NHB 1620.3C NASA Security Handbook
NASA NHB 1620.3C, (PART 4)
HANDBOOK Effective Date February 1, 1993
_________________________________________________________________
Responsible Office: JL
Subject: NASA Security Handbook (PART 4 of 5)
PREFACE
APPENDIX A: GLOSSARY OF SECURITY TERMS
Access. The ability and opportunity to gain knowledge of
classified information.
Access Control. The means, through a variety of procedures and
equipment, to regulate and monitor the movement of personnel
and/or vehicle traffic through points of entry and exit.
Access Control System. A system of electromechanical and
electronic devices that monitor and permit or deny entry and exit
of a protected area by personnel or vehicles.
Acoustic Security. Those security measures designed and used to
deny audio access to information.
Aeronautical and Space Activities. (l) Research into, and the
solution of, problems of flight within and outside the Earth's
atmosphere; (2) the development, construction, testing, and
operation for research purposes of aeronautical and space
vehicles, and (3) such other activities as may be required for
the exploration of space.
Administrative/Service Area. Those areas within an accredited
facility where storage, exposure, discussion, and/or processing
of classified or sensitive material is not allowed.
Agency. Any department or agency of the Government.
Alien. Any person who is not a citizen or national of the United
States.
Anti-Terrorism. Defensive measures used to reduce the
vulnerability of individuals or property to terrorism.
Arrest Authority. Authority to execute arrests and searches
without warrants granted to designated NASA employees and
contractors by the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as
amended.
Audible Scrambler. A method of modifying communications equipment
to encode or decode transmitted signals. Provides a limited
degree of security in sensitive operations, but does not meet
encryption standards required for transmission of classified
information.
Authorized Person. A person who is appropriately cleared, has a
valid need-to-know, and has been granted access to an area.
Background Investigation. The means or procedures, such as
selective investigations, records checks, personal interviews,
and supervisory controls, designed to provide reasonable
assurance that persons being considered for or granted access to
classified information are loyal and trustworthy.
Back-up Power. A secondary source of power (usually batteries or
generators) to provide continued system operation when primary
(AC) power is interrupted.
Controlled Cryptographic Item (CCI). Secure telecommunications
or information handling equipment or associated cryptographic
component or ancillary device that is unclassified when unkeyed
(or keyed with unclassified key), but controlled.
Classification Category. The specific degree of security
classification that has been assigned to classified information
to indicate the extent of protection required in the national
interest.
Certified Tempest Technical Authority (CTTA). Designated official
responsible for performing TEMPEST countermeasure cost and
security analyses prior to the implementation of TEMPEST
countermeasures.
Classification Guide. The guidance issued or approved by an
original Top Secret classification authority that identifies the
information or material to be protected from unauthorized
disclosure and specifies the level and duration of classification
assigned or assignable to such information or material.
Classified Material. Any physical object on which is recorded or
in which is embodied classified information that may be discerned
by the study, analysis, observation, or other use of the object
itself.
Closed Area. An area in which security measures are applied
primarily to safeguard classified information and material, entry
to the area being equivalent to access to such classified
information and material.
Closed Circuit Television (CCTV). A television system where
video signals are transmitted from one area to another via
coaxial or fiber optic cables.
Closed Storage Area. An area, cleared for classified operations,
in which all classified material must be stored in a GSA-approved
security container when the area is unoccupied.
Cognizant Security Authority (CSA). Agency, office, or person
responsible for establishing security requirements.
COMINT. Information derived from the study of intercepted
electromagnetic communications.
Communications Security. The protection resulting from the
application of cryptosecurity, transmission security, and
emission security measures to telecommunications and from the
application of physical security measures to COMSEC information.
These measures are taken to deny unauthorized persons information
of value that might be derived from the possession and study of
such telecommunications, or to ensure the authenticity of such
telecommunications.
Compromise. A breach of security due to an unauthorized person's
gaining knowledge of classified information.
Compromising Emanations. Unintentional emissions that could
disclose information being transmitted, received, or handled by
any information-processing equipment. (See TEMPEST)
COMSEC. Communications Security.
COMSEC Accounting. Procedures that document the control of
COMSEC material from its origin through destruction or other
final disposition.
COMSEC Custodian. Individual designated responsible for the
receipt, transfer, accountability, safeguarding, and destruction
of COMSEC material assigned to a COMSEC account.
COMSEC Insecurity. Any occurrence that jeopardizes the security
of COMSEC material or the secure electrical transmission of
classified or sensitive government information.
COMSEC Material. Aids and hardware that are designed to secure
telecommunications.
Contractor. Any entity that is party to a contract with the
United States.
Concertina Wire. Rolled barbwire, usually in .914m/three-foot
diameter rolls that are pulled apart and expanded to make a
physical protective barrier. A military version is called
General Purpose Barbed Tape Obstacle. Also called razor wire or
wire obstacle.
Counterespionage. Aspect of counterintelligence designed to
detect, destroy, neutralize, exploit, or prevent espionage
activities through identification, penetration, manipulation,
deception, and repression of individuals, groups, or
organizations conducting or suspected of conducting espionage
activities.
Countermeasures Advisory Panel (CAP). An interagency panel that
recommends National TEMPEST policy for approval by the National
Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Committee
(NTISSC).
Cryptographic Information. All information and material,
including documents, devices, equipment and apparatus, essential
to the encryption, decryption, or authentication of
telecommunications. Whenever cryptographic information is
classified, the material is marked "CRYPTO" and the specific
security classification is indicated.
Cryptosystem. Associated items of COMSEC material used as a unit
to provide a single means of encryption or decryption.
Custodian. Any authorized person who possesses and is
responsible for safeguarding classified information or material.
Dead Bar. A solid bar attached to both a door and its frame on
the inner side to prevent opening from the outside.
Dead Bolt. A lock bolt with no spring action. Activated by a
key or turn knob and cannot be moved by end pressure.
Decibel. A unit of sound measurement.
Dedicated Phone Lines. Leased or propriety telephone lines used
solely for transmission of a particular signal.
DES Data Encryption Standard. An unclassified algorithm
implanted in electronic hardware or firmware devices used for the
cryptographic protection of unclassified but sensitive
information.
DOD Representative. An officer or employee of the Department of
Defense, or any department or agency thereof, or a member of the
Armed Forces, or a contractor or subcontractor of any DOD
department, agency, or Armed Forces, or an officer or employee of
any such contractor or subcontractor.
Door Switch. An electromechanical device attached to doors used
to detect door openings and generate an alarm.
Duress Alarm. A mechanical or electronic device that enables
personnel to alert a response force to obtain immediate
assistance without arousing suspicion.
Electrical Metallic Tubing (EMT). Steel tubing used to protect
electrical and electronic signal cables.
Electric Strike. A feature that locks or unlocks a door or
turnstile automatically or manually.
Electromagnetic Interference (EMI). A component of energy
generated by radar, high-voltage lines, radios, etc., that can
cause interference or damage to unprotected electronic equipment.
ELINT: Information derived from noncommunications
electromagnetic radiations (such as those emitted by radar).
Emission Security: The component of communications security that
results from all measures taken to deny unauthorized persons
information of value that might be derived from intercept and
analysis of compromising emanations from crypto and
telecommunications equipment. Frequently referred to as TEMPEST.
Expanded Steel. Also called Expanded Metal Mesh. A lacework
patterned material produced from sheet steel by making regular
uniform cuts and then pulling it apart with uniform pressure.
Fence Apron. Barbed wire section placed atop barrier fences,
usually placed at a 45-degree angle.
Fence Sensor System. A system mounted on a fence or installed as
part of a fence that detects an intruders' attempts to climb
over, penetrate, or crawl under the fence.
Foreign National. Any person who is not a U.S. citizen or not a
national of or an immigrant to the United States.
Guard. A properly trained and equipped individual whose duties
include the protection of assets.
ITAR. International Traffic in Arms Regulation.
Intelligence Community. The aggregate of the following executive
branch organizations and agencies involved in intelligence
activities: the Central Intelligence Agency; the National
Security Agency; the Defense Intelligence Agency; offices within
the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized
national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance programs;
the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of
State; intelligence elements of the military services; the
Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Department of the Treasury;
the Department of Energy; and staff elements of the Office of the
Director of Central Intelligence.
Intrusion Detection System (IDS). A security alarm system
consisting of one or more various types of components used to
detect unauthorized access into a protected area.
Level of IDS Protection. Number of sensor types used in an IDS
system to protect an area. (Door switches and motion detectors
in use in one area constitute two levels of protection.)
Limited Area. An area in which security measures are applied
for the safeguarding of classified information and material, or
unclassified property warranting special protection, and in which
uncontrolled movement of visitors or other unauthorized persons
would permit access to such classified information and material
or property, but within which such access may be prevented by
appropriate visitor escort or other internal restrictions and
controls.
NRP. NASA Resource Protection.
National Security Decision Directive (NSDD). A document that
promulgates Presidential decisions implementing national policy
and objectives in all areas involving national security. All
decision directives are individually identified by number and
signed by the President.
National Telecommunications and Information Systems Security
Committee (NTISSC). An interagency committee responsible for
approving national security policies for safeguarding systems
that process or communicate sensitive information.
Open Storage Area: A properly accredited vault or area in which
classified material may be processed, discussed, or stored
without the use of security containers.
Operations Security (OPSEC). A systematic and analytical process
by which the U.S. Government and its supporting contractors can
deny to potential adversaries information about capabilities and
intentions by identifying, controlling, and protecting evidence
of planning and execution of sensitive activities and operations.
Perimeter. A wall, fence, natural terrain, water, etc., that
provides a barrier or indicates the outer limits of an area.
Personnel Turnstile. A device consisting of fixed and rotating
bars that permits or prevents entry or exit in a protected area.
Protected Distribution System (PDS). A wireline or fiber optic
system that includes adequate acoustic, electrical,
electromagnetic and physical safeguards to permit its use for the
unencrypted transmission of classified information.
Radio Frequency Interference (RFI). A signal in the radio
frequency range that may prevent proper operation or destroy
unprotected electronic circuits.
Reader (Card). An electronic device used to decode data
contained on cards or keys to identify the holder as an
authorized or unauthorized entrant into a protected area.
Red/Black Concept. The separation of electrical and electronic
circuits, components, equipment, and systems, that handle
classified plain language information in electric signal form
(Red) from those that handle encrypted or unclassified
information (Black).
