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Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement National Policy and Strategy (Chapter Report, 09/26/97, GAO/NSIAD-97-254).


Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed U.S. efforts to combat
terrorism, focusing on federal agencies' programs and activities to: (1)
prevent and deter terrorism; (2) respond to terrorist threats and
incidents; and (3) manage the consequences of a terrorist act,
especially involving weapons of mass destruction.

GAO noted that: (1) under sponsorship of the National Security Council
(NSC), various interagency groups have been formed to coordinate the
efforts of the more than 40 federal agencies, bureaus, and offices that
combat terrorism; (2) the intelligence community also has an Interagency
Intelligence Committee on Terrorism; (3) these interagency groups and
committees meet to coordinate policy, plan interagency activities, share
intelligence and other information, and coordinate responses to certain
crises; (4) many programs and activities have been developed or used to
carry out the three elements of the U.S. strategy for combatting
terrorism; (5) key federal efforts to prevent and deter terrorist acts
include gathering, sharing, and disseminating intelligence information
on terrorist threats and keeping foreign terrorists and materials from
entering the United States; (6) federal efforts to respond to terrorist
incidents and to manage the consequences of terrorist incidents include
designating lead agencies for crisis response, establishing interagency
quick-reaction support teams, creating special operating teams or units,
developing contingency plans, and conducting interagency or single
agency training and exercises; (7) for both crisis management and
consequence management, federal efforts include special teams and units
to deal with weapons of mass destruction, whether they are nuclear,
biological, or chemical weapons; and (8) federal agencies are also
involved in programs to assess the capabilities of state and local
jurisdictions to immediately respond to and manage the consequences of
domestic terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction and
provide them training and assistance.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-97-254
     TITLE:  Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement 
             National Policy and Strategy
      DATE:  09/26/97
   SUBJECT:  Interagency relations
             Terrorism
             National defense operations
             Federal intelligence agencies
             Bombs
             International cooperation
             Americans abroad
             Crime prevention
             Law enforcement information systems
IDENTIFIER:  Treasury Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
             FBI Domestic Emergency Support Team
             Dept. of State Foreign Emergency Support Team
             Dept. of State Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program
             Dept. of State TIPOFF Program
             Saudi Arabia
             New York (NY)
             Oklahoma City (OK)
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to Congressional Requesters

September 1997

COMBATING TERRORISM - FEDERAL
AGENCIES' EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT
NATIONAL POLICY AND STRATEGY

GAO/NSIAD-97-254

Combating Terrorism

(701103)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  ATF - Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
  BC - biological or chemical
  CIA - Central Intelligence Agency
  DEST - Domestic Emergency Response Team
  DOD - Department of Defense
  DOE - Department of Energy
  EPA - Environmental Protection Agency
  EST - Emergency Support Team
  FAA - Federal Aviation Administration
  FBI - Federal Bureau of Investigation
  FEMA - Federal Emergency Management Agency
  FEST - Foreign Emergency Response Team
  GAO - General Accounting Office
  HHS - Health and Human Services
  INS - Immigration and Naturalization Service
  NBC - nuclear, biological, and chemical
  NSC - National Security Council
  OFDA - Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
  OMB - Office of Management and Budget
  PDD - Presidential Decision Directive
  SWAT - Special Weapons and Tactics
  USAID - U.S.  Agency for International Development
  WMD - Weapons of Mass Destruction

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-276818

September 26, 1997

The Honorable Ike Skelton
House of Representatives

The Honorable John Glenn
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Governmental Affairs
United States Senate

The threat of terrorist attacks against U.S.  citizens and property
both at home and abroad has been an issue of growing national
concern.  As you requested, we reviewed U.S.  efforts to combat
terrorism.  This report provides information on national policy and
strategy to combat terrorism and federal agencies' roles and
responsibilities in implementing them.  Specifically, the report
discusses agencies' programs and activities to (1) prevent and deter
terrorism; (2) respond to terrorist threats or incidents; and (3)
manage the consequences of a terrorist act, especially involving
weapons of mass destruction.  The report also provides information on
interagency coordination mechanisms intended to facilitate
information sharing and enhance operational links.  We plan to
discuss issues concerning the funding of federal agencies'
terrorism-related programs and activities in a separate report.  Our
related work on Department of Defense programs was reported to you
separately in Combating Terrorism:  Status of DOD Efforts to Protect
Its Forces Overseas (GAO/NSIAD-97-207, July 21, 1997). 

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional
committees, federal agencies discussed in the report, and other
interested parties.  If you have any questions about this report,
please contact me at (202)-512-3504.  Major contributors are listed
in appendix XIII. 

Richard Davis
Director, National Security
 Analysis


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
============================================================ Chapter 0


   PURPOSE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1

The threat of terrorist attacks against U.S.  citizens and property
is a high-priority U.S.  national security and criminal concern.  The
bombings of the New York City World Trade Center, a federal building
in Oklahoma City, and a U.S.  military facility in Saudi Arabia,
among others, prompted increased emphasis on the need to strengthen
the federal government's ability to effectively combat terrorism,
both at home and abroad.  The terrorist attack in the Tokyo subway
system using a nerve agent raised additional concern over major U.S. 
cities' preparedness for incidents involving weapons of mass
destruction--weapons using nuclear, biological, or chemical agents. 
At the requests of Congressman Ike Skelton and Senator John Glenn,
Ranking Minority Member, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, GAO
reviewed U.S.  efforts to combat terrorism.  Specifically, GAO
identified federal agencies' programs and activities to (1) prevent
and deter terrorism; (2) respond to terrorist threats or incidents;
and (3) manage the consequences of a terrorist act, especially
involving weapons of mass destruction.  GAO also identified
interagency coordination processes and groups intended to facilitate
information sharing and enhance operational links.  GAO was also
asked to identify interagency processes intended to ensure efficient
allocation of funding and resources.  These matters will be discussed
in a report to be issued later. 


   BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2

U.S.  policy on combating terrorism has been evolving for about 25
years.  In June 1995, the President issued Presidential Decision
Directive 39
(PDD 39), the central blueprint for the U.S.  counterterrorism
strategy.
PDD 39 restated standing U.S.  policy and elaborated a strategy for
combating terrorism and measures to implement it.  The U.S.  strategy
consists of three main elements:  (1) reduce vulnerabilities and
prevent and deter terrorist acts before they occur; (2) respond to
terrorist acts that do occur, including managing crises and
apprehending and punishing terrorist perpetrators; and (3) manage the
consequences of terrorist attacks.  The strategy also incorporates
consideration of weapons of mass destruction across the three
elements. 

In addition, Congress passed legislation stating that certain acts of
terrorism are federal crimes no matter where they are committed,
requiring or permitting sanctions on countries that support or
sponsor terrorism, delineating agency roles and responsibilities, and
authorizing and/or appropriating funds.  Congress has appropriated
funds to enhance federal agencies and local capabilities to prevent,
deter, counter, and manage the consequences of terrorist attacks,
including those involving weapons of mass destruction. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3

Under sponsorship of the National Security Council (NSC), various
interagency groups have been formed to coordinate the efforts of the
more than 40 federal agencies, bureaus, and offices that combat
terrorism.  The intelligence community also has an Interagency
Intelligence Committee on Terrorism.  These interagency groups and
committees meet to coordinate policy, plan interagency activities,
share intelligence and other information, and coordinate responses to
certain crises. 

Many programs and activities have been developed or used to carry out
the three elements of the U.S.  strategy for combating terrorism. 
Key federal efforts to prevent and deter terrorist acts include
gathering, sharing, and disseminating intelligence information on
terrorist threats and keeping foreign terrorists and materials from
entering the United States.  Federal efforts to respond to terrorist
incidents and to manage the consequences of terrorist incidents
include designating lead agencies for crisis response, establishing
interagency quick-reaction support teams, creating special
operational teams or units, developing contingency plans, and
conducting interagency or single agency training and exercises.  For
both crisis management and consequence management, federal efforts
include special teams and units to deal with weapons of mass
destruction, whether they are nuclear, biological, or chemical
weapons.  Federal agencies are also involved in programs to assess
the capabilities of state and local jurisdictions to immediately
respond to and manage the consequences of domestic terrorist
incidents involving weapons of mass destruction and provide them
training and assistance. 


   GAO'S ANALYSIS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4


      FORMAL COORDINATION FOR
      FEDERAL POLICY ISSUES AND
      ACTIVITIES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1

More than 40 federal departments, agencies, and bureaus have some
role in combating terrorism.  The NSC is the overall interagency
coordinator for U.S.  policy issues on combating terrorism for
federal efforts to respond to terrorist incidents abroad or domestic
incidents with foreign involvement.  The NSC sponsors an Interagency
Working Group on Counterterrorism, led by the State Department.  The
working group oversees subgroups coordinating certain
terrorism-related research and development activities, exercises,
international consequence management, and transportation security. 
The NSC also has a link with interagency forums to coordinate
intelligence information sharing within the intelligence community. 
The Director of Central Intelligence coordinates intelligence
community issues and information sharing through a Counterterrorist
Center and an Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism.  The
Federal Emergency Management Agency also recently established a
separate Senior Interagency Coordination Group on Terrorism to deal
with interagency domestic consequence management issues. 


      FEDERAL EFFORTS TO REDUCE
      VULNERABILITIES, PREVENT AND
      DETER TERRORIST ACTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2

Under PDD 39, the Attorney General led a study to examine possible
terrorist threats to the critical U.S.  infrastructures, which
include the banking and finance system, the water supply,
telecommunications, and five other infrastructures.  An executive
order established a government-private sector presidential commission
to identify ways and means to protect these critical national
infrastructures from physical and cyber attack, with participation
from 10 federal agencies and the private sector. 

Other federal efforts to prevent and deter terrorism include (1)
protecting and enhancing the security of personnel and buildings, (2)
disrupting terrorist activities through various programs and
approaches, (3) preventing terrorists and their materials from
entering the United States, (4) training and assisting U.S.  and
foreign personnel to combat terrorism, and (5) promoting
international cooperation in fighting terrorism.  Specific examples
of federal programs include:  the Department of State's efforts to
protect U.S.  diplomatic posts and persons overseas, the Federal
Aviation Administration's efforts to ensure the security of civilian
aviation, and the Treasury Department Office of Foreign Assets
Control's efforts to administer economic sanctions against state
sponsors of terrorism and foreign terrorist organizations. 


      MANAGING TERRORIST CRISES
      AND CONDUCTING CRIMINAL
      INVESTIGATIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.3

Operationally, federal efforts to combat terrorism are organized
along a lead agency concept.  Regarding crisis response to terrorist
attacks, the Department of Justice, through the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), has the lead for crisis management of domestic
terrorist incidents in the United States and for forming a Domestic
Emergency Support Team.  The Department of State has the lead role
for managing terrorist incidents abroad and for forming a Foreign
Emergency Support Team.  Depending on the nature of the threat or
incident, numerous other agencies, including specially trained U.S. 
military forces, the FBI's Critical Incident Response Group, the
Department of Energy's Nuclear Emergency Search Team, the Department
of the Treasury's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, and
others, may be called upon to provide support as needed.  For
example, in the event of a nuclear terrorist threat or incident, the
Department of Energy deploys one of several teams to provide expert
advice and assistance in dealing with the device.  The domestic and
foreign emergency support teams are designed to rapidly deploy key
federal personnel and equipment to the scene of a terrorist incident. 
The teams operate under sets of draft guidelines that detail each
agency's roles and responsibilities during an incident, including
command and control of operations.  While the Foreign Emergency
Support Team has operated, trained, and exercised for 11 years, the
Domestic Emergency Support Team is newly formed and is now beginning
to organize, train, and exercise.  In cases of terrorist activity
perpetrated against U.S.  individuals or interests, the Attorney
General and Department of Justice leads federal efforts to pursue,
apprehend, and prosecute terrorists, generally through the
appropriate U.S.  Attorney's Office and the FBI.  Other federal law
enforcement agencies (e.g., various Treasury Department elements),
also have investigative jurisdiction over a number of
terrorism-related areas and would work with FBI in the investigation. 


      MANAGING THE CONSEQUENCES OF
      TERRORIST INCIDENTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.4

Unlike crisis management of terrorist incidents, the federal
government does not have primary responsibility for consequence
management, but it supports state and local governments in domestic
incidents and host governments in international incidents.  As some
federal agencies respond to a crisis and seek to bring the
perpetrators to justice, other agencies manage the consequences of an
incident.  In domestic incidents, the Federal Emergency Management
Agency takes the lead to marshal and coordinate federal emergency
assistance to state and local authorities.  The Federal Response
Plan, which has an annex on terrorist incidents, outlines the roles,
responsibilities, and emergency support functions of various federal
agencies for consequence management.  For example, the Department of
Health and Human Services may be called upon to support a locality
with a medical response team, and the Environmental Protection Agency
may be asked to help deal with certain chemical contaminants and to
clean up a site.  In international terrorist incidents, the State
Department is the lead agency, assisted by the Agency for
International Development.  Other agencies may also provide support,
including the Department of Defense and other agencies that would
provide consequence management support domestically, such as the
Department of Health and Human Services, the Environmental Protection
Agency, and the Department of Energy.  A series of interagency
exercises are used to test and improve consequence management
response capabilities, with recent emphasis on dealing with terrorist
incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.  In response to
legislative requirements, the Department of Defense and other
agencies are preparing to provide local first responders in numerous
U.S.  cities with training and assistance to manage the consequences
of weapons of mass destruction. 


   RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5

GAO is making no recommendations in this report. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6

The Departments of State, Justice, Treasury, Health and Human
Services and Energy; FBI; Federal Emergency Management Agency; the
Central Intelligence Agency; and the Agency for International
Development reviewed a draft of this report and provided written
comments.  Their comments, and GAO's responses, appear in appendixes
IV to XII.  The Department of Defense also provided written comments,
but the department requested that GAO not print them due to
references to classified material.  The National Security Council,
Environmental Protection Agency, and Department of Transportation
also reviewed a draft of this report and discussed it with GAO staff
but did not provide written comments.  In general, these agencies
stated that the report accurately portrays U.S.  policy on combating
terrorism and the roles and missions of the various federal agencies
involved.  For example, the Department of Defense stated that the
report "is a concise, well-written document that fully encompasses
the National process for combating terrorism." These agencies also
provided technical corrections, which GAO made as appropriate. 


INTRODUCTION
============================================================ Chapter 1

As the Cold War era ended, the threat of terrorism became a
high-priority U.S.  national security and criminal concern, both at
home and abroad.  The federal government does not have a single
definition of terrorism, and agencies use different terms to describe
protective and deterrent programs and activities and countermeasures
against the threat of terrorist attack.\1 U.S.  policy and strategy
for dealing with terrorism, along with the nature and perception of
the terrorist threat, has been evolving since the 1970s.  A variety
of presidential directives, implementing guidance, executive orders,
interagency agreements, and legislation provide the complex framework
for the programs and activities to combat terrorism in more than 40
federal agencies, bureaus, and offices.  Formal interagency
coordination is managed at the National Security Council (NSC), which
also sponsors a number of interagency working groups on certain
terrorism matters.  For intelligence issues related to terrorism, the
Community Counterterrorism Board's Interagency Intelligence Committee
on Terrorism is the mechanism for interagency coordination among U.S. 
military, regulatory, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies. 


--------------------
\1 In addition, Congress has defined the term terrorism in several
federal statutes.  The definitions vary somewhat depending on the
particular context. 


   THE THREAT OF TERRORISM AT HOME
   AND ABROAD
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1

While the number of terrorist incidents both worldwide and in the
United States has declined in recent years, the level of violence and
lethality of attacks has increased.  The State Department reported
that the number of international terrorist incidents has fallen from
a peak of 665 in 1987 to 296 in 1996, a 25-year low.\2 Of the 296
international incidents during 1996, 73 were against U.S.  persons
and facilities overseas.  But casualties resulting from international
terrorist incidents during 1996 were among the highest ever
recorded--311 persons killed and 2,652 wounded.\3 Of those, 24
Americans were killed and 250 Americans were wounded.  Similarly,
between 1989 and the end of 1993, there were 23 recorded acts of
terrorism in the United States, and for 1995, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) reported only one domestic terrorist incident in
the United States--the bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma
City.  That incident--the most destructive ever on U.S.  soil--killed
168 and wounded 500 persons.  Figure 1.1 shows State Department
statistics on U.S.  casualties of international terrorism from 1991
through 1996, and figure 1.2 shows FBI statistics on domestic
terrorist incidents in the United States from 1980 through 1995. 

   Figure 1.1:  U.S.  Casualties
   of International Terrorism
   Attacks, 1991-96

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

\a These are casualties from the World Trade Center bombing in New
York City. 

Source:  U.S.  Department of State. 

   Figure 1.2:  Terrorist
   Incidents in the United States,
   1980-95

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  As of September 1997, FBI officials said that 1996 data was
not available. 

Source:  FBI. 

In its annual report on international terrorism, the State Department
noted a continuing trend toward more ruthless attacks on mass
civilian targets and the use of more powerful bombs.\4

State also noted that finding clear patterns in terrorism is becoming
more difficult.  The FBI's most recent report discussing domestic
U.S.  terrorism notes an upsurge in rhetoric from domestic right-wing
extremist groups, many members of which believe they are being
displaced by the rapidly changing U.S.  culture, or hate or fear of
the federal government.\5

Also, the intelligence community has issued classified National
Intelligence Estimates on the terrorist threat.\6

In 1995 and 1996, about one-fourth of international terrorist attacks
were against U.S.  targets, and historically, the United States has
not been immune from terrorist acts.  However, certain key,
large-scale incidents at home and abroad since 1993 have dramatically
raised the profile of U.S.  vulnerability to terrorist attack.  For
example, the February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New
York City raised the specter of foreign terrorism in the United
States.  The April 1995 bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma
City turned attention to domestic sources of terrorist threats and
violence.  The June 1996 truck bombing of a U.S.  military housing
facility near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, prompted a reexamination of DOD
programs to protect its forces and installations overseas.\7 The 1995
terrorist use of a nerve agent in the Tokyo subway elevated concerns
about the greater likelihood of terrorist's use of weapons of mass
destruction (nuclear, biological, and chemical) and the need to shore
up U.S.  federal and cities' capabilities to respond to and manage
such incidents. 

One expert noted there are three schools of thought on the terrorist
threat:  (1) some believe the threat and likelihood of terrorist
attack is very low and does not pose a serious risk ; (2) others
believe the threat and likelihood of terrorist attack is high and
could seriously disrupt the U.S.  national and economic security; and
(3) still others believe assessments of the threat and vulnerability
to terrorist attack need to be accompanied by risk assessments to
rationally guide the allocation of resources and attention.  The
expert further stated that such risk assessments would include
analyses of vulnerability and susceptibility to terrorist attack and
the severity of potential damage. 

