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USAF INTELLIGENCE TARGETING GUIDE
AIR FORCE PAMPHLET 14- 210 Intelligence
1 FEBRUARY 1998

Chapter 6
WEAPONEERING


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Chapter 6
WEAPONEERING

6.1. Overview. Weaponeering is the process of estimating the quantity of a specific type weapon required to achieve a specific level of damage to a given target, considering target vulnerability, weapon effects, munition delivery errors, damage criteria, probability of kill, weapon reliability, etc. It is the third phase in the conceptual targeting process, but it is embedded into target development, force selection, and execution planning. Weaponeering is a core competency of targeting, although many confuse all target-ing with weaponeering. Weaponeers quantify the expected results of lethal and non lethal weapons employment against targets. The recommended target list provides the basis for weaponeering assess-ment activities. Since time constraints may preclude calculations of potential effects against all targets, calculations should proceed in a prioritized fashion that mirrors the target list. Nonnuclear weaponeering is normally done using methodologies prepared by the Joint Technical Coordinating Group for Munition Effectiveness (JTCG/ ME).

6.2. Weapon Allocation. Weapon allocation is the designation of specific numbers and types of weap-ons for use during a specified time period or for carrying out an assigned task.

6.3. Weapon Effectiveness. Weapon effectiveness is a statistical estimate of the results expected from specific munitions effects, target environment, damage criteria, delivery accuracy, munitions reliability, and ballistics. This should be closely tied to munitions effectiveness assessment in combat assessment.

6.4. Combat Weapon Effectiveness Data. It is difficult to assemble data on the combat effectiveness of a weapon system. Weapons are not operated by laboratory experts methodically following test plans, but by aircrews acting under combat tensions and pressure. Data used in predicting weapon effectiveness must be a valid representation of how both human and machines perform in combat. Very little of this type of information can be recovered from combat experience. Some data can be gained from test firings, if the tests are carefully controlled to allow for the realities of combat, but other data simply is not avail-able and must be extrapolated.

6.4.1. Several complicating factors must be fully considered before the combat effectiveness of muni-tions can be realistically estimated. Weaponeers and operational planners must consider all of these factors so as not to provide overly optimistic predictions of combat effectiveness:

  • Enemy Actions-- The effects of enemy actions and countermeasures.
  • Delivery Accuracy-- The measurement of how closely a system can deliver its weapons or warheads to the target. Delivery accuracy's in JMEM are determined from data gathered in weapons tests and operational aircrew experiences, as well as programs to gather data (e. g., Weapons System Evaluation Program). JMEM data is not the best accuracy ever achieved on the range in noncombat situations, but rather an estimate of real- world expected accuracy.


    Foot Stomper Box
    . Weaponeering results in probable outcomes given many replications of an event. It does not predict the outcome of every munition delivery. It is a statistical average based on modeling, weapons tests, and real- world deliveries. 56


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  • Damage Mechanisms-- Warhead characteristics producing damage effects, including blast, fragmentation, incendiary, overpressure, dynamic pressure, etc.

  • Target Vulnerability-- The susceptibility of a target to terminal effects or specific damage mechanisms of a munition.

  • Weapon Reliability-- Warhead functioning dependability.
  • Trajectory-- Ballistics and/ or weapon or warhead flight characteristics.

    6.4.2. The Services, as well as the JTCG/ ME, DIA, and the Defense Special Weapons Agency (for-merly Defense Nuclear Agency) have developed a number of quantitative techniques used to estimate weapon effectiveness, taking many of these factors into account. The JTCG/ ME, for example, devel-ops analytical methods for measuring and predicting munitions effectiveness. It has also produced a large body of scientifically valid data related to specific weapons, munitions, and appropriate targets. The group devised mathematical models which enable weaponeers to predict the effectiveness of weapons against most militarily significant targets. Inputs to these methodologies include factors such as aircraft capabilities and configurations; target characteristics, such as size, shape, and hard-ness, and delivery parameters (altitudes, speeds, dive angles, etc.). Model outputs include numbers of sorties or passes required to achieve specified damage levels in terms of stated damage criteria. These outputs allow weapons effectiveness comparisons.

    6.5. Steps in Weaponeering. There are multiple steps in weaponeering.

  • Set collection requirements
  • Obtain information on friendly aircraft, weapons, fuzes, and delivery tactics
  • Determine target elements to be analyzed
  • Determine damage criteria, if analysis of individual targets is to be accomplished
  • Determine weapons effectiveness index
  • Determine aimpoints and desired impact points
  • Evaluate weapon effectiveness
  • Prepare preliminary documentation
  • Review collection requirements

    6.5.1. Set Collection Requirements. The weaponeer can generally obtain most necessary data from the target developer, if the functions are separate, but there are times when special information is needed to perform a weaponeering task. The weaponeer must establish collection and exploitation requirements as soon as they are identified. Requirements for both target development and weap-oneering should be coordinated and submitted as a single set.