Restricted Area. An area in which security measures are applied
to safeguard or control property, or to protect operations and
functions that are vital or essential to the accomplishment of
the mission assigned to a NASA Installation or component
Installation.
Security Dispatcher. A person assigned to the duties of
dispatching response forces and/or patrols, usually in response
to alarms, calls for assistance, or other emergencies requiring
security personnel at the scene.
Security Survey. A comprehensive formal evaluation of a
facility, area, or activity by security specialists to determine
its physical or technical strengths and weaknesses and to propose
recommendations for improvement.
Sensitive Requiring special protection from disclosure to avoid
compromise or threat to the security of the sponsor.
Solid Wall. A wall that is constructed without hollow portions
in it.
Sound Groups. Voice transmission attenuation groups established
to satisfy acoustical security requirements.
Sound Transmission Class (STC): The ratings used in
architectural considerations of sound transmission loss such as
those involving walls, ceilings, and/or floors.
STS: Space Transportation System.
Special Access Program (SAP). Any program established and
approved under EO 12356 that imposes need-to-know or access
controls beyond those normally required for access to
Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret information.
Surreptitious Entry. The unauthorized entry into an area or
security container in a manner in which evidence of such entry is
not readily discernible.
TELINT. Information derived from the intercept and analysis of
communications between pieces of equipment. An example of TELINT
would be information obtained from the intercept of electronic
communications between a spacecraft and its ground-based guidance
system.
TEMPEST. An unclassified short name referring to investigations
and studies of compromising emanations. It is sometimes used
synonymously for the term "compromising emanations."
TEMPEST Test. A laboratory or on-site (field) test to determine
the nature and amplitude of conducted or radiated signals
containing compromising information. A test normally includes
detection and measurement of these signals and analyses to
determine the correlation between received signals and
potentially compromising transmitted signals.
Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) Surveys and
Inspections: A thorough physical, electronic, and visual
examination to detect technical surveillance devices, technical
security hazards, and attempts at clandestine penetration of an
area for hostile technical collection of classified and sensitive
information.
Terrorism. The unlawful use of force or violence against persons
or property to intimidate or coerce a government, a civilian
population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political
or social objectives.
Type I COMSEC Product. A classified or CCI COMSEC product
endorsed for securing classified or sensitive government
information when appropriately keyed. NOTE: Refers only to
products and not to information, key, services, or controls.
Type I products contain a classified NSA algorithm. They are
available to U.S. Government users and their contractors and are
subject to export restrictions in accordance with ITAR.
Type II COMSEC Product. An unclassified device or equipment
endorsed for protecting sensitive government or government-
derived information. NOTE: Refers only to products and not to
information, key, services, or controls. Type II may not be used
for classified information. Type II products contain a classified
NSA algorithm, which distinguishes them from products containing
an unclassified DES algorithm. They are available to U.S.
Government users and their contractors and U.S.- sponsored
entities, but are subject to export restrictions in accordance
with ITAR.
Vault. An area used for storing, handling, discussing, and/or
processing classified information that is constructed to afford
maximum protection against unauthorized entry.
Visual Security. Those security measures designed and used to
deny unauthorized visual access to classified or sensitive
materials and activity.
Waiver. The approved continuance of a condition that varies from
a requirement and creates a vulnerability.
APPENDIX B: PERSONNEL AND INFORMATION SECURITY DEFINITIONS
For the purpose of this Handbook, the following definitions
will apply:
1. Access. The ability and opportunity to gain knowledge of
classified information; that is, an individual may obtain
access to classified information merely by being near a
place where the information is discussed or being within
a place where it is kept if the security measures in
force do not prevent the individual from gaining
knowledge of the information.
2. Aeronautical and Space Activities. (a) Research into,
and the solution of, problems of flight within and
outside the Earth's atmosphere; (b) the development,
construction, testing, and operation for research
purposes of aeronautical and space vehicles; and (c) such
other activities as may be required for the exploration
of space.
3. Agency. Any department or agency of the Government.
4. Alien. Any person who is not a citizen or national of
the United States (see "Immigrant Alien").
5. Authorized Person. A person who has been:
a. Cleared to at least the degree of security
classification of the information involved and has a
need-to-know the information in connection with that
person's official duties.
b. Authorized to enter a Security Area.
6. BDI - Background Investigation Update.
7. BGI - Background Investigation Upgrade.
8. Certifying Official. A NASA official authorized to
certify a NASA representative for access to Restricted
Data in the possession of (a) personnel of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) and its contractors; (b)
personnel of the Department of Energy (DOE) and its
contractors; and (c) NRC- or DOE-cleared personnel of
other Federal departments and agencies (except NASA and
the Department of Defense (DOD)) and their contractors.
9. Classification. The initial or original determination
that information requires protection against unauthorized
disclosure in the interest of national security, and a
designation of the level of classification. This
contrasts with the physical act of marking material
containing classified information to which a
classification category already has been assigned, e.g.,
information covered by a security classification guide or
material copied or reproduced from material previously
marked with an assigned classification (see "Marking").
10. Classification Authority. The authority delegated to an
official of NASA to originally classify information or
material that is determined by that official to require
protection against unauthorized disclosure in the
interest of national security. It further means the
authority to extend the duration of the original
classification, subject to the limits prescribed in this
Handbook, only so long as the basis for the original
classification continues to exist.
11. Classification Category. The specific degree of security
classification (Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential) that
has been assigned to classified information to indicate
the extent of protection required in the national
interest.
12. Classified Contract. Any contract, purchase order,
award, or grant that requires, or will require, access to
any classified information by the contractor, grantee,
supplier, or their employees in the performance of the
contract. A contract may be classified even though the
contractual document or the end item to be produced is
unclassified.
13. Classification Guide. The guidance issued or approved by
an original Top Secret classification authority that
identifies the information or material to be protected
from unauthorized disclosure and specifies the level and
duration of classification assigned or assignable to such
information or material. Appendix E, "NASA Information
Security Program," is the basic classification guide for
NASA.
14. Classified Information.
a. Information or material, herein collectively termed
information that is owned by, produced for or by, or
under the control of the U.S. Government, that has
been determined pursuant to "The Order" or prior
Executive Orders to require protection against
unauthorized disclosure, and that is so designated.
b. Other information to which an appropriate authority
of a foreign government or international pact
organization has assigned a security classification
to indicate the extent of protection required, and
which the United States is obligated to protect
pursuant to an agreement with that government or
organization.
15. Classifier. An individual who makes a classification
determination and applies a security classification to
information or material. A classifier may be an original
classification authority or a person who derivatively
applies a security classification based on a properly
classified source or a security classification guide.
16. Classified Material. Any physical object on which is
recorded or in which is embodied classified information
that may be discerned by the study, analysis,
observation, or other use of the object itself.
17. Closed Area. An area wherein security measures are
applied primarily for the purpose of safeguarding
classified information and material, entry to the area
being equivalent to access to such classified information
and material.
18. Cognizant Security Office. The Defense Investigative
Service (DIS) Industrial Security region which is
primarily responsible for exercising control over
industrial security matters at a contractor facility.
19. Communications Security (COMSEC). The protection
resulting from a measure taken to deny unauthorized
access to information related to national security that
might be derived from telecommunications, or measures
taken to ensure the authenticity of such
telecommunications.
20. Compromise. A breach of security owing to an
unauthorized person's gaining knowledge of classified
information.
21. Confidential Information. Information that could be
reasonably expected to cause damage to the national
security if disclosed to unauthorized persons.
22. Contractor. Any industrial, educational, commercial, or
other entity that is a party to a contract with the
United States and has received a facility clearance from
a Government department or agency.
23. Cryptographic Information. All information and material,
including documents, devices, equipment and apparatus,
essential to the encryption, decryption, or
authentication of telecommunications. Whenever
cryptographic information is classified, the material is
marked "CRYPTO" and the specific security classification
category also is indicated.
24. Custodian. Any authorized person who has possession of,
and is responsible for, safeguarding classified
information or material (see "Authorized Person" and
"Safeguarding").
25. Declassification Event. An event that would eliminate
the need for continued classification.
26. Declassify. Action taken by an appropriate authority to
cancel completely the security classification of an item
of classified information.
27. Derivative Classification. A determination that
information is in substance the same as information
currently classified, and a designation of the level of
classification.
28. Designated Agency Official. Refers to the official with
authority to deny, suspend, or remove an employee's
security clearance (except under 5 U.S.C. 7532). At NASA
Field Installation, this official is the Director; at
NASA Headquarters, this official is the Associate
Administrator for Management Systems and Facilities.
29. Document. Any recorded information regardless of its
physical form or characteristics, including, without
limitation, written or printed matter, data processing
cards and tapes, maps, charts, paintings, drawings,
engravings, sketches, working notes and papers,
reproductions of such things by any means or process, and
sound, voice, magnetic, or electronic recordings in any
form.
30. DoD Representative. An officer or employee of the
Department of Defense, or any department or agency
thereof, or a member of the Armed Forces, or a contractor
or subcontractor of any DOD department, agency, or Armed
Forces, or an officer or employee of any such contractor
or subcontractor (see "NASA Representative").
31. Downgrade. Action taken by an appropriate authority to
lower the classification category of an item of
classified information.
32. Employee. Any individual, including an expert,
consultant, or adviser, serving on a permanent or
temporary appointment, on a full-time, part-time, or
intermittent basis, and regardless of whether the
individual is compensated for services rendered.
33. Facility Security Clearance. From a security viewpoint,
an administrative determination that a facility is
eligible for access to classified information up to and
including a designated category.
34. Foreign Government Information. Information that has
been provided to the United States in confidence by or
produced by the United States pursuant to a written joint
arrangement requiring confidentiality with a foreign
government or international or regional organization of
governments.
35. Foreign National. Any person who is not a citizen or not
a national of or an immigrant to the United States (see
"Immigrant Alien").
36. Foreign Representative. A citizen or national of the
United States or an immigrant alien who is acting as a
representative official, or employee of a foreign
government, firm, corporation, or person.
37. Formerly Restricted Data. Information that has been
removed from the Restricted Data category based on a
formal determination by appropriate authority that the
information relates primarily to the military utilization
of atomic weapons, and that the information can be
protected adequately as classified information under the
provisions of "The Order." Such information may not be
transmitted or otherwise made available to any foreign
nation or international pact organization while it
remains classified information except under the
provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
38. Immigrant Alien. Any person who is lawfully admitted
into the United States under an immigration visa for
permanent residence.
