Category: SSIC 03000 Operations & Readiness
Updated: 06/24/96
Number: MCO 3302.1B
Subj: THE MARINE CORPS ANTITERRORISM PROGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON, DC 20380-0001
MCO 3302.1B
POS-43A
3 Jun 1992

MARINE CORPS ORDER 3302.1B

From: Commandant of the Marine Corps
To: Distribution List

Subj: THE MARINE CORPS ANTITERRORISM PROGRAM

Ref: (a) DOD Dir 0-2000.12 (NOTAL)
(b) SECNAVINST 3300.2
(c) OPNAVINST 5530.14B
(d) MCO P5320.5E
(e) FMFM 7-14
(f) MCO 5000.17
(g) MCO 5500.14
(h) FMFRP 7-14A
(i) MCO 5500.13A

(j) MCO 5740.2E
(k) MCO P4600.14B
(l) FMFRP 7-37
(m) MCO P5580.2
(n) OPNAVINST 5530.13A
(o) CJCS MOP 51 (NOTAL)
(p) MCO 1553.1B

Encl: (1) Definitions
(2) Department of Defense (DoD) Travel Security Policy
(3) Terrorist Threat Assessments
(4) Formal Antiterrorism Training
(5) Security Screening and Specialized Training for
Marines Selected for Assignment to Hazardous Billets
(6) Sample Diagram of Crisis Management Organization
(7) Terrorist Threat Conditions (THREATCON's)
(8) installations/Commands Required to Report Changes
in Threat Condition (THREATCON)

1. Purpose. To establish Marine Corps antiterrorism (AT)
policy and procedures.

2. Cancellation. MCO 1500.49 and MCO 3302.1A.

3. Background

a. The standard Department of Defense (DoD) definition of
"Terrorism" can be found in enclosure (1) to this Order.

b. Acts of terrorism are crimes. Those who perpetrate them
are criminals. As criminals, terrorists are not entitled to the
protection of the 1949 Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War.





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MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

c. All Marine Corps personnel, military and civilian, must
be aware of the terrorist threat. Furthermore, all Marine Corps
personnel must possess the knowledge to detect signs of
terrorism, and to defend against its impact.

d. With advances in technology and increased availability of
resources, terrorist acts have become more deadly and
destructive. Consequently, all Marine Corps personnel must be
prepared to defend themselves in order to carry out their
assigned mission in any environment.

4. Information

a. This Order promulgates Marine Corps AT policy, and
establishes specific procedures for defending against terrorism
at the installation and unit level. Additionally, it provides
for measures to increase the security and safety of traveling
Marine Corps personnel.

b. This Order implements references (a) and (b). Reference
(c), the Department of the Navy (DON) Physical Security and Loss
Prevention manual, provides technical guidance necessary to
develop and implement the installation physical security plan.
References (d) through (k) provide additional guidance on
specific aspects of combatting terrorism and physical security.

c. This Order is not intended to be a philosophical
compendium on terrorist ideologies, groups, or tactics. It is
not designed to serve as a guidebook on how to combat terrorism.
References (c) through (k) already provide the guidance necessary
to develop and implement the provisions of this Order.

d. This Order contains operational information for official
U.S. Government use only, thus distribution is limited to U.S.
Government agencies. Requests for release of this document
outside the U.S. Government must be made to the Commandant of the
Marine Corps (POS).

e. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has exclusive
responsibility for the direction of any law enforcement activity
affecting the safety of persons, aboard aircraft in flight
involved in aircraft piracy. "In flight" is defined as that
period when an aircraft's exterior doors are closed.


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MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

5. Policy

a. It is Marine Corps policy to protect military personnel
and civilian employees, their families, Government facilities,
and material resources from acts of terrorism and other criminal
and destructive acts. Commanding officers will develop an
operational capability which provides defense in depth against
all threats. Commanding officers will be guided by the
provisions of this Order and references (b) through (k) in
attaining the measures needed to be both proactive and reactive
toward acts of terrorism and other criminal and hostile acts.

b. The cornerstone of the Marine Corps AT program and the
best deterrent against terrorism is an alert, educated, combat-
ready Marine.

6. Action

a. Commanding Generals/Commanding Officers/Officers in Charge
(battalion/squadron level and higher)

(1) Appoint a command/organizational AT officer in
writing. This appointment may be an additional duty.

(2) Establish terrorism awareness programs per this Order
to ensure all assigned personnel are aware of the general
terrorist threat and the personal protection measures that could
reduce individual vulnerability to acts of terrorism. References
(c), (e) and (h) will be used as guidance in developing these
programs. Specific requirements include:

(a) An annual terrorism awareness briefing for all
personnel. Commanding officers may use local Naval Investigative
Service (NIS), command intelligence/counterintelligence
personnel, or specially trained military police (MP) personnel to
conduct these briefings. If these personnel are not readily
available, such as with organizations performing independent
duties, the annual terrorism awareness brief should be conducted
by the unit AT officer. The use of audiovisual support is
encouraged.

(b) A mandatory briefing for all personnel planning
to travel abroad, covering the DoD travel policy contained in
enclosure (2) to this Order.

(c) A threat information brief for all personnel
planning to travel to or through high threat and potential threat
areas, as defined in periodic DoD travel security advisories.


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MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

(3) Develop and implement security procedures to defend
against terrorism, and support these procedures with adequate
planning and evaluation. For major tenant commands, this
includes active participation in the installation physical
security council and the installation crisis management team
(CMT). Reference (e) applies. For independent activities, this
may include the revision of existing local security directives.

(4) Identify those unit assets likely to become terrorist
targets, paying particular attention to mission essential
vulnerable areas (MEVA) as defined in enclosure (1) to this
Order. Perform unit vulnerability assessments at least annually.
Appendix E of reference (e) provides guidance for the completion
of a vulnerability assessment.

(5) Obtain and review area threat assessments prepared by
the Naval Investigative Service Command Antiterrorist Alert Center
(NISCOM ATAC). Enclosure (3) to this Order provides additional
information on ATAC support available for the commander.
Commanding officers of Marine Corps districts will bequest ATAC
support for all independent Marine Corps activities within their
district.

(6) Draft and maintain a physical security/crisis
management plan per chapter 2 and appendix VII of reference (c).
For tenant units, this plan will support the host installation's
physical security plan, and will be coordinated with the host
installation provost marshal.

(7) Integrate terrorism scenarios into field and other
training exercises, whenever practical.

(8) During periods of elevated threat conditions, issue a
copy of reference (h), "The Individual's Guide for Understanding
and Surviving Terrorism," to all personnel. Alternatively, issue
a handout to all personnel, which contains essential information
extracted from reference (h).

(9) During periods of elevated threat conditions, ensure a
copy of reference (l), "Vehicle Bomb Searches," is maintained with
the Government Vehicle Operator's Record (trip ticket) of all
Government vehicles. Alternatively, a handout which contains the
essential information extracted from reference (l) may be attached.

(10) Screen personnel on orders to designated "high risk
billets" for completion of required training. The assignment of
Marines to certain billets external to the Marine Corps may require
special training to properly prepare them for the potential hazards
of these assignments. Enclosures (4) and (5) to this Order apply.


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MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

(11) If a unit or activity is located overseas, provide
initial threat and security briefings to all newly assigned
military and civilian personnel and their dependents.

(12) Commanding officers of Marine Corps organizations
physically located outside a Marine Corps installation (i.e.,
Marine Corps districts, recruiting stations, Marine Corps Reserve
units, etc.) will comply with applicable provisions of
subparagraph 6a, and the reporting requirements specified in
paragraph 6b(6) and 6b(7) of this Order.

b. Commanding Generals/Commanding Officers of Installations.
In addition to the requirements of paragraph 6a above, installation
commanders will:

(1) Draft and maintain an installation physical security
plan, per chapter 2 and appendix VII of reference (c). As a
minimum, this plan will:

(a) Organize and convene the installation physical
security council, per reference (i) and chapter 12 of reference
(c). This organization helps the commander gain full community
involvement in the planning for terrorist and other critical
incidents. Membership should include major subordinate activity
representatives and key members of the installation staff (such
as the comptroller, staff judge advocate, provost marshal,
operations security (OPSEC) personnel, intelligence officer,
medical representative, public affairs officer, logistics
officer, and facilities engineer, and others).

(b) Contain a crisis management plan, which must
contain a barrier plan, countersurveillance plan, random
antiterrorism measures (RAM) program, and other contingency plans
or annexes required by unique local conditions.

