Approval Date:

13 Dec 93

Document:


MISSION NEED STATEMENT
FOR 
COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE (C2W), CRYPTOLOGIC, AND SIGNALS
INTELLIGENCE (SIGINT) SYSTEM
(NO. CCC 11.21)


1.  Defense Planning Guidance Element.  This mission need statement responds to two of the four foundations of the Regional Defense Strategy of the Defense Planning Guidance:  Forward Presence and Crisis Response.  It is further supported by Mid-Term Combat Development Priorities 6, 9, 10, 13, 18, and 28; and implementing actions 12.4.4.8, and .9, and 36.4.2.3, and .7-.16 of the Marine Corps Master Plan (MCMP) 1994-2004, dated 21 July 1993.  

2.  Mission and Threat Analyses

    a.  Mission

        (1) Fleet Marine Force (FMF) units are required to perform Command and Control Warfare (C2W), Cryptologic, and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) functions and tasks, particularly against critical enemy command and control nodes, regardless of location on the battlefield or type of operations being conducted.  Specifically, they have the need to:
         
            (a) Plan and direct C2W, cryptologic, and SIGINT operations.

            (b) Intercept, collect, locate, process, and analyze communications and on communications signals, regardless of signal characteristics and electromagnetic density, by using a variety of means, including airborne and unattended sensors, from various locations.

            (c) Receive and disseminate C2W, cryptologic, and SIGINT information (both general service and sensitive compartmented information).

            (d) Disrupt and deceive enemy communications and electronics.

            (e) Protect friendly communications and electronics from enemy action.

            (f) Conceal, emulate, or replicate friendly assets.

            (g) Exploit tactical wirelines.

        (2) The Marine Corps has devoted much attention to ensuring it has an adequate C2W, cryptologic, and SIGINT capability.  It participates in joint and national efforts (e.g., Marine Corps membership in the United States SIGINT System  (USSS)),  maintains units (e.g., radio battalions and tactical electronic warfare squadrons (VMAQ)), and outfits Marines with equipment and systems.  These capabilities deteriorate, however, in the face of constantly changing and improving threats and technology.  As a  result, the Marine Corps must constantly improve its own capabilities in order to remain effective.

    b.  Mission Area Analysis

        (1) The needs for better C2W, cryptologic, and SIGINT support were identified in the Mission Area Analysis (MAA) for Intelligence (MAA 12), as deficiency 10, throughout the MAA for Electronic Warfare (MAA 36), and the Marine Corps Signal Intelligence/Electronic Warfare Plan, the three primary MAAs for these capabilities.  

        (2) They were also identified in MAA 15 (Military  Operations Other Than War), MAA 23 (Close Combat), MAA 24 (Fire Support), MAA 33 (Assault Support), MAA 34 (Offensive Air Support), and MAA 44 (Expeditionary Engineering).

        (3) Finally, they are also supported by the Marine Air Ground Task Force Equipment Assessments on Mission Areas 12 and 36, which provide further analyses down to the capability set level.

    c.  Threat

        (1) Potential threats confronting the United States in the near-to-long range are developed in the Mid-Range Threat Estimate 1992-2002 Parts I and II dated November 1992 and May 1992.  Marines will face a variety of threats across the entire operational continuum which will certainly include operations in the electromagnetic spectrum.

        (2) The primary threats against C2W, cryptologic, and SIGINT functions are enemy C2W (which includes physical destruction), cryptologic, and SIGINT operations, and rapidly advancing technologies.  These threats are documented in many sources, such as Defense Intelligence Agency publications on SIGINT and Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities of numerous foreign countries and the Worldwide EW Threat (DST-1730H-018 and DST-1730H-077); National Security Agency (NSA) reports, such as "Future SIGINT Access", (G/094/92), August 1992; and others, such as the Joint-Service Tactical Exploitation of National Systems Manual, Tabs 4B and 4C, 27 September 1991, and the System Threat Assessment for the Marine Tactical Command and Control System (MTACCS) (1992-2010), 16 December 1992.  Other vulnerabilities  include conventional and nuclear weapons effects, advanced technology weapons such as High Power Microwaves (HPM), and nuclear/biological/chemical contamination.

    d.  Timing and Priority.  Initial operational capabilities are required in FY98.  Full operational capabilities are desired by FY02.  Afterwards, further improvements and replacements will be necessary to ensure continuous capability through FY10-12.  Relative to other programs in Mission Areas 12 and 36, C2W, cryptologic, and SIGINT programs are very high priorities.

