS TO THE FBI
1. Security Case
a. Information coming to the attention of the ICS
indicating that an applicant or employee may have
been subjected to coercion, influence, or pressure
to act contrary to the interests of the national
security must be referred promptly to the FBI for
investigation.
(1) When such information is received concerning
an individual on whom a routine personnel
security investigation is required or is
pending, and there is no indication that the
FBI has previously investigated the matter,
the case will be submitted to OPM with a
request that it be referred to the FBI for
investigation under the provisions of the
National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958,
as amended.
(2) When such information is received concerning
an employee upon whom the routine personnel
investigation has been completed and a
favorable security determination has been
made, the case will normally be referred
directly to the Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Washington, DC 20535, for
investigation. If the nature of the
information indicates a need for urgency, it
may be referred to the local office of the
FBI by the most expeditious means.
b. When referring cases to the FBI, either directly
or through OPM, sufficient information, including
a copy of the individual's OSF, should be
furnished to permit the FBI to conduct an
appropriate investigation. An information copy of
the cover letter to either OPM or the FBI in these
cases will be forwarded to the Chief, NASA
Security Office. If a case is referred to the
local office of the FBI, that fact and the basis
for the referral should be documented and an
information copy of the documentation forwarded to
the NASA Security Office.
2. Apparent Falsifications, Concealments, or
Misrepresentations on Employment or Security Forms
a. Personnel security investigations frequently
reveal information regarding apparent
discrepancies, omissions, falsifications, or
misrepresentations on applications for employment.
Such information, in addition to being possible
cause for removal or disciplinary action, may come
within the purview of Federal criminal statutes.
b. When the results of investigation, including any
subject interviews conducted, reveal an apparent
falsification, concealment, or misrepresentation
on an individual's employment or security forms
that appears to have been knowingly and willfully
made or to involve a material fact, the case
should be referred to the Personnel Officer. In
addition to the suitability determination, the
Personnel Officer should be requested to furnish
an opinion, in writing, regarding the materiality
of the apparent falsification, concealment, or
misrepresentation. The Personnel Officer should
be requested to furnish a prompt opinion regarding
the materiality even if the Personnel Officer is
unable to furnish a prompt suitability
determination.
c. Cases involving evidence of material fraud in
examination or appointment, including
falsification of a material issue, or refusal to
furnish testimony will be referred to the OPM-NACI
Center for adjudication. Matters involving
falsification, fraud, or a nonmaterial issue are
adjudicated by the Personnel Officer. If there is
any question as to whether an issue is material
falsification or fraud in a case, the case should
be referred to the OPM-NACI Center.
CHAPTER 7: PROCESSING RESULTS OF INVESTIGATIONS
700 GENERAL
1. When investigative material concerning NASA employees
or applicants is received in the NASA Security Office
or ISO from sources outside NASA, the material will be
referred to the appropriate Chief of Security with
little or no initial review or screening by other
Security Office personnel.
2. No person whose employment has been terminated on
security grounds or whose security clearance has been
revoked or denied by any department or agency of the
Federal Government will be appointed until the
individual's case has been reviewed by the NASA
Security Office. Termination under 5 U.S.C. 7532 and
Executive Order (EO) 10450 does not prevent the person
terminated from being employed at NASA. The
Administrator, however, must obtain the OPM approval
before appointing the person.
3. Information received by the ICS indicating that an
applicant's employment and/or security clearance has
been suspended on security grounds, even though
subsequently reinstated, must be thoroughly
investigated before a commitment is made to employ the
individual.
4. The Personnel Security Program requires the
utilization, to the maximum extent practical, of the
results of investigations, in concert with the
traditional personnel selection processes, to ensure
the selection of well qualified personnel. Accordingly,
the Personnel Officer may, upon request, have access to
investigative reports when necessary in the performance
of his or her duties regardless of whether unfavorable
information is involved.
5. When an investigation discloses derogatory information
concerning an applicant's or employee's qualifications,
work performance, fitness, or general suitability, the
ICS will furnish an abstract of such information to the
Personnel Officer to permit a determination of the
individual's suitability for employment. After
consultation among the Personnel Officer, cognizant
management officials, and the ICS, the Personnel
Officer will advise the ICS, in writing, of the
suitability determination.
6. Investigative reports and any abstracts therefrom which
are loaned to the Personnel Officer will, when they
have served his or her needs, be returned to the ICS
for retention. Personnel security reports made
available to the Personnel Officer must be handled in
accordance with the provisions of Chapter 8 and access
to the information limited only to those officials who
have an official need-to-know.
7. A case involving derogatory information will be
referred to the Personnel Officer for consideration
under applicable suitability standards, and the
Personnel Officer will be advised that a security
determination has been deferred. Removal action may be
initiated under OPM suitability standards without
regard to the pending security determination.
8. Installations should provide status reports to their
respective Program Office Security Official (PSO) and
the NASA Security Office, on all cases in which the OPM
has ranked an issue as major in seriousness, or in
which information has been developed that meets the
criteria of EO 10450, for suspending, revoking or
denying a NASA personnel security clearance. The
Installation will provide a status report within 30
days of receipt of the information. The report will
include a synopsis of the issues and what actions
management has taken or specifically plans to take.
For those cases that have not been resolved within the
original 30 days, a report within 90 days should be
made on the final disposition of the case.
9. The NASA Security Office will conduct quarterly reviews
of the cases that OPM has ranked as substantial or
major in seriousness.
10. To assist senior management in determining which course
of action should be taken regarding "serious" cases
involving NASA security clearances, we recommend that a
formal coordination process be established. The
utilization of the process will help ensure that due
process is provided, and that senior management has
been made aware of various potential problems and the
course of action available with recommendations. The
coordination process should always include
representatives from senior management, Security, Human
Resources, Chief Counsel, Equal Employment Opportunity,
and others when appropriate, such as Public Affairs and
a NASA physician for medical opinions.
11. The NASA Security Clearance Adjudication Statistics
form should be utilized to assist in monitoring the
Personnel Security Program.
12. OPM reserves the right to take adjudicative action or
to direct action in any sensitive, competitive service
involving a suitability issue.
701 SENSITIVE POSITION CASES
1. General. OPM will forward the results of an OPM
investigation for a sensitive position (SS, CS, or NCS)
directly to the initiating Chief of Security for review
and evaluation. After preliminary review, any
supplemental investigation determined to be necessary
for the proper evaluation of the case should be
requested in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph 605 of this Handbook.