    6.5.2. Obtain Information on Friendly Forces. The weaponeer must know the aircraft, weapons, and fuzes available for use, as well as probable munitions delivery tactics. Moreover, weaponeering results will only be useful to an operational planner if the employment parameters used in the process represent the ones used in combat. In combat planning, where a large number of targets must be weaponeered very quickly, it is advisable to agree upon standard planning factors. Some additional information helpful in making intelligent weaponeering recommendations include: weather, training/ readiness posture, target acquisition probability, collateral damage potential, and ROEs. Targeteers should work closely with the operations and logistics staff to obtain this information and keep them up 57


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    to date. As a rule of thumb, theater component targeting branches should request from their OPlan/ Checkered Flag Time- Phased Force and Deployment Listing (TPFDL) units' expected input options for the Automated Weaponeering Optimization Program (AWOP) to provide realistic planning data. For remote tour areas such as Korea, this data should be requested every six months.

    6.5.3. Determine Target Elements To Be Analyzed . The third step in weaponeering is to examine the data provided by target developers or imagery interpreters and decide which elements to analyze for vulnerability. Where is the target most vulnerable and to what weapon effect?

    6.5.3.1. Some targets are hardened or designed to withstand specific weapon effects, so it may be difficult to damage or destroy them. Experiences in recent conflicts and use of JMEM approved Munitions Effectiveness Assessment computer programs will help with these difficult weaponeer-ing cases. A hardened structure may often be penetrated and the content damaged or destroyed with little or no damage to the structure itself. Therefore, the basic question which must be answered is "What type of damage must be inflicted on the target to reach the stated objective?"

    6.5.3.2. Determining which target elements should be analyzed can be broken down into two activities: first, performing a functional analysis, and second, performing a structural analysis. In preparing a functional analysis, targeting personnel identify the functions of all parts of a target, determine the relative importance of each part, and designate those parts which are vital to target operation. A structural analysis provides much of the information necessary for determining over-all target vulnerability. It includes construction types, dimensions of structures, equipment, etc. The results of this analysis will normally determine the components to be struck or attacked. Good resources for analysis include DIA's Critical Elements of Selected Generic Installations and USAF's Conventional Weaponeering Proficiency Refresher.

    6.5.4. Determine Damage Criteria. Target vulnerability data must be expressed in terms of the results desired when a target is struck or attacked. Specifically, a desired level of destruction, damage, or performance degradation is sought to produce a significant military advantage for friendly forces. The desired goal of the attacker is called "damage criteria" or "kill criteria." Damage criteria can be referred to as a quantitative measure of target susceptibility to a given amount of damage.

    6.5.4.1. Measurement methods vary considerably with target type, basic input data, and the for-mat of the desired results. Generally, the format of the output data includes: vulnerable areas for penetrating damage mechanisms such as fragments and projectiles; conditional kill probabilities of shaped charges; charge weights and distances; and lethal envelopes for flames. Damage criteria should include time parameters. Tactical plans may require, for example, rendering an enemy vehicle incapable of moving within five minutes after it is hit. A truck farther to the rear of a col-umn may require "20 minutes to stop after it is hit" criterion. Because some weapons may be effi-cient at achieving the first type of damage and others may more easily achieve the second type, it is necessary to consider differences in damage required for target defeat.

    6. 5.4.2. There are a large number of different damage criteria for nonnuclear weapons. These include F- Kill (Fire- power kill), M- Kill (Mobility kill), K- Kill (Catastrophic Kill), FC- Kill (Fire Control Kill), PTO- Kill (Prevent Takeoff Kill), I- Kill (Interdiction Kill), SW- Kill (Seaworthiness Kill), Cut, and Block. Some of these criteria are broken into subcategories to reflect different effectiveness levels. The sample damage criteria set below from the JMEM is for aircraft (figure 6.1). 58


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    Figure 6.1. Example Damage Criteria for Aircraft.
    The target aircraft is to be attacked while parked. Two damage categories are applicable to this target: PTO and K- Kill. Detailed descriptions of specific target damage criteria are provided in the JMEM Target Vul-nerability Manual (USAF TH61A1- 3- 1). PTO damage occurs when, for example, as a consequence of the attack, the aircraft cannot generate enough power for takeoff or the pilot cannot control the aircraft. This damage criterion is presented as PTO 4 or PTO 24, which reflect the minimum number of hours (4 or 24) the aircraft will be inoperable. K damage constitutes basic, irreparable damage to the aircraft. An aircraft suf-fering K damage is good only for cannibalization and scrap.

    6.5.5. Determine Weapons Effectiveness Index. The JMEM have established the effectiveness indexes for nonnuclear weapons. Weapons effectiveness varies according to the weapon, target, dam-age criteria, delivery conditions, and target environment. There are different ways of stating weapon effectiveness according to the target/ weapon combination. The weapon effectiveness and lethality indexes used by JMEM are Mean Area of Effectiveness (MAE), Vulnerable Area (VA), Crater Diam-eter (DC), Effective Miss Distance (EMD), Bridge Effectiveness Index (BEI), Number of Hits (NH), Probability of Damage (Pd), and Probability of Damage Given a Hit (Pdh). These indexes account for the primary damage mechanisms of nonnuclear weapons.

