Chapter 4: Connecting the PCW Framework
The PCW framework, with its diversified post-Cold War requirements, offers a formidable challenge to the intelligence community, especially during personnel cuts and budget reductions.(37)
The IC needs to maintain the breadth required to address all three tiers while operating in a cost constrained environment. Thus, reforms must concentrate on making optimium use of available resources, expanding into less expensive methods of intelligence collection, and in general, making the entire IC run more efficiently.
In evaluating all of the IC challenges in the post-Cold War, the Snyder Commission noted the recurring appearance of five major points which support the PCW framework:
Empower the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).
Conduct human intelligence (HUMINT).
Improve IC coordination and relationships.
Diversify personnel assignments.
These aspects are mutually linked, and together weave a web that binds the IC missions into an integrated and holistic structure. Even more importantly, they have the potential to reduce costs and bureaucracy, freeing resources needed by the IC to address a broader range of threats. In this chapter, each of these aspects will be examined in turn.
4.1 Empower the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)
The time-honored reform topic in the intelligence community has been the power of the DCI. The National Security Act of 1947(38) unfortunately left the DCI position "directionless, vague, and most of all, powerless"(39) relative to established cabinet heavyweights like the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. Consequently, a disparity emerged between the responsibilities and authorities given to the DCI. Ever since that time, intelligence reform efforts and the DCIs themselves have fought time and time again to remedy this disparity and to empower the post.
As discussed in Chapter 2, due to the dramatic rise of new and emerging threats, intelligence requirements have grown and diversified. Thus, ever closer communication between producers and consumers is needed to facilitate the production of relevant and timely intelligence. Mechanisms previously discussed, such as the long-term adjustment of the PCW framework by the IWG and reform of the National Intelligence Estimates, are only part of the solution. More than ever in the post-Cold War era, additional power must be allocated to the DCI to allow him to coordinate and direct intelligence efforts.
Make the DCI a Member of the National Security Council (NSC).
Chapter 2 proclaims that the primary tenet of the PCW framework is the balance between the two pillars, SPO and SMO. Both primary representatives of SPO and SMO, the Secretary of State (SECSTATE) and the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) respectively, are members of the NSC. However, the DCI, the all-important moderator who has the unenviable task of sustaining this critical balance, is currently only a statutory advisor. As a consequence, the DCI must be invited by the NSC in order to attend meetings. How can the DCI maintain a balance between the prime consumers: SECSTATE and SECDEF (or analogously, how can the IC provide intelligence to support the critical balance between SPO and SMO) if the DCI is not present at all NSC meetings? If the DCI is not aware of national security decisions, he cannot direct the PCW framework. In short, the current statute not only gives the DCI the difficult job of balancing SPO and SMO; it also makes that job nearly impossible (just as President Kennedy foresaw). Therefore, to give the DCI regular access to the SECSTATE and the SECDEF, Congress should amend the National Security Act of 1947 to give the DCI a permanent seat on the NSC among his peers.
Another significant advantage of this recommendation is improving the relationship between the DCI and the President, the most important producer-consumer relationship in the IC. Currently, the only formalized contact between the President and his chief intelligence advisor occurs at the National Security Council (NSC), but once again the DCI is only a statutory advisor (he is not always present). This recommendation would create regular access and contact between the President and the DCI.
This proposal will likely precipitate considerable protest from the SECDEF and the SECSTATE, mainly in the form of warnings against the dangers of politicization. However, the intent of the recommendation is not to add policymaking to the DCI's list of responsibilities. Rather, it seeks to enable him to better fulfill both his IC responsibility to balance SPO and SMO, and his legal role as "the principal adviser to the President for intelligence matters related to the national security."(40)
Congress: Make the DCI Chair of the Committee on Foreign Intelligence.
Congress should also amend Section 802 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 to make the DCI chair of the newly created Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI) in the NSC. As it now stands, the bill designates the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs as the chair of the CFI; the DCI is merely a member, along with the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and the Secretary of State (SECSTATE). Since the Committee was established for the purposes of "identifying intelligence needs" and "establishing intelligence priorities," which are imperative for the proper operation of the PCW framework, the DCI as the sole intelligence professional among the four members is the logical choice for the chair. He alone has the requisite knowledge to properly guide substantive discussions on intelligence.(41)
Aside from the issue of chairmanship, the Snyder Commission welcomes the creation of the Committee on Foreign Intelligence. The CFI will be a valuable medium through which the Intelligence Community can ensure that it remains in close contact with the highest echelon of influence in government.