(c) Establish an installation crisis management team
(CMT), per reference (e). The CMT coordinates the installation's
response to and recovery from a variety of critical incidents,
including terrorism. It identifies infrastructures and key assets
critical to the installation's operation (e.g., MEVA). The CMT and
physical security council may be combined.

(d) Establish an installation crisis management force
(CMF), per reference (e). The CMF provides for overall physical
security and an organic reactive capability, and falls under the
operational control of the installation provost marshal.

(e) Provide for specialized equipment to combat the
terrorist threat, such as special reaction team (SRT) equipment,
lights/mirrors for vehicle undercarriage inspections, portable
metal detectors, and similar devices.


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MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

(f) Contain response procedures for a variety of
terrorist and other crisis incidents (e.g., hostage/barricade,
bomb threat, kidnapping, sabotage, environmental disasters,
etc.). A sample graphic portrayal of a crisis management
organization is contained in enclosure (6).

(g) Contain procedures for notification of higher
headquarters in case of an act of terrorism or other crisis
situation.

(h) Contain a prioritized list of MEVA's. This list
should indicate MEVA locations likely to be targeted by
terrorists, and those most vulnerable to terrorist attack.

(2) Maintain liaison with local, State, Federal and
foreign authorities (as applicable) on matters pertaining to a
coordinated response to security threats, and other mutual
physical security and loss prevention issues. The installation
provost marshal will keep the servicing Naval Investigative
Service Resident Agency (NISRA) apprised of these consultations,
per reference (b).

(3) Develop and maintain the capability to counter or
contain a terrorist incident aboard the installation.

(a) At bases and stations with a provost marshal,
this mission will be performed by trained law enforcement
personnel who will, at a minimum, be capable of isolating the
crime scene, providing proficient marksmanship support,
conducting tactical movement and building entry, and clearing of
buildings. Personnel providing this support will, at a minimum,
undergo quarterly marksmanship training in a variety of light and
weather conditions.

(b) At the discretion of the installation commander,
an SRT may be formed under the auspices of the provost marshal.
When established, the installation SRT will be organized per
chapter 22 of reference (d), and guided by the provisions of
chapter 22 of reference (m).

(c) Installations in the same geographic area may
consolidate their resources to form a single regional SRT. Once
an SRT is tactically employed, it falls under the operational
control of the using installation commander.




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MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

(d) Installation commanders will exercise caution
when committing the SRT to ensure the team is employed within its
operational and equipment capabilities. If a situation exceeds
the capability of the local SRT, installation commanders in the
United States may consider requesting additional support from
neighboring defense installations, local law enforcement
agencies, and the supporting field office of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI). At installations located outside the
United States, the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) prescribes
options available to the installation commander.

(4) Declare threat conditions (THREATCON's) and implement
appropriate security measures. Enclosure (7) to this Order gives
a description of THREATCON's, and lists measures to be
implemented under each. These measures should be followed except
when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances
dictate otherwise. Revised THREATCON's may be decreed following
the receipt of intelligence through official or unofficial
sources. Subordinate, tenant and adjacent units will be kept
advised of changes in the local THREATCON.

(5) During periods of elevated threat conditions,
initiate RAM's as defined in enclosure (1) of this Order.

(6) Installations and commands listed in enclosure (8) to
this Order will provide a telephonic (secure telephone) report to
CMC via the Marine Corps Command Center (MCCC), DSN: 225-7366,
Comm: (703) 695-7366:

(a) When the installation THREATCON level changes.

(b) When an actual terrorist incident occurs.

(7) Immediately following the telephonic report,
installations and commands listed in enclosure (8) to this Order
will submit an operational report/serious incident report (OPREP-
3/SIR) to CMC (POC/POS/CIE), per reference (j). Report control
symbol MC-5740-02 applies. Include the following information in
all OPREP-3/SIR's submitted:

(a) Primary and alternate command points of contact,
and telephone numbers.

(b) Overall THREATCON.

(c) List of THREATCON security measures not
implemented (if applicable), and the rationale for not
implementing these measures.

(d) Additional security measures implemented, which
are not normally a part of the established THREATCON.


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MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

(e) Units exempted from THREATCON, if applicable.

(8) Whenever an actual terrorist incident occurs,
immediately notify the following agency (as appropriate) via the
servicing NISRA:

(a) If the incident occurs within the United States
or possessions, notify the servicing field office of the FBI.

(b) If the incident occurs on foreign territory,
notify the Department of State (DoS) and host nation authorities.

(9) Conduct an AT exercise at least annually, to evaluate
the installation's ability to counter or contain a terrorist
threat.

(a) This AT exercise will be operational in nature
and will include activation of the installation emergency
operations center, the crisis intelligence cell (CIC), the CMT,
the CMF, all installation and tenant commands, and other
activities as appropriate. Representatives from the servicing
NISRA and civilian law enforcement agencies should be involved to
the maximum extent possible.

(b) Minimum one week prior to commencement of the AT
exercise, notify CMC (POS) and submit a copy of the exercise letter
of instruction, operations plan, or other exercise directive.

(c) Release "EXERCISE ONLY" message traffic to CMC
(POS) related to all significant AT exercise developments and
changes in exercise THREATCON's.

(d) At the request of the installation commander, and
if funding is provided by the installation, the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Plans, Policies and Operations (DC/S, PP&O) (CMC (P))
may provide an observer or evaluator. to assist the base or
station in the conduct of the AT exercise.

(e) As a minimum, AT exercises should allow the
commander to evaluate:

1 The adequacy and realism of the installation
physical security plan.

2 The adequacy of wire, radio and supplementary
communication means during states of emergency, within the
command as well as with higher and adjacent headquarters.


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MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

3 The adequacy of personnel and logistical
support during states of emergency.

4 The ability of the CMT to coordinate, and
recommend legal and otherwise appropriate courses of action to
the installation commander.

5 The ability of the CMF to muster rapidly, and
with the proper weapons and equipment.

6 Command and control procedures during states
of emergency.

7 The effective integration of NIS,
counterintelligence team (CIT), and criminal investigation
division (CID) personnel within the CIC.

(10) At the conclusion of every actual terrorist incident
as well as every locally conducted AT exercise, provide an after
action report (AAR) to CMC (POS) and the Commanding General,
Marine Corps Combat Development Command (WF), Quantico, VA for
inclusion into the Marine Corps Lessons Learned System (MCLLS),
per reference (f). Report control symbol MC-5000-07 applies.
The MCLLS provides the Marine Corps the capability to collect,
process, and disseminate lessons learned and related information
from AAR's. The MCLLS data base provides all Marines worldwide
an efficient way to correct deficiencies in doctrine,
organization, training, education, and equipment.

(11) Because incidents of terrorism generate considerable
media interest, include the public affairs officer (PAO) in all
planning and operational activities related to terrorist events.
Public affairs officers will be guided by chapter 5 and appendix
R of reference (e).

(12) Provide safe haven/refuge for intransit DoD
shipments, regardless of destination, when contacted by the
Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) Area Command.
Paragraph 0713 of reference (n) applies.

(13) Ensure that AT protective features and other
physical security measures are included in the planning and
design of military construction and special projects.




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MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

c. Commanding Generals/Commanding Officers of Marine Corps
Air Stations and Marine Corps Air Fields

(1) Assign flight line security (FLS) priorities based on
the threat level and the nature of assets being protected. The FLS
Program was established to increase the physical security of assets
within the flight line restricted area through systematic
employment of security personnel and equipment designed to detect,
delay, and/or deny access to unauthorized personnel. The level of
security inherent at the installation determines the extent of the
FLS effort required, and must be considered when distributing
resources for the execution of the FLS program, as per reference
(g).

(2) Provide the FAA and other authorized Federal officials
all information pertaining to aircraft piracy, such as onboard
documents, equipment, weapons of mass destruction, or material
determined to be sensitive in nature. When an act of aircraft
piracy involves a military installation, military aircraft, or
military contract aircraft within the United States or its
possessions, any response will be per the guidelines set forth in
reference (o).

d. Commanding Generals of Marine Corps Recruit Depots. Per
references (e) and (h), provide entry-level AT instruction to all
Marine recruits, to familiarize them with the terrorist threat and
appropriate individual protective measures.

e. Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies, and Operations
(DC/S, PP&O) (CMC (POS)), Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps

(1) Exercise overall staff cognizance for matters
relating to combatting terrorism (AT and counterterrorism (CT)).

