This comprehensive treatment of intelligence reform issues
was prepared by former CIA analyst John A. Gentry for submission
to the Congressional intelligence committees and the Aspin
Commission on Intelligence Roles and Missions. Because of its
unusually rich content and provocative insights, The
Project on Intelligence Reform of the the Federation of
American Scientists offers it here for broader public
consideration.
A Framework for Reform of the
U.S. Intelligence Community
by John A. Gentry
6 June 1995
Table of Contents
- Scope of Mission
- Consumers of Intelligence
- Time Horizons
- Performance Criteria
- Organizational Flexibility
- Dysfunctional Intelligence Culture
- CIA's Directorate of Operations
- CIA's Directorate of Science & Technology
- CIA's Directorate of Intelligence
- Magnitude of the Problem
- Other Agencies' Problems
- Outside Pressure Essential
- Strengthen the DCI
- Collection and Analysis: Complements or Adversaries?
- Unite NSA and CIA
- Reform Military Intelligence
- Revamp the National Intelligence Council
- Establish Genuine Intellectual Competition
- State/INR Performs Well
- Reinvigorate Inspectors General
- Revamp Security Procedures
- What Place the Intelligence Budget?
- Exempt Intelligence From Affirmative Action
- Improve Congressional Oversight
- Presidential Leadership Critical
- CIA Must Continue to Exist
- Keep the DO and DI Separate
- No Military Control of Covert Action
- No National Imagery Agency
- No Separate Open-Source Agency
- No Industrial Espionage
- Put Ames in Perspective
- Don't Eliminate CIA's Military Analysis
- No New Intelligence Paradigm
- Beware of the "Wise Men"
- Conduct Real Research
- A Critical Window of Opportunity
As a former employee of the United States Central Intelligence Agency, I
am required by U.S. law to submit papers I write on intelligence
topics to CIA's Publications Review Board. The Board reviews only to
ensure that papers do not contain classified material. CIA has reviewed
this manuscript and has no security objection to its public
dissemination. Such review does not indicate that CIA agrees with its
contents.
John A. Gentry spent 12 years as an analyst in CIA's
Directorate of Intelligence before
resigning in November 1990. He is an economist and at CIA worked mainly on economic
projects, particularly on Eastern Europe and the USSR. He was senior analyst on the staff of the
National Intelligence Officer for Warning in 1987-89. Gentry is a U.S. Army Reserve lieutenant
colonel with service mainly in intelligence and special operations assignments. Gentry is author
of Lost Promise: How CIA Analysis Misserves the Nation (Lanham, MD: University Press of
America, 1993).
The author wishes to acknowledge and to thank Peter Dickson, who provided helpful
comments on a draft of this paper.