2. Preappointment Investigations
a. Results of preappointment or preplacement
investigations will be screened for information
that might preclude the employment of an applicant
or the granting of a security clearance to an
employee.
b. If an investigation discloses information that
raises substantial security considerations, the
case will be referred to the Personnel Officer.
If the employee or applicant is not removed or
denied employment on suitability grounds, the
security processing will be continued. An
applicant will not be appointed, nor will an
employee be granted a security clearance, until
further investigation has been completed and a
favorable security determination made.
3. Final Investigations
a. If the final investigation is adequate and reveals
no derogatory information, the Security Officer
will indicate a favorable determination by
completing NASA Form 397, which will be retained
in the personnel security file, and NASA Form 346,
the original of which will be filed in the
employee's OPF. If the investigation reveals
significant derogatory information of the type set
forth in Appendix C, the individual should
normally be interviewed in accordance with
paragraph 606 of this Handbook.
b. If, after completion of a subject interview, a
favorable security determination is justified in
light of all available information, the case will
then be referred to the Personnel Officer for a
suitability determination. If a favorable
suitability determination is made, then the ICS
will complete NASA Form 346.
c. If a favorable security determination is not
clearly justified, the case will be referred to
the Personnel Officer for a suitability
determination. Unless removal under suitability
standards is initiated, the ICS will refer the
case to the NASA Security Office. If it is
recommended that the employee be suspended from
employment on security grounds, the following
information/material must be forwarded to the NASA
Security Office:
(1) Complete security file, including copies of
all investigative reports, NASA Form 397,
interview reports, and memorandum of
evaluation;
(2) A statement from the Personnel Officer
concerning the proposed disposition of the
case from a suitability standpoint;
(3) A draft of a proposed statement of reasons
for suspension from employment on security
grounds; and
(4) A statement assessing the relation between
the conduct or issue and performance on the
job in terms of the national security
interests. This statement also should
include the basis for the designation of the
position as a sensitive position and some
examples of the classified information to
which the employee has most recently had
access or would be expected to have access.
702 NONSENSITIVE POSITION CASES
1. OPM will forward nonactionable National Agency Checks
(NAC's) and National Agency Checks and Inquiries
(NACI's) for Nonsensitive positions to the NASA office
that initiated the investigation with a transmittal
document indicating the results of the case and a
certification that the investigation was conducted.
The certification should be filed in the subject's OPF.
2. Results of the investigations revealing derogatory
information, will be sent to the Installation Chief of
Security. If the investigation is expanded by NASA and
develops pertinent information, the information
developed must be submitted to the OPM-FIPC indicating
the final action taken in the case.
3. If the results of investigation reveal information
reflecting that the individual is of questionable
loyalty and an appropriate investigation has not been
conducted by the FBI, the case will be referred to the
FBI. When the FBI investigation has been completed,
the case should be reviewed and abstracted by the ICS
and referred to the Personnel Officer. No security
determination will be made concerning an applicant for,
or an occupant of, a Nonsensitive position. However,
if it is recommended that an employee be removed under
OPM suitability standards on the grounds that a
reasonable doubt exists as to the subject's loyalty to
the Government of the United States, a draft of the
proposed statement of reasons for removal, a memorandum
of evaluation, any interview reports, and all
investigative reports will be forwarded to the
Director, Personnel Division. Removal or other
disciplinary action under OPM standards will not be
initiated until the Director, Personnel Division , has
concurred in the proposed action.
CHAPTER 8: LIMITATIONS AND RESTRICTIONS
800 GENERAL
In recognition of the sensitivity of personnel security
reports and records, particularly with regard to individual
privacy, it is imperative that such personnel information be
handled with discretion.
801 USES OF PERSONNEL SECURITY INFORMATION
1. Information compiled under the NASA Personnel Security
Program may be used within NASA for the following
purposes only:
a. Granting security clearances;
b. Determining suitability and loyalty to the U.S.
Government;
c. Personnel security screening for ADP-Computer
positions;
d. Determining eligibility for access to classified
information, security areas, and NASA
Installations; and
e. Determining eligibility to travel to designated
countries and areas.
2. In addition, personnel security information may only be
used outside of NASA in accordance with the routine
uses described in the Security Records System pursuant
to the Privacy Act of 1974, as amended. NASA Form
1536, Privacy Act Disclosure Authorization and
Accounting Record, must be used as the Form of Record.
802 ACCESS RESTRICTIONS
1. Access to personnel security investigative reports and
other related records will be afforded only to those
NASA officials who require access in connection with
specifically assigned personnel security duties, or to
those officials responsible for suitability
determinations, or to such other Agency officials on a
strict need-to-know basis as the Installation Chief of
Security (ICS) determines necessary. Investigative
information should be handled in a manner that protects
the privacy of individuals without compromising the
capability of Agency officials to make informed
suitability and security determinations and selection
decisions. The cognizant Security Office must maintain
a record of each disclosure of OPM investigative
material, including, at a minimum, (1) the name and
title of the person to whom disclosure was made; (2)
the type of background investigation conducted on the
person for whom the material was disclosed; (3) the
date(s) of disclosure; and (4) the reason for the
disclosure. The ICS must also ensure that each person
authorized to review investigative files on a
continuing basis has been subject to a favorable
evaluation based on a background investigation that is
commensurate in scope and coverage with the risk
imposed by the nature of the investigative information
being reviewed. The status of persons authorized to
review investigative files should be updated on a
continuing basis.
2. Personnel security investigative reports will be
released outside of NASA only with the specific
approval of the investigative agency having authority
over the control and disposition of the reports.
3. The subject of an investigation may be provided with
sanitized excerpts, summaries, or an analytical
abstract of the information contained in the case file,
but not with a copy of the investigative report itself.
Under no circumstances may the subject be provided the
following types of information:
a. Information that contains a national security
classification, even if the subject already has a
clearance;
b. Information that would reveal the identity of a
source granted confidentiality;
c. Information that is protected sensitive medical
information; or
d. Information that is otherwise exempt from release
by the Privacy Act of 1974.
803 PRIVACY ACT NOTIFICATION
Whenever personnel information is solicited from an
individual for the purpose of initiating a personnel
security investigation or inclusion in the NASA Security
Records System, the individual must be provided with a copy
of NASA Form 1574 (PA), NASA Security Records System Privacy
Act Notice.