According to U.S.  intelligence agencies, conventional explosives
continue to be the weapon of choice for terrorists.  Although the
probability of their use may increase over time, chemical and
biological materials are less likely terrorist weapons because they
are more difficult to weaponize and the results are unpredictable. 
Agency officials also noted that terrorist's use of nuclear weapons
is the least likely scenario, although the consequences could be
disastrous. 


--------------------
\2 State Department statistics only include terrorism involving
citizens or the territory of more than one country.  As a result,
these numbers do not include incidents of domestic terrorism
worldwide. 

\3 The deaths of 90 people and injuries of 1,400 people in 1996 were
caused by a single truck bombing in Sri Lanka.  Because the bombing
wounded some U.S., Japanese, and Dutch citizens, this was counted as
an international terrorist incident. 

\4 Patterns of Global Terrorism 1996, U.S.  Department of State,
April 1997. 

\5 Terrorism in the United States 1995, Department of Justice,
Federal Bureau of Investigation.  As of September 1997, FBI officials
told GAO that the 1996 version had not been published yet. 

\6 The intelligence community includes the Office of the Director of
Central Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National
Security Agency, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the
National Reconnaissance Office, the Defense Intelligence Agency,
other offices within the Department of Defense (DOD) for the
collection of specialized national intelligence through
reconnaissance programs, the intelligence elements of the Army, the
Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the FBI, the Department of the
Treasury, the Department of Energy, the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research of the Department of State, and such other elements of any
department or agency as may be designated by the President or jointly
by the Director of Central Intelligence and the head of the
department or agency concerned. 

\7 For more information, see our recent report Combating Terrorism: 
Status of DOD Efforts to Protect Its Forces Overseas
(GAO/NSIAD-97-207, June 21, 1997). 


   FEDERAL AGENCIES DEFINE
   TERRORISM DIFFERENTLY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2

Federal agencies use different definitions of terrorism.  The State
Department uses a statutory definition of terrorism:  premeditated,
politically motivated violence against noncombatant targets by
subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to
influence an audience.\8 The FBI more broadly defines terrorism as
"the unlawful use of violence, committed by a group of two or more
individuals against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a
government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in
furtherance of political or social objectives." FBI's definition of
terrorism is broader than State's definition, in that the terrorist
act can be done by a group of two or more individuals for social as
well as political objectives.  Because of this broader definition,
the FBI includes in its annual reports on terrorism in the United
States acts such as bombings, arson, kidnapping, assaults, and
hijackings committed by persons who may be suspected of associating
with militia groups, animal rights groups, and others. 

Federal agencies also use different terms to describe their programs
and activities for combating terrorism.  For example, FBI uses
"counterterrorism" to refer to the full range of its activities
directed against terrorism, including preventive and crisis
management efforts.  On the other hand, DOD uses the term
"counterterrorism" to refer to offensive measures to prevent, deter,
and respond to terrorist attack and "antiterrorism" to cover
defensive measures to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and
property to terrorist acts.  For purposes of this report, we use the
term "combat terrorism" to refer to the full range of federal
programs and activities applied against terrorism, domestically and
abroad, regardless of the source or motive. 


--------------------
\8 See 22 U.S.C.  Sec.  2656f(d).  The term noncombatant includes
military personnel who at the time of the incident are unarmed and/or
not on duty.  This legislation also requires the State Department to
submit annual reports to Congress on international terrorism. 


   U.S.  POLICY AND IMPLEMENTING
   GUIDELINES ON COMBATING
   TERRORISM
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3

U.S.  policy to combat terrorism has been evolving since the 1970s
but became formalized in 1986 with the Reagan administration's
issuance of National Security Decision Directive 207.  This directive
resulted from the findings of the 1985 Vice President's Task Force on
Terrorism, which highlighted the need for improved, centralized
interagency coordination of the federal government's significant
assets to respond to terrorist incidents.  The directive was
primarily focused on crisis response to terrorist incidents abroad. 
It tasked an NSC sponsored Interagency Working Group to coordinate
the national response and designated lead federal agencies to respond
to and resolve terrorist incidents overseas and domestically.  The
State Department was reaffirmed as the lead agency for international
terrorism policy, procedures, and programs, and the FBI, through the
Department of Justice, was reaffirmed as the lead agency for dealing
with acts of domestic terrorism. 


      NATIONAL LEVEL EXECUTIVE
      BRANCH POLICY AND STRATEGY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3.1

Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD 39), signed in June 1995,
built upon the previous directive and elaborated a national policy, a
strategy, and an interagency coordination mechanism and management
structure to combat terrorism.  It also expanded on roles,
responsibilities, and mechanisms to combat domestic terrorism.  PDD
39 continues the basic U.S.  policy of no concessions to terrorists,
pressure on state sponsors of terrorism, and application of the rule
of law to terrorists as criminals.  It also states that the U.S. 
policy is to deter, defeat, and respond vigorously to all terrorist
attacks on U.S.  territory and against U.S.  citizens, whether they
occur domestically, in international waters or airspace, or on
foreign territory. 

The strategy consists of three main elements:  (1) reduce
vulnerabilities and prevent and deter terrorist acts before they
occur; (2) respond to terrorist acts that do occur--crisis
management--and apprehend and punish terrorists; and (3) manage the
consequences of terrorist acts, including restoration of capabilities
to protect public health and safety, essential government services,
and emergency relief.  The strategy incorporates the need to deal
with terrorist's use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) with
nuclear, chemical, and biological substances across the three main
elements. 

PDD 39 directs agencies to undertake specific measures regarding each
element of the strategy.  It also reaffirms lead agency
responsibilities for responding to domestic (FBI, through the
Department of Justice) and international (State Department) terrorist
incidents, and for managing the consequences of domestic terrorist
attacks (Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)).  PDD 39 further
charges the State Department to work closely with other governments
to carry out U.S.  policy to combat terrorist threats.  The PDD also
states that agencies directed to participate in operations and
activities to combat terrorism shall bear the cost of their
participation, unless otherwise directed by the President.  It
further directs the Director, Office of Management and Budget (OMB),
to report on the adequacy of funding for programs related to
combating terrorism and assigns OMB ongoing responsibility to ensure
that certain technology research, development, and acquisition
efforts associated with efforts to combat terrorism are adequately
funded. 

On reducing vulnerabilities, PDD 39 directed the Attorney General to
identify and review the vulnerability to terrorist attack of critical
national infrastructures, such as telecommunications, transportation,
and banking and financial institutions.  The Attorney General
identified eight critical infrastructures that, if attacked, could
significantly affect the national and/or economic security.  This
review resulted in Executive Order 13010 on protection of the
critical infrastructure, which formed a government-private sector
commission to further review vulnerabilities and propose solutions,
as appropriate.  In addition, all department and agency heads have
been directed to ensure that their personnel and facilities are
protected against terrorism.  These efforts to identify
vulnerabilities and protect persons and facilities are further
discussed in chapter 2. 

For crisis management, the PDD also discusses interagency,
multidisciplinary Domestic and Foreign Emergency Support Teams, DEST
and FEST.  These quick-response teams are to include expertise and
capabilities that are tailored to the specific conditions of the
threat or incident, including WMD.  For domestic terrorist incidents,
the Attorney General, through the FBI, is to lead the operational
response, while also performing law enforcement and investigative
efforts to pursue, apprehend, and punish the terrorist perpetrators
as criminals.  The goal is to terminate terrorist attacks before the
terrorists can accomplish their objectives or to capture them, while
seeking to minimize damage and loss of life and provide emergency
assistance.  For international terrorist incidents, the Secretary of
State is to lead U.S.  crisis management abroad.  These interagency
teams and the federal role in responding to and managing terrorist
crises are further discussed in chapter 3. 

The PDD also directed FEMA to ensure the Federal Response Plan is
adequate for consequence management activities in response to
terrorist attacks against large U.S.  populations, including those in
which weapons of mass destruction are involved.  FEMA is also to
ensure that state's response plans and capabilities are adequate and
tested.  These efforts to manage the consequences of terrorist
incidents are further discussed in chapter 4. 

Appendix I contains an unclassified abstract of PDD 39. 


      IMPLEMENTING GUIDANCE ON
      COMBATING TERRORISM
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3.2

The FBI and State Department have drafted but not finalized detailed
implementing and operational guidelines for domestic and
international crisis management of terrorist incidents.  FEMA
coordinated an annex to the Federal Response Plan that deals with how
the federal government will assist state and local authorities in
managing the consequences of a terrorist attack in the United States. 
In addition, key agencies such as DOD, FBI, and the State Department
have drafted or are drafting various concepts of operations and
guidelines to deal with terrorist incidents at home and abroad,
including those involving WMD.  Further, numerous interagency
agreements have been formulated over the years on operational and
other matters relating to terrorism.  For example, the FBI, the
Department of Energy (DOE), and DOD have an agreement defining
specific areas of responsibility and procedures for responding to
emergencies involving improvised nuclear devices within the United
States, and the Departments of Justice and Transportation have a
memorandum of understanding on notification of terrorist threats to
domestic transportation entities. 


      LEGISLATION ON COMBATING
      TERRORISM
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3.3

While there is no single, comprehensive federal law explicitly
dealing with terrorism, Congress has passed a series of laws dealing
with various aspects of terrorism.  These laws were enacted to ensure
that the perpetrators of certain terrorist acts are subject to
punishment no matter where the acts occur; require or permit
sanctions on countries supporting or sponsoring terrorism; delineate
agency roles and responsibilities; and authorize and/or appropriate
funding for agencies to carry out their responsibilities.\9 Congress
recently passed legislation with significant terrorism components,
such as the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,\10
which includes provisions prohibiting terrorists' fund-raising and
financial transactions and other assistance to terrorists, procedures
for removing alien terrorists from the United States, and expanded
and strengthened criminal prohibitions and penalties pertaining to
terrorism.  In addition, Title XIV of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997\11 (commonly called
Nunn-Lugar-Domenici) directs the Secretary of Defense to assist
federal, state, and local government agencies with training, advice,
equipment, and other actions to shore up domestic local capabilities
to respond to and manage consequences of a terrorist incident with
WMD.  For example, DOD is to provide expert advice to assist federal,
state, and local agencies to develop chemical and biological defense
programs and assist the Public Health Service to organize
Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams.  Appendix II provides citations of
selected legislation pertaining to terrorism. 


--------------------
\9 For more information on historical and recent terrorism-related
legislation and proposals, see Terrorism:  Background and Issues for
Congress, Congressional Research Service Issue Brief for Congress,
95086, Updated January 13, 1997. 

\10 P.L.  104-132, April 24, 1996. 

\11 P.L.  104-201, September 23, 1996. 


   KEY FEDERAL AGENCIES INVOLVED
   IN COMBATING TERRORISM
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:4

Many intelligence, policy-making, law enforcement, defense, and
regulatory agencies are involved in implementing the national policy
to combat terrorism.  Figure 1.3 is adapted from NSC's overview of
the U.S.  government structure to combat terrorism and illustrates
the key federal agencies and offices with roles and missions in that
effort.  Chapters 2, 3, and 4 of this report further discuss the
agency roles, responsibilities, programs, and activities along the
functional lines of PDD-39's strategy for combating terrorism. 

   Figure 1.3:  Overview of U.S. 
   Government Structure to Combat
   Terrorism

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Source:  NSC, Office of Global Issues and Multilateral Affairs. 


   INTERAGENCY COORDINATION THAT
   OCCURS THROUGH THE NSC AND IN
   THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:5

Formal interagency coordination of national policy and operational
issues to combat terrorism occurs through the NSC.  The NSC's
Coordinating Sub-Group of the Deputies Committee is comprised of
representatives from State, Justice, DOD, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and FBI.  Any single member can
call a session of the Coordinating Sub-Group.  By invitation,
depending on the issue or incident, representatives from
Transportation, Treasury, Health and Human Services, Energy, and FEMA
may attend meetings of the Coordinating Sub-Group.  The Coordinating
Sub-Group deals with and tries to reach consensus on terrorism policy
and operational matters and makes recommendations to the Deputies
Committee or through the National Security Advisor to the President. 

As shown in figure 1.4, a standing Interagency Working Group for
Counterterrorism, a policy group chaired by State Department's
Coordinator for Counterterrorism, is to oversee the activities of
several interagency subgroups.  CIA's Counterterrorist Center is
NSC's link to the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism,
which operates under the oversight of the Community Counterterrorism
Board, which is part of the Counterterrorist Center.  The Interagency
Intelligence Committee on Terrorism is to advise and assist the
Director of Central Intelligence in coordinating national
intelligence on terrorism issues and to promote effective use of
intelligence resources for this purpose.  This Committee is composed
of representatives of the intelligence, law enforcement, and
regulatory communities and oversees several subcommittees.  As figure
1.4 illustrates, the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism
has seven subcommittees or groups. 

   Figure 1.4:  National Security
   Council Organization to
   Coordinate Federal Efforts to
   Combat Terrorism

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

\a Meet as required. 

Source:  Agency information and documents. 

We did not evaluate the operation of the groups or subcommittees or
the effectiveness of the coordination mechanisms, but we obtained
information on them and the scope of their functions.  Under the
Interagency Working Group on Counterterrorism, the Exercises Subgroup
is co-chaired by State and FBI.  The Subgroup's quarterly meetings
are attended by representatives from the 20 agencies that participate
in major counterterrorism exercises.  The group deals with issues
relating to each agency's exercise objectives, discusses after-action
report items and lessons learned that have an impact on interagency
operations, and plans future exercises.  The Technical Support
Working Group coordinates certain research and development activities
across the antiterrorism/counterterrorism community in seven
categories of terrorism-related products.  The seven categories are: 
(1) assault support, (2) explosive detection and disposal, (3)
investigative support and forensics, (4) personnel protection, (5)
physical security and infrastructure protection, (6) surveillance
collection and operations support, and (7) WMD countermeasures. 
While the group is to coordinate and ensure against duplication of
about $30 million\12 in terrorism-related projects, it is not
responsible for oversight, coordination, or ensuring against
duplication of the full range of research and development efforts in
these fields governmentwide.  Projects in the Technical Support
Working Group's purview represent a minor share of all
terrorism-related research and development being conducted across the
federal government.  Recently, a Consequence Management Working Group
focused on international incidents was formed, and State Department
officials expect this standing group to be very active in the future. 
The Aviation Security, Maritime Security, and Ground Transportation
Security Working Groups meet on an as-needed basis, particularly to
coordinate and establish the U.S.  positions on matters to be
discussed in multilateral forums such as summits of The Eight.\13

Operationally, NSC serves as the focal point for immediate emergency
interagency coordination under the following conditions:  to activate
a State Department-led FEST in the event of a terrorist incident
overseas and to establish an FBI-led DEST to respond to domestic
terrorist incidents with an international or foreign connection.  In
these cases, a special NSC group feeds critical information to the
NSC Deputies Committee, which in turn makes recommendations to the
President.  However, if domestic terrorism incidents involve U.S. 
perpetrators, the FBI Director, in coordination with the Attorney
General, is responsible for authorizing an FBI-led DEST and the
crisis response.  Such cases are not coordinated through the NSC
mechanism. 


--------------------
\12 According to participants in the Technical Support Working Group,
DOD is the largest contributor of funds to the projects under the
group's purview.  Planned funding for these projects increases from
$19.3 million in fiscal year 1997 to $31.5 million in 1998 and to
$41.3 million in fiscal year 2002. 

\13 This group, formerly known as the "Group of Seven" Western
industrial countries (or G7), now includes Russia and is known as
"The Eight." Members other than Russia include Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 


   OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
   METHODOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:6

Our objectives were to review U.S.  efforts to combat terrorism by
specifically looking at programs and activities to (1) prevent and
deter terrorism; (2) respond to terrorist threats or incidents; and
(3) manage the consequences of a terrorist act, especially involving
weapons of mass destruction.  In reviewing these activities, we used
PDD-39 to scope our effort.  We obtained information through
documentation and interviews of officials at the Departments of
State, Treasury, Justice, Defense, Energy, Transportation, and Health
and Human Services; the CIA; Environmental Protection Agency; and
FEMA.  We also identified interagency coordination processes and
groups intended to facilitate information sharing and enhance
operational links.  To ascertain the interagency coordinating
mechanisms and their scopes, we met with NSC, the Department of
State, FBI, and intelligence community officials.  We also discussed
the coordinating mechanisms with participating agency officials. 

We met with former government officials from the counterterrorism
community and attended congressional briefings, conferences, and
symposiums on terrorism issues.  We did not evaluate the
effectiveness of the programs or activities discussed in this report. 
We performed a separate review of DOD's force protection efforts and
have reported separately on these matters.\14 We also did not include
in our scope issues pertaining to information security. 

Some of the information we obtained was classified and could not be
incorporated in this report.  We used this information, however, to
help corroborate unclassified data we obtained and our analyses.  We
did not independently verify agencies' statistical data.  We
performed our work in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards between October 1996 and July 1997. 


--------------------
\14 Combating Terrorism:  Status of DOD Efforts to Protect Its Forces
Overseas (GAO/NSIAD-97-207, July 21, 1997). 


EFFORTS TO PREVENT AND DETER
TERRORISM
============================================================ Chapter 2

One of the most important goals of U.S.  national policy is to reduce
its citizens' and properties' vulnerability to terrorism, at home and
abroad, and to prevent and deter terrorist incidents.  The federal
government has a number of initiatives intended to reduce the
vulnerability of its domestic and overseas facilities to accomplish
this goal.  In recognition of the importance of certain national
infrastructures to the defense, economic security, and public welfare
of the United States, a presidential commission was created to
develop a national strategy to protect the nation's critical
infrastructures. 

To disrupt terrorist activities before they occur and prevent
terrorists from entering the United States, the federal government
has programs to reduce the capabilities and support available to
terrorists.  Federal agencies have programs to gather intelligence on
and monitor the activities of terrorists and to coordinate their
information and efforts, to impose economic sanctions and embargoes
to disrupt the ability of terrorists to raise funds, and to
scrutinize persons crossing U.S.  borders for possible affiliation
with terrorist groups. 

A number of U.S.  agencies offer training and technical assistance in
combating terrorism for U.S.  and/or foreign law enforcement and
other personnel, often as part of broader law enforcement or other
curricula.  U.S.  counterproliferation programs and activities are
intended to help prevent terrorists' access to WMD. 


   VULNERABILITY OF CRITICAL
   NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE TO BE
   ASSESSED
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1

PDD 39 chartered an interagency group, chaired by the Attorney
General, to study the vulnerabilities of government facilities and
critical national infrastructure to terrorist threats.  These threats
were divided into two categories:  (1) bombings and other physical
threats to tangible property and (2) computer-based electronic
attacks on the information or communications components that control
the infrastructures.  The group determined that the incapacity or
destruction of any of the following eight critical infrastructures
would have a debilitating impact on the defense or economic security
of the United States:  telecommunications; transportation; electric
power systems; water supply systems; banking and financial systems;
gas and oil supplies (storage and transportation); emergency services
systems (including medical, police, fire and rescue); and continuity
of government and government operations. 

