070296_cia_72566_72566_01.txt
Subject: CW USE IN IRAN-IRAQ WAR

Not Finally Evaluated Intelligence







TO FACILITATE ELECTRONIC ACCESS, THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN

REFORMATTED TO ELIMINATE INFORMATION THAT DOES NOT PERTAIN

TO GULF WAR ILLNESS ISSUES OR THAT IS CLASSIFIED. A COPY OF

THIS REDACTED DOCUMENT, IN ORIGINAL FORMAT, IS AVAILABLE ON

REQUEST.







DIRECTOR OF

CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE







IMPACT AND IMPLICATIONS OF

CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE IN THE

IRAN-IRAQ WAR







CONTENTS







KEY JUDGMENTS............................................................................



DISCUSSION  ....................................................................................



BATTLEFIELD USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS .......................

IRAQ .....................................................................................................







BATTLEFIELD EFFECTIVENESS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS    .................................

STRATEGIC RESULTS ............................................................................................................



IMPLICATIONS-DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL-OF THE

CHEMICAL WAR .....................................................................................................................



IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES ......................................................................



IMPLICATIONS FOR CHEMICAL WARFARE TREATY NEGOTIATIONS ...................







IRAQ'S CHEMICAL WARFARE CAPABILITY.....................................................................



MEDICAL HANDLING OF CHEMICAL

CASUALTIES  ............................................................................................................................





KEY JUDGMENTS





CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND RIOT CONTROL AGENTS HAVE BEEN PART OF THE

IRAN-IRAQ WAR SINCE THE EARLY 1980s. CHEMICAL WEAPONS HAVE BECOME A

REGULAR AND RECURRING TACTIC IN THE CONFLICT AND ARE LIKELY TO INCREASE.

WE BELIEVE BOTH STATES HAVE ASSESSED THAT SELECTIVE USE OF CHEMICAL

WEAPONS CAN AUGMENT CONVENTIONAL ARSENALS, ATTAIN SHORT-TERM OBJEC-

TIVES, INFLUENCE CERTAIN COMBAT SITUATIONS, AND SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE

ENEMY CASUALTIES.



BAGHDAD          APPARENTLY BELIEVE THAT CHEMICAL WEAPONS

HAVE BEEN TACTICALLY EFFECTIVE OR EVEN DECISIVE IN A LIMITED CONTEXT, BUT

CHEMICAL WARFARE HAS NOT PROVIDED A STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVE OR ADVANTAGE.

AS LONG AS          IRAQ CONTINUE TO EMPLOY CHEMICALS PRIMARILY IN A

DEFENSIVE ROLE,          WILL GAIN A STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE BASED

PURELY ON THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS.



IRAQ HAS EMPLOYED SUCH WEAPONS

SINCE AUGUST 1983, AND          1984 THE NERVE

AGENT TABUN WAS USED FOR THE FIRST TIME EVER ON THE BATTLEFIELD. THE

IRAQIS HAVE ADOPTED A DRY/DUSTY FORM OF MUSTARD THAT AFFECTS PERSONNEL

RAPIDLY







FOREIGN ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN PIVOTAL IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND

EXPANSION OF THE          AND IRAQI CHEMICAL WARFARE PROGRAMS. WHILE

WESTERN EXPORT CONTROLS INITIALLY RAISED THE COST AND SLOWED THE

PROGRAMS SO BECOME ADEPT AT CIRCUMVENT-

ING THESE CONTROL AND ALTERING THE PRODUCTION PROCESSES. THEIR DRIVE FOR

AN INDEPENDENT AND INDIGENOUS CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION CAPABILI-

TY WILL MAKE THEM LESS DEPENDENT ON FOREIGN SUPPORT AND LESS SUSCEPTI-

BLE TO EXTERNAL POLITICAL PRESSURE







DISCUSSION





1.          EXAMINES THE DEGREE TO

WHICH CHEMICAL WARFARE (CW) IN THE IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT

HAS BEEN EFFECTIVE AND DISCUSSES THE FACTORS DRIVING

DECISIONS TO DEVELOP AND USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS. IT

