NHB 1620.3C NASA Security Handbook


NASA                                        NHB 1620.3C, (PART 4)

HANDBOOK                         Effective Date  February 1, 1993

_________________________________________________________________



Responsible Office: JL



Subject:  NASA Security Handbook (PART 4 of 5)





PREFACE



            APPENDIX A:   GLOSSARY OF SECURITY TERMS



Access. The ability and opportunity to gain knowledge of

classified information. 



Access Control.  The means, through a variety of procedures and

equipment, to regulate and monitor the movement of personnel

and/or vehicle traffic through points of entry and exit.



Access Control System.  A system of electromechanical and

electronic devices that monitor and permit or deny entry and exit

of a protected area by personnel or vehicles.



Acoustic Security. Those security measures designed and used to

deny audio access to information.



Aeronautical and Space Activities.  (l) Research into, and the

solution of, problems of flight within and outside the Earth's

atmosphere; (2) the development, construction, testing, and

operation for research purposes of aeronautical and space

vehicles, and (3) such other activities as may be required for

the exploration of space.



Administrative/Service Area. Those areas within an accredited

facility where storage, exposure, discussion, and/or processing

of classified or sensitive material is not allowed.



Agency.  Any department or agency of the Government.



Alien.  Any person who is not a citizen or national of the United

States.



Anti-Terrorism.  Defensive measures used to reduce the

vulnerability of individuals or property to terrorism.



Arrest Authority.  Authority to execute arrests and searches

without warrants granted to designated NASA employees and

contractors by the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as

amended.



Audible Scrambler. A method of modifying communications equipment

to encode or decode transmitted signals.  Provides a limited

degree of security in sensitive operations, but does not meet

encryption standards required for transmission of classified

information.



Authorized Person.  A person who is appropriately cleared, has a

valid need-to-know, and has been granted access to an area.



Background Investigation. The means or procedures, such as

selective investigations, records checks, personal interviews,

and supervisory controls, designed to provide reasonable

assurance that persons being considered for or granted access to

classified information are loyal and trustworthy.



Back-up Power.  A secondary source of power (usually batteries or

generators) to provide continued system operation when primary

(AC) power is interrupted.



Controlled Cryptographic Item (CCI).  Secure telecommunications

or information handling equipment or associated cryptographic

component or ancillary device that is unclassified when unkeyed

(or keyed with unclassified key), but controlled.



Classification Category. The specific degree of security

classification that has been assigned to classified information

to indicate the extent of protection required in the national

interest.



Certified Tempest Technical Authority (CTTA). Designated official

responsible for performing TEMPEST countermeasure cost and

security analyses prior to the implementation of TEMPEST

countermeasures.



Classification Guide.  The guidance issued or approved by an

original Top Secret classification authority that identifies the

information or material to be protected from unauthorized

disclosure and specifies the level and duration of classification

assigned or assignable to such information or material.



Classified Material.  Any physical object on which is recorded or

in which is embodied classified information that may be discerned

by the study, analysis, observation, or other use of the object

itself.



Closed Area.  An area in which security measures are applied

primarily to safeguard classified information and material, entry

to the area being equivalent to access to such classified

information and material.



Closed Circuit Television (CCTV).  A television system where

video signals are transmitted from one area to another via

coaxial or fiber optic cables.



Closed Storage Area.  An area, cleared for classified operations,

in which all classified material must be stored in a GSA-approved

security container when the area is unoccupied.



Cognizant Security Authority (CSA).  Agency, office, or person

responsible for establishing security requirements.



COMINT. Information derived from the study of intercepted

electromagnetic communications.



Communications Security.  The protection resulting from the

application of cryptosecurity, transmission security, and

emission security measures to telecommunications and from the

application of physical security measures to COMSEC information. 

These measures are taken to deny unauthorized persons information

of value that might be derived from the possession and study of

such telecommunications, or to ensure the authenticity of such

telecommunications.



Compromise. A breach of security due to an unauthorized person's

gaining knowledge of classified information.



Compromising Emanations.  Unintentional emissions that could

disclose information being transmitted, received, or handled by

any information-processing equipment.  (See TEMPEST)



COMSEC.  Communications Security.



COMSEC Accounting.  Procedures that document the control of

COMSEC material from its origin through destruction or other

final disposition.



COMSEC Custodian.  Individual designated responsible for the

receipt, transfer, accountability, safeguarding, and destruction

of COMSEC material assigned to a COMSEC account.



COMSEC Insecurity.  Any occurrence that jeopardizes the security

of COMSEC material or the secure electrical transmission of

classified or sensitive government information.



COMSEC Material.  Aids and hardware that are designed to secure

telecommunications.



Contractor.  Any entity that is party to a contract with the

United States.



Concertina Wire.  Rolled barbwire, usually in .914m/three-foot

diameter rolls that are pulled apart and expanded to make a

physical protective barrier.  A military version is called

General Purpose Barbed Tape Obstacle.  Also called razor wire or

wire obstacle.



Counterespionage. Aspect of counterintelligence designed to

detect, destroy, neutralize, exploit, or prevent espionage

activities through identification, penetration, manipulation,

deception, and repression of individuals, groups, or

organizations conducting or suspected of conducting espionage

activities.



Countermeasures Advisory Panel (CAP).  An interagency panel that

recommends National TEMPEST policy for approval by the National

Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Committee

(NTISSC).



Cryptographic Information.  All information and material,

including documents, devices, equipment and apparatus, essential

to the encryption, decryption, or authentication of

telecommunications.  Whenever cryptographic information is

classified, the material is marked "CRYPTO" and the specific

security classification is indicated.



Cryptosystem.  Associated items of COMSEC material used as a unit

to provide a single means of encryption or decryption.



Custodian.  Any authorized person who possesses and is

responsible for safeguarding classified information or material.



Dead Bar.  A solid bar attached to both a door and its frame on

the inner side to prevent opening from the outside.



Dead Bolt.  A lock bolt with no spring action.  Activated by a

key or turn knob and cannot be moved by end pressure.



Decibel.  A unit of sound measurement.



Dedicated Phone Lines.  Leased or propriety telephone lines used

solely for transmission of a particular signal.



DES Data Encryption Standard.  An unclassified algorithm

implanted in electronic hardware or firmware devices used for the

cryptographic protection of unclassified but sensitive

information.



DOD Representative.  An officer or employee of the Department of

Defense, or any department or agency thereof, or a member of the

Armed Forces, or a contractor or subcontractor of any DOD

department, agency, or Armed Forces, or an officer or employee of

any such contractor or subcontractor.



Door Switch.  An electromechanical device attached to doors used

to detect door openings and generate an alarm.



Duress Alarm.  A mechanical or electronic device that enables

personnel to alert a response force to obtain immediate

assistance without arousing suspicion.



Electrical Metallic Tubing (EMT).  Steel tubing used to protect

electrical and electronic signal cables.



Electric Strike.  A feature that locks or unlocks a door or

turnstile automatically or manually.



Electromagnetic Interference (EMI).  A component of energy

generated by radar, high-voltage lines, radios, etc., that can

cause interference or damage to unprotected electronic equipment.



ELINT:  Information derived from noncommunications

electromagnetic radiations (such as those emitted by radar).



Emission Security:  The component of communications security that

results from all measures taken to deny unauthorized persons

information of value that might be derived from intercept and

analysis of compromising emanations from crypto and

telecommunications equipment. Frequently referred to as TEMPEST.



Expanded Steel.  Also called Expanded Metal Mesh.  A lacework

patterned material produced from sheet steel by making regular

uniform cuts and then pulling it apart with uniform pressure.



Fence Apron.  Barbed wire section placed atop barrier fences,

usually placed  at a 45-degree angle.



Fence Sensor System.  A system mounted on a fence or installed as

part of a fence that detects an intruders' attempts to climb

over, penetrate, or crawl under the fence.



Foreign National. Any person who is not a U.S. citizen or not a

national of or an immigrant to the United States.



Guard.  A properly trained and equipped individual whose duties

include the protection of assets.



ITAR.  International Traffic in Arms Regulation.



Intelligence Community.  The aggregate of the following executive

branch organizations and agencies involved in intelligence

activities: the Central Intelligence Agency; the National

Security Agency; the Defense Intelligence Agency; offices within

the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized

national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance programs;

the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of

State; intelligence elements of the military services; the

Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Department of the Treasury;

the Department of Energy; and staff elements of the Office of the

Director of Central Intelligence.



Intrusion Detection System (IDS).  A security alarm system

consisting of one or more various types of components used to

detect unauthorized access into a protected area.



Level of IDS Protection.  Number of sensor types used in an IDS

system to protect an  area.  (Door switches and motion detectors

in use in one area constitute two levels of protection.)



Limited Area.  An area in which  security measures are applied

for the safeguarding of classified information and material, or

unclassified property warranting special protection, and in which

uncontrolled movement of visitors or other unauthorized persons

would permit access to such classified information and material

or property, but within which such access may be prevented by

appropriate visitor escort or other internal restrictions and

controls.



NRP.  NASA Resource Protection.



National Security Decision Directive (NSDD).  A document that

promulgates Presidential decisions implementing national policy

and objectives in all areas involving national security.  All

decision directives are individually identified by number and

signed by the President.



National Telecommunications and Information Systems Security

Committee (NTISSC).  An interagency committee responsible for

approving national security policies for safeguarding systems

that process or communicate sensitive information.



Open Storage Area: A properly accredited vault or area in which

classified material may be processed, discussed, or stored

without the use of security containers.



Operations Security (OPSEC).  A systematic and analytical process

by which the U.S. Government and its supporting contractors can

deny to potential adversaries information about capabilities and

intentions by identifying, controlling, and protecting evidence

of planning and execution of sensitive activities and operations.



Perimeter.  A wall, fence, natural terrain, water, etc., that

provides a barrier or indicates the outer limits of an area.



Personnel Turnstile.  A device consisting of fixed and rotating

bars that permits or prevents entry or exit in a protected area.



Protected Distribution System (PDS).  A wireline or fiber optic

system that includes adequate acoustic, electrical,

electromagnetic and physical safeguards to permit its use for the

unencrypted transmission of classified information.



Radio Frequency Interference (RFI).  A signal in the radio

frequency range that may prevent proper operation or destroy

unprotected electronic circuits.



Reader (Card).  An electronic device used to decode data

contained on cards or keys to identify the holder as an

authorized or unauthorized  entrant into a protected area.



Red/Black Concept.  The separation of electrical and electronic

circuits, components, equipment, and systems, that handle

classified plain language information in electric signal form

(Red) from those that handle encrypted or unclassified

information (Black).



Restricted Area.  An area in which security measures are applied

to safeguard or control property, or to protect operations and

functions that are vital or essential to the accomplishment of

the mission assigned to a NASA Installation or component

Installation.



Security Dispatcher.  A person assigned to the duties of

dispatching response forces and/or patrols, usually in response

to alarms, calls for assistance, or other emergencies requiring

security personnel at the scene.



Security Survey.  A comprehensive formal evaluation of a

facility, area, or activity by security specialists to determine

its physical or technical strengths and weaknesses and to propose

recommendations for improvement.