39. Information. Knowledge that can be communicated by any
means.
40. Information Security. The result of any system of
administration policies and procedures for identifying,
controlling, and protecting from unauthorized disclosure,
information of which protection is authorized by
Executive order or statute.
41. International Pact Organization. A regional defense
organization (e.g., NATO).
42. LDI - Limited Background Investigation Update.
43. LGI - Limited Background Investigation Upgrade.
44. Limited Area. An area wherein security measures are
applied primarily for the safeguarding of classified
information and material or unclassified property
warranting special protection and in which the
uncontrolled movement of visitors would permit access to
such classified information and material or property, but
within which area such access may be prevented by
appropriate visitor escort and other internal
restrictions and controls.
45. Marking. The physical act of stamping or otherwise
indicating on a document or other material (a) the
specific category of security classification assigned to
the information contained therein; and (b) other
pertinent notations (e.g., "Restricted Data--Atomic
Energy Act of 1954," "Unclassified when classified
enclosures are detached," and "CRYPTO").
46. Material. Any product or substance on, or in, which
information is embodied.
47. MDI - Minimum Background Investigation Update.
48. NASA Employee or Personnel.
a. Any permanent or temporary employee of NASA;
b. Any person serving without a contract as an advisor,
consultant, or expert to NASA; or
c. Any employee or member of another Federal department
or agency who is detailed to NASA or assigned to a
program or activity jointly sponsored by NASA.
49. NASA Representative. Any officer, employee, member of an
advisory committee, contractor, subcontractor, or officer
or employee or a contractor or subcontractor of NASA (see
"DOD Representative").
50. National Agency Check (NAC). A review of the files of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (including
fingerprint files), Office of Defense Central Index of
Investigations, the Office of Personnel Management, or
other Government agencies, as appropriate. The files of
the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the
Central Intelligence Agency will be reviewed when the
individual is an alien or a naturalized citizen of the
United States.
51. National Security. The protection of the nation from
foreign aggression or espionage, including development of
defense plans or policies, intelligence or
counterintelligence activities, and related activities
concerning the preservation of the military strength of
the United States.
52. National of the United States. A citizen of the
United States, or a person who, although not a
citizen of the United States, owes permanent
allegiance to the United States.
53. Need-to-Know. A determination, by persons having
responsibility for classified information or matter, that
a proposed recipient's access to such classified
information or matter is necessary in the performance of
that person's official, contractual, or licensee duties
of employment under the cognizance of NASA.
54. Non-NASA Personnel. Any person (other than a NASA
employee) who is within the boundaries of a NASA
Installation or component and is outside the physical
limits of a cleared contractor facility (holding a
facility clearance under the DOD Industrial Security
Program) that is situated within the Installation or
component.
55. Original Classification. An initial determination that
information requires, in the interest of national
security, a specific degree of protection against
unauthorized disclosure, together with a designation
signifying that such a determination has been made.
56. Program Office Security Official (PSO). The PSO serves
as the first point of contact externally, and as the
focal point internally, on program security matters
within the responsibility of the program office Associate
Administrator. Primary responsibility for program
security rests with the program office Associate
Administrator.
57. Regrade. A determination that classified information
requires a different degree of protection against
unauthorized disclosure than currently provided, together
with a change of classification designation that reflects
such different degrees of protection.
58. Restricted Area. An area wherein security measures are
applied primarily for the safeguarding or administrative
control of property or to protect operations and
functions that are vital or essential to the
accomplishment of the mission assigned to a NASA
Installation or component Installation.
59. Restricted Data. All data concerning design,
manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons, the
production of special nuclear material, or the use of
special nuclear material in the production of energy, but
will not include data declassified or removed from the
Restricted Data category pursuant to Section 142 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
60. Safeguarding.
a. All measures taken to minimize the possibility of
compromise of classified information including
accountability, control, and storage of classified
material; and
b. All measures taken to protect unclassified property
warranting special protection.
61. Secret Information. Only information that could
reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to the
national security if disclosed to unauthorized persons.
62. Security Area. A physically defined area established for
the protection or security of facilities, property, or
classified information and material in the possession or
custody of NASA or a NASA contractor located at a NASA
Installation or component Installation, entry to which is
subject to security measures, procedures, or controls.
63. Security Officer. The Installation Security Officer of a
NASA Field Installation or the Chief, NASA Security
Office.
64. Security Storage Equipment. Any security filing cabinet,
safe, safe-type filing cabinet, modified steel filing
cabinet, vault, vault-type room, or other storage
container or equipment specifically approved by the
Security Officer for the storage of classified material.
65. Security Violation (Infraction). A failure to comply
with or observe security regulations or procedures
established to safeguard classified information but has
not resulted in the loss or compromise of the information
involved (see Compromise).
66. SDI - Single Scope Background Investigation update.
67. SGI - Single Scope Background Investigation upgrade.
68. Short Title. A brief, unclassified identifying
combination of words, letters or numbers assigned to a
specific classified document or item of material for the
purpose of brevity and security.
69. Special Access Program. Any program imposing
need-to-know or access controls beyond those normally
provided for access to Confidential, Secret, or Top
Secret information. Such a program includes, but is not
limited to, special clearance, adjudication, or
investigative requirements, special designation of
officials authorized to determine need-to-know, or
special lists of persons determined to have a
need-to-know.
70. Top Secret Information. Only that information that
could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave
damage to the national security if disclosed to
unauthorized persons.
71. Unauthorized Person.
a. Any person not authorized to have access to specific
classified information in accordance with the access
provisions of this Handbook; or
b. Any person who enters a Security Area without proper
authorization.
72. United States and Its Territories. The 50 States; the
District of Columbia; the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico;
the Territories of Guam, American Samoa, and the Virgin
Islands; the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; the
Canal Zone; and the Possessions, Midway, and Wake
Islands.
73. Upgrade. A determination made in the interests of
national security that certain classified information
requires a higher degree of protection against
unauthorized disclosure than currently provided, together
with a change in the classification designation to
reflect the higher degree.
74. Visit.
a. Classified Visit. A visit involving the authorized
disclosure of classified information.
b. Unclassified Visit. A visit that does not involve
the disclosure of classified information.
75. Visitor.
a. Any person who is admitted to a NASA Field
Installation other than a NASA employee of that
Installation; and
b. A NASA employee visiting another agency or
contractor.
76. Work Document. Any note, draft, preliminary copy of a
page of a document, or a form used to collect data for
inclusion in a document, which is prepared prior to
incorporation into a master or final copy.
APPENDIX C: PERSONNEL SECURITY ADJUDICATION POLICY
GENERAL
The following adjudication policy has been developed to assist
NASA adjudicators in making determinations about an
individual's eligibility for employment or retention in
sensitive duties or eligibility for access to classified
information. Refer also to Appendix V and W.
While reasonable consistency in reaching adjudicative
determinations is desirable, the nature and complexities of
human behavior preclude the development of a single set of
guidelines or policies that is equally applicable in every
personnel security case. Accordingly, the following
adjudication policy is not intended to be interpreted as
inflexible rules of procedure. The following policy requires
that each adjudicator has successfully passed the Department
of Defense (DOD) Personnel Security Adjudication course as
well as attended the suitability and security adjudication
course provided by the Office of Personnel Management. The
adjudicator's sound judgment, mature thinking, and careful
analysis of each case must be weighed on its own merits,
taking into consideration all relevant circumstances, and
prior experience in similar cases as well as the guidelines
contained in the adjudication policy, which have been compiled
from common experience in personnel security determinations.
Each adjudication is to be an overall common sense
determination based upon consideration and assessment of all
available information, both favorable and unfavorable, with
particular emphasis being placed on the seriousness, recency,
frequency, and motivation for the individual's conduct; the
extent to which conduct was negligent, willful, voluntary, or
undertaken with knowledge of the circumstances or consequences
involved; and, to the extent that it can be estimated, the
probability that conduct will or will not continue in the
future. The listed "Disqualifying Factors" and "Mitigating
Factors" in this set of Adjudication Policies reflect the
consideration of those factors of seriousness, recency,
frequency, motivation, etc., to common situations and types of
behavior encountered in personnel security adjudications, and
should be followed whenever an individual case can be measured
against this policy guidance. Common sense may occasionally
necessitate deviations from this policy guidance, but such
deviations should not be made frequently and must be carefully
explained and documented.
The "Disqualifying Factors" provided herein establish some of
the types of serious conduct under the criteria that can
justify a determination to deny or revoke an individual's
eligibility for access to classified information, or
appointment to, or retention in sensitive duties. The
"Mitigating Factors" establish some of the types of
circumstances that may mitigate the conduct listed under the
"Disqualifying Factors." Any determination must include a
consideration of both the conduct listed under "Disqualifying
Factors" and any circumstances listed under the appropriate or
corresponding "Mitigating Factors."
In all adjudications, the protection of the national security
shall be the paramount determinant. In the last analysis, a
final decision in each case must be arrived at by applying the
standard that the issuance of the clearance or assignment to
the sensitive position is "clearly consistent with the
interests of national security."
LOYALTY
Basis: Commission of any act of sabotage, espionage, treason,
terrorism, anarchy, sedition, or attempts thereat or
preparation therefor, or conspiring with or aiding or abetting
another to commit or attempt to commit any such act.
Establishing or continuing a sympathetic association with a
saboteur, spy, traitor, seditionist, anarchist, terrorist,
revolutionist, or with an espionage or other secret agent or
similar representative of a foreign nation whose interests may
be inimical to the interests of the United States, or with any
person who advocates the use of force or violence to overthrow
the Government of the United States or to alter the form of
Government of the United States by unconstitutional means.
Advocacy or use of force or violence to overthrow the
Government of the United States or to alter the form of
Government of the United States by unconstitutional means.
Knowing membership with the specific intent of furthering the
aims of, or adherence to and active participation in any
foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group
or combination of persons (hereafter referred to as
organizations) that unlawfully advocates or practices the
commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from
exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the
United States or of any State or which seeks to overthrow the
Government of the United States or any State or subdivision
thereof by unlawful means.
Disqualifying Factors
The behavior falls in one or more of the following categories:
1. Furnishing a representative of a foreign government
information or data that could damage the national
security of the United States.
2. Membership in an organization that has been characterized
by the Department of Justice as one that meets the
criteria in the above cited "Basis."