APPEARS THAT CHEMICAL WEAPONS HAVE A ROLE ON THE

MIDDLE EASTERN BATTLEFIELD, AND THE REPORT ADDRESSES

REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS AS WELL AS

POLITICAL AND MILITARY FACTORS THAT COULD AFFECT US

INTERESTS



2. IRAN AND IRAQ HAVE DEVELOPED CHEMICAL WEAPONS

AND HAVE EMPLOYED THEM IN THEIR CONFLICT SINCE THE

EARLY 1980S. IRAQ BEGAN TO DEVELOP ITS CW CAPABILITY 

IN THE EARLY 1970s

WHILE IRAN BEGAN ITS PROGRAM AS A RESPOND TO

IRAQI BATTLEFIELD USE. BAGHDAD USED RIOT CONTROL AGENTS

(RCA)1 IN THE MID-1970s AGAINST DISSIDENT KURDS IN

NORTHERN IRAQ. HOSTILITIES WITH IRAN GAVE ADDITIONAL 

IMPETUS TO THE IRAQI CW PROGRAM IN THE EARLY 1980s, 

AND SINCE 1983, IRAN HAS USED CHEMICAL WEAPONS EVERY

YEAR IN ITS WAR WITH IRAN.



3. OVERALL, WE BELIEVE THE FREQUENCY OF CHEMICAL 

WEAPONS USE, INITIALLY CONSTRAINED BY AVAILABILITY, HAS

INCREASED WHILE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF BAGHDAD'S CW

EMPLOYMENT IN MAJOR BATTLES IS IMPROVING. PRESIDENT 

SADDAM HUSAYN'S INITIAL POLITICAL AND MILITARY DECISION

TO USE CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST IRAN SEEMS TO HAVE

BEEN MADE IN AN EFFORT TO COMPENSATE FOR IRAQ'S 

LIMITED MILITARY MANPOWER POOL. IRAQ WAS ABLE TO USE

CW TO MINIMIZE PERSONNEL AND TERRITORIAL LOSSES BY

STALLING OR PREVENTING IRANIAN HUMAN WAVE ATTACKS AND

BECAUSE IRAN HAD ONLY LIMITED CW PROTECTIVE CAPABILI-

TIES AND COULD NOT RETALIATE IN KIND. ALTHOUGH IRAQ HAS

NOT ACHIEVED ITS STRATEGIC MILITARY AND POLITICAL GOAL OF

ENDING THE WAR, CW HAS BEEN A SIGNIFICANT ELEMENT IN

HELPING IRAQ ACHIEVE ITS TACTICAL BATTLEFIELD OBJECTIVES.

IN OUR JUDGMENT, THE IRAQIS PERCEIVE CHEMICAL WEAP-

ONS TO BE AN EFFECTIVE COMPLEMENT TO THEIR CONVENTION-

AL ARSENAL.







1 THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT RECOGNIZE RIOT CONTROL AGENTS SUCH AS

TEAR GAS, CS, OR CN AS CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS. 







BATTLEFIELD USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS







CW HAS BE-

COME A RECURRING EVENT IN THE WAR.

ALTHOUGH IRAQ DENIES THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS,

AND CONTENDS THAT THE 1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL (OF WHICH

BOTH IRAQ AND IRAN ARE SIGNATORIES) DOES NOT PROHIBIT

CHEMICAL WEAPON USE ON ONE'S OWN TERRITORY, MANY OF

IRAQ'S CHEMICAL ATTACKS HAVE OCCURRED IN IRANIAN TERRI-

TORY. IN THOSE ATTACKS, CHEMICAL WEAPONS HAVE BEEN

USED PRIMARILY IN A DEFENSIVE ROLE 2 IN RESPONSE TO

MAJOR IRANIAN OFFENSIVES AND HAVE INVOLVED A VARIETY

OF DELIVERY MEANS.          REPORTING INDICATES

THAT IRANIAN REAR AREA SUPPORT TROOPS OCCASIONALLY

SUSTAIN LARGE NUMBERS OF CASUALTIES BECAUSE THEY ARE

LESS PREPARED AND EQUIPPED TO COPE WITH CHEMICAL

ATTACKS.          IN THIS REGARD, REAR AREA

CHEMICAL ATTACKS MAY BE A FORCE MULTIPLIER FOR IRAQ.

THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT IRAQI CW ATTACKS MAY BE

EVOLVING TO INCLUDE PREEMPTIVEUSES.3 IF IRAN WERE TO

THREATEN IRAQI PERCEIVED STRATEGIC POSITIONS, WE BELIEVE

THAT IRAQ MIGHT AUTHORIZE MASSIVE CHEMICAL EMPLOY-

MENTS, AS IMPLIED BY IRAQI POLITICIANS







2 IRAQ HAS USED BOTH LETHAL AND NONLETHAL CHEMICAL AGENTS, PRIMAR-

ILY IN DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS AND COUNTERATTACKS. IT PREFERS TO USE THE

RIOT CONTROL AGENT CS WHEN IRAQI TROOPS ARE IN PROXIMITY TO IRANIANS.

THE GOAL OF CS USE BY BAGHDAD IS TO FORCE IRANIAN TROOP TO DON

PROTECTIVE GEAR, THUS HAMPERING OPERATIONS. EVEN IF THIS DOES NOT

HALT AN IRANIAN ADVANCE, IT AT LEAST DISRUPTS THE IRANIAN OFFENSIVE

LONG ENOUGH TO PERMIT IRAQI TROOPS TO PULL BACK-PERMITTING THE USE

OF LETHAL CHEMICAL AGENTS AND CAUSING IRANIAN CASUALTIES.







6. BEGINNING IN 1982 THERE WERE INDICATIONS OF RCA

USE BY IRAQ AGAINST IRANIAN FORCES. SINCE THEN, THE

TYPES AND LETHALITY OF CHEMICALS USED BY IRAQ HAS

INCREASED, FROM RIOT CONTROL AGENT CS TO MUSTARD AGENT

IN 1983 AND TO THE FIRST BATTLEFIELD USE OF A NERVE AGENT 

(TABUN) AGAINST IRANIAN TROOP CONCENTRATIONS

IT APPEARS THAT EARLY

ATTACKS WERE LIMITED TO USING A FEW ARTILLERY SHELLS,

MORTAR ROUNDS, OR AIRCRAFT-DELIVERED MUNITIONS. MANY

TYPES OF CW AGENTS AND RIOT CONTROL AGENTS ARE NOW

BEING USED ON THE BATTLEFIELD







7. IRAQ APPEARS TO HAVE BECOME MORE COMPETENT IN

ITS CAPABILITY TO INTEGRATE CHEMICALS INTO ITS CONVEN-

TIONAL BATTLE STRATEGY.

AS CHEMICAL WEAPONS

HAVE BECOME MORE AVAILABLE AND HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL-

LY EMPLOYED, IRAQI POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERS AP-

PEAR TO HAVE ACCEPTED THEM AS A TACTICALLY USEFUL AND

EFFECTIVE WEAPON. WE BELIEVE THAT CHEMICAL MUNI-

TIONS, IN A FEW CASES, HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANT IN THE

CONTEXT OF SPECIFIC BATTLES. FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE KARBALA

VIII CAMPAIGN OF APRIL 1987 THE USE OF CHEMICAL

WEAPONS, COMBINED WITH CONVENTIONAL ARMS, PROVED

EFFECTIVE.







IRAQI USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST THE KURDS



IRAQI USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS TO SUBDUE THE KURDISH

POPULATION INSIDE IRAQ, ALONG THE TRIBORDER AREA WITH

IRAN AND TURKEY, IS QUALITATIVELY DIFFERENT FROM THE USE

OF CHEMICALS AGAINST ANOTHER COUNTRY. THE IRAQIS HAVE

PRIMARILY USED RIOT CONTROL AGENTS AND POSSIBLY, IN SOME

CASES, CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST THE KURDS TO MINIMIZE

THE DIVERSION OF TROOPS FROM MORE CRITICAL FRONTS AND THE

LOSSES THAT MIGHT OCCUR IN INACCESSIBLE AREAS THAT FAVOR

GUERRILLA FORCES.







THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE KURDS ONCE AGAIN INTENSI-

FIED IN EARLY 1987 AS IRAQ ATTEMPTED TO SECURE THE

NORTHERN BORDER AREAS WITH TURKEY AND IRAN. SINCE

APRIL 1987, A MILITARY CAMPAIGN HAS BEEN WAGED TO

ERADICATE VILLAGE BASES OF SUPPORT FOR KURDISH GUERRILLA

GROUPS. TO MINIMIZE LOSSES OF MEN AND MATERIEL, IRAQI

TROOPS HAVE USED RIOT CONTROL AGENTS AND POSSIBLY CHEMI-

CAL WEAPONS REPEATEDLY WHEN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

HAVE NOT SUFFICED TO SUBDUE VILLAGERS BEFORE RAZING THEIR

DWELLINGS



SADDAM HUSAYN REPORTEDLY GAVE THE DIRECTION OF THIS

CAMPAIGN TO ALI HASSAN AL-MAJID, DIRECTOR OF INTERNAL

SECURITY AND SADDAM'S COUSIN, WHO DEVISED A "SCORCHED

EARTH" POLICY TO ELIMINATE DISSIDENT KURDISH ACTIVITY IN

NORTHERN IRAQ. THE POLICY, CARRIED OUT BETWEEN APRIL

AND JULY 1987, AND APPARENTLY RESUMED IN OCTOBER

1987, HAS SPURRED THE DESERTION OF MANY LOYALIST KURDS

AND PRIVATE CRITICISM FROM SENIOR IRAQI GOVERNMENT AND

MILITARY FIGURES. EVEN THE FIGUREHEAD VICE PRESIDENT OF

IRAQ, A KURD, HAS REFUSED TO SUPPORT THE POLICY-A

DARING DEFIANCE OF SADDAM HUSAYN'S AUTHORITY.







THE TYPES AND LETHALITY OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AVAIL-

ABLE TO BOTH SIDES HAVE INCREASED IN RECENT MONTHS, AND

THE FIGHTING IN NORTHEASTERN IRAQ DEMONSTRATES THAT

NEITHER HAS BACKED OFF FROM EMPLOYING THEM EVEN

AGAINST KURDISH POPULATION CENTERS.







8. UNTIL 1986, RELEASE AUTHORITY FOR CHEMICAL WEAP-

ONS IN IRAQ WAS HELD AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF DECISION-

MAKING, PERHAPS EXCLUSIVELY BY PRESIDENT HUSAYN.

THIS WAS PROBABLY TO ENSURE CONTROL OF A LIMITED

STOCKPILE OF CHEMICAL MUNITIONS AND TO GUARANTEE THAT 

SUFFICIENT SUPPLIES WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO COUNTER LARGE

IRANIAN OFFENSIVES. BAGHDAD MAY ALSO HAVE BELIEVED

THAT TIGHT CONTROL OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS WOULD MAKE IT

EASIER TO DENY THAT IRAQI FORCES HAD EMPLOYED CW. IN

1986, CW RELEASE AUTHORITY WAS DELEGATED TO CORPS- 

LEVE COMMANDERS AS THE RESULT OF IRAQI LOSSES DURING

THE AL FAW AND MEBRAN CAMPAIGNS AND AFTER THE

MILITARY APPARENTLY CONVINCED PRESIDENT HUSAYN TO 

CHANGE RELEASE AUTHORITY FOR CHEMICAL WEAPONS TO

PERMIT BETTER INTEGRATION OF CW INTO BATTLE PLANS.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS NOW APPEAR TO BE AN IMPORTANT

ADJUNCT FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF TACTICAL OBJECTIVES. 







9. IN OUR JUDGMENT, THE IRAQIS PERCEIVE CHEMICAL

WEAPONS TO BE AN EFFECTIVE COMPLEMENT TO THEIR

CONVENTIONAL ARSENAL. OVERALL, WE BELIEVE THE FREQUEN-

CY OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS USE-PROBABLY CONSTRAINED

ONLY BY AVAILABILITY-HAS INCREASED, AND THE EFFECTIVE-

NESS OF BAGHDAD'S CW EMPLOYMENT IN MAJOR BATTLES IS

IMPROVING.