Sensitive Requiring special protection from disclosure to avoid

compromise or threat to the security of the sponsor.



Solid Wall.  A wall that is constructed without hollow portions

in it.



Sound Groups.  Voice transmission attenuation groups established

to satisfy acoustical security requirements.



Sound Transmission Class (STC):  The ratings used in

architectural considerations of sound transmission loss such as

those involving walls, ceilings, and/or floors.



STS:  Space Transportation System.



Special Access Program (SAP).  Any program established and

approved under EO 12356 that imposes need-to-know or access

controls beyond those normally required for access to

Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret information.



Surreptitious Entry.  The unauthorized entry into an area or

security container in a manner in which evidence of such entry is

not readily discernible.



TELINT. Information derived from the intercept and analysis of

communications between pieces of equipment.  An example of TELINT

would be information obtained from the intercept of electronic

communications between a spacecraft and its ground-based guidance

system.



TEMPEST.  An unclassified short name referring to investigations

and studies of compromising emanations.  It is sometimes used

synonymously for the term "compromising emanations." 



TEMPEST Test.  A laboratory or on-site (field) test to determine

the nature and amplitude of conducted or radiated signals

containing compromising information. A test normally includes

detection and measurement of these signals and analyses to

determine the correlation between received signals and

potentially compromising transmitted signals.



Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) Surveys and

Inspections:  A thorough physical, electronic, and visual

examination to detect technical surveillance devices, technical

security hazards, and attempts at clandestine penetration of an

area for hostile technical collection of classified and sensitive

information.



Terrorism.  The unlawful use of force or violence against persons

or property to intimidate or coerce a government, a civilian

population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political

or social objectives.



Type I COMSEC Product.  A classified or CCI COMSEC product

endorsed for securing classified or sensitive government

information when appropriately keyed.  NOTE:  Refers only to

products and not to information, key, services, or controls. 

Type I products contain a classified NSA algorithm.  They are

available to U.S. Government users and their contractors and are

subject to export restrictions in accordance with ITAR.



Type II COMSEC Product.  An unclassified device or equipment

endorsed for protecting sensitive government or government-

derived information.  NOTE:  Refers only to products and not to

information, key, services, or controls.  Type II may not be used

for classified information. Type II products contain a classified

NSA algorithm, which distinguishes them from products containing

an unclassified DES algorithm.  They are available to U.S.

Government users and their contractors and U.S.- sponsored

entities, but are subject to export restrictions in accordance

with ITAR.



Vault.  An area used for storing, handling, discussing, and/or

processing classified information that is constructed to afford

maximum protection against unauthorized entry.



Visual Security.  Those security measures designed and used to

deny unauthorized visual access to classified or sensitive

materials and activity.



Waiver. The approved continuance of a condition that varies from

a requirement and creates a vulnerability.







   APPENDIX B:  PERSONNEL AND INFORMATION SECURITY DEFINITIONS



For the purpose of this Handbook, the following definitions

will apply:



1.   Access.  The ability and opportunity to gain knowledge of

     classified information; that is, an individual may obtain

     access to classified information merely by being near a

     place where the information is discussed or being within

     a place where it is kept if the security measures in

     force do not prevent the individual from gaining

     knowledge of the information.



2.   Aeronautical and Space Activities.  (a) Research into,

     and the solution of, problems of flight within and

     outside the Earth's atmosphere; (b) the development,

     construction, testing, and operation for research

     purposes of aeronautical and space vehicles; and (c) such

     other activities as may be required for the exploration

     of space.



3.   Agency.  Any department or agency of the Government.



4.   Alien.  Any person who is not a citizen or national of

     the United States (see "Immigrant Alien").



5.   Authorized Person.  A person who has been:



     a.   Cleared to at least the degree of security

          classification of the information involved and has a

          need-to-know the information in connection with that

          person's official duties.



     b.   Authorized to enter a Security Area.



6.   BDI -  Background Investigation Update.



7.   BGI -  Background Investigation Upgrade.



8.   Certifying Official.  A NASA official authorized to

     certify a NASA representative for access to Restricted

     Data in the possession of (a) personnel of the Nuclear

     Regulatory Commission (NRC) and its contractors; (b)

     personnel of the Department of Energy (DOE) and its

     contractors; and (c) NRC- or DOE-cleared personnel of

     other Federal departments and agencies (except NASA and

     the Department of Defense (DOD)) and their contractors.



9.   Classification.  The initial or original determination

     that information requires protection against unauthorized

     disclosure in the interest of national security, and a

     designation of the level of classification. This

     contrasts with the physical act of marking material

     containing classified information to which a

     classification category already has been assigned, e.g.,

     information covered by a security classification guide or

     material copied or reproduced from material previously

     marked with an assigned classification (see "Marking").



10.  Classification Authority.  The authority delegated to an

     official of NASA to originally classify information or

     material that is determined by that official to require

     protection against unauthorized disclosure in the

     interest of national security. It further means the

     authority to extend the duration of the original

     classification, subject to the limits prescribed in this

     Handbook, only so long as the basis for the original

     classification continues to exist.



11.  Classification Category.  The specific degree of security

     classification (Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential) that

     has been assigned to classified information to indicate

     the extent of protection required in the national

     interest.



12.  Classified Contract.  Any contract, purchase order,

     award, or grant that requires, or will require, access to

     any classified information by the contractor, grantee,

     supplier, or their employees in the performance of the

     contract.  A contract may be classified even though the

     contractual document or the end item to be produced is

     unclassified.

13.  Classification Guide.  The guidance issued or approved by

     an original Top Secret classification authority that

     identifies the information or material to be protected

     from unauthorized disclosure and specifies the level and

     duration of classification assigned or assignable to such

     information or material.  Appendix E, "NASA Information

     Security Program," is the basic classification guide for

     NASA.



14.  Classified Information.



     a.   Information or material, herein collectively termed

          information that is owned by, produced for or by, or

          under the control of the U.S. Government, that has

          been determined pursuant to "The Order" or prior

          Executive Orders to require protection against

          unauthorized disclosure, and that is so designated.



     b.   Other information to which an appropriate authority

          of a foreign government or international pact

          organization has assigned a security classification

          to indicate the extent of protection required, and

          which the United States is obligated to protect

          pursuant to an agreement with that government or

          organization.



15.  Classifier.  An individual who makes a classification

     determination and applies a security classification to

     information or material.  A classifier may be an original

     classification authority or a person who derivatively

     applies a security classification based on a properly

     classified source or a security classification guide.



16.  Classified Material.  Any physical object on which is

     recorded or in which is embodied classified information

     that may be discerned by the study, analysis,

     observation, or other use of the object itself.



17.  Closed Area.  An area wherein security measures are

     applied primarily for the purpose of safeguarding

     classified information and material, entry to the area

     being equivalent to access to such classified information

     and material.



18.  Cognizant Security Office.  The Defense Investigative

     Service (DIS) Industrial Security region which is

     primarily responsible for exercising control over

     industrial security matters at a contractor facility.



19.  Communications Security (COMSEC).  The protection

     resulting from a measure taken to deny unauthorized

     access to information related to national security that

     might be derived from telecommunications, or measures

     taken to ensure the authenticity of such

     telecommunications.



20.  Compromise.  A breach of security owing to an

     unauthorized person's gaining knowledge of classified

     information.



21.  Confidential Information.  Information that could be

     reasonably expected to cause damage to the national

     security if disclosed to unauthorized persons.



22.  Contractor.  Any industrial, educational, commercial, or

     other entity that is a party to a contract with the

     United States and has received a facility clearance from

     a Government department or agency.

23.  Cryptographic Information.  All information and material,

     including documents, devices, equipment and apparatus,

     essential to the encryption, decryption, or

     authentication of telecommunications. Whenever

     cryptographic information is classified, the material is

     marked "CRYPTO" and the specific security classification

     category also is indicated.



24.  Custodian.  Any authorized person who has possession of,

     and is responsible for, safeguarding classified

     information or material (see "Authorized Person" and

     "Safeguarding").



25.  Declassification Event.  An event that would eliminate

     the need for continued classification.



26.  Declassify.  Action taken by an appropriate authority to

     cancel completely the security classification of an item

     of classified information.



27.  Derivative Classification.  A determination that

     information is in substance the same as information

     currently classified, and a designation of the level of

     classification.



28.  Designated Agency Official.  Refers to the official with

     authority to deny, suspend, or remove an employee's

     security clearance (except under 5 U.S.C. 7532).  At NASA

     Field Installation, this official is the Director; at

     NASA Headquarters, this official is the Associate

     Administrator for Management Systems and Facilities.



29.  Document.  Any recorded information regardless of its

     physical form or characteristics, including, without

     limitation, written or printed matter, data processing

     cards and tapes, maps, charts, paintings, drawings,

     engravings, sketches, working notes and papers,

     reproductions of such things by any means or process, and

     sound, voice, magnetic, or electronic recordings in any

     form.



30.  DoD Representative.  An officer or employee of the

     Department of Defense, or any department or agency

     thereof, or a member of the Armed Forces, or a contractor

     or subcontractor of any DOD department, agency, or Armed

     Forces, or an officer or employee of any such contractor

     or subcontractor (see "NASA Representative").



31.  Downgrade.  Action taken by an appropriate authority to

     lower the classification category of an item of

     classified information.



32.  Employee.  Any individual, including an expert,

     consultant, or adviser, serving on a permanent or

     temporary appointment, on a full-time, part-time, or

     intermittent basis, and regardless of whether the

     individual is compensated for services rendered.



33.  Facility Security Clearance.  From a security viewpoint,

     an administrative determination that a facility is

     eligible for access to classified information up to and

     including a designated category.



34.  Foreign Government Information.  Information that has

     been provided to the United States in confidence by or

     produced by the United States pursuant to a written joint

     arrangement requiring confidentiality with a foreign

     government or international or regional organization of

     governments.



35.  Foreign National.  Any person who is not a citizen or not

     a national of or an immigrant to the United States (see

     "Immigrant Alien").



36.  Foreign Representative.  A citizen or national of the

     United States or an immigrant alien who is acting as a

     representative official, or employee of a foreign

     government, firm, corporation, or person.



37.  Formerly Restricted Data.  Information that has been

     removed from the Restricted Data category based on a

     formal determination by appropriate authority that the

     information relates primarily to the military utilization

     of atomic weapons, and that the information can be

     protected adequately as classified information under the

     provisions of "The Order."  Such information may not be

     transmitted or otherwise made available to any foreign

     nation or international pact organization while it

     remains classified information except under the

     provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.



38.  Immigrant Alien.  Any person who is lawfully admitted

     into the United States under an immigration visa for

     permanent residence.



39.  Information.  Knowledge that can be communicated by any

     means.



40.  Information Security.  The result of any system of

     administration policies and procedures for identifying,

     controlling, and protecting from unauthorized disclosure,

     information of which protection is authorized by

     Executive order or statute.



41.  International Pact Organization.  A regional defense

     organization (e.g., NATO). 