804 POLYGRAPH RESTRICTIONS
Use of the polygraph for employment screening purposes for
applicants or appointees to the competitive service is
prohibited. Accordingly, the polygraph will be used in the
NASA Personnel Security Program only in the most serious
national security cases, and then only as an aid in
furnishing additional investigative coverage. Requests for
approval to use the polygraph in national security cases
must be submitted to the Chief, NASA Security Office, for
approval by the Administrator. NASA employees may
voluntarily agree to polygraph examinations conducted by
other agencies without the approval of NASA Security Office
or the Administrator.
805 SAFEGUARDING PERSONNEL SECURITY INFORMATION
1. When not in use, personnel security investigations and
related personnel information must be stored in a
combination-lock cabinet or safe, or in an equally
secure area. Access to the cases should be limited
only to the Security Office and approved staff.
2. Personnel security investigations and related personnel
information will be sealed in double envelopes when
transmitted by mail or when carried by persons not
authorized access to such information. The inner
envelope will be marked "To Be Opened Only By (Name
Designated Recipient)."
CHAPTER 9: PROCESSING AND CONTROL OF VISITS AND VISITORS
900 GENERAL
1. It is the policy of NASA to regulate visits and control
visitors to NASA Installations in the following
interests:
a. The physical security of the Installation and
property located therein;
b. The protection of classified information and
material located therein; and
c. The orderly and expeditious preparation and
transmission of visit requests.
2. The procedures established herein are applicable to all
but the following visits:
a. Visits by persons owing allegiance to a foreign
government, or representing a foreign government,
corporation or organization (these procedures are
set forth in NMI 1371.4A, "Guidelines for Access
to NASA Installations by Nationals of the USSR,
Eastern Europe, China, and Designated Areas" and
NMI 1371.3B, "Coordination and Authorization of
Foreign Visits to NASA facilities").
b. Visits requiring access to Restricted Data at
Installations other than those of the Department
of Defense (DoD) and at facilities of DoD
contractors (these procedures are set forth in
Section IV, Chapter 7).
901 RESPONSIBILITY
1. The Installation Chief of Security (ICS) is primarily
responsible for the coordination of visits and
controlling of visitors.
2. A NASA employee visiting or being visited is
responsible for ensuring that classified information is
disclosed only in accordance with the requirements of
paragraph 1308 of this Handbook.
3. A NASA employee to whom a NASA Identification Badge
Card has been issued must keep the card in his or her
immediate possession at all times when visiting other
NASA Installations.
902 ARRANGING AND PROCESSING A REQUEST FOR A CLASSIFIED VISIT
1. Initiating Arrangements
a. General. Arrangements for visits by NASA
Installation personnel to other NASA
Installations, Government agencies, and
contractors should be made sufficiently in advance
to permit expeditious processing.
b. To another NASA Installation
(1) A NASA employee listed in a current NASA
Installation Cleared Personnel Roster will:
(a) Notify the person to be visited directly
of the purpose and date of the proposed
visit; and
(b) Request the person to be visited to
arrange for any processing required in
connection with the proposed visit to
the Installation.
(2) A NASA employee who has a security clearance,
but who is not listed on a current NASA
Installation Cleared Personnel Roster, will
notify the home ICS of the identity of the
Installation and of the person(s) to be
visited, date(s) of visit, and the security
classification of the information involved
(if known). The ICS will authenticate the
employee's security clearance to the
Installation to be visited.
c. To another Government Agency
(1) A NASA employee desiring to visit another
Government agency in connection with the
receipt or release of classified information
will notify the home ICS of the intended
visit.
(2) The ICS (upon receiving notification of an
intended visit to another agency) will
address a visit request to the agency to be
visited. At a minimum, requests will contain
the following information:
(a) Name (as indicated on employee's NASA
Identification Badge Card);
(b) Position or title;
(c) Citizenship;
(d) Level of security clearance;
(e) Purpose of visit;
(f) Date(s) of visit; and
(g) Name(s) of person(s) to be visited, if
known.
d. To a Contractor Facility
(1) A NASA employee desiring to visit a
contractor facility in connection with
receipt or release of classified information
will notify the ICS of the intended visit.
(2) The ICS (upon receiving notification of an
intended visit to a contractor facility) will
prepare and process a visit request as
required by the DoD Industrial Security
Manual for Safeguarding Classified
Information.
2. Approving Visit. Upon receipt of a visit request,
telephonic or written, the NASA office to be visited
may do the following:
a. Approve or disapprove the request on the basis of
the information provided; or
b. Request that additional information be furnished
to evaluate more fully the original request, and
approve or disapprove the request upon the basis
of the additional information furnished; or
c. Request a continuing authorization as prescribed
in paragraph 902-3.
3. Continuing Visit Authorization. Authorization for
repeated visits to a particular agency or contractor,
for a specific period of time not to exceed 1 year,
should be requested from the appropriate Security
Office. However, the office granting the authorization
will be notified by the Security Office making the
request immediately upon the termination of a NASA
employee for whom such a visit authorization has been
granted.
903 AUTHENTICATION OF SECURITY CLEARANCE
1. For a NASA Employee. Current NASA Installation Cleared
Personnel Rosters (see paragraph 906) will be
considered a valid source for clearance authentication
purposes. The security clearance of a NASA employee
who is not listed in a current NASA Installation
Cleared Personnel Roster may be authenticated by any
NASA ICS, or by higher authority within the same
organizational structure as the employee.
2. Personnel of Other Government Agencies and Contractors.
Clearance authentications for personnel of other
Government agencies may be accepted from the agency
concerned. Authentications for contractor employees may
be accepted from the Security Office of any contractor
cleared under the DoD Industrial Security Program. In
addition, approving officials may request the clearance
status of a contractor or a contractor employee
directly from the Defense Industrial Security Clearance
Office (DISCO), Defense Supply Agency, Columbus, OH
43215 (8-614-692-2265).
904 UNCLASSIFIED VISITS BY JET PROPULSION LABORATORY (JPL)
EMPLOYEES, PAYLOAD SPECIALISTS AND FLIGHT PARTICIPANTS
1. Recognizing the unique relationship that exists between
NASA and the JPL, a small number of JPL employees will
be issued a NASA Employee Badge to simplify their
frequent visits to NASA Installations. The Badges are
identified as "JPL" on the front side, but otherwise
are identical to employee badges issued throughout the
Agency. The Badge color code will depict "no security
clearance" and are intended for use in entrance to the
Installation and those interior areas where no
additional entry requirements are in effect. Visit
notifications conveying security clearances will be
accomplished by the JPL Security Manager when
appropriate for classified visits.