10. CONSTRAINTS ON IRAQI USE. BY DENYING ITS USE OF

CW, IRAQ HAS SHOWN SOME CONCERN FOR INTERNATIONAL

CONSEQUENCES. BAGHDAD'S MAIN CONCERN HAS BEEN THAT

ANY PUBLIC OUTCRY WOULD FURTHER COMPLICATE ITS EFFORTS

TO OBTAIN NECESSARY CONVENTIONAL WAR MATERIELS AS WELL

AS NECESSARY CW MATERIALS. ALTHOUGH LIMITED INTERNA-

TIONAL REACTION HAS THUS FAR NOT DETERRED IRAQ'S CHEMI-

CAL EMPLOYMENT, NO POLITICAL OR RELIGIOUS CONSTRAINTS

SEEM TO BEAR SERIOUSLY ON HUSAYN'S DECISION TO EMPLOY

CW. INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL PRESSURE-UNITED

NATIONS CONDEMNATORY RESOLUTIONS, DEMARCHES, AND

EXPORT CONTROLS-HAVE BEEN INEFFECTIVE IN STOPPING THE

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CW PROGRAM OR CONTINUED BATTLE-

FIELD USE.







BATTLEFIELD EFFECTIVENESS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS



13. FACED WITH SUPERIOR NUMBERS OF IRANIAN SOLDIERS

IN A WAR OF ATTRITION, IRAQ ELECTED IN 1982 TO USE THE

RIOT CONTROL AGENT CS IN CONJUNCTION WITH CONVENTIONAL

WEAPONS, HOPING TO SOLVE ITS MILITARY DILEMMA. IRAQ'S

EARLY USES OF MUSTARD AND TABUN IN 1983 AND 1984







WERE PROBABLY MILITARILY INEFFECTIVE BECAUSE OF POOR

EMPLOYMENT TECHNIQUES AND UNSUITABLE WEATHER CON-

DITIONS. IN SOME CASES, IRAQI PILOTS RELEASED CHEMICAL

MUNITIONS FROM TOO HIGH ATTITUDES AND RARELY DELIVERED

ENOUGH AGENT AT ONE TIME TO BE MILITARILY EFFECTIVE. IN

OTHER CASES, CHEMICAL BOMBS WERE RELEASED TOO LOW FOR

THEIR FUZES TO FUNCTION. IRAN THUS OBTAINED NUMEROUS

IRAQI CHEMICAL WEAPONS INTACT AND SCORED A MAJOR

PROPAGANDA VICTORY BY PUBLICIZING THIS EVIDENCE

ALSO, IRAQ USED CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN DAMP

CONDITONS-PARTICULARLY IN THE SOUTHERN BORDER AREA-

WHEN THE WIND WAS BLOWING TOWARD ITS OWN TROOPS AND

IN DAYLIGHT.







WHENEVER THE IRAQIS USED GOOD DELIVERY TECHNIQUES, WEATHER

CONDITIONS AND TERRAIN WERE FAVORABLE, AND THE IRANI-

ANS WERE NOT ADEQUATELY PREPARED OR TRAINED, THE USE

OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS HAS BEEN EFFECTIVE.







15. AS CURRENTLY EMPLOYED, CHEMICAL WEAPONS WILL

SOMETIMES ALLOW TACTICAL ADVANTAGE, BUT ARE UNLIKELY TO

AFFECT THE WAR STRATEGICALLY. BAGHDAD, THUS FAR, HAS NOT

SHOWN THE INTENTION TO COMMIT THE FULL CW RESOURCES

NECESSARY TO GAIN A TRUE STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE.