The group recommended that a follow-on task force be established to
examine ways to reduce the vulnerability of these critical national
infrastructures, much of which are owned and/or operated by the
private sector.  In July 1996, the President signed an executive
order\1

establishing a joint government and private sector Commission to
develop a national strategy to protect the country's critical
infrastructures from a spectrum of threats, including terrorism.  The
Commission is to have representatives from 10 government agencies and
the private sector.  The Commission encountered delays as the private
sector Chairman was not appointed until December 1996.  As of
September 1997, Commission staff told us that 18 of the 20
commissioners had been appointed, and the Commission's deadline for
submitting its recommendations to the President had been extended to
October 1997. 

The executive order recognized the need to improve coordination of
existing infrastructure protection efforts while the Commission is
conducting its analysis and the President is considering its
recommendations.  As a result, the President established an
interagency Infrastructure Protection Task Force to undertake this
interim mission.  The FBI chairs this Task Force, which complements
its existing mission to operate the Infrastructure Vulnerability/Key
Asset Protection Program, the origins of which date to 1985 in
response to a continuing threat of terrorism directed at U.S. 
critical facilities.  The program is designed to maintain information
on critical facilities throughout the United States to assist in
contingency planning should these facilities become terrorist
targets. 


--------------------
\1 Executive Order 13010, Critical Infrastructure Protection, July
15, 1996. 


   FEDERAL AGENCIES' ROLES AND
   RESPONSIBILITIES TO PROTECT
   U.S.  PERSONS AND FACILITIES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2

PDD 39 directs federal agencies to ensure that the people and
facilities under their jurisdiction are protected against terrorism. 
The PDD specifies certain agency roles and responsibilities for
enhancing security.  In addition, various federal agencies are
involved in protective and preventive measures for major special
events, such as multilateral economic conferences. 

In PDD 39, the President charged the Secretary of Transportation to
reduce vulnerabilities affecting the security of airports in the
United States; all aircraft, aviation, maritime shipping under U.S. 
control\2 ; and rail, highway, mass transit, and pipeline facilities. 
For example, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), through the
Department of Transportation, is charged with reducing
vulnerabilities to terrorism pertaining to civil aviation.  This
includes not only U.S.  airports and U.S.-flagged carriers, but also
foreign airports served by U.S.  carriers and foreign-flagged
carriers with routes to the United States.  For example, FAA educates
and advises commercial carriers on methods to prevent and deter
terrorism.  In addition, FAA assesses the adequacy of U.S.  and
foreign carriers' security programs, makes recommendations, and
provides assistance to enhance security at U.S.  and foreign
airports.\3

In the aftermath of the destruction of Trans World Airlines Flight
800, President Clinton created the White House Commission on Aviation
Safety and Security, known as the Gore Commission, to examine ways to
enhance aviation security overall, including measures to protect
against terrorism.  Some of the Commission's recommendations reported
to the President in February 1997 focused on terrorism.  For example,
they called for (1) developing an automated passenger profiling
system, (2) increasing the frequency of passenger inspections, and
(3) increasing reliance on canine teams and equipment to detect
explosives likely to be used by terrorists. 

The FAA; intelligence community; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms (ATF); Customs; and the airlines are now implementing the
Commission's recommendations.  For example, by the end of fiscal year
1997, 98 additional Customs inspectors are to be stationed at 14
major U.S.  airports that have heavy international passenger traffic. 
Equipped with X-ray vans, radiation detectors, and other
anomaly-detection equipment, these Customs officials are expected to
increase searches of passengers, baggage, and cargo leaving the
United States.  Similarly, FAA plans to procure 54 certified
explosives detection devices.  In addition, both FAA and ATF are
expanding their canine programs for explosives detection.\4

PDD 39 directed the Secretary of State to reduce vulnerabilities
affecting the security of all personnel and facilities at nonmilitary
U.S.  government installations abroad as well as the general safety
of American citizens abroad.  As part of the State Department's
overall responsibility to directly and indirectly protect U.S. 
personnel and facilities at diplomatic posts, its Bureau of
Diplomatic Security develops security construction and protection
standards.  The Bureau also develops security procedures for U.S. 
overseas embassies and missions and monitors their implementation. 
The security standards incorporate an array of programs pertaining to
terrorism and other threats, including the use of armored vehicles,
emergency plans and exercises, and transit security.  The Bureau
manages the many overseas regional security officers and has its own
intelligence unit, which assesses the threat for U.S.  posts
overseas.  Worldwide, about 1,400 Marine Corps security guards and
13,000 local guards provide around-the-clock security for U.S. 
diplomatic missions abroad. 

Also, State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security maintains relationships
and communications with U.S.  corporations with operations overseas,
and in some countries, U.S.  business concerns have established
forums to work with the regional security officers on security
matters, including terrorism.  In addition, while the Secret Service
typically protects visiting heads of state, the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security is to protect lower-level foreign dignitaries visiting the
United States.  Because these officials frequently travel together,
the two agencies coordinate their missions during these visits. 

The Secretary of Defense is to reduce vulnerabilities affecting the
security of all U.S.  military personnel (except those assigned to
diplomatic posts abroad, who are the responsibility of the State
Department) and facilities both abroad and within the United States. 
According to PDD 39 and by directive, all DOD personnel and their
families and facilities are to be protected against terrorist acts.\5
Specific security standards are left to the discretion of the
regional military commander, recognizing that the mission, threat
level, and specific circumstances would determine the level of force
protection at each facility.  In response to a Downing Assessment
Task Force\6 recommendation concerning the Khobar Towers bombing, DOD
and the State Department are reviewing their responsibilities to
protect U.S.  military personnel assigned overseas. 

PDD 39 also directed the Secretary of the Treasury to reduce
vulnerabilities by preventing unlawful traffic in firearms and
explosives, by protecting the President and other officials against
terrorist attack and by enforcing laws controlling the movement of
assets, and imports and exports of goods and services under
Treasury's jurisdiction. 

The federal government also provides protection at special events
held within the United States and abroad.  Federal agency
responsibilities to prepare for special events will vary based upon
the venue and the officials that attend.  Such events may include
presidential inaugurations, political conventions, sporting events,
and international conferences.  In general, primary responsibilities
for event security rest with the local authorities in domestic events
and host governments in events abroad.  For domestic events, the FBI
plays a major role in crisis management planning, preparation, and
implementation, in coordination with state and local authorities and
other federal agencies.  For example, DOD, DOE, FEMA, Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS), and the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) sent personnel and advisors to prepare for and monitor
the 1996 Olympics in Atlanta, Georgia.  For events abroad, the State
Department is the lead agency to coordinate federal agency assistance
for overseas events in which the United States participates, such as
the 1992 Olympics in Barcelona, Spain.  If the President or other
U.S.  officials, as defined by statute,\7 attend the event, the
Secret Service has primary responsibilities for security planning and
implementation in the areas specifically visited by such persons,
again, in coordination with local, state, and other federal agencies
like FBI, DOD, and others.  Responsibility to protect foreign
officials visiting the United States is split:  the Secret Service
protects heads of state, and State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security
protects other foreign dignitaries. 


--------------------
\2 The U.S.  Coast Guard is responsible for domestic ships' and port
facilities' security to reduce their vulnerability to terrorist
attack and for assessing the vulnerability to terrorist attack of
foreign ports frequented by U.S.  cruise ship passengers. 

\3 In addition, civil aviation security liaison officers in 16
locations worldwide are the primary contact between U.S.  embassies
and foreign governments on civil aviation security matters. 

\4 For additional information on detection technologies, see
Terrorism and Drug Trafficking:  Responsibilities for Developing
Explosives and Narcotics Detection Devices (GAO/NSIAD-97-95, Apr. 
15, 1997). 

\5 DOD Directive 2000.12, DOD Combating Terrorism Program, September
15, 1996. 

\6 The Downing Assessment Task Force was created by Secretary of
Defense Perry to examine the facts and circumstances surrounding the
June 25, 1996, bombing of Khobar Towers, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, in
which 19 U.S.  personnel were killed and about 500 were wounded.  The
Task Force reported its findings in an August 30, 1996, report. 

\7 18 U.S.C.  3056 specifies who the Secret Service protects. 


   FEDERAL AGENCIES USE VARIOUS
   APPROACHES TO DISRUPT TERRORIST
   ACTIVITIES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3

The federal government disrupts terrorist activities in several ways. 
Intelligence and law enforcement agencies collect and disseminate
information about suspected terrorists and their activities.  Recent
U.S.  laws make it more difficult for terrorist organizations to
raise funds in the United States, and under certain circumstances,
the government has frozen or confiscated terrorist financial assets. 
In addition, the government can take covert and military action
against terrorist groups or countries that sponsor them. 


      FBI AND CIA GATHER
      INTELLIGENCE ON TERRORIST
      GROUPS AND THREATS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.1

Intelligence is a crucial component of the federal government's
efforts to combat terrorism, and the collection and analysis of
intelligence on terrorist threats is among the highest priorities. 
In accordance with
PDD 39, the FBI is the principal agency that monitors the activities
of terrorist groups operating within the United States.  The CIA is
responsible for gathering intelligence overseas. 

The FBI is expanding its counterterrorism programs.  In addition to
hiring additional agents, in January 1996, the FBI restructured its
approach to deal with terrorism.  Three sections in FBI's National
Security Division manage counterterrorism programs:  one focused on
foreign threats, another focused on domestic threats in the United
States, and another focused on computer investigations and
infrastructure protection.  These sections are designed to provide
real-time operational and analytical capabilities to enhance the
federal government's ability to prevent acts of terrorism in the
United States.  According to the FBI, its program, among other
things, supports ongoing field investigations, formulates threat
warnings and alerts based on intelligence information, and
disseminates this information to other law enforcement agencies. 

The FBI monitors domestic groups and individuals that it believes
pose a terrorist threat and collects intelligence on suspected
foreign terrorists operating within the United States.  According to
Justice officials, the FBI's program focused on suspected foreign
terrorists frequently involves surveillance under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act.  To safeguard individuals' rights,
Justice Department prosecutors are not to be privy to information
obtained during the surveillance.  However, if an investigation
reveals the occurrence of or plans for significant criminal
activity--terrorism-related or otherwise--this information can be
provided to federal prosecutors.  For example, plots to bomb the
Holland and Lincoln tunnels and the George Washington Bridge in New
York and a federal building in New York City were detected during an
investigation initiated under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act. 

The Director for Central Intelligence's Counterterrorist Center at
the CIA was established in 1986 to collect, analyze, and distribute
national intelligence on terrorism, and use this information to
support U.S.  efforts to penetrate, disrupt, and ultimately destroy
terrorist organizations worldwide.  In addition, the Center prepares
intelligence reports on terrorist groups and countries that support
terrorism that are made available to other intelligence and law
enforcement agencies.  For example, the Center issues a monthly
classified review of international terrorism developments and
provides other analysis on terrorist groups, capabilities, or
incidents as needed. 


      INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
      COOPERATION
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.2

To enhance the processing, analyzing, and distributing of
intelligence information, more than 40 federal agencies, bureaus, and
offices have joined the Interagency Intelligence Committee on
Terrorism
(see table 2.1).  Members of this Committee share information on the
activities of terrorist groups and countries that sponsor terrorism
and assess indications of terrorist threats. 



                               Table 2-1
                
                Members of the Interagency Intelligence
                         Committee on Terrorism

Advanced Research Projects Agency   National Reconnaissance Office
----------------------------------  ----------------------------------
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and     National Security Agency
Firearms

Central Intelligence Agency         National Security Council

Drug Enforcement Agency             Office of the Secretary of Defense

Defense Intelligence Agency         Office of the Vice President

Defense Information Systems Agency  U.S. Special Operations Command

Defense Special Weapons Agency      U.S. Army

Department of Commerce              U.S. Air Force

Department of Energy                U.S. Capitol Police

Department of Health and Human      U.S. Coast Guard
Services

Department of Justice               U.S. Customs Service

Department of State                 U.S. Central Command

Department of Transportation        U.S. Information Agency

Department of Treasury              U.S. Marshals Service

Environmental Protection Agency     U.S. Marine Corps

Federal Aviation Administration     U.S. Navy

Federal Emergency Management        U.S. Postal Service
Agency

Federal Bureau of Investigation     U.S. Supreme Court Marshal's
                                    Office

Immigration and Naturalization      U.S. Secret Service
Service

Joint Chiefs of Staff               White House Communications Agency

Nuclear Regulatory Commission       White House Military Office
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  Agency documents. 

The sharing of terrorism-related intelligence is expected to be
facilitated by agencies' detailing staff to one another's
organizations.  The counterterrorism units located at the FBI and CIA
have representatives from numerous other federal agencies.  For
example, more than a dozen agencies have representatives at the CIA
Counterterrorist Center.  Moreover, the FBI manages standing joint
terrorism task forces to facilitate an exchange of intelligence and
coordinate activities across the law enforcement community within a
specific geographic area.  Conceived in the 1980s, these task forces
are currently located in 13 metropolitan areas throughout the country
and are staffed by federal, state, and local law enforcement
officers. 

The intelligence community disseminates threat warnings through
various channels.  CIA's Counterterrorist Center has created a new
Threat Warning Group in the Community Counterterrorism Board.  This
group analyzes threat reports, coordinates them with the intelligence
community, and distributes them to senior U.S.  policymakers.  In
addition, the FBI cooperates with federal, state, and local law
enforcement through its threat and warning channels.  The FBI manages
the Terrorist Threat Warning System, which communicates
terrorism-related information to other law enforcement agencies.  The
FBI told us it also disseminates unclassified terrorism threat and
warning information to law enforcement agencies nationwide through
its teletype National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System. 
According to FBI, in 1996, 13 such messages were delivered.  FBI also
transmits information to U.S.  businesses on the potential for
terrorism through its Awareness of National Security Issues and
Response Program.  Established in 1996, this program is a facsimile
network linking FBI field offices to more than 5,000 businesses. 


      U.S.  SANCTIONS CAN DISRUPT
      TERRORISTS' FINANCIAL
      OPERATIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.3

The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control
develops, administers, and, along with the Customs Service, enforces
economic sanctions and embargo programs against state sponsors of
terrorism, foreign terrorist organizations and their supporters, and
attempts to deny them access to U.S.  economic and financial
markets.\8 The Office has administered economic sanctions programs
against state sponsors of terrorism beginning in 1950 when sanctions
against North Korea were declared.  The Office currently administers
sanctions programs against North Korea, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya,
Sudan, and Syria.  More than $3 billion in assets are blocked as a
result of these sanctions programs.\9 The Office's ability to block
in-process transactions depends largely on privately owned financial
institutions adhering to the terms of blocking orders and the ability
to impose civil penalties for failure to comply. 

Recent legislation\10 expands on existing prohibitions pertaining to
financing terrorists.  For example, it prohibits U.S.  persons from
lending financial support to foreign terrorist organizations and
requires domestic financial institutions to freeze the funds of
designated foreign terrorist organizations and their supporters. 


--------------------
\8 The Office does not have a domestic terrorism role; it focuses
exclusively on foreign-based terrorism. 

\9 For more information on sanctions, see Economic Sanctions: 
Effectiveness as Tools of Foreign Policy (GAO/NSIAD-92-106, Feb.  19,
1992). 

\10 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 
104-132). 


      COVERT AND MILITARY ACTIONS
      CAN BE USED AGAINST
      TERRORISTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.4

Another means of preventing and deterring future terrorist activity
is to strike directly at terrorist organizations through covert
action.  CIA covert action is the execution of operations to
influence events in another country in which it is deemed important
to mask the U.S.  government's involvement.  Congress has supported
such action in recent legislation, urging the President to "use all
necessary means, including covert action and military force, to
disrupt, dismantle, and destroy international infrastructure used by
international terrorists, including overseas terrorist training
facilities and safe havens."\11

Military action is also used to disrupt terrorist activities. 
Special Operations Forces have a statutory counterterrorism mission,
which may include preemptive military attacks on terrorist targets. 
The United States has also taken retaliatory military action against
state sponsors of terrorism.  For example, in 1986 the United States
attacked targets in Libya in retaliation for several Libyan terrorist
actions, including the bombing of a discotheque in Germany that
killed several off-duty U.S.  servicemembers.  In 1993, the United
States used military force against Iraqi targets when it became clear
that Iraq was responsible for a foiled plot to assassinate former
President Bush when he visited Kuwait. 


--------------------
\11 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 
104-132), Section 324. 


   GOVERNMENT AGENCIES ATTEMPT TO
   PREVENT TERRORISTS FROM
   ENTERING THE UNITED STATES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4

The federal government leverages existing functions of the State
Department, U.S.  Customs Service, and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) to prevent terrorists and terrorist
materials from entering the United States. 

First, the State Department is responsible for denying terrorists and
their supporters entry visas.\12 State Department's Bureau of
Intelligence and Research has a "TIPOFF" program to declassify
sensitive intelligence and law enforcement information and enter it
into State's Consular Lookout and Support System.  The Bureau of
Consular Affairs and overseas consular officers use this information
to monitor visa applications and detect known or suspected terrorists
as they apply for visas overseas.  According to State Department
statistics, since 1987, the TIPOFF program has detected 722 suspected
terrorists as they applied for visas.\13

Second, terrorists and terrorist materials might be also prevented
from entering the United States through border controls manned by the
INS and the U.S.  Customs Service.  Customs is responsible for
enforcing compliance on behalf of 60 different agencies with more
than 660 U.S.  laws that govern goods and persons entering and
exiting the United States.\14 According to Customs officials,
programs to combat terrorism complement Customs' other missions. 
Generally, Customs inspectors look for contraband, such as illegal
drugs, currency, and explosives, whether or not the contraband is
intended for terrorism.  While most of Customs' inspection equipment
was developed and acquired to detect drugs, the majority of this
equipment does not detect specific substances but detects anomalies
in general.  For example, X-ray machines may alert an inspector to
something unusual about an item being examined, and therefore the
possible concealment of contraband. 

The State Department's TIPOFF program also assists INS and Customs by
providing intelligence and law enforcement information for their
automated Interagency Border Inspection System.  This information
helps INS and Customs detect suspected terrorists as they attempt to
pass through any of 350 U.S.  border entry points.  According to
State Department statistics, since 1991, the TIPOFF program has
allowed INS and Customs to intercept 196 suspected terrorists from 56
countries at 44 different U.S.  border points. 


--------------------
\12 The Immigration and Nationality Act, as recently amended by the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, allows the
State Department to deny a visa (i.e., exclude entry) to a foreigner
who is a known or suspected terrorist or is a representative or
member of a designated foreign terrorist organization.  Congress
requires that a report be submitted each time the Department denies a
visa on terrorist grounds. 