2. The Johnson Space Center (JSC) has issued a special
badge for payload specialists and flight participants.
These badges will be honored for access to NASA
Installations. This equates the access accorded by the
JSC badge to that of the NASA Badge. It will not be
used to gain access to those areas under additional
access control.
905 CONTROL PROCEDURE FOR A CLASSIFIED VISIT
1. Identification. A visitor to NASA Field Installations
will be subjected to positive identification at the
time of the visit.
2. Badge System
a. Where a NASA Installation utilizes a visitor badge
system, the badges will embody distinctive
characteristics that will make it readily apparent
that the wearer is a visitor.
b. Possession of a security clearance will not be
construed as proof of a need-to-know. Such need
-to-know will be individually established in every
case before a visitor is granted access to
classified information or material.
c. Both clearance for access to and need-to-know Top
Secret will be verified with the visitor's home
Installation Security Office in every case.
d. The badge system will include controls to recover
badges upon termination of visits.
3. Escort. A visitor will be escorted in those areas
wherein, if not escorted, unauthorized access could be
gained to classified information.
4. Contractor Personnel Employed at NASA Installations
a. A NASA contractor employee, working in the same
areas and having the same opportunity for access
to classified information as NASA personnel, is
considered a visitor. The Installation Chief of
Security will establish procedures which will
ensure that each contractor employee:
(1) Possesses an appropriate security clearance,
that the clearance is recorded in the
Security Office, and that the NASA employees
working in the same area are informed of the
level of clearance prior to the assignment of
duties to the contractor employee;
(2) Is granted access to classified information
only in connection with the contractual
duties that are to be performed on a
need-to-know basis; and
(3) Is advised at the time of the assignment to a
NASA Installation that the employee is
subject to applicable NASA security
regulations.
b. The contractor employee badges may embody
applicable features of the NASA Badge, but will
contain distinctive characteristics that will
readily identify the wearer as a contractor
employee. The contractor/employee badge system
will include controls to recover all badges upon
the termination of employment of holders or at the
expiration of the contract.
906 NASA INSTALLATION CLEARED PERSONNEL ROSTER
1. Each NASA Installation will maintain a NASA
Installation Cleared Personnel Roster. As a minimum, a
NASA Installation Cleared Personnel Roster should
contain the following information:
a. The effective and expiration dates on the front
cover;
b. The names of all NASA personnel who have security
clearances and perform, or are likely to perform,
official travel to other NASA Installations;
c. Indicate for each individual included therein the
following information:
(1) Name (as indicated on the NASA Badge);
(2) Citizenship;
(3) Level of security clearance;
(4) Date of clearance;
(5) Basis of clearance
(6) Social Security number; and
d. Be certified as correct by the Installation Chief
of Security.
2. The NASA Installation Cleared Personnel Roster will be
published monthly or quarterly and distributed to all
NASA Installations, component Installations, and other
activities. The rosters should be maintained in a
current status by monthly addendum sheets and should be
authenticated as correct by the ICS.
3. To facilitate the standardization of clearance rosters,
the following abbreviations and symbols should be used
as a minimum by all Installations:
a. Clearance (CL)
T - Top Secret
IT - Interim Top Secret
S - Secret
IS - Interim Secret
LS - Limited Access Authorization for Secret
C - Confidential
LC - Limited Access Authorization for
Confidential
Q - DOE or NRC "Q" Clearance
NA - No Clearance Required
* preceding name designates Critical-Sensitive
# preceding name designates ADP-l positions
Number 2 after name designates detailee from
another U.S. Government agency
Number 3 after name designates military personnel
detailed to NASA
Number 4 after name designates consultant
Number 5 after name designates detailee from a
NASA contractor's firm
b. Basis for Clearance
BI - Background Investigation
LBI - Limited Background Investigation
MBI - Minimum Background Investigation
NAC - National Agency Checks
NACI - National Agency Checks and Inquiries
UR - Updating Reinvestigation
PRI - Periodic Reinvestigation Plus
SBI - Single Scope Background Investigation
c. Other Symbols. The use of additional symbols
pertaining to other types of data is authorized
provided their purpose is explained and
prominently displayed within the document.
d. Sample Entry. An entry on the roster will, as a
minimum, contain the following information:
Last Name Citz Cl Cl Date Basis SSN
Smith, Sara U.S. S 6/30/79 BI xxx-oo-xxxx
CHAPTER 10: SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR NASA CLASSIFIED SYMPOSIA
1000 REQUIREMENTS
1. General
a. This Chapter sets forth the minimum security
standards, procedures, and guidelines relating to
a classified symposium (conference, seminar,
exhibit, convention, or similar gathering,
hereinafter referred to as a "symposium"). For
the purpose of this Chapter these requirements are
applicable only to a symposium that does the
following:
(1) Involves the release, outside the scope of
routine NASA and/or NASA contractor business,
of classified information; and
(2) Includes attendees other than NASA employees
and consultants, the employees and
consultants of NASA contractors or
subcontractors, or authorized visitors to or
representatives of NASA and its contractors
or subcontractors.
(3) Is officially conducted by NASA (i.e., NASA
actually develops, implements, and executes
all security measures prescribed herein); or
(4) Is officially sponsored by NASA (i.e., NASA
only approves and monitors the development,
implementation, and execution of appropriate
security measures set forth herein).
2. Sponsorship. NASA sponsorship normally will be limited
to a symposium that is managed and conducted by a
contractor (hereinafter referred to as the "Manager").
The Manager must be cleared under the Department of
Defense (DoD) Industrial Security Program to at least
the highest category of classification of the
information to be disclosed during the symposium.
However, a symposium held by an association, society,
or other group whose membership consists primarily of
cleared contractors may be sponsored by NASA provided
an appropriately cleared contractor is designated and
accepts responsibility for furnishing all symposium
security measures as set forth herein.
3. Responsibility
a. Key officials of the Office of the Administrator,
Officials-In-Charge of Headquarters Offices, and
Directors of NASA Field Installations, as
appropriate, are responsible for ensuring that
security approval is requested.
b. The Chief, NASA Security Office, NASA
Headquarters, is responsible for the following
security measures:
(1) Security approval or disapproval of a
symposium conducted or sponsored by NASA.