AS

LONG AS BOTH IRAN AND IRAQ CONTINUE TO EMPLOY CHEMI-

CALS IN PRIMARILY DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS, NEITHER NATION

WILL GAIN A STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE, BASED PURELY ON THE USE

OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. HOWEVER, A CONCENTRATED USE OF

CHEMICALS BY EITHER SIDE MAY CREATE A TACTICAL ADVAN-

TAGE IN A LOCALIZED SITUATION. WE SHOULD ALSO EXPECT TO

OBSERVE THE INTRODUCTION OF MORE LETHAL AGENTS SUCH AS

VX





IMPLICATIONS-DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL-OF

THE CHEMICAL WAR



16. THE 1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL HAS NOT BEEN AN

EFFECTIVE IMPEDIMENT TO THE SPREAD AND USE OF SUCH

WEAPONS IN THE REGION. WE BELIEVE THE PERCEIVED

SUCCESSES OF SUCH WEAPONS ON THE IRAN-IRAQ BATTLEFIELD,

COUPLED WITH THE LACK OF MEANINGFUL  INTERNATIONAL

SANCTIONS OR CONDEMNATIONS, MAY SUGGEST TO THIRD

WORLD STATES THAT THEY CAN ACQUIRE A CW CAPABILITY AS

A DETERRENT OR A MILITARY FORCE MULTIPLIER. PROLIFERATION

IN THE THIRD WORLD HAS BEEN TIED PRIMARILY TO THE

AVAILABILITY OF TECHNOLOGIES-MOSTLY FROM WESTERN EU-

ROPE. THE HIGH PROFITS FROM THE SALE OF TECHNOLOGY AND

PRECURSOR CHEMICALS, AS WELL AS THE DIFFICULTY OF REGU-

LATING DUAL-USE MATERIEL, HAVE MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO

ACHIEVE THE NECESSARY ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STEPS TO

STOP PROLIFERATION AND WEAPONIZATION. THE INCREASING

NUMBER OF NATIONS THAT POSSESS CHEMICAL CAPABILITIES

SUGGESTS THAT CHEMICAL WEAPONS ARE BEING INTEGRATED

INTO THEIR CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS ARSENALS.







IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES



17. AS MORE NATIONS ACQUIRE A CHEMICAL CAPABILITY,

MILITARY AND PEACEKEEPING FORCES MUST EXPECT THE

THREAT OF EITHER INTENTIONAL OR INADVERTENT EXPOSURE TO

CHEMICAL ATTACK.







THE PROLIFERATION OF CW PROGRAMS INDICATES A

WIDENING THREAT FROM AN INCREASING NUMBER OF CHEMI-

CAL AGENTS. THE UNITED STATES MUST EXPECT TO FACE A

VARIETY OF AGENTS-NOT ONLY THOSE THAT ARE EXPECTED TO

BE USED ON THE NATO BATTLEFIELD, BUT OTHERS SUCH AS

THOSE USED BY          IRAQ4 THE USE OF "STANDARD"

CW AGENTS AND AGENTS IN DIFFERENT FORMS SUCH AS THOSE

THAT HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR HAS

CREATED UNEXPECTED VULNERABILITIES, SUCH AS:



-THE SIMULTANEOUS USE OF SEVERAL AGENTS DURING

ANY ATTACK,          

AND CASUALTY TREATMENT.







4 EXAMPLES OF EXPECTED WARSAW PACT AGENTS ARE GB, GD, HD

VX, AND L; EXAMPLES OF MIDDLE EAST AGENTS ARE GA, HN, CG, AND

CK.







-DECONTAMINATION OF TABUN CAN LEAD TO LIBERATION

OF DANGEROUS CYANIDE COMPOUNDS.







OBSERVATIONS FROM THE CHEMICAL WAR



- CW TACTICAL DELIVERY METHODS HAVE IMPROVED WITH

EXPERIENCE.



- CW HAS BEEN LOCALLY EFFECTIVE IN SOME INSTANCE.

ITS EFFECT HAS BEEN MAXIMIZED WHEN SURPRISE HAS

BEEN ACHIEVED AGAINST UNPREPARED TROOPS.



- CW CAN CONTRIBUTE TO TACTICAL SUCCESSES AS ONE

COMPONENT OF AN INTEGRATED FIREPLAN.



- CW HAS BEEN USED LARGELY IN THE DEFENSE ROLE.



-CW AGENT HAS BEEN USED AS AN AREA DENIAL

WEAPON.