(2) Coordinate physical security, military police,
Marine Security Guard (MSG), and Marine Corps Security Force
(MCSF) issues and initiatives in support of the Marine Corps
combatting terrorism program.

(3) Publish travel security advisories, as required.

(4) Represent the Marine Corps at the annual DoD World-
wide Antiterrorism Conference, and other AT fora.

(5) Represent the Marine Corps at the DoD Antiterrorism
Coordinating Committee, its subcommittees, and its executive
council.



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MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

(6) Represent the Marine Corps at the DoD Physical
Security Review Board (PSRB), and the Joint Security Chiefs
Council (JSCC).

(7) Perform those other specific duties pertaining to the
screening and specialized training of personnel assigned to
hazardous billets, as listed in enclosure (5) of this Order.

(8) Coordinate with the Deputy Naval Inspector General
for Marine Corps Matters/Inspector General of the Marine Corps
(DNIGMC/IGMC) regarding integration of the provisions of this
Order into the Automated Inspection Reporting System (AIRS)
discrepancy listing.

(9) Provide augmentation assistance to DNIGMC/IGMC in
evaluations of unit and installation AT programs.

f. Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs
(DC/S, M&RA) (CMC (MMEA/MMOA)) Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.
Perform those duties pertaining to the screening and specialized
training of personnel assigned to hazardous billets, as listed in
enclosure (5) of this Order.

g. Deputy Naval Inspector General for Marine Corps Matters
Inspector General of the Marine Corps (DNIGMC/IGMC). Coordinate
with the DC/S, PP&O (POS) regarding integration of the provisions
of this Order into the Automated Inspection Reporting System
(AIRS) discrepancy lIsting, and evaluations of unit and
installation AT programs.

h. Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development
Command (TE), Quantico, VA

(1) Establish and coordinate with the DC/S, PP&O (POS)
quotas for appropriate schools, including those in enclosure (4),
and ensure that sufficient training opportunities are available
to support the requirements of this Order.

(2) Per references (e) and (h), provide entry-level AT
instruction to all Marine officer candidates, to familiarize them
with the terrorist threat and appropriate individual protective
measures.

i. Assistant Chief of Staff, Command, Control, Communications,
Computers, and Intelligence (AC/S, C4I) (CMC(CI)). Support and
coordinate with the DC/S, PP&O (POS) regarding requirements for
terrorist-related intelligence.


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MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992


7. Reserve Applicability. This Order is applicable to the
Marine Corps Reserve.



H. C. STACKPOLE III
Deputy Chief of Staff for
Plans, Policies, and Operations

DISTRIBUTION: PCN 10203214100

Copy to: 7000110 (55)
8145005 (2)
7000006, 007, 017, 028, 034, 060, 064, 099, 144/
8145001 (1)






12

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

DEFINITIONS

1. Antiterrorism (AT). Defensive measures used to reduce the
vulnerability of individuals and property to acts of terrorism,
to include limited response and containment by local military
forces.

2. AT Awareness. Fundamental knowledge of the terrorist threat
and measures to reduce personal vulnerability to acts of
terrorism.

3. AT Resident Training. Formal classroom instruction in
designated DoD courses that provide specialized instruction on
specific combatting terrorism topics; i.e., personal protection,
terrorism analysis, regional interest, and AT planning.

4. Barrier. A coordinated series of obstacles designed or
employed to canalize, direct, restrict, delay, or stop the
movement of an opposing force, and to impose additional losses in
enemy personnel.

a. Natural Barrier. Pre-existing terrain and topographical
feature such as a river, mountain, and similar feature which
offers stand-off, and provides a buffer zone around areas such as
flight line restricted areas.

b. Manmade Barrier. A roadblock, gate, fence, etc.,
employed to restrict the normal flow of personnel and traffic in
and around designated activities.

c. Active Barrier. A barrier is considered active if it
requires action by personnel or equipment to permit entry.

d. Fixed Barrier. A barrier system is fixed if it is
permanently installed, or if heavy equipment is required to move
or dismantle the barrier.

e. Movable Barrier. A movable barrier system can be
transferred from place to place. It may require heavy equipment
or personnel to assist in the transfer.

f. Passive Barrier. A barrier is passive if its
effectiveness relies on its bulk or mass, and it has no moving
parts. Such a system typically relies on weight to prevent entry
into a restricted area.

g. Portable Barrier. A portable barrier system is used as a
temporary barrier. A movable system can be used, but may take
increased time, money, or effort.


ENCLOSURE (1)
1


MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

5. Barrier Plan. Typically a part of the installation physical
security plan, the barrier plan is designed to enhance the
security of specific facilities and areas aboard an installation
by ensuring that barriers are properly planned for and prudently
installed. The plan should acknowledge types of barriers
available and needed for different priority assets. Other
concerns, such as special skills and equipment to emplace
barriers should be addressed.

6. Combatting Terrorism (CbtTerr). Actions, including AT and
CT, taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat
spectrum.

7. Countermeasures. Impairment of the operational effectiveness
of the enemy by the employment of devices and/or techniques.

8. Countersurveillance. All measures, active or passive, taken
to counteract hostile surveillance of friendly activity. The
countersurveillance should be done as unobtrusively as possible,
or in a passive mode.

9. Countersurveillance Plan. Typically a part of the
installation physical security plan, the countersurveillance plan
allows for the detection of surveillance efforts by hostile
intelligence agents.

10. Counterterrorism (CT). Offensive measure taken to prevent,
deter, and respond to terrorism.

11. Crisis Intelligence Cell (CIC). A CIC may be established in
response to a terrorist or other crisis incident. It is jointly
staffed by representatives from NIS, CIT, CID, and civilian law
enforcement agencies, as required. The CIC coordinates the
intelligence, investigative and criminal information needs of the
installation and on-scene operational commander. The CIC should
be physically separated from the emergency operations center
(EOC) and the CMF commander. It should be linked to both,
however, by a wide variety of wire and wireless communication
means, including a direct data link. The design of the CIC
should be flexible, to allow for the rapid integration of other
Federal, state, and local agencies, as appropriate. See
enclosure (6).


ENCLOSURE (1)
2


MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

12. Crisis Management Plan. Typically a part of the
installation physical security plan, the crisis management plan
includes responsive measures for various types of crisis
situations. It outlines specific duties and responsibilities of
the installation's CMT and CMF. The installation-operations
officer normally has responsibility for the development of the
crisis management plan, in coordination with key installation
staff. The crisis management plan should provide for worst-case
scenarios, without reinforcements.

13. DoD-Designated High-Physical Threat Countries. Geographic
areas determined to be of significant terrorist threat to DoD
travelers, as designated by the Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD (SO/LIC)) in
coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense,
International Security Affairs (ASD (15A)), the Assistant
Secretary of Defense, International Security Policy (ASD (15P)),
and the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Strategy and Resources
(DUSD (S&R)).

14. DoD-Designated Potential Physical Threat Countries.
Geographic areas determined to be of potential terrorist threat
to DoD travelers, as designated by the ASD (SO/LIC) in
coordination with the ASD (15A) and the ASD (15P), and the DUSD

15. Family Member. That definition used for "dependent" found
in Title 10 United States Code, Section 1072(2) (spouse;
unmarried widow; unmarried widower; unmarried legitimate child,
including adopted child or stepchild (under 21, incapable of self
support or under 23 and enrolled in a full-time institution).
See 10 U.S.C. 1072(2) (1988) for the complete definition.

16. High-Risk Billet. Authorized personnel billet (identified
and recommended by appropriate authority) that because of grade,
assignment, travel itinerary, or symbolic value may make
personnel filling them an especially attractive or accessible
terrorist target.

17. High-Risk Personnel (HRP). U.S. personnel and their family
members whose grade, assignment, travel itinerary, or symbolic
value may make them an especially attractive or accessible
terrorist target.

18. High-Risk Targets. U.S. material resources and facilities
who, because of mission sensitivity, ease of access, isolation,
or symbolic value may be especially attractive or accessible
terrorist target.


ENCLOSURE (1)
3


MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

19. Hostage. A person held as a pledge that certain terms or
agreements will be kept. Hostage taking violates article 34 of
the Fourth Convention, and is a grave breach. The parties to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 are obliged to search for and either
try or extradite persons (regardless of nationality) alleged to
have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, grave
breaches. The Hostage Taking Act (18 U.S.C. 1203 (1988))
prohibits the seizure or detention and threatening of a person
in order to compel a third person or a governmental organization
to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit
condition for the release of the person detained. If the person
seized or detained is a U.S. national, such a seizure or
detention is a crime, regardless of whether the act occurred
inside or outside of the United States.