Endorse, but do not formalize, the DCI as a cabinet-level position. (42)
Having the DCI as a non-voting member of the cabinet allows him to obtain a clearer picture of national policy decisions and future intelligence requirements. However, the Cabinet position does come with the cost of possible politicization of the DCI post. Understanding this trade-off, the Snyder Commission decided to maintain the status quo as a compromise.
The President should continue to allow the DCI to serve as a non-voting Cabinet member, but only if the DCI so desires and only on a director-by-director basis.
Continue replacement of DCI with Presidential term, but only with the expectation that the DCI serves a full term.
To facilitate the relationship between the President and the DCI, DCI replacement by presidential term should continue. However, the DCI should serve under the Presidential expectation that his tenure will be a full four-year term. Over the past five years, the IC has had five different DCIs, a practice which has destroyed continuity in the IC and depressed morale.
Nevertheless, no formalization of the aforementioned expectation, such as setting a fixed DCI term, should be made. Since the DCI is still the chief intelligence adviser to the President, he serves at the pleasure of the President, and the President should have the prerogative to remove him if desired.
Appointment of the directors of national foreign intelligence producing agencies should require DCI concurrence, as opposed to consultation.
Because most national foreign intelligence producing agencies exist primarily within larger Cabinet departments such as the Department of Defense (DoD), the DCI's control over them is problematic and limited. Even though the DCI has control of the National Foreign Intelligence Program Budget, the DCI needs additional authority to fulfill his responsibility as the chief coordinator of the national intelligence community.
Thus, Cabinet officers (i.e. the SECDEF) should be required to seek concurrence from the DCI regarding the appointment of directors of national foreign intelligence producing agencies.(43)
Doing so would give the DCI substantial additional leverage with which to centrally guide the IC in accordance with the PCW framework without creating unnecessary power struggles. The recommendation would avoid having the DCI directly control DoD intelligence personnel, and would continue to allow the directors of IC agencies to independently manage their own subordinate agencies.
4.2 Conduct Human Intelligence (HUMINT)
The ability to collect information covertly through human sources has always been indispensable to the United States. America triumphed during World War II and the Cold War due in part to high quality information collected clandestinely by CIA case officers and operatives. Now in the post-Cold War era, as seen repeatedly throughout Section 3.1, the traditional and emerging transnational (Tier A) threats demand a reinvigorated application of human intelligence (HUMINT).
The good news is that our HUMINT mechanism is not broken, and has the potential to meet and address the post-Cold War challenges to our national security. Currently, the clandestine collection of information is being tasked effectively, mainly through the efforts of the new National HUMINT Requirements Tasking Center.(44)
With "a little tinkering around the margins," the structure of HUMINT within the Directorate of Operations (DO) could reach an optimal level of organization and management.
Unfortunately however, a perceptible shift in attitude against the IC threatens to undermine the progress made to date. In the last decade, recent scandals, accusations, suspicions of impropriety, or alleged failures have created a politically charged atmosphere in which the CIA is increasingly compelled to defend its clandestine human collection activities. Congressional politics and a growing public distrust of the CIA are also creating external pressures that threaten the freedom and effectiveness of the recruiting process.
Understanding the effectiveness and importance of HUMINT, the Snyder Commission in its recommendations would like to reverse some of the recent steps toward deemphasizing and limiting the use of HUMINT. In the coming years, the information available exclusively through human sources will be critical to fight Tier A threats: terrorism, narcotics trafficking, global crime, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In addition, if HUMINT is budgeted reasonably and flexibly enough to support the PCW framework, it can meet broad IC requirements under a limited resource environment. HUMINT remains an essential weapon in the IC's arsenal, and its scope in the post-Cold War world should expand, not contract. (Of course, accountability and vigilant oversight cannot and should not be neglected or slighted when HUMINT is conducted in a democracy like the United States.)
Eliminate the recruiting guidelines imposed by former DCI Deutch in June 1995.