3. Knowing participation in acts that involve force or
violence or threats of force or violence to prevent
others from exercising their rights under the
Constitution or to overthrow or alter the form of
government of the United States or of any State.
4. Monetary contributions, service, or other support of the
organization defined in "Basis," above, with the intent
of furthering the unlawful objectives of the
organization.
5. Participation, support, aid, comfort or sympathetic
association with persons, groups, organizations involved
in terrorist activities, threats, or acts.
6. Evidence of continuing sympathy with the unlawful aims
and objectives of such an organization, as defined in the
"Basis" above.
7. Holding a position of major doctrinal or managerial
influence in an organization as defined in the "Basis"
above.
Mitigating Factors
The following circumstances may mitigate disqualifying
information:
1. Lack of knowledge or understanding of other unlawful aims
of the organization.
2. Affiliation or activity occurred during adolescent/young
adult years (17-25), more than 5 years has passed since
affiliation was severed, and affiliation was due to
immaturity.
3. Affiliation for less than a year out of curiosity or
academic interest.
4. Sympathy or support limited to the lawful objectives of
the organization.
FOREIGN PREFERENCE
Basis: Performing or attempting to perform one's duties,
acceptance and active maintenance of dual citizenship or other
acts conducted in a manner that serve or could be expected to
serve the interests of another government in preference to the
interests of the United States.
Disqualifying Factors
The behavior falls in one or more of the following categories:
1. The active maintenance of dual citizenship by one or more
of the following:
a. Possession of a passport issued by a foreign nation
and use of this passport to obtain legal entry into
any sovereign state in preference to use of a U.S.
passport.
b. Military service in the armed forces of a foreign
nation or the willingness to comply with an
obligation to so serve, or the willingness to bear
arms at any time in the future on behalf of the
foreign state.
c. Exercise or acceptance of rights, privileges or
benefits offered by the foreign state to its
citizens (e.g., voting in a foreign election;
receipt of honors or titles; financial compensation
due to employment/retirement, educational or medical
or other social welfare benefits), in preference to
those of the United States.
d. Travel to or residence in the foreign state for the
purpose of fulfilling citizenship requirements or
obligations.
e. Maintenance of dual citizenship to protect financial
interests, to include property ownership, or
employment or inheritance rights in the foreign
state.
f. Registration for military service or registration
with a foreign office, embassy or consulate to
obtain benefits.
2. Employment as an agent or other official representative
of a foreign government, or seeking or holding political
office in a foreign state.
3. Use of a U.S. Government position of trust or
responsibility to influence decisions to serve the
interests of another government in preference to those of
the United States.
Mitigating Factors
The following circumstances may mitigate disqualifying
information:
1. Claim of dual citizenship is with a foreign country whose
interests are not inimical to those of the United States
and is based solely on applicant's or applicant's
parent(s) birth; the applicant has not actively
maintained citizenship in the past 10 years and indicates
he/she will not in the future act so as to pursue this
claim.
2. Military service while a U.S. citizen was in the armed
forces of a state whose interests are not inimical to
those of the United States and such service was
officially sanctioned by United States authorities.
3. Employment is as a consultant only and services provided
is of the type sanctioned by the United States
government.
SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY SAFEGUARDS
Basis: Disregard of public law, statutes, Executive orders or
regulations, including violation of security regulations or
practices, or unauthorized disclosure to any person of
classified information, or of other information, disclosure of
which is prohibited by statute, Executive order or regulation.
Disqualifying Factors
The behavior falls in one or more of the following categories:
1. Deliberate or reckless disregard of security regulations,
public law, statutes or Executive orders that could have
resulted in the loss or compromise of classified
information.
2. Deliberate or reckless violations of security
regulations, including, but not limited to, taking
classified information home or carrying classified data
while in a travel status without proper authorization,
intentionally copying classified documents to obscure
classification markings, disseminating classified
information to cleared personnel who have no need to
know, or disclosing classified information, or other
information, disclosure of which is prohibited by
statute, Executive order or regulation, to persons who
are not cleared or authorized to receive it.
3. Pattern of negligent conduct in handling or storing
classified documents.
Mitigating Factors
The following circumstances may mitigate disqualifying
information:
1. Violation of security procedures was directly caused or
significantly contributed to by an improper or inadequate
security briefing, provided the individual reasonably
relied on such briefing in good faith.
2. Individual is personally responsible for a large volume
of classified information, and the nature of the
violation was merely administrative.
3. Security violation was merely an isolated incident not
involving deliberate or reckless violation of security
policies, practices or procedures.
CRIMINAL CONDUCT
Basis: Criminal or dishonest conduct
When it is determined that an applicant for a security
clearance, or a person holding a clearance, has engaged in
conduct that would constitute a felony under the laws of the
United States, the clearance of such person shall be denied or
revoked unless it is determined that there are compelling
reasons to grant or continue such clearance. Compelling
reasons can only be shown by clear and convincing evidence of
the following:
1. The felonious conduct (l) did not involve an
exceptionally grave offense; (2) was an isolated
episode; and (3) the individual has demonstrated
trustworthiness and respect for the law over an
extended period since the offense occurred; or
2. The felonious conduct (1) did not involve an
exceptionally grave offense; (2) was an isolated
episode; (3) was due to the immaturity of the
individual at the time it occurred; and (4) the
individual has demonstrated maturity,
trustworthiness, and respect for the law since that
time; or
3. In cases where the individual has committed
felonious conduct but was not convicted of a felony,
there are extenuating circumstances that mitigate
the seriousness of the conduct such that it does not
reflect a lack of trustworthiness or respect for the
law.
The above criteria supersede all criteria previously used to
adjudicate criminal conduct involving commission of felonies
under the Laws of the United States. Involvement in criminal
activities that does not constitute a felony under the laws of
the United States shall be evaluated in accordance with the
criteria set forth below. (For purposes of this paragraph,
the term "felony" means any crime punishable by imprisonment
for more than a year. The term "exceptionally grave offense"
includes crimes against the Federal Government, its
instrumentalities, officers, employees or agents; or involves
dishonesty, fraud, bribery or false statement; or involves
breach of trust or fiduciary duty; or involves serious threat
to life or public safety.)
Disqualifying Factors
The behavior falls in one or more of the following categories:
1. Criminal conduct that involves the following:
a. Commission of a state felony;
b. Force, coercion, or intimidation;
c. Firearms, explosives, or other weapons;
d. Dishonesty or false statements, e.g., fraud, theft,
embezzlement, falsification of documents or
statements;
e. Obstruction or corruption of government functions;
f. Deprivation of civil rights; or
g. Violence against persons.
2. Criminal conduct punishable by confinement for one year
or more.
3. An established pattern of criminal conduct, whether or
not the individual was convicted.
4. Failure to complete a rehabilitation program resulting
from disposition of a criminal proceeding or violation of
probation, even if the violation did not result in formal
revocation of probation. Rehabilitation should not be
considered a success or failure while the individual is
still on parole/probation.
5. Criminal conduct that is so recent in time as to preclude
a determination that recurrence is unlikely.
6. Close and continuing association with persons known to
the individual to be involved in criminal activities.
7. Criminal conduct indicative of a serious mental
aberration, lack of remorse, or insufficient probability
of rehabilitative success (e.g., spouse or child abuse).
8. Disposition:
a. Conviction.
b. Disposition on a legal issue not going to the merits
of the crime.
c. Arrest or indictment pending trial when there is
evidence that the individual engaged in the criminal
conduct for which arrested or indicted.
9. Arrest record. In evaluating an arrest record,
information that indicates that the individual was
acquitted, that the charges were dropped or the subject
of a "stet" or "nolle prosequi," that the record was
expunged, or that the cause was dismissed due to error
not going to the merits, does not negate the security
significance of the underlying conduct. Personnel
security determinations are to be made on the basis of
all available information concerning a person's conduct
and actions rather than the legal outcome of a criminal
proceeding.
Mitigating Factors
The following circumstances may mitigate disqualifying
information:
1. Immaturity attributable to the age of the individual at
the time of the offense;
2. Extenuating circumstances surrounding the offense;
3. Circumstances indicating that the actual offense was less
serious than the offense charged;
4. Isolated nature of the conduct;
5. Conduct occurring only in the distant past (such as more
than 5 years ago) in the absence of subsequent criminal
conduct; or
6. Transitory conditions directly or significantly
contributing to the conduct (such as divorce action,
death in family, severe provocation) in the absence of
subsequent criminal conduct.
MENTAL OR EMOTIONAL DISORDERS
Basis: Any behavior or illness, including any mental
condition, which, in the opinion of competent medical
authority, may cause a defect in judgment or reliability with
due regard to the transient or continuing effect of the
illness and the medical findings in such case.
Disqualifying Factors
The behavior or condition falls in one or more of the
following categories:
1. Diagnosis by competent medical authority (board certified
psychiatrist or clinical psychologist) that the
individual has an illness or mental condition that may
result in a significant defect in judgment or
reliability.
2. Conduct or personality traits that are bizarre or reflect
abnormal behavior or instability even though there has
been no history of mental illness or treatment, but that
nevertheless, in the opinion of competent medical
authority, may cause a defect in judgment or reliability.
3. A diagnosis by competent medical authority that the
individual suffers from mental or intellectual
incompetence or mental retardation to a degree
significant enough to establish or suggest that the
individual could not recognize, understand or comprehend
the necessity of security regulations, or procedures, or
that judgment or reliability is significantly impaired,
or that the individual could be influenced or swayed to
act contrary to the national security.
4. Diagnosis by competent medical authority that an illness
or condition that had affected judgment or reliability
may recur even though the individual currently manifests
no symptoms, or that symptoms are currently reduced or in
remission.
5. Failure to take prescribed medication or participate in
treatment (including follow-up treatment or aftercare),
or otherwise failing to follow medical advice relating to
treatment of the illness or mental condition.
Mitigating Factors
The following circumstances may mitigate disqualifying
information:
1. Diagnosis by competent medical authority that an
individual's previous mental or emotional illness or
condition that did cause significant defect in judgment
or reliability is cured and has no probability of
recurrence, or that there is such a minimal probability
of recurrence as to reasonably estimate there will be
none.
2. The contributing factors or circumstances that caused the
bizarre conduct or traits, abnormal behavior, or defect
in judgment and reliability have been eliminated or
rectified; there is a corresponding alleviation of the
individual's condition and the contributing factors or
circumstances are not expected to recur.