20. Indicators. In intelligence usage, an item of information
which reflects the intention or capability of a potential enemy
to adopt or reject a course of action.

21. Inner Perimeter. The boundary marking the area closest to
the crisis point. The inner perimeter element normally takes no
action against hostile elements without the approval of the CMF
commander. Ordinarily, only law enforcement and security forces
operate within the inner perimeter. See enclosure (6).

22. Military Services. Includes the Army, Navy, Air Force, and
the Marine Corps. Also includes the Coast Guard, under agreement
with the Department of Transportation, when it is not operating
as a military service in the Navy.

23. Mission Essential Vulnerable Areas (MEVA). Areas aboard a
military installation designated by the commander as essential to
the accomplishment of the installation mission. A NEVA list
should be included in every installation physical security plan.

24. Navy Antiterrorist Alert Center (NAVATAC). An element of
the Naval Investigative Service Command (NISCOM), which provides
indications, warnings and current operational intelligence on
potential terrorist or unconventional warfare activities that are
threats to Department of the Navy (DON) personnel, property or
assets worldwide.

25. Outer Perimeter. A boundary established outside the inner
perimeter to a crisis point. The outer perimeter provides a
broad buffer zone between innocent bystanders and the crisis
point. The outer perimeter is characterized by posts, barriers,
and an entry control point. See enclosure (6).


ENCLOSURE (1)
4


MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

26. Physical Security. That part of security concerned with
physical measures designed to safeguard personnel, prevent
unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and
documents, and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage,
damage and theft.

27. Random Antiterrorism Measures (RAM). The implementation of
multiple security measures in a totally random fashion. When
activated, RAM's provide a "different look" at security
procedures in effect, to deny the terrorist surveillance team the
opportunity to accurately predict security actions. The plan is
used throughout THREATCON's ALPHA and BRAVO, and consists of
using selected security measures from THREATCON CHARLIE, as
described in enclosure (7). Showing a variety of additional
security measures in a normal security posture prevents overuse
of our security forces, as would be the case in a constant
THREATCON CHARLIE posture. RAM's are implemented in a strictly
random manner, never using a set time frame or location for a
given measure.

28. Special Reaction Team (SRT). A team of specially trained
military police personnel, operating under the auspices of the
installation provost marshal, armed and equipped to respond to
and resolve special threat situations beyond the scope of normal
law enforcement capabilities.

29. Terrorism. The calculated (unlawful) use of violence or
threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to
intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that
are generally political, religious, or ideological.

a. Domestic Terrorism. Terrorism perpetrated by the
citizens of one country against fellow countrymen. That includes
acts against citizens of a second country when they are in the
host country, and not the principal or intended target.

b. International (or Transnational) Terrorism. Terrorism,
in which planning and execution of the act of terrorism
transcends national boundaries. In defining international
terrorism, the purpose of the act, the nationalities of the
victims, or the resolution of the incident are considered. Those
acts are usually planned to attract widespread publicity, and are
designed to focus attention on the existence, cause, or demands
of the terrorists.

c. Non-State Supported Terrorism. Terrorist groups that
operate autonomously, receiving no significant support from any
government.

ENCLOSURE (1)
5


MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

d. State-Directed Terrorism. Terrorist groups that operate
as agents of a government, receiving substantial intelligence,
logistical, and operational support from the sponsoring
government.

e. State-Supported Terrorism. Terrorist groups that
generally operate independently, but receive support from one or
more governments.

30. Terrorism Intelligence Cell. See Crisis Intelligence Cell
(CIC).

31. Terrorist Threat Condition (THREATCON) System. (See
enclosure (7)).







ENCLOSURE (1)
6


MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD)
TRAVEL SECURITY POLICY

The Department of Defense's worldwide presence increases its
vulnerability to acts of terrorism and, as a result, various
commands have developed guidance to enhance the travel security
of DoD personnel. To establish consistency within DoD, the
following standard guidance has been developed for use by all DoD
components:

a. When official business requires travel to, or through,
DoD-designated high or potential physical threat countries, DoD
personnel and their dependents shall travel by military air or
Military Airlift Command (MAC) charter whenever possible. The
military services shall identify international airlift
requirements to MAC. MAC is tasked to support those requirements
with priority of support for travel to high physical threat
countries. Theater commanders shall also identify intratheater
airlift requirements to MAC through their Air Force service
components.

b. Members of the Uniformed Services and DoD civilian
employees are authorized to use foreign flag airlines and/or
indirect routings to avoid DoD-designated high or potential
physical threat countries. Transportation officers who arrange
travel through an indirect routing or on a foreign flag air
carrier to avoid such areas should cite 57 CompGen. 519 and 522
as the justification for using a foreign flag carrier. The use
of that citation must be documented in each case and attached to
each travel voucher. That citation is not authority to disregard
totally the requirement in the Joint Federal Travel Regulations
(JFTR), volume 1, paragraph U3125C; and the JFTR volume 2,
paragraph C2204-2, to use U.S. air carriers where available.
Travelers hereby authorized to avoid specific areas must
disembark at the nearest interchange from point of origin and
continue the journey on American flag carrier service.

c. Blanket approval and reimbursement for the use of
regular-fee passports is not authorized. The passport policy for
DoD personnel and their family members traveling on official
orders to and or from countries with no identified threat remains
unchanged. DoD personnel shall travel on no-fee official (red)
passports or on official orders with I.D. Cards, as required by
the country visited. Command-sponsored family members shall
continue to use the no-fee regular (blue) passports with an
official endorsement. DoD personnel and their families traveling
on official orders to or from high or potential physical threat
countries by commercial air are authorized, but not required, to
obtain and use the regular fee passport for security reasons.
Travelers electing to exercise that option are responsible for
obtaining the regular fee passport and all required visas.


ENCLOSURE (2)
1


MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

Reimbursement for passports and visas obtained under those
conditions is authorized by the JFTR, and payment shall be made on
submission of appropriate documentation. Some countries have
strict rules as to type of passport or visa required for entry.
Information on the restrictions on the use of regular fee passports
can be obtained from local personnel offices before travel.
Individuals traveling solely by military air or MAC charter shall
not be reimbursed for regular-fee passports, unless U.S. Government
transportation became available on short-notice (i.e., after
commercial travel arrangements had been made and passport
purchased), or priority of travel was sufficiently high to require
backup travel arrangements. Reimbursement for regular-fee
passports for personal travel is not authorized.

d. Commercial airline tickets shall not be annotated to
show any affiliation of the traveler to the U.S. Government.

e. Travel itineraries of high-risk personnel (to
include general officers or civilian equivalents) minimally shall
be marked "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY," and handled in accordance
with command directives, when their travel takes them to, or
through, DoD-designated high physical threat countries or
DoD-designated potential physical threat countries, as defined by
the DoD travel security policy.








ENCLOSURE (2)
2


MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

TERRORIST THREAT ASSESSMENTS

1. Terrorist threat assessments are a continuing and ongoing
process. They should be performed by the installation/unit
intelligence officer, unit AT officer, or another officer
designated by the commander.

2. While the assessment of the terrorist threat is a command
function, the Naval Investigative Service Command (NISCOM)
maintains responsibility for providing counterintelligence/AT
information to all Marine Corps commands, except those combat-
related counterintelligence matters within the functional
responsibility of the Marine Corps. To fulfill this
responsibility, the NISCOM has established the Navy Antiterrorism
Alert Center (NAVATAC), which processes real.time information and
operates on a 24-hour basis. The NAVATAC provides the following
support to Marine Corps commands:

a. Navy Antiterrorist Alert Center Summary (ATACSUM)

(1) The ATACSUM is sent to all Marine Corps installations
and major commands 6 days a week (excluding Saturdays).

(2) It provides current operational intelligence on
terrorist and related unconventional warfare threats to
Department of the Navy (DON) personnel and assets, to include
establishing the threat levels for specific geographic areas.

b. NAVATAC Warning Report

(1) This report is sent to affected commands.

(2) It provides threat specific information on impending
or likely terrorist activity, to include establishing the threat
levels for specific geographic areas.

c. NAVATAC Scot Report

(1) This report is sent to affected commands.

(2) It provides indications and warnings of imminent
terrorist activity, and advises of activities, conditions, or
events which could lead to near-term terrorist operations
directed against DON assets or personnel.