(2) Coordinating security approval or disapproval
with the Director, International Relations
Division, NASA Headquarters, whenever
attendance at a symposium by a foreign
national or representative is proposed.
(3) Forwarding official notification of security
approval or disapproval to or through the
appropriate NASA Chief of Security.
(4) Designating the Installation Chief of
Security (ICS) to be responsible in the
following cases:
(a) A classified symposium conducted by
NASA, for developing, implementing, and
executing all security measures
prescribed herein; or
(b) A classified symposium sponsored by
NASA, for approving and monitoring the
manager's development, implementation,
and execution of appropriate security
measures prescribed herein.
4. Determinations. Official security approval for the
conduct or sponsorship of a classified symposium will
be based on the following determination:
a. Adequate security measures can and will be
provided for in advance by the Manager or the
responsible ICS, whichever is appropriate; and
b. Foreign nationals or representatives will not be
in attendance, except as provided in paragraph
1003.
1001 LOCATION OF SYMPOSIUM
A classified symposium will be restricted to an area that is
not used for public gatherings and normally will be held at
a Government installation or at an appropriately cleared
contractor facility.
1002 REQUEST FOR SECURITY APPROVAL
A request for security approval of any NASA-sponsored or
conducted classified symposium will be forwarded through, or
by, the ICS to the Chief, NASA Security Office, NASA
Headquarters. This must be done well in advance of the date
of the proposed symposium to permit timely completion of
necessary security planning and coordination. The request
should contain all pertinent information, including the
following items:
1. Specific location proposed for the symposium. If the
location is other than a Government installation or an
appropriately cleared contractor facility, include a
narrative statement explaining the following details:
a. Why a Government installation or an appropriately
cleared contractor facility cannot be used; and
b. Why separate classified and unclassified sessions
cannot be scheduled to permit use of a Government
installation or an appropriately cleared
contractor facility for the classified sessions.
2. Identification of the subject matter that is to be
disclosed on a classified basis during the symposium,
and the highest category of classification involved.
3. When NASA sponsorship is being requested:
a. The level of the Manager's DOD facility security
clearance;
b. A statement affirming that the manager's security
officer has determined adequate security
protection can be established and maintained at
the proposed location; and
c. Details of any previous request made to another
Government activity to sponsor the symposium,
along with the reasons why the request was not
approved, if applicable.
4. When the request concerns a symposium to be conducted
or sponsored by NASA, a statement affirming that the
responsible Chief of Security has determined through an
appropriate on-site survey that adequate protection can
be established and maintained at the proposed location.
5. If any foreign national or representative will be in
attendance during any classified or unclassified
session of the classified symposium, the following
information will be submitted to the Chief, NASA
Security Office, NASA Headquarters:
a. Name, date, and place of birth of the individual;
b. Current citizenship status (e.g., is the
individual a Permanent Resident Alien or other
category);
c. Type of security clearance, if any, and issuing
authority;
d. Identification of each foreign government, firm
and/or entity represented, if applicable;
e. Date(s) of proposed attendance;
f. Subject and security classification, if any, of
each agenda item to be presented during the
session(s) at which attendance of the foreign
national or representative is proposed;
g. Exact nature of the foreign national's
participation in the symposium; and
h. Specific reasons why the attendance is considered
to be in the U.S. national interest.
When complete and detailed information specified in
this paragraph is not available at the time the initial
request for approval is forwarded, indicate the current
status and the approximate date the information is
expected to be available.
1003 RESTRICTIONS ON ATTENDANCE BY A FOREIGN NATIONAL OR
REPRESENTATIVE
1. A foreign national or representative will not be
extended a formal invitation to attend, or be permitted
to attend, any unclassified or classified session of
the symposium unless the requirements of paragraph
1002-5 have been met and advance approval has been
obtained under procedures set forth in paragraph
1000-3.
2. A foreign national or representative of a Communist
area or entity is excluded, without exception, from
attending any classified session of a symposium, but
may attend an unclassified session provided the
requirements of paragraph 1002-5 are met and advance
approval has been obtained under procedures set forth
in paragraph 1000-3.
3. A reciprocal access authorization granted to a Canadian
or United Kingdom representative is not valid for
access to the following:
a. Restricted Data, as defined in the U.S. Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended;
b. Formerly Restricted Data removed from the
Restricted Data category pursuant to Section
142(d) of the above cited Act;
c. Cryptographic information;
d. Information for which foreign dissemination has
been prohibited pursuant to Chapter 18; and
e. Information for which special access authorization
is required.
1004 GUIDELINES FOR SECURITY MEASURES AND PROCEDURES
During the supervision or monitoring of a classified
symposium, the responsible NASA Chief of Security will
ensure that the following security measures and procedures,
as appropriate, are accomplished:
1. All applicable requirements of this Chapter are met.
2. All necessary security measures and procedures are
completely and effectively coordinated prior to,
during, and after the symposium.
3. The category of security classification is determined
for each item on the proposed agenda.
4. The responsible NASA Chief of Security must provide
advance approval for proposed symposium announcements
and invitations. These will be unclassified and
indicate the name of the NASA-sponsored activity and
the date sponsorship was approved. Invitations to
attend a classified symposium will not be extended to a
person known to be from or representative of a
Designated country or area.
5. The responsible NASA ICS makes advance determination
that each proposed attendee of a classified session has
an appropriate security clearance.
6. Each contractor who proposes to disclose classified
information furnishes written authorization for release
from the responsible contracting officer prior to the
symposium. Also ensure that the authorizing
contracting officer is specifically informed whenever
NASA approval has been requested for a foreign national
to attend the classified session involved.
7. Each individual who will disclose classified
information during the symposium is notified of
pertinent security limitations including, where
necessary, the requirements contained in directives of
other Federal agencies participating on a classified
basis in the symposium.
8. Attendees of classified presentations are informed, in
each instance, of the category of classified
information disclosed.
9. Necessary procedures are in effect to safeguard and
control all classified information during the
symposium. This includes making provisions for guards,
entry controls, positive personal identification,
storage facilities and other physical security
protection necessary to preclude unauthorized access
to, or illicit acquisition of classified information
involved in the symposium. These procedures must be
fully coordinated with the symposium site management
well in advance of the scheduled event.
10. Classified information is disclosed during the
symposium only to the extent previously authorized.
