Seeking information from other sources
Introduction
In the absence of sufficient information from official sources, we sought information from some previous official statements on the public record and from two well-known and respected academics in the field:
- Professor Paul Dibb, Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University; and
- Professor Des Ball, also from the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University but who gave evidence in his private capacity.
- Professor Dibb is highly regarded in the field of strategic analysis and is the author of an influential review of Australia's strategic position and outlook. He was Deputy Secretary of the Department of Defence in the period 1988 to 1991 and in this position was responsible for overseeing the operation of the Joint Defence Facility at Pine Gap.
- Professor Ball has published many articles and books on Defence related issues, including a series of publications about Joint Defence Facilities in Australia. His writings on the Joint Defence Facility at Pine Gap are regarded as being authoritative.
- At a public hearing on 9 August 1999, the two professors gave us an overview of the purpose of the Joint Defence Facility and of its value to Australia.
- Some of the key elements of their evidence are summarised below. The full transcript is available from the Committee Secretariat or from the Hansard database maintained on the Internet by the Department of the Parliamentary Reporting Staff.
Purpose of the Facility
According to Professor Ball, the Joint Defence Facility is the ground control and processing station for a series of satellites in geostationary orbits above the equator, whose purpose is to collect signals intelligence.
There are four principal categories of signals monitored by the satellites controlled from the Joint Defence Facility: telemetry signals, signals from large radars, communications from other satellites, and microwave emissions from the earth’s surface.
Telemetry signals
Telemetry signals are those signals sent in the course of advanced weapons development. Typically, they are transmissions of data about the in-flight performance of deployed missiles.
Professor Ball explained that information about ‘vibrations, temperature and stage separation’ is important not only for those developing missile systems but for those seeking to monitor the development of such systems in other countries. Telemetry information is critical for monitoring compliance with arms control agreements.
Signals from large radars
The radar signals tracked from the Joint Defence Facility include signals associated with anti-ballistic missile fields, air defence radars and radars on ships. These emissions are analysed to obtain information about air defence capabilities – in particular, about the location, range and potential of anti-missile and anti-aircraft systems.
Signals from other satellites
The Joint Defence Facility is also able to intercept communications to and from other satellite systems: that is, ‘communications which are going up from the ground to communication satellites which are also based in geostationary orbits.’
Microwave emissions
A wide range of other microwave emissions from the earth’s surface are also intercepted, including telecommunications such as long distance telephone calls. This enables the Joint Defence Facility to monitor military microwave circuits, key microwave channels used by political and government agencies, and even private communications.
Importance of the Facility
Professor Dibb noted that while Australia’s military alliance with the United States has many dimensions, including shared values and common strategic interests, the Joint Defence Facility is undoubtedly a key element in the relationship. He referred to the facility as a ‘unique and enormously powerful collector' of information of increasing relevance to Australia's national interest.
Professor Ball argued in a similar vein, explaining that although the Joint Defence Facility is only one part of the signals intelligence system developed by the United States and its allies, it offers a unique capability:
Because you can actually park a satellite over the interior of a country and intercept microwave emissions coming out of that country, you are able to get a lot of intelligence which simply cannot be intercepted by any other means.
The intelligence gathered at the Joint Defence Facility is, according to Professor Ball, not only of critical importance to the United States but also to the Australian Government and its defence and intelligence agencies.
Professor Ball went on to say that while he had been a strong critic of other Joint Defence Facilities in Australia, he had to accept that the intelligence collected at Pine Gap was of high value and could not otherwise be collected. He concluded that to refuse to proceed with the 1998 Amendments would be ‘a very unfortunate decision’, adding that:
I do not see any other alternative other than to have Pine Gap here. That is whether one is concerned about monitoring, proliferation of ballistic missiles, nuclear proliferation or other advanced weapon systems in our region.
Continuing importance of the Facility
Both Professors Ball and Dibb argued that, despite the end of the Cold War, the Joint Defence Facility is likely to be of increasing (rather than decreasing) utility to the Australian and United States Governments.
Professor Ball expressed this view in the following terms:
With the breakdown of the bipolar system and its replacement by some as yet undetermined multipolar system, each particular country that is involved in advanced signals intelligence collection … has found that they need to collect intelligence on a greater number of countries and from a wider variety of perspectives. They are not just collecting strategic intelligence about weapons systems: they are finding it necessary to collect more political intelligence and even more economic intelligence …
Professor Dibb suggested that the Australia’s strategic environment has become much more complex and uncertain since the end of the Cold War and, correspondingly, much more demanding of intelligence collection and analysis. He noted that there are more developments in the areas of ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons technology and chemical and biological weapons occurring in Asia more than elsewhere in the world. While not posing an immediate threat to our strategic interests, these developments need to be monitored.
It has been argued in other fora that the Joint Defence Facility is of continuing importance to Australia because:
- like all nations, we share a strong interest in avoiding global conflict and the capabilities of the Joint Defence Facility help maintain a stable system of deterrence; and
- the Joint Defence Facility gives us some moral standing in taking an active role in promoting arms control and reduction.
- Similar arguments about the importance of accurate intelligence in maintaining an effective deterrence regime and verifying compliance with arms control measures were put by the former Prime Minister, the Hon Bob Hawke MP, in a 1984 statement to Parliament.