\13 For related GAO work on passports and visas, see State
Department:  Efforts to Reduce Visa Fraud (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-167, May
20, 1997) and Passports and Visas:  Status of Efforts to Reduce Fraud
(GAO/NSIAD-96-99, May 9, 1996). 

\14 By regulation, Customs and INS evenly share responsibility for
inspecting persons at the land borders between the United States and
Mexico and Canada. 


   TRAINING AND ASSISTANCE
   PROGRAMS TO COMBAT TERRORISM
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:5

Training and technical assistance relevant to combating terrorism is
available through a variety of sources.  While some of this training
covers more than antiterrorism or counterterrorism, many of the
principles and techniques, such as evidence collection and bomb site
analysis, are also applicable to terrorism investigations.  Domestic
law enforcement and intelligence agency personnel receive training to
combat terrorism at the Treasury Department's Federal Law Enforcement
Training Center,\15 which offers an array of terrorism-related
courses and has a physical security and antiterrorism training
complex.  Terrorism-related training is also conducted at the FBI
Academy in Virginia and the FAA Technical Center in New Jersey. 
These latter two venues are used primarily by FBI and FAA personnel,
respectively.  Domestic training is conducted on an agency-by-agency
basis. 

Several federal agencies participate in foreign counterterrorism and
counterproliferation training and assistance programs.  These
programs are designed to aid other countries to deter and manage
their terrorist threats, including making it more difficult for
terrorists to acquire and transport WMD.  A major portion of this
assistance is funded and coordinated by the State Department and
delivered through its Antiterrorism Assistance Program.  Since its
inception in 1983, more than 18,000 students, representing 87
countries, have received counterterrorism training through the
Antiterrorism Assistance Program.  Table 2.2 indicates available
domestic and foreign counterterrorism and antiterrorism training and
assistance programs, as well as relevant counterproliferation
training programs. 



                                    Table 2.2
                     
                          Terrorism-related Training and
                               Assistance Programs

                  Type
          --------------------
          Combatin
Sponsori         g    Counter-
ng        terroris  proliferat
agency           m         ion  Program
--------  --------  ----------  ------------------------------------------------
State            X              Administers the Antiterrorism Assistance
                                 Program. Other participants include the
                                 Departments of Justice, Treasury, and
                                 Transportation.
FAA              X              Trains federal air marshals at the FAA Technical
                                 Center. Conducts terrorism-related training at
                                 the FAA Academy and other locations. At the FAA
                                 Academy or on site, trains airport managers
                                 from countries where U.S. carriers are
                                 establishing service.
FBI              X              Provides training through the International
                                 Association of Chiefs of Police. Trains foreign
                                 police under the National Academy Program at
                                 the FBI Training Academy. Trains FBI officials
                                 and agents at FBI training facilities and
                                 trains local law enforcement personnel who will
                                 work with the FBI at special events.
State,           X              The International Law Enforcement Academy in
 Justice,                        Budapest, Hungary, is funded by the State
 Treasur                         Department. Training programs are geared toward
 y                               improving the investigative capabilities of
                                 foreign law enforcement agencies. Other U.S.
                                 participants include FBI, Secret Service,
                                 Customs, ATF, and the Federal Law Enforcement
                                 Training Center.
Treasury         X              The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
                                 offers courses in antiterrorism contingency
                                 planning, antiterrorism management, seaport
                                 security/antiterrorism, and surviving hostage
                                 situations.
ATF              X              Trains domestic and foreign law enforcement
                                 officials in firearms and explosives
                                 identification and tracing and post-blast
                                 investigations.
Secret           X              Trains Secret Service, as well as local, state,
 Service                         federal, and foreign law enforcement personnel
                                 in special event management and physical
                                 protection countermeasures.
Justice          X              Trains foreign law enforcement officers on
                                 criminal justice matters through the
                                 International Criminal Investigative Training
                                 Assistance Program.
FBI and                      X  Train and equip law enforcement officials,
 DOD                             judges, and prosecutors from the former Soviet
                                 Union and Eastern Europe to counter nuclear
                                 material smuggling and trafficking and chemical
                                 and biological weapons proliferation.
Multiple                     X  The FBI, along with the State Department,
                                 Department of Energy, and Customs, train
                                 personnel from six former Soviet Union
                                 countries on investigating and prosecuting
                                 nuclear-related crimes.
DOD                          X  Under the Nunn-Lugar/Cooperative Threat
                                 Reduction Program, enhances the security of
                                 former Soviet nuclear weapons and material
                                 during their storage and transport.
Energy                       X  Focuses on reducing the opportunity for
                                 terrorists to acquire nuclear materials. A
                                 draft memorandum of understanding being
                                 developed between the United States and Russia
                                 discusses U.S. assistance in the event of a
                                 nuclear terrorist incident in Russia.
Customs                      X  Trains customs service personnel of former
                                 Soviet Union countries on detecting nuclear
                                 materials.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  Agency documents. 


--------------------
\15 The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center is the largest law
enforcement training organization in the United States.  Since its
inception in 1970, over 330,000 people have received training. 


   INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS
   ACTIVELY WORKED TO COMBAT
   TERRORISM
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:6

The United States has been actively trying to enlist multilateral
organizations in the fight against terrorism.\16 These efforts
include multilateral agreements and conventions, U.N.  resolutions,
and international summits. 

Nine key international treaties and conventions, promoted by the
United States and foreign governments, expand the legal basis for
deterring terrorists from committing acts of terrorism and bringing
them to justice.  Examples of these conventions include the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Civil Aviation, International Convention Against the Taking of
Hostages, and Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the
Purpose of Detection. 

The United States has also relied on the United Nations and other
multilateral organizations to promote international cooperation
against terrorism.  The United Nations has adopted resolutions on
measures to eliminate international terrorism, and passed resolutions
that impose sanctions on Libya for its involvement in the destruction
of Pan Am
flight 103 and Union of Transportation Air flight 772.  These
sanctions against Libya represent the first time the United Nations
has imposed sanctions on a nation solely because it supports
terrorism. 

The group of industrialized countries known as The Eight has also
been an active forum for discussing terrorism.  Several of the
group's summits have resulted in joint declarations that condemn
terrorism and pledge to improve member-countries' individual and
collective efforts to combat terrorism.  In addition,
ministerial-level and expert-level meetings have been devoted
entirely to terrorism.  Other forums that have also promoted
cooperation in combating terrorism include the 1994 Summit of the
Americas Conference in Miami, Florida, the 1996 Summit of Peacemakers
in Egypt, and a 1996 conference on counterterrorism that was held in
the Philippines. 


--------------------
\16 Congress has supported such efforts for a number of years.  For
example, Congress has urged the President to pursue multilateral
cooperation in counterterrorism in the Omnibus Diplomatic Security
and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 and the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996. 


CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN TERRORIST
INCIDENTS
============================================================ Chapter 3

Crisis management includes measures to identify, acquire, and plan
the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a
specific threat or act of terrorism.  Specific crisis management
response activities emphasize prevention, crisis mitigation efforts,
and criminal prosecution of terrorists.  The federal government has
the primary role to respond to acts of terrorism; state and local
governments provide assistance as required.  The United States
regards terrorist attacks against its territory, citizens, or
facilities as a national security threat and a criminal act, wherever
the attack may occur.  Therefore, the U.S.  policy is to react
rapidly and decisively to terrorism directed at the United States,
whether it occurs domestically or internationally and whether it
involves the use of conventional weapons or WMD involving nuclear,
biological, or chemical devices.  Specifically, in PDD 39, the
President stated that the objectives of U.S.  policy to combat
terrorism are to protect Americans, minimize damage and loss of life,
terminate terrorist attacks, defeat or arrest terrorists, and pursue
and apprehend terrorists and bring them to trial for their crimes. 

The FBI and Department of State are responsible for crisis management
and marshal the federal assets required to defeat or punish
terrorists involved with domestic and international incidents,
respectively.  Rapidly deployable, trained, and equipped interagency
emergency support teams--a DEST and a FEST--assist them to manage the
crises on site.  The FEST is well-developed and has operated for 11
years.  The DEST concept and organization, however, is relatively
new, and its guidelines were only recently drafted.  To build and
maintain a quick and effective response capability, the interagency
teams exercise crisis management scenarios. 


   FBI LEADS CRISIS MANAGEMENT FOR
   DOMESTIC INCIDENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1

Since 1982, the Department of Justice, acting through the FBI, has
been responsible for responding to terrorist incidents that occur
domestically.\1 The Department of Justice and the FBI not only are to
resolve and manage a crisis caused by a terrorist incident but are
also to conduct the criminal investigation and pursue, arrest, and
prosecute the terrorists.  An incident may involve U.S.  citizens or
foreign individuals or groups engaging in terrorist acts or threats
on U.S.  soil.  When threats are communicated, particularly involving
the use of WMD, the FBI is to initiate threat credibility assessments
in accordance with its chemical/biological or nuclear incident
contingency plans.  These assessments are to entail close
coordination with experts from other agencies--DOE, HHS, EPA, DOD,
and FEMA--to assess the viability of the threat from a technical,
operational, and behavioral standpoint.  The FBI would direct an
operational response, if warranted, based on the assessment.  The
FBI's contingency plans for crisis management of nuclear or
chemical/biological incidents call for drawing appropriate tactical,
technical, scientific, and medical resources from the federal
community to bolster the FBI's investigative and crisis management
capabilities.  The FBI considers all three WMD
possibilities--nuclear, biological, and chemical--to be equally
serious.  The nuclear threat is considered the least likely. 

Each of the FBI's 56 field offices is developing contingency plans
for WMD incidents, identifying key facilities that might be attacked
in such incidents, and coordinating a response with local
authorities.  If there is no warning of a terrorist threat or event,
the FBI is expected to provide a rapid on-scene response, typically
in coordination with local law enforcement authorities or other
federal agencies. 


--------------------
\1 In aircraft hijackings, the FAA is to coordinate law enforcement
activity affecting the safety of passengers aboard aircraft within
the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States.  FAA's
federal air marshals have counterterrorism responsibilities aboard an
aircraft.  On the ground in U.S.  territory, once the door of the
aircraft is open, the FBI is responsible for the resolution of
terrorist hijackings. 


      THE FBI HAS A VARIETY OF
      OPERATIONAL RESPONSE
      CAPABILITIES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.1

In the event of a terrorist incident, the on-scene FBI commander is
to establish a command post to manage the crisis based upon the
premise of a graduated and flexible response.  However, the FBI
acknowledges that the first priority in a crisis is public safety and
the preservation of life.  According to FBI officials, when a threat
or incident exceeds the capabilities of a local FBI field office, the
FBI Critical Incident Response Group will deploy necessary resources
to assist that office.  The Group was established in 1994 as a
separate field entity to integrate the tactical and investigative
expertise needed for terrorist and other critical incidents that
require an immediate law enforcement response.  The Group has crisis
managers, hostage negotiators, behaviorists, surveillance assets and
agents, and a trained and exercised tactical team--the Hostage Rescue
Team--that can operate in a chemical or a biological environment.\2
Figure 3.1 shows the FBI's crisis management structure. 

   Figure 3.1:  FBI Crisis
   management

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Source:  FBI. 

The FBI has a number of tactical response assets that it can employ. 
The Hostage Rescue Team, which is authorized 90 special agents, is
expected to deploy rapidly upon notice of the FBI Director's
authorization to rescue individuals who are held illegally by a
hostile force or to engage in other law enforcement activities as
directed.  The FBI also has over 1,000 agents in Special Weapons and
Tactics (SWAT) teams located in its field offices, with enhanced SWAT
teams in 9 of the offices.  FBI SWAT teams are capable of planning
and executing high-risk tactical operations that exceed the
capabilities of field office investigative resources.  Figure 3.2
summarizes the FBI's tactical response assets. 

   Figure 3.2:  FBI tactical
   assets

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Source:  FBI. 

FBI case management and evidence specialists can deploy with or
otherwise support the Critical Incident Response Group shown in
figure 3.1 to investigate an incident for the arrest and prosecution
of the terrorists.  FBI forensic and evidence capabilities are being
enhanced through the establishment of the Hazardous Materials
Response Unit within the Laboratory Division.\3


--------------------
\2 Among Hostage Rescue Team skills are:  hostage rescue tactics,
precision shooting, advanced medical support, and tactical site
surveys.  The team receives frequent specialized training to maintain
high levels of expertise and skills. 

\3 Other agencies may assist the FBI in its terrorism investigations. 
For example, although the FBI has a Bomb Data Center, the Treasury
Department's ATF also has significant explosives investigation
capability and can support FBI investigations of bombings.  ATF is
forming critical incident management response teams to draw resources
from across the Bureau in response to critical incidents, and it has
national response teams to help gather evidence and identify the
cause and origin of an explosion or fire.  ATF also has a special
response team for situations that may be violent or in which
surveillance or other nontraditional operations are required. 


      DOMESTIC EMERGENCY SUPPORT
      TEAM DESIGNED TO SUPPORT FBI
      RESPONSE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.2

Based on a preliminary threat assessment, the FBI Director, through
the Attorney General, may authorize the deployment of a DEST
comprised of those agencies that can advise or provide assistance to
the FBI on-scene commander as circumstances dictate.  No higher level
coordination or approvals (e.g., from the NSC Deputies Committee) are
required unless the FBI's capability to deal with an extreme crisis,
such as that potentially resulting from some types of WMD incidents
or multiple incidents, proves insufficient. 

Upon the Attorney General's approval of the FBI's request for a DEST,
each agency's representatives are expected to be ready to deploy
quickly.  The FBI determines the composition of the team and
communicates that to the appropriate agencies.  For example, a DEST
may include nuclear, chemical, or biological experts to provide
advice or support to the FBI in dealing with a specific type of
incident involving WMD.  The FBI incorporates the DEST into its
existing crisis management structure.  The FBI Director designates a
DEST team leader from the FBI to advise the on-scene commander about
other federal agencies' capabilities.  The team leader conducts an
initial situation assessment, develops courses of action, assesses
potential consequences, and makes recommendations to the on-scene
commander.  The team leader is then to assign tasks for the
commander's selected courses of action, supervise the evaluation of
changes in the situation, and ensure information is disseminated in a
timely manner. 

The FBI command post can then be converted to a Joint Operations
Center for decisions involving the interagency response to the
incident.  The center would have four groups:  command, operations,
consequence management, and support.  The command group would include
the on-scene principals of the DEST agencies, such as the DOE, HHS,
EPA, DOD, FEMA, and any other federal, state, or local agency
officials that are critical to successful resolution of the crisis,
particularly incidents involving WMD.  For example, specialized
assistance may also be requested from the Departments of
Transportation, Agriculture, Treasury, and State; the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission; and the intelligence community.  The agencies
then support the FBI's response to the incident by providing the
required expertise, staffing, and equipment.  The operations group
includes the following functions:  intelligence, investigations,
tactical operations, technical support, surveillance, and
negotiations.  The consequence management group monitors and provides
advice on dealing with destruction and mass casualties.  And the
support group provides logistical, legal, media, administrative, and
liaison services.  Figure 3.3 shows the structure of an FBI Joint
Operations Center. 

   Figure 3.3:  FBI's Joint
   Operations Center

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Source:  FBI. 

As of September 1997, a DEST had not been deployed in response to an
actual incident.  However, DEST components have been deployed as a
precaution for special events, such as the 1996 Democratic National
Convention, the 1996 Summer Olympic Games, and the 1997 presidential
inauguration. 


      OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES MAY
      SUPPORT FBI IN WMD INCIDENT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.3

For chemical or biological incidents, several agencies support the
FBI's crisis management efforts, including HHS, EPA, and DOD.  The
HHS on-scene representative through a number of HHS entities,\4 can
provide services such as (1) threat assessment, (2) consultation, (3)
agent identification, (4) epidemiological investigation, (5) hazard
detection and reduction, (6) decontamination, (7) public health
support, (8) medical support, and (9) pharmaceutical support
operations.  For example, public health and medical care response
activities coordinated through HHS include assessment, triage,
treatment, transportation, hospitalization, and mental health
services for victims of a chemical or biological incident.  Through
its on-scene coordinator and response teams, the EPA can provide
technical advice and assistance, such as identification of
contaminants; sample collection and analysis; monitoring of
contaminants; and on-site safety, prevention, and decontamination
activities.\5 EPA also issues any permits required for the custody,
transportation, and transfer of chemical materials.  DOD has
technical organizations and tactical units, including the Chemical,
Biological Defense Command; the U.S.  Army Explosive Ordnance
Disposal group; the Defense Technical Response Group; and the U.S. 
Army Technical Escort Unit; that can similarly assist the FBI on site
in dealing with chemical and biological incidents, through
identification of contaminants, sample collection and analysis,
limited decontamination, air monitoring, medical diagnosis and
treatment of casualties, and by render safe procedures for WMD
devices.  DOD can also provide for the custody, transportation, and
disposal of chemical/biological materials when EPA lacks the
capability to do so. 

In the event of a nuclear incident--which terrorism experts view as
the least likely of possible events--DOE would activate a nuclear
incident team to monitor the crisis and coordinate the requested
deployment of its crisis management teams for the DEST.\6

Specifically, DOE provides scientific and technical assistance
regarding (1) threat assessments; (2) search operations; (3) access
operations; (4) diagnostic and device assessments; (5) disablement
and render safe operations; (6) hazard assessments; (7) containment,
relocation, and storage of special nuclear material evidence; and (8)
post-incident cleanup.\7 In providing these types of support, DOE
emergency response teams do not enter hostile environments.  In such
environments, DOD provides personnel trained to disarm and dismantle
an explosive device and any booby traps surrounding the device.  Once
DOD renders the device safe for movement or transportation and the
environment is not hostile, DOE personnel can assist in further
render-safe procedures, disassembly, and final disposition of the
device.  As with other types of WMD materials, DOD can provide for
the custody, transportation, and disposal of nuclear materials if DOE
is unable to do so. 

Appendix III provides a profile of DOD, HHS, EPA, and DOE
capabilities for dealing with aspects of terrorist incidents
involving WMD. 


--------------------
\4 These entities include the Office of Emergency Preparedness/Office
of Public Health Service, Federal Interagency Chemical/Biological
Rapid Deployment Team, Medical Management Support Unit, Medical
Response Teams and specialty teams, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, Food and Drug Administration, Agency for Toxic Substances
and Disease Registry, National Institutes of Health, Substance Abuse
and Mental Health Services Administration, and Health Resources and
Services Administration. 

\5 EPA provides its support through a number of local, regional, and
national entities, including federal On-Scene Coordinators supported
by contractors for sampling, monitoring, cleanup, and disposal;
National Response Team; Regional Response Teams; Office of Radiation
and Indoor Air; Center for Risk Modeling and Emergency Response;
Radiological Emergency Response Team; National Enforcement
Investigations Center; and laboratory support.  National headquarters
components include the Environmental Response Team and the Office of
the Emergency Coordinator. 