In response to allegations by Sen. Robert Torricelli concerning the CIA recruitment of murderers and human rights abusers in Guatemala, former DCI John Deutch in 1995 developed a set recruiting guidelines. These guidelines established standards for recruiting informants, many of whom have shadowy pasts. While the Clinton Administration maintains that the guidelines have not hampered efforts to infiltrate terrorist groups, sources inside the CIA suggest that "the rules have had a real chilling effect."(45)
Case officers are reluctant to recruit shady sources for fear of reprimand, even if the sources could be invaluable to American efforts against terrorism, narcotics, or proliferation.
As Rep. Bill McCollum suggests, "if [these restrictions] are an impediment, then they have to be removed. We have to have better human intelligence to deal with terrorism."(46)
Thus, although considerations for human rights and ethical behavior are important, the gravity of counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and nonproliferation suggests that the IC should not hamper its own efforts. The guidelines should be removed, and instances evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
Maintain the waiver on the prohibition against recruiting American journalists overseas in accordance with the language in the 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act.
Sec 309(a) of the 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act explicitly prohibits the use of American journalists to collect intelligence. However, in rare and unique circumstances, the President or the DCI can waive this prohibition with a written determination and notification of the Congressional Intelligence Committees.
The Snyder Commission supports and would like to reaffirm the wisdom of this arrangement. While the effectiveness of journalists relies heavily upon their integrity, there are extreme instances in which a severe threat to United States national security warrants the use of journalists for collection. As former DCI John Deutch notes, these instances are exactly where the unique access of a journalist is essential.
Increase resources and personnel to facilitate a global presence of HUMINT worldwide.
HUMINT provides information on essential national security topics with relatively low cost and with great flexibility though with inherent risk. Because it has the potential to infiltrate rogue groups, HUMINT can readily support Tier A transnational missions by collecting intelligence not available from satellites and other technical methods. In addition, a modest increase in funds and personnel to the HUMINT side would result in a vast improvement of our clandestine collection capability, allowing the United States to develop a global presence.
If resources for a complete "conventional" global HUMINT presence are not available, the IC should investigate the creative use of new unofficial covers in outlying areas. Previous experience suggests that new trouble spots have emerged exactly where the US has withdrawn its presence as a cost-cutting measure (e.g. Sub-Saharan Africa). Unofficial covers would allow the IC to maintain a pseudo-global presence while incurring minimal costs.
Fortunately, most of the budget increases to the IC's HUMINT capability could be achieved through relatively minor cutbacks in the large technical intelligence (TECHINT) budgets. For example, as Loch K. Johnson notes, removing a few "bells and whistles" off the IC's extremely expensive new IMINT satellites would result in tremendous cost savings.
Complete the process of merging the Defense HUMINT Service into the CIA's Directorate of Operations (DO).
To increase resource and personnel efficiency in the IC's HUMINT structure, integrating the Defense HUMINT Service from DoD with the CIA's existing HUMINT capabilities within the DO would yield an ideal home-base for all IC HUMINT activities. The new, more-efficient conglomerate would provide some of the increased resources and capabilities needed to combat the post-Cold War threats to national security.
4.3 Improve Coordination and Relationships
As seen throughout the discussion on Tier A transnational threats in Section 3.1, one of the pressing needs for the IC is to improve its ability to effectively coordinate and share intelligence with law enforcement. This coordination is especially pertinent to efforts against terrorism and global organized crime as US law enforcement develops new relationships with governments overseas. Section 4.3.1 will discuss recommendations to improve IC coordination with law enforcement.
On a more general level, inter-agency coordination within the IC (which includes law enforcement) will help support the entire PCW framework by eliminating duplication and inefficiencies. Section 4.3.2 examines reforms to improve inter-agency coordination.
Coordination with foreign governments and international organizations has also become important, since the post-Cold War's Tier A transnational threats require the IC to frequently support multilateral efforts with the United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Interpol. As a result, IC coordination has become an integral part of the SPO and SMO pillars, particularly in United Nations peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. These coordination issues will be discussed in Section 4.3.3.
Finally, enhancing relationships with industry and academia will allow the IC to draw upon a broad source of expertise at a lower cost, especially in the Tier B and C areas of Economic Intelligence, Information Warfare, Economic Intelligence, and Health and Humanitarian-related Intelligence. As mentioned repeatedly in Chapter 3, these areas can become critical SMO or SPO pillar missions under certain circumstances. Section 4.3.4 will recommend the formation of a Civilian Intelligence Reserve Corps to improve relationships with organizations outside the IC.