42.  LDI - Limited Background Investigation Update.



43.  LGI - Limited Background Investigation Upgrade.



44.  Limited Area.  An area wherein security measures are

     applied primarily for the safeguarding of classified

     information and material or unclassified property

     warranting special protection and in which the

     uncontrolled movement of visitors would permit access to

     such classified information and material or property, but

     within which area such access may be prevented by

     appropriate visitor escort and other internal

     restrictions and controls.



45.  Marking.  The physical act of stamping or otherwise

     indicating on a document or other material (a) the

     specific category of security classification assigned to

     the information contained therein; and (b) other

     pertinent notations (e.g., "Restricted Data--Atomic

     Energy Act of 1954," "Unclassified when classified

     enclosures are detached," and "CRYPTO").



46.  Material.  Any product or substance on, or in, which

     information is embodied.



47.  MDI - Minimum Background Investigation Update.



48.   NASA Employee or Personnel.



     a.   Any permanent or temporary employee of NASA;



     b.   Any person serving without a contract as an advisor,

          consultant, or expert to NASA; or



     c.   Any employee or member of another Federal department

          or agency who is detailed to NASA or assigned to a

          program or activity jointly sponsored by NASA.



49.  NASA Representative.  Any officer, employee, member of an

     advisory committee, contractor, subcontractor, or officer

     or employee or a contractor or subcontractor of NASA (see

     "DOD Representative").



50.  National Agency Check (NAC).  A review of the files of

     the Federal Bureau of Investigation (including

     fingerprint files), Office of Defense Central Index of

     Investigations, the Office of Personnel Management, or

     other Government agencies, as appropriate.  The files of

     the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the

     Central Intelligence Agency will be reviewed when the

     individual is an alien or a naturalized citizen of the

     United States.



51.  National Security.  The protection of the nation from

     foreign aggression or espionage, including development of

     defense plans or policies, intelligence or

     counterintelligence activities, and related activities

     concerning the preservation of the military strength of

     the United States.



52.       National of the United States.  A citizen of the

          United States, or a person who, although not a

          citizen of the United States, owes permanent

          allegiance to the United States.



53.  Need-to-Know.  A determination, by persons having

     responsibility for classified information or matter, that

     a proposed recipient's access to such classified

     information or matter is necessary in the performance of

     that person's official, contractual, or licensee duties

     of employment under the cognizance of NASA.



54.  Non-NASA Personnel.  Any person (other than a NASA

     employee) who is within the boundaries of a NASA

     Installation or component and is outside the physical

     limits of a cleared contractor facility (holding a

     facility clearance under the DOD Industrial Security

     Program) that is situated within the Installation or

     component.



55.  Original Classification.  An initial determination that

     information requires, in the interest of national

     security, a specific degree of protection against

     unauthorized disclosure, together with a designation

     signifying that such a determination has been made.



56.  Program Office Security Official (PSO).  The PSO serves

     as the first point of contact externally, and as the

     focal point internally, on program security matters

     within the responsibility of the program office Associate

     Administrator.  Primary responsibility for program

     security rests with the program office Associate

     Administrator.



57.  Regrade.  A determination that classified information

     requires a different degree of protection against

     unauthorized disclosure than currently provided, together

     with a change of classification designation that reflects

     such different degrees of protection.



58.  Restricted Area. An area wherein security measures are

     applied primarily for the safeguarding or administrative

     control of property or to protect operations and

     functions that are vital or essential to the

     accomplishment of the mission assigned to a NASA

     Installation or component Installation.



59.  Restricted Data.  All data concerning design,

     manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons, the

     production of special nuclear material, or the use of

     special nuclear material in the production of energy, but

     will not include data declassified or removed from the

     Restricted Data category pursuant to Section 142 of the

     Atomic Energy Act of 1954.



60.       Safeguarding.



     a.   All measures taken to minimize the possibility of

          compromise of classified information including

          accountability, control, and storage of classified

          material; and



     b.   All measures taken to protect unclassified property

          warranting special protection.



61.  Secret Information.  Only information that could

     reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to the

     national security if disclosed to unauthorized persons.



62.  Security Area.  A physically defined area established for

     the protection or security of facilities, property, or

     classified information and material in the possession or

     custody of NASA or a NASA contractor located at a NASA

     Installation or component Installation, entry to which is

     subject to security measures, procedures, or controls.



63.  Security Officer.  The Installation Security Officer of a

     NASA Field Installation or the Chief, NASA Security

     Office.



64.  Security Storage Equipment.  Any security filing cabinet,

     safe, safe-type filing cabinet, modified steel filing

     cabinet, vault, vault-type room, or other storage

     container or equipment specifically approved by the

     Security Officer for the storage of classified material.



65.  Security Violation (Infraction).  A failure to comply

     with or observe security regulations or procedures

     established to safeguard classified information but has

     not resulted in the loss or compromise of the information

     involved (see Compromise).



66.  SDI - Single Scope Background Investigation update.



67.  SGI - Single Scope Background Investigation upgrade.



68.  Short Title.  A brief, unclassified identifying

     combination of words, letters or numbers assigned to a

     specific classified document or item of material for the

     purpose of brevity and security.



69.  Special Access Program.  Any program imposing

     need-to-know or access controls beyond those normally

     provided for access to Confidential, Secret, or Top

     Secret information.  Such a program includes, but is not

     limited to, special clearance, adjudication, or

     investigative requirements, special designation of

     officials authorized to determine need-to-know, or

     special lists of persons determined to have a

     need-to-know.



70.  Top Secret Information.   Only that information that

     could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave

     damage to the national security if disclosed to

     unauthorized persons.



71.  Unauthorized Person.



     a.   Any person not authorized to have access to specific

          classified information in accordance with the access

          provisions of this Handbook; or



     b.   Any person who enters a Security Area without proper

          authorization.



72.  United States and Its Territories.  The 50 States; the

     District of Columbia; the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico;

     the Territories of Guam, American Samoa, and the Virgin

     Islands; the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; the

     Canal Zone; and the Possessions, Midway, and Wake

     Islands.



73.  Upgrade.  A determination made in the interests of

     national security that certain classified information

     requires a higher degree of protection against

     unauthorized disclosure than currently provided, together

     with a change in the classification designation to

     reflect the higher degree.



74.  Visit.



     a.   Classified Visit.  A visit involving the authorized

          disclosure of classified information.



     b.   Unclassified Visit.  A visit that does not involve

          the disclosure of classified information.



75.   Visitor.



     a.   Any person who is admitted to a NASA Field

          Installation other than a NASA employee of that

          Installation; and



     b.   A NASA employee visiting another agency or

          contractor.



76.  Work Document.  Any note, draft, preliminary copy of a

     page of a document, or a form used to collect data for

     inclusion in a document, which is prepared prior to

     incorporation into a master or final copy.







       APPENDIX C:  PERSONNEL SECURITY ADJUDICATION POLICY



GENERAL



The following adjudication policy has been developed to assist

NASA adjudicators in making determinations about an

individual's eligibility for employment or retention in

sensitive duties or eligibility for access to classified

information.  Refer also to Appendix V and W.



While reasonable consistency in reaching adjudicative

determinations is desirable, the nature and complexities of

human behavior preclude the development of a single set of

guidelines or policies that is equally applicable in every

personnel security case.  Accordingly, the following

adjudication policy is not intended to be interpreted as

inflexible rules of procedure.  The following policy requires

that each adjudicator has successfully passed the Department

of Defense (DOD) Personnel Security Adjudication course as

well as attended the suitability and security adjudication

course provided by the Office of Personnel Management.  The

adjudicator's sound judgment, mature thinking, and careful

analysis of each case must be weighed on its own merits,

taking into consideration all relevant circumstances, and

prior experience in similar cases as well as the guidelines

contained in the adjudication policy, which have been compiled

from common experience in personnel security determinations.



Each adjudication is to be an overall common sense

determination based upon consideration and assessment of all

available information, both favorable and unfavorable, with

particular emphasis being placed on the seriousness, recency,

frequency, and motivation for the individual's conduct; the

extent to which conduct was negligent, willful, voluntary, or

undertaken with knowledge of the circumstances or consequences

involved; and, to the extent that it can be estimated, the

probability that conduct will or will not continue in the

future.  The listed "Disqualifying Factors" and "Mitigating

Factors" in this set of Adjudication Policies reflect the

consideration of those factors of seriousness, recency,

frequency, motivation, etc., to common situations and types of

behavior encountered in personnel security adjudications, and

should be followed whenever an individual case can be measured

against this policy guidance.  Common sense may occasionally

necessitate deviations from this policy guidance, but such

deviations should not be made frequently and must be carefully

explained and documented.



The "Disqualifying Factors" provided herein establish some of

the types of serious conduct under the criteria that can

justify a determination to deny or revoke an individual's

eligibility for access to classified information, or

appointment to, or retention in sensitive duties.  The

"Mitigating Factors" establish some of the types of

circumstances that may mitigate the conduct listed under the

"Disqualifying Factors."  Any determination must include a

consideration of both the conduct listed under "Disqualifying

Factors" and any circumstances listed under the appropriate or

corresponding "Mitigating Factors."



In all adjudications, the protection of the national security

shall be the paramount determinant.  In the last analysis, a

final decision in each case must be arrived at by applying the

standard that the issuance of the clearance or assignment to

the sensitive position is "clearly consistent with the

interests of national security."



LOYALTY



Basis:  Commission of any act of sabotage, espionage, treason,

terrorism, anarchy, sedition, or attempts thereat or

preparation therefor, or conspiring with or aiding or abetting

another to commit or attempt to commit any such act. 

Establishing or continuing a sympathetic association with a

saboteur, spy, traitor, seditionist, anarchist, terrorist,

revolutionist, or with an espionage or other secret agent or

similar representative of a foreign nation whose interests may

be inimical to the interests of the United States, or with any

person who advocates the use of force or violence to overthrow

the Government of the United States or to alter the form of

Government of the United States by unconstitutional means.

Advocacy or use of force or violence to overthrow the

Government of the United States or to alter the form of

Government of the United States by unconstitutional means. 

Knowing membership with the specific intent of furthering the

aims of, or adherence to and active participation in any

foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group

or combination of persons (hereafter referred to as

organizations) that unlawfully advocates or practices the

commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from

exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the

United States or of any State or which seeks to overthrow the

Government of the United States or any State or subdivision

thereof by unlawful means.



Disqualifying Factors



The behavior falls in one or more of the following categories:



1.   Furnishing a representative of a foreign government

     information or data that could damage the national

     security of the United States.



2.   Membership in an organization that has been characterized

     by the Department of Justice as one that meets the

     criteria in the above cited "Basis."



3.    Knowing participation in acts that involve force or

     violence or threats of force or violence to prevent

     others from exercising their rights under the

     Constitution or to overthrow or alter the form of

     government of the United States or of any State.



4.   Monetary contributions, service, or other support of the

     organization defined in "Basis," above, with the intent

     of furthering the unlawful objectives of the

     organization.



5.   Participation, support, aid, comfort or sympathetic

     association with persons, groups, organizations involved

     in terrorist activities, threats, or acts.



6.   Evidence of continuing sympathy with the unlawful aims

     and objectives of such an organization, as defined in the

     "Basis" above.