\6 These crisis management teams consist of the Nuclear/Radiological
Advisory Team, the Nuclear Emergency Search Team, the Joint Technical
Operations Team, and the Lincoln Gold Augmentation Team.  Almost 800
contractor personnel are to be available to provide the scientific
and technical expertise in support of DOE crisis management teams. 
These contractor personnel normally work in DOE facilities as weapons
designers, engineers, and physicists.  In addition, to deal with
terrorist incidents occurring at DOE facilities, DOE Special Response
Teams would be the first to respond. 

\7 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission will be included in the DEST if
the incident involves a facility it has licensed. 


      MILITARY FORCES COULD BE
      USED IN UNUSUAL CRISIS
      SITUATIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.4

If an exceptionally grave terrorist threat or incident is beyond FBI
capabilities to resolve, a military joint special operations task
force may be established to respond in accordance with contingency
plans developed by DOD.  As a general principle, the Posse Comitatus
Act\8 and DOD regulations prohibit the armed forces from being
employed to enforce domestic law.  The Posse Comitatus Act, however,
is subject to a number of statutory exceptions, which permit the use
of the armed forces in dealing with domestic terrorist incidents in
special situations.  \9 According to Justice Department officials,
these statutory exceptions often require a request from the Attorney
General and concurrence by the Secretary of Defense.  Justice
officials added that, in most instances, as a matter of policy,
approval by the President will also be sought whenever possible. 
Further, Justice officials said that when military force is needed to
restore order in an act of domestic terrorism and renders ordinary
means of enforcement unworkable or hinders the ability of civilian
law enforcement authorities, the President must issue an executive
order and a proclamation.  These documents are maintained in draft
form and are ready for the President's signature if needed. 

If military force is required and approved, the on-scene FBI
commander passes operational control of the incident site to the
military commander.  The military commander develops and submits
courses of action to the National Command Authority.  If the incident
cannot be resolved peacefully, the National Command Authority may
order a military operation, including the disablement of a WMD.  Once
this is accomplished, the military commander returns operational
control of the site to the FBI.  To date, military action has never
been required to resolve a domestic terrorist incident.  Further, FBI
officials stated that the FBI's own tactical skills to resolve a
terrorist incident are generally equal to the military's, although
technical assistance would be required in certain WMD incidents. 


--------------------
\8 See 18 U.S.C.  section 1385. 

\9 For example, 18 U.S.C.  section 1751 (i) (presidential
assassination); 18 U.S.C.  section 2332e (emergencies involving
chemical WMD); 18 U.S.C.  section 1116 (murder) and 18 U.S.C. 
section 112(f) authorize the Attorney General to request the
assistance of military authorities for enforcement purposes when the
victim is a foreign official, official guest, or internationally
protected person. 


      DOMESTIC CRISIS RESPONSE
      EXERCISES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.5

Under PDD 39, supporting agencies are to provide trained personnel to
the DEST, and the FBI is to design and coordinate an overall DEST
exercise program.  Although the FBI participated in 30 interagency
exercises from October 1994 through March 1997, the FBI had not yet
led a full-field DEST exercise.  Exercises to date have included
tabletop, command post, field training, and joint readiness
exercises.  These exercises involved conventional, chemical,
biological, and nuclear incident scenarios.  The FBI sponsored 10 of
the exercises.  Through March of 1999, 25 more exercises are
scheduled. 

The October 1994 Mirage Gold field exercise involved several agencies
with nearly 1,000 participants and was designed to test the
interagency crisis management capabilities for a nuclear incident. 
The exercise helped the FBI and other agencies, such as DOE, identify
needed improvements in interagency coordination and intelligence
flow, interagency coordination of forensic matters, and information
management and technical support.  FBI officials said they revised
their crisis management plans accordingly and took other steps based
on the lessons learned from the exercise.  For example, the Critical
Incident Response Group implemented a crisis management training
program for senior FBI officials that emphasized the Joint Operations
Center concept. 

Several interagency operational opportunities have arisen while
preparing for special events.  In preparing for the 1996 Summer
Olympic Games in Atlanta, the FBI conducted WMD counterterrorism
exercises, including tabletop, leadership, command post, and
full-field exercises.  According to an HHS official, participation in
major events has been especially instructive.  For example,
preparations for special events have helped HHS identify needed
improvements in communications equipment, the distribution system for
antidotes for WMD agents, and the surveillance system for reporting
illnesses associated with a chemical or biological attack. 

Individual agencies also have internal exercises related to crisis
management.  For example, DOE has exercises that focus on crisis
management of a nuclear terrorist incident and include national
policy-level exercises to test interagency coordination and command
and control procedures; bilateral exercises with the FBI and other
interagency participants; various command post, field, and joint
exercises with DOD; team-level drills to test DOE personnel's call-up
and deployment response capabilities; and frequent tabletop drills
using a nuclear incident scenario involving the development of
appropriate emergency response strategies to deal with the
incident.\10


--------------------
\10 According to DOE officials, DOE has also instituted an exercise
after-action tracking system to evaluate whether exercise objectives
were met and to identify significant deficiencies in need of
corrective action. 


   STATE DEPARTMENT LEADS CRISIS
   MANAGEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL
   INCIDENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2

For an international terrorist incident, the State Department is to
lead U.S.  crisis management efforts.  A number of contingency
arrangements are already in place to respond to a terrorist crisis. 
For example each diplomatic post has an Emergency Action Committee
and an Emergency Action Plan.  In addition, State's Bureau of
Diplomatic Security has advance teams that can deploy to enhance a
post's security posture if the threat level increases.  In an actual
incident, crisis management would be managed at a post by the
Emergency Action Committee, led by the ambassador, and at
headquarters by a task force led by the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism.  In addition, with permission from the host
country, a State-led FEST can deploy to support the ambassador at a
post.  The FEST is tailored to the terrorist act and may include
personnel with expertise to deal with specific types of WMD
incidents.  Other agencies may also participate in U.S.  crisis
management overseas.  For example, DOD, FBI, ATF, HHS, EPA, or DOE
teams could support overseas operations involving WMD.  The State
Department and other agencies test their crisis management
capabilities through exercises at the interagency or individual
agency level. 


      STATE DEPARTMENT RESPONSIBLE
      FOR MANAGEMENT AND
      CONTINGENCY ARRANGEMENTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.1

The State Department generally is the lead agency in terrorist
incidents that take place outside the United States.  PDD 39
reaffirmed the State Department's lead for interagency coordination
of international terrorist incidents.  State Department has a variety
of contingency arrangements and plans in case of a terrorist attack
on U.S.  interests overseas.  State's Emergency Planning Handbook
serves as a consolidated source of guidance for overseas posts on how
to plan for and deal with emergencies abroad.  The handbook
identifies post emergency management responsibilities; discusses
emergency and crisis management mechanisms within State and with
other U.S.  government agencies; highlights the kinds of information
the post will need to plan for specific emergencies; and provides
action-oriented checklists that posts may use to ensure rapid, clear,
and complete responses in emergencies. 

The Emergency Planning Handbook explains post mechanisms for crisis
management, including the Emergency Action Committee and the
Emergency Action Plan.  Every U.S.  diplomatic post is required to
have an Emergency Action Committee.  In organizing for emergency
action, the ambassador establishes the committee and designates
personnel responsible for 19 specific crisis-related functions. 
Every post is also required to have an operative Emergency Action
Plan designed to provide procedures to deal with foreseeable
contingencies specific to the post.  The post plan is written by
members of the post Emergency Action Committee to implement
department-level guidance (as contained in the Emergency Planning
Handbook) in conjunction with post-specific information.  The post
plan translates worldwide guidance into a post-specific action plan
for dealing with a crisis. 

State also maintains security response teams that can deploy in
anticipation of a crisis.  The Bureau of Diplomatic Security has
Mobile Training Teams and Security Support Teams to respond to
increased threats or critical security needs at posts.  These teams
can provide special training or assistance to plan or implement a
drawdown or evacuate post personnel.  These teams are to provide
supplemental support to Regional Security Officers and stand ready
for immediate deployment to any post. 


      TASK FORCES AND FOREIGN
      EMERGENCY SUPPORT TEAMS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.2

Headquarters-level crisis management begins in the State Department's
Operations Center, in coordination with the NSC.  State's Operations
Center maintains a 24-hour global watch and crisis management support
staff.  The watch is the initial point of contact for posts
experiencing emergency crises, including terrorism.  In a crisis, the
Operations Center would establish a 24-hour task force to coordinate
the flow of communications and instructions between the Department,
other involved agencies, overseas posts, and foreign governments.  In
a terrorist incident, this task force would be chaired by the
Coordinator for Counterterrorism and, in addition to relevant State
bureaus, may include other U.S.  government agencies with action
responsibilities.  Past task forces related to terrorism include
those for hijackings, the takeover of the cruise ship Achille Lauro,
the Pan Am flight 103 bombing, and the recent hostage crisis in Lima,
Peru. 

In coordination with NSC, State would lead an interagency FEST to
assist the ambassador--the on-scene coordinator for the U.S. 
government.  The purpose of a FEST is to assist the ambassador and
host government to manage a terrorist incident.  The FEST is advisory
and will not enter the host country unless requested by the
ambassador, with the host country's permission.  The FEST also
provides the ambassador a single point of contact to coordinate all
U.S.  government on-scene support during a terrorist incident. 

Each FEST is tailored to the type of incident, the capabilities of
the host government, and the desires of the host government and the
ambassador.  For example, the FEST can provide (1) guidance on
terrorist policy and incident management; (2) dedicated secure
communications to support the embassy throughout the incident; and
(3) special expertise and equipment not otherwise available,
including a professional hostage negotiations adviser.  The FEST
could include experts on managing specific types of WMD incidents,
such as nuclear, biological, and chemical threats.  Depending on the
situation, the size of a FEST may range from a few individuals to
more than 30 people. 


      OTHER AGENCIES SUPPORT STATE
      DEPARTMENT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.3

In addition to providing advisers on the FEST, several other
agencies, most notably DOD, support the State Department with
operational units.  DOD has forces from all the military services
trained to cope with terrorist incidents.  Command and control
elements for these forces exist and have participated in exercises. 
State and DOD also have memorandums of understanding on the
coordination and implementation of plans for the protection of U.S. 
citizens abroad in emergencies, and on the protection and evacuation
of U.S.  citizens and designated aliens abroad.  A pending or actual
terrorist crisis may require the evacuation of U.S.  government
employees and other Americans from the affected area.  Such
evacuations (known in the military as Noncombatant Evacuation
Operations) might be necessary in the face of continued terrorist
attacks, or in an attack involving WMD.  DOD has considerable assets
with which to respond to all three types of WMD incidents, including
on-call rapid response teams, equipment and vaccines, medical
treatment personnel, and decontamination capabilities. 

In responding to a terrorist incident overseas, other agencies also
support the State Department.  For example, ATF provides immediate
response and support teams related to explosives investigations.  In
WMD incidents, other agencies already discussed under domestic WMD
incidents could also participate in crisis management of an
international WMD incident.  For example, DOE, EPA, and HHS special
teams could provide support in terrorist incidents involving nuclear,
chemical, or biological agents respectively. 


      INTERNATIONAL CRISIS
      MANAGEMENT EXERCISES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.4

In PDD 39, the President directed the heads of several agencies
(including State, DOD, and DOE) to ensure that their organizations'
capabilities to combat terrorism are, among other things, well
exercised.  The State Department coordinates the interagency exercise
program for counterterrorism overseas.  This program is coordinated
with other departments through the Interagency Working Group on
Counterterrorism's Subgroup on Exercises.  The exercise program is
designed to strengthen the U.S.  government's ability to deal with
terrorist attacks.  Four to six full-scale interagency overseas
exercises are conducted annually.  These involve the actual movement
of response teams in a scenario that simulates a realistic overseas
terrorist incident.  In addition, tabletop exercises are held
periodically to practice the coordination and management of a
terrorism crisis without the expense of actually deploying special
teams of people.  The scenarios and agencies differ from exercise to
exercise to develop and improve U.S.  capabilities to deal with a
variety of situations.  Some exercises are conducted in overseas
locations with host government participation. 

DOD runs several interagency field exercises.  The Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff sponsors the Eligible Receiver exercises each
year.  These are no-notice interoperability exercises that involve
not only DOD forces but also representatives from State, Justice,
FBI, CIA and potentially DOE, EPA, and HHS.  These exercises also
require regional commanders in chief to execute their own response
plans and test agency interoperability.  In addition, the regional
commanders in chief conduct the Ellipse exercises, which involve
interagency participation. 

Interagency tabletop exercises are conducted under the Interagency
Terrorism Response Awareness Program.  Some of these senior-level
interagency exercises have been hosted by DOD's Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict.  In
these exercises, officials practice interagency coordination for
terrorist crises and special events, such as terrorists' use of WMD,
or the presidential inaugurations.  These exercises, now in their
seventh iteration, have been conducted for Coordinating Sub-Group
officials at the Assistant Secretary level, and were designed to
exercise policy issues in combating terrorism. 

Individual agencies also have internal terrorism exercises for
international incidents.  For example, some of DOD's Ellipse
exercises are done internally, without major participation by other
agencies.  These exercises require the regional commanders in chief
to exercise all levels of their response capabilities--tabletop
sessions with their staff, response forces, and interagency crisis
management cells and integration with Special Operations Forces.  In
addition, DOD also runs exercises related to evacuations of U.S. 
diplomatic personnel and other Americans.  Some of these may include
some participation by other agencies.  For example, since 1991, the
State Department has participated in the U.S.  Marine Corps' special
operations capable exercise program (i.e., SOCEX) to help train
Marine Expeditionary Units in Noncombatant Evacuation Operations. 

The State Department also runs internal exercises at overseas posts
to test their Emergency Action Committees and Emergency Action Plans,
and to generally prepare them for crisis management.  The Department
conducts exercises designed to expose posts to issues of
decision-making, contingency planning, implementation of plans and
formulation, and interpretation and coordination of policy.  These
exercises may cover a wide range of contingencies related to
terrorism, such as hostage barricades, terrorist threats, and
bombings.  The State Department has been running these at-post
exercises since 1983.  In addition to these Department-led exercises,
the post-level Emergency Action Committee is to prepare, execute, and
evaluate post-level crisis exercises.  These exercises are designed
to test individuals' understanding of their roles under all
foreseeable crises.  They seek to identify gaps or ambiguities in the
plan or in departmental guidance. 


   ARREST AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
   OF TERRORISTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3

U.S.  policy for combating terrorism calls for the investigation of
terrorism-related crimes and the apprehension and prosecution of
terrorists.  Arresting terrorists and bringing them to justice
entails the application of U.S.  criminal statutes and, in some
cases, international treaties or agreements to obtain custody of the
terrorists overseas and deliver them to the United States for
prosecution.  The Department of Justice (and the State Department
involving the extradition or rendition of terrorists overseas) leads
the federal government's efforts to apprehend terrorists for
prosecution. 

As the principal investigative agency of the federal government for
terrorism matters, the FBI is to detect and investigate acts of
terrorism against U.S.  persons and property, both in the United
States and abroad.  The FBI's investigative authority is broad and
its counterterrorism investigations involve a variety of potential
incidents.  Such incidents include domestic terrorism, bombings or
attempted bombings, hostage-taking, homicides or attempted homicides
of U.S.  citizens overseas, sabotage, and extortion by threatening to
use WMD.  Table 3.1 shows that, depending upon the nature of a
terrorist incident, other federal agencies may also participate in or
support terrorism investigations.\11



                               Table 3.1
                
                    Federal Agencies' Involvement in
                  Investigations Related to Terrorism

Federal agency          Involvement
----------------------  ----------------------------------------------
FBI                     Acts as lead federal agency for all domestic
                        and overseas terrorism investigations.

State Department,       Diplomatic lead for overseas terrorism
Bureau of Diplomatic    investigations. Participates in investigations
Security                of terrorist incidents against U.S. diplomatic
                        personnel and other persons under its
                        protection. State also investigates passport
                        and visa fraud.

Bureau of Alcohol,      Investigates terrorist bombings and explosive
Tobacco, and Firearms   blast scenes, both domestic and international.

Secret Service          Investigates terrorist threats against
                        officials under its protective mission,
                        including the President and Vice President,
                        and economic crimes committed by terrorists.

Customs Service         Investigates foreign and domestic cases of
                        terrorists and terrorist materials crossing
                        U.S. borders, violations of economic sanctions
                        and embargoes, and money laundering related to
                        financing designated international terrorist
                        organizations.

Financial Crimes        Supports lead investigative agencies in
Enforcement Network     determining actual or suspected terrorists'
(Treasury)              financial transactions and money laundering.

Immigration and         Investigates cases of terrorists crossing U.S.
Naturalization Service  borders.

Environmental           Supports lead investigative agency in
Protection Agency       terrorist cases involving the actual or
                        potential release of hazardous materials.

Postal Inspection       Investigates terrorist attacks involving U.S.
Service                 Postal Service property or functions.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  Agency documents. 

The FBI is to arrest individuals who commit terrorist acts, and the
Department of Justice is responsible for prosecuting them.  The U.S. 
Attorney's office of the federal district in which a terrorist crime
occurs leads the prosecution for terrorist acts committed within the
United States.  For terrorism-related crimes committed overseas, the
U.S.  Attorney for the District of Columbia, together with the
Department of Justice Criminal Division's Terrorism and Violent Crime
Section, ordinarily prosecutes the offense.  When terrorist suspects
are located overseas, an indictment is usually obtained in a U.S. 
court before their apprehension, if possible. 

Where terrorists operate abroad, the federal government applies
extraterritorial statutes to prosecute them.  PDD 39 states that, if
terrorists are wanted for violation of U.S.  laws and are at large
overseas, their return for prosecution is a matter of the highest
priority and is a central issue in bilateral relations with any
country that harbors or assists terrorists.  The United States has
extradition treaties with a number of countries, and since 1993, it
has obtained two terrorist suspects through extradition.  The State
Department is currently working to renegotiate a number of
extradition treaties to extend their application to terrorist-related
crimes.  In some instances, the United States has obtained custody
over a suspected terrorist by agreement with the asylum nation to
render the individual to the United States for trial without resort
to the formalities of an extradition treaty.  Since 1993, the United
States has obtained custody over six terrorists in this manner. 

Another tool for arresting and prosecuting terrorist suspects is the
State Department's Counterterrorism Rewards Program.  The program
will pay up to $2 million for information that leads to the arrest or
conviction in any country of any individual involved in an act of
international terrorism or information that averts an act of
international terrorism against U.S.  persons or property.  Since
1991, the program has paid over $5 million in more than 20 cases. 


--------------------
\11 For more information on the specific investigative authorities of
different agencies, see Federal Law Enforcement:  Investigative
Authority and Personnel at 13 Agencies (GAO/GGD-96-154, Sept.  30,
1996). 