3.  Nonmateriel Alternatives.  Corrective actions are being pursued through several non-materiel alternatives, such as the development of better concepts and doctrine, continual emphasis on education and training, maintenance of structure of tactical SIGINT and EW units, and pursuit of joint interoperability.  Nevertheless, the nature of the electromagnetic spectrum requires physical access to communications and electronic signals, which is only possible through materiel solutions.

4.  Potential Materiel Alternatives.  Materiel alternatives may be acquired as systems, components of systems, or stand-alone items.

    a.  Product Improvement Program.  The Marine Corps could product improve its existing and planned C2W, cryptologic, SIGINT, and related equipment and systems.

    b.  Nondevelopmental Approach.  The Marine Corps could
procure C2W, cryptologic, SIGINT, and related equipment and systems five ways.

        (1) Purchase other agency, command, Service, or Allied existing or planned equipment and systems.

        (2) Purchase commercial off-the-shelf equipment and systems.

        (3) Authorize FMF commanders to purchase limited quantities of authorized equipment (e.g., table of equipment and special allowance) to replace existing stocks of equipment and systems.

        (4) Authorize FMF commanders to purchase limited quantities of inexpensive receivers and related peripheral equipment directly from commercial sources as temporary special allowances.

        (5) Use a mix of these purchase alternatives.

    c.  Research and Development.  The Marine Corps could conduct its own or participate in other agency, command, or Service research, development, and acquisition program(s) for C2W, cryptologic, SIGINT, and related equipment and systems.  The Marine Corps could also use the resources and procedures of the Marine Enhancement Program to acquire limited quantities of C2W, cryptologic, SIGINT, and related equipment and systems.

    d.  Borrow.  Per Memorandum Joint Chief of Staff 111-88/ United States SIGINT Directive 4, "Concept of SIGINT Support to Military Commanders," the Marine Corps could borrow available cryptologic and SIGINT equipment and systems from the USSS.

5.  Constraints

    a.  Logistics.  C2W/cryptologic/SIGINT equipment and systems are critical low density items which should be supportable by the calibration and logistics support procedures and techniques
currently used for communications, electronic, and related equipment in the FMF.  This may also include use of NSA's Repair/ Return Program and SIGINT Service Center.  This equipment should also be capable of being powered by standard FMF power sources.

    b.  Mobility and Transportation.   This equipment and systems should be able to be transported by a mix of standard tactical and strategic means.  No materiel alternatives should require any special handling or loading.  

    c.  Manpower, Personnel, and Training

        (1) The structure is in the radio battalions (with augmentation from the Marine Support Battalion), special security communication teams, VMAQ, and other FMF units.  

        (2) C2W/cryptologic/SIGINT activities and support are performed by Marines from Occupational Fields 26 (SIGINT/EW) and 28 (Data/Communications Maintenance).  Additional manpower or new military occupational specialties are not available or needed.

        (3) The materiel should be easy and safe to use and support.  Development, modification, or use of formal courses in the Cryptologic Training System or Landing Force Training Commands are the desired means of training operators.  However, on-the-job and unit training is acceptable, especially for non-electronic deception.  All materiel alternatives should include documentation to use to develop or modify and conduct training, before fielding.

    d. Command, Control, Computers, and Standardization/ Interoperability.  All C2W/cryptologic/SIGINT activities must be compatible and interoperable with, and if security access allows, integrated into the MAGTF Command Control Communications Computers and Intelligence and USSS.

    e.  Operational Environment

        (1) Conventional.  Fully capable C2W/cryptologic/ SIGINT operations are mandatory in all conventional military deployments and operations.  Deception activities must be realistic.

        (2) Environment, Terrain, and Weather.  C2W/cryptologic/SIGINT equipment should be capable of operation, maintenance, transportation, and storage under all austere, climatic and environmental conditions, wherever a MAGTF may be deployed and employed.  They should be as fully capable as the forces they support.

        (3) Survivability.  C2W/cryptologic/SIGINT equipment should be able to support Marines operating in dense electromagnetic/HPM, electronic warfare, and nuclear/ biological/chemical environments.  They should be as fully capable as the forces they support.

        (4) Security.  C2W/cryptologic/SIGINT operations should be protected from detection, capture, destruction, and deception.

    f.  Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy.  This materiel should use standard products.

6.  Joint Potential Designator

    a.  U.S. Army:  Joint interest.

    b.  U.S. Navy:  Joint interest.
   
    c.  U.S. Air Force:  Joint interest.