11. Symposium minutes, summaries, recordings, proceedings,
and reports are reviewed prior to distribution for
appropriate security classification. Also ensure that
distribution is made only to persons approved to attend
the particular session involved. In either instance,
the material will be forwarded only to an appropriate
Government activity or an appropriately cleared
contractor facility (the latter having been determined
to have facilities to adequately safeguard the
classified material) and marked to the attention of the
authorized recipient.
12. NASA maintains a central record of the disclosure
authorizations for contractor-classified presentations
and displays.
CHAPTER 11: RESPONSIBILITY FOR SAFEGUARDING NATIONAL SECURITY
INFORMATION
1100 GENERAL
The Director, Logistics and Security Division is responsible
for providing direction and guidance for an Agencywide
administrative program for the protection of national
security information in NASA's custody.
1101 NASA HEADQUARTERS
1. The Chief, NASA Security Office, NASA Headquarters, is
responsible for establishing, planning, and
implementing Agencywide policies and procedures
pertaining to the following listed items:
a. The safeguarding of all national security
information and material generated by or in the
custody of NASA. This entails accountability,
control, access, storage, transmission,
identification and marking, and ensuring that such
policies and procedures are systematically
reviewed.
b. The NASA Resource Protection Program in
conjunction with cognizant Agency Program Offices.
2. Key officials of the Office of the Administrator and
Officials-in-Charge of Headquarters Offices are
responsible for compliance with the provisions of this
Handbook within their respective offices or
organizations.
3. The appropriate Institutional Associate Administrator
will ensure that the responsibilities and procedures of
Field Installations concerning physical security are
adequately carried out.
1102 NASA FIELD INSTALLATIONS
Directors of NASA Field Installations are responsible for
ensuring proper safeguarding of classified information and
material under the jurisdiction and custody of their
respective Installations. This responsibility includes
component activities geographically located apart from the
parent Installation.
1103 NASA INSTALLATION CHIEFS OF SECURITY
Each Installation Chief of Security (ICS) assumes the
following responsibilities:
1. Ensure that Security personnel are immediately and
fully responsive to any appropriate request for
assistance as set forth in this Handbook.
2. Maintain Agency standards, specifications, and
guidelines and implement the policies and procedures
outlined in this Handbook for the safeguarding of
classified information and material, and the protection
of facilities and property in the possession of the
Installation. In discharging this responsibility, the
cognizant ICS will personally approve the modification
or substitution of any provision set forth in this
Handbook only after a specific determination that such
modification or substitution provides protection at
least equal to that prescribed herein.
3. Within the limits set forth in Chapter 20, promptly and
fully determine the circumstances surrounding any loss
or possible compromise of classified information or
material and initiate appropriate investigative action
regarding such.
4. Establish more rigid standards, specifications,
procedures, or guidelines than prescribed in this
Handbook under the following circumstances:
a. When the overall accumulation of Secret or
Confidential information or material warrants the
protection of a higher category of security
classification; or
b. When other conditions or circumstances arise that
indicate that increased safeguards are necessary
in the interest of national security.
1104 NASA EMPLOYEES
1. NASA supervisors at all levels are responsible for
ensuring that they, and the personnel under their
jurisdiction to whom classified information or material
is entrusted, are fully knowledgeable of and comply
with the provisions set forth in this Handbook and
Installation security regulations as applicable.
2. All NASA employees who generate, have possession of, or
otherwise handle classified information or material are
responsible for the following:
a. Familiarizing themselves and complying with the
requirements of this Handbook for the safeguarding
and handling of classified information or
material;
b. Verifying that a prospective recipient of such
information or material meets the following
criteria:
(1) Possesses security clearance at least equal
to the degree of classification involved and
(2) Has an official need-to-know.
c. Immediately reporting to the nearest NASA ICS any
loss or suspected compromise of classified
information or material; and
d. Bringing to the attention of their immediate
supervisor any known, or suspected, practice, or
condition that compromises the proper safeguarding
and handling of classified information or
material.
1105 NON-NASA PERSONNEL
Non-NASA personnel to whom classified information is
entrusted or becomes accessible are responsible for
complying with the provisions of this Handbook.
CHAPTER 12: IDENTIFICATION AND MARKING OF NATIONAL SECURITY
INFORMATION AND MATERIAL
1200 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
All paper copies of NASA-generated classified documents will
be marked on the face with the following information:
1. The office of origin;
2. The original classifying authority;
3. The date or event for declassification or "Originating
Agency's Determination Required (OADR)";
4. One of the authorized classification designations,
i.e., Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential; and
5. Such additional warning notices as may be required in
accordance with paragraph 1202-13.
1201 ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION AND CLASSIFICATION MARKINGS
In the assignment of original classification and marking of
documents generated by NASA, the following will apply:
1. Classification Authority. Only those individuals who
have been delegated original classification authority
may determine the level of classification to be
assigned to a document generated by NASA. This is
established in NMI 1600.2, "NASA Security Program,"
paragraph 6d.
2. Marking Procedures
a. The person generating a classified document is
responsible for identifying it with the proper
classification marking (Top Secret, Secret, or
Confidential). Only the designations of Top
Secret, Secret, or Confidential may be used to
identify NASA classified information. Such
markings as "For Official Use Only" and "Limited
Official Use" may not be used for that purpose.
Furthermore, terms such as "Agency" or
"Conference" may not be used in conjunction with
classification designations, e.g., "Agency
Confidential" or "Conference Confidential."
b. The person who signs or finally approves a
document or other material containing classified
information is the classifier, providing that
person has been delegated original classification
authority. If the classifier is other than the
signer of the document, that person will be
identified on the appropriate marking as indicated
in paragraph 1202.
c. To facilitate excerpting and other uses,
classifiers will identify the level of
classification of each classified section, part,
paragraph, subparagraph, or similar portion of a
document (including subjects and titles), as well
as those portions that are not classified. A
parenthetical designation will be placed
immediately before the text it governs. The
symbols "(TS)" for Top Secret, "(S)" for Secret,
"(C)" for Confidential, and "(U)" for Unclassified
will be used for this purpose. To illustrate, if
a lead-in paragraph is unclassified and a
subparagraph is classified (i.e., Top Secret,
Secret, or Confidential), the markings will be
indicated as follows:
(1) (U) This is the unclassified lead-in
paragraph.
(a) (TS), (S), or (C) This is the classified
subparagraph.