MANAGING THE CONSEQUENCES OF
TERRORIST INCIDENTS
============================================================ Chapter 4

Consequence management is the preparation for and response to the
consequences of a terrorist incident.  Specific consequence
management activities include measures to alleviate damage, loss of
life, or suffering; protect public health and safety; restore
essential government services; and provide emergency assistance. 
Consequence management can follow crisis management, but these two
activities usually occur simultaneously or overlap, depending on the
nature of the terrorist incident. 

Unlike crisis management, the federal government does not have
primary responsibility for consequence management, but it supports
state and local governments in domestic incidents or host governments
in international incidents.  Federal capabilities that would support
state and local governments in any disaster would be leveraged to
also assist them in terrorist incidents.  FEMA, using the Federal
Response Plan, coordinates all federal efforts to manage consequences
in domestic incidents for which the President has declared, or
expressed an intent to declare, an emergency.  The State Department,
in coordination with the Agency for International Development,
coordinates all federal consequence management efforts overseas. 
Terrorist attacks that successfully employ WMD would be particularly
dangerous and complex, and several federal agencies might provide
highly specialized consequence management capabilities under either
FEMA or State Department leadership.  Federal agencies conduct a
variety of exercises to prepare to manage the consequences of
terrorist incidents.  Because of the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation,
federal agencies, led by FEMA and DOD, have increased their focus on
training local authorities who would first respond to terrorist
incidents. 


   MANAGING THE CONSEQUENCES OF
   DOMESTIC INCIDENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1

State governments have primary responsibility for managing the
consequences of domestic disasters, including major terrorist
incidents.  Through the Stafford Act and PDD 39, the federal
government can support state and local authorities if they lack the
capabilities to respond adequately.  In the transition from crisis
management to consequence management, the lead federal agency shifts
from FBI to FEMA.  FEMA manages the support provided by other federal
agencies and coordination with state and local authorities.  FEMA
coordinates such federal assistance in accordance with an existing
contingency plan.  FEMA, as directed by the President in PDD 39,
evaluated the adequacy of this plan and issued a separate annex on
terrorism. 

At the policy level, the FEMA-led Senior Interagency Coordination
Group on Terrorism serves as the interagency forum for domestic
terrorism-related consequence management issues.  This group,
established in November 1996, meets monthly, or as needed, and
consists of FEMA, DOD, Justice, FBI, DOE, HHS, EPA, Transportation,
Agriculture, the General Services Administration and the National
Communications System.  This group was established by the director of
FEMA and focuses on domestic consequence management only.  It is
separate from the NSC-sponsored Interagency Working Group on
Counterterrorism and its subgroup on consequence management (which
focuses on international consequence management).  The coordination
group sponsors multiagency working groups to address specific issues,
initially focused on training. 


      FEMA COORDINATES FEDERAL
      RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC
      INCIDENTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1.1

The Robert T.  Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
authorizes the President to issue emergency and major disaster
declarations in response to a governor's request.\1 Such a
declaration can be made without a governor's request in rare
emergencies, including some acts of terrorism, for which the federal
government is assigned the exclusive or preeminent responsibility and
authority to respond.\2 The Stafford Act provides FEMA with authority
to assign missions to any federal agency in the event of a disaster
or emergency declared by the President. 

For a terrorist incident, PDD 39 directs FEMA to (1) appoint an
officer to direct the federal consequence management response, (2)
issue and track the status of consequence management actions assigned
to federal agencies, (3) establish the primary federal operations
centers, (4) establish the primary federal centers for information,
(5) designate appropriate liaisons, (6) determine when consequences
are imminent that warrant consultations with the White House and
governor's office, (7) consult with the White House and governor's
office, and (8) coordinate the federal consequence management
response with the lead state and local consequence management
agencies.\3

FEMA coordinates the federal response through a generic disaster
contingency plan known as the Federal Response Plan.  The plan, which
implements the authorities of the Stafford Act, is used to respond to
incidents or situations requiring federal emergency disaster
assistance and to facilitate the delivery of that assistance.  The
plan outlines the planning assumptions, policies, concepts of
operations, organizational structures, and specific assignment of
responsibilities to lead departments and agencies in providing
federal assistance.  The plan categorizes types of federal assistance
into specific emergency support functions (e.g., information and
planning, health and medical services, urban search and rescue). 


--------------------
\1 42 U.S.C.  section 5121 et.  seq. 

\2 As an example of this, the President made such a declaration after
the bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City under subsection
501(b) of the Stafford Act. 

\3 Several other federal agencies, such as EPA and HHS, also have
protocols and experience coordinating with state and local
governments in emergency responses.  For example, EPA, works with
local governments on chemical releases through Local Emergency
Planning Committees. 


      TRANSITION FROM CRISIS
      MANAGEMENT TO CONSEQUENCE
      MANAGEMENT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1.2

The transition from crisis management to consequence management can
occur in a variety of ways.  In general, crisis management and
consequence management activities may occur concurrently.  If
consequences become imminent or actually occur, state and local
authorities would initiate consequence management actions, while FEMA
would monitor the situation in consultation with the President and
the governor.  If state and local capabilities are overwhelmed, the
President could then direct FEMA, with the support of appropriate
federal agencies, to assist the state, in coordination with FBI. 
When the Attorney General, in consultation with the directors of FBI
and FEMA, determines that the FBI no longer needs to function as the
lead agency, the Attorney General may transfer the lead agency role
from FBI to FEMA.  Table 4.1 compares the federal government's
organization for crisis management and consequence management in a
domestic terrorist incident. 



                               Table 4.1
                
                 The Federal Government's Organizations
                 for Crisis Management and Consequence
                   Management of a Domestic Terrorist
                               Incident.

Function or Structure   Crisis Management       Consequence Management
----------------------  ----------------------  ----------------------
Lead agency             FBI                     FEMA

Headquarters            FBI-led Strategic       FEMA-led Catastrophic
coordination group      Information Operations  Disaster Response
                        Center monitors         Group monitors
                        situation               situation

Regional/local          FBI Field Office        FEMA Regional
coordination                                    Operations Center

On-scene coordination   FBI Command Post. If    FEMA-led Disaster
center                  interagency, FBI-led    Field Office
                        Joint Operations
                        Center

On-scene coordinator    FBI Special Agent in    FEMA Federal
                        Charge                  Coordinating Officer

Interagency             FBI-led DEST            FEMA-led Emergency
augmentation team                               Support Team

Policy guidance         PDD 39, domestic        Stafford Act, PDD 39,
                        guidelines              FEMA Federal Response
                                                Plan and Terrorism
                                                Incident Annex

Other relevant          FBI Nuclear Incident    Federal Radiological
guidance                Contingency Plan,       Emergency Response
                        FBI Chemical/           Plan, HHS Health and
                        Biological Incident     Medical Services
                        Contingency Plan        Support Plan, EPA
                                                National Contingency
                                                Plan

Local/site guidance     Site-specific plans     FEMA Regional Office's
                        (e.g., nuclear power    regional response
                        plan site contingency   plans, state or local
                        plan).                  response plans
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  GAO analysis of documents from FBI and FEMA . 

Advance planning or other consequence management activities may occur
during the crisis management phase.  The on-scene Joint Operations
Center, discussed in chapter 3, includes an interagency consequence
management group, led by FEMA, to monitor a crisis and provide advice
and continuity of leadership should consequence management be
necessary.  If an incident occurs without warning and immediately
produces major consequences that appear to be caused by an act of
terrorism, FEMA and the FBI would initiate consequence management and
crisis management concurrently.  In some cases, planning and
preparation for consequence management occurs without any crisis at
all.  For example, at special events within the United States (e.g.,
the Olympics or inauguration), the President may direct federal
agencies to take precautionary actions, due to a general concern or
an actual threat of terrorism. 


      OTHER AGENCIES SUPPORT THE
      FEDERAL RESPONSE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1.3

FEMA's Federal Response Plan outlines the roles of other federal
agencies in consequence management.  The plan covers a wide variety
of contingencies, involving both conventional or WMD terrorist
attacks. 

In WMD terrorist incidents, FEMA would lead consequence management
activities, with support from other federal agencies, to assist
people and to dismantle, transfer, dispose of, and decontaminate
property exposed to WMD material.  FEMA's Terrorism Annex to the
Federal Response Plan deals specifically with WMD terrorist
incidents.  For nuclear incidents, FEMA also coordinates federal
support using the framework defined in the Federal Radiological
Emergency Response Plan.  Together, these plans lay out the support
responsibilities of specific federal agencies. 

Table 4.2 displays the consequence management roles and missions of
different federal agencies to support FEMA in consequence management. 
As shown in this table (and also in app.  III), several federal
agencies have similar capabilities to provide consequence management
in WMD incidents. 



                                    Table 4.2
                     
                         Consequence Management Roles and
                        Missions of Federal Agencies that
                       Support FEMA in a Domestic Terrorist
                                    Incident.

--------------  ----------------------------------------------------------------
HHS             The Office of Emergency Preparedness coordinates HHS efforts to
                provide medical and health care support. For any type of
                incident, HHS can activate Disaster Medical Assistance Teams to
                provide triage and medical care at the incident site. HHS (with
                FEMA, DOD and the Department of Veterans Administration) can
                also activate the National Disaster Medical System to track
                hospital beds for mass casualties. Further, HHS can activate
                Disaster Mortuary Teams to assist localities with the
                identification and processing of deceased victims. For all WMD
                incidents, HHS is developing three National Medical Response
                Teams and regionally located Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams.
                For biological incidents, HHS can help provide agent
                identification through its laboratories at the Centers for
                Disease Control and Prevention, the National Institutes of
                Health, the Agency for Toxic Substance and Disease Registry, and
                the Food and Drug Administration. In addition, the HHS
                counterterrorism plan covers administering appropriate antidotes
                and vaccines and decontaminating victims.

DOD             The Secretary of the Army directs DOD efforts to provide a wide
                range of support services. For biological incidents, response
                teams and laboratories at the U.S. Army Medical Research
                Institute of Infectious Diseases and the U.S. Naval Medical
                Research Institute can help identify biological agents and has
                limited capability to administer appropriate antidotes and
                vaccines. For chemical and biological incidents, the Marine
                Corps Chemical Biological Incident Response Force can provide
                agent identification, triage, decontamination, and medical care
                for victims. For both chemical and nuclear incidents, the
                Defense Special Weapons Agency could project potential plume
                sizes and directions for planning evacuations and other remedial
                activities. For nuclear incidents, the Army's Technical Escort
                Unit could package and transport a nuclear device.

EPA             The Office of the Emergency and Deputy Emergency Coordinator
                coordinates EPA support in chemical and nuclear incidents. For
                chemical incidents, EPA's On-Scene Coordinators, Environmental
                Response Teams, research laboratories, and EPA-led interagency
                National Response Team could identify, contain, clean up, and
                dispose of chemical agents. Five of EPA's research labs have
                mobile units that could analyze chemical and some biological
                agents. For nuclear incidents, in accordance with the Federal
                Radiological Emergency Response Plan, EPA could activate its
                Radiological Emergency Response Teams, Radiation Environmental
                Laboratories, and Environmental Radiation Ambient Monitoring
                System to monitor and assess radiation sources and provide
                protective action guidance.

DOE             The Office of Emergency Response (within the Office of Defense
                Programs) manages DOE support in nuclear incidents. In
                accordance with the Federal Radiological Emergency Response
                Plan, DOE could activate a number of units, such as the Federal
                Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center, Accident Response
                Group, Aerial Measuring System, Radiological Assistance Program,
                Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability, and Radiation Emergency
                Assistance Center and Training Site. These units could provide a
                number of services, to include prediction of the consequences of
                high-explosive nuclear detonations, advice on medical and health
                impacts, monitor radiation, aerial radiological surveys,
                projection of plume sizes and directions, and decontamination.
                DOE could also package and transport a nuclear device.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  GAO analysis of documents from HHS, DOD, EPA, and DOE. 

HHS can provide medical and public health support to local
authorities in any type of terrorist incident.  Through its Office of
Emergency Preparedness, HHS has developed a Strategic National
Counterterrorism Plan, with goals to improve local health and medical
capabilities for a rapid and effective response and to improve the
federal capability to quickly augment the state and local response. 
To implement this plan, the office is developing a concept of
operations plan with individual cities.  In addition, HHS recently
developed a Health and Medical Service Support Plan for the federal
response to acts of chemical and biological terrorism.  HHS may draw
upon a number of resources both inside and outside the Department to
respond to a terrorist incident, as shown above in table 4.2 and
appendix III. 

DOD has considerable assets with which to support consequence
management in any type of terrorist incident.\4 The
Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation requires the Secretary of Defense to
develop and maintain at least one domestic terrorism rapid response
team that can aid federal, state, and local officials to detect,
neutralize, contain, dismantle, and dispose of chemical and
biological weapons.  DOD has designated the Chemical Biological Quick
Response Force to meet this requirement.  This force is not a
specific unit but a number of task-organized units that could
participate under the leadership of the Army's Chemical, Biological,
and Decontamination Command.\5 The role of these units is described
above in table 4.2, and in appendix III. 

EPA has many assets to respond to a terrorist incident involving WMD. 
EPA's Office of the Emergency and Deputy Emergency Coordinator is to
lead EPA's preparedness and response activities to combat terrorism,
and to coordinate EPA's actions.  EPA technicians and supporting
equipment have the capability to identify contaminants, collect and
analyze samples, monitor contaminants, and decontaminate equipment or
sites.  EPA helped plan for a federal consequence management response
to potential terrorist incidents at the 1996 Olympics and deployed
personnel and equipment to Atlanta during the entire event.  Specific
EPA units and their roles are described above in table 4.2, and in
appendix III. 

DOE has several assets that could be used to assist the interagency
effort during the consequence management phase of a nuclear or
radiological terrorist incident.  These programs deal primarily with
radiological containment and mitigation of the effects of radiation,
such as plume and dose projections and aerial radiological survey
results.  Under the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan, DOE
is to coordinate federal radiological monitoring and assessment; act
as a technical liaison to federal, state, and local authorities;
maintain a common set of monitoring data; assisting with technical
and medical advice; assist in decontamination and recovery planning;
and aid in the transition of the incident to EPA management.  As part
of consequence management, DOE also develops and implements methods
to contain high-explosive detonations and predict the consequences of
mitigated and unmitigated high-explosive and nuclear detonations. 
Specific DOE units and their roles are described above in table 4.2,
and in appendix III. 

Other federal agencies could also provide assistance with consequence
management, depending on the circumstances.  For example, if a
chemical incident occurred in a port, the U.S.  Coast Guard has
capabilities to assist with decontamination. 


--------------------
\4 DOD Directive 3025.15 outlines conditions of military support
during both crisis management and consequence management.  The
Secretary of the Army serves as the DOD executive agent for civil
emergencies and is assisted in this role by the Director of Military
Support.  This office reviews requests for civil disaster response
and recommends an appropriate course of action. 

\5 These task-organized units include the U.S Army Technical Escort
Unit, the Marine Corps Chemical Biological Incident Response Force,
the U.S.  Army Medical Command, and the Naval Medical Research
Institute. 


      FEMA ASSESSES FEDERAL,
      STATE, AND LOCAL
      CAPABILITIES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1.4

In PDD 39, the President tasked FEMA to review the adequacy of the
Federal Response Plan to deal with a terrorist incident, including
those involving WMD.  FEMA and other agencies (i.e., DOD, HHS, FBI,
DOE, and EPA) reviewed the Federal Response Plan and, in February
1997, published a supplemental Terrorism Incident Annex to provide
guidance for responding to terrorist incidents within the United
States. 

FEMA, in coordination with other federal departments and agencies,
also assessed the capabilities of federal agencies to provide
consequence management in a WMD incident.  As part of these
assessments, FEMA developed five detailed scenarios, describing
various WMD incidents which were used by federal officials to assess
their current capabilities to meet response requirements.\6 As a
result of the assessment, FEMA and the other agencies identified 12
critical areas that needed to be addressed, including the need for
baseline information on capabilities; combined federal/state/local
planning; and timely federal augmentation of local authorities.\7
Since the assessment, a number of agencies have started initiatives
to improve federal capabilities. 

FEMA also assessed the capabilities of state and local governments to
deal with the immediate effects of a terrorist event, including one
involving WMD.  The President and Congress have tasked FEMA and other
agencies to assess the capabilities of state and local authorities to
respond to terrorist incidents.  For example, PDD 39 tasked FEMA to
ensure that state response plans and capabilities are adequate and
tested.  Consequently, FEMA and other agencies worked with state and
local authorities to assess the needs of local first responders. 
FEMA surveyed state terrorism response capabilities through the
National Governor's Association and held focus group discussions with
emergency first responders from four metropolitan areas on the
capabilities and needs of local governments to respond to terrorist
incidents.  In making these assessments, FEMA again used its five
detailed WMD scenarios for state and local officials to assess their
current capabilities. 


--------------------
\6 These five scenarios were a (1) terrorist exploding a plutonium
device, (2) terrorist exploding a nuclear uranium device, (3)
terrorist using anthrax, (4) terrorist using nonpersistent nerve
agents (Sarin), and (5) terrorist using persistent nerve agents (VX). 

\7 The results of this assessment were documented in the Report to
the President:  An Assessment of Federal Consequence Management
Capabilities for Response to Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical
Terrorism, dated February 1997, and Report to Congress on Response to
Threats of Terrorist Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction, dated
January 31, 1997. 


   MANAGING THE CONSEQUENCES OF
   INTERNATIONAL INCIDENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2

While host governments are to manage the consequences of terrorist
incidents overseas, the United States may provide assistance under
certain circumstances.  When the United States provides consequence
management overseas, the State Department is the lead agency, and the
U.S.  Agency for International Development (USAID) plays a key role
by assessing requirements in a given country.  To date, U.S. 
government contingency plans for overseas consequence management have
focused on WMD incidents, which are those most likely to overwhelm
host government capabilities.  The same federal agencies that have
specialized capabilities to deal with domestic WMD incidents might
also support efforts overseas. 


      STATE DEPARTMENT LEADS
      CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT
      ACTIVITIES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2.1

Unlike domestic incidents, there is no transfer of leadership in
international terrorist incidents--the State Department leads both
crisis management and consequence management.  The U.S.  government
provides consequence management overseas when an ambassador has
determined that the host government is unable to cope with the
problem without outside help, that it wants assistance, and that it
is in U.S.  interests to provide it.  U.S.  government disaster
assistance is designed to complement host country efforts, not to
replace them. 

In addition to its leadership role, the State Department has
operational responsibilities for consequence management.  For
example, State Department consular officers are to assist American
victims with medical care as well as identify the remains, notify the
next of kin, and ship the remains of deceased victims. 