ENCLOSURE (3)
1


MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

d. NAVATAC Threat Assessment

(1) This assessment is sent to the following activities
upon request:

(a) Marine Corps installations.

(b) Major Marine Corps tenant commands aboard Marine
Corps installations (Marine Divisions, Marine Aircraft Wings,
Force Service Support Groups, Marine Brigades, etc.).

(c) Marine Corps units deploying outside the
continental United States. (Deployed units embarked aboard Navy
ships in the Mediterranean Sea will automatically receive a
threat assessment at least 7 to 10 days prior to commencement of
each port call).

(d) Marine Corps units that are not tenants aboard a
Marine Corps installation (Reserve units, Marine Corps districts,

(2) This threat assessment provides current operational
intelligence on terrorist and related unconventional warfare
threats for the geographic area specified, to include the
establishment of a threat level for that specific area.

(3) Requests to receive this assessment should be
submitted in writing through the supporting Naval Investigative
Service Resident Agency (NISRA) at least 2 weeks prior to the
date the assessment is required.

e. NAVATAC Threat Briefing

(1) This briefing is provided to requesting commands
preparing for deployment outside CONUS.

(2) It is conducted by an NAVATAC representative.

(3) It provides unit personnel with an overview of the
general terrorist threat, and specifics on the threat in the
geographic area where the unit will deploy.

(4) Requests for this briefing should be submitted in
writing through the supporting NISRA at least 1 month prior to
the scheduled briefing date. Requesting commands must provide
travel and per diem funding for NAVATAC briefers.


ENCLOSURE (3)
2


MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

3. The following factors are considered by NAVATAC prior to
establishing a threat level:

a. Existence. A terrorist group is present, assessed to be
present, or able to gain access to a given country or locale.

b. Capability. The acquired, assessed, or demonstrated
level of ability to conduct terrorist attacks.

c. Intentions. Recent demonstrated anti-U.S. terrorist
activity, or stated or assessed intent to conduct such activity.

d. History. Demonstrated terrorist activity over time.

e. Targeting. Current credible information on activity
indicative of preparations for specific terrorist operations.

f. Security Environment. The internal policy and security
considerations that impact on the capability of terrorist
elements to implement their intentions.

4. To establish a threat level, the NAVATAC assesses which of
the following five threat levels describe the likelihood of the
threat:

a. Critical. Factors of existence, capability, and
targeting must be present. History and intentions may or may not
be present.

b. High. Factors of existence, capability, history, and
intentions must be present.

c. Medium. Factors of existence, capability, and history
must be present. Intentions bay or may not be present.

d. Low. Existence and capability must be present. History
may or may not be present.

e. Negligible. Existence and/or capability may or may not
be present.

5. Although threat assessments performed by NAVATAC will
normally provide the commander with sufficient information to
make prudent security determinations, such assessments must not
be considered "stand alone" documents. Commanders must ensure
threat assessments are kept up-to-date. The local NISRA can
provide current AT information necessary to continually assess
the terrorist threat.

ENCLOSURE (3)
3


MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

FORMAL ANTITERRORISM TRAINING

1. General. The cornerstone of the Marine Corps AT program and
the best deterrent against terrorism is an alert, educated,
combat-ready Marine. To achieve the required level of training
and education, a thorough and dynamic program has been designed
to ensure all Marines, their dependents, and all other assigned
military and civilian personnel are capable of protecting
themselves and performing their duties while countering the
terrorist threat.

2. Training

a. Marine Corps training programs for combatting terrorism
are designed to heighten terrorism awareness among individual
Marines. These programs consist of:

(1) Threat awareness instruction in all entry level
training programs, as well as annual follow-on awareness training
at the unit level.

(2) Supporting Marine Corps Institute (MCI)
correspondence courses.

(3) Mobile training teams (MTT) from a variety of Marine
Corps and external sources.

(4) Terrorism instruction in formal Marine Corps schools.

(5) Innovative use of news and production media by public
affairs office (PAO), and training and audiovisual support center
(TAVSC) personnel.

b. The following specialized training courses are available
for Marines involved in physical or personnel security programs.
Quotas and funding will be allocated by the CMC (POS) or the CG
MCCDC (TE-33).

(1) Course Title: Antiterrorism Instructor Qualification
Course

Location: U.S. Army, John F. Kennedy Special
Warfare Center, Ft. Bragg, North
Carolina (2 weeks)



ENCLOSURE (4)
1


MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

Purpose/Scope: Course is designed to train already
well qualified instructors in
antiterrorism measures. Students are
required to prepare and deliver
several blocks of instruct ion on such
topics as terrorist history and
organizations, awareness and
avoidance, and hostage survival
methods.

(2) Course Title: Terrorism Counteraction on Military
Installations

Location: U.S. Army, Military Police School,
Fort McClellan, Alabama (1 week)

Purpose/Scope: The course is designed for personnel
serving in, or assigned to security
staff positions supporting combatting
terrorism efforts. It teaches
Marines the proactive and reactive
methods for developing a systematic
approach to effectively counter the
terrorist threat aboard bases and
stations.

(3) Course Title: Individual Terrorism Awareness Course

Location: U.S. Army, John F. Kennedy Special
Warfare Center, Ft. Bragg, North
Carolina (1 week)

Purpose/Scope: The course is designed for Marines who
are scheduled for overseas assignments
to a moderate or higher threat area,
to include deployments. It provides
Marines with information on victim
avoidance, and those countermeasures
designed to reduce the risk of
terrorist attack in a high threat
environment. Course also teaches
individual survival methods for
Marines taken hostage by terrorists.


ENCLOSURE (4)
2


MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

(4) Course Title: Dynamics of International Terrorism

Location: U.S. Air Force, Hurlburt Field,
Florida (1 week)

Purpose/Scope: Provides selected personnel with a
basic understanding of the theory,
psychology, organization, technique
and operational capability of
terrorist groups on an international
and regional basis.

(5) Course Title: High Risk Personnel (HRP) Course

Location: Weapons Training Battalion, MCCDC,
Quantico, Virginia (5 days)

Purpose/Scope: The course is designed to train
personnel in special shooting
techniques which may be required in a
high risk area. This course is
restricted to personnel actually
designated to fill overseas high risk
billets.

(6) Course Title: Special Intelligence Training

Location: MCCDC, Quantico, Virginia (1 day)

Purpose/Scope: Curriculum classified. Course
conducted by the AC/S, C4I (CIC).

(7) Course Title: Evasive Driving

Location: Summit Point, WV

Purpose/Scope: Course is designed to train personnel
in evasive driving tactics, including
defensive/offensive driving, route
surveillance, countersurveillance, and
psychology and awareness required to
initiate protective measures.
Intended for personnel driving for
VIP's with the potential to be in
high threat areas, or personnel who
are required to drive themselves in a
high threat environment.

ENCLOSURE (4)
3


MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

c. The following specialized training course is available
for active duty judge advocates. Quotas and funding will be
allocated by the CMC (JAS).

Course Title: Legal Aspects of Terrorism (5F-F43)

Location: The Judge Advocate General's School,
U.S. Army, Charlottesville, VA
(HQMC Course ID A0658M1)

d. Information on additional related courses of instruction
is available from CMC (POS-42A) at DSN 224-4177/2180, Comm: (703)
614-4177/2180.












ENCLOSURE (4)
4


MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

SECURITY SCREENING AND SPECIALIZED TRAINING
FOR MARINES SELECTED FOR ASSIGNMENT
TO HAZARDOUS BILLETS

1. General

a. Training

(1) Marines selected for assignment to certain hazardous
billets are required to complete AT training. Appendix A to this
enclosure lists billets for which both pre-assignment security
and specialized AT training will be conducted. Appendix B to
this enclosure lists the billets for which only specialized AT
training is currently required. These lists are not intended to
be all-encompassing; worldwide changes may require screening and
training for additional billets on short notice. All required
training listed in the appendices will be conducted prior to
arrival at the new duty station.

(2) The Commanding General, MCCDC (TE) conducts AT
training for Marines assigned to certain overseas billets not
specifically listed in appendices A and B, where the threat
warrants (such as Saudi Arabia), as a part of a pre-deployment
course covering cultural and geographic factors.

(3) Prior to transferring to an overseas assignment, all
Marines not listed in appendices A and B to this enclosure and
their dependents should be provided an AT awareness brief by the
transferring command.

b. The following factors are criteria for inclusion of
billets in appendices A or B:

(1) Long term threat potential of a designated country.