4.3.1 Coordination with Law Enforcement
The post-Cold War Era marks a period which begs for increasing coordination between the intelligence and law enforcement communities. The growth of Tier A transnational threats, such as global crime, proliferation, and drug trafficking, has in many ways dissolved international borders and forced a reexamination of the demarcation between law enforcement and the intelligence community.
With the recent extraterritorial expansion of law enforcement, including the establishment of twenty-seven FBI foreign field stations, its relationship to intelligence is transforming. This changing relationship between law enforcement and intelligence raises a number of interesting questions. Who is in charge among the official U.S. representatives abroad? Should law enforcement have the authority to task intelligence? Will the same foreign agents be recruited for different purposes by different U.S. departments? The following recommendations seek to answer these questions.
A definitive overseas hierarchical structure is critical for preventing confusion abroad.
Both the intelligence and law enforcement communities have expressed interest in coordinating activities overseas. However in practice, they often act independently due to the absence of an explicit working structure. In accordance with its stated objective of developing guidelines for overseas coordination, the newly created Committee on Transnational Threats of the NSC should define a practical, working hierarchy overseas.(47)
If intelligence and law enforcement activities are to avoid embarrassing conflicts and if they are to conduct a securely coordinated policy, this hierarchy is essential.
The Ambassador should continue to hold primary approval authority regarding all U.S. activities within the host nation, while the Chief of Station (COS) should have only secondary authority. Disputes regarding prioritizing missions should be referred to either the Committee on Foreign Intelligence or the Committee on Transnational Threats.
Make the Chief of Station explicitly responsible for coordinating the day-to-day intelligence activities of CIA, FBI, and other U.S. intelligence agencies.
Under the overseas hierarchical structure discussed above, the Chief of Station should be responsible for handling the day-to-day coordination of intelligence activities. Towards this goal, the Committee on Foreign Intelligence should issue clear guidelines for coordination and delegate appropriate authorities to the Chiefs of Station through CIA Headquarters. As the head of the official US delegation, the Ambassador should be kept informed of both intelligence and law enforcement activities, but the degree of personal ambassadorial involvement in the details of coordination should be left to each individual Ambassador.
The use of the COS as the primary coordinating authority overseas is particularly effective in managing HUMINT activities. Existing cultural problems between the FBI and CIA have precluded coordinated recruiting by both agencies, and consequently the CIA and FBI have occasionally recruited each other's agents or agents another agency had dismissed as untrustworthy. Empowering the Chief of Station as a strong and centralized coordinator will hopefully put an end to this problem.
One major source of potential conflict in this recommendation could come from the Attorney General and law enforcement officials (especially the FBI). Though they have been supportive of greater cooperation, law enforcement officials are rapidly increasing their activities overseas and might object to limitations from the Chief of Station.
Maintain the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1997's (IAA97) demarcation that law enforcement does not have the authority to task the IC.
IAA97 specifically notes, "elements of the intelligence community may, upon the request of a United States law enforcement agency, collect information outside the United States about individuals who are not United States persons."(48)
This clause clearly states that law enforcement may not actually task intelligence; it can only request help. Under normal circumstances, the IC generally accomodates requests for intelligence collection from law enforcement if it has a "foreign intelligence" purpose,(49) but its participation should remain voluntary. For a variety of reasons (overriding national security concerns, protection of its own agents and activities, diplomatic concerns), the IC may have reason to refuse a law enforcement request in certain instances. Executive Order 12333 embodies this spirit, ordering the IC to support law enforcement objectives, but only if doing so does not endanger intelligence informants or jeopardize higher priority missions.
Any change in this currently flexible and non-institutionalized relationship between intelligence and law enforcement should require a new Executive Order.
Domestically, the Snyder Commission sees no present need for reforms regarding the relations between intelligence and law enforcement, since changes could infringe on the Constitutional prohibition on illegal search and seizure or other civil rights. Also, many successful reforms emerged as a fallout from the Aldrich Ames case. Law enforcement can utilize the technical surveillance capabilities of the IC, but only with a warrant and only if law enforcement officials assist in the investigation. For example, these limitations would be applicable to future law enforcement investigations which require the use of the National Security Agency's technical capabilities to crack communications encryption.