-CW, INEPTLY EMPLOYED, HAS NOT PROVED TO BE A

PANACEA TO MAKE UP FOR OTHER WEAKNESSES. NON-

CHEMICAL TACTICAL WEAKNESS SUCH AS FAILURE TO

MAXIMIZE ADVANTAGES AND INEFFECTIVE EMPLOYMENT

OF TACTICAL AIRPOWER CARRY OVER INTO EMPLOYMENT

OF CW.



-CW EMPLOYMENT SHORTCOMINGS HAVE INCLUDED USE

OF INADEQUATE CONCENTRATIONS IN RELATION TO RE-

QUIRED AREA COVERAGE, ENEMY TROOP NUMBERS,

WEATHER AND TERRAIN, INEFFECTIVE DELIVERY, AND

FAILURE TO INTEGRATE CW PROPERLY WITH THE SCHEME

OF MANEUVER.







ANNEX B



IRAQ'S CHEMICAL WARFARE CAPABILITY







THE DEVELOP-

MENT OF ITS CHEMICAL WEAPONS CAPABILITY BEGAN IN THE

EARLY TO MID-1970s, WELL BEFORE ITS WAR WITH IRAN. IN

THE EARLY TO MID-1970s RIOT CONTROL AGENTS WERE EM-

PLOYED TO SUBDUE DISSIDENT KURDISH ACTIVITY IN NORTH-

ERN IRAQ. THE HOSTILITIES WITH IRAN IN THE EARLY 1980s

GAVE ADDITIONAL IMPETUS TO THE CHEMICAL PROGRAM. THE

INITIAL POLITICAL AND MILITARY DECISION TO EMPLOY CHEMI-

CAL WEAPONS AGAINST IRAN SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN MADE IN

AN EFFORT TO MINIMIZE PERSONNEL (BAGHDAD'S CRITICAL

RESOURCE) AND MATERIAL LOSSES. BAGHDAD APPARENTLY

BELIEVED THAT CHEMICAL WEAPONS, IN COMBINATION WITH

CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, WOULD BE USEFUL IN DEFEATING OR 

STALLING IRANIAN ATTACKS.





PRODUCTION



IRAQ NOW POSSESSES THE LARGEST CHEMICAL WEAPONS 

PRODUCTION CAPABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND HAS THE

CAPACITY TO INCREASE ITS STOCKPILE SIGNIFICANTLY OVER THE

NEXT FEW YEARS. THE PRINCIPAL AGENTS BEING PRODUCED

AT IRAQ'S CW PRODUCTION FACILITY NEAR SAMARRA ARE THE

BLISTER AGENT MUSTARD AND THE NERVE AGENTS TABUN AND 

SARIN. THE RIOT CONTROL AGENT CS IS ALSO PRODUCED THERE.

IN ADDITION, IRAQ APPEARS TO BE PRODUCING AT LEAST SMALL

QUANTITIES OF THE NERVE AGENT VX AND RESEARCHING THE

PRODUCTION OF THE PSYCHOCHEMICAL BZ.







BESIDES ITS PRIMARY CW PRODUCTION FACILITIES NEAR 

SAMARRA' AND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FACILITY AT

SALMAN PAK, THREE PROBABLE NEW CW PRODUCTION

FACILITIES HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED IN THE AL HABBANIYAH

AREA OF IRAQ. BAGHDAD MAY BE TRYING TO ESTABLISH

REDUNDANCY IN ITS SYSTEM, MAKING IT LESS SUSCEPTIBLE TO

PREEMPTIVE STRIKES AGAINST ITS CHEMICAL

INFRASTRUCTURE, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME INCREASING THE

AMOUNT OF AGENT AVAILABLE FOR USE IN THE WAR



BEFORE THE ONSET OF HOSTILITIES WITH IRAN, THE LACK OF

URGENCY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CHEMICAL WEAPONS

PROGRAM ALLOWED IRAQ TIME TO PLACE STUDENTS IN SELECT-

ED SCHOOLS ABROAD, WITH THE GOAL OF DEVELOPING A POOL

OF TECHNICALLY COMPETENT SCIENTISTS. IN 1979, HOWEVER,

IRAQ STILL LACKED INDIGENOUS TECHNICAL EXPERTISE FOR THE

PRODUCTION OF LETHAL CHEMICAL AGENTS. THIS NECESSITATED

BAGHDAD'S RELYING HEAVILY ON FOREIGN COUNTRIES FOR

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, AS WELL AS FOR MATERIALS. AS OF LATE