If marking individual portions is impractical, a
narrative description sufficient to identify the
information that is classified and the level of
such classification should be included in the
text.
d. Whenever practical, select subjects and titles
that do not require classification. When the
subject or title must be classified, an
unclassified identifier should be assigned to the
document to facilitate receipting and reference.
e. The overall classification of a document will be
conspicuously marked, stamped, or affixed
permanently at the top and bottom of the outside
of the front cover (if any), on the title page (if
any), on the first page, and on the outside of the
back cover (if any). Each interior page of a
classified document will be marked or stamped at
the top and bottom either according to the highest
classification of the content of the page,
including the designation "Unclassified" when
appropriate, or according to the highest overall
classification of the document. Classification
marking of the page will not supersede the
classification markings of portions of the page
marked with lower levels of classification.
3. Duration of Classification
a. Information will be classified only as long as
required by national security considerations.
When it can be determined, a specific date or
event for declassification will be set by the
original classification authority at the time the
information is originally classified.
b. Whenever a specific time or future event for
declassification cannot be predetermined, the
following notation will be used: DECLASSIFY ON:
Originating Agency's Determination Required or
"OADR."
c. For foreign government information, no date or
event for automatic declassification may be
assigned unless such is specified or agreed to by
the foreign governments concerned. Foreign
government information may be assigned a date for
declassification up to 30 years from the time the
information was classified or acquired. When
classification is extended beyond 30 years, the
following notation will be used: DECLASSIFY ON:
Originating Agency's Determination Required or
"OADR."
1202 STANDARD IDENTIFICATION AND MARKINGS
1. Identity of Classifier. The identity of the classifier
will be shown on a "Classified by" line, e.g.,
"Classified by John Doe" or "Classified by Director,
XXX."
2. Date of Classification and Office of Origin. The date
and office of origin on a document at the time the
document is generated will be considered the date and
identification of the office or origin.
3. Date or Event for Declassification. The date or event
for automatic declassification will be shown on a
"DECLASSIFY ON" line, e.g., DECLASSIFY ON: July 1,
1995, DECLASSIFY ON: completion of A-B-C mission, or
DECLASSIFY ON: Originating Agency's Determination
Required or "OADR."
4. Identity of Extension Authority. The identity of the
official who authorizes an extension date for
declassification will be shown on the document, unless
that official also is the classifier, signer, or
approver of the document.
5. Extension Policy. Information classified under
predecessor orders and marked for declassification
review will remain classified until reviewed for
declassification under the provision of "The Order."
To implement subparagraphs 1 through 5, the document
will bear the following marking:
CLASSIFIED BY: _____________________________________
DECLASSIFY ON: _____________________________________
6. Downgrading, Declassification, and Upgrading Markings.
Changes made in the original classification or in the
dates of downgrading or declassification of any
classified information will be promptly and
conspicuously marked to indicate the change, the
authority for the action, the date of the action, and
the identity of the person taking the action. This
marking will take the following form:
CLASSIFICATION CHANGED:
TO: ________________________________________________
BY AUTHORITY OF ____________________________________
(Authority)
Earlier classification markings will be cancelled when
practical by crossing through with heavy black pen or
pencil.
7. Automatic Downgrading Markings. In addition to the
markings required by paragraphs 1202-3 and 1202-5, when
it is determined that a classified document should be
downgraded automatically at a certain date or upon the
occurrence of a certain event, that date or event will
be recorded on the face of the document by means of the
following marking:
Downgrade to: ____________________ on ______________
(Classification) (Date or Event)
8. Transmittal Documents
a. A transmittal document, including comments when
such are added to the basic communication, will
indicate on its face the highest classification of
information transmitted by it and a legend showing
the classification, if any, of the transmittal
document or comment standing alone. It will also
include the following or similar instruction:
(1) For an unclassified transmittal document:
"UNCLASSIFIED WHEN CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE IS
REMOVED."
(2) For a classified transmittal document: "UPON
REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS THIS DOCUMENT IS
(classification level of the transmittal
document standing alone)."
b. Letters of transmittal of Restricted Data that do
not themselves contain such data will be marked in
the lower left-hand corner of the first page with
one of the following, as appropriate:
(1) "Document(s) transmitted herewith contain(s)
RESTRICTED DATA," or
(2) "Document(s) transmitted herewith contain(s)
FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA."
9. Marking Foreign Government Information. Except in
those cases where such markings would reveal
intelligence information, foreign government
information incorporated in U.S. documents will,
whenever practical, be identified in such a manner as
to ensure that the foreign government information is
not declassified prematurely or made accessible to
nationals of a third country without the consent of the
originator. Documents classified by a foreign
government or an international organization of
governments will, if the foreign classification is not
in English, be marked with the equivalent U.S.
classification. Foreign government information not
classified by a foreign government, or an international
or other organization of governments, but provided in
confidence to the United States by a foreign government
or by an organization of governments, will be
classified at an appropriate level and will be marked
accordingly with the U.S. classification. Documents
that contain foreign government information will
include either the marking "FOREIGN GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION" or a marking that otherwise indicates that
this information is foreign government information.
10. Material Other Than Documents. The classification and
associated markings prescribed by this Handbook for
documents will, where practical, be affixed to material
other than documents by stamping, tagging, or other
means. If this is not practical, recipients will be
made aware of the classification and associated
markings by notification in writing.
11. Documentation Marking-Top Secret and Secret. All Top
Secret documents, originated or reproduced, will be
marked serially in the upper right-hand corner. This
serial marking will indicate the number of pages in the
document, the number of each copy, the number of copies
within the individual set, and the series designation
for that particular set of copies. The series
designation for that particular set of copies will
begin with the letter "A." Subsequent set designations
will follow the alphabetical sequence. For example,
the marking for the first of three copies of a
five-page document in an original set should read:
"This document consists of 5 pages. Copy No. 1 of
3 copies, Series A."
12. Marking of Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data
a. For classified information or material containing
Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data, as
defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended, the markings depicted below have been
designated for use by the Department of Energy
(DOE) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
and will be used by NASA originators of such
information where appropriate:
(1) RESTRICTED DATA
This document contains Restricted Data as
defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
Administrative and Criminal Sanctions.
(2) FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
Administrative and Criminal Sanctions.
Handle as Restricted Data in Foreign
Dissemination Section 144.b, Atomic Energy
Act, 1954.
b. Classified subjects or titles may be used for
Secret(s) or Confidential Restricted Data (RD) or
Formerly Restricted Data (FRD) documents only when
it is not possible to use unclassified ones. Top
Secret RD or FRD information will not be included
in a subject or title under any circumstances. If
the subject title is classified, the following
letters in parentheses will follow it as
appropriate: (SRD), (SFRD), (CRD), or (CFRD).