      USAID HAS KEY ROLE IN
      DISASTER RELIEF
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2.2

USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is the lead
agency for coordinating the U.S.  government humanitarian relief and
rehabilitation activities.  OFDA might respond to virtually any
disaster abroad, with emphasis on humanitarian relief in the form of
equipment and funds.  OFDA can provide damage and needs assessment
specialists and a wide variety of disaster management consultants,
should the post require them.  OFDA has four stockpiles of basic
disaster relief items, such as tents, plastic sheeting, and blankets. 
These stockpiles are strategically located around the world and could
be used to provide humanitarian assistance in the wake of a terrorist
incident.  These stockpiles are used frequently, and due to changing
stock levels, OFDA determines how to best support a specific disaster
and when to release stockpile material. 


      STATE DEPARTMENT IS TO PLAN
      RESPONSE TO INCIDENTS
      INVOLVING WMD
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2.3

U.S.  government efforts to provide consequence management overseas
have focused on WMD incidents, which are the most likely to overwhelm
host nation capabilities.  In PDD 39, the President directed the
State Department, in coordination with OFDA and DOD, to develop a
plan to provide assistance to foreign populations that are victims of
terrorist WMD attacks.  The State Department's Bureau of Political
and Military Affairs has written draft guidelines for a consequence
management response to an international WMD incident.  The guidelines
provide instructions, within the framework of counterterrorism policy
documents, to provide U.S.  government assistance.  These guidelines
require that State (along with OFDA, DOD, DOE, and HHS) maintain the
capability to respond rapidly to any incident when approved by the
NSC.  The response would be authorized subject to concurrences of the
ambassador and host government. 

The guidelines identify various response teams and detail their
deployment and employment considerations.  For example, State and
OFDA are to provide a standing Consequence Management Response Team
designed to help manage the consequences of an WMD emergency
overseas.  This team would be tailored to meet the specific emergency
situation or conditions, and would deploy as an integral part of the
NSC-directed FEST.  The team leader would normally be from State's
Bureau of Political Military Affairs and would coordinate consequence
management activities, ensure that the ambassador is kept informed,
and ensure the proper integration of all relief activities.  The team
leader would also serve as primary liaison between the ambassador,
FEST, and team technical experts.  The Consequence Management
Response Team, through its OFDA representative, would coordinate all
U.S.  government consequence management activities with appropriate
authorities of the affected country as well as the international
organizations, private voluntary organizations, and nongovernment
organizations that may be involved in the emergency.  The same
federal agencies that would provide consequence management in a
domestic WMD incident (e.g., HHS, DOD, EPA, and DOE) could also
respond overseas. 


   CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT
   EXERCISES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3

U.S.  government agencies participate in exercises to prepare for
consequence management.  Consequence management exercises are usually
tied into crisis management exercises and often involve federal,
state, and local authorities.  The Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation
has put additional emphasis on and funding for federal efforts to
train local first responders in selected cities to deal with domestic
WMD incidents. 


      INTERAGENCY EXERCISES
      ENHANCE PREPAREDNESS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3.1

In PDD 39, the President directed several agency heads to exercise
their capabilities to combat terrorism.  Several interagency
exercises are dedicated to, or include consequence management in
terrorist incidents.  For domestic incidents, FEMA has developed an
interagency national exercise schedule to document and disseminate
information on planned, unclassified exercises related to WMD
terrorist incidents and involve multiple agencies and/or levels of
government.  Exercises included in the schedule include the FEMA-led
Ill Wind series, which is designed to test coordination at the
federal, state, and local level in response to a terrorist incident
involving biological and chemical weapons.  For fiscal year 1997, the
emphasis of this program was on tabletop exercises in each FEMA
regional office to familiarize regional and state responders with the
new Terrorism Incident Annex to the Federal Response Plan.  For
international incidents, DOD's Eligible Receiver and Ellipse
exercises, discussed in chapter 3, have also included cells that plan
consequence management deployments.\8

DOD officials said that recent and planned Eligible Receiver and
Ellipse exercises have more emphasis on consequence management. 
Agencies participating in these interagency exercises include FEMA,
FBI, State, HHS, DOD, EPA, DOE, USAID, and the Department of
Transportation. 

Agencies have also taken part in consequence management exercises
related to several special events, such as presidential
inaugurations, economic summits, and the Olympic Games.  During the
1996 Atlanta Olympic Games, for example, DOD supported civil agencies
by planning to respond to terrorist attacks involving conventional
high explosives and WMD.  The Director of HHS' Office of Emergency
Preparedness said that these types of events are among the most
valuable exercises.  HHS' participation in exercises related to the
Atlanta Olympics was their agency's first large-scale interagency
exercise, and it helped HHS identify a number of areas that needed
improvement, such as secure communications equipment, the
distribution system for antidotes, and the surveillance system to
associate reported illnesses with a potential chemical or biological
release. 


--------------------
\8 DOD officials told us that while these exercises have consequence
management planning cells, they do not always include the actual
deployment of troops to conduct consequence management activities
(e.g., setting up mess halls, building field hospitals, purifying
water).  They were not concerned about the lack of consequence
management field exercises because they said their units were already
well trained in these activities. 


      INDIVIDUAL AGENCIES CONDUCT
      EXERCISES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3.2

HHS has sponsored exercises with Disaster Medical Assistance Teams
and specialty teams and is working with DOD to identify training
needs for the local Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams.  HHS places
great emphasis on improving the capabilities of local emergency
medical systems, since they will be the first on the scene of a
terrorist incident. 

Much of the State Department's crisis management exercises (discussed
in ch.  3) would be applicable to consequence management as well. 
For example, exercises related to the evacuation of an embassy in the
Emergency Planning Handbook could be directly relevant in the
aftermath of an overseas terrorist WMD incident. 


      FEMA AND DOD HAVE KEY ROLES
      IN TRAINING FIRST RESPONDERS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3.3

Federal training efforts for local first responders for WMD incidents
are being coordinated by the FEMA-led Senior Interagency Coordination
Group on Terrorism.  This Group and its associated Training Task
Group provide policy-level guidance in the development of a
governmentwide terrorism training strategy.  These groups also
develop and oversee the interagency training strategy.\9 The strategy
includes the following elements:  prioritize Nunn-Lugar-Domenici
training, continue to analyze training needs, compile a compendium of
existing training, deliver training in nontraditional ways, develop
training for unmet needs, and work better with states and cities. 

DOD has a major role in training first responders due to the
Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation.  This act directed DOD, in
coordination with FEMA and other agencies, to assist state and local
agencies to train and prepare for the consequences of a terrorist WMD
incident.  In accordance with DOD Directive 3025.15, the Director of
Military Support is the action office for implementing DOD's
Nunn-Lugar-Domenici responsibilities for training. 

Before providing targeted training, FEMA and DOD assessed the general
training needs of local first responders.  FEMA/DOD-led assessments
have found several areas where additional training was needed. 
Specific needs included (1) training for first responders on
incidents in which the WMD agent is unknown, (2) training on how to
use the media, (3) training on planning and managing victim and
family assistance, (4) training on medical triage and
decontamination, and (5) multiagency and multijurisdictional training
and exercises.  Assessments of specific state and local training
needs are ongoing to prepare for initial training. 

DOD, through the Director of Military Support, plans to concentrate
training resources initially on first responders from 27 cities and
metropolitan areas.  The training will be provided by multiagency
teams of experts and generally be provided to local authorities'
training organizations.  The original 27 communities were selected
based on their population, risk, and geographic dispersion.  Federal
training could thereby reach the largest number of people in the
shortest time.  DOD has plans to eventually expand the number of
cities reached to 120.  DOD will "train the trainers" in these local
organizations so that they, in turn, can train others throughout
their communities.  Figure 4.1 shows the initial 27 cities scheduled
to receive Nunn-Lugar-Domenici first responder training. 

   Figure 4.1:  Initial 27 Cities
   Scheduled to Receive
   Nunn-Lugar-Domenici First
   Responder Training.

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

   Source:  DOD, Director of
   Military Support.

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Other agencies are also involved in providing Nunn-Lugar-Domenici or
related training to first responders.  For example, EPA is training
first responders on hazardous material identification and handling. 
DOE is also involved in first responder training through the First
Responder Focus Group sessions sponsored by the Army's Chemical and
Biological Defense Command, and developed first responder training
objectives and curriculum. 


--------------------
\9 An Integrated Approach to Federal Training Regarding Terrorist Use
of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report of the Training Task Group of
the Senior Interagency Coordination Group on Terrorism, December 11,
1996. 


U.S.  POLICY ON COMBATING
TERRORISM
=========================================================== Appendix I

This unclassified abstract of Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD
39) is reproduced verbatim.  The National Security Council (NSC)
reviewed and approved it for distribution to federal, state, and
local emergency response and consequence management personnel. 


------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:0.1

1.  General.  Terrorism is both a threat to our national security as
well as a criminal act.  The Administration has stated that it is the
policy of the United States to use all appropriate means to deter,
defeat and respond to all terrorist attacks on our territory and
resources, both people and facilities, wherever they occur.  In
support of these efforts, the United States will: 

  -- Employ efforts to deter, preempt, apprehend and prosecute
     terrorists. 

  -- Work closely with other governments to carry our
     counterterrorism policy and combat terrorist threats against
     them. 

  -- Identify sponsors of terrorists, isolate them, and ensure they
     pay for their actions. 

  -- Make no concessions to terrorists. 

2.  Measures to Combat Terrorism.  To ensure that the United States
is prepared to combat terrorism in all its forms, a number of
measures have been directed.  These include reducing vulnerabilities
to terrorism, deterring and responding to terrorist acts, and having
capabilities to prevent and manage the consequences of terrorist use
of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, including those
of mass destruction. 

a.  Reduce Vulnerabilities.  In order to reduce our vulnerabilities
to terrorism, both at home and abroad, all department/agency heads
have been directed to ensure that their personnel and facilities are
fully protected against terrorism.  Specific efforts that will be
conducted to ensure our security against terrorist acts include the
following: 

  -- Review the vulnerability of government facilities and critical
     national infrastructure. 

  -- Expand the program of counterterrorism. 

  -- Reduce vulnerabilities affecting civilian personnel/facilities
     abroad and military personnel/facilities. 

  -- Reduce vulnerabilities affecting U.S.  airports,
     aircraft/passengers and shipping, and provide appropriate
     security measures for other modes of transportation. 

  -- Exclude/deport persons who pose a terrorist threat. 

  -- Prevent unlawful traffic in firearms and explosives, and protect
     the President and other officials against terrorist attack. 

  -- Reduce U.S.  vulnerabilities to international terrorism through
     intelligence collection/analysis, counterintelligence, and
     covert action. 

b.  Deter.  To deter terrorism, it is necessary to provide a clear
public position that our policies will not be affected by terrorist
acts and we will vigorously deal with terrorist/sponsors to reduce
terrorist capabilities and support.  In this regard, we must make it
clear that we will not allow terrorism to succeed and that the
pursuit, arrest, and prosecution of terrorists is of the highest
priority.  Our goals include the disruption of terrorist-sponsored
activity including termination of financial support, arrest and
punishment of terrorists as criminals, application of U.S.  laws and
new legislation to prevent terrorist groups from operating in the
United States, and application of extraterritorial statutes to
counter acts of terrorism and apprehend terrorists outside of the
United States.  Return of terrorists overseas, who are wanted for
violation of U.S.  law, is of the highest priority and a central
issue in bilateral relations with any state that harbors or assists
them. 

c.  Respond.  To respond to terrorism, we must have a rapid and
decisive capability to protect Americans, defeat or arrest
terrorists, respond against terrorist sponsors, and provide relief to
the victims of terrorists.  The goal during the immediate response
phase of an incident is to terminate terrorist attacks so that the
terrorists do not accomplish their objectives or maintain their
freedom, while seeking to minimize damage and loss of life and
provide emergency assistance.  After an incident has occurred, a
rapidly deployable interagency Emergency Support Team (EST) will
provide required capabilities on scene:  a Foreign Emergency Support
Team (FEST) for foreign incidents and a Domestic Emergency Support
Team (DEST) for domestic incidents.  DEST membership will be limited
to those agencies required to respond to the specific incident.  Both
teams will include elements for specific types of incidents such as
nuclear, biological or chemical threats. 

The Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), will ensure
that the Federal Response Plan is adequate for consequence management
activities in response to terrorist attacks against large U.S. 
populations, including those where weapons of mass destruction are
involved.  FEMA will also ensure that State response plans and
capabilities are adequate and tested.  FEMA, supported by all Federal
Response Plan signatories, will assume the Lead Agency role for
consequence management in Washington, D.C., and on scene.  If large
scale casualties and infrastructure damage occur, the President may
appoint a Personal Representative for consequence management as the
on scene Federal authority during recovery.  A roster of senior and
former government officials willing to perform these functions will
be created and the rostered individuals will be provided training and
information necessary to allow them to be called upon on short
notice. 

Agencies will bear the costs of their participation in terrorist
incidents and counterterrorist operations, unless otherwise directed. 

d.  NBC Consequence Management.  The development of effective
capabilities for preventing and managing the consequences of
terrorist use of nuclear, biological or chemical (BC) materials or
weapons is of the highest priority.  Terrorist acquisition of weapons
of mass destruction is not acceptable and there is no higher priority
than preventing the acquisition of such materials/weapons or removing
this capability from terrorist groups.  FEMA will review the Federal
Response plan on an urgent basis, in coordination with supporting
agencies, to determine its adequacy in responding to an NBC-related
terrorist incident; identify and remedy any shortfalls in stockpiles,
capabilities or training; and report on the status of these efforts
in 180 days. 


SELECTED LAWS RELATED TO TERRORISM
========================================================== Appendix II


   TRADE AND FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
   LEGISLATION
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1


      FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF
      1961, AS AMENDED
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:1.1

Prohibited the provision of U.  S.  assistance to foreign countries
whose governments support terrorism (22 U.S.C.  2371, as amended). 


      ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT, AS
      AMENDED (FORMERLY THE
      FOREIGN MILITARY SALES ACT
      OF 1968)
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:1.2

Prohibited various transactions with foreign countries that support
acts of terrorism, such as exports of any munition items or the
provision of credits, guarantees, or other financial assistance to
those countries
(22 U.S.C.  2780, as amended). 


      INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
      INSTITUTIONS ACT (1977)
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:1.3

Directed that the U.S.  government, while participating in enumerated
international financial institutions, shall seek to channel
assistance to countries other than those whose governments provide
refuge to individuals that commit acts of international terrorism by
hijacking aircraft (Title VII, P.L.  95-118). 


      1978 AMENDMENTS TO THE
      BRETTON WOODS AGREEMENTS ACT
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:1.4

Required the U.S.  Executive Director to the International Monetary
Fund to oppose the extension of any financial or technical assistance
to any country that supports terrorist activities (P.L.  95-435). 


      EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT OF
      1979
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:1.5

Listed compatibility with U.S.  efforts to counter international
terrorism as a factor in determining whether certain controls should
be imposed for a particular export license on foreign policy grounds
(P.L.  96-72, sec.6). 


      INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND
      DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION ACT
      OF 1985
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:1.6

Authorized the President to ban the import into the United States of
any good or service from any country that supports terrorism or
terrorist organizations (Part A of Title V, P.L.  99-83). 


      IRAQ SANCTIONS ACT OF 1990
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:1.7

Classified Iraq as a terrorism-supporting foreign country and imposed
U.S.  export controls and foreign assistance sanctions (P.L. 
101-513, sec.  586). 


      IRAN-IRAQ ARMS
      NON-PROLIFERATION ACT OF
      1992
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:1.8

Suspended foreign assistance military and dual-use sales to any
foreign country whose government knowingly and materially contributes
to Iran's or Iraq's efforts to acquire advanced conventional weapons
(Title XVI,
P.L.  102-484). 


      1996 AMENDMENT TO
      EXPORT-IMPORT BANK ACT
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:1.9

Restricted the President from granting special debt relief regarding
any Export-Import Bank loan or guarantee to any country whose
government has repeatedly supported acts of international terrorism
(P.L.  103-87,
sec.  570). 


      MIDDLE EAST PEACE
      FACILITATION ACT OF 1994
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1.10

Allowed the President to suspend for 6-month periods, until July
1995, any previously passed restrictions on U.  S.  assistance to the
Palestinian Liberation Organization (Part E of title V, P.L.103-236). 


      SPOILS OF WAR ACT OF 1994
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1.11

Prohibited the transfer of spoils of war in the possession of the
United States to any country that the Secretary of State has
determined to be a nation whose government has repeatedly supported
acts of international terrorism (Part B of title V, P.L.  103-236). 


      FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT
      FINANCING, AND RELATED
      PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS ACT
      FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1.12

Prohibited the direct funding of any assistance or reparations to
certain terrorist countries such as Cuba, Iraq, Libya, Iran (Title V,
P.L.  103-306). 


      1996 AMENDMENTS TO THE
      FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF
      1961 AND THE ARMS EXPORT
      CONTROL ACT
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1.13

Removed certain restrictions on the manner in which antiterrorism
training assistance could be provided (Chapter 3 of title I, P.L. 
104-164). 


      1996 AMENDMENTS TO THE TRADE
      ACT OF 1974
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1.14

Required the President to withhold General System of Preferences
designation as a beneficiary developing country entitled to duty free
treatment, if the country is on the Export Administration Act's
terrorist list, or if the country has assisted any individual or
group that has committed an act of international terrorism (P.L. 
104-295, sec.  35). 


      IRAN AND LIBYA SANCTIONS ACT
      OF 1996
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1.15

Required the President to impose sanctions against companies that
make investments of more than $40 million in developing Iran's or
Libya's oil resources (P.L.  104-172, sec.  5). 


   STATE DEPARTMENT AND RELATED
   FOREIGN RELATIONS LEGISLATION
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2


      ACT FOR THE PROTECTION OF
      FOREIGN OFFICIALS AND
      OFFICIAL GUESTS OF THE
      UNITED STATES (1972)
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:2.1

Established as a federal crime the murder or manslaughter of foreign
officials and official foreign guests (Title I, P.L.  92-539). 


      ACT FOR THE PREVENTION AND
      PUNISHMENT OF CRIMES AGAINST
      INTERNATIONALLY PROTECTED
      PERSONS (1976)
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:2.2

Provided federal jurisdiction over assaults upon, threats against,
murders of, or kidnapping of U.S.  diplomats overseas (P.L.  94-467). 


      ACT FOR THE PREVENTION AND
      PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF
      HOSTAGE-TAKING (1984)
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:2.3

Imposed punishment for taking a hostage, no matter where, if either
the terrorist or the hostage is a U.S.  citizen, or if the purpose is
to influence the U.S.  government (Part A of ch.  XX, P.L.  98-473). 


      1984 ACT TO COMBAT
      INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:2.4

Offered cash awards to anyone who furnishes information leading to
the arrest or conviction of a terrorist in any country, if the
terrorist's target was a U.S.  person or U.S.  property (Title I,
P.L.  98-533). 


