17 May 94
MISSION NEED STATEMENT
INTELLIGENCE BROADCAST RECEIVERS (IBR)
(NO. CCC 12)
1. Defense Planning Guidance Element. This mission need statement responds to two of the four foundations of the Regional Defense Strategy of the Defense Planning Guidance: Forward Presence and Crisis Response. It is further supported by Mid-Term Combat Development Priorities 9 and 10, and implementing actions 12.4.1 and 4 of the Marine Corps Master Plan (MCMP) 1994-2004, dated 21 July 1993.
2. Mission and Threat Analyses
(1) Fleet Marine Force (FMF) units have the requirement of being capable of receiving and exploiting intelligence broadcasts from national, theater, and fleet intelligence producers, regardless of location on the battlefield or type of operations being conducted. National, theater, and fleet support is important in planning and conducting all types of operational maneuver from the sea, sustained operations ashore, and operations other than war. Specifically, Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) have the need to:
(a) Plan and manage the receipt of these intelligence broadcasts.
(b) Receive these broadcasts.
(c) Process, exploit, and display this data.
(2) The Marine Corps has devoted much attention to ensuring it has an adequate intelligence capability in the MAGTF. The MAGTF's ability to receive and exploit existing and planned intelligence broadcasts isn't adequate because of an inability of all potential users to physically receive certain broadcasts; an inability to process certain broadcasts; an inability to automatically integrate this data; and a prolif-eration of independent, stand-alone terminals. In the interim, the Marine Corps will use the Commander's Tactical Terminal (CTT) and Tactical Receive Equipment (TRE) to satisfy part of its needs. However, these interim solutions suffer many of the same deficiencies noted above, and they are scheduled to be at the end of their useful service around FY00-02.
b. Mission Area Analysis. The need for better access by the MAGTF to national, theater, and fleet intelligence producers was first identified in the Mission Area Analysis (MAA) for Intelli-gence (MAA 12), dated 25 March 1991, and was revalidated by the present MAA 12, dated 15 February 1994. Additionally, the joint Commanders, Marine Forces Atlantic and Pacific FMF Operational Need Statement, "Tactical Related Applications (TRAP) and Other Broadcast Support", COMMARFORPAC 060020Z JAN 93 (S), identifies a need for such a capability. Finally, an indirect finding of the Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis for the Connectivity to GUARDRAIL Mission Need Statement, dated 21 October 1993, further identifies a need for a future capability as a replacement to the CTT and TRE.
(1) Potential threats confronting the United States in the near-to-long range are described in the MCMP and the Mid-Range Threat Estimate 1992-2002, Parts I and II, dated November 1992 and May 1992 respectively. According to these publications, Marines will face a variety of threats and missions across the entire operational continuum that will include the need for intelligence from national, theater, and fleet intelligence producers.
(2) System Vulnerability. The primary threats against an intelligence broadcast receive capability are the same threats faced by all communications entities. These threats are well-documented, for example in the Defense Intelligence Agency's Fact Book Communist World Forces (DST-2660Z-13-YR) and the Marine Corps Intelligence Centers' System Threat Assessment for the Marine Tactical Command and Control System (MTACCS) (1992-2010), dated 16 December 1992.
d. Timing and Priority. Initial operational capabilities are required in FY98 (for a small, suitcase-sized receiver) and FY00 (for other receivers). Full operational capabilities for the baseline core elements are desired by FY02. Afterwards, further improvements and replacements will be necessary to ensure complete and continuous capability until FY12-14. Relative to other programs in Mission Area 12, Intelligence Broadcast Receivers (IBR) are mid-level priorities.
3. Nonmateriel Alternatives. Corrective actions will be pursued through non-materiel alternatives, such as the development of better concepts and doctrine. Nevertheless, the nature of receiving intelligence broadcasts is such that it is only pos-sible through materiel solutions.
4. Potential Materiel Alternatives. Materiel alternatives may be acquired as systems, components of systems, or stand-alone items.
a. Product Improvement Program. The Marine Corps could product improve its existing and programmed assets (e.g., CTT).
b. Nondevelopmental Approach. Procure existing or planned systems from allied, joint or other services. A commercially available nondevelopmental item could be procured to fulfill this requirement (i.e. Man-Portable Multi-source Information Receiver and Display Suite, and the Versatile Intelligence Portable Receiver).
c. Research and Development. A research and development effort could be initiated for new Intelligence Broadcast Receivers (IBR) to fulfill this requirement.
a. Logistics. IBRs must be supportable within the existing three level/five echelon maintenance concept using common tools and general/special purpose test equipment. The IBR shall be capable of being powered by standard Marine Corps power sources.
b. Mobility and Transportation. IBRs must be able to be transported by a mix of standard tactical vehicles, aircraft or ships. Materiel alternatives should not require any special handling or loading.
c. Manpower, Personnel, and Training
(1) The existing structure in the FMF should be able to operate and support this capability; however, this is not fully certain and will require further evaluation before final acquisition of any materiel solution.
(2) Marines from Occupational Fields 02 (Intelligence), 25 (Communications), 26 (Signals Intelligence/Electronic War-fare), and 28 (Data/ Communications Maintenance) perform or support intelligence activities. Additional or new military occupational specialties are not available or needed.
(3) The materiel should be easy and safe to use and support. Use of existing formal courses are the desired means of training; however, on-the-job and unit training are acceptable. All materiel alternatives should include documentation to use to develop, modify and/or conduct training, before fielding.
d. Command, Control, Computers, and Standardization/ Inter-operability. All intelligence broadcast receivers must be certified compatible, interoperable with, and integrated into the MAGTF Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelli-gence (MAGTF C4I) architecture, and national, theater, and fleet intelligence communications networks, as appropriate (e.g., Common Operating Environment, Defense Special Security Communic-ations System, Joint Maritime Command Information System, fleet intelligence broadcasts, Marine Air Ground Intelligence System (MAGIS) - particularly the Intelligence Analysis System, Tactical Data Information Exchange Service, Tactical Information Broadcast Service, Tactical Reconnaissance Intelligence Exchange System, TRAP, and their replacements).
e. Operational Environment
(1) Conventional. Tailored and timely intelligence support from national, theater, and fleet intelligence producers is mandatory in all conventional military deployments and operations.
(2) Environment, Terrain, and Weather. Intelligence
broadcast receivers must be capable of operation, maintenance, transportation, and storage under all climatic and environmental situations - including all-weather and austere conditions, wherever a MAGTF may be deployed and employed. They must be as fully capable as the forces they support.
(3) Survivability. Intelligence broadcast receivers must be able to support MAGTF's operating in moderate electromagnetic, electronic warfare, and nuclear/biological/ chemical environments. They must be as fully capable as the forces they support.
f. Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy. These receivers shall use Defense Mapping Agency standard products to produce tactical map backgrounds and overlays with graphic display of the tactical situation sufficient to support mission accomplishment. They must be able to interoperate among the different types of mapping, charting, and geodesy products used by the intelligence community.
6. Joint Potential Designator
a. U.S. Army: Joint Interest.
b. U.S. Navy: Joint Interest.
c. U.S. Air Force: Joint Interest.