3. Evidence of the individual's continued reliable use of
prescribed medication for a period of at least 2 years,
without recurrence and testimony by competent medical
authority that continued maintenance of prescribed
medication is medically practical and likely to preclude
recurrence of the illness or condition affecting judgment
or reliability.
4. There has been no evidence of a psychotic condition, a
serious or disabling neurotic disorder, or a serious
character or personality disorder for the past 10 years.
FOREIGN CONNECTIONS/VULNERABILITY TO BLACKMAIL OR COERCION
Basis: Vulnerability to coercion, influence, or pressure
that may cause conduct contrary to the national interest.
This may be (l) the presence of immediate family members or
other persons to whom the applicant is bonded by affection or
obligation in a nation (or areas under its domination) whose
interests may be inimical to the United States, or (2) any
other circumstances that could cause the applicant to be
vulnerable.
Disqualifying Factors
The behavior falls in one or more of the following categories:
1. Indications that the individual now is being blackmailed,
pressured or coerced by any individual, group,
association, organization or government.
2. Indications that a vulnerable individual actually has
been targeted and/or approached for possible blackmail,
coercion or pressure by any individual, group,
association, organization, or government.
3. Indications that the individual has acted to increase the
vulnerability for future possible blackmail, coercion or
pressure by any individual, group, association,
organization or governments, especially by or in a
country designated hostile to the United States (see
Appendix F). Indicators include, but are not limited to
the following:
a. Failure to report to security officials any
evidence, indication or suspicion that mail to
relatives has been opened, unusually delayed or
tampered with in any way, or that telephone calls
have been monitored.
b. An increase in curiosity or official or
quasi-official inquiries about the individual to
relatives in the country where they reside
occasioned by the receipt of mail, packages,
telephone calls or visits from the individual.
c. Contact with, or visits by, officials to the
individual while visiting relatives in another
country, to learn more about the individual, or the
individual's employment or residence, etc.
d. Unreported attempts to obtain classified or other
sensitive information or data by representatives of
a foreign country.
4. Conduct or actions by the individual while visiting in a
country hostile to the United States that increase the
individual's vulnerability to be targeted for possible
blackmail, coercion, or pressure. These include, but are
not limited to the following:
a. Violation of any laws of the foreign country where
relatives reside during visits or through mailing
letters or packages (e.g., smuggling, currency
exchange violations, unauthorized mailings,
violations of postal regulations of the country, or
any criminal conduct, including traffic violations)
that may call the attention of officials to the
individual.
b. Frequent and regular visits, correspondence, or
telephone contact with relatives in the country
where they reside, increasing the likelihood of
official notice.
c. Failure to report to security officials those
inquiries by friends or relatives for more than a
normal level of curiosity concerning the
individual's employment, sensitive duties, military
service, or access to classified information.
d. Repeated telephone or written requests to the
foreign government officials for official favors,
permits, visas, travel permission, or similar
requests that increase the likelihood of official
notice.
e. Reckless conduct, open or public misbehavior or
commission of acts contrary to local customs or
laws, or that violate the mores of the foreign
country and increase the likelihood of official
notice.
f. Falsification of documents, lying to officials,
harassing or taunting officials or otherwise acting
to cause an increase in the likelihood of official
notice or to increase the individual's vulnerability
because personal freedom could be jeopardized.
g. Commission of any illicit sexual act, drug purchase
or use, drunkenness or similar conduct that
increases the likelihood of official notice, or that
increases the individual's vulnerability because
personal freedom could be jeopardized.
5. Conduct or actions by the individual that increase the
individual's vulnerability to possible coercion,
blackmail or pressure, regardless of the country in which
it occurred, including, but not limited to the following:
a. Concealment or attempts to conceal from an employer
prior unfavorable employment history, criminal
conduct, mental or emotional disorders or treatment,
drug or alcohol use, sexual preference, or sexual
misconduct described under that section below, or
fraudulent credentials or qualifications for
employment.
b. Concealment or attempts to conceal from immediate
family members, or close associates, supervisors or
coworkers, criminal conduct, mental or emotional
disorders or treatment, drug or alcohol abuse,
sexual preference, or sexual misconduct described
under that section below.
Mitigating Factors
The following circumstances may mitigate disqualifying
information:
1. Receives no financial assistance from and provides no
financial assistance to persons or organizations in the
designated country.
2. Has been in the United States for at least 5 years since
becoming a U.S. citizen without significant contact with
persons or organizations from the designated country
(each year of active service in the United States
military may be counted).
3. Has close ties of affection to immediate family members
in the United States.
4. Has adapted to the lifestyle in the United States,
established substantive financial or other associations
with U.S. enterprises or community activities.
5. Prefers the way of life and form of the U.S. Government
over the other country.
6. Is willing to defend the United States against all
threats, including the designated country in question.
7. Has not divulged the degree of association with the U.S.
Government or access to classified information to
individuals in the designated country in question.
8. Has not been contacted or approached by anyone or any
organization from a designated country to provide
information or favors, or to otherwise act for a person
or organization in the designated country in question.
9. Has promptly reported to proper authorities all attempted
contacts, requests or threats from persons or
organizations from the designated country.
10. The individual is aware of the possible vulnerability to
attempts of blackmail or coercion and has taken positive
steps to reduce or eliminate such vulnerability.
FINANCIAL MATTERS
Basis: Excessive indebtedness, recurring financial
difficulties, or unexplained affluence.
Disqualifying Factors
The behavior falls in one or more of the following categories:
1. History of bad debts, garnishments, liens, repossessions,
unfavorable judgments, delinquent or uncollectible
accounts or debts written off by creditors as
uncollectible losses with little or no apparent or
voluntary effort by the individual to pay amounts owed.
2. Bankruptcy:
a. Due to financial irresponsibility, or
b. With continuing financial irresponsibility
thereafter.
3. Indebtedness aggravated or caused by gambling, alcohol,
drug abuse, or other factors indicating poor judgment or
financial irresponsibility.
4. A history or pattern of living beyond the person's
financial means or ability to pay, a lifestyle reflecting
irresponsible expenditures that exceed income or assets,
or a history or pattern of writing checks on closed
accounts or not covered by sufficient funds.
5. Indication of deceit or deception in obtaining credit or
bank accounts, misappropriation of funds, income tax
evasion, embezzlement, fraud, or attempts to evade lawful
creditors.
6. Indifference to or disregard of financial obligations or
indebtedness or intention not to meet or satisfy lawful
financial obligations or when present expenses exceed net
income.
7. Unexplained affluence or income derived from illegal
gambling, drug trafficking or other criminal or nefarious
means.
8. Significant unexplained increase in an individual's net
worth.
Mitigating Factors
The following circumstances may mitigate disqualifying
information:
1. Schedule program or systematic efforts demonstrated over
a period of time (generally 1 year) to satisfy creditors,
to acknowledge debts and arrange for reduced payments,
entry into debt-consolidation program or seeking the
advice and assistance of financial counselors or court
supervised payment program.
2. Change to a more responsible lifestyle, reduction of
credit card accounts, and favorable change in financial
habits over a period of time (generally 1 year).
3. Stable employment record and favorable financial
references.
4. Unforeseen circumstances beyond the individual's control
(e.g., a major or catastrophic illness or surgery,
accidental loss of property or assets not covered by
insurance, decrease or cutoff of income, indebtedness
resulting from court judgments not due to the
individual's financial mismanagement), provided the
individual demonstrates efforts to respond to the
indebtedness in a reasonable and responsible fashion.
5. Indebtedness due to failure of legitimate business
efforts or business-related bankruptcy without evidence
of fault or financial irresponsibility on the part of the
individual, irresponsible mismanagement of an
individual's fund by another who had fiduciary control or
access to them without the individual's knowledge, or
loss of assets as a victim of fraud or deceit, provided
the individual demonstrates efforts to respond to the
indebtedness in a reasonable and responsible fashion.
6. Any significant increase in net worth was due to
legitimate business interests, inheritance or similar
legal explanation.
ALCOHOL ABUSE
Basis: Habitual or episodic use of intoxicants to excess.
Disqualifying Factors
The behavior falls in one or more of the following categories:
1. Habitual or episodic consumption of alcohol to the point
of impairment or intoxication.
2. Alcohol-related incidents such as traffic violations,
fighting, child or spouse abuse, non-traffic violation or
other criminal incidents related to alcohol use.
3. Deterioration of the individual's health or physical or
mental condition owing to alcohol use or abuse.
4. Drinking on the job, reporting for work in an intoxicated
or "hungover" condition, tardiness or absences caused by
or related to alcohol abuse, and impairment or
intoxication occurring during, and immediately following,
luncheon breaks.
5. Refusal or failure to accept counseling or professional
help for alcohol abuse or alcoholism.
6. Refusal or failure to follow medical advice relating to
alcohol abuse treatment or to abstain from alcohol use
despite medical or professional advice.
7. Refusal or failure to significantly decrease consumption
of alcohol or to change lifestyle and habits that
contributed to past alcohol-related difficulties.
8. Indications of financial or other irresponsibility or
unreliability caused by alcohol abuse, or discussing
sensitive or classified information while drinking.
9. Failure to cooperate in or successfully complete a
prescribed regimen of an alcohol abuse rehabilitation
program.
Mitigating Factors
The following circumstances may mitigate disqualifying
information:
1. Successfully completed an alcohol awareness program
following two or less alcohol-related incidents and has
significantly reduced alcohol consumption, and made
positive changes in lifestyle and improvement in job
reliability.
2. Successfully completed an alcohol rehabilitation program
after three or more alcohol-related incidents, has
significantly reduced or eliminated alcohol consumption
in accordance with medical or professional advice,
regularly attended Alcoholics Anonymous or similar
support organization for approximately 1 year after
rehabilitation, and abstained from the use of alcohol for
that period of time.
3. Whenever one of the situations listed below occurs, the
individual must have successfully completed an alcohol
rehabilitation or detoxification program and totally
abstained from alcohol for a period of approximately 2
years:
a. The individual has had one previously failed
rehabilitation program and subsequent alcohol abuse
or alcohol-related incidents.
b. The individual has been diagnosed by competent
medical or health authority as an alcoholic,
alcoholic dependent, or chronic abuser of alcohol.
4. Whenever the individual has had repeated unsuccessful
rehabilitation efforts and has continued drinking or has
been involved in additional alcohol-related incidents
then the individual must have successfully completed an
alcohol rehabilitation or detoxification program, totally
abstained from alcohol for a period of at least 3 years
and maintained regular and frequent participation in
meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous or similar
organizations.