4.3.2 Inter-agency Coordination
One goal of the PCW framework is to link the diverse IC together into a single integrated whole. Improving inter-agency coordination within the IC will be invaluable for supporting the entire PCW framework and eliminating duplication and inefficiencies.
Continue to strengthen the DCI Centers, which serve as focal points for Tier A transnational threats and counterintelligence.
The recent development of subject-focused analysts clearly aids internal IC coordination. The analysts work in one of the several DCI Centers, such as the Nonproliferation Center, the Counterterrorism Center, and the Crime and Counternarcotics Center, in order to pool intelligence from the IC on a specific issue that threatens national security. Notably, these centers focus primarily on the Tier A transnational threats discussed in Section 3.1.
With an increased use of rotational assignments within the IC (see Section 4.4), these centers can bring together analysts from many different IC agencies, establishing communication and coordination channels. In addition, these centers also increase the proportion of analysts from outside the CIA, increasing the IC's breadth of knowledge and developing relationships with non-CIA sources. (see Section 4.3.4)
Employ Information Age solutions for production and dissemination of intelligence.
Modern technological advances offer some of the most promising and cost-effective avenues to improve coordination, dissemination, and producer-consumer relations in a secure environment. By enabling the virtual co-location of one intelligence professional with multiple co-workers or customers at a given time, electronic connectivity will alleviate some of the strain caused by personnel and resource cuts. Production, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence would greatly benefit from secure database systems shared by all members of the IC. These systems could offer a number of security levels through file 'tags,' and would improve efficiency.
The DCI should grant the INTELINK information management system and other similar initiatives, such as the nuclear nonproliferation information system mentioned in Section 3.1.1, highest resource priority. While the initial capital investment is substantial, the eventual return will justify the infrastructure.
4.3.3 Coordination with International Agencies and Foreign Governments
In the post-Cold War era, threats to national security are no longer concentrated in one adversary, but are rather found in dispersed criminal groups and rogue states with many international connections. Thus, global cooperation and coordination have become essential. In nonproliferation, the IC must work with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to detect and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to rogue states and terrorist groups. In the fight against global organized crime and terrorism, the IC and law enforcement organizations find themselves working increasingly with foreign governments. Even in the nontraditional areas of environmental intelligence and support to humanitarian operations, intelligence aids the efforts of the United Nations and other international groups, particularly in supporting military operations (SMO pillar).
Most of the recommendations related to coordination with international organizations and foreign governments are mission specific, and were discussed with respect to the various Tier missions in Chapter 3. However, there remains one general recommendation for the IC in the area of foreign coordination.
Have both the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury direct representatives of US law enforcement overseas
One difficult question concerning coordination with foreign governments is whether the US should have a single spokesperson and representative for law enforcement. On this issue, the Brown Commission recommended having the Attorney General as the sole focal point to centralize coordination, while the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Report, IC21,(50) and the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1997 strongly disagreed.
Having the Attorney General as the sole spokesperson could make coordination with non-Department of Justice entities "cumbersome and unrealistic."(51)
The Attorney General already acts as US spokesperson for many foreign government coordination efforts, but the Secretary of the Treasury may be the more appropriate representative on matters which pertain more to the Treasury such as smuggling and money laundering. Appointing a single focal point would eliminate this flexibility. Thus, the President should support the continuation of both the Attorney General and the Secretary of Treasury as representatives of law enforcement overseas.
4.3.4 Relationships with Academia and Industry
For conducting analyses, the IC has traditionally used publicly available open source information much more than clandestine material. Even though open source material must often go through a validation process before being used by the IC, analysts typically draw on information contained in academic works, journals, magazines, and newspapers because it is inexpensive and readily available. They often gain important insights from these open sources without ever resorting to more expensive, complex, and potentially risky clandestine methods of collection.
The National Resources (NR) Division of the CIA's Directorate of Operations (DO) has the charter to draw on the "vast potential information"(52) available from academia and industry. Scientists and academics attend conferences and exchange information with colleagues from all over the world. Similarly, business people continuously travel and compile reports on economic, financial, and technical developments. As a result, academic and industry sources have additional expertise and foreign contacts that are valuable to the IC.