      OMNIBUS DIPLOMATIC SECURITY
      AND ANTITERRORISM ACT OF
      1986
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:2.5

Provided extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction for acts of
international terrorism against U.S.  nationals (Title XII, P.L. 
99-399). 


      ANTITERRORISM ACT OF 1987
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:2.6

Prohibited U.S.  citizens from receiving anything of value except
information material from the Palestine Liberation Organization,
which has been identified as a terrorist organization (Title X, P.L. 
100-204). 


      PLO COMMITMENTS COMPLIANCE
      ACT OF 1989
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:2.7

Reaffirmed a U.S.  policy that any dialogue with the Palestinian
Liberation Organization be contingent upon certain commitments,
including the organization's abstention from and renunciation of all
acts of terrorism (Title VIII, P.L.  101-246). 


      IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1990
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:2.8

Required the exclusion or deportation from the U.  S.  any alien who
the U.  S.  government knows or has reason to believe has engaged in
terrorist activities ( P.L.  101-649, sec.  601 and 602). 


      FEDERAL COURTS
      ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 1992
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:2.9

Provided civil remedies for U.  S.  nationals or their survivors for
personal or property injury due to an international terrorism act;
granted U.  S.  district courts jurisdiction to hear cases (Title X,
P.L.  102-572). 


      ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE
      DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2.10

Established procedures for removing alien terrorists from the United
States; prohibited fundraising by terrorists; prohibited financial
transactions with terrorists (Title IV, P.L.104-132). 


   AVIATION SECURITY
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:3


      FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:3.1

Authorized the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Administrator to
prescribe such rules and regulations as necessary to provide
adequately for national security and safety in air transportation;
prohibited the air transportation of explosives and other dangerous
articles in violation of a FAA rule or regulation (P.L.  85-726, sec. 
601 and 902). 


      ANTI-HIJACKING ACT OF 1974
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:3.2

Established a general prohibition against aircraft piracy outside
U.S.  special aircraft jurisdiction; allowed the President to suspend
air transportation between the United States and any foreign state
that supports terrorism (Title I, P.L.  93-366). 


      AIR TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
      ACT OF 1974
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:3.3

Authorized screening of passengers and their baggage for weapons
(Title II, P.L.  93-366). 


      AIRCRAFT SABOTAGE ACT OF
      1984
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:3.4

Prohibited anyone from setting fire to, damaging, or destroying any
U.S.  aircraft (Part B of ch.  XX, P.L.  98-473). 


      FOREIGN AIRPORT SECURITY ACT
      OF 1985
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:3.5

Required FAA to assess foreign airport security procedures and the
security procedures used by foreign air carriers serving the United
States.  (Part B of title V, P.L.  99-83). 


      AVIATION SECURITY
      IMPROVEMENTS ACT OF 1990
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:3.6

Implemented many recommendations of the President's Commission on
Aviation Security and Terrorism to improve aviation security and
consular affairs assistance (Titles I and II of P.L.  101-604). 


      FEDERAL AVIATION
      REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1996
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:3.7

Mandated the performance of an employment investigation, including a
criminal history record check, of airport security personnel (Title
III,
P.L.  104-264). 


   OTHER LEGISLATION
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:4


      INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND
      DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION ACT
      OF 1981
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:4.1

Required the President to submit a report to Congress describing all
legislation and all administrative remedies that can be employed to
prevent the participation of U.S.  citizens in activities supporting
international terrorism (P.L.  97-113, sec.  719). 


      CONVENTION ON THE PHYSICAL
      PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR
      MATERIAL IMPLEMENTATION ACT
      OF 1982
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:4.2

Prohibited a person from engaging in the unauthorized or improper use
of nuclear materials (P.L.  97-351, sec.  2). 


      NATIONAL DEFENSE
      AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL
      YEAR 1987
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:4.3

Required Department of Defense (DOD) officials to ensure that all
credible, time-sensitive intelligence received concerning potential
terrorist threats be promptly reported to DOD headquarters (P.L. 
99-661, sec.  1353). 


      UNDETECTABLE FIREARMS ACT OF
      1988
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:4.4

Prohibited the import, manufacture, sale, and shipment for civilian
use of handguns that are made of largely nonmetallic substances (P.L. 
100-649, sec.  3). 


      BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
      ANTITERRORISM ACT OF 1989
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:4.5

Prohibited a person from knowingly producing or possessing any
biological agent or toxin for use as a weapon or knowingly assisting
a foreign state or organization to do so (P.L.  101-298, sec.  3). 


      NATIONAL DEFENSE
      AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL
      YEAR 1994
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:4.6

Required certain defense contractors to report to DOD each commercial
transaction with a terrorist country; expressed the sense of Congress
that FEMA should strengthen interagency emergency planning for
potential terrorists' use of chemical or biological agents or weapons
(P.L.  103-160, sec.  843 and 1704). 


      VIOLENT CRIME CONTROL AND
      LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1994
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:4.7

Made it a federal crime to intentionally destroy or damage a ship or
its cargo or to perform an act of violence against a person on board
a ship (P.L.  103-322, sec.  60019). 


      ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE
      DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:4.8

Expanded and strengthened criminal prohibitions and penalties
pertaining to terrorism; established restrictions on the transfer and
use of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, as well as plastic
explosives (Titles II, III, V, and VII, P.L.  104-132). 


      NATIONAL DEFENSE
      AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL
      YEAR 1997
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:4.9

Established the Domestic Preparedness Program to strengthen U.S. 
capabilities to prevent and respond to terrorist activities involving
WMD; authorized DOD to take the lead role and provide necessary
training and other assistance to federal, state, and local officials
(Title XIV of P.L.  104-201, commonly known as Nunn-Lugar-Domenici). 


      OMNIBUS CONSOLIDATED
      APPROPRIATIONS ACT (1997)
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:4.10

Provided substantial funding for multiple federal agencies to combat
terrorism, in response to the President's request (see individual
agency appropriations acts within P.L.  104-208). 


      EMERGENCY SUPPLEMENTAL
      APPROPRIATIONS FOR
      ADDITIONAL DISASTER
      ASSISTANCE, FOR
      ANTITERRORISM INITIATIVES,
      FOR ASSISTANCE IN THE
      RECOVERY FROM THE TRAGEDY
      THAT OCCURRED AT OKLAHOMA
      CITY, AND RESCISSIONS ACT
      (1995)
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:4.11

In response to the tragedy of the Oklahoma City federal building
bombing, provided substantial emergency funding for various federal
agencies to combat terrorism (Title III, P.L.  104-19). 


SUPPORT AGENCIES' CAPABILITIES
RELATED TO WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION
========================================================= Appendix III

Capability      DOD             HHS             EPA             DOE
--------------  --------------  --------------  --------------  ----------------
Locate and      Army           No capability   No capability   žJoint Technical
examine         Technical                                       Operations Team
unknown WMD     Escort Unit                                     žNuclear-
device          52nd                                           Radiological
                Explosives                                      Advisory Team
                Ordnance                                        žNuclear
                Disposal Unit                                   Emergency Search
                Other                                          Team
                selected DOD                                    žLincoln Gold
                units                                           Augmentation
                                                                Team

Render safe an  Army           No capability   No capability   žJoint Technical
armed WMD       Technical                                       Operations Team
device          Escort Unit                                     žNuclear-
                52nd                                           Radiological
                Explosives                                      Advisory Team
                Ordnance                                        žNuclear
                Disposal Unit                                   Emergency Search
                Other                                          Team
                selected DOD                                    žLincoln Gold
                units                                           Augmentation
                                                                Team

Identify or     Army           Center for     Radiological   Joint Technical
evaluate WMD    Technical       Disease         Emergency       Operations Team
agents          Escort Unit     Control and     Response Team   Nuclear-
                Marine Corps   Prevention      Environmental  Radiological
                Chemical        National       Response Team   Advisory Team
                Biological      Institutes of   Environmental  Nuclear
                Incident        Health          Radiation       Emergency Search
                Response        Agency for     Ambient         Team
                Force           Toxic           Monitoring      Lincoln Gold
                U.S. Army      Substance       System          Augmentation
                Medical         Registry        National       Team
                Research        Food and Drug  Enforcement
                Institute for   Administration  Investigations
                Infectious                      Center
                Diseases                        EPA research
                U.S. Naval                     laboratories
                Medical                         Contract
                Research                        laboratories
                Institute

Project         Defense        Center for     Radiological   Federal
dispersion of   Special         Disease         Emergency       Radiological
WMD agents      Weapons Agency  Control and     Response Team   Monitoring and
                                Prevention      Environmental  Assessment
                                Agency for     Response Team   Center (before
                                Toxic           Environmental  handoff to EPA)
                                Substance       Radiation       Aerial
                                Registry        Ambient         Measuring
                                                Monitoring      System
                                                System          Atmospheric
                                                                Release Advisory
                                                                Capability

Track           Defense        No capability   Radiological   Federal
dispersion of   Special                         Emergency       Radiological
WMD agents      Weapons Agency                  Response Team   Monitoring and
                                                Environmental  Assessment
                                                Radiation       Center (before
                                                Ambient         handoff to EPA)
                                                Monitoring      Aerial
                                                System          Measuring
                                                Environmental  System
                                                Response Team   Atmospheric
                                                Federal        Release Advisory
                                                Radiological    Capability
                                                Monitoring and
                                                Assessment
                                                Center (after
                                                handoff from
                                                DOE)

Provide         U.S. Army      Center for     Radiological   Federal
medical advice  Medical         Disease         Emergency       Radiological
on health       Research        Control and     Response Team   Monitoring and
impact of WMD   Institute for   Prevention      Environmental  Assessment
                Infectious      National       Radiation       Center (before
                Diseases        Institutes of   Ambient         handoff to EPA)
                Naval Medical  Health          Monitoring      Atmospheric
                Research        Agency for     System          Release Advisory
                Institute       Toxic           Environmental  Capability
                                Substance       Response Team   Radiation
                                Registry        Federal        Emergency
                                Food and Drug  Radiological    Assistance
                                Administration  Monitoring and  Center and
                                                Assessment      Training Site
                                                Center (after
                                                handoff from
                                                DOE)

Provide triage  Marine Corps   National       No capability   Radiation
and medical     Chemical        Medical                         Emergency
treatment       Biological      Response                        Assistance
                Incident        Teams                           Center and
                Response        Disaster                       Training Site
                Force           Medical
                U.S. Army      Assistance
                Medical         Teams
                Research        Metropolitan
                Institute for   Medical Strike
                Infectious      Teams
                Diseases        Experts from
                Naval Medical  Public Health
                Research        Service
                Institute       agencies

Administer      U.S. Army      Variety of     No capability   Radiation
antidotes,      Medical         potential HHS                   Emergency
vaccines, and   Research        units                           Assistance
chelating       Institute for                                   Center and
agents          Infectious                                      Training Site
                Diseases
                Naval Medical
                Research
                Institute

Decontaminate   Marine Corps   Variety of     No capability   No capability
victims         Chemical        potential HHS
                Biological      units
                Incident
                Response Force

Decontaminate   Marine Corps   No capability   Environmental  Radiological
equipment and   Chemical                        Response Team   Assistance
other           Biological                      Emergency      Program
materials       Incident                        Response
                Response Force                  Contract
                                                Services

Package and     Army           No capability   Environmental  Joint Technical
transport WMD   Technical                       Response Team   Operations Team
devices and     Escort Unit                     Emergency
agents          52nd                           Response
                Explosives                      Contract
                Ordnance                        Services
                Disposal Unit
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note:  Includes crisis management and consequence management. 

Source:  Agency capabilities as stated in agency documents and
discussions with agency officials. 




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix IV
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
========================================================= Appendix III




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix V
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE
========================================================= Appendix III



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)


The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Justice's
letter dated July 3, 1997. 


   GAO COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:1

1.  Our report does discuss the dichotomy between international and
domestic terrorism, and the associated roles of NSC.  Although we do
not make this point every time the issue is addressed in our report,
we have added emphasis where we refer to this dichotomy. 

2.  We modified the text to reflect Justice's comment. 




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix VI
COMMENTS FROM THE FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
========================================================= Appendix III



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)


The following are GAO's comments on the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's (FBI) letter dated August 4, 1997. 


   GAO COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:2

1.  We did not include FBI's suggested revisions to figure 1.3
because they exceeded the level of detail we were trying to portray
in a figure providing an overview of the U.S.  government structure
for combating terrorism. 

2.  We did not include FBI's suggested revisions to table 3.1 for a
variety of reasons.  Our report, in table 3.1 and several other
locations, already states that the FBI is the lead agency in
investigating terrorist incidents.  We modified the title of the
table to read investigations "related to terrorism," since it is not
clear that the FBI would be the lead agency in all possible
terrorism-related investigations.  While the documents cited by the
FBI do indicate that FBI is the lead investigative agency in a
general sense, other agencies also have special statutory and
mandated roles, giving them substantial investigative jurisdiction
and authority in particular areas.  It is clear that FBI and the
other law enforcement agencies need to work together in conducting
any terrorism-related investigation. 

3.  We removed all classified material identified by FBI and other
executive agencies to ensure that this report does not compromise
national security information.  Subsequently, NSC conducted a
specific and detailed security review and ruled that the report is
unclassified. 




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix VII
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
THE TREASURY
========================================================= Appendix III



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)


The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Treasury's
letter dated September 9, 1997. 


   GAO COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:3

1.  Based upon this letter, additional technical corrections supplied
by Treasury, and various meetings with Treasury officials, we have
revised the report to reflect the Treasury Department's role in
combating terrorism. 




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix VIII
COMMENTS FROM THE FEDERAL
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
========================================================= Appendix III


The following are GAO's comments on the Federal Emergency Management
Agency's (FEMA) letter dated July 22, 1997. 


   GAO COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:4

1.  Within PDD 39's functional framework of prevention and
deterrence, crisis management and consequence management, we believe
our report makes a clear distinction between domestic and
international terrorist incidents. 

2.  Based upon the written technical corrections supplied by FEMA, we
have revised the report as appropriate. 




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix IX
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERICES
========================================================= Appendix III




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix X
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY
========================================================= Appendix III


The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Energy's (DOE)
letter dated July 2, 1997. 


   GAO COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:5

1.  We modified the text to reflect DOE's comment. 




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix XI
COMMENTS FROM THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
========================================================= Appendix III


The following are GAO's comments on the Central Intelligence Agency's
(CIA) letter dated July 17, 1997. 


   GAO COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:6

1.  We deleted all classified material identified by CIA and other
executive agencies to ensure that this report does not compromise
national security information.  Subsequently, NSC conducted a
specific and detailed security review and ruled that the report is
unclassified. 

2.  Based upon the written technical corrections supplied by CIA, we
revised the report as appropriate. 




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix XII
COMMENTS FROM THE U.S.  AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
========================================================= Appendix III


The following are GAO's comments on the Agency for International
Development's (USAID) letter dated June 26, 1997. 


   GAO COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:7

1.  We modified the text to reflect USAID's comment. 


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
======================================================== Appendix XIII


   NATIONAL SECURITY AND
   INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION,
   WASHINGTON, D.C. 
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix XIII:1

Stephen L.  Caldwell
Davi M.  D'Agostino
Richard A.  McGeary
H.  Lee Purdy
Marc J.  Schwartz
Gary K.  Weeter


   OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL,
   WASHINGTON, D.C. 
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix XIII:2

Raymond J.  Wyrsch





RELATED GAO PRODUCTS
============================================================ Chapter 1

Combating Terrorism:  Status of DOD Efforts to Protect Its Forces
Overseas (GAO/NSIAD-97-207, July 21, 1997). 

Chemical Weapons Stockpile:  Changes Needed in the Management
Structure of Emergency Preparedness Program (GAO/NSIAD-97-91, June
11, 1997). 

State Department:  Efforts to Reduce Visa Fraud (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-167,
May 20, 1997). 

Aviation Security:  FAA's Procurement of Explosives Detection Devices
(GAO/RCED- 97-111R, May 1, 1997). 

Aviation Security:  Commercially Available Advanced Explosives
Detection Devices (GAO/RCED-97-119R, Apr.  24, 1997). 

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking:  Responsibilities for Developing
Explosives and Narcotics Detection Technologies (GAO/NSIAD-97-95,
Apr.  15, 1997). 

Federal Law Enforcement:  Investigative Authority and Personnel at 13
Agencies (GAO/GGD-96-154, Sept.  30, 1996). 

Aviation Security:  Urgent Issues Need to Be Addressed
(GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-151, Sept.  11, 1996). 

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking:  Technologies for Detecting
Explosives and Narcotics (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-252, Sept.  4, 1996). 

Aviation Security:  Immediate Action Needed to Improve Security
(GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-237, Aug.  1, 1996). 

Passports and Visas:  Status of Efforts to Reduce Fraud
(GAO/NSIAD-96-99, May 9, 1996)

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking:  Threats and Roles of Explosives and
Narcotics Detection Technology (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR, Mar.  27,
1996). 

Nuclear Nonproliferation:  Status of U.S.  Efforts to Improve Nuclear
Material Controls in Newly Independent States (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89,
Mar.  8, 1996)

Aviation Security:  Additional Actions Needed to Meet Domestic and
International Challenges (GAO/RCED-94-38, Jan.  27, 1994). 

Nuclear Security:  Improving Correction of Security Deficiencies at
DOE's Weapons Facilities (GAO/RCED-93-10, Nov.  16, 1992). 

Nuclear Security:  Weak Internal Controls Hamper Oversight of DOE's
Security Program (GAO/RCED-92-146, June 29, 1992). 

Electricity Supply:  Efforts Underway to Improve Federal Electrical
Disruption Preparedness (GAO/RCED-92-125, Apr.  20, 1992). 

Economic Sanctions:  Effectiveness as Tools of Foreign Policy
(GAO/NSIAD-92-106, Feb.  19, 1992)

State Department:  Management Weaknesses in the Security Construction
Program (GAO/NSIAD-92-2, Nov.  29, 1991). 

Chemical Weapons:  Physical Security for the U.S.  Chemical Stockpile
(GAO/NSIAD-91-200, May 15, 1991). 

State Department:  Status of the Diplomatic Security Construction
Program (GAO/NSIAD-91-143BR, Feb.  20, 1991). 

International Terrorism:  FBI Investigates Domestic Activities to
Identify Terrorists (GAO/GGD-90-112, Sept.  9, l990). 

International Terrorism:  Status of GAO's Review of the FBI's
International Terrorism Program (GAO/T-GGD-89-31, June 22, 1989). 

Embassy Security:  Background Investigations of Foreign Employees
(GAO/NSIAD-89-76, Jan.  5, 1989). 

Aviation Security:  FAA's Assessments of Foreign Airports
(GAO/RCED-89-45, Dec.7, 1988). 

Domestic Terrorism:  Prevention Efforts in Selected Federal Courts
and Mass Transit Systems (GAO/PEMD-88-22, June 23, 1988). 


*** End of document. ***