- At the inter-governmental level, the value of joint efforts to gather and share information was underscored recently by the William Cohen, the US Secretary of Defense, who commented that:
In terms of our military-to-military relations: they couldn't be stronger. We have a commonality of interests and values and commitments ... We are spending a great deal of our resources developing mechanisms to protect that information, and we intend to again share with our Australian friends and allies that effort.
Australian involvement in the operation of the Joint Defence Facility
One issue we were keen to explore was the extent of involvement by Australian officials in the operation of the Joint Defence Facility.
Professor Ball explained that there are about 850 personnel employed at Pine Gap – half of whom are Australians. Professor Dibb noted that since the late 1980s, Australia has had ‘an absolute thorough knowledge of what is going on at the Facility’.
Australian personnel are represented at all levels of management and are involved in determining the day to day operations of the surveillance satellites controlled from the Joint Defence Facility. In practical terms, this means that Australians work:
- in the Satellite Station Keeping Section (which is responsible for keeping each satellite in its designated location);
- in the Signals Processing Section (which processes the intercepted signals sent down from the listening satellites); and
- in the Signals Analysis Section (which extracts intelligence from the intercepted signals).
- Perhaps most importantly of all, since 1980 Australian personnel have chaired the Joint Reconnaissance Schedule Committee, which meets every morning to determine the focus for the listening antennae for the following 24 hours.
- This fact of full Australian knowledge and concurrence helps guarantee the longstanding policy that the Joint Defence Facility does not gather information on either Australian or US citizens. Professor Ball added that the enormous cost of operating the listening satellites ensures that they are used only for gathering intelligence of ‘the most immense and lucrative value’.
Transparency vs secrecy
Professors Ball and Dibb also talked at some length about the degree of openness and transparency that the community should expect from governments in relation to signals intelligence matters.
Traditionally, Australian governments have said very little about signals intelligence – little more than acknowledging that Australian agencies are involved in gathering signals intelligence. The rationale for this attitude is that to say anything more would alert potential targets to the need to take counter-measures.
Professor Ball recognises the dilemma faced by the Defence and intelligence agencies, but believes the approach they take is unnecessarily restrictive.
… my view is that there is a large area of signals intelligence activities which it is quite proper to talk about. Indeed, from the point of view of informed democratic policy making, it is necessary to talk about it, otherwise we simply do not know what is going on.
He gave the following as an example of the sort of information that governments could disclose without jeopardising their intelligence capability or damaging broader strategic or political interests.
I believe that we could have a statement that confirms that there are listening satellites in operation. … I think you could say that Pine Gap is the ground station for those satellites and I think that one could canvass the type of signals which are interceptable by those satellites, because anyone who knows anything about signals propagation and antennae design can work out what sort of signals are interceptable by a satellite with a dish of 300 feet at an altitude of 36 000 kilometres.
Professor Ball did not argue for unfettered access to information about the Joint Defence Facility. He readily accepted that access to information about the technical operation of the intercept technology, about operational targets, and about some sensitive intelligence outcomes should be restricted.
Professor Dibb took a more conservative line on this issue, arguing that tight security surrounding the operation of the Joint Defence Facility is essential if the operational effectiveness of the facility is to be maintained.
The consequence of this position, which Professor Dibb acknowledged, is a dramatically reduced level of public accountability.
Another consequence, noted by the former Prime Minister, the Hon Bob Hawke MP, is an often ill-informed level of public debate.
The lack of public information until now on the purposes of the facilities has not assisted public understanding of the vital issues involved ... This has helped build up an unwarranted mystique about them and encouraged a tendency in certain sections of the media and elsewhere to discuss Nurrungar and Pine Gap in a speculative and provocative manner.
The classified agreement
Professor Ball described to us the purpose of the classified level agreement that underpins the Head Agreement. The agreement sets out in some detail the command and control arrangements that govern the operation of the facility, describing the:
- authority of the Australian Deputy at Pine Gap;
- rules concerning the decision making processes of the Joint Reconnaissance Schedule Committee; and
- rules for the dissemination of intelligence gathered by the listening satellites.
- The classified agreement also describes the security arrangements governing access to the facility and to the information collected and produced by staff at the facility.
It sets out who in Australia is allowed to see that [ie. the intelligence collected at Pine Gap], and who at the various levels is allowed to visit the facility. And if they visit the facility it sets out whether they are allowed in the Signals Analysis Section as opposed to just the Satellite Station Keeping Section.
Observations on the evidence
The evidence given by Professors Ball and Dibb was frank, comprehensive and informative, without apparently disclosing material which might jeopardise our national interests. Much of this information is already available on the public record.
The two professors provided substance to the assertions made by Defence. They explained:
- why the Joint Defence Facility is a significant element in our broader strategic alliance with the United States;
- the nature of the contribution that the Joint Defence Facility makes to the capacity of the United States to remain globally engaged; and
- the value of the intelligence gathered at the Joint Defence Facility to both Australia and the United States.
- In principle, these are compelling points and clearly it is in the national interest to promote and facilitate arrangements conducive to achieving these outcomes.
- The difficulty is that while Professors Ball and Dibb were credible witnesses and we have no reason to doubt the accuracy of their testimony, we cannot give unqualified support to a treaty action proposed by the Executive on the basis of testimony provided only by non-government witnesses. To do so in the absence of any confirmation from the Government that the testimony is accurate would be an abrogation of our treaty review responsibilities to the Parliament and the wider community.