Enhancing the IC's relationships with industry and academia in the post-Cold War is imperative for several reasons.
International political developments (the opening of international borders) and new technologies have greatly improved the quality and quantity of open source material.(53)
The IC is facing large budget cuts.
The current national security environment has no dominant focus.
'Secrets' may be less important than 'mysteries' in the post Cold-War era.(54)
According to the former chairman of the National Intelligence Council (NIC) Joseph Nye, "a greater proportion of the questions that decision-makers and policy-makers want answers to are mysteries. . . a great deal of what's good analysis of mysteries comes from diverse, open sources".(55)
Create a Civilian Intelligence Reserve Corps(56) In order to build productive relationships with outside experts in academia and industry to monitor Tiers B and C of the PCW framework (economic intelligence, information warfare, environmental intelligence, health and humanitarian-related intelligence), the IC should recommend that Congress create a Civilian Intelligence Reserve Corps. Outside experts will be electronically linked to the IC (in accordance with the information management recommendation in Section 4.2), and will submit reports in their field of expertise as required. As long as their work focuses on low priority Tier C, their contributions should only be based on open source material, and should not go through an intelligence validation process. In addition, experts in Tier C areas should not be required to receive security clearances, nor would they be compensated. Their employers would support them in a manner similar to Army Reserve or National Guard employees. Participants would volunteer for this task understanding that if the threat escalated, then they might be called on to work more closely with the IC. As long as their work remained a low priority mission for the IC, their unclassified reports (on non-traditional threats for instance) could also be shared with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
If a threat went from Tier C to Tier B (low to medium priority), the outside reports would be validated. Experts would also receive security clearances so that they could be asked to review classified material, and would be paid for their work.
Experts from academia and industry should be chosen based on their qualifications, the relevance of their work to the IC, and their ability to serve during crises. They should receive basic orientation training on how to structure their contributions to be most useful to intelligence producers. Several different experts should cover every issue, and their analyses should be competitive and complementary.
While this discussion is barely a skeletal outline, the Snyder commission believes categorically that, consistent with IAA97, this proposal must be brought to fruition with a plan and resources in place for preliminary implementation by Fiscal Year 1998.
4.4 Diversify Assignments
Many efforts to improve national intelligence for the policy-maker (Chapters 2 and 3) and coordination with law enforcement (Section 4.3) involve high-level IC officials. However, increased contact and coordination between producers and consumers is just as crucial at the working level, where actual collection and analysis is performed. It is imperative that intelligence professionals at all levels and in all agencies clearly understand the needs of their clientele. Additionally, the proposed Civilian Reserve Corps could substantially benefit if the academic and industry participants developed personal contacts in the IC. Rotational assignments provide the most-effective vehicle for developing productive relationships among intelligence professionals, their counterparts at other agencies, and their consumers.
ADCI/Administration: Increase IC Rotation Postings at Policy Agencies
Irrelevance not politicization being the more insidious danger confronting the intelligence community in the post-Cold War era, the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Administration (ADCI/A) should move aggressively to increase the number of IC mid-level career intelligence analysts who serve on rotation at policy agencies. These policy rotations actually require participants to live and work with their customers and counterparts, and offer valuable opportunities to improve producer-consumer relations by fostering broader perspectives and personal contacts. The ADCI/A should also consider linking personnel promotion to rotations completed as a program incentive.
Continue reciprocal rotational assignments of intelligence officers within the various law enforcement agencies.
The current exchange of personnel between the IC and law enforcement builds inter-departmental relations, helps dissolve cultural barriers, and instills respect for differing objectives. Since the program operates at relatively low cost and is quite effective, it should continue to provide an avenue for improving coordination.
Institute more reciprocal rotational assignments with industry and academia
The IC should provide its scientific, analytical and management personnel with opportunities for assignments in industry and academia. Those on such assignments should be required to file reports on what they have learned, and conduct educational sessions for other IC employees in order to maximize the benefits of their experience. The existing Officer-in-Residence program could serve as a model. Barring any statutory conflicts, any IC employee who goes out on a rotation to industry and academia is automatically a member of the Civilian Intelligence Reserve Corps outlined in 4.3.4.