7.   Holding a position of major doctrinal or managerial

     influence in an organization as defined in the "Basis"

     above.



Mitigating Factors



The following circumstances may mitigate disqualifying

information:



1.   Lack of knowledge or understanding of other unlawful aims

     of the organization.



2.   Affiliation or activity occurred during adolescent/young

     adult years (17-25), more than 5 years has passed since

     affiliation was severed, and affiliation was due to

     immaturity.



3.   Affiliation for less than a year out of curiosity or

     academic interest.



4.   Sympathy or support limited to the lawful objectives of

     the organization.



FOREIGN PREFERENCE



Basis:  Performing or attempting to perform one's duties,

acceptance and active maintenance of dual citizenship or other

acts conducted in a manner that serve or could be expected to

serve the interests of another government in preference to the

interests of the United States.



Disqualifying Factors



The behavior falls in one or more of the following categories:



1.   The active maintenance of dual citizenship by one or more

     of the following:



     a.   Possession of a passport issued by a foreign nation

          and use of this passport to obtain legal entry into

          any sovereign state in preference to use of a U.S.

          passport.



     b.   Military service in the armed forces of a foreign

          nation or the willingness to comply with an

          obligation to so serve, or the willingness to bear

          arms at any time in the future on behalf of the

          foreign state.



     c.   Exercise or acceptance of rights, privileges or

          benefits offered by the foreign state to its

          citizens (e.g., voting in a foreign election;

          receipt of honors or titles; financial compensation

          due to employment/retirement, educational or medical

          or other social welfare benefits), in preference to

          those of the United States.



     d.   Travel to or residence in the foreign state for the

          purpose of fulfilling citizenship requirements or

          obligations.



     e.   Maintenance of dual citizenship to protect financial

          interests, to include property ownership, or

          employment or inheritance rights in the foreign

          state.



     f.   Registration for military service or registration

          with a foreign office, embassy or consulate to

          obtain benefits.



2.   Employment as an agent or other official representative

     of a foreign government, or seeking or holding political

     office in a foreign state.



3.   Use of a U.S. Government position of trust or

     responsibility to influence decisions to serve the

     interests of another government in preference to those of

     the United States.



Mitigating Factors



The following circumstances may mitigate disqualifying

information:



1.   Claim of dual citizenship is with a foreign country whose

     interests are not inimical to those of the United States

     and is based solely on applicant's or applicant's

     parent(s) birth; the applicant has not actively

     maintained citizenship in the past 10 years and indicates

     he/she will not in the future act so as to pursue this

     claim.



2.   Military service while a U.S. citizen was in the armed

     forces of a state whose interests are not inimical to

     those of the United States and such service was

     officially sanctioned by United States authorities.



3.   Employment is as a consultant only and services provided

     is of the type sanctioned by the United States

     government.



SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY SAFEGUARDS



Basis:  Disregard of public law, statutes, Executive orders or

regulations, including violation of security regulations or

practices, or unauthorized disclosure to any person of

classified information, or of other information, disclosure of

which is prohibited by statute, Executive order or regulation.



Disqualifying Factors



The behavior falls in one or more of the following categories:



1.   Deliberate or reckless disregard of security regulations,

     public law, statutes or Executive orders that could have

     resulted in the loss or compromise of classified

     information.



2.   Deliberate or reckless violations of security

     regulations, including, but not limited to, taking

     classified information home or carrying classified data

     while in a travel status without proper authorization,

     intentionally copying classified documents to obscure

     classification markings, disseminating classified

     information to cleared personnel who have no need to

     know, or disclosing classified information, or other

     information, disclosure of which is prohibited by

     statute, Executive order or regulation, to persons who

     are not cleared or authorized to receive it.



3.   Pattern of negligent conduct in handling or storing

     classified documents.



Mitigating Factors



The following circumstances may mitigate disqualifying

information:



1.   Violation of security procedures was directly caused or

     significantly contributed to by an improper or inadequate

     security briefing, provided the individual reasonably

     relied on such briefing in good faith.



2.   Individual is personally responsible for a large volume

     of classified information, and the nature of the

     violation was merely administrative.



3.   Security violation was merely an isolated incident not

     involving deliberate or reckless violation of security

     policies, practices or procedures.



CRIMINAL CONDUCT



Basis:  Criminal or dishonest conduct



When it is determined that an applicant for a security

clearance, or a person holding a clearance, has engaged in

conduct that would constitute a felony under the laws of the

United States, the clearance of such person shall be denied or

revoked unless it is determined that there are compelling

reasons to grant or continue such clearance.  Compelling

reasons can only be shown by clear and convincing evidence of

the following:



     1.   The felonious conduct (l) did not involve an

          exceptionally grave offense; (2) was an isolated

          episode; and (3) the individual has demonstrated

          trustworthiness and respect for the law over an

          extended period since the offense occurred; or



     2.   The felonious conduct (1) did not involve an

          exceptionally grave offense; (2) was an isolated

          episode; (3) was due to the immaturity of the

          individual at the time it occurred; and (4) the

          individual has demonstrated maturity,

          trustworthiness, and respect for the law since that

          time; or



     3.   In cases where the individual has committed

          felonious conduct but was not convicted of a felony,

          there are extenuating circumstances that mitigate

          the seriousness of the conduct such that it does not

          reflect a lack of trustworthiness or respect for the

          law.



The above criteria supersede all criteria previously used to

adjudicate criminal conduct involving commission of felonies

under the Laws of the United States.  Involvement in criminal

activities that does not constitute a felony under the laws of

the United States shall be evaluated in accordance with the

criteria set forth below.  (For purposes of this paragraph,

the term "felony" means any crime punishable by imprisonment

for more than a year.  The term "exceptionally grave offense"

includes crimes against the Federal Government, its

instrumentalities, officers, employees or agents; or involves

dishonesty, fraud, bribery or false statement; or involves

breach of trust or fiduciary duty; or involves serious threat

to life or public safety.)



Disqualifying Factors



The behavior falls in one or more of the following categories:



1.   Criminal conduct that involves the following:



     a.   Commission of a state felony;



     b.   Force, coercion, or intimidation;



     c.   Firearms, explosives, or other weapons;



     d.   Dishonesty or false statements, e.g., fraud, theft,

          embezzlement, falsification of documents or

          statements;



     e.   Obstruction or corruption of government functions;



     f.   Deprivation of civil rights; or



     g.   Violence against persons.



2.   Criminal conduct punishable by confinement for one year

     or more.



3.   An established pattern of criminal conduct, whether or

     not the individual was convicted.



4.   Failure to complete a rehabilitation program resulting

     from disposition of a criminal proceeding or violation of

     probation, even if the violation did not result in formal

     revocation of probation. Rehabilitation should not be

     considered a success or failure while the individual is

     still on parole/probation.



5.   Criminal conduct that is so recent in time as to preclude

     a determination that recurrence is unlikely.



6.   Close and continuing association with persons known to

     the individual to be involved in criminal activities.



7.   Criminal conduct indicative of a serious mental

     aberration, lack of remorse, or insufficient probability

     of rehabilitative success (e.g., spouse or child abuse).



8.   Disposition:



     a.   Conviction.



     b.   Disposition on a legal issue not going to the merits

          of the crime.



     c.   Arrest or indictment pending trial when there is

          evidence that the individual engaged in the criminal

          conduct for which arrested or indicted.



9.   Arrest record.  In evaluating an arrest record,

     information that indicates that the individual was

     acquitted, that the charges were dropped or the subject

     of a "stet" or "nolle prosequi," that the record was

     expunged, or that the cause was dismissed due to error

     not going to the merits, does not negate the security

     significance of the underlying conduct.  Personnel

     security determinations are to be made on the basis of

     all available information concerning a person's conduct

     and actions rather than the legal outcome of a criminal

     proceeding.



Mitigating Factors



The following circumstances may mitigate disqualifying

information:



1.   Immaturity attributable to the age of the individual at

     the time of the offense;



2.   Extenuating circumstances surrounding the offense;



3.   Circumstances indicating that the actual offense was less

     serious than the offense charged;



4.   Isolated nature of the conduct;



5.   Conduct occurring only in the distant past (such as more

     than 5 years ago) in the absence of subsequent criminal

     conduct; or



6.   Transitory conditions directly or significantly

     contributing to the conduct (such as divorce action,

     death in family, severe provocation) in the absence of

     subsequent criminal conduct.



MENTAL OR EMOTIONAL DISORDERS



Basis:  Any behavior or illness, including any mental

condition, which, in the opinion of competent medical

authority, may cause a defect in judgment or reliability with

due regard to the transient or continuing effect of the

illness and the medical findings in such case.



Disqualifying Factors



The behavior or condition falls in one or more of the

following categories:



1.   Diagnosis by competent medical authority (board certified

     psychiatrist or clinical psychologist) that the

     individual has an illness or mental condition that may

     result in a significant defect in judgment or

     reliability.



2.   Conduct or personality traits that are bizarre or reflect

     abnormal behavior or instability even though there has

     been no history of mental illness or treatment, but that

     nevertheless, in the opinion of competent medical

     authority, may cause a defect in judgment or reliability.



3.   A diagnosis by competent medical authority that the

     individual suffers from mental or intellectual

     incompetence or mental retardation to a degree

     significant enough to establish or suggest that the

     individual could not recognize, understand or comprehend

     the necessity of security regulations, or procedures, or

     that judgment or reliability is significantly impaired,

     or that the individual could be influenced or swayed to

     act contrary to the national security.



4.   Diagnosis by competent medical authority that an illness

     or condition that had affected judgment or reliability

     may recur even though the individual currently manifests

     no symptoms, or that symptoms are currently reduced or in

     remission.



5.   Failure to take prescribed medication or participate in

     treatment (including follow-up treatment or aftercare),

     or otherwise failing to follow medical advice relating to

     treatment of the illness or mental condition.



Mitigating Factors



The following circumstances may mitigate disqualifying

information:



1.   Diagnosis by competent medical authority that an

     individual's previous mental or emotional illness or

     condition that did cause significant defect in judgment

     or reliability is cured and has no probability of

     recurrence, or that there is such a minimal probability

     of recurrence as to reasonably estimate there will be

     none.



2.   The contributing factors or circumstances that caused the

     bizarre conduct or traits, abnormal behavior, or defect

     in judgment and reliability have been eliminated or

     rectified; there is a corresponding alleviation of the

     individual's condition and the contributing factors or

     circumstances are not expected to recur.



3.   Evidence of the individual's continued reliable use of

     prescribed medication for a period of at least 2 years,

     without recurrence and testimony by competent medical

     authority that continued maintenance of prescribed

     medication is medically practical and likely to preclude

     recurrence of the illness or condition affecting judgment

     or reliability.



4.   There has been no evidence of a psychotic condition, a

     serious or disabling neurotic disorder, or a serious

     character or personality disorder for the past 10 years.



FOREIGN CONNECTIONS/VULNERABILITY TO BLACKMAIL OR COERCION



Basis:   Vulnerability to coercion, influence, or pressure

that may cause conduct contrary to the national interest. 