    6.5.6. Determine Aimpoints and Impact Points. The sixth step in the weaponeering phase is to determine the desired point of impact (DPI) or desired mean point of impact (DMPI). In choosing a point of attack, it is usually best, time permitting, to select more than one target element and weapon combination. This allows planners who may be resource or weather constrained to have greater flex-ibility.

    6.5.6.1. For conventional weapons, targets may be unitary targets, area targets, or linear targets. A unitary target may be a point (essentially without dimensions) or a geometric target (with dimensions). An area target consists of multiple unitary target elements. Buildings are treated as area targets unless a single building is considered the primary target. The target area is usually large with respect to the unitary elements assumed to be uniformly distributed in the target area. Area targets may be treated as unitary targets if weapons effects are considerably larger than that target area, or the circular error probable (CEP) is close to the target size, or a combination of the two. A linear target is a long, narrow target such as a road, rail line, or an airfield runway.

    6.5.6.2. Multiple DPIs or DMPIs should be used whenever the effective damage area (resulting from the combination of the weapon effective area and the CEP) is considerably less than the area of the target. In all other cases a single point of impact is sufficient. Runway interdiction is a spe-cial case, since the runway may have to be cut in more than one spot to prevent aircraft from tak-ing off.

    6.5.7. Evaluate Weapon Effectiveness . During this step, various aircraft, missiles, weapons, yields, heights of burst, fuzes, and delivery tactics are evaluated to determine the best combination to use against each individual target. In this step, the weaponeer uses appropriate methodology to deter-mine the solution to the problem. This solution is expressed as the probability of damage (Pd). Pd is used to express the statistical probability that a specified damage criteria can be met assuming the

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    probability of arrival. In a few cases, specific probabilities of damage to individual targets may be indicated by combatant or component command headquarters. Despite this fact, Pd is typically deter-mined by the target analyst. Specific recommendations for probabilities of damage for individual tar-gets are provided in various JMEMs.

    6.5.7.1. The data developed by the weaponeer are then given to target selection planners. This data should include the recommended weapons, fuzing, height of burst, as well as the computed damage level. Pd is not an end in itself and does not provide an adequate comparison between tar-gets. Pd must be used in conjunction with such factors as damage criteria and Pa. Damage criteria is a descriptive term (i. e., drop a bridge span, neutralize telecommunications function in HQ build-ing) depicting how you want to affect the target.

    6.5.7.1.1. Damage criteria can be incorporated with other factors. For example, the targeteer may find the available force could achieve a Pd of .70 against an aircraft parking area contain-ing 10 aircraft, or a Pd of .40 against an area containing 30 aircraft. Which target should be attacked? On the basis of Pd alone the target with a .70 Pd would be selected. If damage cri-teria is considered (for this example, the criteria equals the maximum number of aircraft), on the average, only seven aircraft would be killed in the first target area, while 12 would be killed in the second. Therefore, the second target area in the example above should be attacked if all other factors are equal.

    6.5.7.2. Although the weaponeer searches for the best combination of weapon and delivery sys-tem to recommend for use against a target, they must recognize that their first choice may not always be available due to logistical or operational considerations. Time permitting, the weap-oneer should develop an array of probabilities, using different combinations of systems, weapons, fuzes, etc to provide force application planners flexibility. Normally weaponeering is done with more generalized parameters at the force level and unit specific factors are taken into account by the executing unit.

    6.5.8. Prepare Preliminary Documentation . The targeteer must provide recommended options and supporting rationale to planners for use in force application planning decisions. Use of a work-sheet to collect and organize data for future use or reference is essential. Space should be available for target development, weaponeering, and force application data. The information should include the specific element or point of attack. This point may be specified in a simple textual description, by ref-erence to areas annotated on standard target materials, by reference to the grid provided on a Basic Target Graphic (BTG) or similar product, or by other agreed upon techniques. Precise target coordi-nates for the point of attack should also be provided. Use of precise coordinates can significantly improve delivery accuracy for nonvisual weapons employment.

    6.5.8.1. Target analysts should also recommend fuzes or fuze settings whenever unit level exper-tise or materials available are limited. When specific effects are required (i. e., arming and self- destruct times for mines), it is essential to provide such information to operational combat units preparing ordnance for the mission.

    6.5.9. Review Collection Requirements . After the development, weaponeering, and force selec-tion information is accumulated, gaps in the weaponeer's database can be identified. Collection requirements should be reviewed to determine if they will fill the gaps or will need modification, or whether new requirements should be established. 60



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    USAF INTELLIGENCE TARGETING GUIDE
    AIR FORCE PAMPHLET 14- 210 Intelligence
    1 FEBRUARY 1998