(2) Special threat situation of unknown duration of a
country or geographic area.

(3) Type of duties to be performed by the incumbent, such
as UN Observer, counterintelligence, or similar.

2. Responsibilities

a. Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs
(DC/SC M&RA) (MMOA/MMEA):

(1) Not later than 120 days prior to the desired date of
transfer, and prior to the issuance of orders:

(a) Identify Marines to be assigned to a high risk
billet listed in appendix A to this enclosure.,


ENCLOSURE (5)
1


MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

(b) Provide a history of the individual's previous
duty assignments to the AC/S, C4I (CI) indicating that pre-
assignment screening is required.

(c) Coordinate predeployment training requirements
with the CG MCCDC (TE-30) for Marines to be assigned to Security
Assistance sponsored billets abroad.

(2) Use the assessment provided by the AC/S, C4I (CI) in
addition to all other assignment factors, to arrive at a final
decision regarding the assignment of the Marine to the billet in
question. When an unfavorable assessment is received from the
AC/S, C4I (CI) and a decision is reached not to assign the
originally considered Marine to a billet listed in appendix A,
identify another Marine for assessment and screening by the AC/S,
C4I (CI).

(3) Not later than 100 days prior to the desired
effective date of transfer, and prior to the issuance of orders,
provide the Commanding General, MCCDC Quantico (TE-33) and the
DC/S, PP&O (POS) the names of Marines being assigned to the
billets listed in appendices A and B to this enclosure, and the
specific training required.

(4) Upon receipt of the training quota(s) and course
date(s) from MCCDC (TE-33), issue orders assigning the
appropriate AT training to the designee.

(5) Upon establishment of a new billet external to the
Marine Corps, request a determination from the DC/S, PP&O (POS)
whether the billet should be included into appendices A or B to
this enclosure.

(6) When notified by the AC/S, C4I (CI) of an increase in
the terrorist threat level to either high or critical for a given
area, identify and list all external Marine Corps billets at that
location. Provide this information to the appropriate billet
sponsors, as well as to the DC/S, PP&O (POS) and the AC/S, C4I
(CI)

(7) When notified by the DC/S, PP&O (POS) that a billet
external to the Marine Corps now requires security screening
and/or specialized training, ensure appropriate annotations are
made to the respective tables of organization (T/O) by the billet
sponsors.



ENCLOSURE (5)
2

MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

b. Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies, and Operations
(DC/SC PP&O) (POS):

(1) Upon receipt of a request from the DC/S, M&RA (MMEA
or MMOA) to determine whether the proposed new billet should be
added to appendix A or B to this enclosure, obtain appropriate
guidance from the appropriate billet sponsor and the AC/S, C4I
(CI). If appropriate, add billet to either or both appendices to
this enclosure.

(2) During February of each year, coordinate a review of
appendices A and B to this enclosure, and all other billets
external to the Marine Corps located in areas where the terrorist
threat level has increased to high or critical. If applicable,
publish changes to these appendices by April of that year.

(3) When notified by the AC/S, C4I (CI) of a change of
threat levels affecting required training per appendices A and B,
coordinate with the CG MCCDC (TE-32) to ensure training is
modified to meet the new threat.

(4) When notified by the AC/S, C4I (CI) of an increase in
the terrorist threat to either high or critical for a given
location, coordinate with the DC/S, M&RA (MMEA/MMOA); the CG
MCCDC (TE-32); and the cognizant HQMC billet sponsors to ensure
appropriate action is initiated.

(5) During the month of August of each year, provide the
CG MCCDC (TE-33) a by-month listing of billets and associated
required AT training for the following fiscal year.
Additionally, provide projected AT training quota requirements by
course for the following 4 fiscal years.

c. Commanding General, MCCDC Quantico (TE)

(1) Upon receipt of requested quotas from appropriate
school controlling agencies, provide the DC/S, PP&O (POS) and the
DC/S, M&RA (MMEA/MMOA) with appropriate training quota memoranda
(TQM) containing class seats, convening dates, prerequisites, and
administrative instructions.

(2) Provide additional TQM data, as required, not later
than 16 days after receipt of the names of Marines to be assigned
to billets listed in appendices A and B to this enclosure.

(3) Manage the High Risk Personnel (HRP) course, per
reference (p).

ENCLOSURE (5)
3


MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

(4) Review programs of instruction at other service and
civilian schools, per enclosure (4) of this Order.

(5) Review Marine Corps AT training requirements on an
annual basis. Budget for appropriate amounts of training quotas,
considering unforeseen requirements.

d. Assistant Chief of Staff, Command, Control,
Communications, Commuters, and Intelligence (AC/S, C4I) (CI)

(1) Upon receipt of the name of a Marine considered for
assignment to a billet listed in appendix A to this enclosure,
review that Marine's previous assignments to determine:

(a) If any special security access was previously
held.

(b) To what, if any, information affecting national
security the prospective assignee may have been exposed.

(2) Not later than 10 days after receipt of the name of a
Marine considered for assignment to a billet listed in appendix A
to this enclosure, develop and provide to the DC/S, M&RA
(MMEA/MMOA) an assessment of the intelligence vulnerability of
the prospective assignee. This assessment should be based on the
prospective assignee's past history of sensitive billets, and a
verification of the current threat level germane to the area in
which the billet is located.

(3) Maintain a current listing of all high and critical
terrorist threat areas for dissemination to the DC/S, PP&O (POS);
DC/S, M&RA (MMEA/MMOA); and the HQMC billet sponsors; as
required. At a minimum, disseminate an updated listing during
the month of March of each year.

(4) Immediately notify the DC/S, PP&O (POS); the DC/S,
M&RA (MMOA/MMEA); and the HQMC billet sponsors when the terrorist
threat levels increase to either high or critical for a given
billet.

(5) Develop and conduct the special intelligence course
which supplements the AT training.

e. Billet Sponsors

(1) Ensure that T/O's listing billets requiring
specialized training are annotated and updated, as required.


ENCLOSURE (5)
4


MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

(2) When notified by the DC/S, PP&O (POS) of an increase
in the terrorist threat levels to either high or critical for a
given location, take the following action:

(a) Identify all external billets to the Marine
Corps located in the subject high or critical threat area.

(b) Recommend whether security screening and/or
specialized training is required for Marines filling subject
billets.

(3) Conduct frequent reviews of the AT training required
by sponsored billets, and make changes on the T/O, as necessary.














ENCLOSURE (5)
5

MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

MARINE CORPS EXTERNAL BILLETS IN HIGH THREAT AREAS
REQUIRING BOTH TRAINING AND SCREENING

Required
T/O Line # Gde/MOS MCC Training Sponsor(s)
(Encl (4),
Par. 2b)

COLOMBIA

USMC REP LtCol/9911 (ALL) PL

EL SALVADOR

ETSS N/A Maj/0302 (3) (5) (7) MCCDC (TE)
ETSS N/A Capt/0202 (3) (5) (7) MCCDC (TE)
ETSS N/A GySgt/0369 (3) (5) (7) MCCDC (TE)

FLAG ALLOWANCE COMIDEASTFOR

5986 0136 LtCol/9911 528 (3) PL

GUATEMALA

DAO LtCol/9910 (3) (5) (7) MCCDC (TE)

NICARAGUA

DAO LtCol/9910 (3) (5) (7) MCCDC (TE)

PERU

5010 0171 Maj/9910 TEX (ALL) PL

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

5503 0018 LtCol/9910 NAL (3) (6) (7) PL

THAILAND

5503 0123 LtCol/0302 NAM (3) (6) (7) PL
5503 0125 Col/9906 NAM (3) (6) (7) PL

UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS, ALL LOCATIONS

(ALL) (3) (7) PL


Appendix A to
ENCLOSURE (5)
A-1


MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

Required
T/O Line # Gde/MOS MCC Training Sponsor(s)
(Encl (4),
Par. 2b)

USLNO KUWAIT (JOINT, ROTATIONAL BILLET)

5503 0108 Col/9907 NDV (3) (7) PL

VENEZUELA

USMC REP Maj/9911 (3) (7) PL

FOREIGN AREA OFFICER BILLETS

FAO Maj Morocco (3) (7)
FAO Maj Egypt (3) (7)
FAO Maj Thailand (3) (7)








Appendix A to
ENCLOSURE (5)
A-2


MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

MARINE CORPS EXTERNAL BILLETS IN HIGH THREAT AREAS
REQUIRING ONLY TRAINING

Required
T/O Line # Gde/MOS Training Sponsor(s)
(Encl (4),
Par. 2b)