This may be (l) the presence of immediate family members or

other persons to whom the applicant is bonded by affection or

obligation in a nation (or areas under its domination) whose

interests may be inimical to the United States, or (2) any

other circumstances that could cause the applicant to be

vulnerable.



Disqualifying Factors



The behavior falls in one or more of the following categories:



1.   Indications that the individual now is being blackmailed,

     pressured or coerced by any individual, group,

     association, organization or government.



2.   Indications that a vulnerable individual actually has

     been targeted and/or approached for possible blackmail,

     coercion or pressure by any individual, group,

     association, organization, or government.



3.   Indications that the individual has acted to increase the

     vulnerability for future possible blackmail, coercion or

     pressure by any individual, group, association,

     organization or governments, especially by or in a

     country designated hostile to the United States (see

     Appendix F). Indicators include, but are not limited to

     the following:



     a.   Failure to report to security officials any

          evidence, indication or suspicion that mail to

          relatives has been opened, unusually delayed or

          tampered with in any way, or that telephone calls

          have been monitored.



     b.   An increase in curiosity or official or

          quasi-official inquiries about the individual to

          relatives in the country where they reside

          occasioned by the receipt of mail, packages,

          telephone calls or visits from the individual.



     c.   Contact with, or visits by, officials to the

          individual while visiting relatives in another

          country, to learn more about the individual, or the

          individual's employment or residence, etc.



     d.   Unreported attempts to obtain classified or other

          sensitive information or data by representatives of

          a foreign country.



4.   Conduct or actions by the individual while visiting in a

     country hostile to the United States that increase the

     individual's vulnerability to be targeted for possible

     blackmail, coercion, or pressure.  These include, but are

     not limited to the following:



     a.   Violation of any laws of the foreign country where

          relatives reside during visits or through mailing

          letters or packages (e.g., smuggling, currency

          exchange violations, unauthorized mailings,

          violations of postal regulations of the country, or

          any criminal conduct, including traffic violations)

          that may call the attention of officials to the

          individual.



     b.   Frequent and regular visits, correspondence, or

          telephone contact with relatives in the country

          where they reside, increasing the likelihood of

          official notice.



     c.   Failure to report to security officials those

          inquiries by friends or relatives for more than a

          normal level of curiosity concerning the

          individual's employment, sensitive duties, military

          service, or access to classified information.



     d.   Repeated telephone or written requests to the

          foreign government officials for official favors,

          permits, visas, travel permission, or similar

          requests that increase the likelihood of official

          notice.



     e.   Reckless conduct, open or public misbehavior or

          commission of acts contrary to local customs or

          laws, or that violate the mores of the foreign

          country and increase the likelihood of official

          notice.



     f.   Falsification of documents, lying to officials,

          harassing or taunting officials or otherwise acting

          to cause an increase in the likelihood of official

          notice or to increase the individual's vulnerability

          because personal freedom could be jeopardized.



     g.   Commission of any illicit sexual act, drug purchase

          or use, drunkenness or similar conduct that

          increases the likelihood of official notice, or that

          increases the individual's vulnerability because

          personal freedom could be jeopardized.



5.   Conduct or actions by the individual that increase the

     individual's vulnerability to possible coercion,

     blackmail or pressure, regardless of the country in which

     it occurred, including, but not limited to the following:



     a.   Concealment or attempts to conceal from an employer

          prior unfavorable employment history, criminal

          conduct, mental or emotional disorders or treatment,

          drug or alcohol use, sexual preference, or sexual

          misconduct described under that section below, or

          fraudulent credentials or qualifications for

          employment.



     b.   Concealment or attempts to conceal from immediate

          family members, or close associates, supervisors or

          coworkers, criminal conduct, mental or emotional

          disorders or treatment, drug or alcohol abuse,

          sexual preference, or sexual misconduct described

          under that section below.



Mitigating Factors



The following circumstances may mitigate disqualifying

information:



1.   Receives no financial assistance from and provides no

     financial assistance to persons or organizations in the

     designated country.



2.   Has been in the United States for at least 5 years since

     becoming a U.S. citizen without significant contact with

     persons or organizations from the designated country

     (each year of active service in the United States

     military may be counted).



3.   Has close ties of affection to immediate family members

     in the United States.



4.   Has adapted to the lifestyle in the United States,

     established substantive financial or other associations

     with U.S. enterprises or community activities.



5.   Prefers the way of life and form of the U.S. Government

     over the other country.



6.   Is willing to defend the United States against all

     threats, including the designated country in question.



7.   Has not divulged the degree of association with the U.S.

     Government or access to classified information to

     individuals in the designated country in question.



8.   Has not been contacted or approached by anyone or any

     organization from a designated country to provide

     information or favors, or to otherwise act for a person

     or organization in the designated country in question.



9.   Has promptly reported to proper authorities all attempted

     contacts, requests or threats from persons or

     organizations from the designated country.



10.  The individual is aware of the possible vulnerability to

     attempts of blackmail or coercion and has taken positive

     steps to reduce or eliminate such vulnerability.



FINANCIAL MATTERS



Basis:  Excessive indebtedness, recurring financial

difficulties, or unexplained affluence.



Disqualifying Factors



The behavior falls in one or more of the following categories:



1.   History of bad debts, garnishments, liens, repossessions,

     unfavorable judgments, delinquent or uncollectible

     accounts or debts written off by creditors as

     uncollectible losses with little or no apparent or

     voluntary effort by the individual to pay amounts owed.



2.   Bankruptcy:



     a.   Due to financial irresponsibility, or



     b.   With continuing financial irresponsibility

          thereafter.



3.   Indebtedness aggravated or caused by gambling, alcohol,

     drug abuse, or other factors indicating poor judgment or

     financial irresponsibility.



4.   A history or pattern of living beyond the person's

     financial means or ability to pay, a lifestyle reflecting

     irresponsible expenditures that exceed income or assets,

     or a history or pattern of writing checks on closed

     accounts or not covered by sufficient funds. 



5.   Indication of deceit or deception in obtaining credit or

     bank accounts, misappropriation of funds, income tax

     evasion, embezzlement, fraud, or attempts to evade lawful

     creditors.



6.   Indifference to or disregard of financial obligations or

     indebtedness or intention not to meet or satisfy lawful

     financial obligations or when present expenses exceed net

     income.



7.   Unexplained affluence or income derived from illegal

     gambling, drug trafficking or other criminal or nefarious

     means.



8.   Significant unexplained increase in an individual's net

     worth.



Mitigating Factors



The following circumstances may mitigate disqualifying

information:



1.   Schedule program or systematic efforts demonstrated over

     a period of time (generally 1 year) to satisfy creditors,

     to acknowledge debts and arrange for reduced payments,

     entry into debt-consolidation program or seeking the

     advice and assistance of financial counselors or court

     supervised payment program.



2.   Change to a more responsible lifestyle, reduction of

     credit card accounts, and favorable change in financial

     habits over a period of time (generally 1 year).



3.   Stable employment record and favorable financial

     references.



4.   Unforeseen circumstances beyond the individual's control

     (e.g., a major or catastrophic illness or surgery,

     accidental loss of property or assets not covered by

     insurance, decrease or cutoff of income, indebtedness

     resulting from court judgments not due to the

     individual's financial mismanagement), provided the

     individual demonstrates efforts to respond to the

     indebtedness in a reasonable and responsible fashion.



5.   Indebtedness due to failure of legitimate business

     efforts or business-related bankruptcy without evidence

     of fault or financial irresponsibility on the part of the

     individual, irresponsible mismanagement of an

     individual's fund by another who had fiduciary control or

     access to them without the individual's knowledge, or

     loss of assets as a victim of fraud or deceit, provided

     the individual demonstrates efforts to respond to the

     indebtedness in a reasonable and responsible fashion.



6.   Any significant increase in net worth was due to

     legitimate business interests, inheritance or similar

     legal explanation.



ALCOHOL ABUSE



Basis:  Habitual or episodic use of intoxicants to excess.



Disqualifying Factors



The behavior falls in one or more of the following categories:



1.   Habitual or episodic consumption of alcohol to the point

     of impairment or intoxication.



2.   Alcohol-related incidents such as traffic violations,

     fighting, child or spouse abuse, non-traffic violation or

     other criminal incidents related to alcohol use.



3.   Deterioration of the individual's health or physical or

     mental condition owing to alcohol use or abuse.



4.   Drinking on the job, reporting for work in an intoxicated

     or "hungover" condition, tardiness or absences caused by

     or related to alcohol abuse, and impairment or

     intoxication occurring during, and immediately following,

     luncheon breaks.



5.    Refusal or failure to accept counseling or professional

     help for alcohol abuse or alcoholism.



6.   Refusal or failure to follow medical advice relating to

     alcohol abuse treatment or to abstain from alcohol use

     despite medical or professional advice.



7.   Refusal or failure to significantly decrease consumption

     of alcohol or to change lifestyle and habits that

     contributed to past alcohol-related difficulties.



8.   Indications of financial or other irresponsibility or

     unreliability caused by alcohol abuse, or discussing

     sensitive or classified information while drinking.



9.   Failure to cooperate in or successfully complete a

     prescribed regimen of an alcohol abuse rehabilitation

     program.



Mitigating Factors



The following circumstances may mitigate disqualifying

information:



1.   Successfully completed an alcohol awareness program

     following two or less alcohol-related incidents and has

     significantly reduced alcohol consumption, and made

     positive changes in lifestyle and improvement in job

     reliability.



2.   Successfully completed an alcohol rehabilitation program

     after three or more alcohol-related incidents, has

     significantly reduced or eliminated alcohol consumption

     in accordance with medical or professional advice,

     regularly attended Alcoholics Anonymous or similar

     support organization for approximately 1 year after

     rehabilitation, and abstained from the use of alcohol for

     that period of time.



3.   Whenever one of the situations listed below occurs, the

     individual must have successfully completed an alcohol

     rehabilitation or detoxification program and totally

     abstained from alcohol for a period of approximately 2

     years:



     a.   The individual has had one previously failed

          rehabilitation program and subsequent alcohol abuse

          or alcohol-related incidents.



     b.   The individual has been diagnosed by competent

          medical or health authority as an alcoholic,

          alcoholic dependent, or chronic abuser of alcohol.



4.   Whenever the individual has had repeated unsuccessful

     rehabilitation efforts and has continued drinking or has

     been involved in additional alcohol-related incidents

     then the individual must have successfully completed an

     alcohol rehabilitation or detoxification program, totally

     abstained from alcohol for a period of at least 3 years

     and maintained regular and frequent participation in

     meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous or similar

     organizations.



5.   If an individual's alcohol abuse surfaced solely as a

     result of self- referral to an alcohol abuse program and

     there have been no precipitating factors such as alcohol-

     related arrests or incidents, action will not normally be

     taken to suspend or revoke security clearance solely on

     the self-referral for treatment.



DRUG ABUSE



Basis:  Illegal or improper use, possession, transfer, sale or

addiction to any controlled or psychoactive substance,

including narcotics, such as cannabis, or any other dangerous

drug.