5. If an individual's alcohol abuse surfaced solely as a
result of self- referral to an alcohol abuse program and
there have been no precipitating factors such as alcohol-
related arrests or incidents, action will not normally be
taken to suspend or revoke security clearance solely on
the self-referral for treatment.
DRUG ABUSE
Basis: Illegal or improper use, possession, transfer, sale or
addiction to any controlled or psychoactive substance,
including narcotics, such as cannabis, or any other dangerous
drug.
Disqualifying Factors
The behavior falls in one or more of the following categories:
1. Abuse of cannabis only, not in combination with any other
substance.
a. Experimental abuse, defined as an average of once
every 2 months or less, but no more than six times
within the past 2 years.
b. Occasional abuse, defined as an average of not more
than once a month within the past 3 years.
c. Frequent abuse, defined as an average of not more
than once a week within the past 5 years.
d. Regular, compulsive, or habitual abuse, including
physical and/or psychological dependency defined as
an average of more than once a week within the past
15 years.
2. Abuse of any narcotic, psychoactive substance or
dangerous drug (including prescription drugs) either
alone or in combination with another or cannabis, as
follows:
a. Experimental abuse, defined as an average of once
every 2 months or less, but no more than 6 times
within the past 3 years.
b. Occasional abuse, defined as an average of not more
than once a month within the past 5 years.
c. Frequent abuse, defined as an average of not more
than once a week within the past 10 years.
d. Regular, compulsive, or habitual abuse, including
physical and/or psychological dependency defined as
an average of more than once a week within the past
15 years.
3. Involvement to any degree in the unauthorized
trafficking, cultivating, processing, manufacturing,
selling, or distributing of any narcotic, dangerous drug,
or cannabis, or assisting those involved in such acts
whether or not the individual was arrested for such
activity. (Note: There is no corresponding Mitigating
Factor for this Disqualifying Factor.)
4. Involvement with narcotics, dangerous drugs or cannabis
under the following conditions whether or not the
individual engages in personal use:
a. Possession.
b. Possession of a substantial amount, more than could
reasonably be expected for personal use.
c. Possession of drug paraphernalia for cultivating,
manufacturing or distributing (e.g., possession of
gram scales, smoking devices, needles for injecting
intravenously, empty capsules or other drug
production chemical paraphernalia).
d. Possession of personal drug paraphernalia (e.g.,
needles for injecting, smoking devices and
equipment, etc.).
5. Information that the individual intends to continue to
use (regardless of frequency) any narcotic, dangerous
drug or cannabis. (NOTE: There is no corresponding
Mitigating Factor for this Disqualifying Factor because
it is NASA policy that, as a general rule, if any
individual expresses or implies any intent to continue
use of any narcotic, dangerous drug, or other controlled
substance, including marijuana and hashish, without a
prescription, in any amount and regardless of frequency,
it is to be considered contrary to the national interest
and the interests of national security to grant or allow
retention of a security clearance for access to
classified information for that individual.)
Mitigating Factors
The following circumstances may mitigate disqualifying
information:
1. Abuse of cannabis only, as follows: (Use this to assess
Disqualifying Factor 1.)
a. Experimental abuse, which occurred more than 2 years
ago and the individual has demonstrated an intent
not to use cannabis or any other narcotic,
psychoactive substance, or dangerous drug in the
future.
b. Occasional abuse of cannabis, which occurred more
than 3 years ago, and the individual has
demonstrated an intent not to use cannabis or any
other narcotic, dangerous drug, or psychoactive
substance in the future.
c. Frequent abuse of cannabis occurred more than 5
years ago, and the individual has demonstrated an
intent not to use cannabis or any other narcotic,
dangerous drug, or psychoactive substance in the
future.
d. Regular compulsive, habitual use or physical or
psychological dependency on cannabis occurred more
than 15 years ago. The individual has demonstrated
an intent not to use cannabis or any other narcotic,
dangerous drug, or psychoactive substance in the
future and has demonstrated a stable lifestyle, with
no indication of physical or psychological
dependence.
2. For abuse other than cannabis alone. Use is considered
cumulative and each separate substance must not be
considered separately. (Use this to assess Disqualifying
Factor 2.)
a. Experimental abuse occurred more 3 years ago, the
individual has demonstrated an intent not to use any
drugs or cannabis in the future and has successfully
completed a drug rehabilitation program.
b. Occasional abuse occurred more than 5 years ago, the
individual has demonstrated an intent not to use any
drugs or cannabis in the future, has a stable
lifestyle and satisfactory employment record, and
has successfully completed a drug rehabilitation
program.
c. Frequent abuse occurred more than 10 years ago, the
individual has demonstrated an intent not to use any
drugs or cannabis in the future, has a stable
lifestyle, including satisfactory employment record
with no further indication of drug abuse, and has
successfully completed a drug rehabilitation
program.
d. Compulsive abuse occurred more than 15 years ago,
the individual has demonstrated an intent not to use
any drugs or cannabis in the future, has a stable
lifestyle, including satisfactory employment record
with no further indication of drug abuse, and has
successfully completed a drug rehabilitation
program.
3. Use this only to assess conduct under Disqualifying
Factor 4 in the corresponding subparagraphs.
a. No possession of drugs or other criminal activity in
the past 2 years.
b. The individual has not possessed drugs in the past 3
years, has had no other criminal activity in the
past 3 years and has demonstrated an intent not to
be involved in such activity in the future.
c. The individual has not possessed drug paraphernalia
used to process, manufacture or distribute for the
past 5 years, has had no other criminal activity in
the past 5 years and has demonstrated an intent not
to be involved in such activity in
the future.
d. The individual has not possessed drug paraphernalia
for personal use in the past 2 years, has had no
other criminal activity in the past 2 years and has
demonstrated an intent not to be involved in such
activity in the future.
4. For the purpose of this Handbook, Narcotic, Dangerous
Drug and Cannabis are defined as follows:
a. Narcotic. Opium and opium derivatives or synthetic
substitutes.
b. Dangerous Drug. Any of the non-narcotic drugs that
are habit forming or have a potential for abuse
because of their stimulant, depressant, or
hallucinogenic effect.
c. Cannabis. The intoxicating products of the hemp
plant, Cannabis Sativa, including but not limited to
marijuana, hashish, and hashish oil.
FALSIFICATION
Basis: Any knowing and willful falsification, cover-up,
concealment, misrepresentation, or omission of a material fact
from any written or oral statement, document, form, or other
representation or device used by NASA or any other Federal
agency.
Disqualifying Factors
The behavior falls in one or more of the following categories:
1. Deliberate omission, concealment, falsification or
misrepresentation of relevant and material facts
including, but not limited to, information concerning
arrests, drug abuse or treatment, alcohol abuse or
treatment, treatment for mental or emotional disorders,
bankruptcy, military service information, organizational
affiliations, financial problems, employment, foreign
travel, or foreign connections from any Personnel
Security Questionnaire, Personal History Statement or
similar form used by any Federal agency to conduct
investigations, determine employment qualifications,
award benefits or status, determine security clearance or
access eligibility, or award fiduciary responsibilities.
2. Deliberately providing false or misleading information
concerning any of the relevant and material matters
listed above to an investigator, employer, supervisor,
security official or other official representative in
connection with application for security clearance or
access to classified information or assignment to
sensitive duties.
Mitigating Factors
The following circumstances may mitigate disqualifying
information:
1. The information was not relevant or material to reaching
a security clearance or access determination.
2. The falsification was an isolated incident in the distant
past (more than 5 years) and the individual subsequently
had accurately provided correct information voluntarily
during reapplication for clearance or access, and there
is no evidence of any other falsification
misrepresentation or dishonest conduct by the individual.
3. The behavior was not willful.
4. The falsification was done unknowingly or without the
individual's knowledge.
5. The individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct
the falsification before being confronted with the facts
of falsification.
6. Omission of material fact was caused by or significantly
contributed to by improper or inadequate advice of
authorized personnel, provided the individual reasonably
relied on such improper or inadequate advice in good
faith, and when the requirement subsequently was made
known to the individual, the previously omitted
information was promptly and fully provided.
REFUSAL TO ANSWER
Basis: Failing or refusing to answer or to authorize others
to answer questions or provide information required by a
Congressional committee, court or agency in the course of an
official inquiry whenever such answers or information concern
relevant and material matters pertinent to an evaluation of
the individual's trustworthiness, reliability, and judgment.
Disqualifying Factors
The behavior falls in one or more of the following categories:
1. Failure or refusal to provide full, frank and truthful
answers or to authorize others to do so, in connection
with any application for security clearance or access, to
include required nondisclosure and security termination
agreements.
2. Failure or refusal to provide appropriate investigative
forms, including release forms, for use by investigators
in obtaining information from medical institutions,
agencies or personal physicians, therapists,
psychologists, psychiatrists, counselors, rehabilitation
treatment, agencies or personnel; from police or criminal
agencies, probation agencies or officers, financial
institutions, employers, Federal or State agencies,
professional associations, or any other organizations as
required as part of an investigation for security
clearance, access, appointment, or assignment to
sensitive duties.
3. Failure or refusal to authorize others to provide
relevant and material information necessary to reach a
security clearance determination.
4. Failure or refusal to answer questions or provide
information required by a Congressional committee, court,
or agency when such answers or information concern
relevant and material matters pertinent to evaluating the
individual's trustworthiness, reliability and judgment.
Mitigating Factors
The following circumstances may mitigate disqualifying
information:
1. The individual was unable to provide the information
despite good faith and reasonable efforts to do so.
2. The individual was unaware of the necessity to provide
the information requested or of the possible consequences
of such refusal or failure to provide the information
and, upon being made aware of this requirement, fully,
frankly, and truthfully provided the requested
information.
3. The individual sought and relied in good faith on
information and advice from legal counsel or other
officials that the individual was not required to provide
the information requested and, upon being made aware of
the requirement, fully, frankly, and truthfully provided
the requested information.
SEXUAL MISCONDUCT
Basis: Acts of sexual misconduct or perversion indicative of
moral turpitude, poor judgment, or lack of regard for the laws
of society.