CHILE

5010 0187 GySgt/0369 P11 (3) MCCDC (TE)
5010 0188 GySgt/8511 P11 (3) MCCDC (TE)
5010 N/A GySgt/8654 P11 (3) MCCDC (TE)

GREECE

5011 0198F Maj/9910 NDL (3) (5) (7) SO/LIC

TURKEY

5010 0068 LtCol/9969 NET (3) PL

PERU

5010 0171 Maj/9910 TEX (ALL) MCCDC

PERSONNEL EXCHANGE PROGRAM BILLETS

PEP Maj Argentina (3) (7) PL
PEP Maj Brazil (3) (7) PL
PEP Maj Chile (3) (7) PL
PEP Maj Venezuela (3) (7) PL











Appendix B to
ENCLOSURE (5)
B-1


MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

%G 33021B_1.PCX;SAMPLE DIAGRAM OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION


ENCLOSURE (6)
1


MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

TERRORIST THREAT CONDITIONS (THREATCON's)

1. THREATCON. The decision to arrive at a particular THREATCON
and associated security measures should be based on multiple
factors which may include, but are not limited to:

a. The threat.

b. Target vulnerability.

c. Criticality of assets.

d. Security resources availability.

e. Operational and morale impact of security measures.

f. Damage control and recovery procedures.

g. International relations.

h. Planned U.S. Government actions, which could trigger a
terrorist response.

2. THREATCON measures should be followed except when, in the
judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate
otherwise.

3. Units and organizations located in civilian communities
(recruiting stations, Marine Corps Reserve units, etc.) should
modify THREATCON measures at each level to meet their own unique
requirements.

4. THREATCON NORMAL. A general threat of possible terrorist
activity exists, but warrants only a routine security posture.

5. THREATCON ALPHA. A general threat of possible terrorist
activity against personnel and installations exists, the nature
and extent of which are unpredictable. Circumstances do not
justify full implementation of THREATCON BRAVO measures;
however, it may be necessary to implement certain selected
measures from higher THREATCON's. This decision may be based on
intelligence received, or the need to provide a specific
deterrent. The measures in THREATCON ALPHA must be capable of
being maintained for an indefinite period of time.



ENCLOSURE (7)
1


MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

a. Measure 1. Remind all personnel, including family
members, at regular intervals to:

(1) Be suspicious and inquisitive about strangers,
particularly those carrying suitcases or other containers.

(2) Be alert for unidentified vehicles on, or in the
vicinity of, U.S. installations, units, or facilities.

(3) Be alert for abandoned parcels, suitcases or any
unusual activity.

USMC recommended, Measure 1-1: Troop information program:
Brief all personnel on the current threat condition, and those
measures enacted to increase security. Remind all duty personnel
to be especially alert for suspicious or unusual activity,
strangers, or unidentified vehicles.

USMC recommended, Measure 1-2: Conduct unit-level terrorism
awareness training.

b. Measure 2. Keep the duty officer or other appointed
personnel having access to plans for evacuating or sealing off
buildings and/or areas in use, or where an explosion or attack
has occurred, available at all times. Keep key personnel who may
be needed to implement security plans on call.

USMC recommended, Measure 2-1: Ensure duty personnel have
knowledge of, and access to emergency plans. (Give special
attention to the evacuation of buildings and grounds in use, as
well as the plans for cordoning and sealing off areas.)

USMC recommended, Measure 2-2: Establish on-call duty roster
of heavy equipment operators. All off-duty heavy equipment
operators will report their destination and expected time of
return to the military police desk (or the duty officer/NCO for
units without a provost marshal) prior to leaving their listed
recall address.

c. Measure 3. Secure buildings, rooms, and storage areas
not in regular use.

d. Measure 4. Increase security spot checks of vehicles and
persons entering installations and nonclassified areas under the
jurisdiction of the U.S. command or agency.



ENCLOSURE (7)
2


MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

USMC recommended, Measure 4-1: Installation military police
(MP) institute random identification spot checks of passenger and
commercial vehicle-occupants entering the base or station, using
predetermined criteria for vehicle selection. (If possible,
delays in traffic beyond 8 to 10 minutes should be avoided.)

USMC recommended, Measure 4-2: Installation MP, with or
without the assistance of military working dog (MWD) teams,
conduct daily Commanding Officer's administrative vehicle
inspections at random times and locations, using predetermined
criteria for vehicle selection.

USMC recommended, Measure 4-3: Installation MP physically
inspect and verify license plates affixed to vehicles entering
the base or station.

USMC recommended, Measure 4-4: Installation MP check the
identification card, drivers license and/or vehicle registration
card of all passenger vehicle and commercial truck drivers, and
the identification card of vehicle occupants and pedestrians (to
include joggers and bicyclists).

e. Measure 5. Limit installation access points for vehicles
and personnel, commensurate with a reasonable traffic flow.

f. Measure 6. As a deterrent, apply one of the following
measures from THREATCON BRAVO individually and randomly:

(1) Secure and regularly inspect buildings and storage
areas not in regular use.

(2) At the beginning and end of each workday and at
regular and frequent intervals, inspect the interior and
exterior of buildings in regular use for suspicious packages or
activity.

(3) Check all deliveries to messes, clubs, etc. (Advise
family members to check all home deliveries.)

(4) As far as resources allow, increase surveillance of
domestic accommodations, schools, messes, clubs, and other "soft
targets" to improve deterrence and defense, and to build
confidence among staff and family members.

g. Measure 7. Review all plans, orders, personnel details,
and logistic requirements related to the introduction of a higher
THREATCON.

ENCLOSURE (7)
3


MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

h. Measure 8. As appropriate, review and implement security
measures for high-risk personnel; e.g., direct the use of
inconspicuous body armor.

i. Measure 9. As appropriate, consult local authorities on
the threat, and mutual AT measures.

USMC recommended, Measure 9-1: The installation PMO will
notify adjacent police jurisdictions of threat conditions in
effect at the base or station, and continue to exchange
intelligence.

USMC recommended, Measure 9-2: The commander and key staff
review installation contingency plans.

USMC recommended, Measure 9-3: Jurisdiction and command and
control issues are agreed upon and exercised between FBI and
local or host-nation agencies.

j. Measure 10. Spare.

USMC recommended, Measure 10-1:-Place barriers in "ready"
position near gates and/or sensitive buildings, where they may be
required to provide blocking, delaying or channelizing actions.

USMC recommended, Measure 10-2: Establish countersurveillance
in areas likely to be targeted by hostile elements.

6. THREATCON BRAVO. Applies when an increased and more
predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. The measures in
this THREATCON must be capable of being maintained for weeks
without causing undue hardship, affecting operational capability,
or aggravating relations with local authorities.

a. Measure 11. Repeat measure 1 in paragraph 4a above, and
warn personnel of any other terrorist form of attack.

USMC recommended, Measure 11-1: Unit security managers
continue the threat briefing/information/orientation process for
all personnel, with particular emphasis toward reporting
suspicious incidents and persons.

b. Measure 12. Keep all personnel involved in implementing
antiterrorist contingency plans on call.

USMC recommended, Measure 12-1: Key staff members continue
preparation for implementing AT contingency plans.


ENCLOSURE (7)
4


MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

USMC recommended, Measure 12-2: All members of the
crisis management team (CMT), off-duty military police, primary
reaction platoon personnel, and other members of the crisis
management force (CMF) report their destination and expected time
of return to the MP desk sergeant or other designated official
prior to leaving their listed recall address.

USMC recommended, Measure 12-3: As far as resources
allow, assign a driver and/or MP trained in protective service
operations to the base commander, general officers, or other
designated personnel with significant terrorist target value.

USMC recommended, Measure 12-4: The provost marshal directs
a periodic recall of the special reaction team (SRT), if one is
established.

c. Measure 13. Check plans for implementation of
the measures in the next higher THREATCON.

d. Measure 14. Where possible, move cars and objects such
as crates, trash containers, etc., at least 25 meters from
buildings, particularly those buildings of a sensitive
or prestigious nature. Consider the application of centralized
parking.

e. Measure 15. Secure and regularly inspect all buildings,
rooms, and storage areas not in use.

f. Measure 16. At the beginning and end of each workday
and at other regular and frequent intervals, inspect the
interior and exterior of buildings in regular use for the
presence of suspicious objects and packages.

USMC recommended, Measure 16-1: Security and law
enforcement personnel increase physical security checks of
facilities after normal working hours.