Disqualifying Factors



The behavior falls in one or more of the following categories:



1.   Abuse of cannabis only, not in combination with any other

     substance.



     a.   Experimental abuse, defined as an average of once

          every 2 months or less, but no more than six times

          within the past 2 years.



     b.   Occasional abuse, defined as an average of not more

          than once a month within the past 3 years.



     c.   Frequent abuse, defined as an average of not more

          than once a week within the past 5 years.



     d.   Regular, compulsive, or habitual abuse, including

          physical and/or psychological dependency defined as

          an average of more than once a week within the past

          15 years.



2.   Abuse of any narcotic, psychoactive substance or

     dangerous drug (including prescription drugs) either

     alone or in combination with another or cannabis, as

     follows:



     a.   Experimental abuse, defined as an average of once

          every 2 months or less, but no more than 6 times

          within the past 3 years.



     b.   Occasional abuse, defined as an average of not more

          than once a month within the past 5 years.



     c.   Frequent abuse, defined as an average of not more

          than once a week within the past 10 years.



     d.   Regular, compulsive, or habitual abuse, including

          physical and/or psychological dependency defined as

          an average of more than once a week within the past

          15 years.



3.   Involvement to any degree in the unauthorized

     trafficking, cultivating, processing, manufacturing,

     selling, or distributing of any narcotic, dangerous drug,

     or cannabis, or assisting those involved in such acts

     whether or not the individual was arrested for such

     activity.  (Note:  There is no corresponding Mitigating

     Factor for this Disqualifying Factor.)



4.   Involvement with narcotics, dangerous drugs or cannabis

     under the following conditions whether or not the

     individual engages in personal use:



     a.   Possession.



     b.   Possession of a substantial amount, more than could

          reasonably be expected for personal use.



     c.   Possession of drug paraphernalia for cultivating,

          manufacturing or distributing (e.g., possession of

          gram scales, smoking devices, needles for injecting

          intravenously, empty capsules or other drug

          production chemical paraphernalia).



     d.   Possession of personal drug paraphernalia (e.g.,

          needles for injecting, smoking devices and

          equipment, etc.).



5.   Information that the individual intends to continue to

     use (regardless of frequency) any narcotic, dangerous

     drug or cannabis.  (NOTE: There is no corresponding

     Mitigating Factor for this Disqualifying Factor because

     it is NASA policy that, as a general rule, if any

     individual expresses or implies any intent to continue

     use of any narcotic, dangerous drug, or other controlled

     substance, including marijuana and hashish, without a

     prescription, in any amount and regardless of frequency,

     it is to be considered contrary to the national interest

     and the interests of national security to grant or allow

     retention of a security clearance for access to

     classified information for that individual.)



Mitigating Factors



The following circumstances may mitigate disqualifying

information:



1.   Abuse of cannabis only, as follows:  (Use this to assess

     Disqualifying Factor 1.)



     a.   Experimental abuse, which occurred more than 2 years

          ago and the individual has demonstrated an intent

          not to use cannabis or any other narcotic,

          psychoactive substance, or dangerous drug in the

          future.



     b.   Occasional abuse of cannabis, which occurred more

          than 3 years ago, and the individual has

          demonstrated an intent not to use cannabis or any

          other narcotic, dangerous drug, or psychoactive

          substance in the future.



     c.   Frequent abuse of cannabis occurred more than 5

          years ago, and the individual has demonstrated an

          intent not to use cannabis or any other narcotic,

          dangerous drug, or psychoactive substance in the

          future.



     d.   Regular compulsive, habitual use or physical or

          psychological dependency on cannabis occurred more

          than 15 years ago.  The individual has demonstrated

          an intent not to use cannabis or any other narcotic,

          dangerous drug, or psychoactive substance in the

          future and has demonstrated a stable lifestyle, with

          no indication of physical or psychological

          dependence.



2.   For abuse other than cannabis alone.  Use is considered

     cumulative and each separate substance must not be

     considered separately.  (Use this to assess Disqualifying

     Factor 2.)



     a.   Experimental abuse occurred more 3 years ago, the

          individual has demonstrated an intent not to use any

          drugs or cannabis in the future and has successfully

          completed a drug rehabilitation program.



     b.   Occasional abuse occurred more than 5 years ago, the

          individual has demonstrated an intent not to use any

          drugs or cannabis in the future, has a stable

          lifestyle and satisfactory employment record, and

          has successfully completed a drug rehabilitation

          program.



     c.   Frequent abuse occurred more than 10 years ago, the

          individual has demonstrated an intent not to use any

          drugs or cannabis in the future, has a stable

          lifestyle, including satisfactory employment record

          with no further indication of drug abuse, and has

          successfully completed a drug rehabilitation

          program.



     d.   Compulsive abuse occurred more than 15 years ago,

          the individual has demonstrated an intent not to use

          any drugs or cannabis in the future, has a stable

          lifestyle, including satisfactory employment record

          with no further indication of drug abuse, and has

          successfully completed a drug rehabilitation

          program.



3.   Use this only to assess conduct under Disqualifying

     Factor 4 in the corresponding subparagraphs.



     a.   No possession of drugs or other criminal activity in

          the past 2 years.



     b.   The individual has not possessed drugs in the past 3

          years, has had no other criminal activity in the

          past 3 years and has demonstrated an intent not to

          be involved in such activity in the future.



     c.   The individual has not possessed drug paraphernalia

          used to process, manufacture or distribute for the

          past 5 years, has had no other criminal activity in

          the past 5 years and has demonstrated an intent not

          to be involved in such activity in 

          the future.



     d.   The individual has not possessed drug paraphernalia

          for personal use in the past 2 years, has had no

          other criminal activity in the past 2 years and has

          demonstrated an intent not to be involved in such

          activity in the future.



4.   For the purpose of this Handbook, Narcotic, Dangerous

     Drug and Cannabis are defined as follows:



     a.   Narcotic.  Opium and opium derivatives or synthetic

          substitutes.



     b.   Dangerous Drug.  Any of the non-narcotic drugs that

          are habit forming or have a potential for abuse

          because of their stimulant, depressant, or

          hallucinogenic effect.



     c.   Cannabis.  The intoxicating products of the hemp

          plant, Cannabis Sativa, including but not limited to

          marijuana, hashish, and hashish oil.



FALSIFICATION



Basis:  Any knowing and willful falsification, cover-up,

concealment, misrepresentation, or omission of a material fact

from any written or oral statement, document, form, or other

representation or device used by NASA or any other Federal

agency.



Disqualifying Factors



The behavior falls in one or more of the following categories:



1.   Deliberate omission, concealment, falsification or

     misrepresentation of relevant and material facts

     including, but not limited to, information concerning

     arrests, drug abuse or treatment, alcohol abuse or

     treatment, treatment for mental or emotional disorders,

     bankruptcy, military service information, organizational

     affiliations, financial problems, employment, foreign

     travel, or foreign connections from any Personnel

     Security Questionnaire, Personal History Statement or

     similar form used by any Federal agency to conduct

     investigations, determine employment qualifications,

     award benefits or status, determine security clearance or

     access eligibility, or award fiduciary responsibilities.



2.   Deliberately providing false or misleading information

     concerning any of the relevant and material matters

     listed above to an investigator, employer, supervisor,

     security official or other official representative in

     connection with application for security clearance or

     access to classified information or assignment to

     sensitive duties.



Mitigating Factors



The following circumstances may mitigate disqualifying

information:



1.   The information was not relevant or material to reaching

     a security clearance or access determination.



2.   The falsification was an isolated incident in the distant

     past (more than 5 years) and the individual subsequently

     had accurately provided correct information voluntarily

     during reapplication for clearance or access, and there

     is no evidence of any other falsification

     misrepresentation or dishonest conduct by the individual.



3.   The behavior was not willful.



4.   The falsification was done unknowingly or without the

     individual's knowledge.



5.   The individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct

     the falsification before being confronted with the facts

     of falsification.



6.   Omission of material fact was caused by or significantly

     contributed to by improper or inadequate advice of

     authorized personnel, provided the individual reasonably

     relied on such improper or inadequate advice in good

     faith, and when the requirement subsequently was made

     known to the individual, the previously omitted

     information was promptly and fully provided.



REFUSAL TO ANSWER



Basis:  Failing or refusing to answer or to authorize others

to answer questions or provide information required by a

Congressional committee, court or agency in the course of an

official inquiry whenever such answers or information concern

relevant and material matters pertinent to an evaluation of

the individual's trustworthiness, reliability, and judgment.



Disqualifying Factors



The behavior falls in one or more of the following categories:



1.   Failure or refusal to provide full, frank and truthful

     answers or to authorize others to do so, in connection

     with any application for security clearance or access, to

     include required nondisclosure and security termination

     agreements.



2.   Failure or refusal to provide appropriate investigative

     forms, including release forms, for use by investigators

     in obtaining information from medical institutions,

     agencies or personal physicians, therapists,

     psychologists, psychiatrists, counselors, rehabilitation

     treatment, agencies or personnel; from police or criminal

     agencies, probation agencies or officers, financial

     institutions, employers, Federal or State agencies,

     professional associations, or any other organizations as

     required as part of an investigation for security

     clearance, access, appointment, or assignment to

     sensitive duties.



3.   Failure or refusal to authorize others to provide

     relevant and material information necessary to reach a

     security clearance determination.



4.   Failure or refusal to answer questions or provide

     information required by a Congressional committee, court,

     or agency when such answers or information concern

     relevant and material matters pertinent to evaluating the

     individual's trustworthiness, reliability and judgment.



Mitigating Factors



The following circumstances may mitigate disqualifying

information:



1.   The individual was unable to provide the information

     despite good faith and reasonable efforts to do so.



2.   The individual was unaware of the necessity to provide

     the information requested or of the possible consequences

     of such refusal or failure to provide the information

     and, upon being made aware of this requirement, fully,

     frankly, and truthfully provided the requested

     information.



3.   The individual sought and relied in good faith on

     information and advice from legal counsel or other

     officials that the individual was not required to provide

     the information requested and, upon being made aware of

     the requirement, fully, frankly, and truthfully provided

     the requested information.



SEXUAL MISCONDUCT



Basis:  Acts of sexual misconduct or perversion indicative of

moral turpitude, poor judgment, or lack of regard for the laws

of society.



Disqualifying Factors



1.   Behavior falls in one or more of the following

     categories;



     a.   Acts performed or committed in open or public

          places;



     b.   Acts performed with a minor or with animals;



     c.   Acts involving inducement, coercion, force,

          violence, or intimidation of another person;



     d.   Prostitution, pandering, or the commission of sexual

          acts for money or other remuneration or reward;



     e.   Sexual harassment;



     f.   Self-mutilation, self-punishment, or degradation;



     g.   Conduct that involves spouse swapping or group sex

          orgies;



     h.   Adultery that is recent, frequent, and likely to

          continue and has an adverse effect on good order or

          discipline within the workplace (e.g.,

          officer/enlisted, supervisor/subordinate,

          instructor/student);



     i.   Conduct determined to be criminal in the locale in

          which it occurred;



     j.   Deviant or perverted sexual behavior that may

          indicate a mental or personality disorder (e.g.,

          transsexualism, transvestism, exhibitionism, incest,

          child molestation, voyeurism, bestiality, or

          sodomy).



