Approval Date:

14 Jul 92

Document:


MISSION NEED STATEMENT (MNS)
FOR
TACTICAL VISUAL DECEPTION DECOYS

                          (NO. CCC 1.52)

1.  Defense Planning Guidance Element.  This Mission Need Statement (MNS) responds to two of the four foundations of National Defense Policy:  Forward Presence and Crisis Response.  The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Master Plan of 28 June 1991, capability number 31, identifies a need to "field multispectral decoys to emulate key weapons and equipment".

2.  Mission and Threat Analyses

    a.  Mission.  MAGTFs are tasked to plan and execute tactical operations across the spectrum of conflict.  Current doctrine requires MAGTFs to plan tactical deception for every operation, making a conscious decision in each instance on whether or not to execute the deception plan.  When the decision is to employ tactical military deception, the MAGTF must be capable of employing organic assets to cause the enemy to take actions favorable to the MAGTF.  Doctrine defines four categories of deception measures:  visual, sonic, olfactory, and electronic.    Much of an enemy's intelligence is based on what is observed on the ground or seen in a photograph.  Hence, effective visual deception is critical to the projection of the deception story.  Two items commonly used in visual deception are dummies and decoys.  A dummy is an imitation of something on the battlefield.  A decoy is used to draw the enemy away from a more important area.  When a dummy is used to draw the enemy's attention from some other area, it is also termed a decoy.  The distance, both on the ground and in the air, from which the enemy must observe the items dictates the degree of realism required.  Although visual evidence is usually critical to the deception, it alone will not deceive the enemy.  Visual deception must be integrated with electronic, olfactory, and sonic measures to present a realistic deception to the enemy.  The enemy's intelligence collection capability determines the necessary combination of measures.  In order to defeat capabilities of potential adversaries with minimal casualties, MAGTFs must be capable of confusing and misdirecting the efforts of opposing forces.  The Marine Corps currently has no visual deception decoys of any type within the inventory.  Initial operational capability is required by FY96 with full operational capability by FY02.
 
    b.  Threat.  The current Marine Corps Mid-Range Threat Estimate, Defense Intelligence Agency's Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition - USSR, and the Army Material Command/Army Training and Doctrine Command's System Threat Assessment Report for U.S. Camouflage Systems documents provide current and future threat system specifics and technical threat assessments.  Taken together, their overall theme presents an increasingly sophisticated multidiscipline intelligence collection (systems/sensors) capability for the principle military powers as well as various Third World nations.  

3.  Nonmateriel Alternatives.  The Mission Area Analysis number 44 (Expeditionary Engineering), deficiency number 27, highlights the inadequate capability of the MAGTF to conduct deception operations.  Corrective actions of a nonmaterial nature which could be undertaken to improve MAGTF deception capabilities are limited.  Enhanced training in Marine Corps formal schools and at the unit level could improve knowledge of and expertise in deception operations throughout the Fleet Marine Force (FMF).  Nevertheless, a Fleet Operational Need Statement from CG I Marine Expeditionary Force dated 16 Oct 91 states a specific requirement for dedicated visual decoys.

4.  Potential Materiel Alternatives

    a.  Purchase commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) two-dimensional dummies.  A number of such decoys are currently in the inventories of the U.S. Army and Air Force as well as a number of allied nations.  Two-dimensional dummies exist in both horizontal and vertical configuration.  (Horizontal configuration presents an overhead view of equipment being replicated; vertical dummies, the frontal, rear or side view.)

    b.  Purchase COTS three-dimensional dummies.  As with the two-dimensional equipment, such decoys are already in U.S. Army and Air Force inventories and in the possession of allied military forces.

    c.  Undertake a dedicated research, development, and acquisition program to field a multispectral deception device.  At this time, multispectral deception is accomplished by integrating various differing types of deception equipment.  Separate visual, sonic, olfactory, and electronic equipments must be collocated to produce the desired multispectral deception effect.

5.  Constraints

    a.  Operational Environment

        (1) Organizational Concept.  Tactical deception is deliberate action undertaken to achieve surprise on the battlefield.  Deception is conceived and executed to help multiply combat power through surprise and security.  Deception operations do, however, involve a cost to the executing unit, especially in terms of manpower.  A commander who chooses to employ dummies and/or other deception equipment must make the conscious decision to commit organic personnel to install, operate, and maintain such equipment.  Any deception equipment procured in response to this MNS will be assigned to the Division, Wing, or Force Service Support Group (as appropriate) to be installed, operated, and maintained by such organic personnel as may be designated by the Commanders of those organizations.  Dummies should be purchased in sufficient quantities to replicate at least a battalion/squadron size force of the equipment being represented.  Prioritization of purchase for dummy systems (i.e., M-1 tanks, AV-8Bs, supply dumps, headquarters elements, etc.) will be in response to specific FMF input and as determined through a cost and operational effectiveness analysis.   

        (2) Performance Characteristics.  Dummies must be sufficiently lifelike to appear to be actual equipment to enemy reconnaissance forces equipped with binoculars and/or telephoto camera lenses at distances of 1,000 yards.  The ability to easily change camouflage patterns on the dummies to adapt to specific battlefield environment (forest, desert, arctic, etc.) is highly desirable.

        (3) Environment.  Decoys must be employable in all potential operating environments for Marine forces ranging from arctic to desert areas.  Consequently, these devices must withstand temperatures from -40 to 125 degrees Fahrenheit (-40 to 52 degrees Celsius).  Decoys should be designed to withstand wind speeds up to and including gusts of 60 mph.  Personnel wearing Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) 4 equipment and/or cold weather gear must be able to set up and tear down these systems.  NBC survivability for the actual dummy systems is not required.

    b.  Mobility.  Dummies must be small enough so that a minimum of eight systems can be transported in a single tactical 5-ton truck.  Individual systems must be team portable, weighing no more than 80 pounds each and sufficiently small in transport cases so as to be readily carried by a two-man team.

    c.  Manpower.  As noted above, commands deciding to use deception devices are responsible for their employment.  Since dummies must be installed and maintained by the using unit, every effort must be made to minimize personnel impact.  Each individual dummy should be simple enough for a two-man team to install/strike within 30 minutes.  Once installed, a battalion or squadron's worth of equipment should be maintained by not more than four Marines.

    d.  Training.  Actual development of the deception plan will be performed by trained specialists.  Once the decision concerning appropriate employment of dummy systems has been made, organic personnel with no experience in deception planning should be fully capable of installing/maintaining the dummy equipment.  These devices must be sufficiently simple so that with four (4) hours on-the-job training any Marine can set up and tear down the dummy system and, with guidance from deception planners, can maintain the dummies so as to present a realistic depiction of the force being replicated.

    e.  Logistics.  Minor modifications/repairs to decoys must be easily accomplished by the operators.  Sufficient spare parts should be procured with the systems and maintained in normal supply channels so that dependence on non-military organizations for supply/repair is not required.  Commanders must consider their organic limitations regarding storing, transporting, and maintaining these systems when defining their specific procurement objectives.  In particular, limitations in organic motor transport and heavy engineer assets will be a factor effecting the capability to deploy/employ decoys.

    f.  Interoperability.  Since visual deception is only part of any deception plan, dummies must readily operate in concert with sonic, olfactory, and electronic deception measures.