Disqualifying Factors
1. Behavior falls in one or more of the following
categories;
a. Acts performed or committed in open or public
places;
b. Acts performed with a minor or with animals;
c. Acts involving inducement, coercion, force,
violence, or intimidation of another person;
d. Prostitution, pandering, or the commission of sexual
acts for money or other remuneration or reward;
e. Sexual harassment;
f. Self-mutilation, self-punishment, or degradation;
g. Conduct that involves spouse swapping or group sex
orgies;
h. Adultery that is recent, frequent, and likely to
continue and has an adverse effect on good order or
discipline within the workplace (e.g.,
officer/enlisted, supervisor/subordinate,
instructor/student);
i. Conduct determined to be criminal in the locale in
which it occurred;
j. Deviant or perverted sexual behavior that may
indicate a mental or personality disorder (e.g.,
transsexualism, transvestism, exhibitionism, incest,
child molestation, voyeurism, bestiality, or
sodomy).
2. The conduct has been recent.
3. The conduct increases the individual's vulnerability to
blackmail, coercion, or pressure.
4. Evidence that the applicant has intention or is likely to
repeat the conduct in question.
Mitigating Factors
The following circumstances may mitigate disqualifying
information:
1. Sexual misconduct occurred on an isolated basis during or
preceding adolescence with no evidence of subsequent
conduct of a similar nature, and clear indication that
the individual has no intention of participating in such
conduct in the future.
2. Sexual misconduct was isolated, occurred more than 3
years ago, and there is clear indication that the
individual has no intention of participating in such
conduct in the future.
3. The individual was a minor or was the victim of force or
violence by another.
4. The individual has successfully completed professional
therapy, has been rehabilitated, and diagnosed by
competent medical authority that misconduct is not likely
to recur.
5. Demonstration that the individual's sexual misconduct can
no longer form the basis for vulnerability to blackmail,
coercion, or pressure.
APPENDIX D: PERSONNEL SECURITY CASE PROCESSING PROCEDURES
1. PROCESSING OF NASA NATIONAL AGENCY CHECKS (NAC) FOR
UNESCORTED ACCESS BY NONCIVIL SERVANTS
There are four types of individuals who may require
unescorted access to NASA Installations. The following
procedures will identify each type and explain
appropriate NASA NAC processing.
a. Foreign National Residing Outside of the United
States
(1) Submit inquiry to FBI Name Check electronically,
by utilizing the Name Check Request System
(NCRS). (Search of FBI subversive records.) A
fee will be charged.
(2) Submit 2 NASA Name Check Request Forms (NF-531)
to the CIA. (Search of CIA security and
subversive records.)
(3) Submit 1 NF-531 to the Department of State.
(Search of Department of State security
records.)
(4) Submit a Visa Letter to the Department of State.
(Search of visa eligibility records.)*
b. Foreign National Residing in the United States
(1) Submit inquiry to FBI Name Check by utilizing
the NCRS.
(2) Submit Fingerprint Card (FD-258) via mail to the
FBI Identification Division (FBI Ident).
(Search of FBI criminal records.) FBI Ident
will only accept FB-258's for processing. Do
not submit NF-531's. A fee will be charged.
(3) Submit OFI Form 79 - Notice of Personnel
Investigation (OFI-79) to OPM - FIPC (Search of
OPM investigative records).
(4) Submit 2 NF-531 to the CIA.
(5) Submit 1 NF-531 to the Department of State.
(6) Submit 1 NF-531 to the Defense Investigative
Service (DIS) - Defense Central Index of
Investigations (DCII) (Search of DIS/DCII
investigative records).
(7) Submit inquiry to the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) electronically by
utilizing on-line terminal access software
(Search of INS naturalization and alien
registration records). A fee will be charged.
* Do not submit visa letters to the Department of
State on foreign nationals residing in the U.S.
c. U.S. citizen residing in the U.S.
(1) Submit inquiry to FBI Name Check by utilizing
the NCRS. A fee will be charged.
(2) Submit FD-258 to FBI Ident. A fee will be
charged.
(3) Submit OFI-79 to OPM-FIPC.
(4) Submit 1 NF-531 to DIS/DCII.
d. U.S. citizen residing outside of the U.S.
(1) Submit inquiry to FBI Name Check by utilizing
the NCRS. A fee will be charged.
(2) Submit FD-258 to FBI Ident. A fee will be
charged.
(3) Submit OFI-79 to OPM-FIPC.
(4) Submit 2 NF-531's to CIA.
(5) Submit 1 NF-531 to the Department of State.
(6) Submit 1 NF-531 to DIS/DCII.
Credit searches may be utilized when there is a
clear indication that an employee/applicant's
position includes fiduciary responsibilities; or
when issues develop during the course of a personnel
security investigation involving financial
irresponsibility. Credit searches will be initiated
by utilizing on-line terminal access supplied by the
Credit Bureau Incorporated (CBI).
2. UNIFORM PERSONNEL SECURITY FILE SYSTEM
The following NASA Forms will be designated as the first
two or three pages of all civil servant personnel
security file folders in the order presented below.
a. NASA Form 397 - Investigation Review Sheet
(1) Date and type of clearance granted, if any.
(2) Date and type of investigation(s) completed.
(3) Any pertinent information relating to personnel
security actions, such as administrative
withdrawals, clearance revalidations, or
security adjudications.
b. NASA Form 346 - Notification of Completion of
Investigation Under EO 10450 and/or Certificate of
Clearance
(1) Full name of employee.
(2) Date and place of birth of employee.
(3) Position title of employee.
(4) Position sensitivity level designation of
employee.
(5) NASA Installation.
(6) Date and type of investigation(s) completed.
(7) Name of agency that conducted the investigation.
(8) Date and type of clearance granted, if any.
(9) Typed name and signature of security
representative who processed the NASA Form 346.
c. NASA Form 1630 - Request for Access to Classified
National Security Information. NASA Form 1630 will
be utilized for civil servant personnel security
file folders that indicate a requirement for access
to classified national security information.*
(1) Name and address of requesting official.
(2) Employee's full name and social security number.
(3) Date of application.
(4) Position title of employee.
(5) Employee's mail code.
(6) Type of clearance applied for.
(7) Bona fide justification for access to classified
national security information.
(8) Name, title, signature, and date of applicants
first and second level supervisors.
(9) Date and initials of approving security
office representative.
(a) Generating a new 1630.
(b) Recertifying the original 1630 with
initials and dates from supervisors and
certifying officials.
(c) Utilizing a recertification roster.
* NASA Form 1630's will be recertified on an
annual basis for access review/security
clearance revalidation.
3. PERSONNEL SECURITY FILE REVIEW
All personnel security files that are released for review
to authorized Federal officials will contain a NASA Form
1536 (Privacy Act Disclosure Authorization and Accounting
Record). NASA Form 1536 will be utilized to adequately
document information identifying the nature of the
record, purpose of disclosure, agency, and requestor.
4. AUTHORITY FOR RELEASE OF INFORMATION
NASA Form 1635, Authority for Release of Information,
will be utilized when release authorization is required
in order for NASA investigators to obtain certain
appropriate investigatory material.
APPENDIX E: NASA INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM
14 CFR Part 1203
Information Security Program
PART 1203 - INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM
Subpart A - Scope
Sec.
1203.100 Legal basis.
1203.101 Other applicable NASA regulations.
Subpart B - NASA Information Security Program
1203.200 Background and discussion.
1203.201 Information security objectives.
1203.202 Responsibilities.
1203.203 Degree of protection.
Subpart C - Classification Principles and Considerations
1203.300 General.
1203.301 Identification of information requiring protection.
1203.302 Combination, interrelation or compilation.
1203.303 Dissemination considerations.
1203.304 Internal effect.
1203.305 Restricted Data.
Subpart D - Guides for Original Classification
Sec.
1203.400 Specific classifying guidance.
1203.401 Effect of open publication.
1203.402 Classifying material other than documentation.
1203.403 State-of-the-art and intelligence.
1203.404 Handling of unprocessed data.
1203.405 Proprietary information.
1203.406 Additional classification factors.
1203.407 Duration of classification.
1203.408 Assistance by Installation security classification
officers.
1203.409 Exceptional cases.
1203.410 Limitations.
1203.411 Restrictions.
1203.412 Classification guides.
Subpart E - Derivative Classification
1203.500 Use of derivative classification.
1203.501 Applying derivative classification markings.
Subpart F - Declassification and Downgrading
Sec.
1203.600 Policy.
1203.601 Responsibilities.
1203.602 Authorization.
1203.603 Systematic review for declassification.
1203.604 Mandatory review for declassification.
Subpart G - Foreign Government Information
1203.700 Identification.
1203.701 Classification.
1203.702 Duration of classification.
1203.703 Declassification.
AUTHORITY: 42 U.S.C. 2457 et seq. and E.O. 12356.
Subpart A - Scope.
Section 1203.100 Legal basis.
a. Executive Order 12356 (hereinafter referred to
as "the Order"). The responsibilities and
authority of the Administrator of NASA with
respect to the original classification of
official information or material requiring
protection against unauthorized disclosure in
the interest of national defense or foreign
relations of the United States (hereafter
collectively termed "national security"), and
the standards for such classification are
established by the "the Order" (47 FR 14874) and
the Information Security Oversight Office
Directive No. 1, June 25, 1982;
b. EO 10865. Executive Order 10865 (24 FR 1583)
requires the Administrator to prescribe by
regulation such specific requirements,
restrictions, and other safeguards as the
Administrator may consider necessary to protect:
(l) Releases of classified information to or
within United States industry that relate
to contracts with NASA; and
(2) Other releases of classified information to
industry that NASA has responsibility for
safeguarding.
c. The National Aeronautics and Space Act.
(l) Section 304(a) of the National Aeronautics
and Space Act of 1958, as amended (42
U.S.C. 2451 et seq.), states the following
in part: "The Administrator shall
establish such security requirements,
restrictions, and safeguards as he deems
necessary in the interest of the national
security."
(2) Section 303 of the Act states the
following: "Information obtained or
developed by the Administrator in the
performance of his functions under this Act
shall be made available for public
inspection, except (i) information
authorized or required by Federal Statute
to be withheld; and (ii) information
classified to protect the national
security: Provided that nothing in this
Act shall authorize the withholding of
information by the Administrator for the
duly authorized committees of the
Congress."
Section 1203.101 Other applicable NASA regulations.
a. Subpart I of this Part, (14 CFR) "NASA Security
Management Working Group."
b. NMI 1600.2, "NASA Security Program."