2.   The conduct has been recent.



3.   The conduct increases the individual's vulnerability to

     blackmail, coercion, or pressure.



4.   Evidence that the applicant has intention or is likely to

     repeat the conduct in question.



Mitigating Factors



The following circumstances may mitigate disqualifying

information:



1.   Sexual misconduct occurred on an isolated basis during or

     preceding adolescence with no evidence of subsequent

     conduct of a similar nature, and clear indication that

     the individual has no intention of participating in such

     conduct in the future.



2.   Sexual misconduct was isolated, occurred more than 3

     years ago, and there is clear indication that the

     individual has no intention of participating in such

     conduct in the future.



3.   The individual was a minor or was the victim of force or

     violence by another.



4.   The individual has successfully completed professional

     therapy, has been rehabilitated, and diagnosed by

     competent medical authority that misconduct is not likely

     to recur.



5.   Demonstration that the individual's sexual misconduct can

     no longer form the basis for vulnerability to blackmail,

     coercion, or pressure.







APPENDIX D:   PERSONNEL SECURITY CASE PROCESSING PROCEDURES



1.   PROCESSING OF NASA NATIONAL AGENCY CHECKS  (NAC) FOR

     UNESCORTED ACCESS BY NONCIVIL SERVANTS



     There are four types of individuals who may require

     unescorted access to NASA Installations.  The following

     procedures will identify each type and explain

     appropriate NASA NAC processing.



     a.   Foreign National Residing Outside of the United

          States



          (1)  Submit inquiry to FBI Name Check electronically,

               by utilizing the Name Check Request System

               (NCRS). (Search of FBI subversive records.)  A

               fee will be charged.



          (2)  Submit 2 NASA Name Check Request Forms (NF-531)

               to the CIA.  (Search of CIA security and

               subversive records.)



          (3)  Submit 1 NF-531 to the Department of State. 

               (Search of Department of State security

               records.)



          (4)  Submit a Visa Letter to the Department of State. 

               (Search of visa eligibility records.)*



     b.  Foreign National Residing in the United States



          (1)  Submit inquiry to FBI Name Check by utilizing

               the NCRS.



          (2)  Submit Fingerprint Card (FD-258) via mail to the

               FBI Identification Division (FBI Ident). 

               (Search of FBI criminal records.)  FBI Ident

               will only accept FB-258's for processing.  Do

               not submit NF-531's.  A fee will be charged.



          (3)  Submit OFI Form 79 - Notice of Personnel

               Investigation (OFI-79) to OPM - FIPC (Search of

               OPM investigative records).



          (4)  Submit 2 NF-531 to the CIA.



          (5)  Submit 1 NF-531 to the Department of State.



          (6)  Submit 1 NF-531 to the Defense Investigative

               Service (DIS) - Defense Central Index of

               Investigations (DCII)  (Search of DIS/DCII

               investigative records).



          (7)  Submit inquiry to the Immigration and

               Naturalization Service (INS) electronically by

               utilizing on-line terminal access software

               (Search of INS naturalization and alien

               registration records).  A fee will be charged.



           *   Do not submit visa letters to the Department of

               State on foreign nationals residing in the U.S.



     c.   U.S. citizen residing in the U.S.



          (1)  Submit inquiry to FBI Name Check by utilizing

               the NCRS. A fee will be charged.



          (2)  Submit FD-258 to FBI Ident.  A fee will be

               charged.



          (3)  Submit OFI-79 to OPM-FIPC.



          (4)  Submit 1 NF-531 to DIS/DCII.



     d.   U.S. citizen residing outside of the U.S.



          (1)  Submit inquiry to FBI Name Check by utilizing

               the NCRS. A fee will be charged.



          (2)  Submit FD-258 to FBI Ident.  A fee will be

charged.



          (3)  Submit OFI-79 to OPM-FIPC.



          (4)  Submit 2 NF-531's to CIA.



          (5)  Submit 1 NF-531 to the Department of State.



          (6)  Submit 1 NF-531 to DIS/DCII.



          Credit searches may be utilized when there is a

          clear indication that an employee/applicant's

          position includes fiduciary responsibilities; or

          when issues develop during the course of a personnel

          security investigation involving financial

          irresponsibility.  Credit searches will be initiated

          by utilizing on-line terminal access supplied by the

          Credit Bureau Incorporated (CBI).



2.   UNIFORM PERSONNEL SECURITY FILE SYSTEM



     The following NASA Forms will be designated as the first

     two or three pages of all civil servant personnel

     security file folders in the order presented below.



     a.   NASA Form 397 - Investigation Review Sheet



          (1)  Date and type of clearance granted, if any.



          (2)  Date and type of investigation(s) completed.



          (3)  Any pertinent information relating to personnel

               security actions, such as administrative

               withdrawals, clearance revalidations, or

               security adjudications.



     b.   NASA Form 346 - Notification of Completion of

          Investigation Under EO 10450 and/or Certificate of

          Clearance



          (1)  Full name of employee.



          (2)  Date and place of birth of employee.



          (3)  Position title of employee.



          (4)  Position sensitivity level designation of

employee.



          (5)  NASA Installation.



          (6)  Date and type of investigation(s) completed.



          (7)  Name of agency that conducted the investigation.



          (8)  Date and type of clearance granted, if any.



          (9)  Typed name and signature of security

               representative who processed the NASA Form 346.



     c.   NASA Form 1630 - Request for Access to Classified

          National Security Information.  NASA Form 1630 will

          be utilized for civil servant personnel security

          file folders that indicate a requirement for access

          to classified national security information.*



          (1)  Name and address of requesting official.



          (2)  Employee's full name and social security number.



          (3)  Date of application.



          (4)  Position title of employee.



          (5)  Employee's mail code.



          (6)  Type of clearance applied for.



          (7)  Bona fide justification for access to classified

               national security information.



          (8)  Name, title, signature, and date of applicants

               first and second level supervisors.



          (9)  Date and initials of approving security

               office representative.



               (a)  Generating a new 1630.



               (b)  Recertifying the original 1630 with

                    initials and dates from supervisors and

                    certifying officials.



               (c)  Utilizing a recertification roster.



           *   NASA Form 1630's will be recertified on an

               annual basis for access review/security

               clearance revalidation.  



3.   PERSONNEL SECURITY FILE REVIEW



     All personnel security files that are released for review

     to authorized Federal officials will contain a NASA Form

     1536 (Privacy Act Disclosure Authorization and Accounting

     Record).  NASA Form 1536 will be utilized to adequately

     document information identifying the nature of the

     record, purpose of disclosure, agency, and requestor.



4.   AUTHORITY FOR RELEASE OF INFORMATION



     NASA Form 1635, Authority for Release of Information,

     will be utilized when release authorization is required

     in order for NASA investigators to obtain certain

     appropriate investigatory material.







APPENDIX E:  NASA INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM



14 CFR Part 1203



Information Security Program



PART 1203 - INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM



Subpart A -  Scope



Sec.

1203.100  Legal basis.

1203.101  Other applicable NASA regulations.



Subpart B      -  NASA Information Security Program



1203.200  Background and discussion. 

1203.201  Information security objectives.

1203.202  Responsibilities.

1203.203  Degree of protection.



Subpart C      -  Classification Principles and Considerations



1203.300  General.

1203.301  Identification of information requiring protection.

1203.302  Combination, interrelation or compilation.

1203.303  Dissemination considerations. 

1203.304  Internal effect.

1203.305  Restricted Data.



Subpart D      -  Guides for Original Classification



Sec.

1203.400  Specific classifying guidance.

1203.401  Effect of open publication.

1203.402  Classifying material other than documentation. 

1203.403  State-of-the-art and intelligence.

1203.404  Handling of unprocessed data.

1203.405  Proprietary information.

1203.406  Additional classification factors.

1203.407  Duration of classification.

1203.408  Assistance by Installation security classification

          officers. 

1203.409  Exceptional cases.

1203.410  Limitations.

1203.411  Restrictions.

1203.412  Classification guides.



Subpart E      -  Derivative Classification



1203.500  Use of derivative classification.

1203.501  Applying derivative classification markings.



Subpart F      -  Declassification and Downgrading



Sec.

1203.600  Policy.

1203.601  Responsibilities.

1203.602  Authorization.

1203.603  Systematic review for declassification.

1203.604  Mandatory review for declassification.



Subpart G      -  Foreign Government Information



1203.700  Identification.

1203.701  Classification.

1203.702  Duration of classification.

1203.703  Declassification.

AUTHORITY:  42 U.S.C. 2457 et seq. and E.O. 12356.



Subpart A      -  Scope. 



Section 1203.100  Legal basis.



          a.   Executive Order 12356 (hereinafter referred to

               as "the Order").  The responsibilities and

               authority of the Administrator of NASA with

               respect to the original classification of

               official information or material requiring

               protection against unauthorized disclosure in

               the interest of national defense or foreign

               relations of the United States (hereafter

               collectively termed "national security"), and

               the standards for such classification are

               established by the "the Order" (47 FR 14874) and

               the Information Security Oversight Office

               Directive No. 1, June 25, 1982;



          b.   EO 10865.  Executive Order 10865 (24 FR 1583)

               requires the Administrator to prescribe by

               regulation such specific requirements,

               restrictions, and other safeguards as the

               Administrator may consider necessary to protect:



               (l)  Releases of classified information to or

                    within United States industry that relate

                    to contracts with NASA; and



               (2)  Other releases of classified information to

                    industry that NASA has responsibility for

                    safeguarding.



          c.   The National Aeronautics and Space Act.



               (l)  Section 304(a) of the National Aeronautics

                    and Space Act of 1958, as amended (42

                    U.S.C. 2451 et seq.), states the following

                    in part:  "The Administrator shall

                    establish such security requirements,

                    restrictions, and safeguards as he deems

                    necessary in the interest of the national

                    security."



               (2)  Section 303 of the Act states the

                    following: "Information obtained or

                    developed by the Administrator in the

                    performance of his functions under this Act

                    shall be made available for public

                    inspection, except (i) information

                    authorized or required by Federal Statute

                    to be withheld; and (ii) information

                    classified to protect the national

                    security:  Provided that nothing in this

                    Act shall authorize the withholding of

                    information by the Administrator for the

                    duly authorized committees of the

                    Congress."



Section 1203.101  Other applicable NASA regulations.



          a.   Subpart I of this Part, (14 CFR) "NASA Security

               Management Working Group." 



          b.   NMI 1600.2, "NASA Security Program."



