Subject:  Iraq's Chemical Warfare Capability: Lack of Use

During the War







    The major factors that precluded Iraqi chemical warfare use

were fear of Coalition retaliation and fundamental

miscalculations the Iraqi leadership made regarding how the

Coalition would prosecute the war and how effectively Iraqi

forces could respond.



    DIA has no evidence that chemical weapons were deployed to

the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (KTO). Iraq probably feared

Coalition retaliation and most likely believed that both Israel

and the Coalition would use chemical or nuclear weapons if

provoked by Iraqi chemical attacks. Baghdad probably concluded

that, since these weapons could be delivered anywhere in Iraq,

the consequences of any chemical attack would be too severe to

justify CW use; this may have led to an early decision not to

use chemicals.



    Equally likely, the Iraqis probably believed they would

have days or even weeks to move chemical weapons into the KTO

once the war began. Thus, the Iraqis miscalculated the

Coalition speed of advance; the degree to which their Air

Force, artillery assets, and surface-to-surface missile systems

would be attrited; and the degree to which their resupply

capability would be degraded. The Coalition air campaign

eliminated Iraq's preferred means of chemical delivery (its Air

Force) and made timely ammunition supply impossible. The air

campaign also destroyed all known and suspected CW storage in

Iraq.



    In addition, Coalition bombing heavily damaged Iraq's

command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I)

system. Iraqi commanders could not control their forces, in

part because of an intelligence system failure to evaluate the

developing situation. Allied air superiority established at the

start of the air campaign denied Iraq information on Coalition

force dispositions, making fire planning practically

impossible. The limited information available may have resulted

in a decision not to disperse chemicals within the theater

until the ground battle began and Coalition force dispositions

became better defined.



    Destruction of Iraqi chemical weapon production facilities

quite likely swayed the decision not to use chemicals. Chemical

agents Iraq had produced earlier might have deteriorated in

storage, or Iraq might have miscalculated that its defenses

would allow it time to produce and deploy chemicals later in

the conflict. Loss of its production facilities would have

prevented Iraq from making agents as needed, which was the

practice during the Iran-Iraq war.



    Also likely, Saddam Husayn probably retained personal

control of CW during DESERT STORM to allow more complete

military evaluations. In such a case, the speed of the

Coalition ground offensive together with C3I problems would

have complicated and slowed

     chemical release further.