Subpart B-NASA Information Security Program
Section 1203.200 Background and discussion.
a. In establishing a civilian space program, the
Congress required NASA to "provide for the
widest practicable and appropriate dissemination
of information concerning its activities and the
results thereof," and for the withholding from
public inspection of that information that is
classified to protect the national security.
b. In recognition of the essential requirement for
an informed public concerning the activities of
its Government, as well as the need to protect
certain national security information from
unauthorized disclosure, "the Order" was
promulgated. It designates to the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration certain
responsibility for matters pertaining to
national security and confers on the
Administrator of NASA, or such responsible
officers or employees as the Administrator may
designate, the authority for original
classification of official information or
material that requires protection in the
interest of national security. It also provides
for the following:
(l) Basic classification, downgrading, and
declassification guidelines;
(2) The issuance of directives prescribing the
procedures to be followed in safeguarding
classified information or material;
(3) A monitoring system to ensure the
effectiveness of the Order;
(4) Appropriate administrative sanctions
against officers and employees of the
United States Government who are found to
be in violation of the Order or
implementing directive; and
(5) Classification limitations and restrictions
as discussed in Section 1203.410 and
Section 1203.411.
c. "The Order" requires the timely identification
and protection of that NASA information the
disclosure of which would be contrary to the
best interest of national security.
Accordingly, the determination in each case must
be based on a judgment on whether disclosure of
information could reasonably be expected to
result in damage to the national security.
Section 1203.201 Information security objectives.
The following are objectives of the NASA Information
Security Program:
a. Ensure that information is classified only when
a sound basis exists for such classification and
only for such period as is necessary.
b. Prevent both the unwarranted classification and
the overclassification of NASA information.
c. Ensure the greatest practicable uniformity
within NASA in the classification of
information.
d. Ensure effective coordination and reasonable
uniformity with other Government departments and
agencies, particularly in areas where there is
an interchange of information, techniques or
hardware.
e. Provide a timely and effective means for
downgrading or declassifying information when
the circumstances necessitating the original
classification change or no longer exist.
Section 1203.202 Responsibilities.
a. The Chairperson, NASA Security Management
Working Group (Subpart I of this Part), is
responsible for:
(1) Directing the NASA Information Security
Program in accordance with NASA policies
and objectives and applicable laws and
regulations.
(2) Ensuring effective compliance with and
implementation of "the Order" and the
Information Security Oversight Office
Directive No. 1 relating to security
classification matters.
(3) Reviewing, in consultation with the NASA
Security Management Working Group
questions, suggestions, appeals and
compliance concerning the NASA Information
Security Program and making determinations
concerning them.
(4) Coordinating NASA security classification
matters with Program Office Security
Officials, NASA Installations, the
Department of Defense (DOD), the Department
of Energy (DOE) and other Government
agencies as appropriate.
(5) Reviewing Security Classification Guides
for NASA programs and projects.
(6) Developing, maintaining and recommending to
the Administrator guidelines for the
systematic review covering 30-year-old
classified information under NASA's
jurisdiction.
(7) Reviewing and coordinating with appropriate
offices all appeals of denials of requests
for records under Sections 552 and 552a of
Title 5, United States Code (Freedom of
Information and Privacy Acts) when the
denials are based on the records' continued
classification.
(8) Recommending to the Administrator
appropriate administrative action to
correct abuse or violations of any
provision of the NASA Information Security
Program, including notifications by warning
letter, formal reprimand and to the extent
permitted by law, suspension without pay
and removal.
b. All NASA employees are responsible for bringing
to the attention of the Chairperson of the NASA
Security Management Working Group any
information security problems in need of
resolution, any areas of interest wherein
information security guidance is lacking, and
any other matters likely to impede achievement
of the objectives prescribed herein.
c. Each NASA official to whom the authority for
original classification is delegated shall be
accountable for the propriety of each
classification (see Subpart H) and is
responsible for:
(l) Ensuring that classification determinations
are consistent with the policy and
objectives prescribed above, and other
applicable guidelines.
(2) Bringing to the attention of the
Chairperson, NASA Security Management
Working Group, for resolution, any
disagreement with classification
determinations made by other NASA
officials.
(3) Ensuring that information and material that
no longer require the present level of
protection are promptly downgraded or
declassified in accordance with applicable
guidelines.
d. Other Officials-in-Charge of Headquarters
Offices are responsible for the following:
(1) Approving Security Classification Guides
for those programs they are responsible
for. These guides should be coordinated
with the NASA Security Office.
(2) Ensuring that classified information or
material prepared within their respective
offices is appropriately marked.
(3) Ensuring that material proposed for public
release is reviewed to eliminate classified
information.
e. Directors of Field Installations are responsible
for the following:
(1) Developing proposed Security Classification
Guides. Proposed guides must be forwarded
to their Program Office Security Official
for coordination and necessary approval.
(2) Ensuring that classified information or
material prepared in their respective
installations is marked appropriately.
(3) Ensuring that material proposed for public
release is reviewed to eliminate classified
information.
f. The Chief, NASA Security Office, NASA
Headquarters, who serves as the Chairperson of
the NASA Security Management Working Group, is
responsible for the NASA-wide coordination of
security classification matters.
g. The Chief, NASA Security Office, is responsible
for establishing procedures for the safeguarding
of classified information or material (e.g.,
accountability, control, access, storage,
transmission, and marking) and for ensuring that
such procedures are systematically reviewed; and
those that are duplicative or unnecessary are
eliminated.
Section 1203.203 Degree of Protection.
a. General. Upon determination that information or
material must be classified, the degree of
protection commensurate with the sensitivity of
the information must be determined. If there is
reasonable doubt about the need to classify
information, it shall be safeguarded as if it
were classified pending a determination by an
original classification authority, who shall
make this determination within 30 days. If
there is reasonable doubt about the appropriate
level of classification, it shall be safeguarded
at the higher level of classification pending a
determination by an original classification
authority, who shall make this determination
within 30 days.
b. Authorized Categories of Classification. The 3
categories of classification, as authorized and
defined in "the Order," are set out below. No
other restrictive markings are authorized to be
placed on NASA classified documents or materials
except as expressly provided by statute or by
NASA Directives.
(1) Top Secret. Top Secret is the designation
applied to information or material the
unauthorized disclosure of which could
reasonably be expected to cause
exceptionally grave damage to the national
security. Examples of exceptionally grave
damage include armed hostilities against
the United States or its allies; disruption
of foreign relations vitally affecting the
national security; the compromise of vital
national defense plans or complex
cryptologic and communications intelligence
systems; the revelation of sensitive
intelligence operations; and the disclosure
of scientific or technological developments
vital to national security.
(2) Secret. Secret is the designation applied
to information or material the unauthorized
disclosure of which could reasonably be
expected to cause serious damage to the
national security. Examples of serious
damage include disruption of foreign
relations significantly affecting the
national security; significant impairment
of a program or policy directly related to
the national security; revelation of
significant military plans or intelligence
operations; and compromise of significant
scientific or technological developments
relating to national security.
(3) Confidential. Confidential is the
designation applied to that information or
material for which the unauthorized
disclosure could reasonably be expected to
cause damage to the national security.
Subpart C - Classification Principles and Considerations
Section 1203.300 General.
In general, the types of NASA-generated information
and material requiring protection in the interest of
national security lie in the areas of applied
research, technology, or operations.
Section 1203.301 Identification of information requiring
protection.
Classifiers shall identify the level of
classification of each classified portion of a
document (including subject and titles), and those
portions that are not classified.
Section 1203.302 Combination, interrelation or compilation.
An interrelationship of individual items, classified
or unclassified, may result in a combined item
requiring a higher classification than that of any
of the individual items. Compilations of
unclassified information are considered unclassified
unless some additional significant factor is added
in the process of compilation. For example: (a)
the way unclassified information is compiled may be
classified; (b) the fact that the information is
complete for its intended purpose may be classified;
or (c) the fact the compilation represents an
official evaluation may be classified. In these
cases, the compilations would be classified.
Section 1203.303 Dissemination considerations.
The degree of intended dissemination, use of the
information and whether the end purpose to be served
renders effective security control impractical are
considerations during the classification process.
These factors do not necessarily preclude
classification, but must be considered in order not
to impose security controls that are impractical to
enforce.
Section 1203.304 Internal effect.
The effect of security protection on program
progress and cost and on other functional activities
of NASA should be considered. Impedances and added
costs inherent in a security classification must be
assessed in light of the detrimental effects on the
national security interests that would result from
failure to classify.
Section 1203.305 Restricted Data.
Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data is so
classified when originated, as required by the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. Specific
guidance for the classification of Restricted Data
is provided in "Classification Guides" published by
the Department of Energy.
Subpart D - Guides for Original Classification
Section 1203.400 Specific classifying guidance.
Technological and operational information and
material, and in some exceptional cases scientific
information falling within any one or more of the
following categories, must be classified if its
unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected
to cause damage to the national security. In cases
where it is believed that a contrary course of
action would better serve the national interests,
the matter should be referred to the Chairperson,
NASA Security Management Working Group, for a
determination. The following list is not intended to
be exclusive. Original classifiers are responsible
for initially classifying other types of information
not included in the following list which, in their
judgment, requires protection under "the Order."
a. Information that provides the United States, in
comparison with other nations, with a
significant scientific, engineering, technical,
operational, intelligence, strategic, tactical,
or economic advantage related to national
security.
b. Information that, if disclosed, would
significantly diminish the technological lead of
the United States in any military system,
subsystem or component, and would result in
damage to such a system, subsystem, or component.
c. Scientific or technological information in an
area where an advanced military application that
would in itself be classified is foreseen during
exploratory development.
d. Information that, if known, would:
(1) Provide a foreign nation with an
insight into the defense application
or the war or defense plans or posture
of the United States;
(2) Allow a foreign nation to develop, improve,
or refine a similar item of defense
application.
(3) Provide a foreign nation with a base upon
which to develop effective countermeasures.
(4) Weaken or nullify the effectiveness of a
defense or military plan, operation,
project, weapon system, or activity vital
to the national security.
e. Information or material that is important to the
national security of the United States in
relation to other nations when there is sound
reason to believe that those nations are unaware
that the United States has or is capable of
obtaining the information or material, i.e.,
through intelligence activities, sources, or
methods.
f. Information that if disclosed could be exploited
in a manner prejudicial to the national security
posture of the United States by discrediting its
technological powe