The IC should also offer short term (one to two year) employment opportunities for outside experts who could bring and share their expertise within the community. These rotational assignments with industry and academia will also further facilitate the development of the Civilian Intelligence Reserve Corps, since the participants would be personally working with someone, instead of feeding information to a faceless bureaucracy.
4.5 Expedite Declassification
As discussed in the previous sections, especially Section 4.3 which dealt with coordination, the role of the IC as a partner with NGOs, foreign governments, international agencies, industry, and academia has become increasingly important and cannot be ignored. Thus, the question becomes how to maintain a flexible mechanism whereby information, often classified, can be safely disseminated to these non-traditional, but appropriate, partners and consumers. Declassification plays a pivotal role in solving this problem.
Executive Order 12958, enacted in October 1995, made several changes to the government classification system. In particular, the order mandates that all information over 25 years old must be declassified by the year 2000 unless the information falls into several exempt categories, such as the identities of intelligence sources and the details of intelligence gathering methods.(57)
Also, the Executive Order requires the assignment of a specific declassification date or event before a new document may be classified. By default, the date of declassification is ten years after its creation.(58)
This Executive Order is a step in the right direction; it accelerates the release of historically relevant information and discourages the overclassification of new documents. However, further actions are necessary to expedite the process of declassification and reduce the classification level for some forms of information.
Progress towards automatic declassification has slowed partially because agencies have applied for the exemption of a large number of documents. The CIA, for instance, has declared that 64% of its information may be eligible for exemption.(59)
Also, the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO), an office within the National Archives responsible for enforcing some of the executive order provisions, has woefully insufficient resources to carry out its duties.(60)
Significantly expand the budget for the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO).
Because ISOO is currently so small and understaffed, a modest investment in personnel and technology will greatly improve ISOO's capability to oversee and assist the intelligence agencies in declassification efforts. Expanding ISOO would allow declassification to advance at a reasonable pace.
The additional funding for ISOO can be perhaps procured by requiring intelligence agencies who have requested exemptions for a large portion of their classified old documents to lend financial support to the office. This recommendation would have the additional benefit of establishing a disincentive for requesting unnecessary exceptions. As it stands today, agencies lose nothing by offering two-thirds of their documents for review. The mission of the IC biases the agencies towards a highly conservative strategy, so requiring the agencies to help fund the review may counteract this inclination.
Seek advice from nongovernmental organizations to develop archives for automatically declassified information that would only be partially government-funded.
Executive Order 12958 only addresses the question of declassified information distribution in general terms. It mandates the establishment of a government-wide declassification database consisting of all declassified documents.(61)
How declassified information is distributed will affect the cost of the program and its effectiveness in the eyes of the public. Thus, the method chosen must be cost-efficient and effective.
Fortunately, distribution options developed for the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) system provide hope for solving this dilemma. The National Security Archives at George Washington University, for instance, is a privately funded non-profit organization that maintains a large collection of documents previously released through FOIA.(62)
The Archives maintains a public reading room and a database of FOIA requests, and it compiles collections of materials on popular topics on CD-ROM. This model could be used for disseminating declassified information to industry, academia, and the general public.
The costs of classifying information need to be reexamined.
The justification for classifying new information must be reconsidered in light of recent changes in world order, foreign policy, and information technology. Classification of new information is costly for both industry and the government, which together spent $5.6 billion on the protection of classified information.(63)
Costs are incurred indirectly as well. Classification makes it more difficult to share information (with organizations like the United Nations) during the joint military operations which have dominated US foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. (64)
Also, because of classification and the IC's inability to promptly analyze all accumulated information, the production of valuable intelligence is delayed. For instance, in 1994, overhead imagery depicting mass graves in Bosnia was only available months after NGOs had investigated the incident.(65)
Had the images been available to a broader audience, they might have been discovered sooner and might have had a more timely impact on US and world policy towards Bosnia.
Extend Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1/7 (DCID 1/7) to apply to all intelligence production activities
DCID 1/7(66) mandates producing intelligence in a format that is easily releasable to foreign governments and international organizations. For example, it recommends the use of tear lines (an area of a report were lower classified information begins) and clearly marked sections for highly sensitive information. These techniques expedite the process of releasing intelligence in a sanitized form to non-traditional consumers.