1987, IRAQ WAS STILL RELYING ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO

BUILD, MAINTAIN, AND SUPPLY MATERIALS FOR ITS FUTURE

AND EXISTING CHEMICAL PRODUCTION FACILITIES. WE ESTI-

MATE THAT ITS TECHNICAL MANPOWER AND ENGINEERING

SHORTFALLS WILL BE OVERCOME WITHIN THE NEXT FOUR TO SIX

YEARS



EMBARGOES ON PRECURSOR CHEMICALS HAVE NOT STOPPED

IRAQ'S PROGRAM-ONLY SLOWED THE PACE OF THE CHEMICAL

WEAPONS PROGRAM. THEY HAVE INCREASED THE COST OF THE

PROGRAM AND INTENSIFIED BAGHDAD'S SEARCH FOR ADDI-

TIONAL PERCURSOR SOURCES, EQUIPMENT, AND TECHNOLOGY,

AS WELL AS STIMULATING IRAQ'S EFFORTS TO INTERNALLY PRO-

DUCE PRECURSOR CHEMICALS. DESPITE NUMEROUS WESTERN

EXPORT CONTROLS, ACCELERATION OF THE IRAQI PROGRAM HAS

BEEN MADE POSSIBLE







THE IRAQI PROGRAM WILL BE SELF-SUPPORTING

VIRTUALLY INDEPENDENT OF FOREIGN EMBARGOES AND OUT-

SIDE INTERVENTION WITHIN THE NEXT FEW YEARS.





WEAPONS DELIVERY



IRAQ HAS DELIVERED ITS CHEMICAL AGENTS IN 250 AND

500-KG BOMBS, AERIAL SPRAY APPARATUS, AND, TO A LESSER

DEGREE, IN 90-MILLIMETER AIR-TO-GROUND ROCKETS.







MEDICAL HANDLING OF CHEMICAL CASUALTIES





CHEMICAL CASUALTIES REQUIRE NOT ONLY TRANSPORTATION

BUT, IN SOME CASES, LABOR-INTENSIVE HOSPITAL CARE.







IN SOME BATTLES THE

CHEMICAL CASUALTIES HAVE BEEN IN THE THOUSANDS, WHICH

HAS OVERWHELMED THE MEDICAL TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM

AND CAUSED SECONDARY CONTAMINATION CASUALTIES AMONG

THE TRANSPORTATION AND MEDICAL STAFFS. IRAQ'S MEDICAL

SUPPORT SYSTEM HAS NOT BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY TESTED.







WE

BELIEVE THAT NEITHER COUNTRY'S MEDICAL LOGISTIC CAPABILI-

TY COULD MANAGE A LARGE NUMBER OF CHEMICAL CASUALTIES

OVER A SUSTAINED PERIOD.



THE MAJORITY OF THE IRANIAN CASUALTIES HAVE BEEN

MAINLY FROM MUSTARD AGENTS IN BOTH LIQUID AND DUSTY

FORMS. THE LATTER TYPE IS FINELY GROUND (0.1 TO 10.0

MICRONS) SILICA IMPREGNATED WITH MUSTARD AGENT. THE

TWO FORMS DIFFER WITH RESPECT TO THE NATURE OF SKIN

INJURY, THE INTENSITY OF LUNG INJURIES, AND THE LATENT

PERIOD WITH THE DUSTY FORM BEING MORE EFFECTIVE. THE

LATENT PERIOD CAN BE MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT BECAUSE IT

AFFECTS THE TIME A SOLDIER CAN CONTINUE TO FIGHT BEFORE

THE EFFECT OF THE AGENT BECOMES DEBILITATING. DUSTY

MUSTARD CAN AFFECT SOLDIERS WITHIN AS FEW AS 15

MINUTES, WHILE THE LIQUID OR VAPOR MUSTARD MAY NOT

HAVE AN EFFECT FOR FOUR TO SIX HOURS.







1.5(C)

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