Subpart B-NASA Information Security Program



Section 1203.200  Background and discussion.



          a.   In establishing a civilian space program, the

               Congress required NASA to "provide for the

               widest practicable and appropriate dissemination

               of information concerning its activities and the

               results thereof," and for the withholding from

               public inspection of that information that is

               classified to protect the national security.



          b.   In recognition of the essential requirement for

               an informed public concerning the activities of

               its Government, as well as the need to protect

               certain national security information from

               unauthorized disclosure, "the Order" was

               promulgated.  It designates to the National

               Aeronautics and Space Administration certain

               responsibility for matters pertaining to

               national security and confers on the

               Administrator of NASA, or such responsible

               officers or employees as the Administrator may

               designate, the authority for original

               classification of official information or

               material that requires protection in the

               interest of national security.  It also provides

               for the following:



               (l)  Basic classification, downgrading, and

                    declassification guidelines;



               (2)  The issuance of directives prescribing the

                    procedures to be followed in safeguarding

                    classified information or material;



               (3)  A monitoring system to ensure the

                    effectiveness of the Order;



               (4)  Appropriate administrative sanctions

                    against officers and employees of the

                    United States Government who are found to

                    be in violation of the Order or

                    implementing directive; and



               (5)  Classification limitations and restrictions

                    as discussed in Section 1203.410 and

                    Section 1203.411.



          c.   "The Order" requires the timely identification

               and protection of that NASA information the

               disclosure of which would be contrary to the

               best interest of national security. 

               Accordingly, the determination in each case must

               be based on a judgment on whether disclosure of

               information could reasonably be expected to

               result in damage to the national security.



Section 1203.201  Information security objectives.



          The following are objectives of the NASA Information

          Security Program:



          a.   Ensure that information is classified only when

               a sound basis exists for such classification and

               only for such period as is necessary.



          b.   Prevent both the unwarranted classification and

               the overclassification of NASA information.



          c.   Ensure the greatest practicable uniformity

               within NASA in the classification of

               information.



          d.   Ensure effective coordination and reasonable

               uniformity with other Government departments and

               agencies, particularly in areas where there is

               an interchange of information, techniques or

               hardware.



          e.   Provide a timely and effective means for

               downgrading or declassifying information when

               the circumstances necessitating the original

               classification change or no longer exist.



Section 1203.202  Responsibilities.



          a.   The Chairperson, NASA Security Management

               Working Group (Subpart I of this Part), is

               responsible for:



               (1)  Directing the NASA Information Security

                    Program in accordance with NASA policies

                    and objectives and applicable laws and

                    regulations.



               (2)  Ensuring effective compliance with and

                    implementation of "the Order" and the

                    Information Security Oversight Office

                    Directive No. 1 relating to security

                    classification matters.



               (3)  Reviewing, in consultation with the NASA

                    Security Management Working Group

                    questions, suggestions, appeals and

                    compliance concerning the NASA Information

                    Security Program and making determinations

                    concerning them.



               (4)  Coordinating NASA security classification

                    matters with Program Office Security

                    Officials, NASA Installations, the

                    Department of Defense (DOD), the Department

                    of Energy (DOE) and other Government

                    agencies as appropriate.



               (5)  Reviewing Security Classification Guides

                    for NASA programs and projects.



               (6)  Developing, maintaining and recommending to

                    the Administrator guidelines for the

                    systematic review covering 30-year-old

                    classified information under NASA's

                    jurisdiction.



               (7)  Reviewing and coordinating with appropriate

                    offices all appeals of denials of requests

                    for records under Sections 552 and 552a of

                    Title 5, United States Code (Freedom of

                    Information and Privacy Acts) when the

                    denials are based on the records' continued

                    classification.



               (8)  Recommending to the Administrator

                    appropriate administrative action to

                    correct abuse or violations of any

                    provision of the NASA Information Security

                    Program, including notifications by warning

                    letter, formal reprimand and to the extent

                    permitted by law, suspension without pay

                    and removal.



          b.   All NASA employees are responsible for bringing

               to the attention of the Chairperson of the NASA

               Security Management Working Group any

               information security problems in need of

               resolution, any areas of interest wherein

               information security guidance is lacking, and

               any other matters likely to impede achievement

               of the objectives prescribed herein.

 

          c.   Each NASA official to whom the authority for

               original classification is delegated shall be

               accountable for the propriety of each

               classification (see Subpart H) and is

               responsible for:



               (l)  Ensuring that classification determinations

                    are consistent with the policy and

                    objectives prescribed above, and other

                    applicable guidelines.



               (2)  Bringing to the attention of the

                    Chairperson, NASA Security Management

                    Working Group, for resolution, any

                    disagreement with classification

                    determinations made by other NASA

                    officials.



               (3)  Ensuring that information and material that

                    no longer require the present level of

                    protection are promptly downgraded or

                    declassified in accordance with applicable

                    guidelines.



          d.   Other Officials-in-Charge of Headquarters

               Offices are responsible for the following:



               (1)  Approving Security Classification Guides

                    for those programs they are responsible

                    for.  These guides should be coordinated

                    with the NASA Security Office.



               (2)  Ensuring that classified information or

                    material prepared within their respective

                    offices is appropriately marked.



               (3)  Ensuring that material proposed for public

                    release is reviewed to eliminate classified

                    information.

     

          e.   Directors of Field Installations are responsible

               for the following:



               (1)  Developing proposed Security Classification

                    Guides.  Proposed guides must be forwarded

                    to their Program Office Security Official

                    for coordination and necessary approval.  



               (2)  Ensuring that classified information or

                    material prepared in their respective

                    installations is marked appropriately.



               (3)  Ensuring that material proposed for public

                    release is reviewed to eliminate classified

                    information.



          f.   The Chief, NASA Security Office, NASA

               Headquarters, who serves as the Chairperson of

               the NASA Security Management Working Group, is

               responsible for the NASA-wide coordination of

               security classification matters.



          g.   The Chief, NASA Security Office, is responsible

               for establishing procedures for the safeguarding

               of classified information or material (e.g.,

               accountability, control, access, storage,

               transmission, and marking) and for ensuring that

               such procedures are systematically reviewed; and

               those that are duplicative or unnecessary are

               eliminated.



Section 1203.203  Degree of Protection.



          a.   General.  Upon determination that information or

               material must be classified, the degree of

               protection commensurate with the sensitivity of

               the information must be determined.  If there is

               reasonable doubt about the need to classify

               information, it shall be safeguarded as if it

               were classified pending a determination by an

               original classification authority, who shall

               make this determination within 30 days.  If

               there is reasonable doubt about the appropriate

               level of classification, it shall be safeguarded

               at the higher level of classification pending a

               determination by an original classification

               authority, who shall make this determination

               within 30 days.



          b.   Authorized Categories of Classification.  The 3

               categories of classification, as authorized and

               defined in "the Order," are set out below.  No

               other restrictive markings are authorized to be

               placed on NASA classified documents or materials

               except as expressly provided by statute or by

               NASA Directives.



               (1)  Top Secret.  Top Secret is the designation

                    applied to information or material the

                    unauthorized disclosure of which could

                    reasonably be expected to cause

                    exceptionally grave damage to the national

                    security.  Examples of exceptionally grave

                    damage include armed hostilities against

                    the United States or its allies; disruption

                    of foreign relations vitally affecting the

                    national security; the compromise of vital

                    national defense plans or complex

                    cryptologic and communications intelligence

                    systems; the revelation of sensitive

                    intelligence operations; and the disclosure

                    of scientific or technological developments

                    vital to national security.



               (2)  Secret.  Secret is the designation applied

                    to information or material the unauthorized

                    disclosure of which could reasonably be

                    expected to cause serious damage to the

                    national security.  Examples of serious

                    damage include disruption of foreign

                    relations significantly affecting the

                    national security; significant impairment

                    of a program or policy directly related to

                    the national security; revelation of

                    significant military plans or intelligence

                    operations; and compromise of significant

                    scientific or technological developments

                    relating to national security.



               (3)  Confidential.  Confidential is the

                    designation applied to that information or

                    material for which the unauthorized

                    disclosure could reasonably be expected to

                    cause damage to the national security.



Subpart C - Classification Principles and Considerations



Section 1203.300  General.



          In general, the types of NASA-generated information

          and material requiring protection in the interest of

          national security lie in the areas of applied

          research, technology, or operations.



Section 1203.301  Identification of information requiring

                  protection.



          Classifiers shall identify the level of

          classification of each classified portion of a

          document (including subject and titles), and those

          portions that are not classified.



Section 1203.302  Combination, interrelation or compilation.



          An interrelationship of individual items, classified

          or unclassified, may result in a combined item

          requiring a higher classification than that of any

          of the individual items. Compilations of

          unclassified information are considered unclassified

          unless some additional significant factor is added

          in the process of compilation.  For example:  (a)

          the way unclassified information is compiled may be

          classified; (b) the fact that the information is

          complete for its intended purpose may be classified;

          or (c) the fact the compilation represents an

          official evaluation may be classified.  In these

          cases, the compilations would be classified.



Section 1203.303  Dissemination considerations.



          The degree of intended dissemination, use of the

          information and whether the end purpose to be served

          renders effective security control impractical are

          considerations during the classification process. 

          These factors do not necessarily preclude

          classification, but must be considered in order not

          to impose security controls that are impractical to

          enforce.



Section 1203.304  Internal effect.



          The effect of security protection on program

          progress and cost and on other functional activities

          of NASA should be considered.  Impedances and added

          costs inherent in a security classification must be

          assessed in light of the detrimental effects on the

          national security interests that would result from

          failure to classify.



Section 1203.305  Restricted Data.



          Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data is so

          classified when originated, as required by the

          Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.  Specific

          guidance for the classification of Restricted Data

          is provided in "Classification Guides" published by

          the Department of Energy.



Subpart D - Guides for Original Classification



Section 1203.400  Specific classifying guidance.



          Technological and operational information and

          material, and in some exceptional cases scientific

          information falling within any one or more of the

          following categories, must be classified if its

          unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected

          to cause damage to the national security.  In cases

          where it is believed that a contrary course of

          action would better serve the national interests,

          the matter should be referred to the Chairperson,

          NASA Security Management Working Group, for a

          determination. The following list is not intended to

          be exclusive.  Original classifiers are responsible

          for initially classifying other types of information

          not included in the following list which, in their

          judgment, requires protection under "the Order."



          a.   Information that provides the United States, in

               comparison with other nations, with a

               significant scientific, engineering, technical,

               operational, intelligence, strategic, tactical,

               or economic advantage related to national

               security.



          b.   Information that, if disclosed, would

               significantly diminish the technological lead of

               the United States in any military system,

               subsystem or component, and would result in

               damage to such a system, subsystem, or component.



          c.   Scientific or technological information in an

               area where an advanced military application that

               would in itself be classified is foreseen during

               exploratory development.



          d.   Information that, if known, would: 



               (1)       Provide a foreign nation with an

                         insight into the defense application

                         or the war or defense plans or posture

                         of the United States;



               (2)  Allow a foreign nation to develop, improve,

                    or refine a similar item of defense

                    application.



               (3)  Provide a foreign nation with a base upon

                    which to develop effective countermeasures.



               (4)  Weaken or nullify the effectiveness of a

                    defense or military plan, operation,

                    project, weapon system, or activity vital

                    to the national security.



          e.   Information or material that is important to the

               national security of the United States in

               relation to other nations when there is sound

               reason to believe that those nations are unaware

               that the United States has or is capable of

               obtaining the information or material, i.e.,

               through intelligence activities, sources, or

               methods.



          f.   Information that if disclosed could be exploited

               in a manner prejudicial to the national security

               posture of the United States by discrediting its

               technological powe