Although DCID 1/7 applies to all subjects of intelligence, the motivation conveyed in the memo accompanying it from former DCI Deutch was support to military operations (SMO).(67)
This Commission believes that DCID 1/7 should be explicitly amended to include intelligence in all tiers of the PCW framework. In addition, the new directive should include techniques analogous to tear lines for satellite imagery, such as reducing the resolution of the images.
Furthermore, the DCI should recommend that the Information Security Policy Advisory Council (ISPAC), a council of individuals outside of the government who set guidelines for declassification under Executive Order 12958, include representatives from the fields listed above.(68)
This way, the benefits expected for SMO under the directive can also be realized for non-traditional, but nevertheless important, intelligence objectives.
37. Official testimony recorded in open Congressional hearings indicates that, at the baseline, the quality of post-Cold War intelligence to date has been adequate. Yet, as the former staff director of the Aspin-Brown Commission, Britt Snider, comments: "Witnesses tend to be a lot nicer with the microphone on. Interviewed in their own office, they are very much more candid." Telephone interview by Grace Koo, November 25, 1996.
38. The directorship was actually created in 1946 under the Central Intelligence Group. The NSA of 1947 created the Central Intelligence Agency, of which the DCI is now the executive.
39. Justin Riley Murfin,"The Roles, Responsibilities and the Authorities of the Director of Central Intelligence," Princeton University, November 9, 1996.
40. National Security Act of 1947, Section 102, Paragraph (a), Subparagraph (2).
41. The study notes that Section 802 does contain provisions for an intelligence review mechanism that may potentially prove problematic for the DCI. Subparagraph (C) of paragraph (4) of the Section 802 charges the Committee with the responsibility of conducting an annual review of certain elements of the intelligence community.
42. Two former DCIs were members of the Cabinet; but their presence was non-statutory and non-voting.
43. Aspin-Brown Commission, chapter 5.
44. HPSCI, pg. 190.
45. Bill Gertz, "New CIA Rules Said to Hamper Effort to Spy On Terrorist Groups," Washington Times, August 1, 1996, p. A3.
49. Aspin-Brown Commission.
52. Anthony F. Czajkowski, "Techniques of Domestic Intelligence Collection," Studies in Intelligence, vol.3, no.1 (Winter 1959), pp. 69-83.
54. Joseph Nye, Testimony at the Hearing of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, Room SD-106. Dirksen State Office Building. Washington, D.C. Friday Jan. 19, 1996: http://www.fas.org/irp/commission/testnye.htm
55. Joseph Nye, Testimony at the Hearing of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, Room SD-106. Dirksen State Office Building. Washington, D.C. Friday Jan. 19, 1996: http://www.fas.org/irp/commission/testnye.htm
56. In addition to the Civilian Intelligence Reserve Corps, members of industry and academia should continue to advise the government on priority setting (changing the PCW framework) and declassification (see Section 4.5). For example, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), a committee of private citizens responsible for reporting on the performance and progress of the IC, is a step in the right direction.
57. William J. Clinton, "Classified National Security Information," Executive Order 12958, April 17, 1995, section 3.4.
58. Ibid., Sec. 1.7.
59. Report from the DCI Historical Review Panel to the Director of Central Intelligence, Oct. 7, 1996.
60. Steven Aftergood, Director, Project on Government Secrecy, Federation of American Scientists, interviewed by Daniel Konieczny, Washington DC, November 5, 1996.
61 Executive Order 12958, Sec. 3.8.
62. "The National Security Archive Home Page." http://www.seas.gwu.edu/nsarchive/, The National Security Archive, The Gelman Library, George Washington University.
63. Tim Weiner, "Lawmaker Tells of High Cost of Keeping Secret Data Secret," New York Times, June 28, 1996, sec. A, p. 20, col. 5.
64. Bill Gertz, "Deutch orders intelligence to be 'releasable'; CIA chief seeks less secrecy to ease information swap with military, foreign nations," The Washington Times, May 1, 1996, Part A, NATION, p. 8.
65. Stephen Engelberg and Tim Weiner, "Srebenica," New York Times, October 29, 1995.
66. John Deutch, DCI Directive 1/7, June 15, 1996.
67. John Deutch, "Memo on DCI Directive 1/7," April 16, 1996.
Executive Order 12958, Sec. 5.5.