USMC recommended, Measure 16-2: Explosive Detector MWD
teams check the exterior of vehicles in the parking lots
immediately adjacent to headquarters and other sensitive
buildings.

g. Measure 17. Examine all incoming mail for letter or
parcel bomb devices.

h. Measure 18. Check all deliveries to messes, clubs, etc.


ENCLOSURE (7)
5


MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

USMC recommended, Measure 18-1: Designated personnel and
employees randomly check package deliveries brought into service
areas.

USMC recommended, Measure 18-2: Military dependents are
advised to check all home deliveries, and to report all
suspicious letters and packages.

USMC recommended, Measure 18-3: Military police search all
commercial vehicles entering the installation, and compare
vehicle contents with bills of lading or other manifest
documents.

i. Measure 19. As far as resources allow, increase
surveillance of domestic accommodations, schools, messes, clubs,
and other "soft targets."

USMC recommended, Measure 19-1: Military police MWD teams
conduct walking patrols of selected parts of the installation's
housing area perimeter fenceline.

USMC recommended, Measure 19-2: The installation commander
implements regulations prohibiting the carrying of parcels into
exchanges, clubs, and other designated buildings, except for
specific circumstances and through specific doors where they will
be checked for contraband. Signs indicating the new regulations
should be conspicuously posted at these selected sites.

USMC recommended, Measure 19-3: Security and law enforcement
personnel increase patrolling of "soft targets" such as bachelor
enlisted quarters (BEQ) and exchanges.

j. Measure 20. Make organizational staff and dependents
aware of the general situation in order to stop rumors and
prevent unnecessary alarm.

k. Measure 21. At an early stage, inform members of local
security committees of any action being taken and why.

l. Measure 22. Physically inspect visitors to the unit, and
a percentage of their suitcases, parcels, and other containers.

USMC recommended, Measure 22-1: Commanding officers reduce
authorized access points of all buildings under their cognizance,
direct random ID checks at all building entrances, and direct the
physical inspection of handbags, briefcases and parcels of all
visitors.


ENCLOSURE (7)
6


MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

USMC recommended, Measure 22-2: Commanding officers direct
100 percent identification card checks at buildings which are, or
contain, high value targets.

USMC recommended, Measure 22-3: Security personnel physically
inspect all guests ("official visitors" may be exempted), and
escort all visitors.

USMC recommended, Measure 22-4: While issuing visitor passes,
MP conduct a physical inspection of visitors entering the
installation, to include their suitcases, parcels and other
containers.

m. Measure 23. Whenever possible, operate random patrols to
check vehicles, people, and buildings.

USMC recommended, Measure 23-1: Installation MP mobile
patrols check roads adjacent to the installation's perimeter
fenceline, and report suspicious off-base circumstances to the
servicing law enforcement agency. Installation perimeter
fencelines not accessible by vehicles should be checked on foot
or by MWD teams.

n. Measure 24. Protect off-base military personnel and
military transport in accordance with prepared plans. Remind
drivers to lock parked vehicles, and to institute a positive
system of checks before entering and driving their vehicle.

o. Measure 25. Implement additional security measures for
high-risk personnel, as appropriate.

USMC recommended, Measure 25-1: Use frost calls and
base/station cable television to disseminate information and
directions such as: the use of civilian attire, off-limits lists,
alternate reporting times, etc.

USMC recommended, Measure 25-2: Train unit high risk
personnel in incident response and emergency aid procedures.

p. Measure 26. Brief personnel, who may augment guard
force, on the use of deadly force and the rules of engagement.

q. Measure 27. As appropriate, consult local authorities on
the threat and mutual AT measures.




ENCLOSURE (7)
7


MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

USMC recommended, Measure 27-1: Emplace barriers at gates
near sensitive buildings, and per the installation's barrier
plan.

USMC recommended, Measure 27-2: Support emplaced barriers
with sufficient observation.

r. Measure 28 through 29. Spare.

7. THREATCON CHARLIE. Applies when an incident occurs or
intelligence is received indicating some form of terrorist action
against personnel and installations is imminent. Implementation
of this measure for more than a short period probably will create
hardship, and affect the peacetime activities of the unit and its
personnel.

a. Measure 30. Continue all THREATCON BRAVO measures, or
introduce those measures still outstanding.

b. Measure 31. Keep all personnel responsible for
implementing antiterrorist plans available at their places of
duty.

c. Measure 32. Limit access points to absolute minimum.

d. Measure 33. Strictly enforce entry control, and search a
percentage of vehicles.

e. Measure 34. Enforce centralized parking of vehicles away
from sensitive buildings.

f. Measure 35. Issue weapons to guards (local orders should
include specific orders on the issue of ammunition). (Note:
Marine Corps regulations already prescribe the issuance of loaded
weapons to all personnel engaged in law enforcement or security
duties.)

g. Measure 36. Introduce increased patrolling of the
installation.

h. Measure 37. Protect all designated mission essential
vulnerable areas (MEVA) and vulnerable points (VPS), and give
special attention to MEVA's and VPS's outside of military
establishments.

i. Measure 38. Erect barriers and obstacles to control
traffic flow.


ENCLOSURE (7)
8


MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

j. Measure 39. Consult local authorities about closing
public (and military) roads and facilities which will make sites
more vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

k. Measure 40. Spare.

USMC recommended, Measure 40-1: Complete emplacing all
barriers listed in the installation barrier plan.

USMC recommended, Measure 40-2: Have MWD teams conduct
walking patrols of selected installation barriers.

8. THREATCON DELTA. Implementation applies in the immediate
area where a terrorist attack has occurred, or when intelligence
has been received that terrorist action against a specific
location is likely. Normally, that THREATCON is declared as a
localized warning.

a. Measure 41. Continue or introduce all measures listed
for THREATCON BRAVO and CHARLIE.

b. Measure 42. Augment guards, as necessary.

c. Measure 43. Identify all vehicles already on the
installation within operations or mission support areas.

d. Measure 44. Search all vehicles entering the complex or
installation, as well as their contents.

e. Measure 45. Control all access, and implement positive
identification of all personnel.

f. Measure 46. Search all suitcases, briefcases, packages,
etc., brought into the complex or installation.

g. Measure 47. Take measures to control access to all areas
under the jurisdiction of the U.S. command or agency concerned.

h. Measure 48. Make frequent checks of the exteriors of
buildings and parking areas.

i. Measure 49. Minimize all administrative journeys and
visits.

j. Measure 50. Consult local authorities about closing
public (and military) roads and facilities which will make sites
more vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

k. Measure 51. Spare.

ENCLOSURE (7)
9


MCO 3302.1B
3 Jun 1992

INSTALLATIONS/COMMANDS REQUIRED TO REPORT CHANGES
IN THREAT CONDITION (THREATCON)

1. The below listed installations and commands will report all
changes in THREATCON status to CMC (POC/POS/CI), even if already
reported by a higher headquarters:

Blount Island Command, Jacksonville, FL
Camp Elmore, Norfolk, VA
Camp Smith, HI
CMC (ARF), Washington, DC
Henderson Hall, Arlington, VA
HMX-1, Quantico, VA
Marine Barracks, Washington DC
MCAGCC Twentynine Palms, CA
MCAS Beaufort, SC
MCAS Cherry Point, NC
MCAS El Toro, CA
MCAS Futenma, JA
MCAS Iwakuni, JA
MCAS Kaneohe Bay, HI
MCAS New River, NC
MCAS Tustin, CA
MCAS Yuma, AZ
MCB Camp Butler, JA
MCB Camp Lejeune, NC
MCB Camp Pendleton, CA
MCCDC Quantico, VA
MCLB Albany, GA
MCLB Barstow, CA
MCRD/ERR Parris Island, SC
MCRD/WRR San Diego, CA
MCRSC Overland Park, KS
4th FSSG, Marietta, GA
4th MARDIV, New Orleans, LA
4th MAW, New Orleans, LA
1st MCD, Garden City, LI, NY
4th MCD, Philadelphia, PA
6th MCD, Atlanta, GA
8th MCD, New Orleans, LA
9th MCD, Shawnee Mission, KS
12th MCD, Treasure Island, CA

2. For installations and commands above, the THREATCON level
must be the same for the entire organization, with the exception
of Marine Helicopter Squadron One (HMX-1). This unit may adopt a
different THREATCON than the host station, due to its unique
mission and frequent geographic dispersion.

ENCLOSURE (8)
1