Individual sections, paragraphs, or subparagraphs
of a document containing RD or FRD classified
information will be marked as follows:
"(1) (U) Introductory paragraph or statement.
(a) (SRD) Paragraph containing Secret
Restricted Data.
(b) (CFRD) Paragraph containing Confidential
Formerly Restricted Data.
(c) (TSRD) Paragraph containing Top Secret
Restricted Data."
c. All NASA originated or reproduced copies of Top
Secret or Secret documents containing RD or FRD
information will be marked in the upper right-hand
corner with the serial documentation marking
prescribed in paragraph 1202-11.
13. Additional Markings Required. In addition to the above
described marking requirements, the following markings
will, as appropriate, be displayed prominently on
classified documents. When display of these additional
markings is not practical, their applicability to the
information will be included in the written
notification of the assigned classification.
a. Intelligence Sources or Methods Information. For
classified information involving intelligence
sources or methods, the following marking will be
used:
WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED
b. Rubber stamps purchased prior to August 1, 1982,
bearing the notation "INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND
METHODS" may be used until replacement is required
by use or by exhaustion of supply. Continued use
of such stamps under this waiver is done with the
understanding that documents so marked concern
intelligence sources or methods singularly or
collectively. Replacements will conform to the
wording in subparagraph a. above.
c. Dissemination and Reproduction Notice. For
classified information that the originator has
determined will be subject to special
dissemination or reproduction limitation, or both,
a statement placing the user on notice of the
restrictions will be included in the text of the
document or on its cover sheet by means of the
following marking:
REPRODUCTION REQUIRES APPROVAL OF ORIGINATOR.
FURTHER DISSEMINATION ONLY AS DIRECTED BY
14. Unclassified Marking. Except as permitted in paragraph
1201-2e, unclassified material will not normally be so
marked unless it is desirable to indicate that
consideration has been given to classifying the
material and it has been determined that it does not
require a classification.
15. "CRYPTO" Marking. This marking will be used only to
identify classified cryptographic information. The
Chief of Security or the Communications Security
Officer should be consulted for guidance when use of
this marking is contemplated.
16. Work Papers. Work papers, e.g., notes, drafts, and
drawings, accumulated during preparation of a finished
document will be marked with appropriate classification
markings in the same manner as other documents; except
that additional markings constituting dissemination,
reproduction, downgrading, or declassification
instructions need not be affixed unless the work papers
are made part of a permanent record, are entered into a
control accountability register, or are dispatched
outside the originating office or organization.
17. Copies and Reproductions. All copies and reproductions
of a classified document will contain the same markings
and notices appearing on the original document. If
markings and notations are not clearly reproduced, they
will be placed on all reproduced copies in the same
manner as those on the original. Once a product is
retained for more than 180 days from the date of
creation or last data entry, permanently filed, or
transmitted outside NASA, it must be marked as a
permanent document.
18. Miscellaneous Material. Material such as reproduction
rejects, typewriter ribbons, carbons, and similar items
developed in the course of handling, processing,
production, and use of classified information will be
afforded protection commensurate with the degree of
classification involved. Such material will be
destroyed at the earliest possible date. This material
must be marked as classified unless it is immediately
placed in classified waste.
19. Files and Groups of Documents. A file or group of
physically connected classified documents will be
marked with a classification marking at least as high
as that of the most highly classified document
contained therein. The overall accumulation of such a
file or group may warrant the assignment of a
classification category higher than that of any single
document in the file or group. The classification
marking will be placed on the covering page or leaf, or
indicated on a tag or by an appropriate cover sheet
attached to the top surface of the file or group.
Classified documents separated from the file or group
will be handled in accordance with their individual
classification.
20. Classified Message
a. A document that contains a classified message
prepared for electric transmission will be
appropriately marked as prescribed in preceding
subparagraphs 1 through 14. The highest level of
classification will appear before the first line
of text. A "CLASSIFIED BY" line is not required.
The duration of classification will appear at the
end of the message as follows: "DECL: (date or
event)" or "DECL: OADR (Originating Agency's
Determination Required)." For information to be
automatically downgraded the following will
appear: DNG (abbreviation of classification level
and date or event on which downgrading is to
occur)."
b. On receipt of an electrically transmitted
classified message at a communications center, all
copies of the message will be appropriately marked
as provided in preceding subparagraphs 1 through
14.
c. Classified documents that are transmitted
electrically will be annotated with special
markings that will appear after the highest level
of classification. Information concerning
"Intelligence Sources or Methods" will be marked
"WNINTEL." Foreign Government Information will be
marked: "FGI."
21. Data Processing Machine Cards and Lists
a. A deck of classified data processing machine
punched cards will be marked as a single document
by adding an appropriately marked card as the
first card of the deck to identify the following:
(1) The contents of the deck (at a minimum, the
number of cards);
(2) The overall classification, i.e., the highest
classification therein; and
(3) Other markings and notations as required.
Individual cards within the deck need not be
marked separately. A card removed from such
a deck for individual processing must be
either returned promptly to the deck after
such processing or marked with the
appropriate classification marking.
b. Classification markings on the pages of a
classified list produced by data processing
equipment may be applied automatically by the
equipment, provided the first and last pages of
the list and front and back covers, if any, are
marked as prescribed in preceding subparagraphs.
Individual pages removed from the list will be
marked as provided in preceding paragraphs.
c. Removable information storage media and devices,
used with automatic data processing (ADP) systems
and typewriters or word processing systems, will
bear external markings clearly indicating the
classification of the information and applicable
associated markings. Included are media and
devices that store information recorded in analog
or digital form and that are generally mounted or
removed by the users or operators. Examples
include magnetic tape reels, cartridges, and
cassettes; removable disks, disk cartridges, disk
packs, floppy disks, and diskettes; paper tape
reels; and magnetic cards.
22. Classified Information and Material of Foreign
Governments/other Organizations of Government
a. Classified information and material furnished to
NASA by a foreign government or an international
organization will either retain its original
classification or be assigned the lowest U.S.
classification that will ensure protection
equivalent to or greater than that required by the
furnishing government or organization. Documents
that contain foreign government information will
include the marking "FOREIGN GOVERNMENT
INFO